RE: computer pain
Brent Meeker writes: [Colin] So I guess my proclaimations about models are all contingent on my own view of things...and I could be wrong. Only time will tell. I have good physical grounds to doubt that modelling can work and I have a way of testing it. So at least it can be resolved some day. [Stathis] I'm not sure of the details of your experiments, but wouldn't the most direct way to prove what you are saying be to isolate just that physical process which cannot be modelled? For example, if it is EM fields, set up an appropriately brain-like configuration of EM fields, introduce some environmental input, then show that the response of the fields deviates from what Maxwell's equations would predict. I don't think Colin is claiming the fields deviate from Maxwell's equations - he says they are good descriptions, they just miss the qualia. Seems to me it would be a lot simpler to set up some EM fields of various spatial and frequency variation and see if they change your qualia. Brent Meeker I'll let Colin answer, but it seems to me he must say that some aspect of brain physics deviates from what the equations tell us (and deviates in an unpredictable way, otherwise it would just mean that different equations are required) to be consistent. If not, then it should be possible to model the behaviour of a brain: predict what the brain is going to do in a particular situation, including novel situations such as those involving scientific research. Now, it is possible that the model will reproduce the behaviour but not the qualia, because the actual brain material is required for that, but that would mean that the model will be a philosophical zombie, and Colin has said that he does not believe that philosophical zombies can exist. Hence, he has to show not only that the computer model will lack the 1st person experience, but also lack the 3rd person observable behaviour of the real thing; and the latter can only be the case if there is some aspect of brain physics which does not comply with any possible mathematical model. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computer pain
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: I understand your conclusion, that a model of a brain won't be able to handle novelty like a real brain, but I am trying to understand the nuts and bolts of how the model is going to fail. For example, you can say that perpetual motion machines are impossible because they disobey the first or second law of thermodynamics, but you can also look at a particular design of such a machine and point out where the moving parts are going to slow down due to friction. So, you have the brain and the model of the brain, and you present them both with the same novel situation, say an auditory stimulus. They both process the stimulus and produce a response in the form of efferent impulses which move the vocal cords and produce speech; but the brain says something clever while the computer declares that it is lost for words. The obvious explanation is that the computer model is not good enough, and maybe a better model would perform better, but I think you would say that *no* model, no matter how good, could match the brain. Now, we agree that the brain contains matter which follows the laws of physics. Before the novel stimulus is applied the brain is in configuration x. The stimulus essentially adds energy to the brain in a very specific way, and as a result of this the brain undergoes a very complex sequence of physical changes, ending up in configuration y, in the process outputting energy in a very specific way which causes the vocal cords to move. The important point is, in the transformations x-y the various parts of the brain are just working like parts of an elaborate Rube Goldberg mechanism. There can be no surprises, because that would be magic: two positively charged entities suddenly start attracting each other, or the hammer hits the pendulum and no momentum is transferred. If there is magic - actually worse than that, unpredictable magic - then it won't be possible to model the brain or the Rube Goldberg machine. But, barring magic, it should be possible to predict the physical state transitions x-y and hence you will know what the motor output to the vocal cords will be and what the vocal response to the novel stimulus will be. Classical chaos and quantum uncertainty may make it difficult or impossible to predict what a particular brain will do on a particular day, but they should not be a theoretical impediment to modelling a generic brain which behaves in an acceptably brain-like manner. Only unpredictable magical effects would prevent that. Stathis Papaiaonnou I get where you're coming from. The problem is, what I am going to say will, in your eyes, put the reason into the class of 'magic'. I am quite used to it, and don't find it magical at all The problem is that the distal objects that are the subject about which the brain is informing itself, are literally, physically involved in the process. That is true. It is not clear why it should be a problem. You can't model them, because you don't know what they are. Why not? if the brain is succeeding in informing itself about them, then it does know what they are. What else does informing mean? (And remember that one can supplement perceptual information with information from instruments,etc). All you have is sensory measurements and they are local and ambiguous... They are no hopelessly local, because different sensory feeds can be and are combined, and they are not seriously ambiguous, because, although illusions and ambiguities can occur, the sensory system usually succeeds in making a best guess. .that's why you are doing the 'qualia dance' with EM fields - to 'cohere' with the external world. This non-locality is the same non-locality observed in QM and makes gravity 'action at a distance' possible. . That is wildly specualtive. I've been thinking about this for so long I actually have the reverse problem now...I find 'locality' really weird! I find 'extent' really hard to fathom. The non-locality is also predicted as the solution to the 'unity' issue. The empirical testing to verify this non-locality is the real target of my eventual experimentation. My model and the real chips will behave differently, it is predicted, because of the involvement of the 'external world' that is not available to the model. I hope to be able to 'switch off' the qualia whilst holding eveything else the same. The effects on subsequent learning will be indicative of the involvement of the qualia in learning. What the external world 'looks like' in the brain is 'virtual circuits' - average EM channels (regions of low potential that are like a temporary 'wire') down which chemistry can flow to alter synaptic weights and rearrange channel positions/rafting in the membrane and so on. So I guess my proclaimations about models are all contingent on my own view of
Re: computer pain
Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Colin Hales writes: I understand your conclusion, that a model of a brain won't be able to handle novelty like a real brain, but I am trying to understand the nuts and bolts of how the model is going to fail. For example, you can say that perpetual motion machines are impossible because they disobey the first or second law of thermodynamics, but you can also look at a particular design of such a machine and point out where the moving parts are going to slow down due to friction. So, you have the brain and the model of the brain, and you present them both with the same novel situation, say an auditory stimulus. They both process the stimulus and produce a response in the form of efferent impulses which move the vocal cords and produce speech; but the brain says something clever while the computer declares that it is lost for words. The obvious explanation is that the computer model is not good enough, and maybe a better model would perform better, but I think you would say that *no* model, no matter how good, could match the brain. Now, we agree that the brain contains matter which follows the laws of physics. Before the novel stimulus is applied the brain is in configuration x. The stimulus essentially adds energy to the brain in a very specific way, and as a result of this the brain undergoes a very complex sequence of physical changes, ending up in configuration y, in the process outputting energy in a very specific way which causes the vocal cords to move. The important point is, in the transformations x-y the various parts of the brain are just working like parts of an elaborate Rube Goldberg mechanism. There can be no surprises, because that would be magic: two positively charged entities suddenly start attracting each other, or the hammer hits the pendulum and no momentum is transferred. If there is magic - actually worse than that, unpredictable magic - then it won't be possible to model the brain or the Rube Goldberg machine. But, barring magic, it should be possible to predict the physical state transitions x-y and hence you will know what the motor output to the vocal cords will be and what the vocal response to the novel stimulus will be. Classical chaos and quantum uncertainty may make it difficult or impossible to predict what a particular brain will do on a particular day, but they should not be a theoretical impediment to modelling a generic brain which behaves in an acceptably brain-like manner. Only unpredictable magical effects would prevent that. Stathis Papaiaonnou I get where you're coming from. The problem is, what I am going to say will, in your eyes, put the reason into the class of 'magic'. I am quite used to it, and don't find it magical at all The problem is that the distal objects that are the subject about which the brain is informing itself, are literally, physically involved in the process. You can't model them, because you don't know what they are. All you have is sensory measurements and they are local and ambiguousthat's why you are doing the 'qualia dance' with EM fields - to 'cohere' with the external world. This non-locality is the same non-locality observed in QM and makes gravity 'action at a distance' possible. . I've been thinking about this for so long I actually have the reverse problem now...I find 'locality' really weird! I find 'extent' really hard to fathom. The non-locality is also predicted as the solution to the 'unity' issue. The empirical testing to verify this non-locality is the real target of my eventual experimentation. My model and the real chips will behave differently, it is predicted, because of the involvement of the 'external world' that is not available to the model. I hope to be able to 'switch off' the qualia whilst holding eveything else the same. The effects on subsequent learning will be indicative of the involvement of the qualia in learning. What the external world 'looks like' in the brain is 'virtual circuits' - average EM channels (regions of low potential that are like a temporary 'wire') down which chemistry can flow to alter synaptic weights and rearrange channel positions/rafting in the membrane and so on. So I guess my proclaimations about models are all contingent on my own view of things...and I could be wrong. Only time will tell. I have good physical grounds to doubt that modelling can work and I have a way of testing it. So at least it can be resolved some day. I'm not sure of the details of your experiments, but wouldn't the most direct way to prove what you are saying be to isolate just that physical process which cannot be modelled? For example, if it is EM fields, set up an appropriately brain-like configuration of EM fields, introduce some environmental
Re: computer pain
Well this is fascinating! I tend to think that Brent's 'simplistic' approach of setting up oscillating EM fields of specific frequencies at specific locations is more likely to be good evidence of EM involvement in qualia, because the victim, I mean experimental subject, can relate what is happening. Do it to enough naive subjects and, if their accounts of the changes wrought in their experience agree with your predictions, you will have provisional verification. Just make sure you have a falsifiable prediction first. On the other hand Colin's project seems out of reach to me. This is probably because I don't really understand it. I do not, for example, understand how Colin seems to think that we can dispense with the concept of representation. I am however very sceptical of all 'quantum' mechanical/entanglement theories of consciousness. As far as I can see humans are 'classical' in nature, built out of fundamental particles like everything else in the universe of course, but we can live and move and have our being BECAUSE each one of us, and the major parts which compose us, are all big enough to endure over and above the quantum uncertainty. So we don't 'flit in and out of existence' like some people say. We wake up, go to sleep, dose off at the wrong time, forget what we are doing, live through social/cultural descriptions of the world, dream and aspire, and sometimes experience amazing insights which can turn our lives around. We survive and endure by doing mostly the tried and true things we have learned so well that they are deeply ingrained habits. Most of what we do, perceive, and think is so stolidly habitual and 'built-in' that we are almost completely unaware of it; it is fixtures and fittings of the mind if you like. It all works for us, and the whole social and cultural milieu of economic and personal transactions, accounting, appointments, whatever, can happen so successfully BECAUSE so much of what we are and do is solidly habitual and predictable. In my simplistic view, consciousness is the registration of discrepancy between what the brain has predicted compared to what actually happened. Everything else, the bulk of what constitutes the mind in effect, is the ceaseless evoking, selecting, ignoring or suppressing, storing, amalgamating or splitting of the dynamic logical structures which represent our world, and without which we are just lumps of meat. These dynamic logical structures actually EXIST during their evocation. [And this is why there is 'something it is like to be ...'] This may seem like a very boring view of things but I think now there is an amazing amount of explanation already available concerning human experience. I am not saying there is nothing new to discover, far from it, just that the continuous denial that most of the pieces of the puzzle are already exposed and arranged in the right order is not helpful. What ought to be clear to everybody is that our awareness of being here, of being anything in fact, entails a continuous process of self-referencing. It entails a continuous process of locating self in one's world. This self-referencing is always inherently partial and incomplete, but unless this incompleteness itself is explicitly represented, we are not aware of it. We are only ever aware of relationships explicitly represented and being explicitly represented entails inclusion of representation of at least some aspects of how whatever it is, is, was, will be, or might become, causally connected to oneself. When we perceive or imagine things, it is always from a view point, listening point, or at a point of contact. The 'location' of something or someone is an intrinsic part of its or their identity, and the key element of location as such is in relation to oneself or in relation to someone who we ourselves identify with; they are extensions of ourselves. I'll leave that there for the moment. I just want to add that I believe Colin Hales is right in focussing on the ability of humans to do science. I look at that more from the point of view that being able to do science, and being able to perceive and understand entropy - even if it is only grasping where crumbs and fluff balls come from - are what allow us to know that we are NOT in some kind of computer generated matrix. We live in a real, open universe that exists independently of each of us but yet is incomplete without us. Regards Mark Peaty CDES [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/ Brent Meeker wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Colin Hales writes: I understand your conclusion, that a model of a brain won't be able to handle novelty like a real brain, but I am trying to understand the nuts and bolts of how the model is going to fail. For example, you can say that perpetual motion machines are impossible because they disobey the first or second law of thermodynamics, but you can also look at a
Re: computer pain
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
Stathis wrote:
I can understand that, for example, a computer simulation of a storm is
not a storm, because only a storm is a storm and will get you wet. But
perhaps counterintuitively, a model of a brain can be closer to the real
thing than a model of a storm. We don't normally see inside a person's
head, we just observe his behaviour. There could be anything in there - a
brain, a computer, the Wizard of Oz - and as long as it pulled the
person's strings so that he behaved like any other person, up to and
including doing scientific research, we would never know the difference.
Now, we know that living brains can pull the strings to produce normal
human behaviour (and consciousness in the process, but let's look at the
external behaviour for now). We also know that brains follow the laws of
physics: chemistry, Maxwell's equations, and so on. Maybe we don't
*understand* electrical fields in the sense that it may feel like
something to be an electrical field, or in some other as yet unspecified
sense, but we understand them well enough to predict their physical effect
on matter. Hence, although it would be an enormous task to gather the
relevant information and crunch the numbers in real time, it should be
possible to predict the electrical impulses that come out of the skull to
travel down the spinal cord and cranial nerves and ultimately pull the
strings that make a person behave like a person. If we can do that, it
should be possible to place the machinery which does the predicting inside
the skull interfaced with the periphery so as to take the brain's place,
and no-one would know the difference because it would behave just like the
original.
At which step above have I made a mistake?
Stathis Papaioannou
---
I'd say it's here...
and no-one would know the difference because it would behave just like
the original
But for a subtle reason.
The artefact has to be able to cope with exquisite novelty like we do.
Models cannot do this because as a designer you have been forced to define
a model that constrains all possible novelty to be that which fits your
model for _learning_.
If the model has been reverse-engineered from how
the nervous system works (ie, transparent box, not black box), it will
have the learning abilities of NS -- even if we don't know what they
are.
Therein lies the fundamental flaw. Yes... at a given
level of knowledge you can define how to learn new things within the
knowledge framework. But when it comes to something exquisitely novel, all
that will happen is that it'll be interpreted into the parameters of how
you told it to learn things... this will impact in a way the artefact
cannot handle. It will behave differently and probably poorly.
It's the zombie thing all over again.
It's not _knowledge_ that matters. it's _learning_ new knowledge. That's
what functionalism fails to handle. Being grounded in a phenomenal
representation of the world outside is the only way to handle arbitrary
levels of novelty.
That remains to be seen.
No phenomenal representation? = You are model-bound
and grounded, in effect, in the phenomenal representation of your
model-builders, who are forced to predefine all novelty handling in an I
don't know that functional module. Something you cannot do without
knowing everything a-priori! If you already know that you are god so why
are you bothering?
So long as you can peak into a system, you can functionally duplicate
it
without knowing how
it behaves under all circumstances. I can rewrite
the C code
double f(double x, double.y)
{
return 4.2+ sin(x) - exp(cos(y), 9.7);
}
in Pascal, although I couldn't tell you offhand
what the output is for x=0.77 , y=0.33
Say you bring an artefact X into existence. X may behave exactly like a
human Y in all the problem domains you used to define you model. Then you
expose both to novelty nobody has seen, including you and that is
where the two will differ. The human Y will do better every time. You
can't program qualia. You have to have them and you can't do without them
in a 'general intelligence' context.
Here I am on a sat morning...proving I have no life, yet again! :-)
Colin Hales
--~--~-~--~~~---~--~~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
Everything List group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en
-~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computer pain
Just to throw a point of perspective into this conversation about mimicking qualia. I posed a thematic question in my 1992 opus Understanding the Integral Universe. What of a single celled animus like an amoeba or paramecium? Does it 'feel' itself? Does it sense the subtle variations in its shape as it bumps around in its liquid world? Does it somehow note changes in water pressure around it? Is it always hungry? What drives a single celled creature to eat? What need, if any is fulfilled? Is it due to an internal pressure gradient in it's chemical metabolism? Is there a resilience to its boundary that not only determines its particular shape, whether amoebic or firm, but that variations in that boundary re-distribute pressures through its form to create a range of responsive actions? And, because it is coherent for that life form, is this primal consciousness? How far down into the structure of existence can we reasonably extrapolate this? An atom's electron cloud responds and interacts with its level of environment, but is this consciousness? We cannot personify, and therefore mystify, all kinetic functions as different degrees of consciousness; at least not at this point. Neither, can we specify with any certainty a level where consciousness suddenly appears, where there was none before. UIU(c)ROSE 1992 ; 02)Intro section. http://www.ceptualinstitute.com/uiu_plus/UIUcomplete11-99.htm Pain is a net-collective qualia, an 'other-tier' cybernetic emerged phenomenon. But it is -not unrelated- to phenomena like basic EM field changes and 'system's experiences' in those precursive tiers. Also, pain (an aspect of -consciousness-), has to be understood in regard to the panorama of 'kinds-of-sentience' that any given system/organism has, embodies, utilizes or enacts. In other words, it would be wrong to dismiss the presence of 'pain' in autonomic nervous systems, simply because the cognitive nervous system is 'unaware' of the signals or the distress situation generating them. If one wants to 'define' pain sentience as a closed marker, and build contrived systems that match the defined conditions and criteria, that is one thing - and acceptable for what it is. But if the 'pain' is a coordination of generalized engagements and reactions, then a different set of design standards needs to be considered/met. Vis a vis -this- reasoning: http://www.ceptualinstitute.com/uiu_plus/uiu04start.htm Jamie Rose Ceptual Institute cognating on a sunday morning 2006/12/17 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computer pain
James N Rose wrote: Just to throw a point of perspective into this conversation about mimicking qualia. I posed a thematic question in my 1992 opus Understanding the Integral Universe. What of a single celled animus like an amoeba or paramecium? Does it 'feel' itself? Does it sense the subtle variations in its shape as it bumps around in its liquid world? Does it somehow note changes in water pressure around it? Is it always hungry? What drives a single celled creature to eat? What need, if any is fulfilled? Is it due to an internal pressure gradient in it's chemical metabolism? Is there a resilience to its boundary that not only determines its particular shape, whether amoebic or firm, but that variations in that boundary re-distribute pressures through its form to create a range of responsive actions? And, because it is coherent for that life form, is this primal consciousness? How far down into the structure of existence can we reasonably extrapolate this? An atom's electron cloud responds and interacts with its level of environment, but is this consciousness? We cannot personify, and therefore mystify, all kinetic functions as different degrees of consciousness; at least not at this point. Neither, can we specify with any certainty a level where consciousness suddenly appears, where there was none before. UIU(c)ROSE 1992 ; 02)Intro section. If consciousness is the creation of an inner narrative to be stored in long-term memory then there are levels of consciousness. The amoeba forms no memories and so is not conscious at all. A dog forms memories and even has some understanding of symbols (gestures, words) and so is conscious. In between there are various degress of consciousness corresponding to different complexity and scope of learning. http://www.ceptualinstitute.com/uiu_plus/UIUcomplete11-99.htm Pain is a net-collective qualia, an 'other-tier' cybernetic emerged phenomenon. But it is -not unrelated- to phenomena like basic EM field changes and 'system's experiences' in those precursive tiers. Also, pain (an aspect of -consciousness-), has to be understood in regard to the panorama of 'kinds-of-sentience' that any given system/organism has, embodies, utilizes or enacts. In other words, it would be wrong to dismiss the presence of 'pain' in autonomic nervous systems, simply because the cognitive nervous system is 'unaware' of the signals or the distress situation generating them. This seems to depend on whether you define pain to be the conscious experience of pain, or you allow that the bodily reaction is evidence of pain in some more general sense. I think Stathis posed the question in terms of conscious experience. There's really no doubt that one can create and artificial system that reacts to distress; as in my example of a modern aircraft. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: computer pain
I'm not sure of the details of your experiments, but wouldn't the most direct way to prove what you are saying be to isolate just that physical process which cannot be modelled? For example, if it is EM fields, set up an appropriately brain-like configuration of EM fields, introduce some environmental input, then show that the response of the fields deviates from what Maxwell's equations would predict. Stathis Papaioannou I don't expect any deviation from Maxwell's equations. There's nothing wrong with them. It's just that they are merely a very good representation of a surface behaviour of the perceived universe in a particular context. Just like QM. But it's only the surface. The universe is not made of EM or QM or atoms or space. All these things are appearances. and it's what they are all actually made of with is what delivers its appearances. It's a pretty simple idea and it's been around for 300 years (and it's not a substance dualism!). The paper I'm writing at the moment (nearly finished) is about how this cultural delusion that the universe is made of our models pervades the low-level physical science. It's quite stark...the application of situated cognition to knowledge is quite pervasive. You can take a vertical slice all the way through the entire epistemological tree from social sciences down through psychology..cognitive science..ecology..ethology..anthropology || neuroscience...chemistry..physics. The || is the sudden break where situated cognition matters and where physics, in particular cosmology is almost pathologically intent on the surgical excision of the scientist from the universe. Situated cognition applied to metascience at the level of physics is simply absent. You can see it in the desperate drive to make sense of QM maths, as if the universe is made of it...that the only way that any sense can be made of it is to write complex stories about infinite numbers of universes, all of which are somehow explanatory of the weirdness of the maths, rather then deal with what the universe is actually made ofwhen right in front of all of them is the perfect way out...start talking about what universes must be made of in order that it can omplement scientists that have perceptionto realise that the maths of empirical laws is just a model of the stuff, not the stuff. Cosmologists are the key. They have some sort of mass fantasy going about the mathematics they use. Totally unfounded assumptions pervade their craft - far worse than any assumption that the universe is not made of idealsised maths...the thing that gets labeled erroneously 'metaphysics' and eschewed. I have done a cartoon representation of a cosmologist made of stuff in a unoiverse of stuff staring at the cosmos wondering where all teh stuff is, when the fact of be able to stare _at all_ is telling him about the deep nature of of the cosmos. Poor little deluded cosmologist. There's nothing wrong with Maxwell's equations. In fact there's nothing wrong with any empirical laws. The problem is us... cheers, colin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: computer pain
Stathis said I'll let Colin answer, but it seems to me he must say that some aspect of brain physics deviates from what the equations tell us (and deviates in an unpredictable way, otherwise it would just mean that different equations are required) to be consistent. If not, then it should be possible to model the behaviour of a brain: predict what the brain is going to do in a particular situation, including novel situations such as those involving scientific research. Now, it is possible that the model will reproduce the behaviour but not the qualia, because the actual brain material is required for that, but that would mean that the model will be a philosophical zombie, and Colin has said that he does not believe that philosophical zombies can exist. Hence, he has to show not only that the computer model will lack the 1st person experience, but also lack the 3rd person observable behaviour of the real thing; and the latter can only be the case if there is some aspect of brain physics which does not comply with any possible mathematical model. Stathis Papaioannou Exactly rightexcept for the bit where you talk about 'deviation from the model'. I expect the EM model to be perfectly right - indeed MUST be right or I can't do the experiment because the modelling I do will help me design the chips...it must be right or they won't work. It's just that the models don't deliver all the result - you have to BE the chips to get the whole picture. What is missing from the model, seamlessly and irrevocably and instrinsically... is that it says nothing about the first person perspective. You cannot model the first person perspective by definition, because every first person perspective is different! The 'fact' of the existence of the first person is the invariant, however. SoAll the models are quite right and accurate, but are inherently third person descriptions of 'the stuff', not 'the stuff'. When you be 'the stuff' under the right circumstances there's more to the description. And EVERYTHING gets to 'be'...ie..is forced, implicitly to uniquely be somewhere in the universe and inherits all the properties of that act, NONE of which is delivered by empirical laws, which are constructed under conditions designed specifically to throw out that perspective...and...what's worse...it does it by verifying the laws using the FIRST PERSON...to do all scientific measurements...not only that, if you don't do it with the first person (measurement/experimental observation grounded in the first person of the scientist) you get told you are not doing science! How screwed up is that! My planned experiment makes chips and on those chips will be probably 4 intrinsically intermixed 'scientists', all of whom can share each other's scientific evidence = first person experiences...whilst they do 'dumb science' like test a hypothesis H1 = is the thing there?. By fiddling about with the configuration of the scientists you can create circumstances where the only way they can agree/disagree is because of the first person perspectiveand the whole thing will obey Maxwell's equations perfectly well from the outside. Indeed the 'probes' I will embed will measure field effects in-situ that are supposed to do what Maxwell's equations says. cheers, colin hales --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: computer pain
Stathis said SNIP and Colin has said that he does not believe that philosophical zombies can exist. Hence, he has to show not only that the computer model will lack the 1st person experience, but also lack the 3rd person observable behaviour of the real thing; and the latter can only be the case if there is some aspect of brain physics which does not comply with any possible mathematical model. Stathis Papaioannou I just thought of a better way of explaining 'deviation'. Maxwell's equations are not 'unique' in the sense that there are an infinite number of different charge configurations that will produce the same field congurations around some surface. This is a very old resultwas it Poisson who said it? can't remember. Anyway I will be presenting different objects to my 'chip scientists', but I will be presenting them in such a way as the sensory measurement is literally identical. What I expect to happen is that the field configuration I find emerging in the guts of the chips will be different, depending on the object, even though the sensory measurement is identical. The different field configurations will correspond to the different objects. That is what subjective experience will look like from the outside. The chip's 'solution' to the charge cnfiguration will take up a configuration based on the non-locality...hence the scientists will report different objects, even when their sensory measurement is identical, and it is the only apparent access they have to the object (to us). I think that's more like what you are after... there's no failure to obey maxwell's equations, but their predictions as to charge configuration is not a unique solution. The trick is to realise that the sensory maeasurement has to be there in order that _any_ solution be found, not a _particular_ solution. pretty simple really. does that make more sense? cheers colin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computer pain
Brent Meeker wrote: If consciousness is the creation of an inner narrative to be stored in long-term memory then there are levels of consciousness. The amoeba forms no memories and so is not conscious at all. A dog forms memories and even has some understanding of symbols (gestures, words) and so is conscious. In between there are various degress of consciousness corresponding to different complexity and scope of learning. That notion may fit comfortably with your presumptive ideas about 'memory' -- computer stored, special-neuron stored, and similar. But the universe IS ITSELF 'memory storage' from the start. Operational rules of performance -- the laws of nature, so to speak -- are 'memory', and inform EVERY organization of action-appropriateness. Its 'memory' of the longest-term kind actually. Amoebic behavior embodies more than stimulus-response actions - consistent with organismic plan 'must eat'; but less than your criterial state of sentient awareness - consistent with 'plan dynamics/behaviors'. The rut that science is in, is presumption that 'our sentience is 'the only' sentience form' and is the gold standard for any/all aware-behavior activity. Sentience better fits a model of spectrum and degrees; rather than not-extant / suddenly-extant. Correct analoging is more challenging with the former, which is why no AI afficionados want to give up the Cartesian Split way of thinking and dealing with things - trying make square 'wheels' roll in the long run. Jamie http://www.ceptualinstitute.com/uiu_plus/UIUcomplete11-99.htm --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: computer pain
Colin, If there is nothing wrong with the equations, it is always possible to predict the behaviour of any piece of matter, right? And living matter is still matter, which obeys all of the physical laws all of the time, right? It appeared from your previous posts that you would disagree with this and predict that living matter would sometimes do surprising, unpredictable things. In that case, your theory is logically consistent, but you have to find evidence for it, and it would be easier to tease out the essential unpredictable physical elements and test them in a physics lab. Stathis Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2006 07:17:10 +1100 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: computer pain To: everything-list@googlegroups.com I'm not sure of the details of your experiments, but wouldn't the most direct way to prove what you are saying be to isolate just that physical process which cannot be modelled? For example, if it is EM fields, set up an appropriately brain-like configuration of EM fields, introduce some environmental input, then show that the response of the fields deviates from what Maxwell's equations would predict. Stathis Papaioannou I don't expect any deviation from Maxwell's equations. There's nothing wrong with them. It's just that they are merely a very good representation of a surface behaviour of the perceived universe in a particular context. Just like QM. But it's only the surface. The universe is not made of EM or QM or atoms or space. All these things are appearances. and it's what they are all actually made of with is what delivers its appearances. It's a pretty simple idea and it's been around for 300 years (and it's not a substance dualism!). The paper I'm writing at the moment (nearly finished) is about how this cultural delusion that the universe is made of our models pervades the low-level physical science. It's quite stark...the application of situated cognition to knowledge is quite pervasive. You can take a vertical slice all the way through the entire epistemological tree from social sciences down through psychology..cognitive science..ecology..ethology..anthropology || neuroscience...chemistry..physics. The || is the sudden break where situated cognition matters and where physics, in particular cosmology is almost pathologically intent on the surgical excision of the scientist from the universe. Situated cognition applied to metascience at the level of physics is simply absent. You can see it in the desperate drive to make sense of QM maths, as if the universe is made of it...that the only way that any sense can be made of it is to write complex stories about infinite numbers of universes, all of which are somehow explanatory of the weirdness of the maths, rather then deal with what the universe is actually made ofwhen right in front of all of them is the perfect way out...start talking about what universes must be made of in order that it can omplement scientists that have perceptionto realise that the maths of empirical laws is just a model of the stuff, not the stuff. Cosmologists are the key. They have some sort of mass fantasy going about the mathematics they use. Totally unfounded assumptions pervade their craft - far worse than any assumption that the universe is not made of idealsised maths...the thing that gets labeled erroneously 'metaphysics' and eschewed. I have done a cartoon representation of a cosmologist made of stuff in a unoiverse of stuff staring at the cosmos wondering where all teh stuff is, when the fact of be able to stare _at all_ is telling him about the deep nature of of the cosmos. Poor little deluded cosmologist. There's nothing wrong with Maxwell's equations. In fact there's nothing wrong with any empirical laws. The problem is us... cheers, colin _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: computer pain
Colin, I think there is a logical contradiction here. You say that the physical models do, in fact, explain the 3rd person observable behaviour of a physical system. A brain is a physical system with 3rd person observable behaviour. Therefore, the models *must* predict *all* of the third person observable behaviour of a brain. When a person is handed a complex problem to solve, scratches his head and chews his pencil, then writes down his proposed solution to the problem, then that is definitely 3rd person observable behaviour, and it is definitely due to the motion of matter which perfectly follows physical laws. So you can in theory build a model which will predict what the person is going to write down, or at least the sort of thing a real person might write down, given that classical chaos may make it impossible to predict what a particular person will do on a particular day. Now, you would no doubt say that the model will not experience the qualia. That's OK, but then the model will effectively be a zombie that can behave just like a person yet lack phenomenal consciousness, which you don't beleive is possible. The only way you can retain this belief consistently is if the model would *not* be able to predict the 3rd person behaviour of a real person. And the only way that is possible is if there is some aspect of the physics in the brain which is inherently unpredictable. Stathis Papaioannou Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2006 07:42:38 +1100 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: computer pain To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Stathis said I'll let Colin answer, but it seems to me he must say that some aspect of brain physics deviates from what the equations tell us (and deviates in an unpredictable way, otherwise it would just mean that different equations are required) to be consistent. If not, then it should be possible to model the behaviour of a brain: predict what the brain is going to do in a particular situation, including novel situations such as those involving scientific research. Now, it is possible that the model will reproduce the behaviour but not the qualia, because the actual brain material is required for that, but that would mean that the model will be a philosophical zombie, and Colin has said that he does not believe that philosophical zombies can exist. Hence, he has to show not only that the computer model will lack the 1st person experience, but also lack the 3rd person observable behaviour of the real thing; and the latter can only be the case if there is some aspect of brain physics which does not comply with any possible mathematical model. Stathis Papaioannou Exactly rightexcept for the bit where you talk about 'deviation from the model'. I expect the EM model to be perfectly right - indeed MUST be right or I can't do the experiment because the modelling I do will help me design the chips...it must be right or they won't work. It's just that the models don't deliver all the result - you have to BE the chips to get the whole picture. What is missing from the model, seamlessly and irrevocably and instrinsically... is that it says nothing about the first person perspective. You cannot model the first person perspective by definition, because every first person perspective is different! The 'fact' of the existence of the first person is the invariant, however. SoAll the models are quite right and accurate, but are inherently third person descriptions of 'the stuff', not 'the stuff'. When you be 'the stuff' under the right circumstances there's more to the description. And EVERYTHING gets to 'be'...ie..is forced, implicitly to uniquely be somewhere in the universe and inherits all the properties of that act, NONE of which is delivered by empirical laws, which are constructed under conditions designed specifically to throw out that perspective...and...what's worse...it does it by verifying the laws using the FIRST PERSON...to do all scientific measurements...not only that, if you don't do it with the first person (measurement/experimental observation grounded in the first person of the scientist) you get told you are not doing science! How screwed up is that! My planned experiment makes chips and on those chips will be probably 4 intrinsically intermixed 'scientists', all of whom can share each other's scientific evidence = first person experiences...whilst they do 'dumb science' like test a hypothesis H1 = is the thing there?. By fiddling about with the configuration of the scientists you can create circumstances where the only way they can agree/disagree is because of the first person perspectiveand the whole thing will obey Maxwell's equations perfectly well from the outside. Indeed the 'probes' I will embed will measure field effects in-situ that are supposed to do what Maxwell's equations
RE: computer pain
Colin Hales writes: Stathis said SNIP and Colin has said that he does not believe that philosophical zombies can exist. Hence, he has to show not only that the computer model will lack the 1st person experience, but also lack the 3rd person observable behaviour of the real thing; and the latter can only be the case if there is some aspect of brain physics which does not comply with any possible mathematical model. Stathis Papaioannou I just thought of a better way of explaining 'deviation'. Maxwell's equations are not 'unique' in the sense that there are an infinite number of different charge configurations that will produce the same field congurations around some surface. This is a very old resultwas it Poisson who said it? can't remember. Anyway I will be presenting different objects to my 'chip scientists', but I will be presenting them in such a way as the sensory measurement is literally identical. What I expect to happen is that the field configuration I find emerging in the guts of the chips will be different, depending on the object, even though the sensory measurement is identical. The different field configurations will correspond to the different objects. That is what subjective experience will look like from the outside. The chip's 'solution' to the charge cnfiguration will take up a configuration based on the non-locality...hence the scientists will report different objects, even when their sensory measurement is identical, and it is the only apparent access they have to the object (to us). I think that's more like what you are after... there's no failure to obey maxwell's equations, but their predictions as to charge configuration is not a unique solution. The trick is to realise that the sensory maeasurement has to be there in order that _any_ solution be found, not a _particular_ solution. pretty simple really. does that make more sense? If you present an object with identical sensory measurements but get different results in the chip, then that means what you took as sensory measurements was incomplete. For example, blind people might be able to sense the presense of someone who silently walks into the room due to their body heat, or the breeze created by their breathing, or perhaps even some proximity sensor that we have not as yet discovered. But even supposing that perception involves some non-local interaction (which would of course be an amazing finding on its own, regardless of the implications for consciousness), much interesting scientific work has nothing to do with the scientist's direct connection with his object of study. A scientist can read about empirical data collected by someone on the other side of the world and come up with a theory to explain it; for all he knows, the data is completely fabricated, but this makes no difference to the cognitive processes which result in the theory. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: computer pain
Stahis said: snip If you present an object with identical sensory measurements but get different results in the chip, then that means what you took as sensory measurements was incomplete. For example, blind people might be able to sense the presense of someone who silently walks into the room due to their body heat, or the breeze created by their breathing, or perhaps even some proximity sensor that we have not as yet discovered. But even supposing that perception involves some non-local interaction (which would of course be an amazing finding on its own, regardless of the implications for consciousness), much interesting scientific work has nothing to do with the scientist's direct connection with his object of study. A scientist can read about empirical data collected by someone on the other side of the world and come up with a theory to explain it; for all he knows, the data is completely fabricated, but this makes no difference to the cognitive processes which result in the theory. Stathis Papaioannou RE: Incomplete sensing Sorry, Stathis, but no amount of sensory feeds would ever make it 'complete'. The sensory data is fundamentally ambiguous statistic of it's original source. That argumant won't do it. The question is: what physical processes cause the brain's field structure to settle on a particular solution. That constraint is NOT in the sensory data. Yes it will be an amazing result to everyone else. but me. I find it amazing that eveyone thinks it could be anything else or that somehow the incomplete laws derived using appearances can explain the appearance generation system. It's like saying the correltated contents of the image in a mirror somehow fathom the reflective surface of the mirror that generated the appearances. RE: Science I know accurate science requires certain behavioural normatives. Effective science has skill sets, individual characteristics of the temperament and genetic propensities of individual scientists. I know it has a social aspect. All this is true but irrelevant. From one of the metascience gurus: Science is not done by logically omniscient lone knowers but by biological systems with certain kinds of capacities and limitations. At the most fine grained level, scientific change involves modifications of the cognitive states of limited biological systems. Philip Kitcher, 1993 The advancement of science : science without legend, objectivity without illusions It's going to be fun watching the macro-scale electric field change in response to different objects when the sensory measurement is demonstrably the same. The only reason we can;t do it in brain materia is we can't get at it without buggering it up with probes and other junk related to the measurement. Our imaging techniques measure the wrong things. It'll light up a light when the subjective experience changes. We can wire it up like that. That will be a spooky day. I have to leave now. Merry XMAS and 2007 all you everything folk... cheers colin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computer pain
James N Rose wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: If consciousness is the creation of an inner narrative to be stored in long-term memory then there are levels of consciousness. The amoeba forms no memories and so is not conscious at all. A dog forms memories and even has some understanding of symbols (gestures, words) and so is conscious. In between there are various degress of consciousness corresponding to different complexity and scope of learning. That notion may fit comfortably with your presumptive ideas about 'memory' -- computer stored, special-neuron stored, and similar. But the universe IS ITSELF 'memory storage' from the start. Operational rules of performance -- the laws of nature, so to speak -- are 'memory', and inform EVERY organization of action-appropriateness. Its 'memory' of the longest-term kind actually. Assuming there is no inherent randomness. Even in MWI of QM, you can't recover the past from the present, except in a coarse-grained approximation. So you may say the universe has 'memory' and even 'is conscious' but that's stretching the common meaning of the words beyond recognition. Amoebic behavior embodies more than stimulus-response actions - consistent with organismic plan 'must eat'; but less than your criterial state of sentient awareness - consistent with 'plan dynamics/behaviors'. The rut that science is in, is presumption that 'our sentience is 'the only' sentience form' and is the gold standard for any/all aware-behavior activity. Sentience better fits a model of spectrum and degrees; rather than not-extant / suddenly-extant. I thought I said that. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: computer pain
Colin, You have described a way in which our perception may be more than can be explained by the sense data. However, how does this explain the response to novelty? I can come up with a plan or theory to deal with a novel situation if it is simply described to me. I don't have to actually perceive anything. Writers, philosophers, mathematicians can all be creative without perceiving anything. Stathis Papaioannou Date: Mon, 18 Dec 2006 10:54:05 +1100 From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: RE: computer pain To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Stathis said: snip If you present an object with identical sensory measurements but get different results in the chip, then that means what you took as sensory measurements was incomplete. For example, blind people might be able to sense the presense of someone who silently walks into the room due to their body heat, or the breeze created by their breathing, or perhaps even some proximity sensor that we have not as yet discovered. But even supposing that perception involves some non-local interaction (which would of course be an amazing finding on its own, regardless of the implications for consciousness), much interesting scientific work has nothing to do with the scientist's direct connection with his object of study. A scientist can read about empirical data collected by someone on the other side of the world and come up with a theory to explain it; for all he knows, the data is completely fabricated, but this makes no difference to the cognitive processes which result in the theory. Stathis Papaioannou RE: Incomplete sensing Sorry, Stathis, but no amount of sensory feeds would ever make it 'complete'. The sensory data is fundamentally ambiguous statistic of it's original source. That argumant won't do it. The question is: what physical processes cause the brain's field structure to settle on a particular solution. That constraint is NOT in the sensory data. Yes it will be an amazing result to everyone else. but me. I find it amazing that eveyone thinks it could be anything else or that somehow the incomplete laws derived using appearances can explain the appearance generation system. It's like saying the correltated contents of the image in a mirror somehow fathom the reflective surface of the mirror that generated the appearances. RE: Science I know accurate science requires certain behavioural normatives. Effective science has skill sets, individual characteristics of the temperament and genetic propensities of individual scientists. I know it has a social aspect. All this is true but irrelevant. From one of the metascience gurus: Science is not done by logically omniscient lone knowers but by biological systems with certain kinds of capacities and limitations. At the most fine grained level, scientific change involves modifications of the cognitive states of limited biological systems. Philip Kitcher, 1993 The advancement of science : science without legend, objectivity without illusions It's going to be fun watching the macro-scale electric field change in response to different objects when the sensory measurement is demonstrably the same. The only reason we can;t do it in brain materia is we can't get at it without buggering it up with probes and other junk related to the measurement. Our imaging techniques measure the wrong things. It'll light up a light when the subjective experience changes. We can wire it up like that. That will be a spooky day. I have to leave now. Merry XMAS and 2007 all you everything folk... cheers colin _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computer pain
Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: What I expect to happen is that the field configuration I find emerging in the guts of the chips will be different, depending on the object, even though the sensory measurement is identical. The different field configurations will correspond to the different objects. That is what subjective experience will look like from the outside. The chip's 'solution' to the charge cnfiguration will take up a configuration based on the non-locality...hence the scientists will report different objects, even when their sensory measurement is identical, and it is the only apparent access they have to the object (to us). And is it going to be the right solution? Because then you chips are going to do better than humans. Humans presented with ambiguous sensory data make wrong perceptual judgements, or random ones (Necker cube). --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: computer pain
Colin, You have described a way in which our perception may be more than can be explained by the sense data. However, how does this explain the response to novelty? I can come up with a plan or theory to deal with a novel situation if it is simply described to me. I don't have to actually perceive anything. Writers, philosophers, mathematicians can all be creative without perceiving anything. Stathis Papaioannou Imaginative processes also use phenoenal consciousness. To have it described to you you had to use phenomenal consciousness. Once you dispose of PC you are model bound in all ways. You have to have a model to generate the novelty! PC pervades the whole process at all levels. Look what happens to Marvin. Even if he had someoine tell him there was an outide world he'd never know what the data was telling him. Gotta go. cheers colin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: computer pain
Brent Meeker wrote: That notion may fit comfortably with your presumptive ideas about 'memory' -- computer stored, special-neuron stored, and similar. But the universe IS ITSELF 'memory storage' from the start. Operational rules of performance -- the laws of nature, so to speak -- are 'memory', and inform EVERY organization of action-appropriateness. Its 'memory' of the longest-term kind actually. Assuming there is no inherent randomness. Even in MWI of QM, you can't recover the past from the present, except in a coarse-grained approximation. So you may say the universe has 'memory' and even 'is conscious' but that's stretching the common meaning of the words beyond recognition. Your comments are exactly on target Brent, because I am doing exactly that - stretching the 'common meanings' of this and several other concepts. Not to take them beyond 'recognition', but definitely beyond the conventional. Because the conventional notions are narrow and too presumptive (by familiarity, and unexplored assumptions). When you mentioned MWI and 'randomness', my first thought was of Andre Linde and alternative universes defined not as variables of -this universe- but as alternatives of the universal constants - where different values of force and field strength and assignment - vary. Eg, where the fine structure constant is not (approx) 1/137, but maybe 1/143.9. Even those 'possible universes' would be functionally-pinned to certain values and not others. Where again - the value-states would be the 'primal memory' of -that- specific universe. Actions that happen 'because of' or 'conditional on' some temporally previous information (aka 'instructions', guide data, etc) are what you seem to associate as 'memory driven' behaviors. Where we have a current notion of 'stable, recallable information', and by experience that kind of information seems to be N (data) that is 'stored and later accessible' when/as needed. So with that kind of -general notion- I began to think about 'general conditions' and where functional instructive information -could- be held for -any system's- general draw. Memory as resource. Well, it just seems to make sense to first look at relationships that fill that definition, not the mechanisms we are aware of that match the relationship. Memory of 'how' to perform. Irrespective and indifferent to 'mechanisms'. Whether it provides 'choice' or not to perform. The universal constants and similar invariant relations-of-systems must be includable as a form-of-memory. Which in the long run is much much better for our intuitive notions of existence, life and being. Life for example, may be a special existential state, but its a lot more spectrally consistent to think of sentience being wholly present, but in precursive primary forms, and then in refined, improved capacity forms later on, than to say that this massively important quality flat-out has no familially related qualia, and then suddenly does. We already see other aspects that show the spectral notion to exist. For example there are power laws and wave function -laws- that are seen in the QM realm and macro/complex systems - like animal speciation/ditribution studies; relation for relation. Even though the 'qualia' that display the rules, laws and relations are quite quite different. Where there is more going on than scaling differences to account for those mappings. The example I use often is the QM defined electron 'shells' of atoms. The interesting thing about them - especially the valence group - is that electrons of the approprotiate energies can fill or vacate those QM regions. No big thing, you might remark. Very calculable. Great for building molecules we might want; understanding physics event and chemistry. Right. But there's more. A qualia currently not defined. And it goes like this: certain respiring animals use materially identifiable organs called 'lungs', to capture gas and release gas. They take certain energy/configuration molecules and exude other energy/configuration molecules. Plants are complementary and do the opposite exchange. But both kinds of organisms 'breath' in some fashion, through some 'physical' organs or organelles. So lets look at valence shells of electron. There is no cognition or 'intentional' or survival-related necessity to hold/release electrons. An atom or molecule won't 'cease to exist' if the activity of filling/emptying valence states of an electron doesn't take place (as part of some larger/extended metabolic sequence of electron transferring) - but - a living organism -would- die if atoms didn't functionally 'breathe'. The valence shells of atoms are their defacto 'functional' lungs even if they don't exist in/as a 'physical' manifestation of -material- operant organelle. I am NOT imposing a biology model on to physics. I AM citing that primitive precursive BEHAVIOR CAPACITIES exist from the outset of existential living
