Re: ROADMAP (SHORT)
Le 16-août-06, à 18:36, Tom Caylor a écrit : I noticed that you slipped in infinity (infinite collection of computations) into your roadmap (even the short roadmap). In the technical posts, if I remember right, you said that at some point we were leaving the constructionist realm. But are you really talking about infinity? It is easy to slip into invoking infinity and get away with it without being noticed. I think this is because we are used to it in mathematics. In fact, I want to point out that David Nyman skipped over it, perhaps a case in point. But then you brought it up again here with aleph_zero, and 2^aleph_zero, so it seems you are really serious about it. I thought that infinities and singularities are things that physicists have dedicated their lives to trying to purge from the system (so far unsuccessfully ?) in order to approach a true theory of everything. Here you are invoking it from the start. No wonder you talk about faith. Even in the realm of pure mathematics, there are those of course who think it is invalid to invoke infinity. Not to try to complicate things, but I'm trying to make a point about how serious a matter this is. Have you heard about the feasible numbers of V. Sazanov, as discussed on the FOM (Foundations Of Mathematics) list? Why couldn't we just have 2^N instantiations or computations, where N is a very large number? I would say infinity is all what mathematics is about. Take any theorem in arithmetic, like any number is the sum of four square, or there is no pair of number having a ratio which squared gives two, etc. And I am not talking about analysis, or the use of complex analysis in number theory (cf zeta), or category theory (which relies on very high infinite) without posing any conceptual problem (no more than elsewhere). Even constructivist and intuitionist accept infinity, although sometimes under the form of potential infinity (which is all we need for G and G* and all third person point of view, but is not enough for having mathematical semantics, and then the first person (by UDA) is really linked to an actual infinity. But those, since axiomatic set theory does no more pose any interpretative problem. True, I heard about some ultrafinitist would would like to avoid infinity, but until now, they do have conceptual problem (like the fact that they need notion of fuzzy high numbers to avoid the fact that for each number has a successor. Imo, this is just philosophical play having no relation with both theory and practice in math. The UDA is not precise enough for me, maybe because I'm a mathematician? I'm waiting for the interview, via the roadmap. UDA is a problem for mathematicians, sometimes indeed. The reason is that although it is a proof, it is not a mathematical proof. And some mathematician have a problem with non mathematical proof. But UDA *is* the complete proof. I have already explain on this list (years ago) that although informal, it is rigorous. The first version of it were much more complex and technical, and it has taken years to suppress eventually any non strictly needed difficulties. I have even coined an expression the 1004 fallacy (alluding to Lewis Carroll), to describe argument using unnecessary rigor or abnormally precise term with respect to the reasoning. So please, don't hesitate to tell me what is not precise enough for you. Just recall UDA is not part of math. It is part of cognitive science and physics, and computer science. The lobian interview does not add one atom of rigor to the UDA, albeit it adds constructive features so as to make possible an explicit derivation of the physical laws (and more because it attached the quanta to extended qualia). Now I extract only the logic of the certain propositions and I show that it has already it has a strong quantum perfume, enough to get an arithmetical quantum logic, and then the rest gives mathematical conjectures. (One has been recently solved by a young mathematician). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ROADMAP (SHORT)
Le 16-août-06, à 18:04, David Nyman a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote: The self-reference logics are born from the goal of escaping circular difficulties. I think here I may have experienced a 'blinding flash' in terms of your project. If, as I've said, I begin from self-reference - 'indexical David', then I have asserted my 'necessary' point of origin. Yes but this necessity will appear to be a first person necessity, and as such is not communicable, and even not capturable by the self-reference logic. Note that the fact that that necessity is first person explains probably why you want to take the first person as primitive at the start. Unfortunately, as Godel as seen as early as 1933, the self-reference logic does not capture, neither the knower (the first person) nor the its necessity. So, curiously enough (without doubt) formal provability capture only opinion or belief (we lack Bp - p, with B = formal proof). But that is what makes the Theaetetical definition of knowledge (true belief, or true proof, or true justified opinion) working in this aera, and leading then to a notion of (unameable) first person. We will come back. Of course, the more you will be precise, the more I can criticize you by comparing what you say with what G and G* says. That's normal. From this point of origin, I can interview myself (and entity-analogs simulated or modeled within myself) and consequently discover the statements that express my beliefs, the truth of which I can then evaluate in terms of my theology. This theology will derive its consistency from provable theorems, its relevance from generative and explanatory power (e.g. with respect to both 'physical' and 'appearance' povs) and its ultimate validity from faith in the number realm and the operations derived from it. So, in performing such a process I undertake a personal voyage through indexical reality, and never leave it, but there is no tautological circularity since it's a genuinely empirical exploration of the prior unknown, and what I discover could be totally surprising. Is grandma anywhere in the right area? Very very close indeed. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le 16-août-06, à 22:54, John M a écrit : But 2 is just another notation for xx. Why is x 'just another notation for 2? or why is xx not (just) a notation of 3? Mathematician have all the right! As a mathematician you are free to name the number two as you want. *polite* mathematician, or just those who want to be as simple as possible will try to use the more standard notation. naming 3 by xx could be confusing in that respect. (because Peano said so?) There is no authoritative argument in math. There are fashion, prejudice, stubbornness and many human things like that, but nobody serious in math will believe something because the boss said so. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Comp is false. Let's see where *that* leads. I'm erecting
this as a signpost to indicate a direction, and I would beg the
list's indulgence in helping me to look in this direction, rather
than confining its comments to the ramshackle construction of the
signpost itself. My hope is that you will help me to expose whatever is
untrue or confused about what follows (I'm sure you will!). But I
hope you will also 'catch my drift'.
1) The bit-stream
Comp deals with a bit-stream representation of appearance. The theorems
of comp process this bit-stream in terms of a formal system, creating a
framework within which 'true or 'false' theorems may be
evaluated. This system is by its nature closed, or tautological. The
statements that can be made, their 'truth' or 'falsehood', are
inherent in the axiomatic and operational characteristics of the formal
system as applied to the bit-stream.
2) The instantiation
In order to implement the comp approach, an instantiation is required
that will represent the bit-stream and enact the formal operations. The
Turing machine is an idealised version of such an instantiation. A
digital computer is a physical version of a TM. Consequently comp may
be instantiated in a digital computer, and copied in innumerable media
that suitably preserve its informational structure.
3) Dimensionality
The bit-stream is 'pure' information and as such is 0-dimensional.
Multi-dimensionality emerges only at the level of the active
instantiation of the bit-stream. Consequently what is Turing-emulable
is the bit-stream (which includes a statement of the required formal
operations - i.e. the program) and because this emulation is
0-dimensional, it is indifferent to form ('substrate-independent').
Also because it is 0-dimensional, it is inherently powerless to
interact directly with multi-dimensional reality. All such interaction
takes place because what is implicit in the bit-stream is rendered
explicit by its multi-dimensional instantiation. Although we may speak
metaphorically (i.e. 'as if' projecting 'form' on to it) of the
bit-stream as 'representational' in a virtual 0-dimensional sense,
this is powerless as such to cause any interaction with the
multi-dimensional environment. To do this requires that additional
information, merely implicit in the bit-stream, is rendered explicit by
the instantiation.
If we consider an 'intelligent program' instantiated in a digital
computer, 'explicit form' - multi-dimensionality - is 'added
back' at the interfaces where the machine interacts with the external
environment. For example, a display device transforms the bit-stream
into pixels in a 2-dimensional arrangement. At the next 'layer' up,
a user decides whether to interpret the 2-dimensional arrangements
semantically (i.e. 'these are symbols') or graphically (i.e.
'this is a quasi-3-dimensional scene'). Up another layer, and the
user transforms these judgements into direct interaction with a
multi-dimensional environment.
All pure bit-stream representations rely on implicit environmental
assumptions in order to 'execute' as intended. DNA, for example,
relies for its expression both on its multi-dimensional orientation in
space, and the materials present in the local environment. This
information is not present, though implicit, in the codons, but is
*made explicit* by the environment that instantiates them.
4) Form
The 'physical' description of the world, as I was rightly reminded
by Peter, has no significant layering (well, perhaps it does, but more
later). Appearance, however, displays complex layering, and as we have
seen, this also 'appears' to extend to the intelligibility of the
world in which we 'appear' to participate. 'Form' and
'layering' somehow emerge from whatever the physical model
describes as a bit-stream. When we experience and interact with the
world, we do so in a way that is inherently multi-dimensional. What is
represented in this way is directly 'grasped' or 'enacted'
(i.e. represented, structured) in multi-dimensional 'form' and
unfolded by multi-dimensional 'motor units' into action in a
multi-dimensional world. This is both what makes it non-invariant to
Turing-emulation, and gives it its direct multi-dimensional linkage to
enaction in multi-dimensional environments. Certainly, 0-dimensional
bit-stream representations and pathways are entailed in such processes,
but they serve to store and transmit information, not to enact its
meaning or its consequences in the world - i.e. its intentionality
as information-put-into-action.
5) Correlation
How is the above to be correlated with the physical or bit-stream
representation? Through appropriate forms. We already know this from
the fertility of 'laws of form' that are intrinsic to science as
practised - whether physical, chemical, biological, physiological,
psychological, sociological, and so on up the 'levels'. At each
level, 'laws of form' are abstracted that render this world-view
intelligible,
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le 17-août-06, à 00:14, complexitystudies a écrit : Again we are discussing the arithmetical realism (which I just assume). A bold assumption, if I may say so. Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just the belief that the propositions of elementary arithmetic are independent of you. Do you sincerley belief that 37 could be a non prime number? Or that the square root of 2 can equal to a ratio of two integers? Or that if you run a program fortran it could neither stop nor not stop? (When all the default assumption are on, to evacuate contingent stopping of a machine implemented in some deep story)? But my exploration into cognitive neuroscience has exposed to me how mathematical thinking comes about, and that it is indeed not separable from our human brains. I have not yet seen a book on human brain which does not presuppose the understanding of the natural numbers. Note just for using the index, but in the neuronal explanation themselves, implicitly or explicitly. Eventually with comp the brain itself appears as a construct of the mind. The mathematical mind of the Lobian machines. Those are the self-referentially correct universal (sufficiently chatty) machines. Numbers are symbols we create in our minds to communicate with fellow individuals about things of importance to us. Numbers are not symbol. Symbols can be used to talk about numbers, but they should not be confused with numbers. To paraphrase Descartes very liberally: We group, therefore we can count. Our act of arbitrary grouping (made a bit less arbitrary by evolution, which makes us group things which are good to our survival, like gazelles and spears or berries) let's us count and communicate the number. The notion of same number seems to have occur much before we discovered counting. Farmers have most probably learn to compare the size of the herds of sheep without counting, just by associating each sheep from one herd to the another. But this as nothing to do with the fact that sheeps were countable before humans learn to count it. Humans and brains learn to count countable things because they are countable. I think you are confusing the subject or object of math, and the human mathematical theories, which are just lantern putting a tiny light on the subject. If numbers and their math was really invented, why should mathematicians hide some results, like Pythagoras with the irrationality of the square root of two, ... As David Deutsch says: math kicks back. For the universe one apple may not exist, because in effect there are only quarks interacting. And at this level indeterminacy strikes mercilessly, making it all but meaningless to count quarks. You will not find a book explaining that meaninglessness without taking for granted the idea of counting at the start. Also, concepts like infinity are most definitely not universal concepts out there, but products of our mind. I doubt any mind could ever produce infinity. Of course, symbolisms are arbitrary, but physical instantiation makes all the difference. (note that my goal consists in explaining physical instantiation without using physical things at all. My point is that if we postulate comp, then we have to do this). Note that if you understand the whole UDA, Unfortunately, not yet, but I'm reading! Ah, ok. UDA mainly shows that the mind-body problem is two times more difficult than most materialist are thinking. Indeed, with comp, matter can no more be explained by postulating a physical world. I let you discover that, and feel free to ask questions if you have a problem with UDA. you should realize that the price of assuming a physical universe (and wanting it to be related with our experiences *and* our experiments) is to postulate that you (and us, if you are not solipsistic) are not turing emulable. No problem. Why is that so? Could you clarify this issue? It is really the point of the UDA. It shows that computationalism (the idea that I am a digitalizable machine) is incompatible with weak materialism (the idea that there is a primary stuff or matter or aristotelian substances). Absolutely. But I think we have to start with our assumptions and try to scrutinize them very carefully. After all, we want to devote our minds to problems arising out of them during our lives, and thus the initial choice should not be made rashly, but only after careful review of our current body of knowledge. OK, but don't forget that here the idea is also to get some contradiction from hypotheses, so as to abandon them. But until now, comp leads only to weirdness, not contradiction. And then that weirdness seems to explain the quantum weirdness ... Intuitively and qualitatively (already by UDA), and then technically through the
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 17-août-06, à 00:14, complexitystudies a écrit : Again we are discussing the arithmetical realism (which I just assume). A bold assumption, if I may say so. Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just the belief that the propositions of elementary arithmetic are independent of you. Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical structures *exist* independently of you, not just that they are true independently of you. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dual-Aspect Science
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
Hi,
A lot of the dialog below is a mismatch of ideas which indicates that I
have underestimated the degree of difficulty to be expected in getting the
idea of hierarchical structures across. Nevetheless..
I think you are assuming a separateness of structure that does not
exist.
It obviously does exist , up to a point. I am separate form this
keyboard.
(and let's not confuse separateness and difference...)
If space and matter (have a look at the cover of this weeks NewScientist)
are different expressions of a single structure then you and space are
unified.
If they are different substructures within a further (different)
struture,
they are also unified, in that sense and to that extent.
The contentious claims here are:
a) That being multiple instances of the same structure is the only
way things can be unified.
b) Things unified in that sense are devoid of any difference or
separaration
whatsoever.
It is that unification that is at the heart of qualia production,
for qualia result as another feature of the underlying structure.
There is one and one only structure.
If you want ot look at it that way. But it is no
undifferentiated within itself.
Looking at it like that is the only way that makes any sense.
So you say. You have not said anythign at all about what
makes the alternatives nonsensical.
We are all part of it. There is no
concept of 'separate' to be had.
yes there is: spatial separation.
See above.
Doesn't address the point.
Absolutely everything is included in the
structure. No exceptions. Space, atoms, scientists, qualia. All
interactions at all 'scales' (scale itself) are all interactions between
different parts of the one structure. To interact at all is to interact
with another part of the structure.
another in what sense ? You just said there is *no* concept
of separation.
eg. Matter passes through space. It is interacting with itself. Matter
'looks' separate to space, but deep down its not. The appearance of
separateness is how it is presented to us.
It is entirely possible that they are unified deep down and
separate on the surface. Separation need not be dismissed
as appearance.
The idea of there being anything else
('not' the structure) is meaningless. If there is any 'thing' in the
structure then the balance of the structure expressed a perfect
un-thing.
There is nothing else. That is the coincept I am exploring.
None of that has anything to do with your claim that there is
a single *type* of structure, and that everything is composed of
recursive combinations of its instances.
It may be the case that everything is ultimately part of one strucutre,
but
that does not imply that everything within the Great Strucutre is
self-similar.
The structure is hierarchical layers of organisation only. Members of a
layer share morphological invariance to some characteristics of layer
layer. Properties are inherited by child layers from paretn layers. All
the layers are contained by each other.
How very c++-ey.
Do you have any evidence, or are you appelaing to the comfort
zone of Sofware Engineers ?
Their presentation bestows intrinsic knowledge as a measurement to the
embedded structure member called the scientist. This is knowledge as
intrinsic intentionality.
Are yu saying that qualia are marked by intentionality ?
That would be novel.
,, qualia are intrinsic, consciously accessible, NON-INTENTIONAL
features of sense-data and other non-physical phenomenal objects that
are responsible for their phenomenal character.
When we experience redness it is painted onto some'thing'.
Not if it is adream or hallucination ,
or the
result of pressing your eyeball.
In _use_ it has
intrinsic 'aboutness'.
Then that comes from the use, not the quale.
In themselves they have none. At the instance of
their creation they acquire intentionality _because_ they are meant for
that very purpose - to inform 'aboutness'...That is the distinction I
think useful.
S.E.P, my emphasis.
Within the experiences is regularity which can
then be characterised as knowledge attributed to some identified
behaviour
in the structure. This attribution is only an attribution as to
behaviour
of the structure, not the structure. These attributions can be used by a
another scientist in their 'first person' world.
I still think strcuture is an unhappy term for soemthign which
cannot be reduced to abstract relations and behaviour.
The structure can be abstracted and studied. But what you do is simulate
it, not abstract it in the traditional sense, except to characterise the
rules of the simulation and let them run. For example, one of the
structural statistics that will fall out of analyses of the structure is G
(graviatational const), another is the speed of light.and so on. The
natural constants are statistics of the underlying
Re: Rép : ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Bruno Marchal wrote: Note that if you understand the whole UDA, you should realize that the price of assuming a physical universe (and wanting it to be related with our experiences *and* our experiments) is to postulate that you (and us, if you are not solipsistic) are not turing emulable. Perhaps I misunderstood. I thought it only implied that you were *probably* being turing emulated - not that you necessarily were. ? No, if comp is true you are certainly emulate (even before the reversal). If comp and platonsim are both true. But if matter exists in a primary way (like Peter D. Jones describes it), then the UDA leads to our non turing emulability. UDA shows I am turing emulable = physics emerge from number relations. The UDA might be capable of showing that somethign like physics *would* emerge form a UD *if* it existed. But you don't get the existence of a UD for free -- you have to assume Platonism or something else. If the UD doesn't exist, then physics is emerging from something else, presumably matter. The argument has to assume the necessary existence of the UD. (If it is possible that the UD doesn't exist, it is possible that physics is emerging from semething else) It is difficult to see what would entail that except Platonism. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 17-août-06, à 16:41, 1Z a écrit : Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical structures *exist* independently of you, not just that they are true independently of you. What is the difference between the proposition it exists a prime number is true independently of me, and the proposition it exists a prime number (independently of me)? The contextual meaning of exists. What is the difference between Sherlock Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street and Sherlock Holmes lives ? I can see a nuance, and that is why I prefer to use the expression Arithmetical Realism (AR) (and then I always define what I mean by that) instead of platonism (which I prefer to reserve when Plato is actually mentionned, like with the Theatetical definition of knowledge). A claim about truth as opposed to existence cannot support the conclusion that matter does not actually exist. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
David, your post has wits. Yet it reminded me of 'atheism' which starts from the belief it is supposed to deny. I am not an atheist, because I do not know what to deny: what do people 'think' to call god? My question to comp was (and I think it is different from your position): Let me IN into learning about 'comp' from the outside, the 'no comp' mindset. When you say: Comp is false you accepted it and argue about IT. I ask What is comp - if I am outside the entire mindset and don't assume? Bruno is VERY logical and knowledgeable, but his 'mindset' includes numbers and mathematical thinking. I got a lot of good responses from him to my questions and all started from some in theory assumption (e.g. 'assuming comp', etc.). What if we do NOT assume it? I asked about 'numbers' stripped from counting and quantities. Otherwise they are only quantizing adjectives (6 what?). (Like the 'color green'?) Pure mathematics works differently, it even substitutes the numbers with other symbols (yes, 'symbols', if we do not think of the 'what'). I differentiate an applied math in the sciences, working with quantities identified within the limited topical models of the science. This is another subject, - I want to concentrate here on the numbers concept. Ideas 'exist' relationally (and some are translated into physical (materialistic) features). To get to 'ideas' a receiving observer is necessary with enough complexity to accept them. (Then we (our mind) interpret them into the perception of reality). In my older thinking (prone to be revised) I defined my 'information' concept as some difference 'accepted' into an observer. The difference can be e.g. an electric (so called) potential and the acceptor )observer!) even a polar(!) moelcule(!), - or at a different level: a difference, like a strange societal story is accepted by a reader of G.B.Shaw (observer). (Existence in this ontology was the difference itself, observer anything that accepts information.) When the developing human 'mind' reached the complexity to identify 'numbers' the numbers enetered the human thinking. Does it make sense to argue a homoiusion war whether they existed before they could be accepted? For 'us' they started to exist when our mind became capable to 'accept' such information. It is only semantical in our syntax to call this situation an invention. It is only semantical in our syntax to call this situation an invention. Then we started to count and think in quantities using the newly invented 'numbers'. But what are these 'numbers' without the counting and quantizing? Do they have a quantitative original meaning? Originally the 'unit' was 2, and '1' was half of it in certain cases. In my language which is older than the Indo - European ones a man with 1 eye is half-eyed and with 1 hand or foot i said to have lost his half hand or foot. Yet a man is 1, a sable is 1, not 2. Many was 5, seemingly from the fingers, and in Russian grammar they have a dual case and a big plural above 5. (Also: a 'unit' involves more than one by its meaning). David, I do not go all along your long post. These remarks came to mind - I don't write a dissertation. Your idea was an intreresting one. My original reaction (above) was a reminiscence to a 'believer's' challenge that I should 'disprove' god and my answer was: only, if you prove something to exist can I refute it. Best wishes John Mikes - Original Message - From: David Nyman [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2006 9:41 AM Subject: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology' Comp is false. Let's see where *that* leads. I'm erecting this as a signpost to indicate a direction, and I would beg the list's indulgence in helping me to look in this direction, rather than confining its comments to the ramshackle construction of the signpost itself. My hope is that you will help me to expose whatever is untrue or confused about what follows (I'm sure you will!). But I hope you will also 'catch my drift'. 1) The bit-stream Comp deals with a bit-stream representation of appearance. The theorems of comp process this bit-stream in terms of a formal system, creating a framework within which 'true or 'false' theorems may be evaluated. This system is by its nature closed, or tautological. The statements that can be made, their 'truth' or 'falsehood', are inherent in the axiomatic and operational characteristics of the formal system as applied to the bit-stream. 2) The instantiation In order to implement the comp approach, an instantiation is required that will represent the bit-stream and enact the formal operations. The Turing machine is an idealised version of such an instantiation. A digital computer is a physical version of a TM. Consequently comp may be instantiated in a digital computer, and copied in innumerable media that suitably preserve its informational structure. 3) Dimensionality The bit-stream
RE: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Bruno Marchal writes: There is no authoritative argument in math. There are fashion, prejudice, stubbornness and many human things like that, but nobody serious in math will believe something because the boss said so. Interesting: this marks mathematics as different from just about every other academic field. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Brent Meeker writes: Empirical science is universe-specific: eg., any culture, no matter how bizarre its psychology compared to ours, would work out that sodium reacts exothermically with water in a universe similar to our own, but not in a universe where physical laws and fundamental constants are very different from what we are familiar with. Mathematical and logical truths, on the other hand, are true in all possible worlds. But this is really ciruclar because we define possible in terms of obeying our rules of logic and reason. I don't say we're wrong to do so - it's the best we can do. But it doesn't prove anything. I think the concept of logic, mathematics, and truth are all in our head and only consequently in the world. Isn't this like saying that a physical object must be perceived iin order to exist? We define physical phenomena in terms of the effect they have on our senses or scientific instruments, but we assume that they are still there when they are not being observed. The lack of contingency on cultural, psychological or physical factors makes these truths fundamentally different; whether you call them perfect, analytic or necessary truths is a matter of taste. If you directly perceived Hilbert space vectors, which QM tells us describe the world, would you count different objects? I think these truths are contingent on how we see the world. I think there's a good argument that any being that is both intelligent and evolved will have the same mathematics - that's the jist of Cooper's book. If we lived in a world where whenever two objects were put together, a third one magically appeared, would that mean that (a) 1+1=3, because we would think that 1+1=3 (b) 1+1=2, but we would mistakenly think 1+1=3 Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal): Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just the belief that the propositions of elementary arithmetic are independent of you. Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical structures *exist* independently of you, not just that they are true independently of you. What's the difference? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
John
Thanks for taking the trouble to express your thoughts at such length.
I won't say too much now, as I have to leave shortly to meet a long
lost relative - from Hungary! However, I just want to make sure it's
clear, both for you and the list, that:
Comp is false. Let's see where *that* leads.
isn't intended as a definitive claim that comp *is* false. Rather, *if*
it is false, in what ways specifically, and what are the alternatives?
Can they be stated as clearly and explicitly as Bruno is trying to do
for his approach ('to see where it leads')? Hence the 'anti-roadmap',
or perhaps better - 'another roadmap', or some ideas for one. Most of
the thoughts in it were originally expressed in some earlier postings
on 'The Fabric of Reality' list, which Bruno was kind enough to copy to
this list. Anyway, it's intended as a point of departure (for me
certainly) and I look forward to some strenuous critiques.
One misgiving I have, now that I've finally grasped (I think) that the
comp 'theology' entails 'faith' in the number realm, is that by this
token it seeks to provide a TOE (Bruno, am I wrong about this?) That
is, beginning with an assertion of 'faith' in UDA + the number realm,
we seek to axiomatise and 'prove' a complete theory of our origins.
Bruno is a very modest person, but I worry about the 'modesty' of the
goal. Of course, it's highly probable that I just misunderstand this
point. However, I'm having trouble with my faith in numbers,
monseigneur. My own intuition begins from my own indexical
self-assertion, my necessity, generalised to an inclusive
self-asserting necessity extending outwards indefinitely. I don't look
for a way to 'get behind' this, and to this extent I don't seek a TOE,
because I can't believe that 'everything' (despite the name of this
list) is theoretically assimilable. This may well be blindness more
than modesty, however.
Having said this, of course in a spirit of learning I'm trying to
understand and adopt *as if* true the comp assumptions, and continue to
put my best efforts into getting my head around Bruno's roadmap as it
emerges. I have a lot of experience of changing my mind (and maybe I'll
get a better one!)
David
David,
your post has wits. Yet it reminded me of 'atheism' which starts from the
belief it is supposed to deny. I am not an atheist, because I do not know
what to deny: what do people 'think' to call god?
My question to comp was (and I think it is different from your position):
Let me IN into learning about 'comp' from the outside, the 'no comp'
mindset.
When you say: Comp is false you accepted it and argue about IT.
I ask What is comp - if I am outside the entire mindset and don't assume?
Bruno is VERY logical and knowledgeable, but his 'mindset' includes numbers
and mathematical thinking. I got a lot of good responses from him to my
questions and all started from some in theory assumption (e.g. 'assuming
comp', etc.). What if we do NOT assume it?
I asked about 'numbers' stripped from counting and quantities. Otherwise
they are only quantizing adjectives (6 what?). (Like the 'color green'?)
Pure mathematics works differently, it even substitutes the numbers with
other symbols (yes, 'symbols', if we do not think of the 'what'). I
differentiate an applied math in the sciences, working with quantities
identified within the limited topical models of the science. This is another
subject, - I want to concentrate here on the numbers concept.
Ideas 'exist' relationally (and some are translated into physical
(materialistic) features). To get to 'ideas' a receiving observer is
necessary with enough complexity to accept them. (Then we (our mind)
interpret them into the perception of reality).
In my older thinking (prone to be revised) I defined my 'information'
concept as some difference 'accepted' into an observer. The difference can
be e.g. an electric (so called) potential and the acceptor )observer!) even
a polar(!) moelcule(!), - or at a different level: a difference, like a
strange societal story is accepted by a reader of G.B.Shaw (observer).
(Existence in this ontology was the difference itself, observer anything
that accepts information.)
When the developing human 'mind' reached the complexity to identify
'numbers' the numbers enetered the human thinking. Does it make sense to
argue a homoiusion war whether they existed before they could be accepted?
For 'us' they started to exist when our mind became capable to 'accept' such
information.
It is only semantical in our syntax to call this situation an invention.
It is only semantical in our syntax to call this situation an invention.
Then we started to count and think in quantities using the newly invented
'numbers'. But what are these 'numbers' without the counting and quantizing?
Do they have a quantitative original meaning? Originally the 'unit' was 2,
and '1' was half of it in certain cases. In my language which is
RE: Dual-Aspect Science
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
Hi,
A lot of the dialog below is a mismatch of ideas which indicates that I
have underestimated the degree of difficulty to be expected in getting
the
If they are different substructures within a further (different)
structure, they are also unified, in that sense and to that extent.
The contentious claims here are:
a) That being multiple instances of the same structure is the only
way things can be unified.
No there is only 1 structure. Within it are layers of members of different
classes of substructure. Space, Atoms. etc
b) Things unified in that sense are devoid of any difference or
separaration whatsoever.
They are 'difference' and 'separation' are not the same. The appearance of
separation is a physical claim. Imagine an ice-entity living in an ice-cube.
The rest of the ice cube looks like space. The ice entity can move around in
it freely. But they are made of the same (differently organised) stuff.
Absolutely everything is included in the
structure. No exceptions. Space, atoms, scientists, qualia. All
interactions at all 'scales' (scale itself) are all interactions
between
different parts of the one structure. To interact at all is to
interact
with another part of the structure.
another in what sense ? You just said there is *no* concept
of separation.
eg. Matter passes through space. It is interacting with itself. Matter
'looks' separate to space, but deep down its not. The appearance of
separateness is how it is presented to us.
It is entirely possible that they are unified deep down and
separate on the surface. Separation need not be dismissed
as appearance.
Q. If you draw a surface boundary around a human what is inside it?
A. If 99,999,999,999,999,999,999 are space. We are the remaining 1 part.
We are all but not there.
There is a fundamental and intrinsically intimate connection between every
single little atomic nuance of us and space we inhabit. The atoms' mobility
within space is an act of cooperation between the atoms and the space they
inhabit through their joint 'parent' structure. There is no actual
separateness, only behavioural separateness.
The idea of there being anything else
('not' the structure) is meaningless. If there is any 'thing' in the
structure then the balance of the structure expressed a perfect
un-thing.
There is nothing else. That is the coincept I am exploring.
None of that has anything to do with your claim that there is
a single *type* of structure, and that everything is composed of
recursive combinations of its instances.
It may be the case that everything is ultimately part of one
strucutre,
but
that does not imply that everything within the Great Strucutre is
self-similar.
The structure is hierarchical layers of organisation only. Members of a
layer share morphological invariance to some characteristics of layer
layer. Properties are inherited by child layers from paretn layers. All
the layers are contained by each other.
How very c++-ey.
Do you have any evidence, or are you appelaing to the comfort
zone of Sofware Engineers ?
I'm not appealing to any comfort zones. I'm trying to convey ideas in words
that people can follow and relate to. These concepts are well traveled and
explored and the principles can be easily applied to a 'theory of
everything'
Their presentation bestows intrinsic knowledge as a measurement to
the
embedded structure member called the scientist. This is knowledge as
intrinsic intentionality.
Are yu saying that qualia are marked by intentionality ?
That would be novel.
,, qualia are intrinsic, consciously accessible, NON-INTENTIONAL
features of sense-data and other non-physical phenomenal objects that
are responsible for their phenomenal character.
When we experience redness it is painted onto some'thing'.
Not if it is adream or hallucination ,
This is simply internally generated qualia derived from memory rather than
sensory feed.
or the result of pressing your eyeball.
This is a qualia generator mis-generating due to malfunctioning sensory
feed.
Neither of which actually change the argument at all. Machinery embeds
'aboutness', but it doesn't always have to be perfect or even right!
Mechanisms have normal and aberrant/pathological behaviour. Any cogent story
of qualia must account for both.
You could just as well say the apparaent behaviour of the universe.
Yes. The universe literally can be the whole, single structure.
All of this is derived from a first person presentation of a
measurement.
Ergo science is entirely first operson based.
The fact that science happens to be performed by persons
doesn't make it irreducibly first-personal. That would
depend on whether persons can remove themselves from
scientific descriptions. As it happens they can. That
is still true with
RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Peter Jones writes: A claim about truth as opposed to existence cannot support the conclusion that matter does not actually exist. It can if you can show that the mental does not supervene on the physical. This is far from a generally accepted fact, but there but I am not yet aware of convincing arguments against the sort of challenge posed to the supervenience theory by eg. Tim Maudlin - unless you reject computationalism. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Bruno: is your
I do indeed find plausible that the number six is perfect,...
an argument?
I asked about the sixness of six, without counting or quantizing. I honor
your opinion, but it is no evidence. 6 is so nice round, VI is not.
If you want, numbers are what makes any counting possible
No, I want: any counting makes numbers possible. On the abacus you may
count or calculate without numbers if you use identical bullets, by
comparing the length of the strings as your foot, your inch, or your elbow.
Why has 6 'divisors'? because my math teacher said so?
I see a vicious circularity here:
numbers are identified with characteristics which are said to be caused by
the numbers. Assigned characteristics, used as justification for the
character. All assumed to be so. If I do not count my fingers, why is 3
different from 5?
If 6 is so perfect, why do we generally use a decimal system? We can even
more compute in binary and even more in 24ary (English) or in 36ary
(Hungarian)
with strings (=words) arithmetic (=syntax) and sum (=sentence - meaning).
So what is the perfect sixness in 6? Or the imperfect nineness in 9 (upside
down)?
You tell me and I will be ready to calculate a Rieman integral or a Lagrange
series.
John Mikes
PS:
When my son was 4 we used 2 buses to the grandparents: #5 and #25. My son
was a good observer. He knew a '5'. On Sunday morning he pointed in the
newspaper to a #2 and said: a Twenty.
- Original Message -
From: Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Wednesday, August 16, 2006 9:28 AM
Subject: Re: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Ante diem XVII-um calendas Septembris as Aug. 15 (not XVI as 32-16)
John M wrote:
Bruno:
What is - 6 - ?
Perfect number, you say.
If I do NOT count - or quantize, does it have ANY meaning at all?
Again we are discussing the arithmetical realism (which I just assume).
To be clear on that hypothesis, I do indeed find plausible that the
number six is perfect, even in the case the branes would not have
collide, no big bang, no physical universe.
Six is perfect just because its divisors are 1, 2, and 3; and that
1+2+3 = 6. Not because I know that. I blieve the contrary: it is the
independent truth of 6 = sum of its proper divisors than eventually
I, and you, can learn it.
I don't see sense in saying it is more than 5 and less than 7 if I do
not
know the meaning of 5 and 7 as well. And of 6 of course.
I agree. It does not make sense YOU SAYING that 5 6 7, if YOU
don't know the meaning of 5, and 6, and 7; unless you are lucky when
deciding to say random sentences ('course).
It has nothing to do with the fact that 5 6 7, independently of you
and me. Just keep silent, in case you are not sure about the meaning of
5, 6, and 7.
Without quantification, what does 6 mean? Why is it perfect? In
what?
Try to cut out 'counting' and 'quantities' - let us regard the symbol
'6'.
What does it symbolize?
I can understand it in 2+4=6 on an abacus, but there it is 'counting'
bullets.
If you want, numbers are what makes any counting possible.
What is it in the preceding line?
In old Rome 8-3=6 was the right result (as in their back-counting
calendar
as 8,7,6 - they included the starting (day) into the subtraction), now
8-2
make 6 - 6 what?
It is not because some country put salt on pancakes that pancakes do
not exist there. Roman where writing 8 -3 for us 8 - 2. It is like
saying 3*7 = 25 on planet TETRA. They mean 3*7 = 21, they just put it
differently.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
- Original Message -
From: David Nyman [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Everything List everything-list@googlegroups.com
Sent: Thursday, August 17, 2006 8:16 PM
Subject: Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Dave,
thanks fir the friendly and decent words. It was not questionable that you
did not 'attack' comp as false, I reflected principally as a
discussion-technique. I like Bruno a lot and use some not-so-kind
argumentation style lately to tease out from him a stronger argument.
We agree in the goal of learning. You are more of a professional than I am.
John
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
...
John
Thanks for taking the trouble to express your thoughts at such length.
I won't say too much now, as I have to leave shortly to meet a long
lost relative - from Hungary! However, I just want to make sure it's
clear, both for you and the list, that:
Comp is false. Let's see where *that* leads.
isn't intended as a definitive claim that comp *is* false. Rather, *if*
it is false, in what ways specifically, and what are the alternatives?
Can they be stated as clearly and explicitly as Bruno is trying to do
for his approach ('to see where it leads')? Hence the 'anti-roadmap',
or perhaps better - 'another roadmap', or some ideas for one. Most of
the thoughts in it were originally expressed in some earlier postings
on 'The Fabric of Reality' list, which Bruno was kind enough to copy to
this list. Anyway, it's intended as a point of departure (for me
certainly) and I look forward to some strenuous critiques.
One misgiving I have, now that I've finally grasped (I think) that the
comp 'theology' entails 'faith' in the number realm, is that by this
token it seeks to provide a TOE (Bruno, am I wrong about this?) That
is, beginning with an assertion of 'faith' in UDA + the number realm,
we seek to axiomatise and 'prove' a complete theory of our origins.
Bruno is a very modest person, but I worry about the 'modesty' of the
goal. Of course, it's highly probable that I just misunderstand this
point. However, I'm having trouble with my faith in numbers,
monseigneur. My own intuition begins from my own indexical
self-assertion, my necessity, generalised to an inclusive
self-asserting necessity extending outwards indefinitely. I don't look
for a way to 'get behind' this, and to this extent I don't seek a TOE,
because I can't believe that 'everything' (despite the name of this
list) is theoretically assimilable. This may well be blindness more
than modesty, however.
Having said this, of course in a spirit of learning I'm trying to
understand and adopt *as if* true the comp assumptions, and continue to
put my best efforts into getting my head around Bruno's roadmap as it
emerges. I have a lot of experience of changing my mind (and maybe I'll
get a better one!)
David
truncated
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RE: Dual-Aspect Science
I don't think there is a problem with science, but only with some
scientist (and alas with those who are often more refer too in
popularization).
Actually I don't believe in any scientific field. I believe only in
scientific attitude, which is almost just modesty, along with
curiosity, and some amount of willingness to share.
Science, defined as the fruit of that curious but modest attitude, can
only go from doubt to more doubt. Despite a growing knowledge,
ignorance grows quicker. This can be illustrated with the G and G*
logic, but at this step, it would be useless technic. I will try to go
back to the roadmap ...
Scientists are part of the natural world, like elephants. Scientific
behaviour, like elephant behaviour, has invariants across the entire set of
scientific disciplines (humanity) as for elephanity(!) = elephants behaving
elephantly. Not many invariants, but a few. One of those is creativity, of
which the aspects you speak are attributes and not all are adopted well by
all scientists, as you point out But there are invariants to be found,
even if they are not always adopted I have read piles of literature,
talked to many scientists. I sit in the midst of scientists every day all
day and see what they do. I swim in the literature.
Scientific behaviour can be expressed as a natural law like any other law. I
have constructed a prototype of what it may be like. The difference between
this law and all others is that it is implicit in scientists in that unlike
any other law of nature it has never been explicitly formulated, but is
passed on by mimicry. The complete set of all M+1 currently available 'laws
of nature' (any paper in any scientific journal expressing empirical results
qualifies to go into this set) is:
T = {t0, t1 ..tN, .. tJ, b1, b2, .bK ., bM }
These are the laws of appearances, the T-aspect. The special law t0 is the
one for scientific behaviour. The status of these laws is as follows:
By acting 'as-if' t0 was literally driving the natural world you can predict
(statistically) the behaviour of a scientist.
By acting 'as-if' tx was literally driving the natural world you can predict
(statistically) the behaviour of those things that were used to formulate
tx. For example newton's 2nd law f = ma reformulated into the form of the
set T members would be one such law - this would enable a human to predict
the behaviour of mass m.
All the laws in the set T can be treated as beliefs necessary to drive
behaviour of a HUMAN in order that the natural world be predictable. They
say NOTHING about the actual underlying causal necessities of the natural
world. That claim cannot be made: there is no evidence. Novel Technology
proves the laws as predictive and therefore that the causal parent = the
human behaviour resulting from believing in the laws is adequate...remember
the laws are formulated with evidence of behaviour as presented by qualia
into the head of scientists. To the best of my ability the law t0 is as
follows:
tN =The natural world in insert context behaves as follows: insert
behaviour
t0 =The natural world in the context of being scientific about the
natural world behaves as follows: to formulate statements of type tN,
each of which is a statementNote 1 of regularityNote 2 in a specific
contextNote 3 in the natural world arrived at through the process of
critical argumentNote 4 and that in principle can be refuted through the
process of experiencingNote 5 evidenceNote 6 of the regularity Note 7.
Where I have embedded the notes down below. They don't matter much in what I
am trying to convey. Creativity is in them. Objectivity is in them.
Just like a thought about thinking is a member of the set of all possible
thoughts, the law t0 is a law of type tN about the formulation of laws of
type tN.
The set T does not have to be consistent. Different laws in set T can
contradict each other. That is they can be egregiously wrong outside their
context. The set T is growing exponentially day by day. Each member of set T
represents a net brain state (achieved during dynamic brain activity)
comprising the holding of a belief about the natural world by a scientist.
That is all that is claimed.
The property of the natural world that enables t0 is intrinsic (innate) to
brain material: the extraction of invariance from perceptual fields. The
accuracy of t0 is proven by observation of history in that it has been used
all along by scientists and can be seen to be in operation all along even
though any explicit t0 at any time could be very very wrong (it was never
written down until now)!
t0, as a 'law of science' is NOT 'scientific method'. Scientific method is
just detail inside the overall behaviour. This law t0 is novel. It is not in
science literature and it is not in philosophy literature and it is not in
anthropology literature.
Your characterisation of scientific behaviour is very romantic but it is not
scientific. It fails because it does
RE: Dual-Aspect Science ooops
I don't think there is a problem with science, but only with some
scientist (and alas with those who are often more refer too in
popularization).
Actually I don't believe in any scientific field. I believe only in
scientific attitude, which is almost just modesty, along with
curiosity, and some amount of willingness to share.
Science, defined as the fruit of that curious but modest attitude, can
only go from doubt to more doubt. Despite a growing knowledge,
ignorance grows quicker. This can be illustrated with the G and G*
logic, but at this step, it would be useless technic. I will try to go
back to the roadmap ...
Scientists are part of the natural world, like elephants. Scientific
behaviour, like elephant behaviour, has invariants across the entire set of
scientific disciplines (humanity) as for elephanity(!) = elephants behaving
elephantly. Not many invariants, but a few. One of those is creativity, of
which the aspects you speak are attributes and not all are adopted well by
all scientists, as you point out But there are invariants to be found,
even if they are not always adopted I have read piles of literature,
talked to many scientists. I sit in the midst of scientists every day all
day and see what they do. I swim in the literature.
Scientific behaviour can be expressed as a natural law like any other law. I
have constructed a prototype of what it may be like. The difference between
this law and all others is that it is implicit in scientists in that unlike
any other law of nature it has never been explicitly formulated, but is
passed on by mimicry. The complete set of all J+1 currently available 'laws
of nature' (any paper in any scientific journal expressing empirical results
qualifies to go into this set) is:
T = {t0, t1 ..tN, .. tJ } ooops! cut and paste error!
These are the laws of appearances, the T-aspect. The special law t0 is the
one for scientific behaviour. The status of these laws is as follows:
By acting 'as-if' t0 was literally driving the natural world you can predict
(statistically) the behaviour of a scientist.
By acting 'as-if' tx was literally driving the natural world you can predict
(statistically) the behaviour of those things that were used to formulate
tx. For example newton's 2nd law f = ma reformulated into the form of the
set T members would be one such law - this would enable a human to predict
the behaviour of mass m.
All the laws in the set T can be treated as beliefs necessary to drive
behaviour of a HUMAN in order that the natural world be predictable. They
say NOTHING about the actual underlying causal necessities of the natural
world. That claim cannot be made: there is no evidence. Novel Technology
proves the laws as predictive and therefore that the causal parent = the
human behaviour resulting from believing in the laws is adequate...remember
the laws are formulated with evidence of behaviour as presented by qualia
into the head of scientists. To the best of my ability the law t0 is as
follows:
tN =The natural world in insert context behaves as follows: insert
behaviour
t0 =The natural world in the context of being scientific about the
natural world behaves as follows: to formulate statements of type tN,
each of which is a statementNote 1 of regularityNote 2 in a specific
contextNote 3 in the natural world arrived at through the process of
critical argumentNote 4 and that in principle can be refuted through the
process of experiencingNote 5 evidenceNote 6 of the regularity Note 7.
Where I have embedded the notes down below. They don't matter much in what I
am trying to convey. Creativity is in them. Objectivity is in them.
Just like a thought about thinking is a member of the set of all possible
thoughts, the law t0 is a law of type tN about the formulation of laws of
type tN.
The set T does not have to be consistent. Different laws in set T can
contradict each other. That is they can be egregiously wrong outside their
context. The set T is growing exponentially day by day. Each member of set T
represents a net brain state (achieved during dynamic brain activity)
comprising the holding of a belief about the natural world by a scientist.
That is all that is claimed.
The property of the natural world that enables t0 is intrinsic (innate) to
brain material: the extraction of invariance from perceptual fields. The
accuracy of t0 is proven by observation of history in that it has been used
all along by scientists and can be seen to be in operation all along even
though any explicit t0 at any time could be very very wrong (it was never
written down until now)!
t0, as a 'law of science' is NOT 'scientific method'. Scientific method is
just detail inside the overall behaviour. This law t0 is novel. It is not in
science literature and it is not in philosophy literature and it is not in
anthropology literature.
Your characterisation of scientific behaviour is very romantic but it is not
scientific. It fails because
Re: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: Empirical science is universe-specific: eg., any culture, no matter how bizarre its psychology compared to ours, would work out that sodium reacts exothermically with water in a universe similar to our own, but not in a universe where physical laws and fundamental constants are very different from what we are familiar with. Mathematical and logical truths, on the other hand, are true in all possible worlds. But this is really ciruclar because we define possible in terms of obeying our rules of logic and reason. I don't say we're wrong to do so - it's the best we can do. But it doesn't prove anything. I think the concept of logic, mathematics, and truth are all in our head and only consequently in the world. Isn't this like saying that a physical object must be perceived iin order to exist? We define physical phenomena in terms of the effect they have on our senses or scientific instruments, but we assume that they are still there when they are not being observed. I don't see the analogy with defining possible worlds as those obeying some logic and then saying that logic is a prior or analytic because it obtains in all possible worlds. I agree that logically possible is broader than what we think is nomologically possible. The lack of contingency on cultural, psychological or physical factors makes these truths fundamentally different; whether you call them perfect, analytic or necessary truths is a matter of taste. If you directly perceived Hilbert space vectors, which QM tells us describe the world, would you count different objects? I think these truths are contingent on how we see the world. I think there's a good argument that any being that is both intelligent and evolved will have the same mathematics - that's the jist of Cooper's book. If we lived in a world where whenever two objects were put together, a third one magically appeared, would that mean that (a) 1+1=3, because we would think that 1+1=3 (b) 1+1=2, but we would mistakenly think 1+1=3 I say (a), but someone might still invent Peano arithmetic in which 1+1=2. It would be called non-standard arithmetic and only a few, ill regarded mathematicians would study it. :-) Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal): Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just the belief that the propositions of elementary arithmetic are independent of you. Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical structures *exist* independently of you, not just that they are true independently of you. What's the difference? Stathis Papaioannou You could regard the theorems of arithmetic as just being relative to Peano's axioms: 1+1=2 assuming Peano Somewhat as Bruno presents his theorems as relative to the axiom of COMP. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Quantum Mysteries
Norman Samish wrote: - Original Message - From: Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Brent, you say, . . . It seems to me that an information theoretic analysis should be able to place a lower bound on how small a probability can be and not be zero. Doesn't a lower limit on probability repudiate the notion of Tegmark, Vilenkin, et al, that there are necessarily duplicate worlds to ours, if only we go out far enough? I don't see why these questions are related. There are only *necessarily* duplicate worlds if there is an infinity of worlds of a higher order than the information content of a world. If you repudiate duplicate worlds, do you also repudiate infinite space? Space could be infinite without there being duplicate worlds. Repudiate is too strong a word. I doubt they are relevant. E.g., Alex Vilenkin (Beyond the Big Bang, Natural History, July/August 2006, pp 42 - 47) says, A new cosmic worldview holds that countless replicas of Earth, inhabited by our clones, are scattered throughout the cosmos. Vilenkin's view is that this conclusion arises from Alan Guth's theory of inflation and false vacuum put forth in 1980. The unstable false vacuum (which eternally inflates exponentially) has regions where random quantum fluctuations cause decay to a true vacuum. You can't go to those different universes. Their supposed existence is entirely dependent certain theories being correct. But those theories are contingent on suppositions about a quantum theory of spacetime - which is not in hand. So, while I'm willing to entertain them as hypotheses, I neither accept nor deny their existence. The difference in energy of the false vacuum and the true vacuum results in a big bang. In the infinity of the false vacuum there are, therefore, an infinity of big bangs. The big bangs don't consume the false vacuum because it inflates faster than the big bangs expand. Vilenkin figures the distance to our clone at about 10 raised to the 10^90 power, in meters. (This roughly agrees with Tegmark's number.) (An unanswered question is where and why did this initial infinity of high-energy false vacuum originate?) If one can originate, then any number can. But I don't see that such an infinity has any implications. Now 10 raised to the 10^90 power is a big number. Therefore the ratio of duplicate Earths to all worlds is exceedingly small - but not zero! Do you think it should be zero? I think it might be of measure zero. Or there might not be any duplicate universes. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
