Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Brent Meeker writes: > > >>>Even if you say that, there is still a sense in which arithmetic is >>>independent of the >>>real world. The same can be said of Euclidian geometry: it follows from >>>Euclid's axioms >>>*despite* the fact that real space is not Euclidian. The fact that real >>>space is not >>>Euclidian means that Euclidian geometry does not describe the real world, >>>not that >>>it is false or non-existent. >>> >>>Stathis Papaioannou >> >>But the fact that a theorem is true relative to some axioms doesn't make it >>true >>or existent. Some mathematicians I know regard it as a game. Is true that a >>bishop can only move diagonally? It is relative to chess. Does chess exist? >>It does in our heads. But without us it wouldn't. > > > What more could we possibly ask of a theorem other than that it be true > relative to some > axioms? That a theorem should describe some aspect of the real world, or that > it should > be discovered by some mathematician, is contingent on the nature of the real > world, but that > it is true is not. That it is a true description of the real world, or that it is a true theorem relative to the axioms? It is a mistake to conflate the two, which I suspect is done by people claiming mathematical theorems are true. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Brent Meeker writes: > > >>>Even if you say that, there is still a sense in which arithmetic is >>>independent of the >>>real world. The same can be said of Euclidian geometry: it follows from >>>Euclid's axioms >>>*despite* the fact that real space is not Euclidian. The fact that real >>>space is not >>>Euclidian means that Euclidian geometry does not describe the real world, >>>not that >>>it is false or non-existent. >>> >>>Stathis Papaioannou >> >>But the fact that a theorem is true relative to some axioms doesn't make it >>true >>or existent. Some mathematicians I know regard it as a game. Is true that a >>bishop can only move diagonally? It is relative to chess. Does chess exist? >>It does in our heads. But without us it wouldn't. > > > What more could we possibly ask of a theorem other than that it be true > relative to some > axioms? That a theorem should describe some aspect of the real world, or that > it should > be discovered by some mathematician, is contingent on the nature of the real > world, but that > it is true is not. That it is a true description of the real world, or that it is a true theorem relative to the axioms. It is a mistake to conflate the two, which I suspect is done by people claiming mathematical theorems are true. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Günther writes: > Well, let's see: in Alice in Wonderland, Humpty Dumpty fell off a > wall. This is true, isn't it? It is certainly true independent > of our minds. Indeed, it is true in such a way that even when > all humans have died, this universe will have a contained a life-form > which produced an author who wrote a book in which Humpty Dumpty > fell off a wall. But neither Humpty Dumpty nor the fact that he > fell off a wall were ever true in this universe - only that this > story was written, and that many people read about it and could > converse about it. > > So if you believe that numbers have an independent existence, then you > would definitely also have to believe that Humpty Dumpty exists. > Both are products of the mind. Either both exist, or both don't > (other than as brain patterns). > > As much as I would like Humpty Dumpty to exist, I'm afraid that > it is not so. The existence of numbers is not like the existence of objects, and I don't think that most mathematical Platonists would say that it is. It is indeed true independent of our minds that, if someone were to write a story in which Humpty Dumpty falls off the wall, then Humpty Dumpty would fall off the wall in that story. That is different to saying that Humpty Dumpty actually did fall off the wall in the real world, such as it is. It is also true that given the axioms of Euclidian geometry, the angles in a triangle add up to 180 degrees, and this is so independently of whether the angles of a triangle in the real world add up to 180 degrees, or whether Euclid ever lived. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Brent Meeker writes: > 1Z wrote: > > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > ... > >>I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system > >>must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur, > > > > > > I've explained that several times: computer programmes contain > > if-then statements. > > > > > >>other than that otherwise any physical system could be seen as implementing > >>any computation, which does not seem to me a good reason. In any case, > >>Maudlin shows that the requirement for handling counterfactuals leads to > >>a situation where of two systems with identical physical activity, one is > >>conscious and the other not. > > > > > > If two systems differ counterfactually, they are not physically > > identical. > > I don't think I understand this either. Computer programs contain if-then > statements which branch the process depending on the data input to the > program. > But there is no real distinction between data an program. So if you insist > that computed intelligence or consciousness depends on counterfactuals in > the > program that seems to me to be the same as insisting that the computation is > implemented in some way that divides it from input data, i.e. it is in an > environment. > > I'm sympathetic to this view. I think intelligence is relative to an > environment. But I'm not sure what computationalists think of this; I > believe > they suppose the environment can be simulated too and so then the whole thing > is > a closed system and there are no conuterfactual branchings. > > Brent Meeker Is it possible that we are currently actors in a single, deterministic, non-branching computer program, with the illusion of free will and if-then contingency in general being due to the fact that we don't know the details of how the program will play out? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Brent Meeker writes: > > Even if you say that, there is still a sense in which arithmetic is > > independent of the > > real world. The same can be said of Euclidian geometry: it follows from > > Euclid's axioms > > *despite* the fact that real space is not Euclidian. The fact that real > > space is not > > Euclidian means that Euclidian geometry does not describe the real world, > > not that > > it is false or non-existent. > > > > Stathis Papaioannou > > But the fact that a theorem is true relative to some axioms doesn't make it > true > or existent. Some mathematicians I know regard it as a game. Is true that a > bishop can only move diagonally? It is relative to chess. Does chess exist? > It does in our heads. But without us it wouldn't. What more could we possibly ask of a theorem other than that it be true relative to some axioms? That a theorem should describe some aspect of the real world, or that it should be discovered by some mathematician, is contingent on the nature of the real world, but that it is true is not. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): > > I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system > > must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur, > > I've explained that several times: computer programmes contain > if-then statements. > > > other than that otherwise any physical system could be seen as implementing > > any computation, which does not seem to me a good reason. In any case, > > Maudlin shows that the requirement for handling counterfactuals leads to > > a situation where of two systems with identical physical activity, one is > > conscious and the other not. > > If two systems differ counterfactually, they are not physically > identical. What about an inputless computer program, running deterministically like a recording. Would that count as a program at all, and could it be a conscious program, given that computationalism is true? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Are First Person prime?
Peter Jones writes: > > > > But the important point is that the temporal sequence does not itself > > > > make a difference > > > > to subjective experience. > > > > > > We don't actually know that it is possible that > > > there might be some flicker effect. > > > > Not necessarily. I'm suggesting that the actual physical events are > > *exactly* the same, > > just their order is different. If the world were created 5 minutes ago, > > complete with > > fossils, ruins, false memories etc., you could not be aware of this on the > > basis of any > > observation - by definition, otherwise the illusion would not be perfect. > > This is of course > > no reason to believe that the world was created 5 minutes ago; but it does > > mean that > > the absence of a sensation of having just flickered into existence is no > > evidence *against* > > this theory. > > My original point stands. There is no evidence *for* the theory. If > the present > state is determined by more than a 0-width time slice preceding it, > then > a physical process cannot be arbitrarily sliced up. Your original point was that the continuous flow of consciousness is evidence against a block universe. It is not, whether the time slices are of finite or infinitesimal duration. I'm not sure what you mean by the last sentence either: are you suggesting that time is quantised rather than continuous, and if so how is that evidence against a block universe? > Computationalism does not help, because computationalism requries > counterfactuals. I don't see why it does, or why it makes any difference to the present question if it does. > > > > Would you say that it is in theory possible for the subjective > > > > passage of time to be as we know it if the blocks were not > > > > infinitesimal, but lasted for > > > > a second, so that the whole ensemble of blocks lasted for a second? > > > > > > There is still duration within blocks > > > > Yes, and... > > > > > > Then what if you > > > > make the blocks shorter in duration and larger in number, progressively > > > > down to > > > > infinitely many blocks of infinitesimal duration: is there room for > > > > dynamism in an > > > > infenitesimal interval? > > > > > > There are such things as infintiessimal velocities... > > > > So if there is room for movement in infinitesimal intervals (or through > > combination of > > infinitesimal intervals) in a linear theory of time, why not with a block > > universe? > > A block universe with movement is just as dynamic universe > (specifically, > a growing universe). The effect of movement would be the same in a block universe as in a linear universe. If time is discrete then in a linear universe movement is the result of a series of static frames of finite duration, like the frames in a film. If time is continuous then in a linear universe movement is the result of a series of static frames of infinitesimal duration. There is no room for movement within a frame in either case - that is what defines it as a frame - but the series of frames creates the effect of movement. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Dual-Aspect Science
Scientists are part of the natural world, like elephants. Scientific
behaviour, like elephant behaviour, has invariants across the entire set of
scientific disciplines (humanity) as for elephanity(!) = elephants behaving
elephantly. Not many invariants, but a few. One of those is creativity, for
example. Not all are adopted well by all scientists. But there are
invariants to be found, even if they are not always adopted
Scientists are regularity in the natural world. There is absolutely no
reason why Scientific behaviour can't be expressed as a natural law like any
other law. Their behaviour is not that of a musician. Their behaviour is not
that of a tax accountant. Whatever their behaviour it is unique and can be
expressed as a basic minimal prescription, a statistic like and other
natural law.
I have constructed a prototype of what it may be like. The difference
between this law and all others is that it is implicit in scientists in that
unlike any other law of nature it has never been explicitly formulated, but
is passed on by mimicry. The complete set of all J+1 currently available
'laws of nature' (any paper in any scientific journal expressing empirical
results qualifies to go into this set) is:
T = {t0, t1 ..tN, .. tJ }
These are the laws of appearances, the T-aspect. The special law t0 is the
one for scientific behaviour. The status of these laws is as follows:
By acting 'as-if' t0 was literally driving the natural world you can predict
(statistically) the behaviour of a scientist.
By acting 'as-if' tx was literally driving the natural world you can predict
(statistically) the behaviour of those things that were used to formulate
tx. For example newton's 2nd law f = ma reformulated into the form of the
set T members would be one such law - this would enable a human to predict
the behaviour of mass m.
All the laws in the set T can be treated as beliefs necessary to drive
behaviour of a HUMAN in order that the natural world be predictable. They
say NOTHING about the actual underlying causal necessities of the natural
world. That claim cannot be made: there is no evidence. Novel Technology
proves the laws as predictive and therefore that the causal parent = the
human behaviour resulting from believing in the laws is adequate...remember
the laws are formulated with evidence of behaviour as presented by qualia
into the head of scientists. To the best of my ability the law t0 is as
follows:
==
tN =The natural world in < insert context> behaves as follows:
t0 =The natural world in behaves as follows: < to formulate statements of type tN,
each of which is a statementNote 1 of regularityNote 2 in a specific
contextNote 3 in the natural world arrived at through the process of
critical argumentNote 4 and that in principle can be refuted through the
process of experiencingNote 5 evidenceNote 6 of the regularity Note 7>.
I have embedded the notes down below. They don't matter much in what I am
trying to convey. Creativity is in them. Objectivity is in them.
Just like a thought about thinking is a member of the set of all possible
thoughts, the law t0 is a law of type tN about the formulation of laws of
type tN.
The set T does not have to be consistent. Different laws in set T can
contradict each other. That is they can be egregiously wrong outside their
context. The set T is growing exponentially day by day. Each member of set T
represents a net brain state (achieved during dynamic brain activity)
comprising the holding of a belief about the natural world by a scientist.
That is all that is claimed.
The property of the natural world that enables t0 is intrinsic (innate) to
brain material: the extraction of invariance from perceptual fields. The
accuracy of t0 is proven by observation of history in that it has been used
all along by scientists and can be seen to be in operation all along even
though any explicit t0 at any time could be very very wrong (it was never
written down until now)!
t0, as a 'law of science' is NOT 'scientific method'. Scientific method is
just detail inside the overall behaviour. This law t0 is novel. It is not in
science literature and it is not in philosophy literature and it is not in
anthropology literature.
Note that I have a second aspect T' ( a new set about underlying structure)
and the pair T and T' form the characterisation of science called dual
aspect. Set T and set T' are not claimed to 'be' the natural world, but
merely be 'about' it. Qualia as scientific evidence are evidence for both T
and T' equally. Natural laws in T' (future) will account for structures that
generate the qualia that are used to formulate the laws T. The system is
quite consistent and empirically backed throughout.
Cheers
Colin Hales
t0 Notes:
Please note that the detail included in these notes is not intended to be
complete or even appropriately configured. It is merely intended to be a
prototyp
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
> > > > 1Z wrote: > >> Not even remotely. I fact, what I have said can be written as two valid >> syllogisms. >> >> Existence is availability for causal interaction >> Numbers are not available for causal interaction >> Numbers do not exist >> >> Platonism is the claim that numbers exist >> Numbers do not exist >> Platonism is false > > Wonderful! > What about real-world 'existent' causal interaction that _causally_ behaves 'as-if' a platonic 'quantity' exists to interact with? Same for the non-existant platonic object RED. Same for the non-existant platonic object ORGASM. What is the existence status of the causality thus instantiated? What aspect of the platonic object map to the subsequent causally existent of the interaction? If it 'like something' to be an 'existent' causal interaction, ever(and it most certainly can be in brain material) then what would it be 'like' to be a virtual interaction with a platonic object? They may not exist, but they may be 'examinable'. Indeed... I'd say it could 'be like' QUANTITYness, REDness and ORGASMness... to some extent, anyway. If you insist that everything is shoved into 'realism' or 'platonism', just because we have the words...you miss entirely a wonderful intermediate class of existence. Colin Hales (where's my 'Law of Science' post gone?) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
complexitystudies wrote: > >>I think it has been said several times : >> >>The existence of a number/arithmetical proposition is the fact that its >>existence/truth does not depend on the fact that you exist/that it exists >>conscious beings capable of thinking of it. >> >>So the truth value of a proposition is independant of me. > > > Well, let's see: in Alice in Wonderland, Humpty Dumpty fell off a > wall. This is true, isn't it? It is certainly true independent > of our minds. Indeed, it is true in such a way that even when > all humans have died, this universe will have a contained a life-form > which produced an author who wrote a book in which Humpty Dumpty > fell off a wall. But neither Humpty Dumpty nor the fact that he > fell off a wall were ever true in this universe - only that this > story was written, and that many people read about it and could > converse about it. > > So if you believe that numbers have an independent existence, then you > would definitely also have to believe that Humpty Dumpty exists. > Both are products of the mind. Either both exist, or both don't > (other than as brain patterns). > > As much as I would like Humpty Dumpty to exist, I'm afraid that > it is not so. > > Regards, > Günther I agree. But truth need not imply existence. That's the idea of "free logic" (i.e. free of existential suppositions). So one can say "Shelock Holmes lived on Baker Street." is true and "Sherlock Holmes drove a car." is false. But then some statments, such as "Sherlock Holmes had a mole on his left side." are neither true nor false. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
complexitystudies wrote: ... > > > Not exactly. Animals and babies can distinguish up to 2-3 objects > (innate arithmetic, subitizing). The experiments with which this has > been ascertained are both fascinating and entertaining (google is your > friend ;-) > This ability has an evolutionary advantage: it is necessary for higher > organisms to distinguish more or less abundant food sources or numbers > of predators. But this meaning this "countability", arises out of the > physical world, and is not independent of it. The experiment I recall from the '50s was with crows. If men went into a blind in the middle of a corn field where crows were feeding the crows would fly up into the surrounding trees. Then the men would leave one or two at a time. If the number were five or fewer the crows would know when the last one had left and immediately come back to feed. With six they were sometimes wrong. With seven or more they would wait and then return cautiously a few at a time. Of course they probably weren't counting, mapping cardinality to sequence, but they had the concept of number. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Bruno Marchal wrote: > > Le 17-août-06, à 00:14, complexitystudies a écrit : > I recall it is just the belief that the > propositions of elementary arithmetic are independent of you. Do you > sincerley belief that 37 could be a non prime number? Or that the > square root of 2 can equal to a ratio of two integers? > Or that if you run a program fortran it could neither stop nor not > stop? (When all the default assumption are on, to evacuate contingent > stopping of a machine implemented in some deep story)? As 1Z has so nicely put, existence implies causal interaction. Numbers cannot causally interact, therefore they do not exist, save as thoughts in our brains. Of course I do not believe that 37 could be a non prime number, simply because what it means to be "prime" has been exactly defined in arithmetic. I just say that these are thought constructs with no independent existence (independent of human brains, not of a concrete human brain). You might say, that 37 was prime even in the Jurassic, but I say: nobody had invented arithmetic yet, so it's about as true as the fact that James Bond was played by Sean Connery was in the Jurassic. I define a system: 1 + 1 = 2 2 + 1 = 1 1 + 2 = 1 That's all. Okay, it doesn't describe much and probably isn't very useful, but other than that it is not inferior to peano arithmetic. Does my system now exist mind-independtly for all eternity? > I have not yet seen a book on human brain which does not presuppose the > understanding of the natural numbers. Of course, because it is a useful way to describe reality. But in our brains, not numbers operate, but chemicals. > Numbers are not symbol. Symbols can be used to talk about numbers, but > they should not be confused with numbers. You are right there of course. Symbols are only referents. What counts is meaning. What I meant to say is that the meanings we assign to number symbols exist only in our minds. Indeed, meaning _is_ only created by interactions between an agent and an environment. With both of these, no meaning. Indeed, in an mind-and-matter independent (=non existing )universe, arithmetic would be about as meaningless as it gets. > The notion of "same number" seems to have occur much before we > discovered counting. Farmers have most probably learn to compare the > size of the herds of sheep without counting, just by associating each > sheep from one herd to the another. But this as nothing to do with the > fact that sheeps were "countable" before humans learn to count it. > Humans and brains learn to count countable things because they are > countable. Not exactly. Animals and babies can distinguish up to 2-3 objects (innate arithmetic, subitizing). The experiments with which this has been ascertained are both fascinating and entertaining (google is your friend ;-) This ability has an evolutionary advantage: it is necessary for higher organisms to distinguish more or less abundant food sources or numbers of predators. But this meaning this "countability", arises out of the physical world, and is not independent of it. > I think you are confusing the subject or object of math, and the human > mathematical theories, which are just lantern putting a tiny light on > the subject. Indeed I am not. I am just saying that there is no independent subject of math outside of human brains. Mathematics is the study of rules we make up (axioms) and what follows of them (theorems). If we pick our axioms wisely, we can even model some aspects of the real, physical world with it. > If numbers and their math was really invented, why should > mathematicians hide some results, like Pythagoras with the > irrationality of the square root of two, ... As David Deutsch says: > math kicks back. That is very easy: the Pythagoreans assumed axioms, and thought they knew what would follow from them. Then, to their dismay, they found out that also somewhat else followed from the axioms than they had ideally envisioned, something that displeased their aesthetic sense. Only human factors involved here, no independent existence of math. It just shows how limited our thought is, and that we do not even anticipate theorems that follow from our axioms when they are rather simple. > >> Also, concepts like infinity are most definitely not universal >> concepts "out there", but products of our mind. > > I doubt any mind could ever produce infinity. But indeed, _only_ minds produce them, because, as you say, infinity is a concept, and concepts exist only in minds. In reality, there is no such thing as infinity. Even if space would expand infinitely, this "infinity" would not exist as a thing (except in the trivial *lol* sense as the universe exists), but would be a concept for us humans to talk about it. Concepts need not be precisely understood as to be concepts. For example, consciousness is definitely not understood, but talked about a lot. How does the human mind create the concept of infinity: Lakoff
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Hi, Le Vendredi 18 Août 2006 22:17, complexitystudies a écrit : > > I think it has been said several times : > > > > The existence of a number/arithmetical proposition is the fact that its > > existence/truth does not depend on the fact that you exist/that it exists > > conscious beings capable of thinking of it. > > > > So the truth value of a proposition is independant of me. > > Well, let's see: in Alice in Wonderland, Humpty Dumpty fell off a > wall. This is true, isn't it? It is certainly true independent > of our minds. Indeed, it is true in such a way that even when > all humans have died, this universe will have a contained a life-form > which produced an author who wrote a book in which Humpty Dumpty > fell off a wall. But neither Humpty Dumpty nor the fact that he > fell off a wall were ever true in this universe - only that this > story was written, and that many people read about it and could > converse about it. > > So if you believe that numbers have an independent existence, then you > would definitely also have to believe that Humpty Dumpty exists. > Both are products of the mind. Either both exist, or both don't > (other than as brain patterns). Well, if computationalism is true, then there exists observer moment of an "I" (not talking about me here ;) who is Humpty Dumpty, so there is an universe where Humpty Dumpty exists in the same sense I exist. The fact that in our universe Humpty Dumpty only exist in a story does not tell anything about a real Humpty Dumpty living in (at least) one (but in fact an infinity) of the computed universe by for example the UD (Universal Dovetailer). You must at least accept multiple world, ie a multiverse. This multiverse should also be fairly large (the UD trace is very very large ;). Now I think UD could be false if it is impossible to have a real turing machine (no memory bound, no time bound), because if it is possible then the majority of OM will be computed by the UD, so the probability of your current OM being computed on a "physical" computer is zero. UD could also be false if we are not turing emulable... ie consciousness is not a computation process... but physicalism doesn't tell what it is then. Regards, Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Brent Meeker wrote: > 1Z wrote: > > > > Brent Meeker wrote: > > > >>1Z wrote: > ... > >>>If two systems differ counterfactually, they are not physically > >>>identical. > >> > >>I don't think I understand this either. > > > > > > Either that, or counterfactuallity is asupernatural phenomenon. > > > > > >>Computer programs contain if-then > >>statements which branch the process depending on the data input to the > >>program. > >> But there is no real distinction between data an program. > > > > > > There is a difference between data and process --i.e. running > > programme. > > I don't disagree, but I don't see what that has to do with programs having > if-thens. Given the program and the data, the process is only going down one > branch. But that's not what makes it computation. What makes it computation is behaving differently for different data. > So when you talk about counterfactuals it must be because you are > considering other possible data as input. > > Standard computationalism says mentation (as an activity) > > is computation (as a process). It is a rare computationalist > > who think that a spool of tape gathering dust in a cupboardi > > is mentating. (Not much of a Yes Doctor). > > > > > >> So if you insist > >>that computed intelligence or consciousness depends on counterfactuals in > >>the > >>program that seems to me to be the same as insisting that the computation is > >>implemented in some way that divides it from input data, i.e. it is in an > >>environment. > > > > > > Well, it is divided -- by the programme/process distinction. > > That's the (program+data)/process distinction. But ISTM that without a > program/data distinction, counterfactuals are a distinction without a > difference. I am saying there is a programme/data distinction, which rests on the programme/process distinction. > Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
1Z wrote: > Not even remotely. I fact, what I have said can be written as two valid > syllogisms. > > Existence is availability for causal interaction > Numbers are not available for causal interaction > Numbers do not exist > > Platonism is the claim that numbers exist > Numbers do not exist > Platonism is false Wonderful! --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
> I think it has been said several times : > > The existence of a number/arithmetical proposition is the fact that its > existence/truth does not depend on the fact that you exist/that it exists > conscious beings capable of thinking of it. > > So the truth value of a proposition is independant of me. Well, let's see: in Alice in Wonderland, Humpty Dumpty fell off a wall. This is true, isn't it? It is certainly true independent of our minds. Indeed, it is true in such a way that even when all humans have died, this universe will have a contained a life-form which produced an author who wrote a book in which Humpty Dumpty fell off a wall. But neither Humpty Dumpty nor the fact that he fell off a wall were ever true in this universe - only that this story was written, and that many people read about it and could converse about it. So if you believe that numbers have an independent existence, then you would definitely also have to believe that Humpty Dumpty exists. Both are products of the mind. Either both exist, or both don't (other than as brain patterns). As much as I would like Humpty Dumpty to exist, I'm afraid that it is not so. Regards, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
1Z wrote: > > Brent Meeker wrote: > >>1Z wrote: ... >>>If two systems differ counterfactually, they are not physically >>>identical. >> >>I don't think I understand this either. > > > Either that, or counterfactuallity is asupernatural phenomenon. > > >>Computer programs contain if-then >>statements which branch the process depending on the data input to the >>program. >> But there is no real distinction between data an program. > > > There is a difference between data and process --i.e. running > programme. I don't disagree, but I don't see what that has to do with programs having if-thens. Given the program and the data, the process is only going down one branch. So when you talk about counterfactuals it must be because you are considering other possible data as input. > Standard computationalism says mentation (as an activity) > is computation (as a process). It is a rare computationalist > who think that a spool of tape gathering dust in a cupboardi > is mentating. (Not much of a Yes Doctor). > > >> So if you insist >>that computed intelligence or consciousness depends on counterfactuals in the >>program that seems to me to be the same as insisting that the computation is >>implemented in some way that divides it from input data, i.e. it is in an >>environment. > > > Well, it is divided -- by the programme/process distinction. That's the (program+data)/process distinction. But ISTM that without a program/data distinction, counterfactuals are a distinction without a difference. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
unsubscribe
From: Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Reply-To: everything-list@googlegroups.com To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really... Date: Fri, 18 Aug 2006 11:26:10 -0700 1Z wrote: > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system >>must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur, > > > I've explained that several times: computer programmes contain > if-then statements. > > >>other than that otherwise any physical system could be seen as implementing >>any computation, which does not seem to me a good reason. In any case, >>Maudlin shows that the requirement for handling counterfactuals leads to >>a situation where of two systems with identical physical activity, one is >>conscious and the other not. > > > If two systems differ counterfactually, they are not physically > identical. I don't think I understand this either. Computer programs contain if-then statements which branch the process depending on the data input to the program. But there is no real distinction between data an program. So if you insist that computed intelligence or consciousness depends on counterfactuals in the program that seems to me to be the same as insisting that the computation is implemented in some way that divides it from input data, i.e. it is in an environment. I'm sympathetic to this view. I think intelligence is relative to an environment. But I'm not sure what computationalists think of this; I believe they suppose the environment can be simulated too and so then the whole thing is a closed system and there are no conuterfactual branchings. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Brent Meeker wrote: > 1Z wrote: > > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > ... > >>I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system > >>must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur, > > > > > > I've explained that several times: computer programmes contain > > if-then statements. > > > > > >>other than that otherwise any physical system could be seen as implementing > >>any computation, which does not seem to me a good reason. In any case, > >>Maudlin shows that the requirement for handling counterfactuals leads to > >>a situation where of two systems with identical physical activity, one is > >>conscious and the other not. > > > > > > If two systems differ counterfactually, they are not physically > > identical. > > I don't think I understand this either. Either that, or counterfactuallity is asupernatural phenomenon. > Computer programs contain if-then > statements which branch the process depending on the data input to the > program. > But there is no real distinction between data an program. There is a difference between data and process --i.e. running programme. Standard computationalism says mentation (as an activity) is computation (as a process). It is a rare computationalist who think that a spool of tape gathering dust in a cupboardi is mentating. (Not much of a Yes Doctor). > So if you insist > that computed intelligence or consciousness depends on counterfactuals in the > program that seems to me to be the same as insisting that the computation is > implemented in some way that divides it from input data, i.e. it is in an > environment. Well, it is divided -- by the programme/process distinction. > I'm sympathetic to this view. I think intelligence is relative to an > environment. But I'm not sure what computationalists think of this; I believe > they suppose the environment can be simulated too and so then the whole thing > is > a closed system and there are no conuterfactual branchings. > > Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Brent Meeker wrote: > But the fact that a theorem is true relative to some axioms doesn't make it > true > or existent. It doesn't make it *false* relative to those axioms. It has to be estbalished that a mathematical statement needs to or can aspire to further kinds of truth, --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
1Z wrote: > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: ... >>I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system >>must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur, > > > I've explained that several times: computer programmes contain > if-then statements. > > >>other than that otherwise any physical system could be seen as implementing >>any computation, which does not seem to me a good reason. In any case, >>Maudlin shows that the requirement for handling counterfactuals leads to >>a situation where of two systems with identical physical activity, one is >>conscious and the other not. > > > If two systems differ counterfactually, they are not physically > identical. I don't think I understand this either. Computer programs contain if-then statements which branch the process depending on the data input to the program. But there is no real distinction between data an program. So if you insist that computed intelligence or consciousness depends on counterfactuals in the program that seems to me to be the same as insisting that the computation is implemented in some way that divides it from input data, i.e. it is in an environment. I'm sympathetic to this view. I think intelligence is relative to an environment. But I'm not sure what computationalists think of this; I believe they suppose the environment can be simulated too and so then the whole thing is a closed system and there are no conuterfactual branchings. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Quantum Mysteries
Norman Samish wrote: > Brent: ". . . It seems to me that an information theoretic analysis > should be able to place a lower bound on how small a probability can be > and not be zero." > > Norman: Doesn't a lower limit on probability repudiate the notion of > Tegmark, Vilenkin, et al, that there are necessarily duplicate worlds to > ours, if only we go out far enough? > > Brent: I don't see why these questions are related. There are only > *necessarily* duplicate worlds if there is an infinity of worlds of a > higher order than the information content of a world. > > Norman: I don't understand what "higher order than the information > content of a world" means. I mean greater cardinality, as the real numbers are of greater cardinality than the integers. I actually don't know if this is a theorem, but if there are only countably many universes and spacetime is a continuum, then the infinity of universes could just be distinguished by a single real parameter of spacetime being different. > > Norman: If you repudiate duplicate worlds, do you also repudiate > infinite space? > > Brent: Space could be infinite without there being duplicate worlds. > "Repudiate" is too strong a word. I doubt they are relevant. > > Norman: I asked that because my understanding is that "In infinite time > and space, whatever can happen must happen, not only once but an > infinite number of times." Do you disagree? See above. ... > Brent: If one can originate, then any number can. But I don't see that > such an infinity has any implications. > > Norman: To me, an initial infinity of high-energy false vacuum, without > an origin, is not logical. I don't think the theory says anything about the false vacua being "initial". In Guth's form of the theory they are eternal, i.e. continually being created in a branching process. If it's not logical, then you should be able to infer a contradiction from its assumption. But I think you put too much faith in logic. ISTM that any theory that gives a natural law account of the origin of the universe will imply that there are arbitrarily many, because what is to prevent the process that originated this universe from happening again? It's implicit in natural laws that they apply at all times and places. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Brent Meeker writes (quoting Peter Jones and SP): > > Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical structures *exist* independently of you, not just that they are true independently of you. >>> >>> >>>What's the difference? >>> >>>Stathis Papaioannou >> >>You could regard the theorems of arithmetic as just being relative to Peano's >>axioms: "1+1=2 assuming Peano" Somewhat as Bruno presents his theorems as >>relative to the "axiom" of COMP. >> >>Brent Meeker > > > Even if you say that, there is still a sense in which arithmetic is > independent of the > real world. The same can be said of Euclidian geometry: it follows from > Euclid's axioms > *despite* the fact that real space is not Euclidian. The fact that real space > is not > Euclidian means that Euclidian geometry does not describe the real world, not > that > it is false or non-existent. > > Stathis Papaioannou But the fact that a theorem is true relative to some axioms doesn't make it true or existent. Some mathematicians I know regard it as a game. Is true that a bishop can only move diagonally? It is relative to chess. Does chess exist? It does in our heads. But without us it wouldn't. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Rép : ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Bruno Marchal wrote: > Le 17-août-06, à 17:30, 1Z a écrit : > > > The argument has to assume the necessary existence of the UD. > > (If it is possible that the UD doesn't exist, it is possible > > that physics is emerging from semething else) > > It is difficult to see what would entail that except Platonism. > > I agree, but I put Arithmetical Realism (an extremely weak form of > "platonism") inside the definition of comp (which is ambiguous > without). Comp = "yes doctor" + Church Thesis + AR. You can call it > "classical computationalism". > > Now, you could as well criticize String Theory for assuming the > necessary existence of PI. It doesn't. Anti-Platonists can do string theory. String theorists aren't claiming anything exists for purely mathematical reason; they are doing physics, i.e. finding a mathematical model for what is observed. Physics makes explicitly existentially posits: it says "suppose such-and-such a field and particle exists", and then draws existential conclusions, which can be tested empirically. That is quite different from conjuring up existential conclusions from non-existential premises. > UD exists like PI exists, or like square root of two exists. The questions is whether it exists like *I* exist. If it doesn't, I cannot be generated by it! > In the interview, "platonism" is translated into the (p or not p) > axiom, with p restricted to a class of verifiable arithmetical > propositions. (the so called Sigma1, one). I very much doubt that the Platonism can be reduced to a formal procedure without circularity. > Logically I need no more than the idea that if you run a program, and > if no asteroïd, big crunch or other contingent events like that occur, > then the program will stop, or not stop. Matter can't be non-existent just because someone might one day be able to run a UD programme > Arithmetical Realism is the > acceptance that in case that damned asteroid kills me, this will not > change the fact that the program will stop, or will not stop. It will not change the *truth*, no. Matter can't be non-existent just because of the abstract truth of the behaviour of the UD programme > You can prove the existence of the UD in Robinson Arithmetic (cf the > failed roadmap). The mathematical existence. Leaving open the question of how that relates to the kind of existence I have. > You can make a non trivial part of the UDA reasoning > in Peano Arithmetic. Any mathematical argument, however sound, leaves the existential question open. Mathematics cannot prove what mathematical existence is. Different mathematicians disagree about it, and there debates ar caried outin the language of philosophy. > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Quentin Anciaux wrote: > Le Vendredi 18 Août 2006 14:21, 1Z a écrit : > > Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > > Hi, > > > > > > Le vendredi 18 août 2006 11:52, 1Z a écrit : > > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal): > > > > > > > Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a > > > > > > > bold assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a > > > > > > > sophisticated form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just > > > > > > > the belief that the propositions of elementary arithmetic are > > > > > > > independent of you. > > > > > > > > > > > > Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical > > > > > > structures *exist* independently of you, > > > > > > not just that they are true independently of you. > > > > > > > > > > What's the difference? > > > > > > > > Things that exist are available for causal interaction. Numbers aren't. > > > > > > You were defining arithmetical platonism and now you define existing. > > > Your two comments are contradictory. > > > > Not even remotely. I fact, what I have said can be written as two valid > > syllogisms. > > Yes you were... You were denying the definition of Bruno (arithmetical > realism) by giving yours Firstly, that isn't *self* contradiciton. Secondly, Bruno's approach is ambiguous. (If he clearly states that AR is only about truth and not about existence, he can't claim that matter doesn't exist if COMP is true, because "matter doesn't exist" is an existential statement and COMP (absent Platonism) isn't. If he clearly states AR ia about existence, he can no longer claim that COMP is his only premiss). > ... then Bruno and Stathis ask for the difference > between yours and their definition. Defintion of what ? Existence ? Yes, I do have a different definition. > .. Which you respond with a contradiction > to say platonism is false... Platonism *is* false using my definitions. They must be using a different defintion. That still doesn't mean I am contradicting *myself*. I may be comtradicting other peopel: well, people are allowed to contradict each other. > then either you were effectively contradicting > yourself or you did not answer Stathis and Bruno question (it's one or the > other). > > Existence is availability for causal interaction > > Numbers are not available for causal interaction > > Numbers do not exist > > That's your definition of existence... this is your claim. Now a definition > game will not resolve this problem obviously. Then the problem cannot be solved at all, since there is no other way of solving abstract problems. (All mathematical problems are solved using definitions!) Why, BTW, do you assume there is no way of arriving at the correct definition ? Isn't that what dictionaries are for. > > Platonism is the claim that numbers exist > > Numbers do not exist > > Platonism is false > > Platonism does not claim number exist by your definition of existence hence > your conclusion is ill based. It isn't false if my definition of existence is the only defintion. The ball is in the Platonists' court: they need to come up with another definition of existence. However, they presumably don't have one, or they would not be asking me what "existence" means. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Quentin Anciaux wrote: > Le Vendredi 18 Août 2006 17:02, 1Z a écrit : > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > Peter Jones writes: > > > > > What's the difference? > > > > > > > > Things that exist are available for causal interaction. Numbers aren't. > > > > > > What could it possibly mean for numbers to "exist" in the sense you claim > > > they do not? Could I be mugged by a burly number 6 in a dark alley? I > > > don't think that even number-worshipping Pythagoras would have > > > entertained such a notion. > > > > It is for Pythagorenas and Platonists to explain what they mean by > > "exist". > > I think it has been said several times : > > The existence of a number/arithmetical proposition is the fact that its > existence/truth does not depend on the fact that you exist/that it exists > conscious beings capable of thinking of it. That is an explanation of mind-independence, not of existence. The anti-Platonist (e.g. the formalist) can claim that the truth of mathematical statments is mind-independent, but their existence isn't. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le Vendredi 18 Août 2006 17:02, 1Z a écrit : > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > Peter Jones writes: > > > > What's the difference? > > > > > > Things that exist are available for causal interaction. Numbers aren't. > > > > What could it possibly mean for numbers to "exist" in the sense you claim > > they do not? Could I be mugged by a burly number 6 in a dark alley? I > > don't think that even number-worshipping Pythagoras would have > > entertained such a notion. > > It is for Pythagorenas and Platonists to explain what they mean by > "exist". I think it has been said several times : The existence of a number/arithmetical proposition is the fact that its existence/truth does not depend on the fact that you exist/that it exists conscious beings capable of thinking of it. So the truth value of a proposition is independant of me. Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Hi John, Le 18-août-06, à 03:03, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > Why has 6 'divisors'? because my math teacher said so? I say to my students that in case they are saying a falsity (in math), they will get a bad or a good note, depending on the way they will defend the proposition. If they defend it by saying "because you say so during the course", then they will get a *very* bad note, indeed! Even, and I would say *especially* if it is true, that I have said that falsity. Actually I teach like that, I make error all the time (mostly intentionally but of course not always). It works. Students eventually understand that they must understand math by themselves. Each year I have student (about 20 years old) just realizing what math is all about. Now I know you are joking. I know that you know that six has divisors. It follows from the elementary definitions. And I will not repeat them, because that would be sort of an insult (of course a number is "perfect" if it is equal to the sum of its proper divisors ... by definition. Why using the word "perfect"? Pythagorean superstition or folklore, but mathematicians are not sanguine about words and representations. In the lobian interview all natural numbers are represented by strings like 0, s(0), s(s(0)), s(s(s(0))), etc. :-) Best regards, bon week-end, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Peter Jones writes: > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > Peter Jones writes: > > > > > > > A claim about truth as opposed to existence cannot > > > > support the conclusion that matter does not actually exist. > > > > > > It can if you can show that the mental does not supervene > > > on the physical. > > > > I don't see how that is connected, > > If you can conceptualise of a virtual reality generated by a computation > or a mind, and that computation or mind does not require physical > hardware on which to run, then it is possible (Bruno argues, necessary) > that our reality is a virtual reality without any underlying "real" world. A "virtual reality" that is being "generated" is an existing (in some sense) virtual reality that is being really (in some sense) generated. A computation that does not require physical hardware is either non-existent simpliciter (in which case we are simply not such a computation, since nothing existing is identical to anythig non-existing) or it exists Platonically (non-physically, in some sense), A valid argument cannot, in genral, come to a conlusion that is not already implcit in its premises. Either existence is implict in the "virtual reality" premiss, or it isn't. If it is, a Platonic quesiton is being begged. If it isn't, the existential conclusion is invalid. > > and I don't want to claim that the mental > > does not supervene on the physical. > > I didn't think you would. > > > > This is far from a generally accepted fact, > > > but I am not yet aware of convincing arguments > > > against the sort of challenge posed to the supervenience > > > theory by eg. Tim Maudlin - unless you reject computationalism. > > > > Materialism/physicalism is better supported than computationalism. > > Maybe, but mind would be something very mysterious if it isn't computation, Most things aren't computation. Most things also aren't mysterious. > and mysteriouness goes against the grain for physicalists. > > Maudlin's arguments rest on the idea that physicalists must ignore > > counterfactuals. > > That assumption can easilly be abandoned. > > I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system > must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur, I've explained that several times: computer programmes contain if-then statements. > other than that otherwise any physical system could be seen as implementing > any computation, which does not seem to me a good reason. In any case, > Maudlin shows that the requirement for handling counterfactuals leads to > a situation where of two systems with identical physical activity, one is > conscious and the other not. If two systems differ counterfactually, they are not physically identical. > If anyone should find such an idea unpalatable > it should be the physicalists. So I am told, but I remain unconvinced. > Stathis Papaioannou > > _ > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Peter Jones writes: > > > What's the difference? > > > > > > Things that exist are available for causal interaction. Numbers aren't. > > What could it possibly mean for numbers to "exist" in the sense you claim > they do not? Could I be mugged by a burly number 6 in a dark alley? I don't > think that even number-worshipping Pythagoras would have entertained > such a notion. It is for Pythagorenas and Platonists to explain what they mean by "exist". However, if you are going to claim that we are actually *in* Platonia, (mathematical monism) there must be some equivalence between the existence we have and the existence numbers have. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le Vendredi 18 Août 2006 14:21, 1Z a écrit : > Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > Hi, > > > > Le vendredi 18 août 2006 11:52, 1Z a écrit : > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal): > > > > > > Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a > > > > > > bold assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a > > > > > > sophisticated form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just > > > > > > the belief that the propositions of elementary arithmetic are > > > > > > independent of you. > > > > > > > > > > Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical > > > > > structures *exist* independently of you, > > > > > not just that they are true independently of you. > > > > > > > > What's the difference? > > > > > > Things that exist are available for causal interaction. Numbers aren't. > > > > You were defining arithmetical platonism and now you define existing. > > Your two comments are contradictory. > > Not even remotely. I fact, what I have said can be written as two valid > syllogisms. Yes you were... You were denying the definition of Bruno (arithmetical realism) by giving yours... then Bruno and Stathis ask for the difference between yours and their definition... Which you respond with a contradiction to say platonism is false... then either you were effectively contradicting yourself or you did not answer Stathis and Bruno question (it's one or the other). > Existence is availability for causal interaction > Numbers are not available for causal interaction > Numbers do not exist That's your definition of existence... this is your claim. Now a definition game will not resolve this problem obviously. > Platonism is the claim that numbers exist > Numbers do not exist > Platonism is false Platonism does not claim number exist by your definition of existence hence your conclusion is ill based. Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Quantum Mysteries
Brent: ". . . It seems to me that an information
theoretic analysis should be able to place a lower bound on how small a
probability can be and not be zero."
Norman: Doesn't a lower limit on probability repudiate the
notion of Tegmark, Vilenkin, et al, that there are necessarily duplicate worlds
to ours, if only we go out far enough?
Brent: I don't see why these questions are related. There are only *necessarily* duplicate worlds if there is an
infinity of worlds of a higher order than the information content of a
world.
Norman: I don't understand what "higher order than the
information content of a world" means.
Norman: If you repudiate duplicate worlds, do you also
repudiate infinite space?
Brent: Space could be infinite without there being duplicate
worlds. "Repudiate" is too strong a word. I doubt they are
relevant.
Norman: I asked that because my understanding is that
"In infinite time and space, whatever can happen must happen, not only once but
an infinite number of times." Do you disagree?
Norman: E.g., Alex Vilenkin ("Beyond
the Big Bang," Natural History, July/August 2006, pp 42 - 47) says, "A new
cosmic worldview holds that countless replicas of Earth, inhabited by our
clones, are scattered throughout the cosmos." Vilenkin's view is that this conclusion arises from Alan Guth's theory of
inflation and "false vacuum" put forth in 1980. The unstable false vacuum
(which eternally inflates exponentially) has regions where random quantum
fluctuations cause decay to a true vacuum.
Brent: You can't "go to" those different
universes. Their supposed existence is entirely dependent certain theories
being correct. But those theories are contingent on suppositions about a
quantum theory of spacetime - which is not in hand. So, while I'm willing
to entertain them as hypotheses, I neither accept nor deny their existence.
Norman: The difference in energy of the false vacuum and the
true vacuum results in a "big bang." In the infinity of the false vacuum there
are, therefore, an infinity of "big bangs." The big bangs don't consume
the false vacuum because it inflates faster than the big bangs expand.
Vilenkin figures the distance to our clone at about 10 raised to the 10^90
power, in meters. (This roughly agrees with Tegmark's number.) (An
unanswered question is where and why did this initial infinity of high-energy
false vacuum originate?)
Brent: If one can originate, then any number can. But I
don't see that such an infinity has any implications.
Norman: To me, an initial infinity of high-energy false
vacuum, without an origin, is not logical. I ask the question because
I'm hoping for an hypothesis that is logical.
Norman: Now 10 raised to the 10^90
power is a big number. Therefore the ratio of duplicate Earths to all
worlds is exceedingly small - but not zero! Do you think it should be
zero?
Brent: I think it might be of measure zero. Or there
might not be any duplicate universes.
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
--
This message has been scanned for viruses and
dangerous content by
MailScanner, and is
believed to be clean.
Re: The anti-roadmap - an alternative 'Theology'
Hi David,
Le 18-août-06, à 02:16, David Nyman wrote (answering John):
>
> [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
>
> John
>
> Thanks for taking the trouble to express your thoughts at such length.
> I won't say too much now, as I have to leave shortly to meet a long
> lost relative - from Hungary! However, I just want to make sure it's
> clear, both for you and the list, that:
>
>>> "Comp is false". Let's see where *that* leads.
>
> isn't intended as a definitive claim that comp *is* false.
To be honest I have not yet seen where you postulates comp wrong in
your long anti-roadmap post.
Recall that I take comp as YD + CT + AR (Yes Doctor + Church Thesis +
Arithmetical Realism).
So, strictly speaking comp can be false in seven ways:
YD CT AR
1 1 1comp is true
1 1 0comp is false 1
1 0 1 " "2
1 0 0 " "3
0 1 1 " "4
0 1 0 " "5
0 0 1 " "6
0 0 0 " "7
1. AR is false, but CT is true, and YD is true. This would mean there
is a program which stops or does not stop according to my knowledge of
it. It is beyond my imagination, even if, as a logician I know that I
have to postulate AR. Of course the UD would loose all its purpose.
2. CT is false. This would mean there exist a way to explain in a
finite time how to compute a function from N to N, such that no
computer can be programmed to compute it. Possible but unlikely.
3) YD is true, but CT is false and AR is false. This means the doctor
is helped by Gods or Goddesses.
4) YD is false (and CT and AR are true). This means I am an actual
infinite object.
5) 6) 7): combination of above.
> Rather, *if*
> it is false, in what ways specifically, and what are the alternatives?
> Can they be stated as clearly and explicitly as Bruno is trying to do
> for his approach ('to see where it leads')? Hence the 'anti-roadmap',
> or perhaps better - 'another roadmap', or some ideas for one.
It is certainly interesting. But comp is a very weak statement, so
non-comp is very strong. It needs some actual infinite to be
"implemented". Judson Webb range "comp" in the "finitist doctrines"
(but not in the ultra-finitist doctrine).
> Most of
> the thoughts in it were originally expressed in some earlier postings
> on 'The Fabric of Reality' list, which Bruno was kind enough to copy to
> this list. Anyway, it's intended as a point of departure (for me
> certainly) and I look forward to some strenuous critiques.
>
> One misgiving I have, now that I've finally grasped (I think) that the
> comp 'theology' entails 'faith' in the number realm, ...
I prefer to reserve "faith" for the resurection "promised but not
guarantied" by the (honest) doctor.
I need infinitely less faith to believe that each number has a
successor than to believe the sun will rise tomorrow. AR is very weak.
Sometimes I regret to have been explicit on AR, because it looks like
everyone believe in it, except when we write it explicitly. People put
many things in it, which are not there. Not believing in AR also
entails that there is a finite polynomial (on the integers) such that
two different people can find different integer values when applying
the polynomial on the same number, and despite those people agree on
the meaning of + and * and zero and "+1".
> ... is that by this
> token it seeks to provide a TOE (Bruno, am I wrong about this?)
You are right. By the UDA it is not a matter of choice.
> That
> is, beginning with an assertion of 'faith' in UDA + the number realm,
> we seek to axiomatise and 'prove' a complete theory of our origins.
> Bruno is a very modest person, but I worry about the 'modesty' of the
> goal.
Modesty is not incompatible with ambitious goal. You can decide to
climb the everest Mountain, and recognize you have climb only two
meters high :)
> Of course, it's highly probable that I just misunderstand this
> point. However, I'm having trouble with my faith in numbers,
> monseigneur.
We cannot build a theory without accepting some intuitive truth, and
some third person presentation of those truth. AR false means that the
simple y = sin(x) real function could intersect the real axes on some
non integer abscisse. Do you really believe that? Quantum mechanics
relies completely on AR. If AR is false, QM is inconsistent (and almost
all math).
So, either you put in AR something which is not there (like peter D
Jones who want me doing "Aristotle error" on the numbers (like if I was
reifying some concreteness about them), or you should have a powerful
argument against AR, but then you should elaborate.
> My own intuition begins from my own indexical
> self-assertion, my necessity, generalised to an inclusive
> self-asserting necessity extending outwards indefinitely.
Here I have a pedagogical, if not diplomatical, problem. What you say
is exactly wha
Re: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le 18-août-06, à 01:14, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > > > Bruno Marchal writes: > >> There is no authoritative argument in math. There are fashion, >> prejudice, stubbornness and many human things like that, but nobody >> serious in math will believe something because the boss said so. > > Interesting: this marks mathematics as different from just about > every other academic field. Perhaps. Please note that I was talking about people "serious in math". Also, I am not saying that a mathematician will not pretend something interesting because the boss said so. Only, I have never seen (even in old text) a statement in math said to be true by a mathematician referring to a boss. Even at the time of the sad idolatry around Pythagoras. This is so true that they coins two terms: 1) "mathematician" for those who understand, and for those who repeat the math without understanding. But if you have a counterexample I am interested to know. Other field are different by their very nature. A high school student cannot reasonably ask his teacher to justify a statement like "whales weight such number of tons". Some plausibility judgement are obligatory. In math, plausibility argument are needed for having some idea of the work of math colleagues in other field. If you ask me if I believe in Fermat Last theorem, I will say yes in the coffee room, but not in the office. The same for the four color theorem. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Peter Jones writes: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > Peter Jones writes: > > > > > A claim about truth as opposed to existence cannot > > > support the conclusion that matter does not actually exist. > > > > It can if you can show that the mental does not supervene > > on the physical. > > I don't see how that is connected, If you can conceptualise of a virtual reality generated by a computation or a mind, and that computation or mind does not require physical hardware on which to run, then it is possible (Bruno argues, necessary) that our reality is a virtual reality without any underlying "real" world. > and I don't want to claim that the mental > does not supervene on the physical. I didn't think you would. > > This is far from a generally accepted fact, > > but I am not yet aware of convincing arguments > > against the sort of challenge posed to the supervenience > > theory by eg. Tim Maudlin - unless you reject computationalism. > > Materialism/physicalism is better supported than computationalism. Maybe, but mind would be something very mysterious if it isn't computation, and mysteriouness goes against the grain for physicalists. > Maudlin's arguments rest on the idea that physicalists must ignore > counterfactuals. > That assumption can easilly be abandoned. I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur, other than that otherwise any physical system could be seen as implementing any computation, which does not seem to me a good reason. In any case, Maudlin shows that the requirement for handling counterfactuals leads to a situation where of two systems with identical physical activity, one is conscious and the other not. If anyone should find such an idea unpalatable it should be the physicalists. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Peter Jones writes: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal): > > > > > > Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold > > > > assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated > > > > form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just the belief that the > > > > propositions of elementary arithmetic are independent of you. > > > > > > Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical > > > structures *exist* independently of you, > > > not just that they are true independently of you. > > > > What's the difference? > > > Things that exist are available for causal interaction. Numbers aren't. What could it possibly mean for numbers to "exist" in the sense you claim they do not? Could I be mugged by a burly number 6 in a dark alley? I don't think that even number-worshipping Pythagoras would have entertained such a notion. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Can we ever know truth?
Rich Winkel writes: > According to Stathis Papaioannou: > >Why would you not include the well-known fact that driving at high > >speed is more likely to kill someone as "evidence"? If the driver > >honestly did not know this, say due to having an intellectual > >disability, then he would have diminished responsibility for the > >accident. > > I don't know how you're using the term "responsibility", but in any > case the issue is whether a driver is willing to slow down despite > not seeing any obvious hazards. Evidence isn't always obvious. Past experience shows that there might be hazards around even though you can't see them, and you are being irresponsible if you ignore this fact. The only excuse is if you genuinely are unaware of this, in which case you have no reason to slow down if you see no hazards. > >Astronomy does not really have an ethical dimension to it, but most > >other sciences do. Discovering that cyanide kills people is science; > >deciding to poison your spouse with cyanide to collect on the > >insurance is intimately tied up with the science, but it is not > >itself in the domain of science. > > Precisely. Good medical research is science, but medical practice > often involves matters of expedience, cultural bias, conflicts of > interest and habit. OK, but for the purposes of this discussion we should try to separate the purely scientific facts from the rest. If the scientific evidence shows that cyanide is good for headaches, and people die as a result, then perhaps the scientists have been negligent, incompetent, or deceitful. > >As for doing nothing often being the best course of action, that's > >certainly true, and it *is* a question that can be analysed > >scientifically, which is the point of placebo controlled drug trials. > > But of course if the research is never done or never sees the light of > day, something other than science is going on. Right, but we're getting away from the subject of epistemology and onto the specifics of particular treatments and the evidence supporting them. Personally, I have experience of several situations where I believed that a new treatment would be helpful on the basis of the published evidence but subsequently found, either through my own experience or through new evidence coming to light maybe years later, that it caused more harm than good. There is at least one example of a harmful drug side-effect (olanzapine causing diabetes) that was so obvious to me that it crossed my mind that adverse research findings may have been supressed; on the other hand, I also have experience of treatments with well-documented adverse effects which I never seem to encounter, and I don't surmise that in those cases the data has been faked to make the drug look bad. > >You are suggesting that certain treatments believed to be helpful > >for mental illness by the medical profession are not in fact helpful. > >You may be right, because the history of medicine is full of > >enthusiastically promoted treatments that we now know are useless > >or harmful. However, this is no argument against the scientific > >method in medicine or any other field: we can only go on our best > >evidence. > > I'm not arguing against the scientific method. I only wish medical > science practiced it more often. It is unscientific to equate > absence of evidence with evidence of absence. Yes, and everyone is acutely aware that a new treatment may still be harmful even though the present best evidence suggests that it isn't. This needs to be taken into account in any risk-benefit analysis: that is, the "risks" equation should include not only the weighted probability of known adverse events, but also the weighted probability of as yet unrecognised adverse events. It is difficult to quantify this latter variable, but it does play a part in making clinical decisions, perhaps not always obviously so. For example, new treatments are generally used more cautiously than older treatments: in the more severely ill, in cases where the older treatments have failed, in lower dosages. As more experience is gained, it becomes clearer whether the new treatment is in fact better and safer than the old one, or better than no treatment at all, and it is used more widely and more confidently. It would be interesting to retrospectively analyse the incidence and severity of adverse effects of medical treatments not suspected at the time of their initial clinical use, allowing a quantitative estimate of the abovementioned weighted probability for use in clinical decision-making. I don't know if this has ever been attempted. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to t
Re: Are First Person prime?
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Peter Jones writes: > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > Peter Jones writes: > > > > > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > > > > > I don't know if block universe theories are true or not, but the > > > > > subjective > > > > > passage of time is not an argument against them. If mind is > > > > > computation, do > > > > > you believe that a conscious computation can tell if it is being run > > > > > as a sequential > > > > > series of steps or in parallel, without any external information? > > > > > > > > > > > > If it is being run at all, it is dynamic, not static. Parallel > > > > processes are still > > > > processes. > > > > > > But the important point is that the temporal sequence does not itself > > > make a difference > > > to subjective experience. > > > > We don't actually know that it is possible that > > there might be some flicker effect. > > Not necessarily. I'm suggesting that the actual physical events are *exactly* > the same, > just their order is different. If the world were created 5 minutes ago, > complete with > fossils, ruins, false memories etc., you could not be aware of this on the > basis of any > observation - by definition, otherwise the illusion would not be perfect. > This is of course > no reason to believe that the world was created 5 minutes ago; but it does > mean that > the absence of a sensation of having just flickered into existence is no > evidence *against* > this theory. My original point stands. There is no evidence *for* the theory. If the present state is determined by more than a 0-width time slice preceding it, then a physical process cannot be arbitrarily sliced up. Computationalism does not help, because computationalism requries counterfactuals. > > > Would you say that it is in theory possible for the subjective > > > passage of time to be as we know it if the blocks were not infinitesimal, > > > but lasted for > > > a second, so that the whole ensemble of blocks lasted for a second? > > > > There is still duration within blocks > > Yes, and... > > > > Then what if you > > > make the blocks shorter in duration and larger in number, progressively > > > down to > > > infinitely many blocks of infinitesimal duration: is there room for > > > dynamism in an > > > infenitesimal interval? > > > > There are such things as infintiessimal velocities... > > So if there is room for movement in infinitesimal intervals (or through > combination of > infinitesimal intervals) in a linear theory of time, why not with a block > universe? A block universe with movement is just as dynamic universe (specifically, a growing universe). > Stathis Papaioannou > _ > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Peter Jones writes: > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > Peter Jones writes: > > > > > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > > > > > > I don't know if block universe theories are true or not, but the > > > > > subjective > > > > > passage of time is not an argument against them. If mind is > > > > > computation, do > > > > > you believe that a conscious computation can tell if it is being run > > > > > as a sequential > > > > > series of steps or in parallel, without any external information? > > > > > > > > > > > > If it is being run at all, it is dynamic, not static. Parallel > > > > processes are still > > > > processes. > > > > > > But the important point is that the temporal sequence does not itself > > > make a difference > > > to subjective experience. > > > > We don't actually know that it is possible that > > there might be some flicker effect. > > Not necessarily. I'm suggesting that the actual physical events are *exactly* > the same, > just their order is different. If the world were created 5 minutes ago, > complete with > fossils, ruins, false memories etc., you could not be aware of this on the > basis of any > observation - by definition, otherwise the illusion would not be perfect. > This is of course > no reason to believe that the world was created 5 minutes ago; but it does > mean that > the absence of a sensation of having just flickered into existence is no > evidence *against* > this theory. My original point stands. There is no evidence *for* the theory. If the present state is determined by more than a 0-width time slice preceding it, then a physical process cannot be arbitrarily sliced up. Computationalism does not help, because computationalism requries counterfactuals. > > > Would you say that it is in theory possible for the subjective > > > passage of time to be as we know it if the blocks were not infinitesimal, > > > but lasted for > > > a second, so that the whole ensemble of blocks lasted for a second? > > > > There is still duration within blocks > > Yes, and... > > > > Then what if you > > > make the blocks shorter in duration and larger in number, progressively > > > down to > > > infinitely many blocks of infinitesimal duration: is there room for > > > dynamism in an > > > infenitesimal interval? > > > > There are such things as infintiessimal velocities... > > So if there is room for movement in infinitesimal intervals (or through > combination of > infinitesimal intervals) in a linear theory of time, why not with a block > universe? A block universe with movement is just as dynamic universe (specifically, a growing universe). > Stathis Papaioannou > _ > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Quentin Anciaux wrote: > Hi, > > Le vendredi 18 août 2006 11:52, 1Z a écrit : > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal): > > > > > Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold > > > > > assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated > > > > > form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just the belief that the > > > > > propositions of elementary arithmetic are independent of you. > > > > > > > > Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical > > > > structures *exist* independently of you, > > > > not just that they are true independently of you. > > > > > > What's the difference? > > > > Things that exist are available for causal interaction. Numbers aren't. > You were defining arithmetical platonism and now you define existing. Your > two comments are contradictory. Not even remotely. I fact, what I have said can be written as two valid syllogisms. Existence is availability for causal interaction Numbers are not available for causal interaction Numbers do not exist Platonism is the claim that numbers exist Numbers do not exist Platonism is false --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Peter Jones writes: > > > A claim about truth as opposed to existence cannot > > support the conclusion that matter does not actually exist. > > It can if you can show that the mental does not supervene > on the physical. I don't see how that is connected, and I don't want to claim that the mental does not supervene on the physical. > This is far from a generally accepted fact, > but there but I am not yet aware of convincing arguments > against the sort of challenge posed to the supervenience > theory by eg. Tim Maudlin - unless you reject computationalism. Materialism/physicalism is better supported than computationalism. Maudlin's arguments rest on the idea that physicalists must ignore counterfactuals. That assumption can easilly be abandoned. > Stathis Papaioannou > > _ > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Brent Meeker writes (quoting Peter Jones and SP): > >>Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical > >>structures *exist* independently of you, > >>not just that they are true independently of you. > > > > > > What's the difference? > > > > Stathis Papaioannou > > You could regard the theorems of arithmetic as just being relative to Peano's > axioms: "1+1=2 assuming Peano" Somewhat as Bruno presents his theorems as > relative to the "axiom" of COMP. > > Brent Meeker Even if you say that, there is still a sense in which arithmetic is independent of the real world. The same can be said of Euclidian geometry: it follows from Euclid's axioms *despite* the fact that real space is not Euclidian. The fact that real space is not Euclidian means that Euclidian geometry does not describe the real world, not that it is false or non-existent. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Hi, Le vendredi 18 août 2006 11:52, 1Z a écrit : > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal): > > > > Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold > > > > assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated > > > > form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just the belief that the > > > > propositions of elementary arithmetic are independent of you. > > > > > > Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical > > > structures *exist* independently of you, > > > not just that they are true independently of you. > > > > What's the difference? > > Things that exist are available for causal interaction. Numbers aren't. You were defining arithmetical platonism and now you define existing. Your two comments are contradictory. Because following your description of existing, mathematical structure are not available for causal interaction (like numbers... ) If you think you're not contradicting yourself, could you explain more in detail what you mean. Regards, Quentin Anciaux --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal): > > > > Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold > > > assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated > > > form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just the belief that the > > > propositions of elementary arithmetic are independent of you. > > > > Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical > > structures *exist* independently of you, > > not just that they are true independently of you. > > What's the difference? Things that exist are available for causal interaction. Numbers aren't. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
