Re: No(-)Justification Justifies The Everything Ensemble
Thank you for this remark, Hal. Indeed, you mentioned very similar
ideas:
List of all properties: The list of all possible properties
objects can have. The list can not be empty since there is at least
one object: A Nothing. A Nothing has at least one property -
emptiness. The list is most likely at least countably infinite and
is assumed herein to be so. Any list can be divided into two
sub-lists - the process of defining two objects - a definitional
pair. The set of all possible subsets of the list is a power set and
therefore uncountably infinite. Therefore there are uncountably
infinite objects.
But your theories are much more complex than that if my first
impression is correct. Sooner or later, I'll give attention to them in
more detail.
This list really is a rich source of unconventional ideas! Since I'm
new in the list, I am always thankful if someone refers me to
interesting earlier discussions where I can read up on several topics.
Youness
On 16 Sep., 21:50, Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Hi Youness:
I have been posting models based on a list of properties as the
fundamental for a few years.
Hal Ruhl
At 06:36 PM 9/13/2007, you wrote:
On 13 Sep., 19:44, Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
Youness Ayaita wrote:
This leads to the
2nd idea:
We don't say that imaginable things are fundamental, but that the
properties themselves are. This idea was also expressed by 1Z in his
last reply (We define imaginable things through hypothetical
combinations of properties, Z1) and I think it's a very good
candidate for a solution. Then, we start from S being the set of all
properties (perhaps with the cardinality of the natural numbers). As
above, we define {0,1}^S as the ensemble of descriptions. This would
have the cardinality of the real numbers and could mathematically be
captured by the infinite strings {0,1}^IN (the formal definition of
the Schmidhuber ensemble to give an answer for Bruno).
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Re: No(-)Justification Justifies The Everything Ensemble
On Sat, Sep 15, 2007 at 03:13:09PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 14-sept.-07, à 01:02, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Thu, Sep 13, 2007 at 03:04:34PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 13-sept.-07, à 00:48, Russell Standish a écrit :
These sorts of discussions No-justification, Zero-information
principle, All of mathematics and Hal Ruhl's dualling All and
Nothing (or should that be duelling) are really just motivators for
getting at the ensemble, which turns out remarkably to be the same in
each case - the set of 2^\aleph_0 infinite strings or histories.
Once you fix a programming language or a universal machine, then I can
You don't even need a universal machine. All you need is a mapping
from infinite strings to integers.
Which one?
It doesn't matter. The most interesting ones, however, have inverse
images of non-zero measure. ie \forall n \in N, the set
O^{-1}(n) = {x: O(x)=n}
is of nonzero measure.
And that can be given by the
observer,
But what is the observer? Is the observer an infinite string itself, a
machine, ?
The only thing assumed about the observer is that there is a map
between descriptions and interpretations. The additional assumption
about inverse images having nonzero measure is needed to solve the
White Rabbit problem.
An observer can be a machine (which is a subset of such mapping), but
needn't be a machine in general.
Some strings, _under the interpretation of the observer_, are mapped
to observers, including erself. Without the interpretation, though,
they are just infinite strings, inert and meaningless.
where the integers are an enumeration of the oberver's
possible interpretations.
I still don't understand what you accept at the ontic level, and what
is epistemological, and how those things are related.
I'm not sure these terms are even meaningful. Perhaps one can say the
strings are ontic, and the interpretations are epistemological.
imagine how to *represent* an history by an infinite string. But then
you are using comp and you know the consequences. Unless like some
people (including Schmidhuber) you don't believe in the difference
between first and third person points of view.
(Youness Ayaita wrote:
When I first wanted to capture mathematically the Everything, I tried
several mathematicalist approaches. But later, I prefered the
Everything ensemble that is also known here as the Schmidhuber
ensemble.
Could you Youness, or Russell, give a definition of Schmidhuber
ensemble, please.
The set of all infinite length strings in some chosen alphabet.
Is not Shmidhuber a computationalist? I thought he tries to build a
constructive physics, by searching (through CT) priors on a program
generating or 'outputting a physical universe. Is not the ensemble an
ensemble of computations, and is not Schmidhuber interested in the
finite one or the limiting one? Gosh, you will force me to take again a
look at his papers :)
Schmidhuber has his ensemble generated by a machine, and perhaps this
makes him computationalist. However I take the ensemble as simply
existing, not requiring an further justification. It has equivalent
status to your arithmetical realism. Obviously I'm departing from
Schmidhuber at that point, and whilst in Why Occam's Razor I use the
term Schmidhuber ensemble to refer to this, in my book I distinguish
between Schmidhuber's Great Programmer idea and my All infinite
strings exist prima facie idea. This is mostly because Schmidhuber's
second paper (on the speed prior) makes it quite clear he is talking
about something quite different.
Also I still don't know if the physical universe is considered as an
ouptut of a program, or if it is associated to the running of a
program.)
No, it is considered to be the stable, sharable dream, as you
sometimes put it.
It is the case, by and through the idea that the observer is a lobian
machine for which the notion of dream is well defined (roughly
speaking: computations as seen through the spectacles of the
hypostases/point-of-vies).
The set of all infinite strings, according to the structure you allow
on it, could give the real line, the set of subset of natural numbers,
the functions from N to N, etc. It is not enough precise I think.
All of these concepts are more precise and have additional properties
to the set of all infinite strings. For instance, the reals have
group properties of addition and multiplication that the strings
don't.
I don't understand either how you put an uniform measure on those
infinite strings, I also guess you mean a (non-uniform) measure on the
subsets of the set of infinite strings. Interesting things can come
there.
About the only important property the strings have is the uniform
measure. This is basically the same as the uniform or Lebesgue measure
on the interval [0,1] - see Li Vitanyi example
Re: No(-)Justification Justifies The Everything Ensemble
Just a further comment - Youness asked me about his properties idea. For me a property is something that belongs to the semantic level, not the syntactic one. It is something that distinguishes one subset of the ensemble from another. This later ends up being the results of projections in a Hilbert space. Conversely, what distinguishes one string from the next is bits, ie they're pure data without information. Cheers -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: One solution to the Measure Problem: UTM outputs a qualia, not a universe
On Sat, Sep 15, 2007 at 01:25:04PM -, Rolf Nelson wrote: If I understand the Measure Problem correctly, we wonder why we find ourselves in a Goldilocks Universe of stars and galaxies rather than a simpler universe consisting solely of blackbody radiation, or a more complex, unpredictable Harry Potter universe. I call this the Occam catastrophe in my book. The solution I give there is a requirement that observers have to be embedded in the universe they observe, ie are self-aware. 1. An attempt at the solution was that more complex universes are less probable; they are less likely to be produced by a random UTM. This explains why induction works, why we don't live in a Harry Potter universe. But this also means a simple blackbody radiation universe is more probable than a Goldilocks Universe. 2. So we say, There are more observers in a Goldilocks Universe, where observers evolve through natural selection, than in a blackbody radiation universe, where observers can only occasionally emerge through extremely infrequent statistical anomalies. But if both the Goldilocks Universe and the blackbody radiation universe are infinite in size, then both have an infinite number of observers. Unnormalisable measures are not an insurmountable problem. I give some examples where this can be done in appendix C of my book. Of course there are problems in the general case. ... Here is one possible solution: the UTM instead directly produces a qualia (or, if you prefer, substitute observer moment or whatever terminology you deem appropriate). We'll use a broad definition of qualia that can encompass complex observations like Rolf sits at his keyboard, reflecting on past observations and wondering why he seems to live in a Goldilocks Universe, since that's exactly the type of observation that we're trying to explain when we ponder the Measure Problem. Each qualia, in the proposed model, is a long, finite-length string that is output by a UTM running every possible random program. (This is the same type of UTM that some of you have been proposing, but it outputs an attempt at a single qualia, rather than outputting an entire universe.) Very few strings are qualia; most UTM programs fail to produce qualia. The proposed model additionally postulates that many qualia are compressible in a certain interesting way, such that the World-Index-Compression Postulate (below) is true. World-Index-Compression Postulate: The most probable way for the output of a random UTM program to be a single qualia, is through having a part of the program calculate a Universe, U, that is similar to the universe we currently are observing; and then having another part of the program search through the universe and pick out a substring by using an search algorithm SA(U) that tries to find a random sentient being in U and emit his qualia as the final output. This sounds kind of complex. Just how do you recognise sentience? As an example, take two qualia, that we will call Q(Goldilocks) and Q(Potter): Q(Goldilocks): All my life I have read that all swans are white. And indeed, today I just saw a white swan. Q(Potter): All my life I have read that all swans are white. But, today I just saw a black swan. Funny you should say this - all my life I read that swans were white*, but all the swans around here are actually black. It was only at the age of 28 that I saw my first white swan - when living in Europe. * in fairy stories of course - I knew full well that the first European exporers to our land were amazed at the black swans, and that they feature on the state flag where I grew up. -- A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: No(-)Justification Justifies The Everything Ensemble
Le 17-sept.-07, à 08:22, Youness Ayaita a écrit : Thank you for this remark, Hal. Indeed, you mentioned very similar ideas: List of all properties: The list of all possible properties objects can have. The list can not be empty since there is at least one object: A Nothing. A Nothing has at least one property - emptiness. The list is most likely at least countably infinite and is assumed herein to be so. Any list can be divided into two sub-lists - the process of defining two objects - a definitional pair. The set of all possible subsets of the list is a power set and therefore uncountably infinite. Therefore there are uncountably infinite objects. This quotation illustrates the trouble I have with some participants in the list: a big lack of clarity/rigor. There are confusions between list of objects and set of objects. Confusion between set of objects and set of subsets of the set of objects, making this quote too much formal relatively to the informal idea behind. I have often explain to Hal Ruhl that albeit I can appreciate some of his intuitions, his attempts to make things formal are form of 1004 fallacies. It can only discourage those who use all the standard terms in their usual meaning. I continue to suggest Hal to study mainly set theory (given that he uses set vocabulary). But your theories are much more complex than that if my first impression is correct. Sooner or later, I'll give attention to them in more detail. This list really is a rich source of unconventional ideas! Since I'm new in the list, I am always thankful if someone refers me to interesting earlier discussions where I can read up on several topics. Many late remark are based on the ASSA approach, and even more or less on quasi physicalist assumptions like the presupposition that there is a sense to allow observer to belong to physical (?) universes. The Universal Dovetailer Argument (original paper is Marchal 1991, but see also the sequel cf my URL) shows how such assumptions are incompatible with the computationalist assumption. The first and third person distinction is of fundamental importance to get that point. Ihave explain the UDA more than one time in this list, but I can explain again. I don't think most RSSA people have a problem with it, although I know the 8th step in the 8 steps version of the UDA has noit really been already discussed. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: No(-)Justification Justifies The Everything Ensemble
Le 17-sept.-07, à 08:51, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Sat, Sep 15, 2007 at 03:13:09PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 14-sept.-07, à 01:02, Russell Standish a écrit :
On Thu, Sep 13, 2007 at 03:04:34PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Le 13-sept.-07, à 00:48, Russell Standish a écrit :
These sorts of discussions No-justification, Zero-information
principle, All of mathematics and Hal Ruhl's dualling All and
Nothing (or should that be duelling) are really just motivators
for
getting at the ensemble, which turns out remarkably to be the same
in
each case - the set of 2^\aleph_0 infinite strings or histories.
Once you fix a programming language or a universal machine, then I
can
You don't even need a universal machine. All you need is a mapping
from infinite strings to integers.
Which one?
It doesn't matter. The most interesting ones, however, have inverse
images of non-zero measure. ie \forall n \in N, the set
O^{-1}(n) = {x: O(x)=n}
is of nonzero measure.
I have no clue of what you are saying here. Perhaps you could elaborate
or give a reference where you say more.
And that can be given by the
observer,
But what is the observer? Is the observer an infinite string itself, a
machine, ?
The only thing assumed about the observer is that there is a map
between descriptions and interpretations.
Which kind of map? This is already problematic once CT is assumed: it
should be at least a map between descriptions and set of
interpretations (or you assume a form of operational interpretation,
but then you are implicitly assuming some universal machine behind the
curtains ...
The additional assumption
about inverse images having nonzero measure is needed to solve the
White Rabbit problem.
An observer can be a machine (which is a subset of such mapping),
I guess you mean: a machine can be interpreted as a very special sort
of subset of such a mapping (which one?).
but
needn't be a machine in general.
Some strings, _under the interpretation of the observer_, are mapped
to observers, including erself. Without the interpretation, though,
they are just infinite strings, inert and meaningless.
where the integers are an enumeration of the oberver's
possible interpretations.
I still don't understand what you accept at the ontic level, and what
is epistemological, and how those things are related.
I'm not sure these terms are even meaningful. Perhaps one can say the
strings are ontic, and the interpretations are epistemological.
Yes, ok. I was just alluding to the 1-3 distinction. With comp you can
associate a mind to machine, but you have to associate an (uncountable)
infinity of machine to a mind, and all the problem consists in making
this clear enough so as to be able to measure the amount of white
rabbits. This has been done for important subcases in my work, like the
case of probability/measure/credibility *one*, which does indeed obey
to (purely arithmetical) quantum law. This makes the quantum feature
of the observable realities a case of digitality as seen from inside.
imagine how to *represent* an history by an infinite string. But
then
you are using comp and you know the consequences. Unless like some
people (including Schmidhuber) you don't believe in the difference
between first and third person points of view.
(Youness Ayaita wrote:
When I first wanted to capture mathematically the Everything, I
tried
several mathematicalist approaches. But later, I prefered the
Everything ensemble that is also known here as the Schmidhuber
ensemble.
Could you Youness, or Russell, give a definition of Schmidhuber
ensemble, please.
The set of all infinite length strings in some chosen alphabet.
Is not Shmidhuber a computationalist? I thought he tries to build a
constructive physics, by searching (through CT) priors on a program
generating or 'outputting a physical universe. Is not the ensemble an
ensemble of computations, and is not Schmidhuber interested in the
finite one or the limiting one? Gosh, you will force me to take again
a
look at his papers :)
Schmidhuber has his ensemble generated by a machine, and perhaps this
makes him computationalist.
Completely so indeed. But then his proposal for a constructive (and
apparently deterministic) physics appears to be in contradiction with
the comp consequences about the 1-3 relations.
However I take the ensemble as simply
existing, not requiring an further justification.
?
It has equivalent
status to your arithmetical realism.
How could I know? You assume the existence of a (very big set) without
making clear what are your assumptions in general. A priori, accepting
the (ontic) existence of such big sets means that you presuppose a part
of set theory (and thus with infinity). This is a far stronger
assumption than arithmetical realism (accepted by most intuitionists
and finitists). That cannot be equivalent. I make clear (well I try)
that
Re: Space-time is a liquid!
John Mikes skrev: 1.- Q: What are light and fermions? A: Light is a fluctuation of closed strings of arbitrary sizes. Fermions are ends of open strings. 2.- Q: Where do light and fermions come from? A: Light and fermions come from the collective motions of string-like objects that form nets and fill our vacuum. 3.- Q: Why do light and fermions exist? A: Light and fermions exist because our vacuum is a quantum liquid of string-nets. This is from the introduction of the URL so kindly provided by Torgny. It looks very interesting, a gteat idea indeed. I like better a 'liquid' of spacetime than a 'fabric'. Xiao-Gang Wen looks like a very open-minded wise man. I wonder if he made the circularity of his Q#1 and Q#3 deliberately? (if, of course, we include Q#2). Originally - before reading Q#3 I wanted to ask 'what is OUR vacuum? but here it is: a QUANTUM liqud and it has the substance of "string-nets". He also postulates closed strings and open ones. (What-s?) the closed ones fluctuate in waves (=photons) and the open ones have endings we consider electrically charged (also callable: particles). In my original (uneducted) question I wanted to ask what kind of a vacuum is "filled"? is it still a (full) vacuum? Do the 'strings' have a 'filling' quale? or is a 'string-filled' plenum still empty (as in vacuum)? If the strings fluctuate into waves, what fluctuates? I am afraid that ANY answer will start another string of questions. The vocabulary is not so clear, then again it is the nth consequence of the mth consequential result of an old assumption: the assumption of the physical world. Please, do not reply! I just realizes that this entire topic is way above my preparedness and just have "let it out". Some clarifications: The vacuum IS a string-net liquid. But the strings are not continous. As you can see in the picture in Figure 1.8 at page 9 (page 14 in the pdf file) in Xiao-Gang Wen: "Introduction to Quantum Many-boson Theory (-: a theory of almost everything :-)", that can be found at http://dao.mit.edu/~wen/pub/intr-frmb.pdf , and in the 10th slide of his talk "An unification of light and electron" at http://dao.mit.edu/~wen/talks/06TDLee.pdf , there the strings consist of discrete points. And it is these discrete points that ARE the space. There is no space between the points. The vacuum IS these points. This might be hard to understand. But this is the same thing that there were no time "before" the Big Bang. The time started with Big Bang. And there is the same thing with the space points in the strings in the discrete space. There is no space "between" the space points. This is hard to understand mentally, but it can be understood mathematically. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: No(-)Justification Justifies The Everything Ensemble
On Mon, Sep 17, 2007 at 12:36:51PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
It doesn't matter. The most interesting ones, however, have inverse
images of non-zero measure. ie \forall n \in N, the set
O^{-1}(n) = {x: O(x)=n}
is of nonzero measure.
I have no clue of what you are saying here. Perhaps you could elaborate
or give a reference where you say more.
Is there a problem with the notation? Perhaps you are reading too much
into it?
And that can be given by the
observer,
But what is the observer? Is the observer an infinite string itself, a
machine, ?
The only thing assumed about the observer is that there is a map
between descriptions and interpretations.
Which kind of map? This is already problematic once CT is assumed: it
should be at least a map between descriptions and set of
interpretations (or you assume a form of operational interpretation,
Yes.
but then you are implicitly assuming some universal machine behind the
curtains ...
No. It is just a map. Not all maps correspond to machines.
The additional assumption
about inverse images having nonzero measure is needed to solve the
White Rabbit problem.
An observer can be a machine (which is a subset of such mapping),
I guess you mean: a machine can be interpreted as a very special sort
of subset of such a mapping (which one?).
Sorry my fingers are slipping. Machines (computable functions) are a
type of map, but not all maps are machines (or perhaps you prefer the
word function to map).
but
needn't be a machine in general.
Some strings, _under the interpretation of the observer_, are mapped
to observers, including erself. Without the interpretation, though,
they are just infinite strings, inert and meaningless.
where the integers are an enumeration of the oberver's
possible interpretations.
I still don't understand what you accept at the ontic level, and what
is epistemological, and how those things are related.
I'm not sure these terms are even meaningful. Perhaps one can say the
strings are ontic, and the interpretations are epistemological.
Yes, ok. I was just alluding to the 1-3 distinction. With comp you can
associate a mind to machine, but you have to associate an (uncountable)
infinity of machine to a mind, and all the problem consists in making
this clear enough so as to be able to measure the amount of white
rabbits. This has been done for important subcases in my work, like the
case of probability/measure/credibility *one*, which does indeed obey
to (purely arithmetical) quantum law. This makes the quantum feature
of the observable realities a case of digitality as seen from inside.
imagine how to *represent* an history by an infinite string. But
then
you are using comp and you know the consequences. Unless like some
people (including Schmidhuber) you don't believe in the difference
between first and third person points of view.
(Youness Ayaita wrote:
When I first wanted to capture mathematically the Everything, I
tried
several mathematicalist approaches. But later, I prefered the
Everything ensemble that is also known here as the Schmidhuber
ensemble.
Could you Youness, or Russell, give a definition of Schmidhuber
ensemble, please.
The set of all infinite length strings in some chosen alphabet.
Is not Shmidhuber a computationalist? I thought he tries to build a
constructive physics, by searching (through CT) priors on a program
generating or 'outputting a physical universe. Is not the ensemble an
ensemble of computations, and is not Schmidhuber interested in the
finite one or the limiting one? Gosh, you will force me to take again
a
look at his papers :)
Schmidhuber has his ensemble generated by a machine, and perhaps this
makes him computationalist.
Completely so indeed. But then his proposal for a constructive (and
apparently deterministic) physics appears to be in contradiction with
the comp consequences about the 1-3 relations.
However I take the ensemble as simply
existing, not requiring an further justification.
?
It has equivalent
status to your arithmetical realism.
How could I know? You assume the existence of a (very big set) without
making clear what are your assumptions in general. A priori, accepting
the (ontic) existence of such big sets means that you presuppose a part
of set theory (and thus with infinity). This is a far stronger
assumption than arithmetical realism (accepted by most intuitionists
and finitists). That cannot be equivalent.
Not equivalent. Equivalent status. Assumption of the set of all
infinite strings plays the same role as your assumption of
arithmetical realism, and that is of the ontological background.
I make clear (well I try)
that uncountable sets and informal set theories (and many continua)
appears in the *first person* plenitude, or at the
Re: One solution to the Measure Problem: UTM outputs a qualia, not a universe
Le 15-sept.-07, à 15:25, Rolf Nelson a écrit : If I understand the Measure Problem correctly, we wonder why we find ourselves in a Goldilocks Universe of stars and galaxies rather than a simpler universe consisting solely of blackbody radiation, or a more complex, unpredictable Harry Potter universe. This is the ASSA (Absolute Self Sample Assumption) version of the measure problem. In this case, physicalism *does* provide a solution under the form of QM, which explains well the rarity of *THIRD person white rabbits*, through the idea of Everett + decoherence. Alas, Everett has to postulate a computationalist theory of mind, which makes unavoidable the first and third person distinction, and which, by that way, introduces the *FIRST person white rabbits*, and those 1-rabbits are not a priori eliminated through the quantum interferences; unless you derive the quantum interference from the winning general computations in the deployement of the UD work (UD = Universal dovetailer, not Hal Finney's UD which is typical ASSA use of an *Universal Distribution* (closer two the second paper of Schmidhuber based on computable probability distribution than to anything related to the 1-3 distinction). What QM do very well is to explain notion of 1-person plural from 1-person through the division of subject (à-la Washington/Moscow) into division of population of subjects (by contagion of superpositions), by entangling the quantum histories. QM can do that thanks to its double linearity (linearity of the tensor product, and linearity of evolution). A priori comp should completely failed on that, but then what I have done is showing that the nuance brought by the incompleteness phenomenon, gives much room to doubt that comp is already refuted. But then again, we have to extract the double linearity from comp without postulating QM, if we want keep comp, or even just QM (without collapse). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Space-time is a liquid!
Torgny, thanks for your explanations...Let me interject John On 9/17/07, Torgny Tholerus [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: John Mikes skrev: - 1.- Q: *What are light and fermions?* - A: Light is a fluctuation of closed strings of arbitrary sizes. Fermions are ends of open strings. - 2.- Q: *Where do light and fermions come from?* - A: Light and fermions come from the collective motions of string-like objects that form nets and fill our vacuum. - 3.- Q: *Why do light and fermions exist?* - A: Light and fermions exist because our vacuum is a quantum liquid of string-nets http://dao.mit.edu/%7Ewen/stringnet.html. This is from the introduction of the URL so kindly provided by Torgny. It looks very interesting, a gteat idea indeed. I like better a 'liquid' of spacetime than a 'fabric'. Xiao-Gang Wen looks like a very open-minded wise man. I wonder if he made the circularity of his Q#1 and Q#3 deliberately? (if, of course, we include Q#2). Originally - before reading Q#3 I wanted to ask 'what is OUR vacuum? but here it is: a QUANTUM liqud and it has the substance of string-nets. He also postulates closed strings and open ones. (What-s?) the closed ones fluctuate in waves (=photons) and the open ones have endings we consider electrically charged (also callable: particles). In my original (uneducted) question I wanted to ask what kind of a vacuum is filled? is it still a (full) vacuum? Do the 'strings' have a 'filling' quale? or is a 'string-filled' plenum still empty (as in vacuum)? If the strings fluctuate into waves, what fluctuates? I am afraid that ANY answer will start another string of questions. The vocabulary is not so clear, then again it is the nth consequence of the mth consequential result of an old assumption: the assumption of the physical world. Please, do not reply! I just realizes that this entire topic is way above my preparedness and just have let it out. T-Th: Some clarifications: The vacuum IS a string-net liquid. JM: Ex cathedra. If I am a faithful, I have to believe it. - I am not. But the strings are not continous. JM: Then what makes them into a continuous 'string'? OR: do those individual points arrange in unassigned directions they just wish? If they only fluctuate by themselves, what reference do they (individually) follow to be callable 'string' -'fluctuate' - or just vibrate on their own? (below you said it: there the strings consist of discrete points.) T-Th: As you can see in the picture in Figure 1.8 at page 9 (page 14 in the pdf file) in Xiao-Gang Wen: Introduction to Quantum Many-boson Theory (-: a theory of almost everything :-), that can be found at http://dao.mit.edu/~wen/pub/intr-frmb.pdfhttp://dao.mit.edu/%7Ewen/pub/intr-frmb.pdf, and in the 10th slide of his talk An unification of light and electron at http://dao.mit.edu/~wen/talks/06TDLee.pdfhttp://dao.mit.edu/%7Ewen/talks/06TDLee.pdf, there the strings consist of discrete points. And it is these discrete points that ARE the space. There is no space between the points. The vacuum IS these points. JM: so THOSE (discrete) points are SPACE and also VACUUM. Now what keeps them 'discrete' if there is NO space between them? They mold together into an 'undivided' continuum - without any divider in between. Two discrete points have got to be discretized by something interstitial separational - in the geometrical view: their spatial image (what they do not have, because they ARE space). In this same image vacuum is also a bunch of discontinuous points that move. Vibrate. Fluctuate. Undulate into waves. But without anything interstitial they melt into a continuum? Your next sentence is TRUE: This might be hard to understand. But this is the same thing that there were no time before the Big Bang. The time started with Big Bang. JM: I overcame this contradictory duality of yours about time, which - of course could not exist before it was started, - by including into my narrative about (my) Bigbang that the occurring Universe (ours at least) organized its complexity into space and time from the aspatial - atemporal plenitude it popped out from. The wrong expression you applied is BEFORE, a time-reference referring to qualify a state where time is not identified. (It mixes the within-universe view with the view OF the universe from outside of it). T-TH: And there is the same thing with the space points in the strings in the discrete space. There is no space between the space points. This is hard to understand mentally, but it can be understood mathematically. JM: I would say: 'it can be described mathematically'. Realizing the formal match in the math expressions is no understanding. Not in the 'applied' math at least, where the truth of 2+2=4 depends on what the 2s and the 4 are applied for. Change the referents and understading may be gone. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are
Re: One solution to the Measure Problem: UTM outputs a qualia, not a universe
World-Index-Compression Postulate: The most probable way for the output of a random UTM program to be a single qualia, is through having a part of the program calculate a Universe, U, that is similar to the universe we currently are observing; and then having another part of the program search through the universe and pick out a substring by using an search algorithm SA(U) that tries to find a random sentient being in U and emit his qualia as the final output. This sounds kind of complex. Just how do you recognise sentience? You can't recognize it directly, at least not with a 500-bit subroutine. (Otherwise you could write a 510-bit program that iterates through random substrings and picks the first sentient one, violating the given World-Index-Compression postulate.) But in an ordered world, you might track down a human (or other sentient being) within 500 bits with instructions like keep searching in a straight line, through an unbounded number of light-years, until you bump into something that stands upright, uses grammar, and would get angry if I punched it. (I'm making up these numbers, if I'm close to Realistic Numbers it's just luck and not insight here.) -Rolf --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: One solution to the Measure Problem: UTM outputs a qualia, not a universe
and would get angry if I punched it I meant to say, would punch me back if I punched it. It's begging the question for the search algorithm to know whether the internal mental state is angry. -Rolf --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: One solution to the Measure Problem: UTM outputs a qualia, not a universe
The considerations trying to solve the measure problem have not been that primitive, but much better. The concept of a cubic meter won't make sense in most of the universes, and to compare infinities in a rigorous manner is nothing new to mathematicians. Both, Standish and Schmidhuber (and surely others, too) have given well-advised attempts to solve the problem. Maybe you're right; I've tried to wade through the archives, searching on measure problem, but may have missed some key things. If we look at other (concrete, complete) proposals, I'm interested in what answers they give for: 1. How do you calculate the probability of your next observation, based on your current mental state? 2. What is the measure/probability of observers, or of OM's? This is necessary for moral calculations, you need to be able to say what other observers are experiencing in the state of the universe that will result from your actions! Related: how do we calculate the answer to self-indication puzzles, like SIA vs. SSA? 3. Why do we live in a Goldilocks universe rather than a Harry Potter universe or a blackbody universe? UDASSA (if I'm interpreting it right, Hal?) says: 1. The measure of programs that produce OM (I am experiencing A, and I remember my previous experience as B) as its single output, compared to the measure of programs that produce OM (I am not experiencing A, and I remember my previous experience as B) as its single output, is what we perceive as the likelihood of A following B, rather than A not following B. 2. The measure of an OM is the measure of the programs that produce OM. 3. (...) the biggest contribution to the measure of observers (and observer-moments) like our own will arise from programs which conceptually have two parts. The first part creates a universe similar to the one we see where the observers evolve, and the second part selects the observer for output. -Rolf --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: No(-)Justification Justifies The Everything Ensemble
Hi Youness: Bruno has indeed recommended that I study in more detail the underlying mathematics that I may be appealing to. The response that I have made may be a bit self serving but at this point in my life I am having difficultly adding yet another area of skill to my resume. This notwithstanding I present below the current state of my model [surely an informal one] which is a combination of previous posts. - List of all properties: The list of all possible properties objects can have. The list can not be empty since there is at least one object: A Nothing. A Nothing has at least one property - emptiness. The list is most likely at least countably infinite and is assumed herein to be so. Any list can be divided into two sub-lists - the process of defining two objects - a definitional pair. The set of all possible subsets of the list is a power set and therefore uncountably infinite. Therefore there are uncountably infinite objects. One sub list would identify the Nothing having the property empty. There is no reason to create a multi-layered system distinguishing between a sub list and the object it identifies. The list itself, being a particular sub list, is therefore an object with properties - so the list is a member of itself. This nesting yields an infinite number of Nothings. A Nothing is incomplete since it can not resolve any question but there is one it must resolve - that of its own duration. So it is unstable - it eventually decays [Big Bang] into a something that follows a path to completion by becoming an ever increasing sub division of its list - that is, it becomes an evolving object - an evolving universe. Since there is an infinite number of Nothings we have a multiverse. Some such paths to completion will have SAS, Inflation and Dark energy which are expressions of the information flow dynamics resulting from the particular completion dynamics. The completion path is naturally random but always grows in information. Very large completion steps should be less common than smaller ones so SAS - if present - would therefore mostly observe small changes. Hal Ruhl At 02:22 AM 9/17/2007, you wrote: Thank you for this remark, Hal. Indeed, you mentioned very similar ideas: List of all properties: The list of all possible properties objects can have. The list can not be empty since there is at least one object: A Nothing. A Nothing has at least one property - emptiness. The list is most likely at least countably infinite and is assumed herein to be so. Any list can be divided into two sub-lists - the process of defining two objects - a definitional pair. The set of all possible subsets of the list is a power set and therefore uncountably infinite. Therefore there are uncountably infinite objects. But your theories are much more complex than that if my first impression is correct. Sooner or later, I'll give attention to them in more detail. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: No(-)Justification Justifies The Everything Ensemble
On Sep 13, 11:47 pm, Youness Ayaita [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I see two perfectly equivalent ways to define a property. This is
somehow analogous to the mathematical definition of a function f: Of
course, in order to practically decide which image f(x) is assigned to
a preimage x, we usually must know a formula first. But the function f
is not changed if I do not consider the formula, but the whole set
{(x,f(x))} instead, where x runs over all preimages.
Concerning properties, we normally have some procedure to define which
imaginable thing has that property. But I can change my perspective
and think of the property as being the set of imaginable things having
the property. This is how David Lewis defines properties (e.g. in his
book On the Plurality of Worlds).
If you insist on the difference between the two definitions, you may
call your property property1 and Lewis's property property2.- Hide quoted
text -
Surely you are just talking about the well-known distinction between
intensional and extensional definitions:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intensional_definition
An intensional definition gives the meaning of a term by giving all
the properties required of something that falls under that definition;
the necessary and sufficient conditions for belonging to the set being
defined.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extensional_definition
An extensional definition of a concept or term formulates its meaning
by specifying its extension, that is, every object that falls under
the definition of the concept or term in question.
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Re: No(-)Justification Justifies The Everything Ensemble
On Sep 18, 1:24 pm, Hal Ruhl [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Hi Youness: Bruno has indeed recommended that I study in more detail the underlying mathematics that I may be appealing to. The response that I have made may be a bit self serving but at this point in my life I am having difficultly adding yet another area of skill to my resume. My advise: Listen to Bruno. Your ideas are riddled with very basic errors. Example below: Basic Error: There is no reason to create a multi-layered system distinguishing between a sub list and the object it identifies. Yes there is. Objects not only have identities, they also have states and behaviours. This is object-oriented-programming 101. A set of properties only defines an identity condition. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: No(-)Justification Justifies The Everything Ensemble
[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
On Sep 13, 11:47 pm, Youness Ayaita [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
I see two perfectly equivalent ways to define a property. This is
somehow analogous to the mathematical definition of a function f: Of
course, in order to practically decide which image f(x) is assigned to
a preimage x, we usually must know a formula first. But the function f
is not changed if I do not consider the formula, but the whole set
{(x,f(x))} instead, where x runs over all preimages.
Concerning properties, we normally have some procedure to define which
imaginable thing has that property. But I can change my perspective
and think of the property as being the set of imaginable things having
the property. This is how David Lewis defines properties (e.g. in his
book On the Plurality of Worlds).
If you insist on the difference between the two definitions, you may
call your property property1 and Lewis's property property2.- Hide
quoted text -
Surely you are just talking about the well-known distinction between
intensional and extensional definitions:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Intensional_definition
An intensional definition gives the meaning of a term by giving all
the properties required of something that falls under that definition;
the necessary and sufficient conditions for belonging to the set being
defined.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Extensional_definition
An extensional definition of a concept or term formulates its meaning
by specifying its extension, that is, every object that falls under
the definition of the concept or term in question.
But both have difficulties for Youness. You can't use extensional
definitions for infinite sets. On the other hand, using properties
leads to Russell's paradox unless limited in some way.
Brent Meeker
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