RE: Mouse brain simulated on a computer - NOT
Hi, What they did was hook X million simple neural soma models to each other with Y000 models of synaptic interconnects. Very useful for investigating large-scale dynamicsbutthe leap to 'mouse brain'?.presumptuous I think. Perhaps... 'Mouse-brain scale idealised connectionist model' would b more accurate and less loaded remember...Less than half the signaling in the brain is via synapses. They didn't even mention the word 'astrocyte'. Interesting..yes. Relevant to the milieu? Yes...but well informed? Hthe spin has a little too much chest thumping and not enough biology, methinks cheers col --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
On 4/29/07, Jason <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: Person identity is useful when talking about everyday situations, but > I think it muddies things, especially if one tries to bind a > continuous conscious experience with a person. That's true. It's rather like comparing familiar classical mechanics with the strange things that happen at relativistic speeds or very small scales. Our brains did not evolve to easily cope with these things. For example, how can > you explain what happens if one were to make 5 exact duplicates of > some individual? Do you say their consciousness fractures, do you say > it multiplies, do you say it selects one of them? If five copies of you were made secretly in five different labs, then without further information each of the copies would believe he was the "real" you and had somehow been drugged and transported to a distant place (or something like that). From a third person perspective, there are now five copies, not in communication with each other, sharing past memories up to a certain point. From a first person perspective, you have a 1/5 chance of finding yourself in one of the five labs, and otherwise will feel perfectly normal. Do you think it could possibly be otherwise? Just because > observers have memories of experiencing the same observer's past > perspectives in no way implies there is a single consciousness that > follows a person as they evolve through time (even though it very much > seems that way subjectively). But the whole point of consciousness is that "it seems that way". I really can't know how many identical copies of my mind are running, what sort of hardware (if any) they are running on, whether I was created one second ago complete with false memories, or any other diabolical variation on these themes. However, whatever is actually going on, I hope that it or some equivalent process will continue going on, because then it will seem that I have survived another moment, which is important to me. Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
On Sun, Apr 29, 2007 at 09:00:57AM -, Jason wrote: > > Two things in my mind make personal identity fuzzy: > > 1. The MWI of quantum mechanics, which if true means each "person" > experiences a perhaps infinite number of histories across the multi- > verse. Should personal identity extend to just one branch or to all > branches? If all branches where do you draw the line between who is > and is not that person? Remember across the multi-verse you can move > across branches that differ only by the location of one photon, > therefore there is a continuum linking a person in one branch to any > other person. This is debatable. > > 2. Duplication/transportation/simulation thought experiments, which > show that minds can't be tied to a single physical body, simulation > thought experiments suggest there doesn't even have to be a physical > body for there to be a person. If a person can be reduced to > information is it the same person if you modify some bits (as time > does), how many bits must be modified before you no longer consider it > to be the same person? When you've changed enough bits for the person to no longer be conscious (ie for the observer moment so generated to be unexperiencable). > What happens if you make copies of those bits > (as the MWI implies happens), or destroy one copy and reconstitute it > elsewhere? > > Person identity is useful when talking about everyday situations, but > I think it muddies things, especially if one tries to bind a > continuous conscious experience with a person. For example, how can > you explain what happens if one were to make 5 exact duplicates of > some individual? Do you say their consciousness fractures, do you say > it multiplies, do you say it selects one of them? Just because > observers have memories of experiencing the same observer's past > perspectives in no way implies there is a single consciousness that > follows a person as they evolve through time (even though it very much > seems that way subjectively). > The answer is that each duplicate experiences its own observer moment. All other possibilities appear absurd. > Jason > > On Apr 26, 3:11 pm, "John Mikes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Interleaving ONE tiny question: > > > > On 4/20/07, Jason <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > (Jason:) > > "<...Personhood becomes fuzzy and a truly object treatment of conscious > > experience might do well to abandon the idea of personal identity > > altogether. ...>" > > > > Sais WHO? > > > > John > > > -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Mouse brain simulated on a computer
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/6600965.stm Jason --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: RSSA / ASSA / Single Mind Theory
Two things in my mind make personal identity fuzzy: 1. The MWI of quantum mechanics, which if true means each "person" experiences a perhaps infinite number of histories across the multi- verse. Should personal identity extend to just one branch or to all branches? If all branches where do you draw the line between who is and is not that person? Remember across the multi-verse you can move across branches that differ only by the location of one photon, therefore there is a continuum linking a person in one branch to any other person. 2. Duplication/transportation/simulation thought experiments, which show that minds can't be tied to a single physical body, simulation thought experiments suggest there doesn't even have to be a physical body for there to be a person. If a person can be reduced to information is it the same person if you modify some bits (as time does), how many bits must be modified before you no longer consider it to be the same person? What happens if you make copies of those bits (as the MWI implies happens), or destroy one copy and reconstitute it elsewhere? Person identity is useful when talking about everyday situations, but I think it muddies things, especially if one tries to bind a continuous conscious experience with a person. For example, how can you explain what happens if one were to make 5 exact duplicates of some individual? Do you say their consciousness fractures, do you say it multiplies, do you say it selects one of them? Just because observers have memories of experiencing the same observer's past perspectives in no way implies there is a single consciousness that follows a person as they evolve through time (even though it very much seems that way subjectively). Jason On Apr 26, 3:11 pm, "John Mikes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Interleaving ONE tiny question: > > On 4/20/07, Jason <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > (Jason:) > "<...Personhood becomes fuzzy and a truly object treatment of conscious > experience might do well to abandon the idea of personal identity > altogether. ...>" > > Sais WHO? > > John --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
