A scientifically sound, objective test for consciousness

2009-01-27 Thread Colin Hales
(The journal is free!)

The test itself is not easy or cheap - but it is possible AND you can 
perform it on humans as well as AI. To deny that the test is valid 
involves a denial that scientists have P-consciousness, whilst being 
totally demanding of it and dependent on it for all science outcomes.

Hales, C. (2009), 'An empirical framework for objective testing for 
P-consciousness in an artificial agent', The Open Artificial 
Intelligence Journal, 3, pp. 1-15.

http://www.bentham.org/open/toaij/

*Abstract:* Two related and relatively obscure issues in science have 
eluded empirical tractability. Both can be directly traced to progress 
in artificial intelligence. The first is scientific proof of 
consciousness or otherwise in anything. The second is the role of 
consciousness in intelligent behaviour. This document approaches both 
issues by exploring the idea of using scientific behaviour 
self-referentially as a benchmark in an objective test for 
P-consciousness, which is the relevant
critical aspect of consciousness. Scientific behaviour is unique in 
being both highly formalised and provably critically dependent on the 
P-consciousness of the primary senses. In the context of the primary 
senses P-consciousness is literally a formal identity with scientific 
observation. As such it is intrinsically afforded a status of critical 
dependency demonstrably no different to any other critical dependency in 
science, making scientific behaviour ideally suited to a 
self-referential scientific circumstance. The 'provability' derives from 
the delivery by science of objectively verifiable 'laws of nature'. By 
exploiting the critical dependency, an empirical framework is 
constructed as a refined and specialised version of existing 
propositions for a 'test for consciousness'. The specific role of 
P-consciousness is clarified: it is a human intracranial central nervous 
system construct that symbolically grounds the scientist in the distal 
external world, resulting in our ability to recognise, characterise and 
adapt to distal natural world novelty. It is hoped that in opening a 
discussion of a novel approach, the artificial intelligence community 
may eventually find a viable contender for its long overdue scientific 
basis.

cheers
colin hales




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Re: COMP, Quantum Logic and Gleason's Theorem

2009-01-27 Thread Bruno Marchal
Günther,


AUDA is based on the self-reference logic of axiomatizable or  
recursively enumerable theories, of machine. Those machines or  
theories must be rich enough. In practice this means their theorems or  
beliefs are close for induction.This is the work of Gödel and  
followers, notably Löb, who found a nice generalzation of Gödel's  
theorem and Solovay who proves the arithmetical completeness of the  
logic he will call G and G'. Here is the key paper:

Solovay, R. M. (1976). Provability Interpretation of Modal Logic.  
Israel Journal of Mathematics, 25:287-304.

I follow Boolos 1979 and Smullyan "Forever Undecided" in calling such  
system G and G*. G has got many names K4W, PrL, GL.
There are four excellent books on this subject:

Boolos, G. (1979). The unprovability of consistency. Cambridge  
University Press, London.

This is the oldest book. Probably the best for AUDA. And (very "lucky"  
event) it has been reedited in paperback recently; I ordered it, and I  
got it today (o frabjous day!  Callooh! Callay! :). It contains a  
chapter on the S4 intensional variant of G, and the theorem (in my  
notation) that S4Grz = S4Grz*. The first person is the same from the  
divine (true) view and the terrestrial (provable) view.
I have it now in three exemplars but two are wandering.

Boolos, G. (1993). The Logic of Provability. Cambridge University  
Press, Cambridge.

This is the sequel, with the Russians' solutions to virtually all open  
problems in Boolos 1979. The main problem was the question of the  
axiomatizability of the first-order extension of G and G* (which I  
note sometimes qG and qG*). And the answers, completely detailed in  
Boolos' book, are as negative as they can possibly be. qG is PI_2  
complete, and qG* is PI_1 complete *in* the Arithmetical Truth. The  
divine intelligible of Peano Arithmetic is far more complex than Peano  
Arithmetic's ONE, or God, in the arithmetical interpretation of  
Plotinus.


Smoryński, P. (1985). Self-Reference and Modal Logic. Springer Verlag,  
New York.

I have abandon this one sometimes ago, because of my eyes sight  
defect, but with spectacles I have been able to distinguish tobacco  
product from indices in formula, and by many tokens, it could be very  
well suited for AUDA. The reason is that it develops the theory in  
term of (computable) function instead of assertions, showing directly  
the relation between computability and SIGMA_1 provability. Nice intro  
from Hilbert's program to Gödel and Löb's theorem, and the Hilbert  
Bernays versus Löb derivability conditions. It contains a chapter, a  
bit too much blazed in the tone, on the algebraic approach to self- 
reference, which indeed initiates originally the field in Italy  
(Roberto Magari).
It contains also chapter on the Rosser intensional variants.

Smullyan, R. (1987). Forever Undecided. Knopf, New York.

This is a recreative introduction to the modal logic G. I was used  
some times ago in this list to refer to that book by FU, and I don't  
hesitate to use some of Smullyan's trick to ease the way toward self- 
reference. It helps some, but can irritate others.
Note that Smullyan wrote *many* technical books around mathematical  
self-reference, Gödel's theorems in many systems.

Modal logic is not so well known that such book can presuppose it, and  
all those books introduce modal logic in a rather gentle way. But all  
those books presuppose some familiarity with logic. Boolos Et Al. is  
OK. It is difficult to choose among many good introduction to Logic.  
By some aspect Epstein and Carnielly is very good too for our purpose.

Note that the original papers are readable (in this field). All this  
for people who does not suffer from math anxiety which reminds me I  
have to cure Kim soon or later. The seventh step requires some math.  
AUDA requires to understand that those math are accessible to all  
universal machine 'grasping" the induction principle, this is the work  
of Gödel and Al.

I think the book by Rogers is also fundamental. Cutland's book is  
nice, but it omits the study of the Arithmetical Hierarchy (SIGMA_0,  
PI_0, SIGMA_1, PI_1, SIGMA_2, PI_2, ...).


AUDA without math = Plotinus (or Ibn Arabi or any serious and rational  
mystic). Roughly speaking.

I will think about a layman explanation of AUDA without math, and  
different from UDA.

Best regards,

Bruno




On 25 Jan 2009, at 18:45, Günther Greindl wrote:

>
> Hi Bruno,
>
>>> Goldblatt, Mathematics of Modality
>> Note that it is advanced stuff for people familiarized with
>> mathematical logic (it presupposes Mendelson's book, or Boolos &
>> Jeffrey).
>>
>> Two papers in that book are "part" of AUDA: the UDA explain to the
>> universal machine, and her opinion on the matter.
>
> I would like to add a "guide to AUDA" section on the resources page.
> Maybe you could specify the core references necessary for  
> understanding
> the AUDA (if you like and have the time)?
>
> Here a first suggestion of