Re: Newbie Questions
Hi, Stephen (after along time!), it is about THE after Big Bang inflation . I am a 'noninflationary' guy: IMO inflation was deemed necessary to cope with the mathematical problems connected the Big Bang idea and applying the present (here and now) system's math to it - at a system ENTIRELY different from conditions we experience as the basis of such math. In my 'narrative' ( don't call it theory) about a big bang origin (which I accept in spite of my scond thoughts of the validity of the expansion) - I assign the starting conditions and the applicability of early-universe math to the transition no-space to space from the a-spatial proto-Big Bang into our space-time system. The transition from nonexisting (=zero) space into space is indeed an (infinite?) inflationary change. * Same thing with 'time', wich would explain the marvels of the (infinitesimal small fractions of the FIRST second): the transition of NO TIME into a 'time-system' - expressed in terms of physical quantization applied to the Big Bang conditions. I don't want to start an argument on this, I am not ready - it is a narrative. Have a good 2009 John Mikes On Wed, Jan 21, 2009 at 12:11 AM, Stephen Paul King stephe...@charter.netwrote: Hi Ronald, Some people, myself included, would be a lot more comfortable with the whole inflation idea if a) there where some experimental evidence of the scalar fields that are required and b) some sound explanation where given as to how an in principle unknowable phenomenon - the BB singularity itself - is any different from a Creative Deity, sans only the anthropomorphisms. R. Penrose, in his book Road to Reality, brought up a very clear case that inflation does not solve the horizon problem when we consider causaly disjoint regions; has any one countered his arguement? Kindest regards, Stephen - Original Message - From: ronaldheld ronaldh...@gmail.com To: Everything List everything-l...@googlegroups.com Sent: Tuesday, January 20, 2009 7:22 AM Subject: Re: Newbie Questions I do not see the Inflation paradigm as ad-hoc, for it explains the flatness, Horizon problem and lack of early universe relics better than any other to date. Now the Big Bang may be replaced by oscillating solutions from LQG or other theories, but AFAIK they still need an Inflation period. Ronald --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)
Kim, the uncomputability of this issue. Why should the mind be limited to the computable? Clearly it is not. So you deny Step 1 again? You say no to the doctor? Could an AI conceive of Platonia? Why not? Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Newbie Questions
Ronald, the ad hoc is because of the introduction of the inflatons which do nothing but, um, inflate... Stephen said: b) some sound explanation where given as to how an in principle unknowable phenomenon - the BB singularity itself - is any different from a Creative Deity, sans only the anthropomorphisms. ACK! It seems that Steinhardt's model also attempts to solve the problem, at least according to wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmic_inflation#Alternatives_to_inflation BQuote The ekpyrotic and cyclic models are also considered competitors to inflation. These models solve the horizon problem through an expanding epoch well before the Big Bang, and then generate the required spectrum of primordial density perturbations during a contracting phase leading to a Big Crunch. The universe passes through the Big Crunch and emerges in a hot Big Bang phase. In this sense they are reminiscent of the oscillatory universe proposed by Richard Chace Tolman: however in Tolman's model the total age of the universe is necessarily finite, while in these models this is not necessarily so. Whether the correct spectrum of density fluctuations can be produced, and whether the universe can successfully navigate the Big Bang/Big Crunch transition, remains a topic of controversy and current research. EQuote But, as I've said, I haven't read any of the papers, so I dunno. Also, I'm not quite sure what to think of this whole Big Bang when adopting COMP - have to think about it yet... Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: COMP, Quantum Logic and Gleason's Theorem
Hi Günther, The paper is not online, but I found it in this book which is at our University Library, maybe interesting also for other people: Goldblatt, Mathematics of Modality http://www.amazon.com/Mathematics-Modality-Center-Language-Information/dp/1881526240/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8s=booksqid=1232402154sr=8-1 (the book contains the full paper) Not only that! It contains also his paper on the arithmetical intuitionist, alias the arithmetical knower, alias the universal first person, alias the arithmetical interpretation of Plotinus' third hypostase (the universal soul), alias the epistemical temporal arithmetical modal logic S4Grz (pronounce: S four Grzegorczyk). A key paper for the AUDA, except that Boolos found those results, on SAGrz about the same time, see the reference to Boolos in any of my theses. Or see the S4 chapters in the Boolos 1993, book or in the recent paperback reedition of Boolos 1979. It is the logic of provable and true. It leads to a notion of person which the machine cannot named or define. The arithmetical knower is not arithmetical! The book contains also a very interesting study of the Diodorean modality in the Minkowski Space-time, and a logical approach to Groethendieck topology. Note that it is advanced stuff for people familiarized with mathematical logic (it presupposes Mendelson's book, or Boolos Jeffrey). Two papers in that book are part of AUDA: the UDA explain to the universal machine, and her opinion on the matter. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Materialism was:Re: KIM 2.3
Hi Brent, I didn't use the term - it is one being attributed to me simply because I question the adequacy of logic and mathematics to instantiate physics. That is ok - there are different versions of materialism/physicalism etc. I don't accept any such esoteric theories - I merely entertain them. That is well put, I agree - as rational people we all hold tentatively, we entertain - with accept I mean that it passes enough tests that it can be entertained - versus other theories that are so unprobable that one does not have the time to concern oneself with them...(although one never knows ;-) But the problem reappears as the body-problem. Why is materialism so successful as a model of the world? No, the problem is of a quite different nature than the mind-body problem. I would not call the white rabbit problem as a body problem. Besides, materialism also faces this issue in an infinite universe if you accept unification of mind states (remember the Bostrom paper?). It seems somewhat gratuitous to call this a substance. I'd say materialism holds (on simple empirical grounds) that some things exist and some don't. Hmm, that is too little I think to distinguish materialism from, say, Pythagorean views or even Platonic views. Saying that everything exists does not quite capture what Everythingers believe. Everything never means everything conceivable - but everything that is possible. What is possible, is, of course, the question. Why should some things exist and others not - because if everything existed there would be no distinction between exist and not-exist With the restriction to everything possible (and not plain everything) exists, we still have to distinguish accessible regions. Or do you mean can influence us causally by exists? But then you would deny existence to parts outside the observable universe - which is of course dependent from where you look (Earth), so I think it is not a good criterion for existence. But if we accept that material things exist which can never affect us causally, why not accept that there are other, mathematically even more remote entitities? Or, consider decoherence - here mathematically very similar branches are suddenly inaccessible. I don't think it has moved beyond. MWI is attractive for several reasons, but it is well short of Tegmarkia. Of course - what I mean that it has moved beyond is a lot of Absolutes: absolute space, absolute time etc - what remains are relations. And there _are_ defenders in philosophy of physics which retain some anthropomorphic Absolutes, but I think they are fighting a losing battle. I think Tegmark grounded his everything by supposing that the lowest level was uncomputable. Ok thanks I missed that, will have to read the paper again. Materialism has been very effective in not only explaining, but in predicting things. That doesn't prove it's right, but I could ask what explanatory power does everything exists hold. Remember that a theory that could explain anything, fails to explain at all. Indeed, and that is what makes materialism very enticing, but then the question immediately crops up: why this, and not something else? I think materialism would have a much better stance if one would find one set of equations which describes our universe (that is, of logical necessity), but it doesn't look likely. And every contingent description leads to multiversal concepts. Best Wishes, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Newbie Questions
I do not know that the ekpyrotic and cyclic models reprodce the observations better than the BB+inflation. Yes, no one knows what the inflation field is, but no one has observed a gluon or single quark either. I do not know what Penrose's argument is.Without the observable Universe being in causal contact, it could not exhibit the smoothness that we observe. Ronald On Jan 21, 11:56 am, Günther Greindl guenther.grei...@gmail.com wrote: Ronald, the ad hoc is because of the introduction of the inflatons which do nothing but, um, inflate... Stephen said: b) some sound explanation where given as to how an in principle unknowable phenomenon - the BB singularity itself - is any different from a Creative Deity, sans only the anthropomorphisms. ACK! It seems that Steinhardt's model also attempts to solve the problem, at least according to wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cosmic_inflation#Alternatives_to_inflation BQuote The ekpyrotic and cyclic models are also considered competitors to inflation. These models solve the horizon problem through an expanding epoch well before the Big Bang, and then generate the required spectrum of primordial density perturbations during a contracting phase leading to a Big Crunch. The universe passes through the Big Crunch and emerges in a hot Big Bang phase. In this sense they are reminiscent of the oscillatory universe proposed by Richard Chace Tolman: however in Tolman's model the total age of the universe is necessarily finite, while in these models this is not necessarily so. Whether the correct spectrum of density fluctuations can be produced, and whether the universe can successfully navigate the Big Bang/Big Crunch transition, remains a topic of controversy and current research. EQuote But, as I've said, I haven't read any of the papers, so I dunno. Also, I'm not quite sure what to think of this whole Big Bang when adopting COMP - have to think about it yet... Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QM Turing Universality
Hi Mirek, Please be more specific about what do you mean by a quantum counting algorithm. Sometimes I'm not too bright guy :-) Really? Not here I think. The question *was* and *is* fuzzy. Is this what you mean? step 1\ |0 step 2\ |0 + |1 step 3\ |0 + |1 + |2 Interesting. Perhaps an electron climbing in some way the energy states at carefully chosen frequences? or (a classical machine operated by quantum means) step 1\ |0 step 2\ |1 step 3\ |2 or something different :-) My question has perhaps no sense at all. Is there a notion of quantum computation done without any measurement? Is there a purely unitary transformation which augment the dimensionality of the initial quantum machine. Does the notion of universal quantum dovetailing makes sense. I don't find my Shi papers, but from what I remind, it gives some good argument about the difficulty of redefining the halting problem (halting in which universe? ...). I have no problem with most quantum algorithm, but no clear idea of what really a quantum computation in general can be, despite I have few doubt it does really exploits superposed physical realities (assuming QM, that is the SWE). Don't worry. Sometimes I'm not too bright guy too :-) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Materialism was:Re: KIM 2.3
On 20 Jan 2009, at 05:22, Brent Meeker wrote: Günther Greindl wrote: snip The question is, why the quantum (as Wheeler, I think, put it)? Bruno's COMP gives a very elegant _explanation_. I agree it is elegant, but whether it can really explain the world remains to be seen. I am not proposing a new explanation. It is the contrary. I show that if we assume digital mechanism, more or less the current theory of mind, especially among materialist, then materialism not only fail on mind and consciousness (like I would say all experts know), but materialism stop to work for matter itself. Iy is a theorem, in a venerable old theory. Also, with COMP, the mind-body problem indeed disappears. We have computations within computations within computations. (And I think that Bruno is correct when assuming that there is no _lowest_ level). But the problem reappears as the body-problem. Why is materialism so successful as a model of the world? Probably because materialism provides an excellent approximation for most concerns. It needn't even be a pure idealism, but rather Russelian neutral monism - some states more or less conscious - the degree of consciousness depending on the degree of self-reflexivity (see for instance here for a theory of consciousness which works well with COMP: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-higher/) Back to the ontological problem of the grounding: materialism is in essence the thesis that there is, at bottom, a substance, which has no independent properties, but serves as instantiator for other properties. It seems somewhat gratuitous to call this a substance. I'd say materialism holds (on simple empirical grounds) that some things exist and some don't. ? Computationalist or digital mechanist too. They assert that numbers bigger than two, even and prime does not exist, and that numbers with odd divisors exist. If you meant exist physically, then I can agree, yet I have to define exist physically in arithmetic if comp is assumed. But why should such a strange thing exist? Why should some things exist and others not - because if everything existed there would be no distinction between exist and not-exist (I know that's a stilly argument, but it is similar to the kind of logic chopping I sometimes see from the proponents of everything exists). Why not let the relations stand for themselves? Especially for an MWI-theorist; if you only accept a single world, matter does seem much more plausible - going through diverse transformations, that being all there is, and located somewhere in an otherwise empty spacetime or whatever - but those are all very naive intuitions which modern physics has moved beyond (and all the more so critical reflection on the results of modern physics). I think I'm as qualified to speak for modern physics as you and I don't think it has moved beyond. MWI is attractive for several reasons, but it is well short of Tegmarkia. A big question: why should there be such a thing as a lowest level, a grounding? While for a materialist, the imagination of turtles all the way down http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turtles_all_the_way_down is quite strange, computations all the way down is very intuitive. Well, awe-inspiring intuitive ;-)) Think of the fractal video Bruno sent out a little while ago. I think Tegmark grounded his everything by supposing that the lowest level was uncomputable. With comp, the 3-person ultimate everything is digital, or combinatorial, or arithmetical, or Diophantine. There are lower first order citizens; the digits, the combinators, the numbers, etc. It is the first person realities, including the physics which are no no more grounded in the digital or the computable. What explanatory power does matter hold? None, I conjecture. Please give at least one so we can discuss. Materialism has been very effective in not only explaining, but in predicting things. That doesn't prove it's right, but I could ask what explanatory power does everything exists hold. Before seraching explanation we have to well understand the problem. With comp we have this problem: it predicts the observability of the many worlds, when we observe ourselves. And with current physics (quantum mechanic) we have this problem: we observe, albeit indirectly, many worlds, or superposition of histories. Remember that a theory that could explain anything, fails to explain at all. I agree. For myself, I find Bruno's theory very intriguing. It is more specific than Tegmark's I have no theory, except a widely believed (but not understood) digital version of Milinda-Descartes' Mechanism. I have an argument (even a proof I could argue) instead of a theory. Twenty years older than Tegmark or Schmidhuber, too, actually. and so I believe has more
Re: QM Turing Universality
My question has perhaps no sense at all. Is there a notion of quantum computation done without any measurement? Quantum lambda calculus by Andre van Tonder does not containt measurement. http://arxiv.org/pdf/quant-ph/0307150v5 From the abstract, he proves equivalence between his quantum lambda calculus and quantum Turing machine (also without measurement). That's all I know in this respect for the moment. Is there a purely unitary transformation which augment the dimensionality of the initial quantum machine. Does the notion of universal quantum dovetailing makes sense. I am not too familiar with the process of dovetailing, but I'm fine with the general idea that there is program which systematically generates every possible C/Lisp code and in between steps of this generation it interprets parts of what is already generated. Can you sketch how should one think about such dovetailing in terms of classical logical gates, please? I don't find my Shi papers, but from what I remind, it gives some good argument about the difficulty of redefining the halting problem (halting in which universe? ...). Good, your note about the halting problem helped to refine my google search to the extend that I've found the Shi paper you are talking about. Hereby, I also apologize to the authors of QTM Revisited paper, their reference was correct. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/S0375-9601(02)00015-4 I'll read it. Regards, mirek --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: KIM 2.3 (was Re: Time)
On 22/01/2009, at 3:50 AM, Günther Greindl wrote: Kim, the uncomputability of this issue. Why should the mind be limited to the computable? Clearly it is not. So you deny Step 1 again? You say no to the doctor? In fact I have 'multiple personality disorder' - from Thursday to Monday I say 'Yes' to the doctor, on Tuesday and Wednesday I am no longer the same personality because my medications have run out ;-) Well, it's Thursday here now and I have a fresh supply of anxiety- suppression pills, so I'm off to see the Doctor again!! He's talking about this scary Step 7 and I am starting to get sweaty palms, so in a fit of madness I reached into the bookshelf and drew out a Penrose volume which seemed to suggest I might do better to have a cup of tea and a little sleep... Could an AI conceive of Platonia? Why not? Well, this particular AI which calls itself Kim can conceive of it, so I guess all other AIs couldunless there is a special class of AI that can only conceive of computables? Perhaps I should put Road to Reality back on the bookshelf for now! Bring on the advanced Theology loving it K Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Newbie Questions
Getting back to the original question: Are ALL quantum variations explored? So let me ask some more basic questions: How many distinct choices of new state does a particle, say an electron, have at each time quanta? Let's call that number X. In an admittedly over-simplified universe of two particles, the number of new universe states at the next time quanta is X^2, right? In a universe with Y particles, the number of new states that arise from a given previous state at each time quanta is X^Y, right? And due to quantum interference, certain states are less common, and other states are more common. I realize that these are very elementary questions. I'm just trying to get my bearings here. The thing that is simply inconceivable to me is that this bizarre explosive growth is an explosion of *information.* The multiverse seems to have an unlimited capacity to generate and store these new universe states, and also an unlimited capacity to compare all of these universe states to each other in order to produce the quantum interference we observe. The thing I like about the theory is that it certainly takes the dice out of God's hands. Since all states are exhaustively explored, there is no randomness at all. We just happen to exist in some portions of the immense tree of states, and not in other portions. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
