Re: Can we ever know truth?
Colin Hales wrote: Colin Hales wrote: In brain material and brain material alone you get anomaly: things are NOT what they seem. 'Seem' is a construct of qualia. In a science of qualia, what are they 'seeming' to be? Not qualia. That is circular. Parsimony demands we assume 'something' and then investigate it. Having done that we need to hold that very same 'something' responsible for all the other 'seeming' delivered by qualia. Seeming sounds great until you try and conduct a scientific study of the 'seeming' system. Colin Hales I don't understand that? Qualia = directly perceived seemings. I don't know what you mean by a science of qualia - why we would need one? You think we don't need a science of qualia? No, I said I didn't understand what you meant - and now I don't think you do either. You have apparently come to the recent realization that science just creates models and you never know whether they are really real (and most likely they aren't) but for some reason you have seized upon qualia as being the big problem. You don't know whether electrons or tables or the Sun is really real either. If science explains qualia - and I think it will - the explanation will be in terms of a model in which this or that variable produces this or that qualia - like 700nm photons hitting your retina causes red qualia. I understand now that's not what you want. So maybe you could give an example of what a theory in the science of qualia might be like. It's the single biggest problem there is: we don't have one! Science cannot make any justified, authoritative prediction as to the phenomenal life of a rock, a computer, the internet or the plumbing in Beijing or, especially, a scientist. That's because you don't want to use an opertional definition of phenomenal life and science can't work on just words defined in terms of other words. Take a look at Science magazine's July 2005 issue where 125 questions were posed that face scientific inquiry over the next quarter century. The top two questions: 1. What is the universe made of? Stuff that kicks back when you kick it. 2. What is the biological basis of consciousness? Brains. Q2 = what is the physics of qualia?, is delivered by the answer to Q1, in the behaviour of whatever the universe is made of, of which brain material is constructed. This is one question, not 2. 'Seeming' = is a) directly the experiences bestowed upon us by qualia and b) inductions(models) we make from the behaviour of the appearances thus provided. The latter assembled as empirical laws or just 'intuited' from qualia... does not matter. Result is the samewhich is great...works fineuntil you turn the qualia (the evidence making system) on itself in a scientific study of the evidence making system (qualia) to try and get a science of qualia. Then the system breaks down: you can't see it. All you see is the brain delivering it to a 3rd person. This is the anomaly. I don't see it as an anomaly. It's no different than the rest of science -and the rest of common sense. This means that we have literal screaming proof that the universe is not made of 'seemings'. Nobody (except some mystics and idealists) every said it was. It's made of a separate 'something' Or a lot of separate somethings - like strings or particles or fields. and we have license to scientifically consider potential 'somethings' and any underlying fundamentals that may apply to the generation of qualia. I think that's whay neurobiologists do. It doesn't make any existing law of science invalid. It just means we haven't got the complete picture (set of laws) yet. Here's another way to see it: Every scientific question ever posed about any 'thing' X has two questions to ask, not one. These are: Q1. What is X?A1. That which behaves Xly Q2. What is it like to be X? A2. It is like Xness The physical sciences have neglected the second question for every scientific exploration done to date. What is it like to be X?, as a piece of anomalous data is _only_ visible when X = the brain, where we even have a special word for the answer to Q2 Xness = the mind. This has been culturally neglected in relation to all other X, such as X = 'an atom' and X = 'a coffee cup'. It may not be 'like anything' to be these things. That is not the point. The point is we can make no scientific assertion about it ..yet. What's the operational definition of being like something? We get a definite answer to Q2 only in brain material. This, I hold, is the route to answering it for everything else. Like what is it like to be a cold rock cf a hot rock? And so on... You many hold it, but why should anyone else? == Here's yet another version of the anomaly: To illustrate the absurdity of the position
Re: Can we ever know truth?
According to Stathis Papaioannou: Given that even in case (c) doctors were completely wrong, the way we test new treatments now is more stringent. However, evidence is still evidence, including evidence of past failures from medical history, which must be included in any risk/benefit analysis. You can criticise someone for making a decision without fair consideration of all the evidence, but you can't criticise him if he does. Actually we can and often do. The question is one of insight into one's own ignorance. Suppose a child is run over by a car which is driven at high speed through a residential neighborhood. The question of the driver's guilt isn't determined by his knowledge or ignorance that the child was about to run into the street, but by his lack of insight and prudent adaptation to his own ignorance of same. In this case prudent adaptation = driving at a safe speed. Medicine is not like astronomy. Given the self-healing properties of adaptive systems, doing nothing is often the best course of action. The precautionary principle applies. The human mind, especially, is capable of healing itself (i.e. finding a new stable equilibrium) in most circumstances without the aid or hinderance of drugs or lobotomies or electroshock or drilling holes in the skull to release demons. Of course it often takes time and a change of environment, but what's the alternative? To chemically or physically intervene in a self-organizing neural system is like trying to program a computer with a soldering iron, based on the observation that computer programs run on electricity. Ignorance is unavoidable. The question is whether one adapts to one's own ignorance so as to do no harm. Rich --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Can we ever know truth?
According to Rich Winkel: Medicine is not like astronomy. In that ignorance can be toxic. Rich --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dual-Aspect Science
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
LZ:
Colin Hales wrote:
The underlying structure unifies the whole
system. Of course you'll get some impact via the causality of the
structurevia the deep structure right down into the very fabric of
space.
In a very real way the existence of 'mysterious observer dependence' is
actually proof that the hierarchically organised S(.) structure idea
must be
somewhere near the answer.
Not really. You can have a two-way causal interdependene between two
systems without them both having th esame structure.
I think you are assuming a separateness of structure that does not exist.
It obviously does exist , up to a point. I am separate form this
keyboard.
(and let's not confuse separateness and difference...)
There is one and one only structure.
If you want ot look at it that way. But it is no
undifferentiated within itself.
We are all part of it. There is no
concept of 'separate' to be had.
yes there is: spatial separation.
Absolutely everything is included in the
structure. No exceptions. Space, atoms, scientists, qualia. All
interactions at all 'scales' (scale itself) are all interactions between
different parts of the one structure. To interact at all is to interact
with another part of the structure.
another in what sense ? You just said there is *no* concept
of separation.
The idea of there being anything else
('not' the structure) is meaningless. If there is any 'thing' in the
structure then the balance of the structure expressed a perfect un-thing.
There is nothing else. That is the coincept I am exploring.
None of that has anything to do with your claim that there is
a single *type* of structure, and that everything is composed of
recursive combinations of its instances.
It may be the case that everything is ultimately part of one strucutre,
but
that does not imply that everything within the Great Strucutre is
self-similar.
Note that we don't actually have to know what S(.) is to make a whole pile
of observations of properties of organisations of it that apply regardless
of the particular S(.). It may be we never actually get to sort out the
specifics of S(.)! (I have an idea, but it doesn't matter from the
point
of
view of understanding qualia as another property of the structure like
atoms).
In Bruno's terms the structure of S(.) is what he calls 'objective
reality'.
I would say that in science the first person view has primacy.
Epistemic or Ontic ?
These are just words invented by members of the structure.
So is structure.
That wasn't a problem before, why should it be now.
But I'll try.
The structure delivers qualia in the first person. Those qualia are quite
valid 'things' (virtual matter)..organisation/behaviour of structure.
Qualia are not ust organisation and behaviour, or there
would be no hard problem.
Their presentation bestows intrinsic knowledge as a measurement to the
embedded structure member called the scientist. This is knowledge as
intrinsic intentionality.
Are yu saying that qualia are marked by intentionality ?
That would be novel.
,, qualia are intrinsic, consciously accessible, NON-INTENTIONAL
features of sense-data and other non-physical phenomenal objects that
are responsible for their phenomenal character.
S.E.P, my emphasis.
Within the experiences is regularity which can
then be characterised as knowledge attributed to some identified behaviour
in the structure. This attribution is only an attribution as to behaviour
of the structure, not the structure. These attributions can be used by a
another scientist in their 'first person' world.
I still think strcuture is an unhappy term for soemthign which
cannot be reduced to abstract relations and behaviour.
All of this is derived from a first person presentation of a measurement.
Ergo science is entirely first operson based.
The fact that science happens to be performed by persons
doesn't make it irreducibly first-personal. That would
depend on whether persons can remove themselves from
scientific descriptions. As it happens they can. That
is still true with much-misunderstood issue of
quantum observer involvement, since
that is really apparatus-involvement. No observer
ever influenced an experiment without changing the settings of some
apparatus.
Epistemic and Ontic
characters are smatter throughout this description. I could label them all
but you already know and the process adds nothing to the message or to
sorting out how it all works.
I'd say that
we formulate abstractions that correlate with agreed appearances within
the
first person view. However, the correspo0ndence between the underlying
structure and the formulate abstractions is only that - a correlation.
Our
models are not the structure.
*Could* they be the structure ? if it necessarily
the case that the structure cannot be modelled, then
it is perhaps no strcuture at all.
Which is the simpler and more
Re: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le 15-août-06, à 20:52, complexitystudies a écrit : The deductions made via UDA are impressing, but I would like to seriously question the Platonic Assumptions underlying all this reasoning. No problem. I see you assume a physical universe. I don't. We have just different theories. Note that if you understand the whole UDA, you should realize that the price of assuming a physical universe (and wanting it to be related with our experiences *and* our experiments) is to postulate that you (and us, if you are not solipsistic) are not turing emulable. No problem. (I like to separate issues concerning the choice of theory, and issues concerning propositions made *in* a theory, or accepting that theory). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dual-Aspect Science (a spawn of the roadmap)
Le 15-août-06, à 21:09, David Nyman a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: 1), 2), 3), 4) are theorem in the comp theory. Note that the zero-person point of view will appear also to be unnameable. Names emerges through the third person pint of view. I'm beginning to see that, unnameability apart, it's the 'indexicality' of the zero-person point of view that you are reluctant to concede. I press you elsewhere on the 'reality' of the number realm. My essential point is that I assert the necessary reality of 'indexical David', but since I am a merely a 'lens' of the totality - the zero-person point of view, the 'gestalt' - then my claim is subsumed in the logically prior claim on indexical existence of that point of view - i.e. its necessary reality. OK (as far as I understand you). Hence in logic, if necessary reality is to be postulated as deriving from something more 'fundamental', then this must a fortori have a logically prior claim on such necessity. If we claim this reality to be the number realm, are we not merely conceding it such necessity through logical force majeure? This is unclear. i don't figure out what you are trying to say. You will have opportunity to explain this. No need to comment directly (but you can of course). Yours in ontic realism Really? :) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
David Nyman wrote: 1Z wrote: What does access to information mean ? In a dynamic universe, it means causality. In a Barbour-style universe it means some nows coincidentally contain patterns representing other nows just as , in a world consisting of every possible picture, there will be pictures containing pictures-within-a-picture. This is a big topic difficult to do justice to. I'm sure we've both had the experience of re-perusing various treatments of the alternatives without necessarily being completely persuaded either way, but I for one have accomodated my intuitions to this fairly successfully. There's a brief discussion of this in 'not the roadmap' with Bruno and Colin which addresses these issues from the perspective of the 'gestalt'. The points discussed all seem paradoxical from the pov of a classical 'nameable 1st person', and this is IMO a powerful strike against this position. I have no idea what a 'classical nameable 1st person' is suppose to be. BTW, I have a question for you re 'intrinsically dynamic' views of reality. It has always seemed to me that this view commits one to a sort of continual annihilation of each state by the succeeding one. It doesn't. The present does need a special status, but its status can be unerwritten by its being the most recent existing moment, not by its being the only existing moment. So both 'past states' and 'future states' are 'radically absent'. My question is: what is left to be 'present'? Recent developments in string theory (M-theory) picture time in terms of a 'cinematographic' view of Planck-time segments. If these are all that exist at any given 'point in time', then haven'tf we as-near-as-dammit banished the universe from substantial existence? A small time-slice is not an infinitessimal time-slice, an infinitessimal time-slice is not a zero time-slice. You near as dammit is not supported by maths, indeed it is opposed by maths. After all, 'structure' when decomposed is in fact extraordinarily dense action - energy IOW. Is it ? what is dense about a photon sailing thorough empty space for amillion years ? In the 'salami-slicer' model, aren't we left the grin without the cat? I don't think so. It seems to me also that our subjective experience of 'the specious present' entails the compresent existence of Vast numbers of such temporal atoms - say one to one 1/2 seconds-worth. Or maybe it means that time isn't so atomic in the first place, Or maybe it means that the specious present is based on nothing more mysterious than physical latencies in our ultra-parallel, but rather slow, brain. Again, if we try to imagine our experience in the face of the razor of dynamic time, does it seem anything like this? Have you an alternative presentation of a dynamic model that resolves these issues? I think I have offered two models: 1) dynamic time is not necessarily salami-sliced time 2) even so, salami sliced time can be a smeared-out time-capsule. There are no restrictions on what a time-capsule can contain. if it can contain memories of harry Potter siutations, it can certainly contain memories of a blurry, specious present. That doesn't mean all contrast leads to dynamism ! You can get stasis out of dynamism by slowing things dwon to a halt; it is still a paradox to get dynamism out of stasis. Substrate/ differentiation is also a global/ local distinction. How? Locality is manufactured out of information and its manner of propagation. The global/ local contrast is inherently dynamic. Then everything else is inherently dynamic, presumably. Don't expect dynamism to reduce to primitive 'dynamic atoms'. It emerges from the tension between two contrastable states. Why ? So the argument is: 1) David is a person. 2) Because David is a person, some parts of David are conscious, and others unconscious. 3) Some parts of the universe are conscious, and others unconcisous. 4) Therefore the universe is a person, too. 4) should read: therefore the universe manifests personhood in macro as David does in micro. 'Indexical David' is a lens through which the conscious/ unconscious personhood of the universe concentrates a particular perspective. Errmm, yes. But the problem is the basic argument is invalid. it is like saying salt is white sugar is white, therefore, salt is sugar. 1) Persons aren't irreducible Persons are defined and delimited by the intersection of structure and substrate. Isn't everything else as well ? Or in dynamic language, persons are substrate behaving personally. Neither element is dispensible. It depends what you mean by reducible. It depends on what your grounds are for making first-personness ontologically fundamental. A substrate that adopts personal indexicality in this way, that claims 'I am indexical David', is something I 'take personally'. 2) Qualia aren't structural. Qualia are the instantiated experience of
Re: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Ante diem XVII-um calendas Septembris as Aug. 15 (not XVI as 32-16)
John M wrote:
Bruno:
What is - 6 - ?
Perfect number, you say.
If I do NOT count - or quantize, does it have ANY meaning at all?
Again we are discussing the arithmetical realism (which I just assume).
To be clear on that hypothesis, I do indeed find plausible that the
number six is perfect, even in the case the branes would not have
collide, no big bang, no physical universe.
Six is perfect just because its divisors are 1, 2, and 3; and that
1+2+3 = 6. Not because I know that. I blieve the contrary: it is the
independent truth of 6 = sum of its proper divisors than eventually
I, and you, can learn it.
I don't see sense in saying it is more than 5 and less than 7 if I do
not
know the meaning of 5 and 7 as well. And of 6 of course.
I agree. It does not make sense YOU SAYING that 5 6 7, if YOU
don't know the meaning of 5, and 6, and 7; unless you are lucky when
deciding to say random sentences ('course).
It has nothing to do with the fact that 5 6 7, independently of you
and me. Just keep silent, in case you are not sure about the meaning of
5, 6, and 7.
Without quantification, what does 6 mean? Why is it perfect? In
what?
Try to cut out 'counting' and 'quantities' - let us regard the symbol
'6'.
What does it symbolize?
I can understand it in 2+4=6 on an abacus, but there it is 'counting'
bullets.
If you want, numbers are what makes any counting possible.
What is it in the preceding line?
In old Rome 8-3=6 was the right result (as in their back-counting
calendar
as 8,7,6 - they included the starting (day) into the subtraction), now
8-2
make 6 - 6 what?
It is not because some country put salt on pancakes that pancakes do
not exist there. Roman where writing 8 -3 for us 8 - 2. It is like
saying 3*7 = 25 on planet TETRA. They mean 3*7 = 21, they just put it
differently.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: ROADMAP (SHORT)
Hi David, Le 16-août-06, à 02:51, David Nyman a écrit : Good to see this. First off some grandmotherly-ish questions: 1) The computationalist hypothesis (comp), This is the hypothesis that I am a digital machine in the quasi-operational sense that I can survive through an artificial digital body/brain. I make it precise by adding Church thesis and some amount of Arithmetical Realism (without which those terms are ambiguous). To be sure this is what Peter D. Jones called standard computationallism. I need to ask you to make this more precise for me. When I say I *am* a digital machine, what is my instantiation? IOW, am 'I' just the *idea* of a dmc for the purposes of a gedanken experiment, or am I to conceive of myself as equivalent to a collection of bits under certain operations, instantiated - well, how? Well, for a comp practitioners, saying yes to the doctor is not a thought experiment. I will try to explain at some point why we cannot really know what is our instantiation, and that is why the yes doctor needs some act of faith, and also why comp guaranties the right to say NO to the doctor (either because you feel he is proposing a substitution level which is too high, or because you just doubt comp, etc.). Eventually you will see we have always 2^aleph_zero instantiations. You may be going to tell me that this is irrelevant, or as you say a little further on: From a strictly logical point of view this is not a proof that matter does not exist. Only that primitive matter is devoid of any explanatory purposes, both for the physical (quanta) and psychological (qualia) appearances (once comp is assumed of course). Ignoring for the moment the risk of circularity in the foregoing logic, The self-reference logics are born from the goal of escaping circular difficulties. I'm not insisting on 'matter' here. Rather, in the same spirit as my 'pressing' you on the number realm, if I claim 'I am indexical dmc-David', I thereby assert my *necessary* indexical existence. OK. This will be true (G*) but non communicable (G). Strictly speaking you are saying something true, but if you present it as a scientific fact or just a third person describable fact then you are in danger (of inconsistency). If my instantiation is a collection of bits, then equivalently I am asserting the necessary indexical existence of this collection of bits. Is this supposed to reside in the 'directly revealed' Pythagorean realm with number etc and consequently is it a matter of faith? Yes. I just want to know if it is a case of 'yes monseigneur' before we get to 'yes doctor'. That's the point, and that is why, to remain scientist at this point, we must accept we are doing theology. It is just modesty! With comp, doctors are sort of modern monseigneur. By modern here I mean no consistent comp doctor will pretend to *know* the truth in these matters. B does capture a notion of self-reference, but it is really a third person form of self-reference. It is the same as the one given by your contemplation of your own body or any correct third person description of yourself, like the encoding proposed by the doctor, in case he is lucky. Now we come to the 'encoding proposed by the doctor'. I hope he's lucky, BTW, it's a good characteristic in a doctor (this is grandma remember). Indeed. Medicine is already quasi computationalist without saying. Do we have a theory of the correct encoding of a third person description, or is this an idealisation? Penrose would claim, of course, that it is impossible for any such decription to be instantiated in a digital computer, and his argument derives largely from the putative direct contact of the brain with the Platonic/ Pythagorean realm of number, which instantiates his 'non-computable' procedures. But is your claim that a correct digital 3rd-person description can indeed be achieved if the level of digital 'substitution' instantiates non-computability, as Penrose claims for the brain/ Pythagorean dyad? And if so what is that substitution level, and what is that instantiation (in the sense previously requested)? Comp makes it impossible to know the level for sure. We can bet on it, and be lucky. If Penrose is right, then comp is just false. Note that Hammerof (who has worked together with Penrose at some time) eventually accept the idea that the brain is mechanical, albeit quantum mechanical (this makes him remaining under the comp hyp because quantum computer are Turing-emulable). What a curious and ignorant grandmother! Basically a theology for a machine M is just the whole truth about machine M. This is not normative, nobody pretend knowing such truth. Plotinus' ONE, or GOD, or GOOD or its big unnameable ... is (arithmetical, analytical) truth. A theorem by Tarski can justified what this notion is already not nameable by any correct (arithmetical or analytical)
Re: Can we ever know truth?
Le 16-août-06, à 03:11, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : If we realise that things cannot be as they seem then this is new evidence and things now seem different to what they originally did! I did not intend that things are as they seem be understood in a narrow sense, such as what our senses can immediately apprehend. Complex scientific evidence, philosophical considerations, historical experience: all of it has to be added to the mix and whatever comes out is what we should accept as the provisional best theory. We know that it may not be the truth - indeed, that we might never actually know the truth - but it is the best we can do. OK. (I was just interpreting you literally, a bit too much probably). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Can we ever know truth?
Rich Winkel wrote: According to Stathis Papaioannou: Given that even in case (c) doctors were completely wrong, the way we test new treatments now is more stringent. However, evidence is still evidence, including evidence of past failures from medical history, which must be included in any risk/benefit analysis. You can criticise someone for making a decision without fair consideration of all the evidence, but you can't criticise him if he does. Actually we can and often do. The question is one of insight into one's own ignorance. Suppose a child is run over by a car which is driven at high speed through a residential neighborhood. The question of the driver's guilt isn't determined by his knowledge or ignorance that the child was about to run into the street, but by his lack of insight and prudent adaptation to his own ignorance of same. In this case prudent adaptation = driving at a safe speed. I don't think that's a good example of not considering the evidence. Ignorance is a relative term - he didn't know a child was about to run out in the street, but he (and most people) know there are children in residential areas and that they may run out in the street. So we criticise him for not taking this into account. If he were truly ignorant of these possibilities, we'd excuse him. Medicine is not like astronomy. Given the self-healing properties of adaptive systems, doing nothing is often the best course of action. The precautionary principle applies. The human mind, especially, is capable of healing itself (i.e. finding a new stable equilibrium) in most circumstances without the aid or hinderance of drugs or lobotomies or electroshock or drilling holes in the skull to release demons. Of course it often takes time and a change of environment, but what's the alternative? To chemically or physically intervene in a self-organizing neural system is like trying to program a computer with a soldering iron, based on the observation that computer programs run on electricity. Ignorance is unavoidable. The question is whether one adapts to one's own ignorance so as to do no harm. But you don't want to be so precautionary that you never risk doing harm, because then you'd never do good either. You'd never drive in residential areas at all. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le 16-août-06, à 03:39, Brent Meeker a écrit : I agree. Mathematics and logic are ways of constraining our propositions so we don't assert contradictions; contradictions of our own rules. But that doesn't mean they are strong enough to keep us from asserting absurdities. I think math is much more than that. Consistent but uninteresting theories dies quickly. It is a point that physicist are hard to get it. Cf Einstein. Good counter-example: David Deutsch. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Can we ever know truth?
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: Colin Hales wrote: No, I said I didn't understand what you meant - and now I don't think you do either. You have apparently come to the recent realization that science just creates models and you never know whether they are really real (and most likely they aren't) but for some reason you have seized upon qualia as being the big problem. You don't know whether electrons or tables or the Sun is really real either. If science explains qualia - and I think it will - the explanation will be in terms of a model in which this or that variable produces this or that qualia - like 700nm photons hitting your retina causes red qualia. I understand now that's not what you want. So maybe you could give an example of what a theory in the science of qualia might be like. No recent realisation. This has been drving me nuts for years. I'm just trying to wake everyone up. There is 1 problem with what you say above...what you outline is not an explanation at all. It's a description. This is only an explanation in a metaphoric or folk-psychological sense that assumes that the 'rule' is causal. The rule is not causal. ( minor point btw qualia are not generated at the retina. Their generation is causally connected to an experienceless event in the retina...). An example: dynamic hierarchies of structured fluctuations. That's a possible theory in the science of qualia?? What does it predict? You criticise me for providing a mere description, not an explanation; yet when I ask for an example of what you want I get a noun phrase!? It's the single biggest problem there is: we don't have one! Science cannot make any justified, authoritative prediction as to the phenomenal life of a rock, a computer, the internet or the plumbing in Beijing or, especially, a scientist. That's because you don't want to use an opertional definition of phenomenal life and science can't work on just words defined in terms of other words. This is _not_ just words. Let's do an antroplogical study of you right now. Say I am a biologist...normally I study the mating behaviour of penguins. But today I am studying the scientific behaviour of humans. My research question? This 'thing' phenomenality/qualia/phenomenal consciosness, what its its relationship to scientific behaviour? I devise an expermient. I put a coffee cup in front of you and my experiment is as follows: Q1. How much science can you do on this coffee cup? A1. You give a list. Now I ask you to close your eyes. Q2. How much science can you do on coffee cups now? More or less. A2. Less. My research question is answered: Phenomenal consciousness is a necessary causal precursor to scientific behaviour. This is not some glib philosophical nuance. This is in_your_face empirical proof. Right there. I think you've only shown that interacting with photons is useful in science. But suppose I agree that phenomenal cosciousness is necessary for scientific behavoir (which I might on some defintion of phenomenal consciousness and scientific behavoir); so what? Take a look at Science magazine's July 2005 issue where 125 questions were posed that face scientific inquiry over the next quarter century. The top two questions: 1. What is the universe made of? Stuff that kicks back when you kick it. 2. What is the biological basis of consciousness? Brains. WRONG! There's a whole description missing. You just asked for the biological basis; not a description, much less a complete description. And above you seemed to reject description too: There is 1 problem with what you say above...what you outline is not an explanation at all. It's a description. The one you use to do science. The mind! It is the only thing that told you there is a brain! Without the mind (qualia) you wouldn't have any notion of anything whatever. I'm sorry. Pehaps read up on the issue. You've managed to miss the entire discourse. The guys who wrote the science mag article have...Science magazine also thinks your answer is wrong too.. otherwise they wouldn;t think it a valid question. I'm not much chastened by having Science Magazine disagree with me. Brent Meeker The sciences do not try to explain, they hardly even try to interpret, they mainly make models. By a model is meant a mathematical construct which, with the addition of certain verbal interpretations, describes observed phenomena. The justification of such a mathematical construct is solely and precisely that it is expected to work. --—John von Neumann --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
Re: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le 16-août-06, à 15:28, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Note also I have not yet seen physical theory which does not assume numbers. Physical theories assume the validity of mathematical statements. That doesn't mean the existence of numbers. Everyone agrees that numbers can't be empirically detected, so if they don't exist that changes nothing about the theory. Of course I was again using existence in the mathematical sense. Here I was just saying that you cannot axiomatize any physical theory (rich enough to explain if only the appearance of observations) without accepting the independence of truth like it exists a number such that Recall once and for all that I don't believe at all (especially by comp) in any form of substantial numbers or think like that. When I say that numbers exist, I take it as a mathematical statement, not a metaphysical one. The metaphysics, or better the theology, relies in the fact that the comp hypothesis needs an act of faith. Note that taking a plane or just going out of my bed in the morning asks some faith too, once comp is assumed (btw). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Very wise words, Bruno. John - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, August 16, 2006 8:45 AM Subject: Re: ROADMAP (well, not yet really... Le 15-août-06, à 20:52, complexitystudies a écrit : The deductions made via UDA are impressing, but I would like to seriously question the Platonic Assumptions underlying all this reasoning. No problem. I see you assume a physical universe. I don't. We have just different theories. Note that if you understand the whole UDA, you should realize that the price of assuming a physical universe (and wanting it to be related with our experiences *and* our experiments) is to postulate that you (and us, if you are not solipsistic) are not turing emulable. No problem. (I like to separate issues concerning the choice of theory, and issues concerning propositions made *in* a theory, or accepting that theory). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
I find Gunther's argumentation commendable, a 'wider' view and a free spirit getting away from the age-old reductionist education-stuff of subsequent many generations of scientists - maybe even to realize that early thinkers, (ingenious though), had to rely on a meager empirical cognitive inventory about the world - to Brent's final remark (in a seemingly positive acceptance) I have one thing to add: ...(Cooper)... argues that logic and mathematics are produced by evolution. Evolution of the human mind that is. (A sub-chapter in Darwin's pick of the biologic (life) aspect in the overall interconnected 'history' of the complexity planet/universe). John Mikes - Original Message - complexitystudies wrote: Hello to the List :-) The deductions made via UDA are impressing, but I would like to seriously question the Platonic Assumptions underlying all this reasoning. Arguments like the perfectness of 6 seem sensible at first sight, but only because we look at this with human eyes. 1) Mathematical thought only exists in human (or alien intelligent) brains. It thus has neural correlates. 2) These neural correlates are strongly coupled to our sensory experiences, how we experience the world in an embodied way. 3) No brains, no neural correlates, no mathematics. It doesn't make sense to argue about the perfectness of 6 when there is nobody around to argue, when nobody thinks about sixness. These concepts are ways of organizing the world around us, not platonic entities existing - indeed - where? (Insert: from Brent M): I agree. Mathematics and logic are ways of constraining our propositions so we don't assert contradictions; contradictions of our own rules. But that doesn't mean they are strong enough to keep us from asserting absurdities. 4) Why do we acknowledge some math as correct, other as not? It is only our grounding in reality, in our sensory experience, which let's us say: this mathematics describe reality sensibly. When we place one rock on another, then have two rocks, it is indeed not astounding that 1 + 1 = 2 in our symbol space. But, again, this is not a description of even an effect of math on reality, rather it is us getting back that what we have inferred beforehand. 5) Indeed, in advanced mathematics, one is often astounded that some math seems to perfectly fit reality, without us having thought of this application before. But in truth, this results from a selection effect of perception. The major body of mathematics is highly aesthetic but has no relevance to physical structures in the real world. Only the mathematics which fits (and getting this fit sometimes is not astounding, see point 4, because we laid it into the system by our experience of the sensory world) inspires some people to wonder why this works. Example: in many equations, we throw away negative solutions because they don't make sense. This illustrates that math doesn't fit by itself, we make it fit. 6) When we have accepted that mathematics does not exist in a platonic realm, but arises from our embodied experience of the world, we should humbly return to hypothesis, theory, validation, falsification, and a constant construction of a world around us which makes sense to _our specific human brains_, no more, no less. --- I think Quantum Weirdness, Gödels Incompleteness Theorem etc. are only consequences of our embodied mathematics, which has evolved on our macroscopical scale, and this granularity and method of reasoning is not adequate for dimensions which transend our immediate sensory experience. As such, I also find MWI and other extravagancies and erroneous way of approaching our current body of knowledge. This path leads astray. Science is successful because we stay connected with reality (our sensory, and enhanced - with machines - sensory experiences). We cannot hope for more, at least at our level of understanding. Interesting Literature: - Where Mathematics Comes from: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics Into Being; George Lakoff and Rafael Nunez, 2001 - Metaphors We Live; George Lakoff, Mark Johnson 2003 - Chasing Reality. Strife Over Realism; Mario Bunge, 2006 (I can recommend nearly everything by Bunge, who excels at clear reasoning, and is committed to an unspeculative view on nature) Best Regards, Günther -- From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, August 15, 2006 9:39 PM Subject: Re: ROADMAP (well, not yet really... (See the insert above) I'll take a look at Lakoff. You might like William S. Cooper's The Evolution of Reason which argues that logic and mathematics are produced by evolution. Hence they would be common in any intelligent species that arose by evolution. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You
Re: ROADMAP (SHORT)
Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi David, Le 16-août-06, à 02:51, David Nyman a écrit : Good to see this. First off some grandmotherly-ish questions: 1) The computationalist hypothesis (comp), This is the hypothesis that I am a digital machine in the quasi-operational sense that I can survive through an artificial digital body/brain. I make it precise by adding Church thesis and some amount of Arithmetical Realism (without which those terms are ambiguous). To be sure this is what Peter D. Jones called standard computationallism. I need to ask you to make this more precise for me. When I say I *am* a digital machine, what is my instantiation? IOW, am 'I' just the *idea* of a dmc for the purposes of a gedanken experiment, or am I to conceive of myself as equivalent to a collection of bits under certain operations, instantiated - well, how? Well, for a comp practitioners, saying yes to the doctor is not a thought experiment. I will try to explain at some point why we cannot really know what is our instantiation, and that is why the yes doctor needs some act of faith, and also why comp guaranties the right to say NO to the doctor (either because you feel he is proposing a substitution level which is too high, or because you just doubt comp, etc.). Eventually you will see we have always 2^aleph_zero instantiations. Bruno, I noticed that you slipped in infinity (infinite collection of computations) into your roadmap (even the short roadmap). In the technical posts, if I remember right, you said that at some point we were leaving the constructionist realm. But are you really talking about infinity? It is easy to slip into invoking infinity and get away with it without being noticed. I think this is because we are used to it in mathematics. In fact, I want to point out that David Nyman skipped over it, perhaps a case in point. But then you brought it up again here with aleph_zero, and 2^aleph_zero, so it seems you are really serious about it. I thought that infinities and singularities are things that physicists have dedicated their lives to trying to purge from the system (so far unsuccessfully ?) in order to approach a true theory of everything. Here you are invoking it from the start. No wonder you talk about faith. Even in the realm of pure mathematics, there are those of course who think it is invalid to invoke infinity. Not to try to complicate things, but I'm trying to make a point about how serious a matter this is. Have you heard about the feasible numbers of V. Sazanov, as discussed on the FOM (Foundations Of Mathematics) list? Why couldn't we just have 2^N instantiations or computations, where N is a very large number? Tom --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ROADMAP (SHORT)
Bruno Marchal wrote: The self-reference logics are born from the goal of escaping circular difficulties. I think here I may have experienced a 'blinding flash' in terms of your project. If, as I've said, I begin from self-reference - 'indexical David', then I have asserted my 'necessary' point of origin. From this point of origin, I can interview myself (and entity-analogs simulated or modeled within myself) and consequently discover the statements that express my beliefs, the truth of which I can then evaluate in terms of my theology. This theology will derive its consistency from provable theorems, its relevance from generative and explanatory power (e.g. with respect to both 'physical' and 'appearance' povs) and its ultimate validity from faith in the number realm and the operations derived from it. So, in performing such a process I undertake a personal voyage through indexical reality, and never leave it, but there is no tautological circularity since it's a genuinely empirical exploration of the prior unknown, and what I discover could be totally surprising. Is grandma anywhere in the right area? David Hi David, Le 16-août-06, à 02:51, David Nyman a écrit : Good to see this. First off some grandmotherly-ish questions: 1) The computationalist hypothesis (comp), This is the hypothesis that I am a digital machine in the quasi-operational sense that I can survive through an artificial digital body/brain. I make it precise by adding Church thesis and some amount of Arithmetical Realism (without which those terms are ambiguous). To be sure this is what Peter D. Jones called standard computationallism. I need to ask you to make this more precise for me. When I say I *am* a digital machine, what is my instantiation? IOW, am 'I' just the *idea* of a dmc for the purposes of a gedanken experiment, or am I to conceive of myself as equivalent to a collection of bits under certain operations, instantiated - well, how? Well, for a comp practitioners, saying yes to the doctor is not a thought experiment. I will try to explain at some point why we cannot really know what is our instantiation, and that is why the yes doctor needs some act of faith, and also why comp guaranties the right to say NO to the doctor (either because you feel he is proposing a substitution level which is too high, or because you just doubt comp, etc.). Eventually you will see we have always 2^aleph_zero instantiations. You may be going to tell me that this is irrelevant, or as you say a little further on: From a strictly logical point of view this is not a proof that matter does not exist. Only that primitive matter is devoid of any explanatory purposes, both for the physical (quanta) and psychological (qualia) appearances (once comp is assumed of course). Ignoring for the moment the risk of circularity in the foregoing logic, The self-reference logics are born from the goal of escaping circular difficulties. I'm not insisting on 'matter' here. Rather, in the same spirit as my 'pressing' you on the number realm, if I claim 'I am indexical dmc-David', I thereby assert my *necessary* indexical existence. OK. This will be true (G*) but non communicable (G). Strictly speaking you are saying something true, but if you present it as a scientific fact or just a third person describable fact then you are in danger (of inconsistency). If my instantiation is a collection of bits, then equivalently I am asserting the necessary indexical existence of this collection of bits. Is this supposed to reside in the 'directly revealed' Pythagorean realm with number etc and consequently is it a matter of faith? Yes. I just want to know if it is a case of 'yes monseigneur' before we get to 'yes doctor'. That's the point, and that is why, to remain scientist at this point, we must accept we are doing theology. It is just modesty! With comp, doctors are sort of modern monseigneur. By modern here I mean no consistent comp doctor will pretend to *know* the truth in these matters. B does capture a notion of self-reference, but it is really a third person form of self-reference. It is the same as the one given by your contemplation of your own body or any correct third person description of yourself, like the encoding proposed by the doctor, in case he is lucky. Now we come to the 'encoding proposed by the doctor'. I hope he's lucky, BTW, it's a good characteristic in a doctor (this is grandma remember). Indeed. Medicine is already quasi computationalist without saying. Do we have a theory of the correct encoding of a third person description, or is this an idealisation? Penrose would claim, of course, that it is impossible for any such decription to be instantiated in a digital computer, and his argument derives largely from the putative direct contact of the brain with the Platonic/
Re: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 16-août-06, à 15:28, 1Z a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Note also I have not yet seen physical theory which does not assume numbers. Physical theories assume the validity of mathematical statements. That doesn't mean the existence of numbers. Everyone agrees that numbers can't be empirically detected, so if they don't exist that changes nothing about the theory. Of course I was again using existence in the mathematical sense. Here I was just saying that you cannot axiomatize any physical theory (rich enough to explain if only the appearance of observations) without accepting the independence of truth like it exists a number such that But the only reason for axiomatizing a physical theory is to see if it has some hidden inconsistency. If the axiomatized theory has some inconsistency, but the theory works (agrees with known data, comports with other theories) this will just be taken as a sign that the axiomatization is wrong and needs to be changed. Of course it is extremely unlikely that it is arithmetic that will be changed simply because it would mean revising so many theories (including common sense ones); but it is not ruled out in principle. Brent Meeker Logic is just a polite way of helping people (including oneself) to realise they have prejudices. -- Bruno Marchal --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Very wise words, Bruno. John - Original Message - From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, August 16, 2006 8:45 AM Subject: Re: ROADMAP (well, not yet really... Le 15-août-06, à 20:52, complexitystudies a écrit : The deductions made via UDA are impressing, but I would like to seriously question the Platonic Assumptions underlying all this reasoning. No problem. I see you assume a physical universe. I don't. We have just different theories. Note that if you understand the whole UDA, you should realize that the price of assuming a physical universe (and wanting it to be related with our experiences *and* our experiments) is to postulate that you (and us, if you are not solipsistic) are not turing emulable. Perhaps I misunderstood. I thought it only implied that you were *probably* being turing emulated - not that you necessarily were. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 16-août-06, à 02:25, Brent Meeker a écrit : ... There I think I disagree. If there were no intelligent creatures like ourselves, the infinite set of integers would not exist (I don't think they exist like my coffee does anyway). There would be xx but no number 2 that was generated by a sucessor operation under Peano's axioms. But 2 is just another notation for xx. No I meant xx as a specific instance, like || and @@. 2 is a notation for the class of all pairs or some such abstraction. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
--- Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: But 2 is just another notation for xx. Why is x 'just another notation for 2? or why is xx not (just) a notation of 3? (because Peano said so?) John M Le 16-août-06, à 02:25, Brent Meeker a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 14-août-06, à 19:21, Brent Meeker a écrit : But how must the perfect number exist or not exist? You say you only mean it must be true that there is a number equal to the sum of its divsors independent of you. Do you mean independent only in the sense that others will know 6 is perfect after you're gone, or do you mean 6 is perfect independent of all humans, all intelligent beings, the whole world? In the second sense. The perfectness of 6 is what would make any sufficiently clever entity from any possible (consistent) worlds, existing or not, to know that. In that sense it has to be a primitive truth. You can see this through a sequence of stronger and stronger modesty principles: 1) Bruno is not so important that 6 would loose its perfection after Bruno is gone; 2) The Belgian are not so important that 6 would loose its perfectness after the Belgian are gone; 3) The European are not so important that 6 would loose ... 4) The Humans are not so ... 5) The Mammals are not so ... 6) The creature of Earth are not so ... 7) the creature of the Solar system are not so ... 8) the creature of the Milky way are not so ... 9) the creature of the local universe are not so ... 10) the creature of the multiverse are not so ... 11) the creature of the multi multi verse are not so 11) the possible creatures are not so ... Yes, I think (and assume in the Arithmetical realist part of comp) that the fact that 6 is equal to its proper divisors sum, is a truth beyond time, space, whatever ... I have the feeling I would lie to myself to think the contrary. I am frankly more sure about that than about the presence of coffee in my cup right now. I cannot imagine that the numbers themselves could go away. They are not eternal, because they are not even in the category of things capable of lasting or not with respect to any form of observable or not reality. There I think I disagree. If there were no intelligent creatures like ourselves, the infinite set of integers would not exist (I don't think they exist like my coffee does anyway). There would be xx but no number 2 that was generated by a sucessor operation under Peano's axioms. But 2 is just another notation for xx. Note that I agree that the existence of the coffee cup has not the same status than the existence of the numbers. Numbers exist independently of me. Stable cups of coffee appears only through highly involved histories/computations views from inside, and makes sense only for coffee amateurs or perhaps also tea amateurs having an open mind. Bruno --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Hi Bruno, Again we are discussing the arithmetical realism (which I just assume). A bold assumption, if I may say so. To be clear on that hypothesis, I do indeed find plausible that the number six is perfect, even in the case the branes would not have collide, no big bang, no physical universe. Six is perfect just because its divisors are 1, 2, and 3; and that 1+2+3 = 6. Not because I know that. I blieve the contrary: it is the independent truth of 6 = sum of its proper divisors than eventually I, and you, can learn it. I understand your argumentation well, because maybe one or two years ago I said nearly the same sentences to colleagues. But my exploration into cognitive neuroscience has exposed to me how mathematical thinking comes about, and that it is indeed not separable from our human brains. If you want, numbers are what makes any counting possible. Numbers are symbols we create in our minds to communicate with fellow individuals about things of importance to us. To paraphrase Descartes very liberally: We group, therefore we can count. Our act of arbitrary grouping (made a bit less arbitrary by evolution, which makes us group things which are good to our survival, like gazelles and spears or berries) let's us count and communicate the number. For the universe one apple may not exist, because in effect there are only quarks interacting. And at this level indeterminacy strikes mercilessly, making it all but meaningless to count quarks. Also, concepts like infinity are most definitely not universal concepts out there, but products of our mind. It is not because some country put salt on pancakes that pancakes do not exist there. Roman where writing 8 -3 for us 8 - 2. It is like saying 3*7 = 25 on planet TETRA. They mean 3*7 = 21, they just put it differently. Of course, symbolisms are arbitrary, but physical instantiation makes all the difference. No problem. I see you assume a physical universe. I don't. We havejust different theories. So, which experiment decides which is true? I think platonism derives it's power from misconceptions of the human mind. The unthinking stone would never construe such a thing as platonism. It would just exist - in a very real world ;-) Note that if you understand the whole UDA, Unfortunately, not yet, but I'm reading! you should realize that the price of assuming a physical universe (and wanting it to be related with our experiences *and* our experiments) is to postulate that you (and us, if you are not solipsistic) are not turing emulable. No problem. Why is that so? Could you clarify this issue? (I like to separate issues concerning the choice of theory, and issues concerning propositions made *in* a theory, or accepting that theory). Absolutely. But I think we have to start with our assumptions and try to scrutinize them very carefully. After all, we want to devote our minds to problems arising out of them during our lives, and thus the initial choice should not be made rashly, but only after careful review of our current body of knowledge. Best Regards, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dual-Aspect Science
Hi,
A lot of the dialog below is a mismatch of ideas which indicates that I
have underestimated the degree of difficulty to be expected in getting the
idea of hierarchical structures across. Nevetheless..
I think you are assuming a separateness of structure that does not
exist.
It obviously does exist , up to a point. I am separate form this
keyboard.
(and let's not confuse separateness and difference...)
If space and matter (have a look at the cover of this weeks NewScientist)
are different expressions of a single structure then you and space are
unified. It is that unification that is at the heart of qualia production,
for qualia result as another feature of the underlying structure.
There is one and one only structure.
If you want ot look at it that way. But it is no
undifferentiated within itself.
Looking at it like that is the only way that makes any sense.
We are all part of it. There is no
concept of 'separate' to be had.
yes there is: spatial separation.
See above.
Absolutely everything is included in the
structure. No exceptions. Space, atoms, scientists, qualia. All
interactions at all 'scales' (scale itself) are all interactions between
different parts of the one structure. To interact at all is to interact
with another part of the structure.
another in what sense ? You just said there is *no* concept
of separation.
eg. Matter passes through space. It is interacting with itself. Matter
'looks' separate to space, but deep down its not. The appearance of
separateness is how it is presented to us.
The idea of there being anything else
('not' the structure) is meaningless. If there is any 'thing' in the
structure then the balance of the structure expressed a perfect
un-thing.
There is nothing else. That is the coincept I am exploring.
None of that has anything to do with your claim that there is
a single *type* of structure, and that everything is composed of
recursive combinations of its instances.
It may be the case that everything is ultimately part of one strucutre,
but
that does not imply that everything within the Great Strucutre is
self-similar.
The structure is hierarchical layers of organisation only. Members of a
layer share morphological invariance to some characteristics of layer
layer. Properties are inherited by child layers from paretn layers. All
the layers are contained by each other.
Note that we don't actually have to know what S(.) is to make a whole
pile
of observations of properties of organisations of it that apply
regardless
of the particular S(.). It may be we never actually get to sort out
the
specifics of S(.)! (I have an idea, but it doesn't matter from the
point
of
view of understanding qualia as another property of the structure
like
atoms).
In Bruno's terms the structure of S(.) is what he calls 'objective
reality'.
I would say that in science the first person view has primacy.
Epistemic or Ontic ?
These are just words invented by members of the structure.
So is structure.
That wasn't a problem before, why should it be now.
But I'll try.
The structure delivers qualia in the first person. Those qualia are
quite
valid 'things' (virtual matter)..organisation/behaviour of structure.
Qualia are not ust organisation and behaviour, or there
would be no hard problem.
I think the confusion here is between oganisation and behaviour of the
_structure_ (one of which is qualia) on contrast with the
organisation/behaviour of the things presented to us _by_ qualia.
Their presentation bestows intrinsic knowledge as a measurement to the
embedded structure member called the scientist. This is knowledge as
intrinsic intentionality.
Are yu saying that qualia are marked by intentionality ?
That would be novel.
,, qualia are intrinsic, consciously accessible, NON-INTENTIONAL
features of sense-data and other non-physical phenomenal objects that
are responsible for their phenomenal character.
When we experience redness it is painted onto some'thing'. In _use_ it has
intrinsic 'aboutness'. In themselves they have none. At the instance of
their creation they acquire intentionality _because_ they are meant for
that very purpose - to inform 'aboutness'...That is the distinction I
think useful.
S.E.P, my emphasis.
Within the experiences is regularity which can
then be characterised as knowledge attributed to some identified
behaviour
in the structure. This attribution is only an attribution as to
behaviour
of the structure, not the structure. These attributions can be used by a
another scientist in their 'first person' world.
I still think strcuture is an unhappy term for soemthign which
cannot be reduced to abstract relations and behaviour.
The structure can be abstracted and studied. But what you do is simulate
it, not abstract it in the traditional sense, except to characterise the
rules of the simulation and let them run. For example, one of the
structural
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
complexitystudies wrote: Hi Bruno, Again we are discussing the arithmetical realism (which I just assume). A bold assumption, if I may say so. To be clear on that hypothesis, I do indeed find plausible that the number six is perfect, even in the case the branes would not have collide, no big bang, no physical universe. Six is perfect just because its divisors are 1, 2, and 3; and that 1+2+3 = 6. Not because I know that. I blieve the contrary: it is the independent truth of 6 = sum of its proper divisors than eventually I, and you, can learn it. I understand your argumentation well, because maybe one or two years ago I said nearly the same sentences to colleagues. But my exploration into cognitive neuroscience has exposed to me how mathematical thinking comes about, and that it is indeed not separable from our human brains. If you want, numbers are what makes any counting possible. Numbers are symbols we create in our minds to communicate with fellow individuals about things of importance to us. To paraphrase Descartes very liberally: We group, therefore we can count. Our act of arbitrary grouping (made a bit less arbitrary by evolution, which makes us group things which are good to our survival, like gazelles and spears or berries) let's us count and communicate the number. For the universe one apple may not exist, because in effect there are only quarks interacting. And at this level indeterminacy strikes mercilessly, making it all but meaningless to count quarks. Also, concepts like infinity are most definitely not universal concepts out there, but products of our mind. This sounds very much like my view of math. It is not because some country put salt on pancakes that pancakes do not exist there. Roman where writing 8 -3 for us 8 - 2. It is like saying 3*7 = 25 on planet TETRA. They mean 3*7 = 21, they just put it differently. Of course, symbolisms are arbitrary, but physical instantiation makes all the difference. No problem. I see you assume a physical universe. I don't. We havejust different theories. So, which experiment decides which is true? I think platonism derives it's power from misconceptions of the human mind. The unthinking stone would never construe such a thing as platonism. It would just exist - in a very real world ;-) Note that if you understand the whole UDA, Unfortunately, not yet, but I'm reading! The UDA is not precise enough for me, maybe because I'm a mathematician? I'm waiting for the interview, via the roadmap. you should realize that the price of assuming a physical universe (and wanting it to be related with our experiences *and* our experiments) is to postulate that you (and us, if you are not solipsistic) are not turing emulable. No problem. Why is that so? Could you clarify this issue? (I like to separate issues concerning the choice of theory, and issues concerning propositions made *in* a theory, or accepting that theory). Absolutely. But I think we have to start with our assumptions and try to scrutinize them very carefully. After all, we want to devote our minds to problems arising out of them during our lives, and thus the initial choice should not be made rashly, but only after careful review of our current body of knowledge. Best Regards, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Hello to the List :-) The deductions made via UDA are impressing, but I would like to seriously question the Platonic Assumptions underlying all this reasoning. Arguments like the perfectness of 6 seem sensible at first sight, but only because we look at this with human eyes. 1) Mathematical thought only exists in human (or alien intelligent) brains. It thus has neural correlates. 2) These neural correlates are strongly coupled to our sensory experiences, how we experience the world in an embodied way. 3) No brains, no neural correlates, no mathematics. It doesn't make sense to argue about the perfectness of 6 when there is nobody around to argue, when nobody thinks about sixness. These concepts are ways of organizing the world around us, not platonic entities existing - indeed - where? 4) Why do we acknowledge some math as correct, other as not? It is only our grounding in reality, in our sensory experience, which let's us say: this mathematics describe reality sensibly. When we place one rock on another, then have two rocks, it is indeed not astounding that 1 + 1 = 2 in our symbol space. But, again, this is not a description of even an effect of math on reality, rather it is us getting back that what we have inferred beforehand. 5) Indeed, in advanced mathematics, one is often astounded that some math seems to perfectly fit reality, without us having thought of this application before. But in truth, this results from a selection effect of perception. The major body of mathematics is highly aesthetic but has no relevance to physical structures in the real world. Only the mathematics which fits (and getting this fit sometimes is not astounding, see point 4, because we laid it into the system by our experience of the sensory world) inspires some people to wonder why this works. Example: in many equations, we throw away negative solutions because they don't make sense. This illustrates that math doesn't fit by itself, we make it fit. 6) When we have accepted that mathematics does not exist in a platonic realm, but arises from our embodied experience of the world, we should humbly return to hypothesis, theory, validation, falsification, and a constant construction of a world around us which makes sense to _our specific human brains_, no more, no less. --- I think Quantum Weirdness, Gödels Incompleteness Theorem etc. are only consequences of our embodied mathematics, which has evolved on our macroscopical scale, and this granularity and method of reasoning is not adequate for dimensions which transend our immediate sensory experience. As such, I also find MWI and other extravagancies and erroneous way of approaching our current body of knowledge. This path leads astray. Science is successful because we stay connected with reality (our sensory, and enhanced - with machines - sensory experiences). We cannot hope for more, at least at our level of understanding. Interesting Literature: - Where Mathematics Comes from: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics Into Being; George Lakoff and Rafael Nunez, 2001 - Metaphors We Live; George Lakoff, Mark Johnson 2003 - Chasing Reality. Strife Over Realism; Mario Bunge, 2006 (I can recommend nearly everything by Bunge, who excels at clear reasoning, and is committed to an unspeculative view on nature) Best Regards, Günther Ethics and aesthetics are culture-specific. Empirical science is universe-specific: eg., any culture, no matter how bizarre its psychology compared to ours, would work out that sodium reacts exothermically with water in a universe similar to our own, but not in a universe where physical laws and fundamental constants are very different from what we are familiar with. Mathematical and logical truths, on the other hand, are true in all possible worlds. The lack of contingency on cultural, psychological or physical factors makes these truths fundamentally different; whether you call them perfect, analytic or necessary truths is a matter of taste. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Hello to the List :-) The deductions made via UDA are impressing, but I would like to seriously question the Platonic Assumptions underlying all this reasoning. Arguments like the perfectness of 6 seem sensible at first sight, but only because we look at this with human eyes. 1) Mathematical thought only exists in human (or alien intelligent) brains. It thus has neural correlates. 2) These neural correlates are strongly coupled to our sensory experiences, how we experience the world in an embodied way. 3) No brains, no neural correlates, no mathematics. It doesn't make sense to argue about the perfectness of 6 when there is nobody around to argue, when nobody thinks about sixness. These concepts are ways of organizing the world around us, not platonic entities existing - indeed - where? 4) Why do we acknowledge some math as correct, other as not? It is only our grounding in reality, in our sensory experience, which let's us say: this mathematics describe reality sensibly. When we place one rock on another, then have two rocks, it is indeed not astounding that 1 + 1 = 2 in our symbol space. But, again, this is not a description of even an effect of math on reality, rather it is us getting back that what we have inferred beforehand. 5) Indeed, in advanced mathematics, one is often astounded that some math seems to perfectly fit reality, without us having thought of this application before. But in truth, this results from a selection effect of perception. The major body of mathematics is highly aesthetic but has no relevance to physical structures in the real world. Only the mathematics which fits (and getting this fit sometimes is not astounding, see point 4, because we laid it into the system by our experience of the sensory world) inspires some people to wonder why this works. Example: in many equations, we throw away negative solutions because they don't make sense. This illustrates that math doesn't fit by itself, we make it fit. 6) When we have accepted that mathematics does not exist in a platonic realm, but arises from our embodied experience of the world, we should humbly return to hypothesis, theory, validation, falsification, and a constant construction of a world around us which makes sense to _our specific human brains_, no more, no less. --- I think Quantum Weirdness, Gödels Incompleteness Theorem etc. are only consequences of our embodied mathematics, which has evolved on our macroscopical scale, and this granularity and method of reasoning is not adequate for dimensions which transend our immediate sensory experience. As such, I also find MWI and other extravagancies and erroneous way of approaching our current body of knowledge. This path leads astray. Science is successful because we stay connected with reality (our sensory, and enhanced - with machines - sensory experiences). We cannot hope for more, at least at our level of understanding. Interesting Literature: - Where Mathematics Comes from: How the Embodied Mind Brings Mathematics Into Being; George Lakoff and Rafael Nunez, 2001 - Metaphors We Live; George Lakoff, Mark Johnson 2003 - Chasing Reality. Strife Over Realism; Mario Bunge, 2006 (I can recommend nearly everything by Bunge, who excels at clear reasoning, and is committed to an unspeculative view on nature) Best Regards, Günther Ethics and aesthetics are culture-specific. Empirical science is universe-specific: eg., any culture, no matter how bizarre its psychology compared to ours, would work out that sodium reacts exothermically with water in a universe similar to our own, but not in a universe where physical laws and fundamental constants are very different from what we are familiar with. Mathematical and logical truths, on the other hand, are true in all possible worlds. But this is really ciruclar because we define possible in terms of obeying our rules of logic and reason. I don't say we're wrong to do so - it's the best we can do. But it doesn't prove anything. I think the concept of logic, mathematics, and truth are all in our head and only consequently in the world. The lack of contingency on cultural, psychological or physical factors makes these truths fundamentally different; whether you call them perfect, analytic or necessary truths is a matter of taste. If you directly perceived Hilbert space vectors, which QM tells us describe the world, would you count different objects? I think these truths are contingent on how we see the world. I think there's a good argument that any being that is both intelligent and evolved will have the same mathematics - that's the jist of Cooper's book. Brent Meeker Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail.
RE: Can we ever know truth?
Rich Winkel writes: According to Stathis Papaioannou: Given that even in case (c) doctors were completely wrong, the way we test new treatments now is more stringent. However, evidence is still evidence, including evidence of past failures from medical history, which must be included in any risk/benefit analysis. You can criticise someone for making a decision without fair consideration of all the evidence, but you can't criticise him if he does. Actually we can and often do. The question is one of insight into one's own ignorance. Suppose a child is run over by a car which is driven at high speed through a residential neighborhood. The question of the driver's guilt isn't determined by his knowledge or ignorance that the child was about to run into the street, but by his lack of insight and prudent adaptation to his own ignorance of same. In this case prudent adaptation = driving at a safe speed. Why would you not include the well-known fact that driving at high speed is more likely to kill someone as evidence? If the driver honestly did not know this, say due to having an intellectual disability, then he would have dimminished responsibility for the accident. Medicine is not like astronomy. Given the self-healing properties of adaptive systems, doing nothing is often the best course of action. The precautionary principle applies. Astronomy does not really have an ethical dimension to it, but most other sciences do. Discovering that cyanide kills people is science; deciding to poison your spouse with cyanide to collect on the insurance is intimately tied up with the science, but it is not itself in the domain of science. As for doing nothing often being the best course of action, that's certainly true, and it *is* a question that can be analysed scientifically, which is the point of placebo controlled drug trials. The human mind, especially, is capable of healing itself (i.e. finding a new stable equilibrium) in most circumstances without the aid or hinderance of drugs or lobotomies or electroshock or drilling holes in the skull to release demons. Of course it often takes time and a change of environment, but what's the alternative? To chemically or physically intervene in a self-organizing neural system is like trying to program a computer with a soldering iron, based on the observation that computer programs run on electricity. Ignorance is unavoidable. The question is whether one adapts to one's own ignorance so as to do no harm. You are suggesting that certain treatments believed to be helpful for mental illness by the medical profession are not in fact helpful. You may be right, because the history of medicine is full of enthusiastically promoted treatments that we now know are useless or harmful. However, this is no argument against the scientific method in medicine or any other field: we can only go on our best evidence. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
