Re: Mathematical methods for the discrete space-time.
I am not sure how related this is to what you ask in your original post, but as for a model (and candidate TOE) of physics which is discrete, there is a theory known as Hiem Theory ( http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Heim_Theory ) which posits there are six discrete dimensions. Interestingly, the theory is able to predict the masses of many subatomic particles entirely from some force constants, something which even the standard model is unable to explain. Jason On Thu, Nov 20, 2008 at 12:12 PM, Torgny Tholerus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Torgny Tholerus skrev: > > > > What I want to know is what result you will get if you start from the > > axiom that *everything in universe is finite*. > > > > One important function in Quantum Theory is the harmonic oscillator. So > I want to know: What is the corresponding function in discrete mathematics? > > In continuous mathematics you have the harmonic oscillator defined by > the differential equation D^2(f) + k^2*f = 0, which will have one of its > solutions as: > > f(t) = exp(i*k*t) = cos(k*t) + i*sin(k*t), where i is sqrt(-1). > > In discrete mathematics you have the corresponding oscillator defined by > the difference equation D^2(f) + k^2*f = 0, which will have one of its > solutions as: > > f(t) = (1 + i*k)^t = dcos(k*t) + i*dsin(k*t), where dcos() och dsin() > are the corresponding discrete functions of the continuous functions > cos() and sin(). > > So what is dcos() and dsin()? > > If you do Taylor expansion of the continuos function you get: > > exp(i*k*t) = Sum((i*k*t)^n/n!) = Sum((-1)^m*k^(2*m)*t^(2*m)/(2*m)!) + > i*Sum((-1)^m*k^(2*m+1)*t^(2*m+1)/(2*m+1)!) > > And if you do binominal expansion of the discrete function you get: > > (1 + i*k)^t = Sum(t!/((t-n)!*n!)*(i*k)^n) = > Sum((-1)^m*k^(2*m)*(t!/(t-2*m)!)/(2*m)!) + > i*Sum((-1)^m*k^(2*m+1)*(t!/(t-2*m-1)!)/(2*m+1)!) > > When you compare these two expession, you see a remarkable resemblance! > If you replace t^n in the upper expression with t!/(t-n)! you will then > get exactly the lower expression! > > This suggest the general rule: > > If the Taylor expansion of a continuous function f(x) is: > > f(x) = Sum(a(n)*x^n) = Sum(a(n)*Prod(n;x)), > > then the corresponding discrete funtion f(x) is: > > f(x) = Sum(a(n)*x!/(x-n)!) = Sum(a(n)*Prod(n;x-m)), > > where Prod(n;x-m) = x*(x-1)*(x-2)* ... *(x-n+2)*(x-n+1) is a finite > product. > > I have no strict proof of this general rule. But this rule is such a > beautifil result, that it simply *must* be true! > > -- > Torgny > > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 1 bis (exercise)
Kory Heath wrote: > > On Nov 20, 2008, at 3:33 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: >> Doesn't the question go away if it is nomologically impossible? > > I'm sort of the opposite of you on this issue. You don't like to use > the term "logically possible", while I don't like to use the term > "nomologically impossible". I don't see the relevance of nomological > possibility to any philosophical question I'm interested in. For > anything that's nomologically impossible, I can just imagine a > cellular automaton or some other computational or mathematical > "physics" in which that thing is nomologically possible. And then I > can just imagine physically instantiating that universe on one of our > real computers. And then all of my philosophical questions still apply. > > I can certainly imagine objections to that viewpoint. But life is > short. My point was that, since you already agreed that it's > nomologically possible for a random robot to outwardly behave like a > conscious person for some indefinite period of time, we can sidestep > the (probably interesting) discussion we might have about nomological > vs. logical possibility in this case. > >> Does a random number generator have computational functionality just >> in case it >> (accidentally) computes something? I would say it does not. But >> referring the >> concept of zombie to a capacity, rather than observed behavior, >> makes a >> difference in Bruno's question. > > I think that Dennett explicitly refers to computational capacities > when talking about consciousness (and zombies), and I follow him. But > Dennett's point is that computational capacity is always, in > principle, observed behavior - or, at least, behavior that can be > observed. In the case of Lucky Alice, if you had the right tools, you > could examine the neurons and see - based on how they were behaving! - > that they were not causally connected to each other. (The fact that a > neuron is being triggered by a cosmic ray rather than by a neighboring > neuron is an observable part of its behavior.) That observed behavior > would allow you to conclude that this brain does not have the > computational capacity to compute the answers to a math test, or to > compute the trajectory of a ball. > >> I would regard it as an empirical question about how the robots >> brain worked. >> If the brain processed perceptual and memory data to produce the >> behavior, as in >> Jason's causal relations, I would say it is conscious in some sense >> (I think >> there are different kinds of consciousness, as evidenced by Bruno's >> list of >> first-person experiences). If it were a random number generator, i.e. >> accidental behavior, I'd say not. > > I agree. But why do you say you're puzzled about how to answer Bruno's > question about Lucky Alice? I think you just answered it - for you, > Lucky Alice wouldn't be conscious. (Or do you think that Lucky Alice > is different than a robot with a random-number-generator in its head? > I don't.) I think Alice is different. She has the capacity to be conscious. This is potentially, temporarily interrupted by some mysterious failure of gates (or neurons) in her brain - but wait, these failures are serendipitously canceled out by a burst of cosmic rays, so they all get the same input/output as if nothing had happened. So, functionally, it's as if the gates didn't fail at all. This functionality is beyond external behavior; it includes forming memories, paying attention, etc. Of course we may say it is not causally related to Alice's environment, but this depends on a certain theory of causality, a physical theory. If the cosmic rays exactly replace all the gate functions to maintain the same causal chains then from an informational perspective we might say the rays were caused by the relations to her environment. Brent Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 1 bis (exercise)
On Nov 20, 2008, at 3:33 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > Doesn't the question go away if it is nomologically impossible? I'm sort of the opposite of you on this issue. You don't like to use the term "logically possible", while I don't like to use the term "nomologically impossible". I don't see the relevance of nomological possibility to any philosophical question I'm interested in. For anything that's nomologically impossible, I can just imagine a cellular automaton or some other computational or mathematical "physics" in which that thing is nomologically possible. And then I can just imagine physically instantiating that universe on one of our real computers. And then all of my philosophical questions still apply. I can certainly imagine objections to that viewpoint. But life is short. My point was that, since you already agreed that it's nomologically possible for a random robot to outwardly behave like a conscious person for some indefinite period of time, we can sidestep the (probably interesting) discussion we might have about nomological vs. logical possibility in this case. > Does a random number generator have computational functionality just > in case it > (accidentally) computes something? I would say it does not. But > referring the > concept of zombie to a capacity, rather than observed behavior, > makes a > difference in Bruno's question. I think that Dennett explicitly refers to computational capacities when talking about consciousness (and zombies), and I follow him. But Dennett's point is that computational capacity is always, in principle, observed behavior - or, at least, behavior that can be observed. In the case of Lucky Alice, if you had the right tools, you could examine the neurons and see - based on how they were behaving! - that they were not causally connected to each other. (The fact that a neuron is being triggered by a cosmic ray rather than by a neighboring neuron is an observable part of its behavior.) That observed behavior would allow you to conclude that this brain does not have the computational capacity to compute the answers to a math test, or to compute the trajectory of a ball. > I would regard it as an empirical question about how the robots > brain worked. > If the brain processed perceptual and memory data to produce the > behavior, as in > Jason's causal relations, I would say it is conscious in some sense > (I think > there are different kinds of consciousness, as evidenced by Bruno's > list of > first-person experiences). If it were a random number generator, i.e. > accidental behavior, I'd say not. I agree. But why do you say you're puzzled about how to answer Bruno's question about Lucky Alice? I think you just answered it - for you, Lucky Alice wouldn't be conscious. (Or do you think that Lucky Alice is different than a robot with a random-number-generator in its head? I don't.) -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Confirmed: Reality is the dream of NUMBERS
http://www.newscientist.com/article/dn16095-its-confirmed-matter-is-merely-vacuum-fluctuations.html What's your definition of "reality"? It is whatever it is. It should be the roots of our knowledge and beliefs. It is what makes us bet on the physical realities, on the psychological realities, on the arithmetical realities and many other related realities, ...(Bruno Marchal) Email: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [EMAIL PROTECTED] Web: http://web.mac.com/kmjcommp/Plenitude_Music Phone: (612) 9389 4239 or 0431 723 001 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 1 bis (exercise)
Kory Heath wrote: > > On Nov 20, 2008, at 10:38 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: >> I think you really you mean nomologically possible. > > I mean logically possible, but I'm happy to change it to > "nomologically possible" for the purposes of this conversation. Doesn't the question go away if it is nomologically impossible? > >> I think Dennett changes the question by referring to >> neurophysiological "actions". Does he suppose wetware can't be >> replaced by >> hardware? > > No, he definitely argues that wetware can replaced by hardware, as > long as the hardware retains the computational functionality of the > wetware. But that's the catch. Computational functionality is a capacity, not a fact. Does a random number generator have computational functionality just in case it (accidentally) computes something? I would say it does not. But referring the concept of zombie to a capacity, rather than observed behavior, makes a difference in Bruno's question. > >> In general when I'm asked if I believe in philosophical zombies, I >> say no, >> because I'm thinking that the zombie must outwardly behave like a >> conscious >> person in all circumstances over an indefinite period of time, yet >> have no inner >> experience. I rule out an accidental zombie accomplishing this as >> to improbable >> - not impossible. > > I agree. But if you accept that it's nomologically possible for a > robot with a random-number-generator in its head to outwardly behave > like a conscious person in all circumstances over an indefinite period > of time, then your theory of consciousness, one way or another, has to > answer the question of whether or not this unlikely robot is > conscious. Now, maybe your answer is "The question is misguided in > that case, and here's why..." But that's a significant burden. I would regard it as an empirical question about how the robots brain worked. If the brain processed perceptual and memory data to produce the behavior, as in Jason's causal relations, I would say it is conscious in some sense (I think there are different kinds of consciousness, as evidenced by Bruno's list of first-person experiences). If it were a random number generator, i.e. accidental behavior, I'd say not. Observing the robot for some period of time, in some circumstances can provide strong evidence against the "accidental" hypothesis, but it cannot rule it out completely. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 1 bis (exercise)
On Nov 20, 2008, at 10:38 AM, Brent Meeker wrote: > I think you really you mean nomologically possible. I mean logically possible, but I'm happy to change it to "nomologically possible" for the purposes of this conversation. > I think Dennett changes the question by referring to > neurophysiological "actions". Does he suppose wetware can't be > replaced by > hardware? No, he definitely argues that wetware can replaced by hardware, as long as the hardware retains the computational functionality of the wetware. > In general when I'm asked if I believe in philosophical zombies, I > say no, > because I'm thinking that the zombie must outwardly behave like a > conscious > person in all circumstances over an indefinite period of time, yet > have no inner > experience. I rule out an accidental zombie accomplishing this as > to improbable > - not impossible. I agree. But if you accept that it's nomologically possible for a robot with a random-number-generator in its head to outwardly behave like a conscious person in all circumstances over an indefinite period of time, then your theory of consciousness, one way or another, has to answer the question of whether or not this unlikely robot is conscious. Now, maybe your answer is "The question is misguided in that case, and here's why..." But that's a significant burden. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 1
Bruno: I think you and John touched the fundamental issues of human rational. It's a dilemma encountered by phenomenology. Now I have a question: In theory we can't distinguish ourselves from a Lobian Machine. But can lobian machines truly have sufficient rich experiences like human? For example, is it possible for a lobian machine to "still its mind' or "cease the computational logic" like some eastern philosophy suggested? Maybe any of the out-of-loop experience is still part of the computation/logic, just as our out-of-body experiences are actually the trick of brain chemicals? Gordon --- On Thu, 11/20/08, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: MGA 1 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Thursday, November 20, 2008, 12:05 PM Hi John, > It boils down to my overall somewhat negative position (although > I have no better one) of UDA, MPG, comp, etc. - all of them are > products of HUMAN thinking and restrictions as WE can imagine > the unfathomable existence (the totality - real TOE). > I find it a 'cousin' of the reductionistic conventional sciences, just > a bit 'freed up'. Maybe a distant cousin. Meaning: it handles the > totality WITHIN the framework of our limited (human) logic(s). I think that Human logic is already a progress compared to Russian, or Belgian, or Hungarian, or American logic, or ... And then you know how much I agree with you, once you substitute "human" by "lobian" (where a lobian machine/number is a universal machine who know she is universal, and bet she is a machine). > Alas, we cannot do better. I'm afraid so. Thanks for acknowledging. > just want to take all this mental > exercise with the grain of salt of "there may be more to all of it" Sure. And if we take ourself too much seriously, we can miss the ultimate cosmic divine joke (if there is one). > > what we cannot even fancy (imagine, fantasize of) today, > with our mind anchored in our restrictions. (Including 'digital', > 'numbers', learned wisdom, etc.). Be careful and be open to your own philosophy. The idea that "digital" and "numbers" (the concept, not our human description of it) are restrictions could be due to our human prejudice. May be a machine could one day believes this is a form of unfounded prejudicial exclusion. I hope you don't mind my frank attitude, and I wish you the best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 1
On Thu, Nov 20, 2008 at 12:03 PM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > > The state machine that would represent her in the case of injection of > random noise is a different state machine that would represent her normally > functioning brain. > > > > Absolutely so. > > > Bruno, What about the state machine that included the injection of "lucky" noise from an outside source vs. one in which all information was derived internally from the operation of the state machine itself? Would those two differently defined machines not differ and compute something different? Even though the computations are identical the information that is being computed comes from different sources and so carries with it a different "connotation". Though the bits injected are identical, they inherently imply a different meaning because the state machine in the case of injection has a different structure than that of her normally operating brain. I believe the brain can be abstracted as a computer/information processing system, but it is not simply the computations and the inputs into the logic gates at each step that are important, but also the source of the input bits, otherwise the computation isn't the same. Jason --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 1
On 19 Nov 2008, at 20:37, Michael Rosefield wrote: > Are not logic gates black boxes, though? Does it really matter what > happens between Input and Output? In which case, it has absolutely > no bearing on Alice's consciousness whether the gate's a neuron, an > electronic doodah, a team of well-trained monkeys or a lucky quantum > event or synchronicity. Good summary. > It does not matter, really, where or when the actions of the gate > take place. As far as they represent, physically or materially, the relevant computation, assuming MEC+MAT. OK. MGA 2 will give one more step forward the idea that the materiality cannot play a relevant part in the computation. I will try to do MGA 2 tomorrow. (It is 21h22m23s here, I mean 9h22m31s pm :). I have to solve a conflict between two ways to make the MGA 2. If I don't succeed, I will make both. Thanks for trying to understand, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 1
Hi John, > It boils down to my overall somewhat negative position (although > I have no better one) of UDA, MPG, comp, etc. - all of them are > products of HUMAN thinking and restrictions as WE can imagine > the unfathomable existence (the totality - real TOE). > I find it a 'cousin' of the reductionistic conventional sciences, just > a bit 'freed up'. Maybe a distant cousin. Meaning: it handles the > totality WITHIN the framework of our limited (human) logic(s). I think that Human logic is already a progress compared to Russian, or Belgian, or Hungarian, or American logic, or ... And then you know how much I agree with you, once you substitute "human" by "lobian" (where a lobian machine/number is a universal machine who know she is universal, and bet she is a machine). > Alas, we cannot do better. I'm afraid so. Thanks for acknowledging. > just want to take all this mental > exercise with the grain of salt of "there may be more to all of it" Sure. And if we take ourself too much seriously, we can miss the ultimate cosmic divine joke (if there is one). > > what we cannot even fancy (imagine, fantasize of) today, > with our mind anchored in our restrictions. (Including 'digital', > 'numbers', learned wisdom, etc.). Be careful and be open to your own philosophy. The idea that "digital" and "numbers" (the concept, not our human description of it) are restrictions could be due to our human prejudice. May be a machine could one day believes this is a form of unfounded prejudicial exclusion. I hope you don't mind my frank attitude, and I wish you the best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Little exercise
Hi Kory, On 20 Nov 2008, at 10:13, Kory Heath wrote: > I should probably let this thread die so that we can concentrate on > the MGA thread. But there are a few more things I wanted to respond > to. > > On Nov 18, 2008, at 9:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> On 18 Nov 2008, at 14:14, Kory Heath wrote: >>> In the meantime, I at least want to say that I'm pretty sure you've >>> read a lot more into my term "mathematical physicalism" than I >>> intended. I use "mathematical physicalism" simply to refer to the >>> idea >>> that the materialist's picture of matter is problematic in the way >>> that the vitalists idea of the "life force" is problematic, and that >>> mathematical facts-of-the-matter unproblematically fill the role >>> that >>> this problematic "physical matter" is supposed to fill. >> >> OK. But then what's the difference with mathematicalism? > > Maybe that's the term I should be using. I thought that the term > "mathematicalism" had some other philosophical meaning, but I now see > that it only gets 29 hits on Google, and most of them are from this > list. I like the term, and am happy to commandeer it. > > However, it still seems that you and I can't agree on how to use it. > For instance, you say: > >> The fact is that I believe mathemaricalism is probably false too, but >> it could be false in the same sense that incompleteness phenomenon à- >> la- Skolem-Tarski could be used to justify that "the whole of >> mathematics" cannot be a mathematical object itself. > > What is your definition of "mathematicalism" here? Strong definition: the big "everything" is a mathematical object. (But perhaps this is asking too much. The whole of math is already not a mathematical object). So: Weak definition: every thing is mathematical, except everything! > > >> If you agree that physics has become a statistic on computations "as >> seen from inside", everything is ok. > > I do agree with this. So everything is ok. :) (except that a joke is not funny if you know it already :). > > >> Then MGA will show what you >> already believe, which is that the computations does not need to be >> implemented in our, or any other, stuffy primitive material universe. > > Ok. Can you tell me a one or two word name for the belief that > "computations do not need to be implemented in our, or any other, > stuffy primitive material universe"? Do not need for what needs? To create the feeling of consciousness? In that case I would say: "cognitive immaterialism", or something like that. > To put it another way, can we > come up with a name for the proposition that "the Movie Graph Argument > is sound"? I want to use the term "mathematicalism" to refer to this > (and only this). But above you say that you believe that > "mathematicalism" is probably false. Yet you seem to believe that the > MGA is sound, so I think you must be using the term "mathematicalism" > in some other way. I would say (with grain of salt) that MGA is the breakdown (or the seed of the breakdown) of 1500 years of Aristotelian naturalism. Mathematicalism is a position, a philosophical position, according to which the big whole is of mathematical nature. In my opinion, it could be much more correct than physicalism (and so represents a big progress if we come back to it (many Platonist, like Xeusippas were mathematicalist, but not all Platonist are). But I can argue (later) that mathematicalism is not true. I am even open to the idea that consciousness is not something mathematical, it is something theological. I think theologicalism could be true (but I don't insist, because if physics could be conceptually wrong today, theology (the science) is conceptually deeply buried. > > > Maybe you don't want to use "mathematicalism" to refer to "the > conclusion of the MGA", because that elevates your argument to the > status of a position. No, it is because, it is a too general position, and it is not entirely correct (but this is a subtle point, and I am influenced by the interview of the lobian machine). It is almost a very technical thing. It is too early (with respect to the thread) > For what it's worth, I feel that it's a tactical > mistake for you to claim that you don't hold positions and that you > don't do philosophy. I have abandon tactics years ago. > Your critics may end up accusing you of > disingenuousness. Critics does not read what they critic. > I understand full well that you do not claim that > COMP is true. You only claim that it is testable. In that sense, I > understand that you don't hold a position on COMP. But the claim that > COMP is testable is also a position! I use position for philosophical position. Not for scientific statement. Would you say "17 is prime" is a position? Ah yes, some philosopher could say that! > The claim that "the MGA shows > that computations do not need to be implemented in our, or any other, > stuffy primitive material universe" is a pos
Re: MGA 1
On 20 Nov 2008, at 08:23, Kory Heath wrote:
>
>
> On Nov 18, 2008, at 11:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> The last question (of MGA 1) is: was Alice, in this case, a zombie
>> during the exam?
>
> Of course, my personal answer would take into account the fact that I
> already have a problem with the materialist's idea of "matter". But I
> think we're supposed to be considering the question in the context of
> mechanism and materialism. So I'll ask, what should a mechanist-
> materialist say about the state of Alice's consciousness during the
> exam?
>
> Maybe I'm jumping ahead, but I think this thought experiment creates a
> dilemma for the mechanist-materialist (which I think is Bruno's
> point). In contrast to many of the other responses in this thread, I
> don't think the mechanist-materialist should believe that Alice is
> conscious in the case when every gate has stopped functioning (but
> cosmic rays are randomly causing them to flip in the exact same way
> that they would have flipped if they were functioning). Alice is in
> that case functionally identical to a random-number generator. It
> shouldn't matter at all whether these cosmic rays are striking the
> broken gates in her head, or if the gates in her head are completely
> inert and the rays are striking the neurons in (say) her arms and her
> spinal chord, still causing her body to behave exactly as it would
> have without the breakdown. I agree with Telmo Menezes that the
> mechanist-materialist shouldn't view Alice as conscious in the latter
> case. But I don't think it's any different than the former case.
I am afraid you are already too much suspect of the contradictory
nature of MEC+MAT.
Take the reasoning has a game. Try to keep both MEC and MAT, the game
consists in showing the more clearly as possible what will go wrong.
The goal is to help the other to understand, or to find an error
(fatal or fixable: in both case we learn).
>
>
> It sounds like many people are under the impression that mechanism-
> materialism, with it's rejection of zombies, is committed to the view
> that Lucky Alice must be conscious, because she's behaviorally
> indistinguishable from the Alice with the correctly-functioning brain.
>
> But, in the sense that matters, Lucky Alice is *not* behaviorally
> indistinguishable from fully-functional Alice.
You mean the ALICE of Telmo's solution of MGA 1bis, I guess. The
original Alice, well I mean the one in MGA 1, is functionally
identical at the right level of description (actually she has already
digital brain). The physical instantiation of a computation is
completely realized. No neurons can "know" that the info (correct and
at the right places) does not come from the relevant neurons, but from
a lucky beam.
> For the mechanist-
> materialist, everything physical counts as "behavior". And there is a
> clear physical difference between the two Alices, which would be
> physically discoverable by a nearby scientist with the proper
> instruments.
But the physical difference does not play a role. If you invoke it,
how could you accept saying yes to a doctor, who introduce bigger
difference?
>
>
> Lets imagine that, during the time that Alice's brain is broken but
> "luckily" acting as though it wasn't due to cosmic rays, someone
> throws a ball at Alice's head, and she ("luckily") ducks out of the
> way. The mechanist-materialist may be happy to agree that she did
> indeed "duck out of the way", since that's just a description of what
> her body did.
OK, for both ALICE of Telmo's solution of MGA 1bis, and ALICE MGA 1.
> But the mechanist-materialist can (and must) claim that
> Lucky Alice did not in fact respond to the ball at all.
Consciously or privately? Certainly not for ALICE MGA 1bis. But why
not for ALICE MGA 1? Please remember to try to naively, or candidly
enough, keep both MECH and MAT in mind. You are already reasoning
like if we were concluding some definitive things, biut we are just
trying to build an argument. In the end, you will say: I knew it, but
the point is helping the others to "know" it too. Many here have
already the good intuition I think. The point is to make that
intuition the most communicable possible.
> And that
> statement can be translated into pure physics-talk. The movements of
> Alice's body in this case are being caused by the cosmic rays. They
> are causally disconnected from the movements of the ball (except in
> the incidental way that the ball might be having some causal effect on
> the cosmic rays).
More on this after MGA 2. Hopefully tomorrow.
> When Alice's brain is working properly, her act of
> ducking *is* causally connected to the movement of the ball. And this
> kind of causal connection is an important part of what the mechanist-
> materialist means by "consciousness".
Careful: such kind of causality needs ... MAT.
>
>
> Dennett is able to - and in fact must - say that Alice is not
> conscious when all
Re: Mathematical methods for the discrete space-time.
Torgny Tholerus skrev: > > What I want to know is what result you will get if you start from the > axiom that *everything in universe is finite*. > One important function in Quantum Theory is the harmonic oscillator. So I want to know: What is the corresponding function in discrete mathematics? In continuous mathematics you have the harmonic oscillator defined by the differential equation D^2(f) + k^2*f = 0, which will have one of its solutions as: f(t) = exp(i*k*t) = cos(k*t) + i*sin(k*t), where i is sqrt(-1). In discrete mathematics you have the corresponding oscillator defined by the difference equation D^2(f) + k^2*f = 0, which will have one of its solutions as: f(t) = (1 + i*k)^t = dcos(k*t) + i*dsin(k*t), where dcos() och dsin() are the corresponding discrete functions of the continuous functions cos() and sin(). So what is dcos() and dsin()? If you do Taylor expansion of the continuos function you get: exp(i*k*t) = Sum((i*k*t)^n/n!) = Sum((-1)^m*k^(2*m)*t^(2*m)/(2*m)!) + i*Sum((-1)^m*k^(2*m+1)*t^(2*m+1)/(2*m+1)!) And if you do binominal expansion of the discrete function you get: (1 + i*k)^t = Sum(t!/((t-n)!*n!)*(i*k)^n) = Sum((-1)^m*k^(2*m)*(t!/(t-2*m)!)/(2*m)!) + i*Sum((-1)^m*k^(2*m+1)*(t!/(t-2*m-1)!)/(2*m+1)!) When you compare these two expession, you see a remarkable resemblance! If you replace t^n in the upper expression with t!/(t-n)! you will then get exactly the lower expression! This suggest the general rule: If the Taylor expansion of a continuous function f(x) is: f(x) = Sum(a(n)*x^n) = Sum(a(n)*Prod(n;x)), then the corresponding discrete funtion f(x) is: f(x) = Sum(a(n)*x!/(x-n)!) = Sum(a(n)*Prod(n;x-m)), where Prod(n;x-m) = x*(x-1)*(x-2)* ... *(x-n+2)*(x-n+1) is a finite product. I have no strict proof of this general rule. But this rule is such a beautifil result, that it simply *must* be true! -- Torgny --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 1 bis (exercise)
Kory Heath wrote: > > On Nov 19, 2008, at 1:43 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: >> So I'm puzzled as to how answer Bruno's question. In general I >> don't believe in >> zombies, but that's in the same way I don't believe my glass of >> water will >> freeze at 20degC. It's an opinion about what is likely, not what is >> possible. > > I take this to mean that you're uncomfortable with thought experiments > which revolve around logically possible but exceedingly unlikely > events. I think you really you mean nomologically possible. I'm not uncomfortable with them, I just maintain a little skepticism. For one thing what is nomologically possible or impossible is often reassessed. Less than a century ago the experimental results Elizer, Vaidman, Zeilenger, et al, on delayed choice, non-interaction measurement, and other QM phenomena would all have been dismissed in advance as "logically" impossible. >I think that's understandable, but ultimately, I'm on the > philosopher's side. It really is logically possible - although > exceedingly unlikely - for a random-number-generator to cause a robot > to walk around, talk to people, etc. It really is logically possible > for a computer program to use a random-number-generator to generate a > lattice of changing bits that "follows" Conway's Life rule. Mechanism > and materialism needs to answer questions about these scenarios, > regardless of how unlikely they are. I don't disagree with that. My puzzlement about how to answer Bruno's question comes from the ambiguity as to what we mean by a philosophical zombie. Do we mean its outward actions are the same as a conscious person? For how long? Under what circumstances? I can easily make a robot that acts just like a sleeping person. I think Dennett changes the question by referring to neurophysiological "actions". Does he suppose wetware can't be replaced by hardware? In general when I'm asked if I believe in philosophical zombies, I say no, because I'm thinking that the zombie must outwardly behave like a conscious person in all circumstances over an indefinite period of time, yet have no inner experience. I rule out an accidental zombie accomplishing this as to improbable - not impossible. In other words if I were constructing a robot that had to act as a conscious person would over a long period of time in a wide variety of circumstances, I would have to build into the robot some kind of inner attention module that selected what was important to remember, compressed into short representation, linked it to other memories. And this would be an inner narrative. Similary for the other "inner" processes. I don't know if that's really what it takes to build a conscious robot, but I'm pretty sure it's something like that. And I think once we understand how to do this, we'll stop worrying about "the hard problem of consciousness". Instead we'll talk about how efficient the inner narration module is or the memory confabulation module or the visual imagination module. Talk about consciousness will seem as quaint as talk about the elan vital does now. Brent > > -- Kory > > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Little exercise
On Thu, Nov 20, 2008 at 1:14 PM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Thanks fo your clarification Anna. We will have the opportunity to > come back on some nuances later. I basically agree with your solution, > but I would have to explain the entire MGA + a part of its > arithmetical translation to be completely accurate commenting your, a > bit to prematurely technical, solution. Hope you will not mind, I don't mind at all...principally because I have no idea what you just said. ;) Anna --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Little exercise
Thanks fo your clarification Anna. We will have the opportunity to come back on some nuances later. I basically agree with your solution, but I would have to explain the entire MGA + a part of its arithmetical translation to be completely accurate commenting your, a bit to prematurely technical, solution. Hope you will not mind, Bruno On 20 Nov 2008, at 00:21, A. Wolf wrote: > >>> No. The tape isn't a standard Turing tape because it's >>> infinitely long. :) >> >> ? > > You're presuming the Universe contains finite data. Most cosmological > evidence suggests that the Universe is flat and unbounded, which > implies it > would be infinite in size. If space is not quantized (which would be > difficult to handle mathematically, anyway), then there's an > infinite amount > of information even in a finite universe. > >> He could dovetail. (The standard way to emulate parallelism in a >> linear way). > > Of course. But this still only works on finite data. > > I think you're confusing "can emulate with a Turing machine" with "is > computable". Everything that is computable /in finite time and > space/ can > be emulated on a Turing machine (if the Church-Turing thesis is > true). But > infinite data sets cannot be handled directly on a Turing machine. > There's > no model for handling infinite data, that I know of anyway. > > Anna > > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)
Bruno Marchal wrote: > Let us go back to the point. The point of MGA is to show that MEC + > MAT implies a contradiction. You can see that it is equivalent with > - the proposition saying that MEC implies NON MAT (mechanism refutes > materialism). > - the proposition saying that MAT implies NON MECH (materialism > refutes mechanism) > > Now, MECH implies " NON MAT" can be made constructive. This means MECH > provides the complete constraints of how a physical laws looks like > and come from, meaning physics is a branch of computationalist theory > of mind (itself a branch of number theory, in a slightest more general > sense of "number"). > > Now, imagine that luckily we arrive at a proof that the "arithmetical" > electron weights two kg. Then we will know that mechanism is false. *But only in /our/ universe, right. In some other universe couldn't electrons actually weigh 2kg?* > > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 1 bis (exercise)
On 20 Nov 2008, at 00:19, Telmo Menezes wrote: > >> Could you alter the so-lucky cosmic explosion beam a little bit so >> that Alice still succeed her math exam, but is, reasonably enough, a >> zombie during the exam. With zombie taken in the traditional sense >> of >> Kory and Dennett. >> Of course you have to keep well *both* MECH *and* MAT. > > I think I can... > > Instead of correcting the brain, the cosmic beams trigger output > neurons in a sequence that makes Alice write the right answers. That > is to say, the information content of the beams is no longer a > representation of an area of Alice's brain, but a representation of > the answers to the exam. An outside observer cannot distinguish one > case from the other. In the first she is Alice, in the second she is a > zombie. Right. I guess you see that such a zombie is an accidental zombie. We will have to come back later on this "accidental" part. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 1
On 19 Nov 2008, at 23:26, Jason Resch wrote: > > > On Wed, Nov 19, 2008 at 1:55 PM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > wrote: > > On 19 Nov 2008, at 20:17, Jason Resch wrote: > >> To add some clarification, I do not think spreading Alice's logic >> gates across a field and allowing cosmic rays to cause each gate to >> perform the same computations that they would had they existed in >> her functioning brain would be conscious. I think this because in >> isolation the logic gates are not computing anything complex, only >> AND, OR, NAND operations, etc. This is why I believe rocks are not >> conscious, the collisions of their molecules may be performing >> simple computations, but they are never aggregated into complex >> patterns to compute over a large set of information. > > > Actually I agree with this argument. But it does not concern Alice, > because I have provide her with an incredible amount of luck. The > lucky rays fix the neurons in a genuine way (by that abnormally big > amount of pure luck). > > If the cosmic rays are simply keeping her neurons working normally, > then I'm more inclined to believe she remains conscious, but I'm not > certain one way or the other. I have no certainty either. But this I feel related with my instinctive rather big uncertainty about the assumptions MECH and MAT. Now if both MECH and MAT are, naively enough perhaps, assumed to be completely true, I think I have no reason for not attributing to Alice consciousness. If not MECH break down, because I have to endow neurons with some prescience. The physical activity is the same, as far as they serve to instanciate a computation (cf the "qua computatio"). > > > If you doubt Alice remain conscious, how could you accept an > experience of simple teleportation (UDA step 1 or 2). If you can > recover consciousness from a relative digital description, how could > that consciousness distinguish between a recovery from a genuine > description send from earth (say), and a recovery from a description > luckily generated by a random process? > > I believe consciousness can be recovered from a digital description, > but I don't believe the description itself is conscious while being > beamed from one teleporting station to the other. I think it is > only when the body/computer simulation is instantiated can > consciousness recovered from the description. I agree. No one said that the description was conscious. Only that consciousness is related to a physical instantiation of a computation, which unluckily break down all the time, but were fixed, at genuine places and moments., by an incredibly big (but finite) amount luck, (assuming consciously MECH+MAT) > > Consider sending the description over an encrypted channel, without > the right decryption algorithm and key the description can't be > differentiated from random noise. The same bits could be > interpreted entirely differently depending completely on how the > recipient uses it. The "meaning" of the transmission is recovered > when it forms a system with complex relations, presumably the same > relations as the original one that was teleported, even though it > may be running on a different physical substrate, or a different > computer architecture. No problem. I agree. > > I don't deny that a random process could be the source of a > transmission that resulted in the creation of a conscious being, > what I deny is that random *simple computations, lacking any causal > linkages, could form consciousness. The way the lucky rays fixed Alice neurons illustrates that they were not random at all. That is why Alice is so lucky! > > * By simple I mean the types of computation done in discrete steps, > such as multiplication, addition, etc. Those done by a single > neuron or a small collection of logic gates. > > If you recover from a description (comp), you cannot know if that > description has been generated by a computation or a random process, > unless you give some prescience to the logical gates. Keep in mind > we try to refute the conjunction MECH and MAT. > > Here I would say that consciousness is not correlated with the > physical description at any point in time, but rather the > computational history and flow of information, and that this is > responsible for the subjective experience of being Alice. If > Alice's mind is described by a random process, albeit one which > gives the appearance of consciousness during her exam, she > nevertheless has no coherent computational history and her mind > contains no large scale informational structures. If it was random, sure. But it was not. More will be said through MGA 2. > The state machine that would represent her in the case of injection > of random noise is a different state machine that would represent > her normally functioning brain. Absolutely so. Bruno http:/
Re: MGA 1 bis (exercise)
On 19 Nov 2008, at 22:43, Brent Meeker wrote: > > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> On 19 Nov 2008, at 16:06, Telmo Menezes wrote: >> >> >>> Bruno, >>> If no one objects, I will present MGA 2 (soon). >>> I also agree completely and am curious to see where this is going. >>> Please continue! >> >> >> Thanks Telmo, thanks also to Gordon. >> >> I will try to send MGA 2 asap. But this asks me some time. >> Meanwhile I >> suggest a little exercise, which, by the way, finishes the proof of >> "MECH + MAT implies false", for those who thinks that there is no >> (conceivable) zombies. (they think that "exists zombie" *is* false). >> >> Exercise (mat+mec implies zombie exists or are conceivable): >> >> Could you alter the so-lucky cosmic explosion beam a little bit so >> that Alice still succeed her math exam, but is, reasonably enough, a >> zombie during the exam. With zombie taken in the traditional sense >> of >> Kory and Dennett. >> Of course you have to keep well *both* MECH *and* MAT. >> >> Bruno > > As I understand it a philosophical zombie is someone who looks and > acts just > like a conscious person but isn't conscious, i.e. has no "inner > narrative". No inner narrative, no inner image, no inner souvenir, no inner sensation, no qualia, no subject, no first person notions at all. OK. > > Time and circumstance play a part in this. As Bruno pointed out a > cardboard > cutout of a person's photograph could be a zombie for a moment. I > assume the > point of the exam is that an exam is long enough in duration and > complex enough > that it rules out the accidental, cutout zombie. Well, given that it is a thought experiment, the resources are free, and I can make the cosmic lucky explosion as lucky as you need for making Alice apparently alive, and with COMP+MAT, indeed alive. All its neurons break down all the time, and, because she is so lucky, an event which occurred 10 billions years before, send to her, at all right moment and place (and thus this is certainly NOT random) the lucky ray plumber who fixes momentarily the problem by trigging the other neurons to which it was supposed to send the infos (for example). Keeping comp and mat, making her unconscious here would be equivalent to give Alice's neurons a sort of physical prescience. > But then Alice has her normal > behavior restored by a cosmic ray shower that is just as improbable > as the > accidental zombie, i.e. she is, for the duration of the shower, an > accidental > zombie. Well, with Telmo solution of the "MGA 1bis exercise", where only the motor output neuron are fixed and where no internal neuron is fixed (almost all neurons), with MEC + MAT, Alice has no working brain at all, is only a lucky puppet, and she has to be a zombie. But in the original problem, all neurons are fixed, and then I would say Alice is not a zombie (if not, you give a magical physical prescience to the neurons). But now, you are right, that in both case, the luck can only be accidental. If, in the same thought experience, keeping the exact same "no lucky cosmic explosion, but giving now a phone call to the teacher or to Alice, so that she moves 1mm away of the position she had in the previous version, she will miss the lucky rays, most probably some will go through in wrong places and most probably she will miss the exams, and perhaps even die. So you are right, in Telmo's solution of" MGA 1bis exercise" she is an accidental zombie. But in the original MGA 1, she should remain conscious (with MECH and MAT), even if accidentally so. > > > So I'm puzzled as to how answer Bruno's question. Hope it is clear for every one now? > In general I don't believe in > zombies, but that's in the same way I don't believe my glass of > water will > freeze at 20degC. It's an opinion about what is likely, not what is > possible. OK. Accidental zombie are possible, but are very unlikely (but wait for MGA 2 for a lessening of this statement). Accidental consciousness (like in MGA 1, with MECH+MAT) is possible also, and is as much unlikely (same remark). Of course, as unlikeley as possible, nobody can test if someone else is "really conscious" or is a accidental zombie, because for any series of test you can imagine, you can conceive a sufficiently lucky cosmic explosion. > > It seems similar to the question, could I have gotten in my car and > driven to > the store, bought something, and driven back and yet not be > conscious of it. > It's highly unlikely, yet people apparently have done such things. (I think here something different occurs, concerning intensity of attention with respect to different conscious streams, but it is out- of-topic, I think). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group
Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)
On 19 Nov 2008, at 22:16, m.a. wrote: > Bruno, > I was just quoting you: "And if you do the math, you get > a physics extracted from mechanism, and you can use it to confirm > mechanism or to refute it." Did you mean "refutes materialism"? Thanks for quoting the entire sentence, before I was misunderstanding myself! Let us go back to the point. The point of MGA is to show that MEC + MAT implies a contradiction. You can see that it is equivalent with - the proposition saying that MEC implies NON MAT (mechanism refutes materialism). - the proposition saying that MAT implies NON MECH (materialism refutes mechanism) Now, MECH implies " NON MAT" can be made constructive. This means MECH provides the complete constraints of how a physical laws looks like and come from, meaning physics is a branch of computationalist theory of mind (itself a branch of number theory, in a slightest more general sense of "number"). Now, imagine that luckily we arrive at a proof that the "arithmetical" electron weights two kg. Then we will know that mechanism is false. Now assuming comp we discover the physics in the inverse way of the empiricists, we discover the multiverse before the universe, the interference of sub-level histories, before the histories, the logic of the observable before the observation, etc. The point, (of course I am thinking to Kory) is that I try to explain a reasoning which shows that the (DIGITAL) MECH hypothesis, can, thanks to "digital" be transformed into a scientific (meaning Popper- refutable) inquiry. A bit like John Bell succeed to show that the Einstein Podolski Rosen was not the product of a senile physician doing philosophy in its old days). It is science. At least this is what the construction is supposed to explain (and its translation in arithmetic is supposed to pave the way of a concretization of the idea). The MECH is a venerable old philosophical idea. The reason and tools making it a science is due to Babbage, Post Turing Kleene Church Markov and Co. extraordinary discovery of the universal machine. "Nature" discovered it before us, for example we are such machine, but enlightening comes when a universal machine begin to suspect its own universality, and discovers the "everything" and its many (related) sub-structure "inside herself". > > > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> On 19 Nov 2008, at 16:01, m.a. wrote: >> >>> So you're saying that a "physics extracted from mechanism" which >>> (let's assume) refutes mechanism, >> >> >> If a physics extracted from mechanism refutes mechanism, then >> mechanism is refuted. (p implies not p) is equivalent with (not p). >> >> I guess you meant "refutes materialism". One main point is that >> physics extracted logically from comp could be refuted by the >> experimental facts, and this would lead to an experimental >> refutation of comp. >> >> Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi m.a. if mechanism is true, then the "physical universe" appears to be the border of the universal machine "ignorance". The cosmos is the tip of the iceberg. And the laws of physics are really something which evolved, yet not in a space time, but in a logical space gluing the possible machine "dreams". I am not saying this is true, only that it is a consequence of the seemingly innocent (for some naturalist) mechanist hypothesis. It gives a way to justify the why and how of physical laws, and this from mechanism, and this without making the (ad hoc) assumption of a physical universe. And if you do the math, you get a physics extracted from mechanism, and you can use it to confirm mechanism or to refute it. You can take the reasoning train which is currently passing. Mainly the MGA can be understood by patient layman having some notion of digital machine. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >>> >>> >>> >> >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ >> >> >> >> >> > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 1
On 11/19/08, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >..." Keep in mind we try to refute the > conjunction MECH and MAT.> > Nevertheless your intuition below is mainly correct, but the point is > that accepting it really works, AND keeping MECH, will force us to > negate MAT. > > Bruno > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ and lots of other things in the discussion. the concept of "Zombie" emerged as questioned. Thinking about it, (I dislike the entire field together with 'thought-experiments' and the fairy-tale processes of differentiated teleportations, etc.) I concluded that a 'zombie' as used mostly, is a 'person(??)' with NO HUMAN CONSCIOUSNESS (whatever WE included in the 'C' term). I am willing to expand on it: a (humanly) zombie MAY HAVE mental functions beyond the (excluded) select ones WE use in our present potential as 'thinking humans'. It needs it, since assumed are the activities that must be directed by some form of mentality (call it 'physical?' ones). - "Zombie does..." It boils down to my overall somewhat negative position (although I have no better one) of UDA, MPG, comp, etc. - all of them are products of HUMAN thinking and restrictions as WE can imagine the unfathomable existence (the totality - real TOE). I find it a 'cousin' of the reductionistic conventional sciences, just a bit 'freed up'. Maybe a distant cousin. Meaning: it handles the totality WITHIN the framework of our limited (human) logic(s). The "list's" said 100 years 'ahead ways' of thinking (Bruno's 200) is still a mental activity of the NOW existing minds. Alas, we cannot do better. I just want to take all this mental exercise with the grain of salt of "there may be more to all of it" what we cannot even fancy (imagine, fantasize of) today, with our mind anchored in our restrictions. (Including 'digital', 'numbers', learned wisdom, etc.). Sorry if I offended anyone on the list, it was not intended. I am not up to the level of the list, just 'freed up' my thinking into alowing further (unknown?) domains into our ignorance. I call it 'my' scinetific agnosticism. John M --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Little exercise
Hi Bruno, I should probably let this thread die so that we can concentrate on the MGA thread. But there are a few more things I wanted to respond to. On Nov 18, 2008, at 9:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 18 Nov 2008, at 14:14, Kory Heath wrote: >> In the meantime, I at least want to say that I'm pretty sure you've >> read a lot more into my term "mathematical physicalism" than I >> intended. I use "mathematical physicalism" simply to refer to the >> idea >> that the materialist's picture of matter is problematic in the way >> that the vitalists idea of the "life force" is problematic, and that >> mathematical facts-of-the-matter unproblematically fill the role that >> this problematic "physical matter" is supposed to fill. > > OK. But then what's the difference with mathematicalism? Maybe that's the term I should be using. I thought that the term "mathematicalism" had some other philosophical meaning, but I now see that it only gets 29 hits on Google, and most of them are from this list. I like the term, and am happy to commandeer it. However, it still seems that you and I can't agree on how to use it. For instance, you say: > The fact is that I believe mathemaricalism is probably false too, but > it could be false in the same sense that incompleteness phenomenon à- > la- Skolem-Tarski could be used to justify that "the whole of > mathematics" cannot be a mathematical object itself. What is your definition of "mathematicalism" here? > If you agree that physics has become a statistic on computations "as > seen from inside", everything is ok. I do agree with this. So everything is ok. :) > Then MGA will show what you > already believe, which is that the computations does not need to be > implemented in our, or any other, stuffy primitive material universe. Ok. Can you tell me a one or two word name for the belief that "computations do not need to be implemented in our, or any other, stuffy primitive material universe"? To put it another way, can we come up with a name for the proposition that "the Movie Graph Argument is sound"? I want to use the term "mathematicalism" to refer to this (and only this). But above you say that you believe that "mathematicalism" is probably false. Yet you seem to believe that the MGA is sound, so I think you must be using the term "mathematicalism" in some other way. Maybe you don't want to use "mathematicalism" to refer to "the conclusion of the MGA", because that elevates your argument to the status of a position. For what it's worth, I feel that it's a tactical mistake for you to claim that you don't hold positions and that you don't do philosophy. Your critics may end up accusing you of disingenuousness. I understand full well that you do not claim that COMP is true. You only claim that it is testable. In that sense, I understand that you don't hold a position on COMP. But the claim that COMP is testable is also a position! The claim that "the MGA shows that computations do not need to be implemented in our, or any other, stuffy primitive material universe" is a position. The claim that "if MECH is true, then MAT is false" is a position, even if you remain agnostic about whether or not MECH is true. This might just be difference about how we use the term "position", but it seems to be causing some confusion. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 1 bis (exercise)
On Nov 19, 2008, at 1:43 PM, Brent Meeker wrote: > So I'm puzzled as to how answer Bruno's question. In general I > don't believe in > zombies, but that's in the same way I don't believe my glass of > water will > freeze at 20degC. It's an opinion about what is likely, not what is > possible. I take this to mean that you're uncomfortable with thought experiments which revolve around logically possible but exceedingly unlikely events. I think that's understandable, but ultimately, I'm on the philosopher's side. It really is logically possible - although exceedingly unlikely - for a random-number-generator to cause a robot to walk around, talk to people, etc. It really is logically possible for a computer program to use a random-number-generator to generate a lattice of changing bits that "follows" Conway's Life rule. Mechanism and materialism needs to answer questions about these scenarios, regardless of how unlikely they are. -- Kory --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
