Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On Nov 11, 2008, at 9:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The problem with Dennett is that he takes physical reality for granted. I agree. But from his perspective, the burden is on us to explain why we can't take physical reality for granted. I've never seen the arguments laid out quite clearly enough for my tastes. (And I'll admit, I've been too lazy to try it myself.) -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia
On 11 Nov 2008, at 20:10, Brent Meeker wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: On 10 Nov 2008, at 17:34, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: PS I think I see the point that you are still missing. I will have to explain that whatever the physical universe is, in the case I am Turing emulable, the physical universe is NOT turing emulable. Bruno, this was the item I was asking (or at least had meant to ask) you about several days ago. But it was phrased differently, something like If I am the universe and the universe is not turning emulable then comp is false Here you are saying the universe is not turning emulable, so if comp is true that implies I != universe. I look forward to your explanation of why the universe is not Turing emulable. BTW: Does this apply to just the Everett Universe, or are there other conceivable universes which are emulable in addition to the observers they might contain? Hmmm... Normally, once you grasp all the steps up to 8, or grasp UDA(1...7) and accept provisorily #8 for the sake of the argument, you should worry if the notion of universe still make sense at all. How can you be sure all the computation going through your current state glues into a coherent physical reality? If you grasp 1...8 or 1...7, you should understand it is up to you to justify why a universe makes sense, or exists at all, and in case it makes sense, why should it be computable. If it was shown to be computable, it would mean the white rabbits have been evacuated already. If you agree that comp entails white rabbits, you already know that the comp physics is non computable. We cannot evacuate any of those white rabbits, they are there in arithmetic. We can only hope (if we want keep mechanism and the appearance of naturalism) that there is an explanation why the white rabbits are *relatively* rare. And I am not assuming Everett in any way, nor even QM. On the contrary, what I try to explain, is that, IF you take seriously the Mechanist Hypothesis into account, THEN you can no more assume the existence of a physical universe. If you still believe in lawful ways to predict and anticipate our neighborhoods' behaviors, you have to extract an explanation of those predictions from a theory of (gluing) computations. IF QM is true (which I tend to believe), then you have to justify QM entirely from computations or numbers. Including the geometrical and topological background. The role of QM and especially through Everett's formulation of QM, is that QM is a witness that the empirical observations already confirm some of the most startling prediction of comp, like the indirect many evidences for the many histories, and (with AUDA) the quantum logical behavior of the certain propositions. The universal dovetailer does dovevtail on the quantum Universal solutions of the SWE, and thanks to Feynman (and Everett, Deutsch) we know how those Universal Quantum solutions do evacuate the *quantum white rabbits*. Unfortunately, I don't think we do know that, c.f. the paper by Dowker and Kent on Griffith's Consistent Histories interpretation. http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/gr-qc/pdf/9412/9412067v2.pdf Brent If Dowker and Kent were right, in that pdf, it would mean QM itself is already in contradiction with the aristotelian conception of the physical universe. I would not have dared to a such incredible confirmation of comp. But I am not convince by Dowker and Brent critics, except on some point about Omnès. In my opinion Everett + Gleason + Feynman already solve the quantum white rabbit problem, and so beautifully, that I always take this is as an evidence that the comp physics will be mainly QM. Again, if Dowker and Kent were correct, and if they were not using the conscience/matter identity principle at the start, their argument would lead that comp has to give rise to a correction of QM, or abandonned. But I doubt it, and I don't think many have accepted Kent reasoning. See Wallace papers for a more correct analysis, imo. IF even QM has still white rabbits, this is a case in favor of comp, where the white rabbits cannot be hunted away even by postulating any theory. They have to be hunted away from pure computer science, in a purely internal way. That pure QM does not solve all problems, in particular the mind-body problem, should be obvious. All my point is that Everett needs comp, and he does not take comp seriously enough. Indeed, if comp is true, and if QM is true, QM has to be justified from comp without postulating a universe. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this
Re: QTI euthanasia
On 11 Nov 2008, at 22:44, Jason Resch wrote: On Tue, Nov 11, 2008 at 12:23 PM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 10 Nov 2008, at 17:34, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Nov 10, 2008 at 5:39 AM, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: PS I think I see the point that you are still missing. I will have to explain that whatever the physical universe is, in the case I am Turing emulable, the physical universe is NOT turing emulable. Bruno, this was the item I was asking (or at least had meant to ask) you about several days ago. But it was phrased differently, something like If I am the universe and the universe is not turning emulable then comp is false Here you are saying the universe is not turning emulable, so if comp is true that implies I != universe. I look forward to your explanation of why the universe is not Turing emulable. BTW: Does this apply to just the Everett Universe, or are there other conceivable universes which are emulable in addition to the observers they might contain? Hmmm... Normally, once you grasp all the steps up to 8, or grasp UDA(1...7) and accept provisorily #8 for the sake of the argument, you should worry if the notion of universe still make sense at all. How can you be sure all the computation going through your current state glues into a coherent physical reality? If you grasp 1...8 or 1...7, you should understand it is up to you to justify why a universe makes sense, or exists at all, and in case it makes sense, why should it be computable. If it was shown to be computable, it would mean the white rabbits have been evacuated already. I don't consider myself or any observer glued to any single reality, yet I still believe coherent realities exist. See below. How does the computability of the universe relate to the evacuation of white rabbits? In the sense that if the white rabbits are computable, then it is hard to see why to call them white rabbits at all. In the worst case they will be called complex unknown, like the shape of the clouds, or far away galaxies ... If you agree that comp entails white rabbits, you already know that the comp physics is non computable. We cannot evacuate any of those white rabbits, they are there in arithmetic. We can only hope (if we want keep mechanism and the appearance of naturalism) that there is an explanation why the white rabbits are *relatively* rare. And I am not assuming Everett in any way, nor even QM. On the contrary, what I try to explain, is that, IF you take seriously the Mechanist Hypothesis into account, THEN you can no more assume the existence of a physical universe. If you still believe in lawful ways to predict and anticipate our neighborhoods' behaviors, you have to extract an explanation of those predictions from a theory of (gluing) computations. IF QM is true (which I tend to believe), then you have to justify QM entirely from computations or numbers. Including the geometrical and topological background. The role of QM and especially through Everett's formulation of QM, is that QM is a witness that the empirical observations already confirm some of the most startling prediction of comp, like the indirect many evidences for the many histories, and (with AUDA) the quantum logical behavior of the certain propositions. The universal dovetailer does dovevtail on the quantum Universal solutions of the SWE, and thanks to Feynman (and Everett, Deutsch) we know how those Universal Quantum solutions do evacuate the *quantum white rabbits*. But if we assume mechanism, we can no more postulate the SWE, we have to extract it from all computations, meaning evacuate vaster sets of white rabbits. We cannot, by 1- inedtermincay in front of the UD, localize ourselves in any computational histories, we belong to all of them, and nothing a priori indicates that the result is a computable things. I think we are in general agreement regarding the idea that a first person experience belongs to many (perhaps infinite) computational histories. First person experience belongs to many (necessarily infinite) computational histories (from UDA), but OK. I think the confusion may have come down to language, in particular how we defined universe. I see now you take universe to mean the perceived environment that appears as a first person experience to observers. I also see how this collection of possible histories can be incomputable/unknowable. Whereas, I was defining universe to mean a single consistent computational/mathematical history which may implement computations that form first person experiences. Hmmm... Such a universe cannot exist, unless you are willing to call the Universal Deployment itself a universe. Then OK, and the universe is a tiny part Arithmetical Truth. A computation is enough to have a consciousness, once
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
I think the most compelling arguments against a fundamental physical reality go along the lines of starting with one, and showing you can abstract away from it until it becomes just another arbitrary perspective. -- - Did you ever hear of The Seattle Seven? - Mmm. - That was me... and six other guys. 2008/11/12 Kory Heath [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Nov 11, 2008, at 9:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The problem with Dennett is that he takes physical reality for granted. I agree. But from his perspective, the burden is on us to explain why we can't take physical reality for granted. I've never seen the arguments laid out quite clearly enough for my tastes. (And I'll admit, I've been too lazy to try it myself.) -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Plotinus' hypostases
On 11 Nov 2008, at 21:14, Tom Caylor wrote: Bruno, Thanks. I must say, there are all kinds of interesting parallels between the Plotinus' three gods and the Christian Trinity which is three persons in one God, the parallel's being noted by Augustine. Specifically 1) Plotinus' One and God the Father, being the source of Everything, all truth; 2) Plotinus' Intellect, logos, and God the Son, also called logos, spanning the gap between the divine and the terrestial (i.e. your modal logics G* and G); and 3) Plotinus' All Soul and God the Holy Spirit, the source of creativity,... OK. Note that it is only through the second and third ones that any person can exist and can know God. Absolutely so. Plato and Plotinus would have agree, I think. More controversial, the Trinity needs all three persons in order to fully be who God really is, because God is love, which requires more than one person: two persons and a way for the two persons to relate (the third one). Hmmm That is a bit ambiguous, but I can interpret it favorably. I must say that I have some problem with Plotinus ethics. But I don't want to tal about it now, and perhaps compare some more translations ... There is also a parallel between Plotinus' fall and the Fall in the Bible. I do agree with this. Christians, Muslims and Jewish have been deeply influenced by Plotinus (and by the greek theology). But their official stands have follow Aristotle theology and his quasi-implicit bet on a primary physical universe. Note that the Christian, Muslims and Jews have conserved Neo-platonist school of thought. It is a fashion today to compare them to eastern religion, and most of the mystics share similar beliefs. Regarding your work, I am particularly focused on the third hypostase. I have read your SANE 2004 paper and your Plotinus paper. I have gone through part of Cutland's book Computability: An Introduction to Recursive Function Theory and convinced myself of the validity of the UDA Step 7 except for the 1st vs. 3rd person distinction. In particular, I am most interested in Step 6 and your later section Arithmetical Theaetetus of your SANE 2004 paper. (I have read Plato's Theaetetus.) This seems to depend on the third hypostase, the All Soul. I still have to contemplate just what my question is, but something just doesn't sit right with me as being a valid argument. I think that there is some additional hidden assumption being made here. I feel it is probably an assumption that would not be acceptable to the scientific community, which by the way doesn't make it false. I'll have to think about this more, or maybe it can be brought to light through conversation. Tell me when you find the question, or the hidden assumption :) Best, Bruno Tom On Nov 9, 9:08 am, Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: On 07 Nov 2008, at 18:53, Tom Caylor wrote: Anna, OK, I understand. Thomas, as another reference point for study, what I refer to as the point of view from the Plenitude, or Plotinus' One, has frequently been referred to as the God's eye point of view. (I didn't bring that up at first because I believe in a God who is different from the Plenitude or Plotinus' One, both of which are impersonal. By the way, the personal God is the only one in whom a person can possibly believe, but that could be another topic.) Tom Tom, Don't forget that for the Greek Theologians (and not just for them), there are three Gods. The ONE is impersonal. Sure. The second one, the INTELLECT is personal, although most mathematician and scientist does not completely realize this, and in math this can be seen as a consequence of incompleteness, as should be transparently clear if we assume mechanism (cf my plotinus paper). With mechanism, the intellect also splits in two parts (effective and terrestrial on one part (G) and ineffective and divine on the the other part (G*). In science, this can be seen a consequence of the fact that we cannot easily get rid of the presence of the observer (cf Galilee, Einstein, Everett ...) But then you have the third one. The third god of Plotinus, the UNIVERSAL SOUL, is the one compared with the eastern God and with the experience of mystics. And it is the one described by S4Grz and intuitionist logics (for those who reminds older posts 'course). This one is a person, it is even the roots of all possible first person knowledge. It is a creative subject, the maker and destroyer of realities, the creator of time an eventually space (with the help of the numbers). It is the one which already in Plotinus has a foot in the material world, a foot in the non computational structures emerging from the collection of all computational consistent extensions. It is the one which can (and will) fall and forget its roots and then come back (as Plotinus hopes for). (and then when the soul falls, both the intellect and
Re: Re: Re: Re:
Well - maybe. I am rather interested in humour, though. It's rarely studied. For me, the funniest part about this thread is that it doesn't yet have a subject line... Maybe keep it that way! Why not discuss humour? Is it not the grease of civilisation as de Bono says? What makes the following such a funny, though still quite a serious joke: A priest, a lawyer and a theoretical physicist were about to face the guillotine. The priest was spared by a miracle and the lawyer by justice. The physicist's last words were that he knew little about God and the law, but that he holds one thing as absolute truth. If you look up you'll see the rope is stuck on the gallows. Quite profound really - but I bet it made you smile! (I think someone on this list used it as their cyber signature ages ago...) regards, Kim On 11/11/2008, at 11:25 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Now we have fun and you already want make it serious? I guess you are joking! B. On 11 Nov 2008, at 01:50, Kim Jones wrote: Yes - humour is according to thinking guru Edward de Bono The most significant activity of the human mind. If anyone is interested in why, we could start a thread over that. It relates, of course, to all the stuff on the mind and consciousness. Humour is occasionally deployed on this list as simple sarcasm. There are more evolved ways of using it cheers Kim Jones On 11/11/2008, at 11:42 AM, Quentin Anciaux wrote: first laugh on this list :) or maybe on this list and this universe only /o\ 2008/11/11 Michael Rosefield [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Look at it this way, you probably did unsubscribe. Just not in this universe. Sorry. -- - Did you ever hear of The Seattle Seven? - Mmm. - That was me... and six other guys. 2008/11/10 Joao Leao [EMAIL PROTECTED] unsubscribe -- All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On 12 Nov 2008, at 12:11, Kory Heath wrote: On Nov 11, 2008, at 9:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: The problem with Dennett is that he takes physical reality for granted. I agree. But from his perspective, the burden is on us to explain why we can't take physical reality for granted. First, I have never stop to work on that and try to share the argument with people interested in the matter. Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to tell us what he means by a physical universe. This is what I try to clarify too. I've never seen the arguments laid out quite clearly enough for my tastes. It is not a question of taste. It is a question of acknowledging use of logic and assumptions, and finding either hidden assumptions, or imprecise statements or invalid argument step(s). (And I'll admit, I've been too lazy to try it myself.) Which gives you perhaps a bit of time to study other's proposal. Of course if it is just a question of taste, I can' help you. Kory, I give you on plate a complete detailed, obviously a bit long and not so simple, argument which shows, or is supposed to show, that if mechanism is true there is no primary material universe, and you ask for a more tasty argument? I give you the blue pill, and you ask for ... what, marmelade, chocolate? (Sorry Kim Jones, I fall into simple sarcasm (again)) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Mathematical methods for the discrete space-time.
When you are going to do exact mathematical computations for the discrete space-time, then the continuous mathematics is not enough, because then you will only get an approximation of the reality. So there is a need for developing a special calculus for a discrete mathematics. One difference between continuous and discrete mathematics is the rule for how to derívate the product of two functions. In continuous mathematics the rule says: D(f*g) = f*D(g) + D(f)*g. But in the discrete mathematics the corresponding rule says: D(f*g) = f*D(g) + D(f)*g + D(f)*D(g). In discrete mathematics you have difference equations of type: x(n+2) = x(n+1) + x(1), x(0) = 0, x(1) = 1, which then will give the number sequence 0,1,1,2,3,5,8,13,21,34,55,... etc. For a general difference equation you have: Sum(a(i)*x(n+i)) = 0, plus a number of starting conditions. If you then introduce the step operator S with the effect: S(x(n)) = x(n+1), then you can express the difference equation as: Sum((a(i)*S^i)(x(n)) = 0. You will then get a polynom in S. If the roots (the eigenvalues) to this polynom are e(i), you will then get: Sum(a(i)*S^i) = Prod(S - e(i)) = 0. This will give you the equations S - e(i) = 0, or more complete: (S - e(i))(x(n)) = S(x(n)) - e(i)*x(n) = x(n+1) - e(i)*x(n) = 0, which have the solutions x(n) = x(0)*e(i)^n. The general solution to this difference equation will then be a linear combination of these solutions, such as: x(n) = Sum(k(i)*e(i)^n), where k(i) are arbitrary constants. To get the integer solutions you can then build the eigenfunctions: x(j,n) = Sum(k(i,j)*e(i)^n) = delta(j,n), for n the grade of the difference equation. With the S-operator it is then very easy to define the difference- or derivation-operator D as: D = S-1, so D(x(n)) = x(n+1) - x(n). What do you think, is this a good starting point for handling the mathematics of the discrete space-time? -- Torgny Tholerus --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI euthanasia (brouillon)
On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: First, I have never stop to work on that and try to share the argument with people interested in the matter. True. You're tireless! (That's a complement.) Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to tell us what he means by a physical universe. I totally agree. But most people will just wave their arms and say, What do you mean? We're obviously in a physical universe. What's problematic about that? And then the burden is back on us to explain why the concept of physical existence is more problematic than it seems. Burden Tennis. It is not a question of taste. It is a question of acknowledging use of logic and assumptions, and finding either hidden assumptions, or imprecise statements or invalid argument step(s). I see your point. But there are issues of clarity or focus, and to some extent those are a matter of taste. I'd like to read an essay (by anyone) that lays out a clear argument in favor of the position that computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious. I believe this argument can be made without reference to Loebian machines, first-person indeterminacy, or teleportation thought- experiments. I hope you don't find my criticism too annoying. It's easy for me to sit on the sidelines and take potshots, while you've done a lot of actual work. And remember that I do, in fact, believe that computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious, so you're usually preaching to the choir with me. My point is that, I can imagine Dennett reading your posts, and saying Ok, that makes sense *if* we accept that computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious. But I still don't see why I should believe that. I guess what it comes down to is that the Movie Graph Argument on its own doesn't seem fully convincing to me. But it's quite possible that I don't fully understand that argument. (I have my own reasons for believing that computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious, and sometimes I think some of them are functionally equivalent to the MGA, but I'm not sure.) Where is the clearest statement of the MGA? -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
