how to define ASSA (was: The ASSA leads to a unique utilitarism)
Russell Standish wrote: This is actually the SSSA, as originally defined by Bostrom. The ASSA is the SSSA applied to next observer moments. I guess there is a bit of confusing on these terms. I did some searching in the mailing list archives to find out how they were originally defined. First of all SSSA was clearly coined by Hal Finney, not Bostrom. Here's Hal Finney on May 18, 1999: Perhaps we need to distinguish a Strong Self-Sampling Assumption, which is like the SSA but instead of discussing observers, it refers to observer-instants. Followed by Bruno Marchal's reply defining RSSA/ASSA: Perhaps we need to distinguish a Strong Self-Sampling Assumption, which is like the SSA but instead of discussing observers, it refers to observer-instants. Useful distinction, indeed. Nevertheless I do think we should also distinguish between a relative strong SSA and a absolute strong SSA. The idea is that we can only quantify the first-person indeterminism on the set of consistent observer-instants extensions. I mean : consistent with the observers memory of its own (first person) past. Actually now I'm not sure what Bruno really meant. I had assumed that ASSA was the same thing as SSSA, only with the clarification that it's not relative. But if Bruno had really meant to define ASSA as SSSA applied to the next observer moment then I have been using the term ASSA incorrectly. So to sum up, there are two possible meanings for ASSA currently. Does anyone else have an opinion on the matter? Here are the competing definitions: 1. You should reason as if your current observer-moment was randomly selected from a distribution that is shared by everyone and independent of your current observations (hence absolute). 2. You should expect your next observer-moment to be randomly selected from a distribution that is shared by everyone and independent of your current observations. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: how to define ASSA (was: The ASSA leads to a unique utilitarism)
1) looks better because there is no unambiguous definition of next. However, I don't understand the shared by everyone part. Different persons are different programs who cannot exactly represent the observer moment of me. As I see it, an observer moment is a snapshot of the universe taken by my brain. The brain simulates a virtual world based on information from the real world. We don't really experience the real world, we just experience this simulated world. Observer moments for observers should refer to the physical states of the virtual world they live in. Since different observers live in different universes which have different laws of physics, these physical states (= qualia) cannot be compared to each other. We can only talk about an absolute measure for programs (simulated by other programs or not)... Citeren Wei Dai [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Russell Standish wrote: This is actually the SSSA, as originally defined by Bostrom. The ASSA is the SSSA applied to next observer moments. I guess there is a bit of confusing on these terms. I did some searching in the mailing list archives to find out how they were originally defined. First of all SSSA was clearly coined by Hal Finney, not Bostrom. Here's Hal Finney on May 18, 1999: Perhaps we need to distinguish a Strong Self-Sampling Assumption, which is like the SSA but instead of discussing observers, it refers to observer-instants. Followed by Bruno Marchal's reply defining RSSA/ASSA: Perhaps we need to distinguish a Strong Self-Sampling Assumption, which is like the SSA but instead of discussing observers, it refers to observer-instants. Useful distinction, indeed. Nevertheless I do think we should also distinguish between a relative strong SSA and a absolute strong SSA. The idea is that we can only quantify the first-person indeterminism on the set of consistent observer-instants extensions. I mean : consistent with the observers memory of its own (first person) past. Actually now I'm not sure what Bruno really meant. I had assumed that ASSA was the same thing as SSSA, only with the clarification that it's not relative. But if Bruno had really meant to define ASSA as SSSA applied to the next observer moment then I have been using the term ASSA incorrectly. So to sum up, there are two possible meanings for ASSA currently. Does anyone else have an opinion on the matter? Here are the competing definitions: 1. You should reason as if your current observer-moment was randomly selected from a distribution that is shared by everyone and independent of your current observations (hence absolute). 2. You should expect your next observer-moment to be randomly selected from a distribution that is shared by everyone and independent of your current observations. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: how to define ASSA
Saibal Mitra wrote: 1) looks better because there is no unambiguous definition of next. However, I don't understand the shared by everyone part. Different persons are different programs who cannot exactly represent the observer moment of me. As I see it, an observer moment is a snapshot of the universe taken by my brain. The brain simulates a virtual world based on information from the real world. We don't really experience the real world, we just experience this simulated world. Observer moments for observers should refer to the physical states of the virtual world they live in. Since different observers live in different universes which have different laws of physics, these physical states (= qualia) cannot be compared to each other. How do you know they live in different universes? The great agreement among observers is what leads us to believe in an objective world. It appears that it is more economical (both ontologically and algorithmically) to explain the agreement by supposing there is an objective world as described by physics. In which case the observer moments are derivative from the objective world - that's what makes it a more efficient hypothesis. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: how to define ASSA
Of course, we all live in the same universe in the sense that we are all simulated by brains that exist in this universe (described approximately by the Standard Model and General Relativity). The problem is how to define the observer moments rigorously at least in principle. It is undeniable that we experience a the world that our brains are simulating and not the real world. We experience the real world only indirectly. If you touch a hot object and burn your finger then you experiencing the pain is really an event that happens in the virtual world simulated by your brain. Your brain simply uses the results of the simulation to compute what action to take in the real world (and the simulation will then be updated accordingly). The burning sensation exists only in the simulated world, not in the real world. Of course, you can infer that the object must have been hot. So, it seems to be more sensible to me to say that an observer moment is itself an entire universe (= program) in some state. This looks equivalent to specifying the exact state a brain is in, but the brain contains more information than is accessible to the observer. We really have to extract the program the brain is running from the brain and use that to define OMs, otherwise an OM becomes an inherently ambiguous concept (e.g. where does the brain end, do the nerves in my feet also count? etc. etc.). One can simply define an observer as some program and look at the entire multiverse to seek out these programs that are in such and such state. Then one adds up all the absolute measures to obtain the total probability that the program is experiencing that state. One would then expect that it is likely that a program defining a human observer is simulated by a brain in a universe described by the Standard Model. citeren Brent Meeker [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Saibal Mitra wrote: 1) looks better because there is no unambiguous definition of next. However, I don't understand the shared by everyone part. Different persons are different programs who cannot exactly represent the observer moment of me. As I see it, an observer moment is a snapshot of the universe taken by my brain. The brain simulates a virtual world based on information from the real world. We don't really experience the real world, we just experience this simulated world. Observer moments for observers should refer to the physical states of the virtual world they live in. Since different observers live in different universes which have different laws of physics, these physical states (= qualia) cannot be compared to each other. How do you know they live in different universes? The great agreement among observers is what leads us to believe in an objective world. It appears that it is more economical (both ontologically and algorithmically) to explain the agreement by supposing there is an objective world as described by physics. In which case the observer moments are derivative from the objective world - that's what makes it a more efficient hypothesis. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
