An Equivalence Principle
By this contribution to the Everything list I want to argue that there is a fundamental equivalence between the first person and the third person viewpoint: Under few assumptions I show that it doesn't matter for our reasoning whether we understand the Everything ensemble as the ensemble of all worlds (a third person viewpoint) or as the ensemble of all observer moments (a first person viewpoint). I think that this result is even more substantial than the assumptions from which it can be deduced. Thus, I further suggest to reverse my argument considering the last statement as a principle, the equivalence principle. Let me first present and explain the two viewpoints: 1. The ensemble of worlds This approach starts from the ontological basis of all worlds (or descriptions thereof). I am not precise to what exactly I refer by saying worlds and descriptions for I don't want to lose wider applicability of my arguments by restricting myself to specific theories of the Everything ensemble. But admittedly, I mainly think of theories similar to Russell's ideas. However, the crucial property of theories starting from the ensemble of worlds consists in their third person viewpoint. The ontological basis does not explicitly refer to observers nor to observer moments. Observers are regarded as being self-aware substructures of the worlds they inhabit. Coming from the sciences, this approach is very natural. In the sciences, we are used to the idea of a physical reality independent of us humans. We are studying phenomena happening in our universe. Thus, when we invent a theory of the Everything ensemble, we are naturally driven to the idea that not only our universe, but a multiverse consisting of all possible worlds exists. We already know how observers come into the scene: As an emergent property, a huge number of the fundamental building blocks can constitute an observer. In order to understand this, one has to introduce a semantic language which describes the emergent phenomenon. The description of the world itself is expressed in the syntactic language (I adopt Russell's nomenclature). The link between between these two languages is some kind of neurological theory explaining how the states of the fundamental building blocks (more precise: the description of the world) lead to mental states (or the emergence of an observer). Though, finding such a neurological theory is a very difficult task. In this world, we are facing the so-called hard problem of consciousness. And even if neurologists, psychologists and philosophers will finally succeed to find an adequate theory in this world, it is not clear whether we can apply the theory to other worlds. So, to conclude, this approach has the great advantage of being very close to the structure of the physical worlds. The explanation of observers and observer moments seems to be possible, but surely is very complicated and difficult. 2. The ensemble of observer moments When I first thought of the Everything ensemble, I did not come from the sciences, but from philosophy. I judged that the concept of absolute existence was a dubious extension of the concepts of subjective accessibility and perceptibility. So, it was natural for me to start from the ensemble of observer moments, a first person viewpoint. The class of all observer moments constitutes the ontological basis of this second approach. Later, I realized that the theory of the Everything ensemble could be used to draw conclusions about the physical world. But this seemed to be unfeasible starting from observer moments: the relatively simple laws of nature that we find in our universe are obscured by the complex properties of our senses. Starting from observer moments seemed to be a complication. Consequently, I switched viewpoints and studied the ensemble of worlds. I always hoped that both approaches would finally turn out to be equivalent. Even in principle, it is very difficult to think of worlds when starting from observer moments only. This task is similar to understanding observer moments when starting from the descriptions of worlds. Starting from worlds, we must identify the observer moments as substructres. Starting from observer moments, we must somehow extract information that allows us to meaningfully talk about a world. From the sciences, we know how difficult this is because there we try to find a description of our world given our observer moments. We see how complementary the two approaches are: The first approach needed some kind of neurological theory to explain the appearance of observer moments within a world, the second approach needs some kind of physical theory to explain the appearance of a world when first studying observer moments. The two approaches are another manifestation of the deep connection between laws of physics and properties of an observer. The assumptions My first assumption is related to our reasoning. The equivalence of the two approaches does not mean that they
Re: Bostrom Paper
Hi Bruno, A pity he does not refer to UDA, given that Bostrom has followed my talk in Brussels at the consciousness ASSC meeting in Brussels, ... Sorry to hear that... where Chalmers quit the audience at the third step of UDA. Chalmers seemed not to accept the subjective or first person comp indeterminacy. And Chalmers should (unless he has changed his mind) to be troubled by Hmm Chalmers ... I am unhappy with his philosophical zombie; and his dualism; and with a 100 other of his positions ;-)) indeed any experiences at all. It is much more plausible to hold that even if the universe is the way it now seems to be, we can still influence what experiences there are. Since this would be impossible on Unification, we should accept Duplication. This is not an argument, but wishful thinking. Agreed - I found this a strange form of argument. Nick Bostrom can do better. Anyway, I would like to comment on unification/duplication issue but I want to go through your SANE paper before once more, and do not have the time at the moment. I will answer as soon as possible. Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: An Equivalence Principle
Hi, I think I have an argument in support of the 'equivalence' of 3rd and 1st person descriptions of the natural world in the sense that you offer. It works by loking at the world predicted by the 1P=3P identity. I agree with your sentiments: The equivalence of the two approaches does not mean that they are identical. I will say that they have identical implications for our reasoning. ... but perhaps not via the route you use. You don't need QM-speak at all. All you have to do is focus on the empirical evidence of science itself as a cognitive act and in the application of science to the scientific description of brain material which then results in the scientific description of scientists thus enabled through the provision of the 1stP, which is 100% the source of scientific observation (an empirically verifiable fact). I always have trouble with these sentences! Read it a couple of times === Step 1. Let us start with a characterisation of what might be claimed as the received (programmed by training) view of the mainstream physicist as expressed by [1] Gari Lisi in 2007 An exceptionally simple theory of everything. The very first paragraph of which is: Introduction We exist in a universe described by mathematics. But which math? Although it is interesting to consider that the universe may be the physical instantiation of all mathematics,[1] there is a classic principle for restricting the possibilities: The mathematics of the universe should be beautiful. A successful description of nature should be a concise, elegant, unified mathematical structure consistent with experience. YES there is only describing going on - NOT explanationOK... but I disagree with We exist in a universe described by mathematics in the sense that NO, We exist in a universe described by scientists and does 'UNIFIED' imply 'COMPLETE'?And where is this unseen computer running the TOE as a program? sorry...I digressit's a minefield of preconceptions and assumptions. . but.more important is at the 'meta-level' and involves how Lisi's claim represents the accepted view of what physics purports to be doing generating a 'theory of everything' which involves A successful description of nature should be a concise, elegant, unifed mathematical structure consistent with experience. AFAICT in the criticisms of Lisi that followed his submission nobody disagreed with this particular statement in that concern was confined to the details of his model. This fact is important in what follows.Let us accept it as a claim merely as an accurate representation of the belief systems of physicists (regardless of its truth) about what they do or are trying, ultimately, to do. = Step 2. Next let us examine the word EVERYTHING. There are two senses of the use of this word which I express as two hypotheses in respect of the state of affairs implicit in such a 'theory of everything'. The first is literal/absolute: 2a) that such a theory shall explain absolutely everything. That is it shall be literally predictive of ALL aspects of the natural world in all its expressions. and then there is this 'relative' definition: 2b) that such a theory merely represents what physicists describe as being 'everything' in the sense that what it does not explain is to remain methodologically (as a matter of procedure) unexplained or is (tacitly) methodologically *defined* as unexplainable in principle These are two very different states of affairs and the applicability of their status in in relation to any instance of a theory of _everything_ seems to be overlooked somewhat. === Step 3. Here is where we get empirical evidence. This is observed inside LISI's theory and evident in his words: .*consistent with* experience. as compared with the possible phrase: .*predictive of* experience. For there is something that is NOT predicted by the 'theory of everything': _experience itself_. .Lisi's theory does not predict the existence of or otherwise explain brain material behaviour relating to the scientist's internal life(= Lisi, himself). NOTE: I do not refer here any _particular_ (contents of) experience used as scientific evidence. I mean experience itself..._the very fact of it_ the empirically verified specifically neurologically empirically demonstrable, localisable delivery of a first person perspective that results from matter configured as we see (experience) when we observe it with that same first person observation system: cranial central nervous system material. NOTE: There is a serious logical flaw in the scientific evidence system in that to demand experience (Lisi'sconsistent with...) as scientific evidence and then to deny that the scientific evidence system (experience itself) has been evidenced (it is a methodological denial - otherwise how could it be a
