Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?
On Thu, Jun 21, 2007 at 12:45:43PM +1000, Colin Hales wrote: OK, so by necessary primitive, you mean the syntactic or microscopic layer. But take this away, and you no longer have emergence. See endless discussions on emergence - my paper, or Jochen Fromm's book for instance. Does this mean magical emergence is oxymoronic? I do not think I mean what you suggest. To make it almost tediously obvious I could rephrase it NECESSARY PRIMITIVE ORGANISATIONAL LAYER. Necessary in that if you take it away the 'emergent' is gone.PRIMITIVE ORGANISATIONAL LAYER = one of the layers of the hierarchy of the natural world (from strings to atoms to cells and beyond): real observable -on-the-benchtop-in-the-lab - layers. Still sounds like the syntactic layer to me. Not some arm waving syntactic or information or complexity or Computaton or function_atom or representon. Magical emergence is real, specious and exactly what I have said all along: real and specious? You claim consciousness arises as a result of [syntactic or information or complexity or Computational or function_atom] = necessary primitive, but it has no scientifically verifiable correlation with any real natural world phenomenon that you can stand next to and have your picture taken. The only form of consciousness known to us is emergent relative to a syntactic of neurons, which you most certainly can take pictures of. I'm not sure what your point is here. You can't use an object derived using the contents of consciousness(observation) to explain why there are any contents of consciousness(observation) at all. It is illogical. (see the wigner quote below). I find the general failure to recognise this brute reality very exasperating. People used to think that about life. How can you construct (eg an animal) without having a complete discription of that animal. So how can an animal self-reproduce without having a complete description of itself. But this then leads to an infinite regress. The solution to this conundrum was found in the early 20th century - first with such theoretical constructs as combinators and lambda calculus, then later the actual genetic machinery of life. If it is possible in the case of self-reproduction, the it will also likely to be possible in the case of self-awareness and consciousness. Stating this to illogical doesn't help. That's what people from the time of Descartes thought about self-reproduction. COLIN snip So this means that in a computer abstraction. d(KNOWLEDGE(t)) --- is already part of KNOWLEDGE(t) dt RUSSEL No its not. dK/dt is generated by the interaction of the rules with the environment. No. No. No. There is the old assumption thing again. How, exactly, are you assuming that the agent 'interacts' with the environment? This is the world external to the agent, yes?. Do not say through sensory measurement, because that will not do. There are an infinite number of universes that could give rise to the same sensory measurements. All true, but how does that differ in the case of humans? The extreme uniqueness of the circumstance aloneWe ARE the thing we describe. We are more entitled to any such claims .notwithstanding that... What are you talking about here? Self-awareness? We started off talking about whether machines doing science was evidence that they're conscious. You've lost me completely here. Here you are trying to say that an explanation of consciousness lies in that direction (magical emergence flavour X), when you appear to You're the one introducing the term magical emergence, for which I've not obtained an adequate definitions from you. ... At the same time we can plausibly and defensibly justify the claim that whatever the universe is really made of , QUALIA are made of it too, and that the qualia process and the rest of the process (that appear like atoms etc in the qualiaare all of the same KIND or CLASS of natural phenomenon...a perfectly natural phenomenon innate to whatever it is that it is actually made of. That is what I mean by we must live in the kind of universe. and I mean 'must' in the sense of formal necessitation of the most stringent kind. cheers, colin I'm still confused about what you're trying to say. Are you saying our qualia are made up of electrons and quarks, or if not them, then whatever they're made of (strings perhaps?) How could you imagine the colour green being made up of this stuff, or the wetness of water? -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au
Re: Penrose and algorithms
You could look up Murmurs in the Cathedral, Daniel Dennett's review of Penrose's The Emperor's New Mind, in the Times literary supplement (and maybe online somewhere?) Here's an excerpt from a review of the review: -- However, Penrose's main thesis, for which all this scientific exposition is mere supporting argument, is that algorithmic computers cannot ever be intelligent, because our mathematical insights are fundamentally non-algorithmic. Dennett is having none of it, and succinctly points out the underlying fallacy, that, even if there could not be an algorithm for a particular behaviour, there could still be an algorithm that was very very good (if not perfect) at that behaviour: Dennett The following argument, then, in simply fallacious: X is superbly capable of achieving checkmate. There is no (practical) algorithm guaranteed to achieve checkmate, therefore X does not owe its power to achieve checkmate to an algorithm. So even if mathematicians are superb recognizers of mathematical truth, and even if there is no algorithm, practical or otherwise, for recognizing mathematical truth, it does not follow that the power of mathematicians to recognize mathematical truth is not entirely explicable in terms of their brains executing an algorithm. Not an algorithm for intuiting mathematical truth - we can suppose that Penrose has proved that there could be no such thing. What would the algorithm be for, then? Most plausibly it would be an algorithm - one of very many - for trying to stay alive, an algorithm that, by an extraordinarily convoluted and indirect generation of byproducts, happened to be a superb (but not foolproof) recognizer of friends, enemies, food, shelter, harbingers of spring, good arguments - and mathematical truths. /Dennett it is disconcerting that he does not even address the issue, and often writes as if an algorithm could have only the powers it could be proven mathematically to have in the worst case. On Jun 9, 2007, at 4:03 AM, chris peck wrote: Hello The time has come again when I need to seek advice from the everything-list and its contributors. Penrose I believe has argued that the inability to algorithmically solve the halting problem but the ability of humans, or at least Kurt Godel, to understand that formal systems are incomplete together demonstrate that human reason is not algorithmic in nature - and therefore that the AI project is fundamentally flawed. What is the general consensus here on that score. I know that there are many perspectives here including those who agree with Penrose. Are there any decent threads I could look at that deal with this issue? All the best Chris. _ PC Magazine's 2007 editors' choice for best Web mail--award-winning Windows Live Hotmail. http://imagine-windowslive.com/hotmail/?locale=en- usocid=TXT_TAGHM_migration_HM_mini_pcmag_0507 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?
On Jun 19, 12:31 pm, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Interaction is in terms of fields - electromagnetic for most of our everyday examples. The fields themselves are emergent effects from virtual boson exchange. Now how is this related to sensing exactly? (Other than sensing being a particular subclass of interaction) Please, spare me the physico-mathematical imperialism! You say interaction is in terms of fields'. I think what you might claim more modestly is something like there is a mathematical formalism in which interaction is modelled in terms of 'fields'. Fair enough. But implicitly the formalism is a projection from (and reference to) a *participatory* actuality which isn't simply 'mathematical' (pace Bruno - and anyway, not in the sense he deploys it for the purposes of COMP). And I'm not of course imputing 'sensing' to the formalism, but to the 'de-formalised participants' from which it is projected. 'Participatory' here means that you must situate yourself at the point of reference of your formalism, and intuit that 'thou-art-that' from which the projection originates. If you do this, does the term 'sensing' still seem so 'soft'? The formalisms are projections from the participatory semantics of a 'modulated continuum' that embraces you, me and everything we know. When you situate yourself here, do you really not 'get' the intuitive self-relation between continuum and modulation? Even when you know that Russell's 1-person world - an 'emergent' from this - indeed self-relates in both sense and action? If not, then as Colin is arguing, you'd have to erect a sign with 'then magic happens' between 'emergent' and 'reductive' accounts. Sensing to me implies some form of agency at one end of the interaction. I don't attribute any sort of agency to the interaction between two hydrogen atoms making up a hydrogen molecule for instance. Same illustration. 'Hydrogen atoms' are again just projective formalisms to which of course nobody would impute 'agency'. But situate yourself where I suggest, and intuit the actions of any 'de- formalised participants' referenced by the term 'hydrogen atoms' that are implicated in Russell's 1-person world. From this perspective, any 'agency' that Russell displays is indeed inherent in such lower- level 'entities' in 'reduced' form. This is a perfectly standard aspect of any 'reductive-emergent' scheme. For some reason you seem prepared to grant it in a 3-person account, but not in a participatory one. The customary 'liquidity' and 'life' counter-arguments are simply misconceived here, because these attributions emerge from, and hence are applicable to, formal descriptions, independent of their 'de- formalised' participatory referents. But you can't apply the semantics of 'sensing' and 'agency' in the same way, because these are ineluctably participatory, and are coherent only when intuited as such 'all the way down' (e.g. as attributes of 1-person worlds and the participatory 'sense-action' hierarchies on which they supervene). David On Tue, Jun 19, 2007 at 09:40:59AM -, David Nyman wrote: On Jun 19, 5:09 am, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: David, I was unable to perceive a question in what you just wrote. I haven't a response, since (sadly) I was unable to understand what you were talking about. :( Really? I'm surprised, but words can indeed be very slippery in this context. Oh, well. To condense: my argument is intended to pump the intuition that a 'primitive' (or 'reduced') notion of 'sensing' (or please substitute anything that carries the thrust of 'able to locate', 'knows it's there', etc.) is already inescapably present in the notion of 'interaction' between fundamental 'entities' in any feasible model of reality. Else, how could we claim that they retain any coherent sense of being 'in contact'? Interaction is in terms of fields - electromagnetic for most of our everyday examples. The fields themselves are emergent effects from virtual boson exchange. Now how is this related to sensing exactly? (Other than sensing being a particular subclass of interaction) ... implications. So my question is, do you think it has any merit, or is simply wrong, indeterminate, or gibberish? And why? If I have to pick an answer: gibberish. Sensing to me implies some form of agency at one end of the interaction. I don't attribute any sort of agency to the interaction between two hydrogen atoms making up a hydrogen molecule for instance. -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this
Re: [SPAM] Re: Asifism
DN: '
I meant here by 'symmetry-breaking' the differentiating of an 'AR
field' - perhaps continuum might be better - into 'numbers'. My
fundamental explanatory intuition posits a continuum that is
'modulated' ('vibration', 'wave motion'?) into 'parts'. The notion of
a 'modulated continuum' seems necessary to avoid the paradox of
'parts' separated by 'nothing'. The quotes I have sprinkled so
liberally are intended to mark out the main semantic elements that I
feel need to be accounted for somehow. 'Parts' (particles, digits)
then emerge through self-consistent povs abstracted from the
continuum. Is there an analogous continuous 'number field' in AR,
from which, say, integers, emerge 'digitally'?'
MP: This seems to me to be getting at a crucial issue [THE
crux?] to do with both COMP and/or physics:
Why is there anything at all?
As a non-mathematician I am not biased towards COMP and AR;
'basic physics' warms far more cockles of _my_heart.
As a non-scientist I am biased towards plain-English
explanations of things; all else is most likely not true, in my
simple minded view :-)
Metaphysically speaking _existence_ is a given; I don't exist
is either metaphor or nonsense.
As you so rightly point out, positing 'nothing' to separate
parts, etc, doesn't make a lot of sense either.
Currently this makes me sympathetic to
* a certain interpretation of mbrane theory [it ain't nothing,
it's just not our brane/s] and
* a simplistic interpretation of the ideas of process physics.
I know Bruno reiterates often that physics cannot be [or is very
unlikely to be] as ultimately fundamental as numbers and Peano
arithmetic, but the stumbling block for me is the simple concept
that numbers don't mean anything unless they are values of
something. I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that
relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but
relationships entail existence and difference. I can see how
'existence' per se could be ultimately simple and unstructured -
and this I take to be the basic meaning of 'mbrane'. If an
mbrane interpenetrates another, this would provide
differentiation and thus the beginnings of structure.
In this simplistic take we have something akin to yin and yang
of ancient Chinese origin. In contrast to the Chinese conception
however, we know nothing of the 'other' one; the name is not
important, just that _our_ universe is either of yin or yang and
the other one provides what otherwise we must call
'nothingness'. In this conception existence, the ultimate
basement level of our space-time, is simple connections, which I
described previously in a spiel about Janus [the connections]
and quorums {the nodes]. Gravity may be the continuous
simplification of connectivity and the reduction of nodes which
results in a constant shrinkage of the space-time fabric in the
direction of smallwards. Particles of matter are knots,
topological self entanglements of space-time which vary in their
properties depending on the number of self-crossings and
whatever other structural/topological features occur. The
intrinsic virtual movement of the space-time fabric in the
direction of smallwards where the knots exist should produce
interesting emergent properties akin to vortices and standing
waves with harmonics.
For anyone still reading this, a reminder that each 'Janus'
connection need have no internal structure and therefore no
'internal' distance, save perhaps the Planck length, so each
face would connect with others in a 'quorum' or node. This
provides a potential explanation of quantum entanglement in that
if each of the two faces of a Janus connection were in different
particles, those particles might be fleeing from each other at
the speed of light, or something close to it, yet for that
particular Janus connection each face will still be simply the
back side of its twin such that their temporal separation might
be no more than the Planck time.
Regards
Mark Peaty CDES
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.arach.net.au/~mpeaty/
David Nyman wrote:
On Jun 12, 2:01 pm, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
If we take AR to be that which is self-asserting,
We don't have too, even without comp, in the sense that, with AR
(Arithmetical Realism) we cannot not take into account the relative
reflexivity power of the number's themselves.
I simply meant that in AR numbers 'assert themselves', in that they
are taken as being (in some sense) primitive rather than being merely
mental constructs (intuitionism, I think?) Is this not so?
OK (but again the symmetry-breaking is a consequence (too be sure
there remains technical problems ...)
I meant here by 'symmetry-breaking' the differentiating of an 'AR
field' - perhaps continuum might be better - into 'numbers'. My
fundamental explanatory intuition posits a continuum that is
'modulated' ('vibration', 'wave motion'?) into 'parts'. The notion of
a 'modulated continuum' seems
Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?
David Nyman wrote: On Jun 19, 12:31 pm, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Interaction is in terms of fields - electromagnetic for most of our everyday examples. The fields themselves are emergent effects from virtual boson exchange. Now how is this related to sensing exactly? (Other than sensing being a particular subclass of interaction) Please, spare me the physico-mathematical imperialism! You say interaction is in terms of fields'. I think what you might claim more modestly is something like there is a mathematical formalism in which interaction is modelled in terms of 'fields'. Fair enough. But implicitly the formalism is a projection from (and reference to) a *participatory* actuality which isn't simply 'mathematical' (pace Bruno - and anyway, not in the sense he deploys it for the purposes of COMP). And I'm not of course imputing 'sensing' to the formalism, but to the 'de-formalised participants' from which it is projected. 'Participatory' here means that you must situate yourself at the point of reference of your formalism, and intuit that 'thou-art-that' from which the projection originates. If you do this, does the term 'sensing' still seem so 'soft'? The formalisms are projections from the participatory semantics of a 'modulated continuum' that embraces you, me and everything we know. When you situate yourself here, do you really not 'get' the intuitive self-relation between continuum and modulation? Even when you know that Russell's 1-person world - an 'emergent' from this - indeed self-relates in both sense and action? If not, then as Colin is arguing, you'd have to erect a sign with 'then magic happens' between 'emergent' and 'reductive' accounts. Sounds like the sign is already up and it reads, Participatorily intuit the magic of the de-formalized ding an sich. Sensing to me implies some form of agency at one end of the interaction. I don't attribute any sort of agency to the interaction between two hydrogen atoms making up a hydrogen molecule for instance. Same illustration. 'Hydrogen atoms' are again just projective formalisms to which of course nobody would impute 'agency'. But situate yourself where I suggest, and intuit the actions of any 'de- formalised participants' referenced by the term 'hydrogen atoms' that are implicated in Russell's 1-person world. From this perspective, any 'agency' that Russell displays is indeed inherent in such lower- level 'entities' in 'reduced' form. This is a perfectly standard aspect of any 'reductive-emergent' scheme. For some reason you seem prepared to grant it in a 3-person account, but not in a participatory one. The customary 'liquidity' and 'life' counter-arguments are simply misconceived here, because these attributions emerge from, and hence are applicable to, formal descriptions, independent of their 'de- formalised' participatory referents. But you can't apply the semantics of 'sensing' and 'agency' in the same way, because these are ineluctably participatory, and are coherent only when intuited as such 'all the way down' (e.g. as attributes of 1-person worlds and the participatory 'sense-action' hierarchies on which they supervene). So a hydrogen atom has a 1st-person world view, but this is more than it's physical interactions (which are merely part of it's formal description)? Maybe so - but my intuition doesn't tell me anything about it. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?
David wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Jun 21, 2007 2:31 PM David, you are still too mild IMO. You wrote: ... there is a mathematical formalism in which interaction is modelled in terms of 'fields'. I would say: we call 'fields' what seems to be callable 'interaction' upon the outcome of certain mathematical transformations - or something similar. The similarity of math formulas does not justify implication of some physical reality - whatever that may mean. What 'SPINS'? What undulates into Waves? Russell's ... emergent effects from virtual boson exchange. ... are indeed virtually (imaginary?) emergent VIRTUAL effects from a virtual exchange of virtual bosons. I agree: that would not match your Fair enough. I like your quest for de-formalized participants (like e.g. energy?) H and other atoms are ingenius representatives serving explanation for things observed scimpily in ages of epistemic insufficiency by 'age'-adjusted instrumentation. And with new epistemic enrichment science does not 'reconsider' what was 'believed', but modifies it to maintain the 'earlier' adjusted to the later information (e.g. entropy in its 15th or so variation). Molecules were rod-connected atom-figments, then turned into electric connections, then secondary attraction-agglomerates, more functional than were the orig. primitive bindings. It still does not fit for biology, this embryonic state limited model- science as applied for the elusive life processes. Something happens and we 'think' what. Those ingenius(ly applied) math equations based on previous cut-model quantization (disregarding the influence of the 'beyond model' total world) are 'matched' by constants, new math, or even for such purpose invented concepts which, however, in the 274th consecutive application are considered facts. The 'matches' are considered WITHIN the aspects included into the model, other aspect unmatches form 'paradoxes', or necessitate axioms. MY synthesized macromolecules(?) were successfully applicable in practical technology - in the same realm they were made for. The mass of an electron matches miraculously to other results within the same wing of the edifice of scientific branch. And how about your mentioned 'agency'? it is all figured in our human patterns, what and how WE should do to get to an effect (maybe poorly observed!). Nature does not have to follow our logic or mechanism. We know only a part of it, understand it by our logic, make it pars pro toto and describe nature in our actual human ways. That is conventional science in which I made a good living, successful practical results, publications and reputation in my branch. Then I started to think. We live on misconceptions and a new paradigm is still in those. It is always a joy to read your posts. John On 6/21/07, David Nyman [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Jun 19, 12:31 pm, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Interaction is in terms of fields - electromagnetic for most of our everyday examples. The fields themselves are emergent effects from virtual boson exchange. Now how is this related to sensing exactly? (Other than sensing being a particular subclass of interaction) Please, spare me the physico-mathematical imperialism! You say interaction is in terms of fields'. I think what you might claim more modestly is something like there is a mathematical formalism in which interaction is modelled in terms of 'fields'. Fair enough. But implicitly the formalism is a projection from (and reference to) a *participatory* actuality which isn't simply 'mathematical' (pace Bruno - and anyway, not in the sense he deploys it for the purposes of COMP). And I'm not of course imputing 'sensing' to the formalism, but to the 'de-formalised participants' from which it is projected. 'Participatory' here means that you must situate yourself at the point of reference of your formalism, and intuit that 'thou-art-that' from which the projection originates. If you do this, does the term 'sensing' still seem so 'soft'? The formalisms are projections from the participatory semantics of a 'modulated continuum' that embraces you, me and everything we know. When you situate yourself here, do you really not 'get' the intuitive self-relation between continuum and modulation? Even when you know that Russell's 1-person world - an 'emergent' from this - indeed self-relates in both sense and action? If not, then as Colin is arguing, you'd have to erect a sign with 'then magic happens' between 'emergent' and 'reductive' accounts. Sensing to me implies some form of agency at one end of the interaction. I don't attribute any sort of agency to the interaction between two hydrogen atoms making up a hydrogen molecule for instance. Same illustration. 'Hydrogen atoms' are again just projective formalisms to which of course nobody would impute 'agency'. But situate yourself where I suggest, and intuit the actions of any 'de- formalised participants'
Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?
On Jun 21, 8:24 pm, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Sounds like the sign is already up and it reads, Participatorily intuit the
magic of the de-formalized ding an sich.
I'd be happy with that sign, if you substituted a phrase like 'way of
being' for 'magic'. There is no analogy between the two cases, because
Russell seeks to pull the entire 1-person rabbit, complete with 'way
of being', out of a hat that contains only 3-person formalisations.
This is magic with a vengeance. The ding an sich (and, although I mis-
attributed monads to him, Kant knew a 'thing' or two) is what we all
participate in, whether you intuit it or not. And my hat and my
rabbit, whether 0, 1, or 3-person versions, are participatory all the
way down.
So a hydrogen atom has a 1st-person world view, but this is more than it's
physical interactions (which are merely part of it's formal
description)?
Maybe so - but my intuition doesn't tell me anything about it.
Clearly not. But your sometime way with (dis)analogy leads me to
mistrust your intuition in this case. Firstly, we're dealing with a
*reductive* account, so '1-person world view' in the case of a 'de-
formalised' hydrogen atom must be 'reduced' correspondingly. Such a
beastie neither sees nor hears, neither does it dream nor plan. But
then, it's 'formalised' counterpart isn't 'wet' either. But the
*behaviour* of such counterparts is standardly attested as a 'reduced'
component of 3-person accounts of the 'emergence' of 'liquidity'.
Analogously (and this really *is* analogous) the de-formalised
participant ('DFP') referenced by 'hydrogen atom' is a 'reduced'
component of a participative account of the emergence Russell's 1-
person world. But it's merely daft to suppose that its 'way of being'
entails a 1-person 'mini sensorium', because it manifestly lacks any
'machinery' to render this. Its humble role is to be a *component* in
*just* that 'machinery' that renders *Russell's* 1-person world.
DFPs aren't just the 'medium' of 1-person accounts, but that of *all*
accounts: 0, 1, or 3-person. All accounts are 'DFP-
instantiated' (whatever else?). The one you're presently viewing is
instantiated in the medium of DFPs variously corresponding to
'brains', 'computers', 'networks' etc. A 3-person account is just a
'formal take' on 'DFP reality'; a 1-person account is a 'personal
take'; and a 0-person account is a 'de-personalised take'.
David
David Nyman wrote:
On Jun 19, 12:31 pm, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Interaction is in terms of fields - electromagnetic for most of our
everyday examples. The fields themselves are emergent effects from
virtual boson exchange. Now how is this related to sensing exactly?
(Other than sensing being a particular subclass of interaction)
Please, spare me the physico-mathematical imperialism! You say
interaction is in terms of fields'. I think what you might claim
more modestly is something like there is a mathematical formalism in
which interaction is modelled in terms of 'fields'. Fair enough. But
implicitly the formalism is a projection from (and reference to) a
*participatory* actuality which isn't simply 'mathematical' (pace
Bruno - and anyway, not in the sense he deploys it for the purposes of
COMP). And I'm not of course imputing 'sensing' to the formalism, but
to the 'de-formalised participants' from which it is projected.
'Participatory' here means that you must situate yourself at the point
of reference of your formalism, and intuit that 'thou-art-that' from
which the projection originates. If you do this, does the term
'sensing' still seem so 'soft'? The formalisms are projections from
the participatory semantics of a 'modulated continuum' that embraces
you, me and everything we know. When you situate yourself here, do
you really not 'get' the intuitive self-relation between continuum and
modulation? Even when you know that Russell's 1-person world - an
'emergent' from this - indeed self-relates in both sense and action?
If not, then as Colin is arguing, you'd have to erect a sign with
'then magic happens' between 'emergent' and 'reductive' accounts.
Sounds like the sign is already up and it reads, Participatorily intuit the
magic of the de-formalized ding an sich.
Sensing to me implies some
form of agency at one end of the interaction. I don't attribute any sort
of agency to the interaction between two hydrogen atoms making up
a hydrogen molecule for instance.
Same illustration. 'Hydrogen atoms' are again just projective
formalisms to which of course nobody would impute 'agency'. But
situate yourself where I suggest, and intuit the actions of any 'de-
formalised participants' referenced by the term 'hydrogen atoms' that
are implicated in Russell's 1-person world. From this perspective,
any 'agency' that Russell displays is indeed inherent in such lower-
level 'entities' in 'reduced' form. This
Re: Asifism
On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that
relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but
relationships entail existence and difference.
I sympathise. In my question to Bruno, I was trying to establish
whether the 'realism' part of 'AR' could be isomorphic with my idea of
a 'real' modulated continuum (i.e. set of self-relationships). But I
suspect the answer may well be 'no', in that the 'reality' Bruno
usually appeals to is 'true' not 'concrete'. I await clarification.
Particles of matter are knots,
topological self entanglements of space-time which vary in their
properties depending on the number of self-crossings and
whatever other structural/topological features occur.
Yes, knot theory seems to be getting implicated in this stuff. Bruno
has had something to say about this in the past.
If an
mbrane interpenetrates another, this would provide
differentiation and thus the beginnings of structure.
Yes, this may be an attractive notion. I've wondered about myself.
'Interpenetration' - as a species of interaction - still seems to
imply that different 'mbranes' are still essentially the same 'stuff'
- i.e. modulations of the 'continuum' - but with some sort of
orthogonal (i.e. mutually inaccessible) dimensionality
PS - Mark, what is CDES?
David
On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
DN: '
I meant here by 'symmetry-breaking' the differentiating of an 'AR
field' - perhaps continuum might be better - into 'numbers'. My
fundamental explanatory intuition posits a continuum that is
'modulated' ('vibration', 'wave motion'?) into 'parts'. The notion of
a 'modulated continuum' seems necessary to avoid the paradox of
'parts' separated by 'nothing'. The quotes I have sprinkled so
liberally are intended to mark out the main semantic elements that I
feel need to be accounted for somehow. 'Parts' (particles, digits)
then emerge through self-consistent povs abstracted from the
continuum. Is there an analogous continuous 'number field' in AR,
from which, say, integers, emerge 'digitally'?'
MP: This seems to me to be getting at a crucial issue [THE
crux?] to do with both COMP and/or physics:
Why is there anything at all?
As a non-mathematician I am not biased towards COMP and AR;
'basic physics' warms far more cockles of _my_heart.
As a non-scientist I am biased towards plain-English
explanations of things; all else is most likely not true, in my
simple minded view :-)
Metaphysically speaking _existence_ is a given; I don't exist
is either metaphor or nonsense.
As you so rightly point out, positing 'nothing' to separate
parts, etc, doesn't make a lot of sense either.
Currently this makes me sympathetic to
* a certain interpretation of mbrane theory [it ain't nothing,
it's just not our brane/s] and
* a simplistic interpretation of the ideas of process physics.
I know Bruno reiterates often that physics cannot be [or is very
unlikely to be] as ultimately fundamental as numbers and Peano
arithmetic, but the stumbling block for me is the simple concept
that numbers don't mean anything unless they are values of
something. I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that
relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but
relationships entail existence and difference. I can see how
'existence' per se could be ultimately simple and unstructured -
and this I take to be the basic meaning of 'mbrane'. If an
mbrane interpenetrates another, this would provide
differentiation and thus the beginnings of structure.
In this simplistic take we have something akin to yin and yang
of ancient Chinese origin. In contrast to the Chinese conception
however, we know nothing of the 'other' one; the name is not
important, just that _our_ universe is either of yin or yang and
the other one provides what otherwise we must call
'nothingness'. In this conception existence, the ultimate
basement level of our space-time, is simple connections, which I
described previously in a spiel about Janus [the connections]
and quorums {the nodes]. Gravity may be the continuous
simplification of connectivity and the reduction of nodes which
results in a constant shrinkage of the space-time fabric in the
direction of smallwards. Particles of matter are knots,
topological self entanglements of space-time which vary in their
properties depending on the number of self-crossings and
whatever other structural/topological features occur. The
intrinsic virtual movement of the space-time fabric in the
direction of smallwards where the knots exist should produce
interesting emergent properties akin to vortices and standing
waves with harmonics.
For anyone still reading this, a reminder that each 'Janus'
connection need have no internal structure and therefore no
'internal' distance, save perhaps the Planck length, so each
face would connect with others in a 'quorum'
Re: Asifism
On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that
relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but
relationships entail existence and difference.
I sympathise. In my question to Bruno, I was trying to establish
whether the 'realism' part of 'AR' could be isomorphic with my idea of
a 'real' modulated continuum (i.e. set of self-relationships). But I
suspect the answer may well be 'no', in that the 'reality' Bruno
usually appeals to is 'true' not 'concrete'. I await clarification.
Particles of matter are knots,
topological self entanglements of space-time which vary in their
properties depending on the number of self-crossings and
whatever other structural/topological features occur.
Yes, knot theory seems to be getting implicated in this stuff. Bruno
has had something to say about this in the past.
If an
mbrane interpenetrates another, this would provide
differentiation and thus the beginnings of structure.
Yes, this may be an attractive notion. I've wondered about myself.
'Interpenetration' - as a species of interaction - still seems to
imply that different 'mbranes' are still essentially the same 'stuff'
- i.e. modulations of the 'continuum' - but with some sort of
orthogonal (i.e. mutually inaccessible) dimensionality
PS - Mark, what is CDES?
David
On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
DN: '
I meant here by 'symmetry-breaking' the differentiating of an 'AR
field' - perhaps continuum might be better - into 'numbers'. My
fundamental explanatory intuition posits a continuum that is
'modulated' ('vibration', 'wave motion'?) into 'parts'. The notion of
a 'modulated continuum' seems necessary to avoid the paradox of
'parts' separated by 'nothing'. The quotes I have sprinkled so
liberally are intended to mark out the main semantic elements that I
feel need to be accounted for somehow. 'Parts' (particles, digits)
then emerge through self-consistent povs abstracted from the
continuum. Is there an analogous continuous 'number field' in AR,
from which, say, integers, emerge 'digitally'?'
MP: This seems to me to be getting at a crucial issue [THE
crux?] to do with both COMP and/or physics:
Why is there anything at all?
As a non-mathematician I am not biased towards COMP and AR;
'basic physics' warms far more cockles of _my_heart.
As a non-scientist I am biased towards plain-English
explanations of things; all else is most likely not true, in my
simple minded view :-)
Metaphysically speaking _existence_ is a given; I don't exist
is either metaphor or nonsense.
As you so rightly point out, positing 'nothing' to separate
parts, etc, doesn't make a lot of sense either.
Currently this makes me sympathetic to
* a certain interpretation of mbrane theory [it ain't nothing,
it's just not our brane/s] and
* a simplistic interpretation of the ideas of process physics.
I know Bruno reiterates often that physics cannot be [or is very
unlikely to be] as ultimately fundamental as numbers and Peano
arithmetic, but the stumbling block for me is the simple concept
that numbers don't mean anything unless they are values of
something. I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that
relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but
relationships entail existence and difference. I can see how
'existence' per se could be ultimately simple and unstructured -
and this I take to be the basic meaning of 'mbrane'. If an
mbrane interpenetrates another, this would provide
differentiation and thus the beginnings of structure.
In this simplistic take we have something akin to yin and yang
of ancient Chinese origin. In contrast to the Chinese conception
however, we know nothing of the 'other' one; the name is not
important, just that _our_ universe is either of yin or yang and
the other one provides what otherwise we must call
'nothingness'. In this conception existence, the ultimate
basement level of our space-time, is simple connections, which I
described previously in a spiel about Janus [the connections]
and quorums {the nodes]. Gravity may be the continuous
simplification of connectivity and the reduction of nodes which
results in a constant shrinkage of the space-time fabric in the
direction of smallwards. Particles of matter are knots,
topological self entanglements of space-time which vary in their
properties depending on the number of self-crossings and
whatever other structural/topological features occur. The
intrinsic virtual movement of the space-time fabric in the
direction of smallwards where the knots exist should produce
interesting emergent properties akin to vortices and standing
waves with harmonics.
For anyone still reading this, a reminder that each 'Janus'
connection need have no internal structure and therefore no
'internal' distance, save perhaps the Planck length, so each
face would connect with others in a 'quorum'
Re: Asifism
On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that
relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but
relationships entail existence and difference.
I sympathise. In my question to Bruno, I was trying to establish
whether the 'realism' part of 'AR' could be isomorphic with my idea of
a 'real' modulated continuum (i.e. set of self-relationships). But I
suspect the answer may well be 'no', in that the 'reality' Bruno
usually appeals to is 'true' not 'concrete'. I await clarification.
Particles of matter are knots,
topological self entanglements of space-time which vary in their
properties depending on the number of self-crossings and
whatever other structural/topological features occur.
Yes, knot theory seems to be getting implicated in this stuff. Bruno
has had something to say about this in the past.
If an
mbrane interpenetrates another, this would provide
differentiation and thus the beginnings of structure.
Yes, this may be an attractive notion. I've wondered about myself.
'Interpenetration' - as a species of interaction - still seems to
imply that different 'mbranes' are still essentially the same 'stuff'
- i.e. modulations of the 'continuum' - but with some sort of
orthogonal (i.e. mutually inaccessible) dimensionality.
PS - Mark, what is CDES?
David
On Jun 21, 8:03 pm, Mark Peaty [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
DN: '
I meant here by 'symmetry-breaking' the differentiating of an 'AR
field' - perhaps continuum might be better - into 'numbers'. My
fundamental explanatory intuition posits a continuum that is
'modulated' ('vibration', 'wave motion'?) into 'parts'. The notion of
a 'modulated continuum' seems necessary to avoid the paradox of
'parts' separated by 'nothing'. The quotes I have sprinkled so
liberally are intended to mark out the main semantic elements that I
feel need to be accounted for somehow. 'Parts' (particles, digits)
then emerge through self-consistent povs abstracted from the
continuum. Is there an analogous continuous 'number field' in AR,
from which, say, integers, emerge 'digitally'?'
MP: This seems to me to be getting at a crucial issue [THE
crux?] to do with both COMP and/or physics:
Why is there anything at all?
As a non-mathematician I am not biased towards COMP and AR;
'basic physics' warms far more cockles of _my_heart.
As a non-scientist I am biased towards plain-English
explanations of things; all else is most likely not true, in my
simple minded view :-)
Metaphysically speaking _existence_ is a given; I don't exist
is either metaphor or nonsense.
As you so rightly point out, positing 'nothing' to separate
parts, etc, doesn't make a lot of sense either.
Currently this makes me sympathetic to
* a certain interpretation of mbrane theory [it ain't nothing,
it's just not our brane/s] and
* a simplistic interpretation of the ideas of process physics.
I know Bruno reiterates often that physics cannot be [or is very
unlikely to be] as ultimately fundamental as numbers and Peano
arithmetic, but the stumbling block for me is the simple concept
that numbers don't mean anything unless they are values of
something. I always come back to the simplistic viewpoint that
relationships are more fundamental than numbers, but
relationships entail existence and difference. I can see how
'existence' per se could be ultimately simple and unstructured -
and this I take to be the basic meaning of 'mbrane'. If an
mbrane interpenetrates another, this would provide
differentiation and thus the beginnings of structure.
In this simplistic take we have something akin to yin and yang
of ancient Chinese origin. In contrast to the Chinese conception
however, we know nothing of the 'other' one; the name is not
important, just that _our_ universe is either of yin or yang and
the other one provides what otherwise we must call
'nothingness'. In this conception existence, the ultimate
basement level of our space-time, is simple connections, which I
described previously in a spiel about Janus [the connections]
and quorums {the nodes]. Gravity may be the continuous
simplification of connectivity and the reduction of nodes which
results in a constant shrinkage of the space-time fabric in the
direction of smallwards. Particles of matter are knots,
topological self entanglements of space-time which vary in their
properties depending on the number of self-crossings and
whatever other structural/topological features occur. The
intrinsic virtual movement of the space-time fabric in the
direction of smallwards where the knots exist should produce
interesting emergent properties akin to vortices and standing
waves with harmonics.
For anyone still reading this, a reminder that each 'Janus'
connection need have no internal structure and therefore no
'internal' distance, save perhaps the Planck length, so each
face would connect with others in a 'quorum'
Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?
On Jun 21, 8:42 pm, John Mikes [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: David, you are still too mild IMO. I try not to be churlish. I like your quest for de-formalized participants (like e.g. energy?) Not sure - can you say more? The 'matches' are considered WITHIN the aspects included into the model, other aspect unmatches form 'paradoxes', or necessitate axioms. MY synthesized macromolecules(?) were successfully applicable in practical technology - in the same realm they were made for. The mass of an electron matches miraculously to other results within the same wing of the edifice of scientific branch. Yes, the principal successes of science are instrumental, and its models are designed for largely instrumental ends. It is especially psychologically difficult to go 'meta' to such models, and the attitudes that spawned them. But when we turn our attention reflexively to 1-person worlds, we have no option but to go 'meta' to 3-person science, in pursuit of a fully participatory 'natural philosophy'. And perhaps if we are successful we will finally achieve the instrumentality to realise 'artificial' 1-person worlds, for good or ill. Without it, we almost certainly won't. And how about your mentioned 'agency'? it is all figured in our human patterns, what and how WE should do to get to an effect (maybe poorly observed!). Nature does not have to follow our logic or mechanism. We know only a part of it, understand it by our logic, make it pars pro toto and describe nature in our actual human ways. As I said, my attempt is really just to get to some human understanding (what else?) of some sort of 'de-formalised participatory semantics' for our human situation, rather than restricting my thinking to 3-person formalised 'syntactics'. I may even be able to see a glimmer of the connection between the two. But I cannot bend Nature to my will! We live on misconceptions and a new paradigm is still in those. Just so. It is always a joy to read your posts. I thank you. David David wrote: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Jun 21, 2007 2:31 PM David, you are still too mild IMO. You wrote: ... there is a mathematical formalism in which interaction is modelled in terms of 'fields'. I would say: we call 'fields' what seems to be callable 'interaction' upon the outcome of certain mathematical transformations - or something similar. The similarity of math formulas does not justify implication of some physical reality - whatever that may mean. What 'SPINS'? What undulates into Waves? Russell's ... emergent effects from virtual boson exchange. ... are indeed virtually (imaginary?) emergent VIRTUAL effects from a virtual exchange of virtual bosons. I agree: that would not match your Fair enough. I like your quest for de-formalized participants (like e.g. energy?) H and other atoms are ingenius representatives serving explanation for things observed scimpily in ages of epistemic insufficiency by 'age'-adjusted instrumentation. And with new epistemic enrichment science does not 'reconsider' what was 'believed', but modifies it to maintain the 'earlier' adjusted to the later information (e.g. entropy in its 15th or so variation). Molecules were rod-connected atom-figments, then turned into electric connections, then secondary attraction-agglomerates, more functional than were the orig. primitive bindings. It still does not fit for biology, this embryonic state limited model- science as applied for the elusive life processes. Something happens and we 'think' what. Those ingenius(ly applied) math equations based on previous cut-model quantization (disregarding the influence of the 'beyond model' total world) are 'matched' by constants, new math, or even for such purpose invented concepts which, however, in the 274th consecutive application are considered facts. The 'matches' are considered WITHIN the aspects included into the model, other aspect unmatches form 'paradoxes', or necessitate axioms. MY synthesized macromolecules(?) were successfully applicable in practical technology - in the same realm they were made for. The mass of an electron matches miraculously to other results within the same wing of the edifice of scientific branch. And how about your mentioned 'agency'? it is all figured in our human patterns, what and how WE should do to get to an effect (maybe poorly observed!). Nature does not have to follow our logic or mechanism. We know only a part of it, understand it by our logic, make it pars pro toto and describe nature in our actual human ways. That is conventional science in which I made a good living, successful practical results, publications and reputation in my branch. Then I started to think. We live on misconceptions and a new paradigm is still in those. It is always a joy to read your posts. John On 6/21/07, David Nyman [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On Jun 19, 12:31 pm, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Interaction is in terms of
Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?
On Thu, Jun 21, 2007 at 08:44:54PM -, David Nyman wrote: There is no analogy between the two cases, because Russell seeks to pull the entire 1-person rabbit, complete with 'way of being', out of a hat that contains only 3-person formalisations. This is magic with a vengeance. You assume way too much about my motives here. I have only been trying to bash some meaning out of the all too flaccid prose that's being flung about at the moment. I will often employ counterexamples simply to illustrate points of poor terminology, or sloppy thinking. Its a useful exercise, not a personal attack on beliefs. BTW - I'm with you Brent. Brent is also doing exactly this, sometimes satirically. Cheers -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?
On Jun 21, 1:45 pm, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You assume way too much about my motives here. I have only been trying to bash some meaning out of the all too flaccid prose that's being flung about at the moment. I will often employ counterexamples simply to illustrate points of poor terminology, or sloppy thinking. Its a useful exercise, not a personal attack on beliefs. Russell, If you believe that a particular thought is poorly expressed or sloppy, I would appreciate any help you might offer in making it more precise, rather than 'bashing' it. Sometimes conversations on the list feel more like talking past one another, and this in general isn't 'a useful exercise'. My comment to Brent was motivated by a perception that you'd been countering my 1-personal terminology with 3- person formalisms. Consequently, as such, they didn't strike me as equivalent, or as genuine 'counterexamples': this surprised me, in view of some of the other ideas you've expressed. So I may well have been too swift to assign certain motives to you, not having detected any pedagogically-motivated intent to caricature, and I would welcome your more specific clarification and correction. I should say at this point that I too find the 'terminology' task very trying, as virtual any existing vocabulary comes freighted with pre- existing implications of the sort you have been exploiting in your ripostes, but which I didn't intend. I would welcome any superior alternatives you might suggest. Trying or not, I'm not quite ready to give up the attempt to clarify these ideas. If you think the exercise misconceived or poorly executed, it's of course up to you to choose to 'bash', satirise, or ignore it, but I would particularly welcome open- ended questions. Brent is also doing exactly this, sometimes satirically. Again, I don't mean to seem humourless, but my basic intention is a genuine exchange of ideas, rather than satire or caricature. So I do try to empathise as best I can with the issues on the other side of the debate, before deciding if, and how, I disagree. How successful I may be is another matter. I'd be more than willing, as ever, to have another go! Cheers David On Thu, Jun 21, 2007 at 08:44:54PM -, David Nyman wrote: There is no analogy between the two cases, because Russell seeks to pull the entire 1-person rabbit, complete with 'way of being', out of a hat that contains only 3-person formalisations. This is magic with a vengeance. You assume way too much about my motives here. I have only been trying to bash some meaning out of the all too flaccid prose that's being flung about at the moment. I will often employ counterexamples simply to illustrate points of poor terminology, or sloppy thinking. Its a useful exercise, not a personal attack on beliefs. BTW - I'm with you Brent. Brent is also doing exactly this, sometimes satirically. Cheers -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: How would a computer know if it were conscious?
On Fri, Jun 22, 2007 at 12:22:31AM -, David Nyman wrote: On Jun 21, 1:45 pm, Russell Standish [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: You assume way too much about my motives here. I have only been trying to bash some meaning out of the all too flaccid prose that's being flung about at the moment. I will often employ counterexamples simply to illustrate points of poor terminology, or sloppy thinking. Its a useful exercise, not a personal attack on beliefs. Russell, If you believe that a particular thought is poorly expressed or sloppy, I would appreciate any help you might offer in making it more precise, rather than 'bashing' it. It seems you've miscontrued my bashing, sorry about that. I was, perhaps somewhat colourfully, meaning extracting some meaning. Since your prose (and often Colin's for that matter) often sounds like gibberish to me, I have to work at it, rather like bashing a lump of metal with a hammer. Sometimes I succeed, but other times I just have to give up. I most certainly didn't mean unwarranted critising of, or flaming. I am interested in learning, and I don't immediately assume that you (or anyone else for that matter) have nothing interesting to say. Sometimes conversations on the list feel more like talking past one another, and this in general isn't 'a useful exercise'. My comment to Brent was motivated by a perception that you'd been countering my 1-personal terminology with 3- person formalisms. Terminology is terminology, it doesn't have a point of view. Terms should have accepted meaning, unless we agree on a different meaning for the purposes of discussion. Consequently, as such, they didn't strike me as equivalent, or as genuine 'counterexamples': this surprised me, in Which counterexamples are you talking about? 1) Biological evolution as a counterexample to Colin's assertion about doing science implies consciousness. This started this thread. 2) Oxygen and hydrogen atoms as counterexamples of a chemical potential that is not an electric field 3) Was there something else? I can't quite recall now. view of some of the other ideas you've expressed. So I may well have been too swift to assign certain motives to you, not having detected any pedagogically-motivated intent to caricature, and I would welcome your more specific clarification and correction. I should say at this point that I too find the 'terminology' task very trying, as virtual any existing vocabulary comes freighted with pre- existing implications of the sort you have been exploiting in your ripostes, but which I didn't intend. I would welcome any superior alternatives you might suggest. Trying or not, I'm not quite ready to give up the attempt to clarify these ideas. If you think the exercise misconceived or poorly executed, it's of course up to you to choose to 'bash', satirise, or ignore it, but I would particularly welcome open- ended questions. I don't recall satirising anything recently. It is true that I usually ignore comments that don't make sense after a couple of minutes of staring at the phrase, unless really prodded like you did in your recent post on attributing sensing to arbitrary interactions. -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
