Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)
Quentin Anciaux wrote: > 2008/8/13 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: >> I've been following this back-and-forth with interest. The above leads to an >> interesting question which I will raise after a couple of background points. >> First, I don't think a conscious AI can exist independent of some >> environment of >> which it is conscious. Of course this doesn't mean you can't create an AI >> which, like us, is conscious of this particular world. > > Agreed. > >> Second, I think a >> conscious AI must necessarily remember and learn. A consequence of these >> two is >> that if you copy an AI the two copies will immediately start to diverge due >> to >> different experiences. > > If we can build an AI we control it and we can give to it input in > whatever way we like, even slowing it down, stopping it, dumping > memory, restore a copy, record input from the world to the AI, > (including clock time, etc) restore another copy and restart it 1 hour > later than the first restore and feed the recorded input data. The two > should do the same, it's a computation, it's deterministic. In principle we could create and artificial environment for two copies of the AI and keep them identical. But then it's a metaphysical question as to whether there are two separate consciousness. If consciousness is computation then "same computation"="same consciousness". The usual form of duplication that Bruno postulates contemplates two copies at separate places in this world - in which case they do diverge immediately. > If they > diverge having the same input (and being the same program) then there > is magic somewhere. Or quantum mechanical uncertainty. Brent Meeker > >> So the indeterminancy will immediately vanish. > > They can be the same as long as you which. > >> There >> will be two different consciousnesses; which is perfectly ordinary except >> that >> they will share a lot of memories. So what does this have to do with MMW? > > What is the status of "mind" ? > >> Brent Meeker >> > > Regards, > Quentin Anciaux --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)
2008/8/13 Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > I've been following this back-and-forth with interest. The above leads to an > interesting question which I will raise after a couple of background points. > First, I don't think a conscious AI can exist independent of some environment > of > which it is conscious. Of course this doesn't mean you can't create an AI > which, like us, is conscious of this particular world. Agreed. > Second, I think a > conscious AI must necessarily remember and learn. A consequence of these two > is > that if you copy an AI the two copies will immediately start to diverge due to > different experiences. If we can build an AI we control it and we can give to it input in whatever way we like, even slowing it down, stopping it, dumping memory, restore a copy, record input from the world to the AI, (including clock time, etc) restore another copy and restart it 1 hour later than the first restore and feed the recorded input data. The two should do the same, it's a computation, it's deterministic. If they diverge having the same input (and being the same program) then there is magic somewhere. > So the indeterminancy will immediately vanish. They can be the same as long as you which. > There > will be two different consciousnesses; which is perfectly ordinary except that > they will share a lot of memories. So what does this have to do with MMW? What is the status of "mind" ? > Brent Meeker > Regards, Quentin Anciaux -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)
Quentin Anciaux wrote: > 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: ... > No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is > ontologically primary. That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to argue for it. >>> I do not assume them. >> Then you need some other way of getting your multiple instantiations. > Well I believe (note the word) that we (the mind) are a computation > and as such I believe in strong AI, such that we will do conscious > digital entities... Either these entities will be truly conscious (and > it is possible for them to be conscious as we have assume that > consciousness is a computational process) or they won't, if they won't > and never will be conscious, it is only possible if contrary to the > assumption, consciousness is not (only) a computational process. Now > if consciousness is a computational process and we build an AI (I > don't see how we couldn't if consciousness is a computation, what > could prevent it ?) then here you are with multiple implementations. And if we don't build an AI, here you are without them. (And with computationalism still true, and without any subjective indeterminacy). >>> If it is a computation explain why we wouldn't with logical >>> argument... if the world is not destroyed tomorrow and consciousness >>> is a computational process then we'll build AI >> >> There is no reason to build and AI duplicate of everybody, >> and there is no reason to single out me. So this is another >> appeal to coincidence. > > i've never said that and that's not the point. This AI could be > duplicated and run in multiple instance when does she die ? when you > pull the last plug of the last computer running it ? by pulling out > all devices capable of running it ? by destroying the whole everything I've been following this back-and-forth with interest. The above leads to an interesting question which I will raise after a couple of background points. First, I don't think a conscious AI can exist independent of some environment of which it is conscious. Of course this doesn't mean you can't create an AI which, like us, is conscious of this particular world. Second, I think a conscious AI must necessarily remember and learn. A consequence of these two is that if you copy an AI the two copies will immediately start to diverge due to different experiences. So the indeterminancy will immediately vanish. There will be two different consciousnesses; which is perfectly ordinary except that they will share a lot of memories. So what does this have to do with MMW? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)
On 13 Aug, 21:47, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > When the universe will end is '17 is prime' still true ? > > Me winning the lotery is a WR event... I play lotery, I do not win > therefore no one wins... It's basically your argument about WR. > > 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > > > > On 13 Aug, 21:05, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > >> >> Sure, why one then ? > > >> > It would be the smallest number that fits the facts. > > >> Which facts ? > > > The observed ones. > > You're talking about the microscopic quantum world ? All the facts. > >> >> >> >> > it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does > >> >> >> >> > not > >> >> >> >> > fit the evidence because of the WR problem. > > >> >> >> >> Yes but I see 'real switch' problem as equally problematic in > >> >> >> >> front of > >> >> >> >> the WR problem. > > >> >> >> > I don't see that. You need to explain. Single-worlders can "switch > >> >> >> > off" WR's. > > >> >> >> Yes by saying it's a no problem... I can say MW can "switch off" WR > >> >> >> as > >> >> >> easily. But we just make a step back and forth. > > >> >> > That is no explanation. Single worlders -- and physical many > >> >> > worlders-- > >> >> > get rid of WR universes by saying they do no exist at all. > > >> >> > Now: don't tell me *that* mathematical may worlders can do > >> >> > the same, tell me how. > > >> >> By saying they exists but you're not in the class of observer capable > >> >> of experiencing them (or experiencing them for a long stable period of > >> >> time...), > > >> >> and as a RSSA proponents, next states probabilities are > >> >> relative to current state... I could also say that you experience only > >> >> one world/history (from your point of view of course) then speaking > >> >> why you're not in these particular WR universes/histories is because > >> >> you're not (it sounds like your 'do not exist at all' no ? :) > > >> > A lot of complicated hypotheses have been put forward on the > >> > MMW side. What does that buy you? Ontological complexity combined > >> > with > >> > theoretical complexity. > > >> I see real complexity in asserting the single universe. > > > Don't just see it, explain it. > > I already did, one universe put more constraint because of its unicity > than infinitely many... One universe is the smallest number that fits a naive subset of the facts, such as the fact of my existence. > >> >> >> >> >> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world > >> >> >> >> >> is > >> >> >> >> >> ontologically primary. > > >> >> >> >> > That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to > >> >> >> >> > argue for it. > > >> >> >> >> I do not assume them. > > >> >> >> > Then you need some other way of getting your multiple > >> >> >> > instantiations. > > >> >> >> Well I believe (note the word) that we (the mind) are a computation > >> >> >> and as such I believe in strong AI, such that we will do conscious > >> >> >> digital entities... Either these entities will be truly conscious > >> >> >> (and > >> >> >> it is possible for them to be conscious as we have assume that > >> >> >> consciousness is a computational process) or they won't, if they > >> >> >> won't > >> >> >> and never will be conscious, it is only possible if contrary to the > >> >> >> assumption, consciousness is not (only) a computational process. Now > >> >> >> if consciousness is a computational process and we build an AI (I > >> >> >> don't see how we couldn't if consciousness is a computation, what > >> >> >> could prevent it ?) then here you are with multiple implementations. > > >> >> > And if we don't build an AI, here you are without them. (And with > >> >> > computationalism still true, and without any subjective > >> >> > indeterminacy). > > >> >> If it is a computation explain why we wouldn't with logical > >> >> argument... if the world is not destroyed tomorrow and consciousness > >> >> is a computational process then we'll build AI > > >> > There is no reason to build and AI duplicate of everybody, > >> > and there is no reason to single out me. So this is another > >> > appeal to coincidence. > > >> i've never said that and that's not the point. This AI could be > >> duplicated and run in multiple instance when does she die ? when you > >> pull the last plug of the last computer running it ? by pulling out > >> all devices capable of running it ? by destroying the whole everything > >> ? > > > If you make a chain of assumptions --how willing people are to build > > AIs, how able they are, how long the universe will support such > > activities-- > > then you can make the AI hypothesis look likely relative to those > > assumptions. > > But there is no necessity there. Anyone can evade the argument by > > rejecting the > > assumptions. It's basically just speculation. > > The necessity is this... either it's possible or not possible at all, > if it's
Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)
When the universe will end is '17 is prime' still true ? Me winning the lotery is a WR event... I play lotery, I do not win therefore no one wins... It's basically your argument about WR. 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > > > On 13 Aug, 21:05, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: >> >> >> Sure, why one then ? >> >> > It would be the smallest number that fits the facts. >> >> Which facts ? > > The observed ones. You're talking about the microscopic quantum world ? >> >> >> >> > it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does >> >> >> >> > not >> >> >> >> > fit the evidence because of the WR problem. >> >> >> >> >> Yes but I see 'real switch' problem as equally problematic in front >> >> >> >> of >> >> >> >> the WR problem. >> >> >> >> > I don't see that. You need to explain. Single-worlders can "switch >> >> >> > off" WR's. >> >> >> >> Yes by saying it's a no problem... I can say MW can "switch off" WR as >> >> >> easily. But we just make a step back and forth. >> >> >> > That is no explanation. Single worlders -- and physical many >> >> > worlders-- >> >> > get rid of WR universes by saying they do no exist at all. >> >> >> > Now: don't tell me *that* mathematical may worlders can do >> >> > the same, tell me how. >> >> >> By saying they exists but you're not in the class of observer capable >> >> of experiencing them (or experiencing them for a long stable period of >> >> time...), >> >> >> and as a RSSA proponents, next states probabilities are >> >> relative to current state... I could also say that you experience only >> >> one world/history (from your point of view of course) then speaking >> >> why you're not in these particular WR universes/histories is because >> >> you're not (it sounds like your 'do not exist at all' no ? :) >> >> > A lot of complicated hypotheses have been put forward on the >> > MMW side. What does that buy you? Ontological complexity combined >> > with >> > theoretical complexity. >> >> I see real complexity in asserting the single universe. > > Don't just see it, explain it. I already did, one universe put more constraint because of its unicity than infinitely many... >> >> >> >> >> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is >> >> >> >> >> ontologically primary. >> >> >> >> >> > That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to >> >> >> >> > argue for it. >> >> >> >> >> I do not assume them. >> >> >> >> > Then you need some other way of getting your multiple instantiations. >> >> >> >> Well I believe (note the word) that we (the mind) are a computation >> >> >> and as such I believe in strong AI, such that we will do conscious >> >> >> digital entities... Either these entities will be truly conscious (and >> >> >> it is possible for them to be conscious as we have assume that >> >> >> consciousness is a computational process) or they won't, if they won't >> >> >> and never will be conscious, it is only possible if contrary to the >> >> >> assumption, consciousness is not (only) a computational process. Now >> >> >> if consciousness is a computational process and we build an AI (I >> >> >> don't see how we couldn't if consciousness is a computation, what >> >> >> could prevent it ?) then here you are with multiple implementations. >> >> >> > And if we don't build an AI, here you are without them. (And with >> >> > computationalism still true, and without any subjective >> >> > indeterminacy). >> >> >> If it is a computation explain why we wouldn't with logical >> >> argument... if the world is not destroyed tomorrow and consciousness >> >> is a computational process then we'll build AI >> >> > There is no reason to build and AI duplicate of everybody, >> > and there is no reason to single out me. So this is another >> > appeal to coincidence. >> >> i've never said that and that's not the point. This AI could be >> duplicated and run in multiple instance when does she die ? when you >> pull the last plug of the last computer running it ? by pulling out >> all devices capable of running it ? by destroying the whole everything >> ? > > If you make a chain of assumptions --how willing people are to build > AIs, how able they are, how long the universe will support such > activities-- > then you can make the AI hypothesis look likely relative to those > assumptions. > But there is no necessity there. Anyone can evade the argument by > rejecting the > assumptions. It's basically just speculation. The necessity is this... either it's possible or not possible at all, if it's possible it will be done. Somewhere in some time in the multi/universe. >> >>you must suppose >> >> either >> >> 1) the end of the world before we do it >> >> 2) or the never ever AI for unknown reason even if it is possible >> >> because the mind is a computational process >> >> 3) or the mind is not a computational process (or in part but >> >> dependant on a non computational/non emulable process lik
Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)
On 13 Aug, 21:05, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > >> Sure, why one then ? > > > It would be the smallest number that fits the facts. > > Which facts ? The observed ones. > >> >> >> > it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does not > >> >> >> > fit the evidence because of the WR problem. > > >> >> >> Yes but I see 'real switch' problem as equally problematic in front > >> >> >> of > >> >> >> the WR problem. > > >> >> > I don't see that. You need to explain. Single-worlders can "switch > >> >> > off" WR's. > > >> >> Yes by saying it's a no problem... I can say MW can "switch off" WR as > >> >> easily. But we just make a step back and forth. > > >> > That is no explanation. Single worlders -- and physical many > >> > worlders-- > >> > get rid of WR universes by saying they do no exist at all. > > >> > Now: don't tell me *that* mathematical may worlders can do > >> > the same, tell me how. > > >> By saying they exists but you're not in the class of observer capable > >> of experiencing them (or experiencing them for a long stable period of > >> time...), > > >> and as a RSSA proponents, next states probabilities are > >> relative to current state... I could also say that you experience only > >> one world/history (from your point of view of course) then speaking > >> why you're not in these particular WR universes/histories is because > >> you're not (it sounds like your 'do not exist at all' no ? :) > > > A lot of complicated hypotheses have been put forward on the > > MMW side. What does that buy you? Ontological complexity combined > > with > > theoretical complexity. > > I see real complexity in asserting the single universe. Don't just see it, explain it. > >> >> >> >> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is > >> >> >> >> ontologically primary. > > >> >> >> > That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to > >> >> >> > argue for it. > > >> >> >> I do not assume them. > > >> >> > Then you need some other way of getting your multiple instantiations. > > >> >> Well I believe (note the word) that we (the mind) are a computation > >> >> and as such I believe in strong AI, such that we will do conscious > >> >> digital entities... Either these entities will be truly conscious (and > >> >> it is possible for them to be conscious as we have assume that > >> >> consciousness is a computational process) or they won't, if they won't > >> >> and never will be conscious, it is only possible if contrary to the > >> >> assumption, consciousness is not (only) a computational process. Now > >> >> if consciousness is a computational process and we build an AI (I > >> >> don't see how we couldn't if consciousness is a computation, what > >> >> could prevent it ?) then here you are with multiple implementations. > > >> > And if we don't build an AI, here you are without them. (And with > >> > computationalism still true, and without any subjective > >> > indeterminacy). > > >> If it is a computation explain why we wouldn't with logical > >> argument... if the world is not destroyed tomorrow and consciousness > >> is a computational process then we'll build AI > > > There is no reason to build and AI duplicate of everybody, > > and there is no reason to single out me. So this is another > > appeal to coincidence. > > i've never said that and that's not the point. This AI could be > duplicated and run in multiple instance when does she die ? when you > pull the last plug of the last computer running it ? by pulling out > all devices capable of running it ? by destroying the whole everything > ? If you make a chain of assumptions --how willing people are to build AIs, how able they are, how long the universe will support such activities-- then you can make the AI hypothesis look likely relative to those assumptions. But there is no necessity there. Anyone can evade the argument by rejecting the assumptions. It's basically just speculation. > >>you must suppose > >> either > >> 1) the end of the world before we do it > >> 2) or the never ever AI for unknown reason even if it is possible > >> because the mind is a computational process > >> 3) or the mind is not a computational process (or in part but > >> dependant on a non computational/non emulable process like an oracle > >> or your substance for example).. > > > Or 4) We build an AI and it isn;t me. Why shoudl it be? The odds > > are billions to one. > > I've never said that and it's not the point if it is you, me, Georges > Bush or Popeye... it's about consciousness. Nothing follows for me if someone builds and AI of someone other than me. If I am never duplicated, I suffer from no indeterminacy, and no issue of many worlds arises.I can quite justifiably regard myself as a single individual in a single reality. > >> >> Either you say that even if consciousness is a computation we will > >> >> never and ever be able to replicate this phenomena (creat
Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)
2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: >> Sure, why one then ? > > It would be the smallest number that fits the facts. Which facts ? >> >> >> > it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does not >> >> >> > fit the evidence because of the WR problem. >> >> >> >> Yes but I see 'real switch' problem as equally problematic in front of >> >> >> the WR problem. >> >> >> > I don't see that. You need to explain. Single-worlders can "switch >> >> > off" WR's. >> >> >> Yes by saying it's a no problem... I can say MW can "switch off" WR as >> >> easily. But we just make a step back and forth. >> >> > That is no explanation. Single worlders -- and physical many >> > worlders-- >> > get rid of WR universes by saying they do no exist at all. >> >> > Now: don't tell me *that* mathematical may worlders can do >> > the same, tell me how. >> >> By saying they exists but you're not in the class of observer capable >> of experiencing them (or experiencing them for a long stable period of >> time...), > > >> and as a RSSA proponents, next states probabilities are >> relative to current state... I could also say that you experience only >> one world/history (from your point of view of course) then speaking >> why you're not in these particular WR universes/histories is because >> you're not (it sounds like your 'do not exist at all' no ? :) > > A lot of complicated hypotheses have been put forward on the > MMW side. What does that buy you? Ontological complexity combined > with > theoretical complexity. I see real complexity in asserting the single universe. >> >> >> >> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is >> >> >> >> ontologically primary. >> >> >> >> > That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to >> >> >> > argue for it. >> >> >> >> I do not assume them. >> >> >> > Then you need some other way of getting your multiple instantiations. >> >> >> Well I believe (note the word) that we (the mind) are a computation >> >> and as such I believe in strong AI, such that we will do conscious >> >> digital entities... Either these entities will be truly conscious (and >> >> it is possible for them to be conscious as we have assume that >> >> consciousness is a computational process) or they won't, if they won't >> >> and never will be conscious, it is only possible if contrary to the >> >> assumption, consciousness is not (only) a computational process. Now >> >> if consciousness is a computational process and we build an AI (I >> >> don't see how we couldn't if consciousness is a computation, what >> >> could prevent it ?) then here you are with multiple implementations. >> >> > And if we don't build an AI, here you are without them. (And with >> > computationalism still true, and without any subjective >> > indeterminacy). >> >> If it is a computation explain why we wouldn't with logical >> argument... if the world is not destroyed tomorrow and consciousness >> is a computational process then we'll build AI > > > There is no reason to build and AI duplicate of everybody, > and there is no reason to single out me. So this is another > appeal to coincidence. i've never said that and that's not the point. This AI could be duplicated and run in multiple instance when does she die ? when you pull the last plug of the last computer running it ? by pulling out all devices capable of running it ? by destroying the whole everything ? >>you must suppose >> either >> 1) the end of the world before we do it >> 2) or the never ever AI for unknown reason even if it is possible >> because the mind is a computational process >> 3) or the mind is not a computational process (or in part but >> dependant on a non computational/non emulable process like an oracle >> or your substance for example).. > > Or 4) We build an AI and it isn;t me. Why shoudl it be? The odds > are billions to one. I've never said that and it's not the point if it is you, me, Georges Bush or Popeye... it's about consciousness. >> >> Either you say that even if consciousness is a computation we will >> >> never and ever be able to replicate this phenomena (creates a digital >> >> consciousness) and you have to explain why or you should accept 1st >> >> person indeterminacy... >> >> > I don't have to do any of those things. I just have to point out that >> > it isn't particularly likely. I could be living in a fantastically >> > elaborate >> > Truman-style replica of a *physical* environment..but why should I >> > believe >> > that? >> >> I do not believe in that, you talk of multiverse like if it was >> something built for deceiving us... that's nonsense paranoia :) > > But you are basing your whole argument on the future construction of > an AI. And > you are trying or persuade me that that means *I* am affected by > indeterminacy. > So the AI must be an AI of me. How is that any less solipsistic than > the Truman > Show? Where all affected, every consciousness if consciousness is computation, but the point is n
Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)
On 13 Aug, 20:38, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > >> >> > Then you had better say what the problem is. > > >> >> Why one ? > > >> > The universe is all there is. How could you have more than one all- > >> > there-is? > > >> Well you're playing with the word here. It's hand waving. > > > I am not saying there is one universe. I am saying there is as many > > as are needed to explain the evidence, and no more. > > You're not saying anything nor asserting something. Says who? > >> >>why not two ? if one why stay one ? There is a single > >> >> universe and a precise one and *only this one* and we are actually in > >> >> it, wow lucky. > > >> > Not at all. If there is one, we must be in it, there is nowhere else > >> > to be. > >> > "Luck"--anthropic claims---features much more in MW thinking. > > >> Well sure we must be in a universe, as we must be part of the > >> everything because we are (well I'm sure for me...) > > > And if there is one universe, we must be in it. Nothing could > > be less coincidental. > > Sure, why one then ? It would be the smallest number that fits the facts. > >> >> > it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does not > >> >> > fit the evidence because of the WR problem. > > >> >> Yes but I see 'real switch' problem as equally problematic in front of > >> >> the WR problem. > > >> > I don't see that. You need to explain. Single-worlders can "switch > >> > off" WR's. > > >> Yes by saying it's a no problem... I can say MW can "switch off" WR as > >> easily. But we just make a step back and forth. > > > That is no explanation. Single worlders -- and physical many > > worlders-- > > get rid of WR universes by saying they do no exist at all. > > > Now: don't tell me *that* mathematical may worlders can do > > the same, tell me how. > > By saying they exists but you're not in the class of observer capable > of experiencing them (or experiencing them for a long stable period of > time...), > and as a RSSA proponents, next states probabilities are > relative to current state... I could also say that you experience only > one world/history (from your point of view of course) then speaking > why you're not in these particular WR universes/histories is because > you're not (it sounds like your 'do not exist at all' no ? :) A lot of complicated hypotheses have been put forward on the MMW side. What does that buy you? Ontological complexity combined with theoretical complexity. > >> >> >> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is > >> >> >> ontologically primary. > > >> >> > That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to > >> >> > argue for it. > > >> >> I do not assume them. > > >> > Then you need some other way of getting your multiple instantiations. > > >> Well I believe (note the word) that we (the mind) are a computation > >> and as such I believe in strong AI, such that we will do conscious > >> digital entities... Either these entities will be truly conscious (and > >> it is possible for them to be conscious as we have assume that > >> consciousness is a computational process) or they won't, if they won't > >> and never will be conscious, it is only possible if contrary to the > >> assumption, consciousness is not (only) a computational process. Now > >> if consciousness is a computational process and we build an AI (I > >> don't see how we couldn't if consciousness is a computation, what > >> could prevent it ?) then here you are with multiple implementations. > > > And if we don't build an AI, here you are without them. (And with > > computationalism still true, and without any subjective > > indeterminacy). > > If it is a computation explain why we wouldn't with logical > argument... if the world is not destroyed tomorrow and consciousness > is a computational process then we'll build AI There is no reason to build and AI duplicate of everybody, and there is no reason to single out me. So this is another appeal to coincidence. >you must suppose > either > 1) the end of the world before we do it > 2) or the never ever AI for unknown reason even if it is possible > because the mind is a computational process > 3) or the mind is not a computational process (or in part but > dependant on a non computational/non emulable process like an oracle > or your substance for example).. Or 4) We build an AI and it isn;t me. Why shoudl it be? The odds are billions to one. > >> Either you say that even if consciousness is a computation we will > >> never and ever be able to replicate this phenomena (creates a digital > >> consciousness) and you have to explain why or you should accept 1st > >> person indeterminacy... > > > I don't have to do any of those things. I just have to point out that > > it isn't particularly likely. I could be living in a fantastically > > elaborate > > Truman-style replica of a *physical* environment..but why should I > > believe > > that? > > I do
Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)
2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: >> >> > Then you had better say what the problem is. >> >> >> Why one ? >> >> > The universe is all there is. How could you have more than one all- >> > there-is? >> >> Well you're playing with the word here. It's hand waving. > > I am not saying there is one universe. I am saying there is as many > as are needed to explain the evidence, and no more. You're not saying anything nor asserting something. >> >>why not two ? if one why stay one ? There is a single >> >> universe and a precise one and *only this one* and we are actually in >> >> it, wow lucky. >> >> > Not at all. If there is one, we must be in it, there is nowhere else >> > to be. >> > "Luck"--anthropic claims---features much more in MW thinking. >> >> Well sure we must be in a universe, as we must be part of the >> everything because we are (well I'm sure for me...) > > And if there is one universe, we must be in it. Nothing could > be less coincidental. Sure, why one then ? >> >> > it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does not >> >> > fit the evidence because of the WR problem. >> >> >> Yes but I see 'real switch' problem as equally problematic in front of >> >> the WR problem. >> >> > I don't see that. You need to explain. Single-worlders can "switch >> > off" WR's. >> >> Yes by saying it's a no problem... I can say MW can "switch off" WR as >> easily. But we just make a step back and forth. > > That is no explanation. Single worlders -- and physical many > worlders-- > get rid of WR universes by saying they do no exist at all. > > Now: don't tell me *that* mathematical may worlders can do > the same, tell me how. > By saying they exists but you're not in the class of observer capable of experiencing them (or experiencing them for a long stable period of time...), and as a RSSA proponents, next states probabilities are relative to current state... I could also say that you experience only one world/history (from your point of view of course) then speaking why you're not in these particular WR universes/histories is because you're not (it sounds like your 'do not exist at all' no ? :) >> >> >> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is >> >> >> ontologically primary. >> >> >> > That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to >> >> > argue for it. >> >> >> I do not assume them. >> >> > Then you need some other way of getting your multiple instantiations. >> >> Well I believe (note the word) that we (the mind) are a computation >> and as such I believe in strong AI, such that we will do conscious >> digital entities... Either these entities will be truly conscious (and >> it is possible for them to be conscious as we have assume that >> consciousness is a computational process) or they won't, if they won't >> and never will be conscious, it is only possible if contrary to the >> assumption, consciousness is not (only) a computational process. Now >> if consciousness is a computational process and we build an AI (I >> don't see how we couldn't if consciousness is a computation, what >> could prevent it ?) then here you are with multiple implementations. > > And if we don't build an AI, here you are without them. (And with > computationalism still true, and without any subjective > indeterminacy). If it is a computation explain why we wouldn't with logical argument... if the world is not destroyed tomorrow and consciousness is a computational process then we'll build AI... you must suppose either 1) the end of the world before we do it 2) or the never ever AI for unknown reason even if it is possible because the mind is a computational process 3) or the mind is not a computational process (or in part but dependant on a non computational/non emulable process like an oracle or your substance for example).. >> Either you say that even if consciousness is a computation we will >> never and ever be able to replicate this phenomena (creates a digital >> consciousness) and you have to explain why or you should accept 1st >> person indeterminacy... > > I don't have to do any of those things. I just have to point out that > it isn't particularly likely. I could be living in a fantastically > elaborate > Truman-style replica of a *physical* environment..but why should I > believe > that? I do not believe in that, you talk of multiverse like if it was something built for deceiving us... that's nonsense paranoia :) > There are many sceptical hypotheses; they are all equally > likely, ie "not certainly false". Rationally they should be treated > equally, > and, since they cannot be equally true, they must be treated as > equally implausible.. Yes and many is more rationally simpler than unicity. Regards, Quentin Anciaux -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group,
Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)
On 13 Aug, 18:58, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > > > > > > On 13 Aug, 00:03, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> Hi, > > >> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > >> > Yes, but One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does > >> > not claim or pretend or wish to have 0 axioms. I aims for an > >> > ontologically > >> > parsimonious explanation that matches the evidence. > > >> Yes so ball at the centre... these axioms are equally valable... > >> except that the finite number of universes hypothesis has to explain > >> why that number (be it 1 or 42). > > > It doesn't have to explain it on the basis of apriori axioms. Standard > > cosmology accepts > > that many features fo the universe stem from contingent, essentially > > unaccountable boundary conditions. > > >> Could you explain more precisely what is parsimonious for you ? > > > The non-existence of unobserved entities. > > Plenty of thing are "unobserved", have you ever seen an electron ? We can posit unobserved things to do explain what is observed. But that is not analogous to MMW, since the extra universes in MMW should be observed, but aren't. > >> > One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does > >> > not claim or pretend or wish to have 0 axioms. > > >> Well so ? > > > So the 0 axiom rule may be impossible to fulfill. Which would make > > other methodological approaches preferable. > > >> >>Besides I find very > >> >> problematic the unicity. > > >> > Then you had better say what the problem is. > > >> Why one ? > > > The universe is all there is. How could you have more than one all- > > there-is? > > Well you're playing with the word here. It's hand waving. I am not saying there is one universe. I am saying there is as many as are needed to explain the evidence, and no more. > >>why not two ? if one why stay one ? There is a single > >> universe and a precise one and *only this one* and we are actually in > >> it, wow lucky. > > > Not at all. If there is one, we must be in it, there is nowhere else > > to be. > > "Luck"--anthropic claims---features much more in MW thinking. > > Well sure we must be in a universe, as we must be part of the > everything because we are (well I'm sure for me...) And if there is one universe, we must be in it. Nothing could be less coincidental. > >> > it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does not > >> > fit the evidence because of the WR problem. > > >> Yes but I see 'real switch' problem as equally problematic in front of > >> the WR problem. > > > I don't see that. You need to explain. Single-worlders can "switch > > off" WR's. > > Yes by saying it's a no problem... I can say MW can "switch off" WR as > easily. But we just make a step back and forth. That is no explanation. Single worlders -- and physical many worlders-- get rid of WR universes by saying they do no exist at all. Now: don't tell me *that* mathematical may worlders can do the same, tell me how. > >> >> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is > >> >> ontologically primary. > > >> > That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to > >> > argue for it. > > >> I do not assume them. > > > Then you need some other way of getting your multiple instantiations. > > Well I believe (note the word) that we (the mind) are a computation > and as such I believe in strong AI, such that we will do conscious > digital entities... Either these entities will be truly conscious (and > it is possible for them to be conscious as we have assume that > consciousness is a computational process) or they won't, if they won't > and never will be conscious, it is only possible if contrary to the > assumption, consciousness is not (only) a computational process. Now > if consciousness is a computational process and we build an AI (I > don't see how we couldn't if consciousness is a computation, what > could prevent it ?) then here you are with multiple implementations. And if we don't build an AI, here you are without them. (And with computationalism still true, and without any subjective indeterminacy). > Either you say that even if consciousness is a computation we will > never and ever be able to replicate this phenomena (creates a digital > consciousness) and you have to explain why or you should accept 1st > person indeterminacy... I don't have to do any of those things. I just have to point out that it isn't particularly likely. I could be living in a fantastically elaborate Truman-style replica of a *physical* environment..but why should I believe that? There are many sceptical hypotheses; they are all equally likely, ie "not certainly false". Rationally they should be treated equally, and, since they cannot be equally true, they must be treated as equally implausible.. > Regards, > Quentin Anciaux > > -- > All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~--
Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)
2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > > > On 13 Aug, 00:03, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> Hi, >> >> 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > >> > Yes, but One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does >> > not claim or pretend or wish to have 0 axioms. I aims for an >> > ontologically >> > parsimonious explanation that matches the evidence. >> >> Yes so ball at the centre... these axioms are equally valable... >> except that the finite number of universes hypothesis has to explain >> why that number (be it 1 or 42). > > It doesn't have to explain it on the basis of apriori axioms. Standard > cosmology accepts > that many features fo the universe stem from contingent, essentially > unaccountable boundary conditions. > >> Could you explain more precisely what is parsimonious for you ? > > The non-existence of unobserved entities. Plenty of thing are "unobserved", have you ever seen an electron ? > >> > One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does >> > not claim or pretend or wish to have 0 axioms. >> >> Well so ? > > So the 0 axiom rule may be impossible to fulfill. Which would make > other methodological approaches preferable. > >> >>Besides I find very >> >> problematic the unicity. >> >> > Then you had better say what the problem is. >> >> Why one ? > > The universe is all there is. How could you have more than one all- > there-is? Well you're playing with the word here. It's hand waving. >>why not two ? if one why stay one ? There is a single >> universe and a precise one and *only this one* and we are actually in >> it, wow lucky. > > Not at all. If there is one, we must be in it, there is nowhere else > to be. > "Luck"--anthropic claims---features much more in MW thinking. > Well sure we must be in a universe, as we must be part of the everything because we are (well I'm sure for me...) >> > it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does not >> > fit the evidence because of the WR problem. >> >> Yes but I see 'real switch' problem as equally problematic in front of >> the WR problem. > > I don't see that. You need to explain. Single-worlders can "switch > off" WR's. Yes by saying it's a no problem... I can say MW can "switch off" WR as easily. But we just make a step back and forth. >> > The computation needs some sort of substrate. >> >> *Any* substrate that can be use for doing a computation. Is a program >> running in a simulated processor can know that the substrate (imagine >> it has sensor to give information about it) is simulated if the >> simulated processor gives out exactly what it should ? no... so the >> substrate is nothing. > > "There is no substrate" doesn't follow from "the substrate is > unknown". The substrate is not part of the computation, it has never and never will. >> >> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is >> >> ontologically primary. >> >> > That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to >> > argue for it. >> >> I do not assume them. > > Then you need some other way of getting your multiple instantiations. > Well I believe (note the word) that we (the mind) are a computation and as such I believe in strong AI, such that we will do conscious digital entities... Either these entities will be truly conscious (and it is possible for them to be conscious as we have assume that consciousness is a computational process) or they won't, if they won't and never will be conscious, it is only possible if contrary to the assumption, consciousness is not (only) a computational process. Now if consciousness is a computational process and we build an AI (I don't see how we couldn't if consciousness is a computation, what could prevent it ?) then here you are with multiple implementations. Either you say that even if consciousness is a computation we will never and ever be able to replicate this phenomena (creates a digital consciousness) and you have to explain why or you should accept 1st person indeterminacy... Regards, Quentin Anciaux -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Simplicity, the infinite and the everything (42x)
On 13 Aug, 00:03, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Hi, > > 2008/8/13 1Z <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > Yes, but One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does > > not claim or pretend or wish to have 0 axioms. I aims for an > > ontologically > > parsimonious explanation that matches the evidence. > > Yes so ball at the centre... these axioms are equally valable... > except that the finite number of universes hypothesis has to explain > why that number (be it 1 or 42). It doesn't have to explain it on the basis of apriori axioms. Standard cosmology accepts that many features fo the universe stem from contingent, essentially unaccountable boundary conditions. > Could you explain more precisely what is parsimonious for you ? The non-existence of unobserved entities. > > One Universe (or at least, non-MMW) methodology does > > not claim or pretend or wish to have 0 axioms. > > Well so ? So the 0 axiom rule may be impossible to fulfill. Which would make other methodological approaches preferable. > >>Besides I find very > >> problematic the unicity. > > > Then you had better say what the problem is. > > Why one ? The universe is all there is. How could you have more than one all- there-is? >why not two ? if one why stay one ? There is a single > universe and a precise one and *only this one* and we are actually in > it, wow lucky. Not at all. If there is one, we must be in it, there is nowhere else to be. "Luck"--anthropic claims---features much more in MW thinking. > > it is not simpler on the "entity" version of O's R, and it does not > > fit the evidence because of the WR problem. > > Yes but I see 'real switch' problem as equally problematic in front of > the WR problem. I don't see that. You need to explain. Single-worlders can "switch off" WR's. > > The computation needs some sort of substrate. > > *Any* substrate that can be use for doing a computation. Is a program > running in a simulated processor can know that the substrate (imagine > it has sensor to give information about it) is simulated if the > simulated processor gives out exactly what it should ? no... so the > substrate is nothing. "There is no substrate" doesn't follow from "the substrate is unknown". > >> No you devise this in 2 parts, I think only the abstract world is > >> ontologically primary. > > > That is your conclusions. You cannot assume it in order to > > argue for it. > > I do not assume them. Then you need some other way of getting your multiple instantiations. > > DuplicABLE is not enough. I might be dreamABLE by the butterfly as > > well. If I am not duplicATED there is no indeterminacy. If there > > is no serious evidence of duplication, there is no serious problem > > of indeterminacy -- it is just speculation like the butterfly story. > > If mind is a computation it's a fact that conscious computation will > be run. Why ? Says who? >If mind is not a computation on the other hand well yes mind > wouldn't be duplicable so asking for potential duplicability in these > conditions is meaningless. > > All sorts of things are possible that I don't worry about. Why should > > I? > > The question is about mind is or is not a computation and what it > entails. You are saying mind is a computation but are rejecting > multiple runs on the ground that there won't be any ever. I am not claiming to be certain that there won't be. I am saying there is no particular evidence three will be. >.. Either you > should dismiss the mind computation hypothesis or dismiss your > susbtance real switch theory, they're not compatible. They are in the absence of Multiple Instantiation and its equivalents , such as Platonism. > >>The only way > >> to be sure not to be rerun is that the mind is not a computation... It > >> can't be a computation and not imply 1st person indeterminacy. > > > You're doing it again...putting forward "you can't be sure of not-X" > > as if it means "you can be sure of X". > > No I can be sure that if mind is a computation it is a computation in > pure term and thus totally independent of the substrate. Buys you nothing without actual multiple instantiations. > > The universe we see is nowhere near as big as the Tegmark-Marechal > > Platonia. > > Therefore you cannot possibly lever Mathematical Many Worlds out > > of Physical Many Worlds. > > nowhere as big... you've seen the entire universe or only what's in > your light cone ? The fact that physics picks out a small subset of mathematics as applicable tells me that the universe we see is nowhere near as big as the Tegmark-Marechal Platonia. > >> Yes, but that's not the point, the point is assuming turing > >> emulability of the mind/the mind is a computation hypothesis implies > >> 1st person indeterminacy and hence many worlds/dreams. > > > > False. The TE alone does not imply indeterminacy. To obtain actual > > indeterminacy, > > you need to get actual -- not just theoretical--implementations from > > somewhere. You need
Re: Intelligence, Aesthetics and Bayesianism: Game over!
Hi Tom, > > Nice. I see beauty in the Mandelbrot set. However, there seems to be > a lot of deja vu, similar repetition on a theme. Right. But full of subtle variations. It is all normal to have a lot of deja vu when you make a journey across a multiverse ... > I have never been > able to find anything resembling a beautiful girl, You are not looking close enough, and also, the zoom movie remains a pure third person description. Consciousness is more related to a internal flux or to some stroboscopic inside views in the Mandelbrot Set (assuming the conjecture). It is a bit like looking to a picture of a galaxy. You will not see beautiful girls, unless you look close enough, and from the right perspective. > or even a mother-in- > law, or a white rabbit. This seems to go against your conjecture. (remember also that "not seeing something" is not an argument of not-existence, like seeing something is not an argument for existence). If you want to see a white rabbit (*the* white rabbit), the best consists in looking at http://fr.youtube.com/watch?v=Z5XfQWKgf4M&feature=related As for the mother-in-law, I am not sure about your motivations ... (Holiday jokes :) Bruno > > Tom > > On Aug 12, 8:30 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> On 09 Aug 2008, at 09:44, Tom Caylor wrote: >> >>> I believe that nature is not primarily functional. It is primarily >>> beautiful. >>> And this from a theist? Yes! This is actually to the core point of >>> why I am a theist. I don't blame people for not believing in God if >>> they think God is about functionality. >> >> If you remember my conjecture that the Mandelbrot Set, (well, its >> complement in the complex plane), is Turing complete (that is >> equivalent in some sense to a universal dovetailing), then zooming in >> >> it gives a picture of the arithmetical multiverse or of the universal >> >> deployment. And I do find most of them wonderfully beautiful. Here is >> >> my favorite on youtube: >> >> http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G0nmVUU_7IQ >> >> Is that not wonderful? Awesome ? >> >> Bruno >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
