Re: A calculus of personal identity
- Original Message - From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Friday, June 30, 2006 09:23 AM Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity Brent Meeker writes: I think it is one of the most profound things about consciousness that observer moments don't *need* anything to connect them other than their content. They are linked like the novels in a series, not like the carriages of a train. It is not necessary that the individual novels be lined up specially on a shelf: as long as they have each been written and exist somewhere in the world, the series exists. But the series exists, as a series, by virtue of the information in them. They are like Barbour's time-capsules; each contains enough references and characters from the others to allow them to be put into order. It's not clear to me what duration obserever moments have - but I don't think they are novel length. I imagine them more like sentences (a complete thought as my English teacher used to say), and sentences *don't* have enough information to allow them to be reconstructed into the novel they came from. A book is the analogy that came to mind, but there is an important difference between this and conscious experience. Books, sentences, words may not need to be physically collected together to make a coherent larger structure, but they do need to be somehow sorted in the mind of an observer; otherwise, we could say that a dictionary contains every book ever written or yet to be written. Moments of consciousness, on the other hand, by their nature contain their own observer. That's why I suggest that OMs are not an adequate ontological basis for a world model. On the other hand, if we include brain processes, or more abstractly, subconscious thoughts, then we would have enough information to string them together. I know some people on this list have attempted world-building with OMs, but my starting point is the less ambitious idea that consciousness can in principle extend across time and space without being specially linked. If a person's stream of consciousness were chopped up into seconds, minutes, days or whatever, using whatever vehicle it takes to run a human mind, and these moments of consciousness randomly dispersed throughout the multiverse, they would all connect up by virtue of their information content. Do you disagree that it would in principle be possible? You can take time evolution as an example. In both classical physics and quantum mechanics, information is preserved. All the information about us was already present in the early universe Saibal --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: A calculus of personal identity
Bruno Marchal writes: Yes,sharingthememoryis*not*thesameashavingtheoriginal experience,butthisappliestorecallingone'sownpastaswell. Areyoureallysure?Whentwopeoplesharememories,theycanonly sharethirdpersoninformation,whichwilltriggertheirrespective unsharablefirstpersonidentities/memories. Whenrecollectingourownmemories,wedorecollect(approximations)of ourunsharablefirstpersonmemories,which*does*,inthepresent, participateintoourpresentfirstpersonidentity.Youmayarguethatrecallingourpastisdifferentbecausewehave justtherightbrainstructure,otherassociatedmemoriesandsoonto putitallincontext,butinprincipleallofthesemightbelacking duetoillnessorthepassageoftime,ormightbeduplicatedina verygoodsimulationmadeforsomeoneelsetoexperience. Yes.NotethatfromafirstpersonmemoryPOV,perfectquasimemories arenotdistinguishablefrom"realmemories"(ifthatmeansanythings: assumingcomp"real"memoriesandartificialquasimemoriesarejust equivalent). Theonlywaytounambiguouslydefineafirstpersonexperienceisto makeitonceonly;perfectrecollectionwouldbeindistinguishable fromtheoriginalexperience,anditwouldbeimpossibleforthe experiencertoeitherknowthathewasrecallingamemoryortoknow howclosetotheoriginaltherecollectionwas. Iagree. Thepostulateofafirstpersonentitypersistingthroughtime violatesthe1stperson/3rdpersondistinction, Iamnotsure,althoughitmakessense,butonlybecauseeventuallyit isthewholeideaofobjectivetimewhichis"illusory".Subjective time,Iwouldsay,cannotbeillusory,norcansubjectivepainbe. sinceitassumesthatI-nowcanhave1stpersonknowledgeof I-yesterdayorI-tomorrow,wheninfactsuchknowledgeisimpossible exceptina3rdpersonway. Idisagree.IdohaveafirstpersonaccountofI-yesterday,andsome firstpersonfeelingsaboutpossiblefirstpersonfeelingsofmyself tomorrow,allofwhicharenondescribableinanythirdpersonway. Againwecouldbeinagreementhere.IfyouwantIhavenodoubtabout my"I-yesterday",evenifIdon'tbelieveatallinsomeabsolutethird persondescribablenotionof"yesterday".ButIdo"feel"I-yesterday: Icannotseparateitfrom"I-now"and"I-tomorrow".Thisiscompletely independentofthefactthatImaywelldieinasecond. My recollection of what I did yesterday is itself a first person experience, whichis not shareable. If I imagine what you did yesterday, that - meaning my imagining - is also a first person experience,also not shareable.Of course, I am more confident that I can "capture" the experience of what I was doing yesterday better than I can "capture" the experience of what you were doing yesterday, but the difference between the two is one of degree, not kind. Whether I think about my own past or about someone else's experiences, I am making an extrapolation: the only thing I can know in a first person way is my own *present* experience. This is also shown by the idea that any person might become any other person by gradual mental change over a sufficiently long period of time, in which case any imagining of someone else's experiences would be a recollection of one's own experiences from the distant past. I can only know about my own past in a3rd person way, albeit in a more intimate 3rd person way than I can know about someone else's experiences. Ibelieveitisthisconfusionwhichleadstotheapparentanomalyof 1stpersonindeterminacyinthefaceof3rdpersondeterminacyin duplicationexperiments. Idon'tseeanyanomaly,tobesure.Onlyweirdness,relativeto probableprejudices.Letusassumeaslittleaspossibleandmakeourtheoriesassimpleas possible.I*have*toacceptthatthereissomethingspecialaboutmy experiencesatthemomentwhichdistinguishthemfromeveryoneelse's experiences:thisisthedifferencebetweenthe1stpersonPOVandthe 3rdpersonPOV. OK,butjustrememberthatintheUDAthoughtexperiment,thefirst personisalmostdefinedbythecontentofapersonaldiary/memory.And whatmakesthoseexperiencespersonalhereisthattheyaredestroyed togetherwiththebodyduringdestructiveteleportationorduplication. Butthememoriesrefers,inthepresent,tosubjective(firstperson) pastandfuture.Wecannothaveillusionsaboutthat,onlyaboutthird personextrapolation*from*that. Yes, but when the subject reads his own diary or examines his own memory of events, that is also third person extrapolation. Do you remember what your third birthday was like? Even if you have some memory of what happened on the day, it is likely that your brain has changed so much in the intervening years that it is actually impossible to come anywhere near capturing what the experience was actually like for the child. Another three year old may actually be able to come closer to the actual experience by imagining what it would have been like than you are able to by recollection. Itistemptingtosaythatmy1stpersonPOVextendsintothefuture andthepastaswell,explainingwhyIthinkofmyselfasaperson persistingthroughtime. Iwouldsayitisinthenatureofthefirstpersontopersistin *subjective*time.Ihavemoreproblemwith(naive?)notionoftimeand space.SoagainIwouldagreeitisan"illusion"that"1-I"persists throughsomenotionof3-timeand3-space,butsomehowthefirstperson
Re: A calculus of personal identity
Le 30-juin-06, à 15:19, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : x-tad-bigger /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger I have the subjective experience of being a person persisting through time because I feel that I know in a 1st person way what I did in the past. If I really did know in a 1st person way what I did in the past I could not possibly doubt it, just as I cannot possibly doubt that I am having my *present* experience. /x-tad-bigger All right. x-tad-biggerHowever, I cannot be sure of my memories of the past just as I cannot be sure about someone else's experiences: I can only have 3rd person knowledge in either case. /x-tad-bigger I would say 3rd belief, reserving knowledge for the first person (may be plural). x-tad-biggerIt could be, for example, that I have been brainwashed and my memories of the past are partly or completely false memories. /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger /x-tad-bigger There is no false 1-memories. Only an association between some 1-memory and some 3-reality can be false. If someone succeeds in implementing correctly (more than just coherently) false beliefs (like I am Napoleon just after Waterloo), then I will believe correctly that I am Napoleon and that I have just lose a battle, almost by definition. I will have to go in an asylum, sure, but my 1-memory of the past is correct given that they have been correctly implemented. x-tad-bigger /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> I agree if you mean by future and past 3-future and 3-past. 1-past /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> and 1-future is not extrapolation thy are feelings continuously lived /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> in a lasting present. I can no more doubt of my feeling of past than I /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> can doubt of a headache (say). Even if time by itself does not exist at /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> all (which is the case with comp). The extrapolation would reside only /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> in some third person projection of that time, space, ... (I think we /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> agree, the problem could just be the term illusion)./x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger I'm not sure if you're saying what I was saying above by distinguishing between 1-future/past and 3-future/past./x-tad-bigger I think so. x-tad-bigger The relationship between different stages in a person's life - how far apart two different experiences can be and still belong to the same person - is complicated and necessarily vague. If we allow that in principle anyone can change into anyone else, how can you pin down this relationship with any rigour? /x-tad-bigger To understand the consequence of UDA, I try to no put more rigor than needed. Eventually those relationship will appear in mathematical form with the lobian interview. Self-reference through diagonalization will do the work, but this is needed to extract physics from numbers, not to understand we have to extract physics from numbers once we assume comp. x-tad-bigger /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger > > such as believing themselves to be moments in the life of a single /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> > individual, having memories or quasi-memories in common, and so on./x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> > If I split into two that presents no problem for the 3rd person POV /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> > (there are two instantiations of Stathis extant where before there was /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> > one) nor for the 1st person POV (each instantiation knows it is /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> > experiencing what it is experiencing as it is experiencing it)./x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> OK./x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> > A problem does arise when I anticipate the split (which one will I /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> > become?) or look back at the split (*I* was the original!); there is /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> > no correct answer in these cases because it is based on 3rd person /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> > extrapolation of the 1st person POV, which in addition to its other /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> > failings assumes only a single entity can be extant at any one time /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> > (only a single 1st person exists by definition, but multiple 3rd /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> > persons can exist at the one time)./x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> This is a little weird. You say there is no correct answer, and then /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> you give the comp-correct answer./x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> The first person is indeed just NOT first person-duplicable (unless /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> some added artificial telepathic trick, but in general I talk only on /x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger> the usual simple teleportation or duplication)./x-tad-bigger x-tad-bigger There is an unambiguous 3rd person descriptive answer, but no such unambiguous 1st person answer. /x-tad-bigger I think there is, once assuming comp.
Re: A calculus of personal identity
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: I think it is one of the most profound things about consciousness that observer moments don't *need* anything to connect them other than their content. They are linked like the novels in a series, not like the carriages of a train. It is not necessary that the individual novels be lined up specially on a shelf: as long as they have each been written and exist somewhere in the world, the series exists. But the series exists, as a series, by virtue of the information in them. They are like Barbour's time-capsules; each contains enough references and characters from the others to allow them to be put into order. It's not clear to me what duration obserever moments have - but I don't think they are novel length. I imagine them more like sentences (a complete thought as my English teacher used to say), and sentences *don't* have enough information to allow them to be reconstructed into the novel they came from. A book is the analogy that came to mind, but there is an important difference between this and conscious experience. Books, sentences, words may not need to be physically collected together to make a coherent larger structure, but they do need to be somehow sorted in the mind of an observer; otherwise, we could say that a dictionary contains every book ever written or yet to be written. Moments of consciousness, on the other hand, by their nature contain their own observer. Even if they are not self-conscious? If they are not reflective, as most aren't, then what is it about the observer that makes it *the same observer*? You seem to be postulating a mystic dualism in which otherwise disjoint moments of consciousness are joined by having the same observer...in the Cartesian theater? That's why I suggest that OMs are not an adequate ontological basis for a world model. On the other hand, if we include brain processes, or more abstractly, subconscious thoughts, then we would have enough information to string them together. I know some people on this list have attempted world-building with OMs, but my starting point is the less ambitious idea that consciousness can in principle extend across time and space without being specially linked. I'm not sure how to take that - a poetic metaphor? Time and space are our inventions: part of our model of the world. In that model If a person's stream of consciousness were chopped up into seconds, minutes, days or whatever, using whatever vehicle it takes to run a human mind, and these moments of consciousness randomly dispersed throughout the multiverse, they would all connect up by virtue of their information content. Do you disagree that it would in principle be possible? Yes, I disagree. At the level of minutes it would probably work; at the level of seconds, I'm doubtful; at the level of milliseconds, I don't believe it. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: A calculus of personal identity
Saibal Mitra wrote: - Original Message - From: Stathis Papaioannou [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Friday, June 30, 2006 09:23 AM Subject: Re: A calculus of personal identity Brent Meeker writes: I think it is one of the most profound things about consciousness that observer moments don't *need* anything to connect them other than their content. They are linked like the novels in a series, not like the carriages of a train. It is not necessary that the individual novels be lined up specially on a shelf: as long as they have each been written and exist somewhere in the world, the series exists. But the series exists, as a series, by virtue of the information in them. They are like Barbour's time-capsules; each contains enough references and characters from the others to allow them to be put into order. It's not clear to me what duration obserever moments have - but I don't think they are novel length. I imagine them more like sentences (a complete thought as my English teacher used to say), and sentences *don't* have enough information to allow them to be reconstructed into the novel they came from. A book is the analogy that came to mind, but there is an important difference between this and conscious experience. Books, sentences, words may not need to be physically collected together to make a coherent larger structure, but they do need to be somehow sorted in the mind of an observer; otherwise, we could say that a dictionary contains every book ever written or yet to be written. Moments of consciousness, on the other hand, by their nature contain their own observer. That's why I suggest that OMs are not an adequate ontological basis for a world model. On the other hand, if we include brain processes, or more abstractly, subconscious thoughts, then we would have enough information to string them together. I know some people on this list have attempted world-building with OMs, but my starting point is the less ambitious idea that consciousness can in principle extend across time and space without being specially linked. If a person's stream of consciousness were chopped up into seconds, minutes, days or whatever, using whatever vehicle it takes to run a human mind, and these moments of consciousness randomly dispersed throughout the multiverse, they would all connect up by virtue of their information content. Do you disagree that it would in principle be possible? You can take time evolution as an example. In both classical physics and quantum mechanics, information is preserved. All the information about us was already present in the early universe That is not a consensus theory. The Copenhagen and other intepretations in which the wave-function collapses provide for growing information. Even many of those who assume a strictly unitary evolution, suppose that the net information is zero or very small: the information we see is cancelled by negative information embodied in correlations with particles that inflation has pushed beyond our horizon. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: A calculus of personal identity
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Bruno Marchal writes: ... This is not to say that my mind can or should overcome [Lee Corbin disagrees on the should] the deeply ingrained belief or illusion that I am a unique, one-track individual living my life from start to finish, Here you really talk about the third person extrapolation, so I agree with you. But the first person is not deceive by its feeling of living uniquely in time and space. It could be dangerous to say so, because it leads to (materialism) eliminativism which eventually conclude that the whole first person thing is an illusion. This leads to a deeply wrong sense of human-irresponsibility. Well, it is a negation of the first person. I can be sure it is wrong, as I bet you can too. I would say that the 1st person experience is *not* an illusion in any sense of the word. It is the very opposite, in a way: the most real thing, which cannot be doubted. But extrapolating to other people or other selves in the past, future, coming out of the teleporter or whatever, that is another matter. I agree. Other people are part of the model of the world we form. And in the same way the existence of myself, as a durable entity, is also a part of that model. Brent Meeker The person I was when I was 3 years old is dead. He died because too much new information was added to his brain. -- Saibal Mitra --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: A calculus of personal identity
--- Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: (unless the final remark with Saibal/s signature underneath comes from him): ... Stathis wrote: ... I would say that the 1st person experience is *not* an illusion in any sense of the word. It is the very opposite, in a way: the most real thing, which cannot be doubted... * I agree. Other people are part of the model of the world we form. And in the same way the existence of myself, as a durable entity, is also a part of that model. Brent Meeker * Does this agreed double(?) statement not rub too close on solipsism? Then again: The person I was when I was 3 years old is dead. He died because too much new information was added to his brain. -- Saibal Mitra * An interesting observation from Saibal that increasing the info-input to one's brain kills person(ality?). I would not say dead, rather 'changed' as into some different one. (It is a gradual change, death is being thought of as something more abrupt and comprehensive.) In spite of that, knowing that when as a 5-yo I had different person-ality and ideas, brainfunction and emotions, I still feel NOW identity with THAT PERSON. The best John M --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: A calculus of personal identity
John M wrote: --- Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: (unless the final remark with Saibal/s signature underneath comes from him): ... Stathis wrote: ... I would say that the 1st person experience is *not* an illusion in any sense of the word. It is the very opposite, in a way: the most real thing, which cannot be doubted... * I agree. Other people are part of the model of the world we form. And in the same way the existence of myself, as a durable entity, is also a part of that model. Brent Meeker * Does this agreed double(?) statement not rub too close on solipsism? Not if you accept that *all* our ideas of reality are models. The fact that they work well and are coherent makes me believe they are models of an external reality - not a personal illusion - but I can still doubt that they *are reality* itself. In other words I take them to be like scientific theories: provisionally accepted, but subject to refutation. Then again: The person I was when I was 3 years old is dead. He died because too much new information was added to his brain. -- Saibal Mitra * An interesting observation from Saibal that increasing the info-input to one's brain kills person(ality?). I would not say dead, rather 'changed' as into some different one. (It is a gradual change, death is being thought of as something more abrupt and comprehensive.) In spite of that, knowing that when as a 5-yo I had different person-ality and ideas, brainfunction and emotions, I still feel NOW identity with THAT PERSON. I have memories from when I was 5yrs old, but the source of identity I feel in those memories arises only from the fact that I remember a personal viewpoint in spactime and I remember emotions. Those are the same aspects of memories of last week that make them coherent with my model of myself as a being who persists over time. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: A calculus of personal identity
Hi John, Le Vendredi 30 Juin 2006 21:06, John M a écrit : An interesting observation from Saibal that increasing the info-input to one's brain kills person(ality?). I would not say dead, rather 'changed' as into some different one. (It is a gradual change, death is being thought of as something more abrupt and comprehensive.) For me death means to never be conscious again... never. That's why death is meaningless in a 1st person point of view, because it is impossible by definition to feel being dead, because if you could feel being dead, it means you're not (dead), if you were by definition you couldn't feel/experience it. So the you at 3 years old could not be dead, because you remember being it (in your bones). That's why I think speaking of 1st person experience/identity as being illusionary is a bad step for explaining 1st person experience, which is the only thing we ever experience, the only real thing we can be sure of. In spite of that, knowing that when as a 5-yo I had different person-ality and ideas, brainfunction and emotions, I still feel NOW identity with THAT PERSON. I totally agree with this. And I think speaking (bis repetita) of 1st person experience/continuous identity through time as being an illusion can not explain the feeling of being a self every day till ... ? ;) The best John M Regards, Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
