Re: Reasons and Persons
On Wed, May 31, 2006 at 09:32:29PM -0400, Jesse Mazer wrote: True, but the same is true of gene-space--there are vastly more sequences of A,T,C,G that would fail to produce anything like a viable multicellular organism (or even a viable single-celled organism) than there are sequences that would. But the theory of evolution implies that any two organisms that have ever existed in the history of earth can be connected by a smooth series of small modifications, with each intermediate being a viable life-form. Well gradualists would have it this way. But in reality large changes in genetic code (and correspondng phenotypic changes) do occur. Nevertheless, it does point to limitations in the analogy. Likewise, the space of all coherent novel-length english texts is tiny compared to the space of all novel-length combinations of letters in the Library of Babel, but I think God could probably find a continuous path between any two novels--say, War and Peace and Huck Finn--with each one differing from the last by a one-word substitution, and each one being a coherent novel with no obvious absurdities. The key is that the midpoint wouldn't have to be a weird amalgam of the plots of the two novels, you could go through a long series of distinct plots which are quite different from either of the two endpoints. Hmm - I'm not so sure, but at least this question could probably be resolved mathematically in some sense. Anyone want to give it a go? And the conscious states we know of are not fully contiguous either. What do you mean? The strength of the synaptic connections between different neurons or groups of neurons does change in a fairly continuous way, no? Of course even if we specify all the synaptic connections and strengths, one's conscious state can change in the short term as different neurons become active, but I don't think this is important to Parfit's thought-experiment, you can imagine a gradual change in the strength and arrangement of synapses even while over the short term there may be more variation in mood and thought processes. Jesse The conscious states we know of are all the examples of human beings on this Earth. As we well know, these brains are quite distinct from each other. The debate hinges upon other possible brains configurations that fill the gaps, and whether these could possibly be conscious. -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Re: Reasons and Persons
The importance of gradual change in the spectrum argument, is that since personal identity can be conserved through discontinous changes (the example you cite here), then any gradual change should not alter identity either. The slight flaw in this argument comes again by analogy with the genetic code with gradual change considered equivalent to point mutation. However a single point mutation is sufficient to dramatically alter the phenotype, whereas large changes to the genome can accrue without change to the phenotype at all (the so called neutral mutations). On Thu, Jun 01, 2006 at 02:07:09PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Jesse Mazer writes: The strength of the synaptic connections between different neurons or groups of neurons does change in a fairly continuous way, no? Of course even if we specify all the synaptic connections and strengths, one's conscious state can change in the short term as different neurons become active, but I don't think this is important to Parfit's thought-experiment, you can imagine a gradual change in the strength and arrangement of synapses even while over the short term there may be more variation in mood and thought processes. I don't think anyone has questioned the importance of *gradual* transition from one person to another in Parfit's argument. After all, we have discontinuities in consciousness all the time: when we are asleep, if we perform some action in a drunken stupor and later forget that it ever happened, following a head injury which may result in the excision of entire chunks of our lives from memory. Given this, we can imagine changing from one person to another despite discontinuities. Stathis Papaioannou _ Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today it's FREE! http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/ -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile) Mathematics0425 253119 () UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://parallel.hpc.unsw.edu.au/rks International prefix +612, Interstate prefix 02 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Reasons and Persons
Le 01-juin-06, à 03:58, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : x-tad-biggerI don't see that there have been any scientific developments in the last twenty years which make Parfit's thought experiments more or less plausible. /x-tad-bigger I think so. x-tad-biggerThe only exception I can think of is in his favour: there is speculation that teleportation may indeed be theoretically possible. /x-tad-bigger I think that classical teleportation is theoretically possible almost by definition (assuming comp). I guess you are thinking about quantum teleportation which has indeed be realized on large distance (about 20 up to 40 km, to my knowledge). But this is quite different: in quantum teleportation of a quantum state the original state has to be destroyed, for example. x-tad-biggerIn any case, it is telling that even Parfit's philosophical adversaries do not focus on lack of scientific plausibility as an argument against *philosophical* validity. For the most part, he could have made the same points had he been writing a century ago, drawing on religious mythology rather than science fiction for his thought experiments./x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger /x-tad-bigger x-tad-biggerPerhaps a philosopher on the list could comment?/x-tad-bigger Oops, sorry. But perhaps I am a philosopher too? After all Pythagoras invented the term :) In any case I agree with you. Thought experiment on soul and identity, including what happens in case of duplication appears already implicitly in Plotinus, and explicitly in Augustine. Bruno PS: I will comment some ascension's posts tomorrow (hopefully: if not it will be for Saturday). http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Reasons and Persons
And why do you want to restrict a 'person' to a cut view of its neurons only? Isn't a person (as anything) part of his ambience - in a wider view: of the totality, with interction back and forth with all the changes that go on? Are you really interested only in the dance of those silly neurons? John M - Original Message - From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, May 29, 2000 9:07 PM Subject: Re: Reasons and Persons There must exist a ''high level'' program that specifies a person in terms of qualia. These qualia are ultimately defined by the way neurons are connected, but you could also think of persons in terms of the high-level algorithm, instead of the ''machine language'' level algorithm specified by the neural network. The interpolation between two persons is more easily done in the high level language. Then you do obtain a continuous path from one person to the other. For each intermediary person, you can then try to ''compile'' the program to the corresponding neural network. - Original Message - From: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, May 30, 2006 02:29 AM Subject: Re: Reasons and Persons Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, May 29, 2006 at 07:15:33PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I don't see why you are so sure about the necessity of passing through non-functional brain structures going from you to Napoleon. After all, there is a continuous sequence of intermediates between you and a fertilized ovum, and on the face of it you have much more in common mentally and physically with Napoleon than with a fertilized ovum. However, technical feasibility is not the point. The point is that *if* (let's say magically) your mind were gradually transformed, so that your We need to be a bit more precise than magically. In Parfit's book he talks about swapping out my neurons for the equivalent neurons in Napoleon's brain. Sure this is not exactly technically feasible at present, but for thought experiment purposes it is adequate, and suffices for doing the teleporting experiment. The trouble I have is that Napoleon's brain will be wired completely differently to my own. Substituting enough of his neurons and connections will eventually just disrupt the functioning of my brain. I agree that Parfit's simple method would probably create a nonfunctional state in between, or at least the intermediate phase would involve a sort of split personality disorder with two entirely separate minds coexisting in the same brain, without access to each other's thoughts and feelings. But this is probably not a fatal flaw in whatever larger argument he was making, because you could modify the thought experiment to say something like let's assume that in the phase space of all possibe arrangements of neurons and synapses, there is some continuous path between my brain and Napoleon's brain such that every intermediate state would have a single integrated consciousness. There's no way of knowing whether such a path exists (and of course I don't have a precise definition of 'single integrated consciousness'), but it seems at least somewhat plausible. Jesse -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.8.0/353 - Release Date: 05/31/06 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Reasons and Persons
John, actually I don't want to do that per se. I think that ultimately we live in a universe described by the very complex ''laws of physics'' that describe the qualia we experience. Perhaps it is better to say that we are such complex universes. We are simulated in a universe described by simple laws of physics. Our brains are simulating us. We shouldn't confuse the hardware with the software Saibal Quoting [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]: And why do you want to restrict a 'person' to a cut view of its neurons only? Isn't a person (as anything) part of his ambience - in a wider view: of the totality, with interction back and forth with all the changes that go on? Are you really interested only in the dance of those silly neurons? John M - Original Message - From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, May 29, 2000 9:07 PM Subject: Re: Reasons and Persons There must exist a ''high level'' program that specifies a person in terms of qualia. These qualia are ultimately defined by the way neurons are connected, but you could also think of persons in terms of the high-level algorithm, instead of the ''machine language'' level algorithm specified by the neural network. The interpolation between two persons is more easily done in the high level language. Then you do obtain a continuous path from one person to the other. For each intermediary person, you can then try to ''compile'' the program to the corresponding neural network. - Original Message - From: Jesse Mazer [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, May 30, 2006 02:29 AM Subject: Re: Reasons and Persons Russell Standish wrote: On Mon, May 29, 2006 at 07:15:33PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I don't see why you are so sure about the necessity of passing through non-functional brain structures going from you to Napoleon. After all, there is a continuous sequence of intermediates between you and a fertilized ovum, and on the face of it you have much more in common mentally and physically with Napoleon than with a fertilized ovum. However, technical feasibility is not the point. The point is that *if* (let's say magically) your mind were gradually transformed, so that your We need to be a bit more precise than magically. In Parfit's book he talks about swapping out my neurons for the equivalent neurons in Napoleon's brain. Sure this is not exactly technically feasible at present, but for thought experiment purposes it is adequate, and suffices for doing the teleporting experiment. The trouble I have is that Napoleon's brain will be wired completely differently to my own. Substituting enough of his neurons and connections will eventually just disrupt the functioning of my brain. I agree that Parfit's simple method would probably create a nonfunctional state in between, or at least the intermediate phase would involve a sort of split personality disorder with two entirely separate minds coexisting in the same brain, without access to each other's thoughts and feelings. But this is probably not a fatal flaw in whatever larger argument he was making, because you could modify the thought experiment to say something like let's assume that in the phase space of all possibe arrangements of neurons and synapses, there is some continuous path between my brain and Napoleon's brain such that every intermediate state would have a single integrated consciousness. There's no way of knowing whether such a path exists (and of course I don't have a precise definition of 'single integrated consciousness'), but it seems at least somewhat plausible. Jesse -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.8.0/353 - Release Date: 05/31/06 -- _ Tele2 - The company that brings you small bills! http://www.tele2.nl --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Reasons and Persons
Saibal, your phrase: ...very complex ''laws of physics'' that describe the qualia we experience. .. includes laws: the recurring observational portions in the model observed, (if our view extends, the 'laws' may alter) and a restriction to what we experience. Which is continually expanding as our epistemic enrichment goes on - and/or as we learn to 'think' better. I may compare your position in hard/soft ware dichotomy to my ignorance is computer science what I never learned: I see lights on/off and some hardware when I peek into the box and hear noises, and read what comes on the screen. As an engineer I may guess that the hardware turns and contacts lick off signs, organize them, but from software I have no idea (not compiler, not programs, not how your name comes out of 0,1, but I accept it and manipulate my computer (poor soul!) to DO what I want. This is the level I feel in your (and others) position about our brain (even if it includes the software) simulating us even understand the universe. Starting with that 'nothin' we know and speculating about the rest. The ideas may be recent, but the modus operandi (mental) is ancient. Thanks for the reply John M - Original Message - From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything everything-list@googlegroups.com; John M [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sent: Thursday, June 01, 2006 11:50 AM Subject: Re: Reasons and Persons John, actually I don't want to do that per se. I think that ultimately we live in a universe described by the very complex ''laws of physics'' that describe the qualia we experience. Perhaps it is better to say that we are such complex universes. We are simulated in a universe described by simple laws of physics. Our brains are simulating us. We shouldn't confuse the hardware with the software Saibal Quoting [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED]: And why do you want to restrict a 'person' to a cut view of its neurons only? Isn't a person (as anything) part of his ambience - in a wider view: of the totality, with interction back and forth with all the changes that go on? Are you really interested only in the dance of those silly neurons? John M - Original Message - From: Saibal Mitra [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Monday, May 29, 2000 9:07 PM Subject: Re: Reasons and Persons --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
