Information content of multiverse
Hi everybody, While I was reading the previous discussion; "justifying theory of everything" , I thought of my recent problem with still imperfection of our TOE. The problem is: Multiverse by itself is a choice, and every choice by it's nature has some bias and information. I could just consider two mathematical universes without any bias; the first is nothing or mathematical point. The second one is a whole, I mean a full space in infinite dimensions(just extending the perfect circle of Plato to remove it's bias in radius and dimension) Any other universe should contain a choice, including the collection of all possible universes! Why? Consider ME! Why 'I' am in this special world and not the other one? You might claim that I'm in the other ones as well. But I would still insist; 'Why 'I' am in this special universe and not the other?'. I hope you get my point. I wanted to conclude from this, even if there is a multiverse there's an information content for whole universe, and that might need another cause. -- Mohsen Ravanbakhsh, --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Some thoughts from Grandma
On Jul 6, 2:56 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > In general, when people use the word "I" they refer to their first > person, or to first person plural feature of their "physical" body. It > is a unexpected (by me) discovery that quanta belongs to that sharable > first person view (making the comp-QM a bit more psychological than > some Many-Worlder would perhaps appreciate. So that Fuch-Pauli could be > right ... (if you know the work of Fuchs). AFAICS he appears to agree with your view that QM amounts to what can be recovered from some maximal 1-person plural agreement. His Bayesian 'gambling' approach with respect to maximally rational agents also seems to correlate with the Lobian interviews. The UD I guess is then a way to model an 'underlying reality', in this case computationally, from which shareable information extracted by Lobian 'interventions' can be empirically assessed. It's interesting that on my initial skimming, he doesn't appear to be a 'naively realistic' Many-Worlder, or Everettic (I like the tic :) - as in Tourettic?) David > Le 05-juil.-07, à 17:31, David Nyman a écrit : > > > On 05/07/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > BM: OK. I would insist that the "comp project" (extract physics from > > comp) > > is really just a comp obligation. This is what is supposed to be shown > > by the UDA (+ MOVIE-GRAPH). Are you OK with this. It *is* > > counterintuitive. > > > DN: I believe so - it's what the reductio ad absurdum of the > > 'physical' computation in the 'grandma' post was meant to show. > > This was not so clear, but OK. > > > My version of the 'comp obligation' would then run as follows. > > Essentially, if comp and number relations are held to be 'real in the > > sense that I am real', > > I am not sure that numbers are real in the sense that "I am real", > unless you are talking of the third person "I". Then "you" are as real > as your (unknown) Godel-number. > In general, when people use the word "I" they refer to their first > person, or to first person plural feature of their "physical" body. It > is a unexpected (by me) discovery that quanta belongs to that sharable > first person view (making the comp-QM a bit more psychological than > some Many-Worlder would perhaps appreciate. So that Fuch-Pauli could be > right ... (if you know the work of Fuchs). > > > then to use Plato's metaphor, it is numbers that represent the forms > > outside the cave. > > OK, but not only (there are also the relations between numbers, the > relation between the relations between the numbers, etc.) > > > If that's so, then physics is represented by the shadows the > > observers see on the wall of the cave. This is what I mean by > > 'independent' existence in my current dialogue with Torgny: i.e the > > 'arithmetical realism' of numbers and their relations in the comp > > frame equates to their 'independence' or self-relativity. And the > > existence of 'arithmetical observers' then derives from subsequent > > processes of 'individuation' intrinsic to such fundamental > > self-relation. Actually, I find the equation of existence with > > self-relativity highly intuitive. > > OK. (Technically it is not obvious how to define in arithmetic such > self-relation: the basic tool is given by the recursion or fixed point > theorems). > > > > > BM: Then, the interview of the universal machine is "just" a way to > > do the > > extraction of physics in a constructive way. It is really the > > subtleties of the incompleteness phenomena which makes this interview > > highly non trivial. > > > DN: This is the technical part. But at this stage grandma has some > > feeling for how both classical and QM narratives should be what we > > expect to emerge from constructing physics in this way. > > I am not sure how could grandma have a feeling about that, except if > grandma get Church Thesis and the UDA. > > > > > > > BM: There is no direct (still less one-one) correlation between the > > mental and the physical, > > that is the physical supervenience thesis is incompatible with the > > comp hyp. [A quale of a pain] felt at time t in place x, is not a > > product of the physical activity of a machine, at time t in place x. > > Rather, it is the whole quale of [a pain felt at time t in place x] > > which is associated > > with an (immaterial and necessarily unknown) computational state, > > itself related to its normal consistent computational continuations. > > > > > > Comp makes the "yes doctor" a gamble, necessarily. That is: assuming > > the "theory comp" you have to understand that, by saying yes to the > > doctor, you are gambling on a level of substitution. At the same time > > you make a "gamble" on the theory comp itself. There is double gamble > > here. Now, the first gamble, IF DONE AT THE RIGHT COMP SUBSTITUTION > > LEVEL, is comp-equivalent with the natural gamble everybody do when > > going to sleep, or just when waiting a nanosecond. In some sense > > "nature"
Re: Justifying the Theory of Everything
> > Jason wrote: > >> I have seen two main justifications on this list for the everything > >> ensemble, the first comes from information theory which says the > >> information content of everything is zero (or close to zero). The > >> other is mathematicalism/arithmatical realism which suggests > >> mathematical truth exists independandly of everything else and is the > >> basis for everything. > >> > >> My question to the everything list is: which explaination do you > >> prefer and why? Are these two accounts compatible, incompatible, or > >> complimentary? Additionally, if you subscribe to or know of other > >> justifications I would be interesting in hearing it. Another justification is rather indirect. Following the arguments in Theory of Nothing (also mostly available in "Why Occams Razor" and "On the Importance of the Observer in Science"), a number of really curly philosophical problems melt away in a blaze of understanding. I refer here to 1) Occams Razor 2) The problem of Induction 3) Why anything bothers to exist 4) The Hilbert space structure of QM Of course its not all plain sailing - the problem of the Occam catastrophe means that the Anthropic Principle is rather mysterious, rather than trivially obvious as it is in naive realist theories. However solving 4 unsolvable mysteries in exchange for having another one is not a bad deal, and is a pretty good justification for taking these theories seriously. -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Justifying the Theory of Everything
Wei Dai wrote: > Jason wrote: >> I have seen two main justifications on this list for the everything >> ensemble, the first comes from information theory which says the >> information content of everything is zero (or close to zero). The >> other is mathematicalism/arithmatical realism which suggests >> mathematical truth exists independandly of everything else and is the >> basis for everything. >> >> My question to the everything list is: which explaination do you >> prefer and why? Are these two accounts compatible, incompatible, or >> complimentary? Additionally, if you subscribe to or know of other >> justifications I would be interesting in hearing it. > > These two justifications are about equally attractive to me. I also have a > couple of other justifications. > > Aesthetic: If anything doesn't exist, it's non-existence would constitute an > element of arbitrariness, given that anything exists at all. We shouldn't > accept arbitrariness unless there's a good reason for it, and there doesn't > seem to be one. It would be a peculiar kind of arbitrariness that had a good reason for it. :-) But what constitutes a "good reason"? Does a good reason have to show that the result is inevitable? or merely probable? > > Pragmatic: We have to accept that there is at least a non-zero probability > that all possible universes exist. This seems to be a tautology: P>0 <=> "possible". The question is what is possible and in what sense of "possible". Certainly many things are logically possible: flying pigs, Santa Claus, and victory in Iraq. But if we assign a non-zero probability to one of theses we are just quantifying the uncertainty of our knowledge. Brent Meeker >Unless there is reason to believe that > the probability is so small as to be negligible (and I don't see such a > reason), we will need to consider the everything ensemble when making > predictions and decisions. Given that, why not believe that the probability > is one? The probabilities for all other possible collections of universes > can be "folded" into the measure over the everything ensemble in such a way > that all of the predictions and decisions come out the same way as before. > > > > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Justifying the Theory of Everything
Jason wrote: > I have seen two main justifications on this list for the everything > ensemble, the first comes from information theory which says the > information content of everything is zero (or close to zero). The > other is mathematicalism/arithmatical realism which suggests > mathematical truth exists independandly of everything else and is the > basis for everything. > > My question to the everything list is: which explaination do you > prefer and why? Are these two accounts compatible, incompatible, or > complimentary? Additionally, if you subscribe to or know of other > justifications I would be interesting in hearing it. These two justifications are about equally attractive to me. I also have a couple of other justifications. Aesthetic: If anything doesn't exist, it's non-existence would constitute an element of arbitrariness, given that anything exists at all. We shouldn't accept arbitrariness unless there's a good reason for it, and there doesn't seem to be one. Pragmatic: We have to accept that there is at least a non-zero probability that all possible universes exist. Unless there is reason to believe that the probability is so small as to be negligible (and I don't see such a reason), we will need to consider the everything ensemble when making predictions and decisions. Given that, why not believe that the probability is one? The probabilities for all other possible collections of universes can be "folded" into the measure over the everything ensemble in such a way that all of the predictions and decisions come out the same way as before. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Some thoughts from Grandma
On 08/07/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I don't understand how you could go automatically from a postulate to > something real. That can happens, but here the comp hyp puts non > trivial restrictions: when that happens, we cannot be sure it happens. Hmm Well, if you 'postulate' that something gives rise to something RITSIAR, then I guess you're postulating that it partakes in that reality to some ineliminable degree. Perhaps you'd rather not use the term. Sometimes in your dialogues with Peter you referred to the 'truth' of 1+1=2, rather than its 'reality'. But then again you call your scheme arithmetical realism, not just arithmetical truth. What precisely is at stake here? > AR is just the common idea that the elementary arithmetic taught in > high school is not crackpot. OK, but if it culminates in my being RITSIAR, isn't it just a little bit real in that sense? But I'm not sure I want to die on this battlefield! > Note that (with comp) there is no need to postulate any form of > primitive causality (beyond the material implication and the modus > ponens deduction rule). All notion of causality, from the physical laws > to the human responsibility, are captured by higher order logical > modalities. Isn't this because you begin by arguing from necessity (i.e. arithmetical necessity)? I've often felt that this was the nub of Peter's difference with you, in that he was putting the contingentist position. And that position assumes some sort of self-caused, or given situation as primitive. > Again I think you have a right intuition, although that "symmetry > breaking" is or should be a fourth hypostase phenomenon (not a > zeroth-one). In the sense that the primary existence of the One is non-differentiated, it could be said to be symmetrical. Thereafter, any differentiation breaks that symmetry, no? Actually, ISTM that the primary reflexive existence of the One, and its spontaneous breaking of symmetry, are equally 'primitive' or given. IOW neither admits of 'explanation', but together they drive all subsequent conceptualisation of 'one', 'many', and their relations. ISTM that AR approaches such issues from the direction of the 'necessary truth' of arithmetical reasoning. > The One differentiates ? I can be ok with the image or analogy, but > strictly speaking the One is static, even more static, in some sense, > than the Second (the "Divine Intellect" (G*). The One is just above or > beside time or space categories. I must be more precise. AFAICS, the dynamic notion of differentiation can't be justified until the reflexive emergence of the 1-person. I've modified my position on Torgny's game in my last reply to him because of this. So my reference to 'differentiation' above is a structural or static sense of the term. > > as the basis for all subsequent categorisation whatsoever, except the > > original - and unique - ontic category of self-relative existence. > > I hope you make yourself precise enough because you enjoy to be made > even more precise! There is no notion of self at the zero person point > of view. Self appears with self-referential machines. Those belongs to > the "Nous", the Intellect, the second hypostase. > (This could be seen as a detail ...) Here I don't mean *a self* in the sense of a person, but 'self-' in the sense of reflexive. I'm stressing independent 'self-relative' or reflexive existence, especially in my points to Torgny, as distinct from 'dependent' existence relative to 'something else'. "I", or my chair, exist relative to the One: our RITSIAR depends on the self-differentiation of One into many. But the One exists reflexively, or independently, relative only to itself. Actually, this is the main point I've been trying to make in various ways since I first posted to the list. It doesn't equate to an Aristotelian notion of the 'material'; rather it tries to avoid the many confusions that arise from *not* understanding 'existence' - in any sense other than the metaphorical - as ultimately a reflexive notion. > All right. But I would say that the differentiated One is already the > Intellect. I can keep your nomenclature for a while. It may indeed be the Intellect, in the sense of a superposition of all knowledge. But it takes ignorance to crystallise out all the little 'knowers' and their tiny scraps of 'knowledge'. To be all knowledge is not yet to be a knower. > Well the passage from a "intellect self" to a knower is the (subtle) > passage from the intellect to the soul (from the second hypostase (or > third person!) to the third hypostase (the unameable first person, the > Brouwer-Post-Bergsonian "builder" of time). Yes indeed. And I'm interested to know if there is any move in the comp frame that *necessitates* the 'builder' of time, or whether this must simply be assumed in the face of its manifest contingency in our own case. ISTM - and this is what I've conceded to Torgny - that the soul or 1-person is characterise
Re: Penrose and algorithms
Le 07-juil.-07, à 16:39, LauLuna a écrit : > > > > On Jul 7, 12:59 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Le 06-juil.-07, à 14:53, LauLuna a écrit : >> >>> But again, for any set of such 'physiological' axioms there is a >>> corresponding equivalent set of 'conceptual' axioms. There is all the >>> same a logical impossibility for us to know the second set is sound. >>> No consistent (and strong enough) system S can prove the soundness of >>> any system S' equivalent to S: otherwise S' would prove its own >>> soundness and would be inconsistent. And this is just what is odd. >> >> It is odd indeed. But it is. > > No, it is not necessary so; the alternative is that such algorithm > does not exist. I will endorse the existence of that algorithm only > when I find reason enough to do it. I haven't yet, and the oddities > its existence implies count, obviously, against its existence. If the algorithm exists, then the knowable algorithm does not exist. We can only bet on comp, not prove it. But it is refutable. > > >>> I'd say this is rather Lucas's argument. Penrose's is like this: >> >>> 1. Mathematicians are not using a knowably sound algorithm to do >>> math. >>> 2. If they were using any algorithm whatsoever, they would be using a >>> knowably sound one. >>> 3. Ergo, they are not using any algorithm at all. >> >> Do you agree that from what you say above, "2." is already invalidate? > > Not at all. I still find it far likelier that if there is a sound > algorithm ALG and an equivalent formal system S whose soundness we can > know, then there is no logical impossibility for our knowing the > soundness of ALG. We do agree. You are just postulating not-comp. I have no trouble with that. > > What I find inconclusive in Penrose's argument is that he refers not > just to actual numan intellectual behavior but to some idealized > (forever sound and consistent) human intelligence. I think the > existence of a such an ability has to be argued. A rather good approximation for machine could be given by the transfinite set of effective and finite sound extensions of a Lobian machine. Like those proposed by Turing. They all obey locally to G and G* (as shown by Beklemishev). The infinite and the transfinite does not help the machine with regard to the incompleteness phenomenon, except if the infinite is made very highly non effective. But in that case you tend to the "One" or truth a very non effective notion). > > If someone asked me: 'do you agree that Penrose's argument does not > prove there are certain human behaviors which computers can't > reproduce?', I'd answered: 'yes, I agree it doesn't'. But if someone > asked me: 'do you agree that Penrose's argument does not prove human > intelligence cannot be simulated by computers?' I'd reply: 'as far > as that abstract intelligence you speak of exists at all as a real > faculty, I'd say it is far more probable that computers cannot > reproduce it'. Why? All you need to do consists in providing more and more "time-space-memory" to the machine. Humans are "universal" by extending their mind by pictures on walls, ... magnetic tape > > I.e. some versions of computationalism assume, exactly like Penrose, > the existence of that abstract human intelligence; I would say those > formulations of computationalism are nearly refuted by Penrose. There is a lobian abstract intelligence, but it can differentiate in many kinds, and cannot be defined *effectively* (with a program) by any machine. It corresponds loosely to the first non effective or non-nameable ordinal (the OMEGA_1^Church-Kleene ordinal). > > I hope I've made my point clear. OK. Personally I am just postulating the comp hyp and study the consequences. If we are machine or sequence of machine then we cannot which machine we are, still less which sequence of machines we belong too ... (introducing eventually verifiable 1-person indeterminacies). I argue that the laws of observability (physics) emerges from that comp-indeterminacy. I think we agree on Penrose. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Some thoughts from Grandma
Le 06-juil.-07, à 19:24, David Nyman a écrit : > > On 06/07/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> I am not sure that numbers are real in the sense that "I am real", >> unless you are talking of the third person "I". Then "you" are as real >> as your (unknown) Godel-number. >> In general, when people use the word "I" they refer to their first >> person, or to first person plural feature of their "physical" body. It >> is a unexpected (by me) discovery that quanta belongs to that sharable >> first person view (making the comp-QM a bit more psychological than >> some Many-Worlder would perhaps appreciate. So that Fuch-Pauli could >> be >> right ... (if you know the work of Fuchs). > > What I meant was something looser, a tautology perhaps. That is, > whatever we postulate as giving rise to our personal 'reality' must > thereby be 'real' in just this sense: it 'underpins' that reality. I don't understand how you could go automatically from a postulate to something real. That can happens, but here the comp hyp puts non trivial restrictions: when that happens, we cannot be sure it happens. > I > recall your various debates with Peter on this issue, and whatever > else was at issue, I just felt that at least implicitly this must be > entailed by the 'realism' part of AR. AR is just the common idea that the elementary arithmetic taught in high school is not crackpot. > >> OK, but not only (there are also the relations between numbers, the >> relation between the relations between the numbers, etc.) > > You are more precise (and correct!) > >> OK. (Technically it is not obvious how to define in arithmetic such >> self-relation: the basic tool is given by the recursion or fixed point >> theorems). > > My basic notion of self-relative existence equates I think to > Plotinus' One as you describe it in the Sienna paper. I postulate it > to stand for 'existence' independent of other causality. Note that (with comp) there is no need to postulate any form of primitive causality (beyond the material implication and the modus ponens deduction rule). All notion of causality, from the physical laws to the human responsibility, are captured by higher order logical modalities. > I see the big > One as 'self-differentiating' through spontaneous symmetry breaking, Again I think you have a right intuition, although that "symmetry breaking" is or should be a fourth hypostase phenomenon (not a zeroth-one). The One differentiates ? I can be ok with the image or analogy, but strictly speaking the One is static, even more static, in some sense, than the Second (the "Divine Intellect" (G*). The One is just above or beside time or space categories. > as the basis for all subsequent categorisation whatsoever, except the > original - and unique - ontic category of self-relative existence. I hope you make yourself precise enough because you enjoy to be made even more precise! There is no notion of self at the zero person point of view. Self appears with self-referential machines. Those belongs to the "Nous", the Intellect, the second hypostase. (This could be seen as a detail ...) > This entails that all such subsequent categorisation is in some > fundamental sense epistemic: i.e. how the One 'gets to know' itself. Exact (assuming comp, etc.) > So I agree with Plotinus that the One can't be said to 'know' anything > without such differentiation. All right. But I would say that the differentiated One is already the Intellect. I can keep your nomenclature for a while. > >> I am not sure how could grandma have a feeling about that, except if >> grandma get Church Thesis and the UDA. > > Well, I'm working on the technicalities. But the 'feeling' comes from > what I've said above. If all categories of 'process' or 'structure' > are epistemic - i.e. forms of self-relative 'coming to know' - Well the passage from a "intellect self" to a knower is the (subtle) passage from the intellect to the soul (from the second hypostase (or third person!) to the third hypostase (the unameable first person, the Brouwer-Post-Bergsonian "builder" of time). > this > entails that everything arises as an interpretation from a 'point of > view'. You are quick but OK. > So what is revealed in any given context and - at least as > importantly - what is obscured, must then be characteristic of that > specific point of view, in no sense 'absolute reality' (whatever that > could mean). There is an absolute common part, even if they are appreciated differently according to the hypostasis/point-of-view. I would say. > >> The point is just that physics appears as a sort of >> sum on your lobian ignorance. > > I think this is what I mean by 'obscured'. Hmmm The fact is that any sound universal machine which introspects itself/herself(?) enough will discover eventually that this self-ignorance is productive, creative in some sense. It can be consi
