Re: No MWI

2009-05-18 Thread rexallen...@gmail.com

So,in terms of the many worlds interpretation, what is the standard
narrative explanation of the double slit experiment?

In particular, in MWI-speak, what exactly happens when you know
which slit the photon has passed through that causes the interference
pattern disappear?

Also, what is the MWI-based explanation for the quantum eraser
experiment?

Rex
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Re: No MWI

2009-05-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 18-mai-09, à 09:25, rexallen...@gmail.com a écrit :


 So,in terms of the many worlds interpretation, what is the standard
 narrative explanation of the double slit experiment?

I guess you are referring to the materialist MWI of QM, and not to the 
idealist MWI of Arithmetic (often discussed here).
I suggest you read the book by David Deutsch The Fabric of Reality 
which motivates the QM MWI from the two slits experiments (well David 
uses four slits for making it clearer). You can ask supplementary 
questions on the FOR mailing list if you have still problems.



 In particular, in MWI-speak, what exactly happens when you know
 which slit the photon has passed through that causes the interference
 pattern disappear?

You get entangled with the outcome (which slit the phton has gone 
through). Your 2^aleph_zero consciousness states differentiate into 
about two continuum of worlds where you can remember which slit the 
photon has gone through. Measurement let you know in which relative 
part you are in the multiverse-partition defined by your measuring 
apparatus.


 Also, what is the MWI-based explanation for the quantum eraser
 experiment?

Erasing memory is the main way to fuse, or undifferentiate the QM (or 
comp) states, so that you can prepare an experiment corresponding to 
another partition of the multiverse. Saibal Mitra has proposed recently 
on the list some exploitation of this feature. Search his name on the 
arxiv.org, in the quant-phys part: Changing the past by forgetting.

Bruno Marchal

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Consciousness is information?

2009-05-18 Thread Bruno Marchal

Note also that, by being universal machine, our look-up table are 
infinite.

Bruno

Le 18-mai-09, à 03:11, Kelly Harmon a écrit :


 On Fri, May 15, 2009 at 12:32 AM, Jesse Mazer laserma...@hotmail.com 
 wrote:

 I don't have a problem with the idea that a giant lookup table is 
 just a
 sort of zombie, since after all the way you'd create a lookup table 
 for a
 given algorithmic mind would be to run a huge series of actual 
 simulations
 of that mind with all possible inputs, creating a huge archive of
 recordings so that later if anyone supplies the lookup table with a 
 given
 input, the table just looks up the recording of the occasion in which 
 the
 original simulated mind was supplied with that exact input in the 
 past, and
 plays it back. Why should merely replaying a recording of something 
 that
 happened to a simulated observer in the past contribute to the 
 measure of
 that observer-moment? I don't believe that playing a videotape of me 
 being
 happy or sad in the past will increase the measure of happy or sad
 observer-moments involving me, after all. And Olympia seems to be 
 somewhat
 similar to a lookup table in that the only way to construct her 
 would be
 to have already run the regular Turing machine program that she is 
 supposed
 to emulate, so that you know in advance the order that the Turing 
 machine's
 read/write head visits different cells, and then you can rearrange the
 positions of those cells so Olympia will visit them in the correct 
 order
 just by going from one cell to the next in line over and over again.


 What if you used a lookup table for only a single neuron in a computer
 simulation of a brain?  So actual calculations for the rest of the
 brain's neurons are performed, but this single neuron just does
 lookups into a table of pre-calculated outputs.  Would consciousness
 still be produced in this case?

 What if you then re-ran the simulation with 10 neurons doing lookups,
 but calculations still being executed for the rest of the simulated
 brain?  Still consciousness is produced?

 What if 10% of the neurons are implemented using lookup tables?  50%?
 90%?  How about all except 1 neuron is implemented via lookup tables,
 but that 1 neuron's outputs are still calculated from inputs?

 At what point does the simulation become a zombie?

 

http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


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Re: Consciousness is information?

2009-05-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


Le 17-mai-09, à 12:43, Alberto G.Corona a écrit :


 The hard problem may be unsolvable, but I think it would be much more
 unsolvable if we don´t fix the easy problem, isn´t?


I think that the hard problem is more easy to solve than the easy 
problem.
Indeed it is a theorem in computer science that an (ideally) correct 
universal machine which introspects itself (in the usual mathematical 
self-referential (Lobian) sense) will discover (not prove, but still 
produce as true) many non machine-communicable statements.

AUDA gives a thorough precise theory of qualia, which is Popper 
refutable, in the (idealist) sense that the quanta appears as 
particular type of sharable first person plural qualia. If it appears 
false on quanta, we can abandon that theory of qualia too!

What is cute in AUDA, is that it provides an explanation why the hard 
problem of consciousness has to seem hard from the point of view of 
the machine. In a sense the hard problem is proved to be unsolvable by 
any direct means, but completely meta-solvable.

It relies mainly on the Gödel points where Penrose and Lucas are wrong: 
machine *can* access their own incompleteness theorem through local 
self-consistency assumptions.





 With a clear idea
 of the easy problem it is possible to infer something about the hard
 problem:

 For example, the latter is a product of the former, because we
 perceive things that have (or had) relevance in evolutionary terms.
 Second, the unitary nature of perception match well with the
 evolutionary explanation My inner self is a private reconstruction,
 for fitness purposes, of how others see me, as an unit of perception
 and purpose, not as a set of processors, motors and sensors, although,
 analytically, we are so. Third, the machinery of this constructed
 inner self sometimes take control (i.e. we feel ourselves capable of
 free will) whenever our acts would impact of the image that others may
 have of ourselves.

 If these conclusions are all in the easy lever, I think that we have
 solved a few of moral and perceptual problems that have puzzled
 philosophers and scientists for centuries. Relabeling them as easy
 problems the instant after an evolutionary explanation of them has
 been aired is preposterous.

 Therefore I think that I answer your question: it´s not only
 information; It´s about a certain kind of information and their own
 processor. The exact nature of this processor that permits qualia is
 not known;


I think we know (assuming comp) the exact nature of that processor. 
It is an immaterial universal machine. The machine does not need to be 
Lobian (as some people think). It needs only to be lobian to be able to 
develop by its own this very special theory of qualia and quanta.

I agree with your critic of consciousness = information. This is not 
even wrong, and Kelly should define what he means by information so 
that we could see what he really means. I suspect Kelly is confusing 
information and information content. Information content needs the 
(immaterial and atemporal) processing of a universal machine or number. 
Not a physical processing, but a processing similar to those in the UD, 
or implemented naturally in (a tiny part) of Arithmetic.




  that’s true, and it´s good from my point of view, because,
 for one side, the unknown is stimulating and for the other,
 reductionist explanations for everything, like the mine above, are a
 bit frustrating.


I can explain in what sense comp is a vaccine against reductionism, but 
you have to be familiar with the UD Argument. Even the physics which 
appears cannot be reduced, still less the person. Hmm ..., you still 
believe we can have both comp and a primitive material universe, isn't 
it?

Computationalism leads to a genuine non trivial and refutable solution 
of both the hard problem of matter *and* the hard problem of 
consciousness. It preserves the necessity of an irreducible gap between 
those things (and other things), but it provides a geometry of that 
gap, together with an explanation of the mystery feeling. Of course (in 
case you have read some of my older post), the geometry of the gap is 
provided by the possible modal semantics of the logic G* \minus G, and 
its intensional variants, (all this on the Sigma_1 restriction, to take 
into account the comp hyp and the Universal Dovetailer in Arithmetic).

The bad news is that the easy problem of matter and consciousness, 
thorugh comp could as well be as diificult as possible. It remains 
possible that only very long computation can lead tp present form of 
human mind and matter. Computationalism does not just reverse math and 
physics, or theology and physics, it reverse hard and easy ...

Eventually everything is reduced to the (deep) mystery of our 
understanding of an assertion like N = {0, 1, 2, ...}.  But, by 
accepting that the expression N = {0, 1, 2, ...} makes sense,  we can 
explain in all detail why this one is absolutely unsolvable. We cannot 

Re: No MWI

2009-05-18 Thread Stathis Papaioannou

2009/5/14 ronaldheld ronaldh...@gmail.com:

 read Aixiv.org:0905.0624v1 (quant-ph) and see if you agree with it

This part at the end, proposing an empirical method of distinguishing
between MWI and single world interpretations and reminiscent of
quantum suicide experiments, is interesting:

Finally, suppose, notwithstanding all the arguments above, that we
arrive at an Everettian theory that, while
perhaps ad hoc and unattractive, is coherent – for example, some
version of the many-minds interpretation[15]. It is
generally believed that, without very advanced technology which allows
the re-interference of macroscopically distinct
branches, such a theory will necessarily be empirically
indistinguishable from Copenhagen quantum theory.
The following argument against this conclusion relies on anthropic
reasoning and also on the hypothesis that species
may evolve a consistent preference for or against higher population
expectation over higher survival probability. An-
thropic reasoning is notoriously tricky to justify, and we may anyway
not necessarily have evolved demonstrable
consistent preferences one way or the other, so the argument may not
necessarily have practical application. Nonethe-
less, it does show in principle that evolutionary evidence could make
many-worlds theories more or less plausible.
Consider a simple model of two species A and B, both of which begin
with population P and are offered, each
year, the option of doing something that depends on a quantum event
and carries a 0.5 probability of extinction and
a 0.5 probability of trebling the species population. Suppose that, if
they reject the option, their population remains
constant, as it does in between these decisions. Species A is
risk-averse, and so always declines the option. Species B
is risk-tolerant, and instinctively driven to maximise expected
population, and so always accepts.
Now let N be a large integer. After N years, if one-world quantum
theory is correct, species A will have population
P, and species B will have either population 0 (with probability (1−(
1
2 )N)) or population 3N (with probability (
1
2 )N).
In other words, species B will almost surely be extinct. If these are
the only two species, and you are alive in the
N-th year, almost certainly you belong to species A.

If many-worlds quantum theory is correct, species A still has
population P in all branches. Species B has population
0 in branches of total Born weight (1 − ( 1
2 )N), and population 3N in branches of total Born weight ( 1
2 )N. Now, if
anthropic reasoning is justifiable here, and you are alive in the N-th
year, almost certainly you belong to species B.
(There are ( 3
2 )N times as many minds belonging to species B as to A after N years.)
In other words, there is a sense in which long-run evolutionary
success is defined by different measures in one-world
and many-worlds quantum theory. If anthropic reasoning were
justifiable, then one could in principle infer whether
one-world or many-worlds quantum theory is likelier correct by seeing
whether one belongs to a Born-weighted
expected population maximising species or to a risk-averse species
that seeks to maximise its Born-weighted survival
probability. Readers may thus wish to consider whether their species
has evolved a coherent strategy of either type.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: logic mailing list

2009-05-18 Thread Bruno Marchal

Hi Abram,


On 24 Apr 2009, at 18:55, Abram Demski wrote:


 I'm starting a mailing list for logic, and I figured some people from
 here might be interested.

 http://groups.google.com/group/one-logic

Interesting! Thanks for the link. But logic is full of mathematical  
mermaids and I am personally more problem driven. I may post some day  
an argument for logical pluralism (even a classical logical argument  
for logical pluralism!), though. Ah! but you can easily guess the  
nature of the argument ...




 I've looked around for a high-quality group that discusses these
 things, but I haven't really found one. The logic-oriented mailing
 lists I've seen are either closed to the public (being only for
 professional logicians, or only for a specific university), or
 abandoned, filled with spam, et cetera.



But it is a very large domain, and a highly technical subject. It is  
not taught in all the universities. It is not a well known subject.
Unlike quantum mechanics and theoretical computer science, the  
difficulty is in grasping what the subject is about.
It take time to understand the difference between formal implication  
and deduction. I have problem to explain the difference between  
computation and description of computation ...




 So, I figured, why not try to
 start my own?


Why not?  Actually I have many questions in logic, but all are  
technical and long to explain. Some have been solved by Eric, who then  
raised new interesting question.

Have you heard about the Curry Howard isomorphism? I have send posts  
on this list on the combinators, and one of the reason for that is  
that combinators can be used for explaining that CH correspondence  
which relates in an amazing way logic and computer science.

Do you know Jean-Louis Krivine? A french logician who try to extend  
the CH (Curry Howard) isomorphism on classical logic and set theory. I  
am not entirely convinced by the details but I suspect something quite  
fundamental and important for the future of computer science and logic.
You can take a look, some of its paper are in english.
http://www.pps.jussieu.fr/~krivine/
Jean-Louis Krivine wrote also my favorite book in set theory.
The CH correspondence of the (classical) Pierce law as a comp look!

Don't hesitate to send us link to anything relating computer science  
and logic (like the Curry-Howard isomorphism), because, although I  
doubt it can be used easily in our framework, in a direct way, it  
could have some impact in the future.  Category theory is a very nice  
subject too, but is a bit technically demanding at the start. Yet, it  
makes possible to link knot theory, quantum computation, number  
theory, gravity, ...
Not yet consciousness, though. Intensional free mathematics still  
resist ...




 In fact, I originally joined this list hoping for a logic-oriented
 mailing list. I haven't been entirely disappointed there,

You are kind!


 but at the
 same time that isn't what this list is really intended for.

Logic is a very interesting field. Too bad it is not so well known by  
the large public. The everything list is more theory of everything  
oriented. Logic has a big role to play, (assuming comp) but physics,  
cognitive science and even theology can hardly be avoided in a truly  
unifying quest ... And we try to be as less technic as possible, which  
is for me very hard,  ... oscillating between UDA and AUDA.

Best,

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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Re: logic mailing list

2009-05-18 Thread John Mikes
Bruno:

could you tell in one sentence YOUR identification for logic?
(I can read the dictionaries, Wiki, etc.)
I always say :common sense, but what I am referring to is
   *-- --  M Y -- -- common sense, *
distorted - OK, interpreted - according to my genetic built, my experience
(sum of memories), instinctive/emotional traits and all the rest ab out what
we have no idea  today yet.

I never studied 'formal' logic, because I wanted to start on my own (online
mostly) and ALL started using signs not even reproducible on keyboards and
not explained what they are standing for. As I guessed: the 'professors'
issued notes at the beginning of the college-courses (($$s?)) and THERE
the students could learn the 'vocabulary' of those signs.
You also use some of them.

I was looking at a dozen books as well and did not find those signes
explained, not in footnotes, not in appendicis, not as intro- or post-
chapters. They were just applied from page 1.
So I gave up.

John M

On Mon, May 18, 2009 at 12:54 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:


 Hi Abram,


 On 24 Apr 2009, at 18:55, Abram Demski wrote:

 
  I'm starting a mailing list for logic, and I figured some people from
  here might be interested.
 
  http://groups.google.com/group/one-logic

 Interesting! Thanks for the link. But logic is full of mathematical
 mermaids and I am personally more problem driven. I may post some day
 an argument for logical pluralism (even a classical logical argument
 for logical pluralism!), though. Ah! but you can easily guess the
 nature of the argument ...


 
 
  I've looked around for a high-quality group that discusses these
  things, but I haven't really found one. The logic-oriented mailing
  lists I've seen are either closed to the public (being only for
  professional logicians, or only for a specific university), or
  abandoned, filled with spam, et cetera.



 But it is a very large domain, and a highly technical subject. It is
 not taught in all the universities. It is not a well known subject.
 Unlike quantum mechanics and theoretical computer science, the
 difficulty is in grasping what the subject is about.
 It take time to understand the difference between formal implication
 and deduction. I have problem to explain the difference between
 computation and description of computation ...




  So, I figured, why not try to
  start my own?


 Why not?  Actually I have many questions in logic, but all are
 technical and long to explain. Some have been solved by Eric, who then
 raised new interesting question.

 Have you heard about the Curry Howard isomorphism? I have send posts
 on this list on the combinators, and one of the reason for that is
 that combinators can be used for explaining that CH correspondence
 which relates in an amazing way logic and computer science.

 Do you know Jean-Louis Krivine? A french logician who try to extend
 the CH (Curry Howard) isomorphism on classical logic and set theory. I
 am not entirely convinced by the details but I suspect something quite
 fundamental and important for the future of computer science and logic.
 You can take a look, some of its paper are in english.
 http://www.pps.jussieu.fr/~krivine/
 Jean-Louis Krivine wrote also my favorite book in set theory.
 The CH correspondence of the (classical) Pierce law as a comp look!

 Don't hesitate to send us link to anything relating computer science
 and logic (like the Curry-Howard isomorphism), because, although I
 doubt it can be used easily in our framework, in a direct way, it
 could have some impact in the future.  Category theory is a very nice
 subject too, but is a bit technically demanding at the start. Yet, it
 makes possible to link knot theory, quantum computation, number
 theory, gravity, ...
 Not yet consciousness, though. Intensional free mathematics still
 resist ...


 
 
  In fact, I originally joined this list hoping for a logic-oriented
  mailing list. I haven't been entirely disappointed there,

 You are kind!


  but at the
  same time that isn't what this list is really intended for.

 Logic is a very interesting field. Too bad it is not so well known by
 the large public. The everything list is more theory of everything
 oriented. Logic has a big role to play, (assuming comp) but physics,
 cognitive science and even theology can hardly be avoided in a truly
 unifying quest ... And we try to be as less technic as possible, which
 is for me very hard,  ... oscillating between UDA and AUDA.

 Best,

 Bruno



 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




 


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Re: logic mailing list

2009-05-18 Thread Abram Demski

 I was looking at a dozen books as well and did not find those signes
 explained, not in footnotes, not in appendicis, not as intro- or post-
 chapters. They were just applied from page 1.
 So I gave up.

That's funny. I never had that experience. There *are* a great many
signs to learn, but somehow I read all the books in the right order so
that I know the simpler signs that the more complex signs were being
explained with. :)

--Abram

On Mon, May 18, 2009 at 3:00 PM, John Mikes jami...@gmail.com wrote:
 Bruno:

 could you tell in one sentence YOUR identification for logic?
 (I can read the dictionaries, Wiki, etc.)
 I always say :common sense, but what I am referring to is
    -- --  M Y -- -- common sense,
 distorted - OK, interpreted - according to my genetic built, my experience
 (sum of memories), instinctive/emotional traits and all the rest ab out what
 we have no idea  today yet.

 I never studied 'formal' logic, because I wanted to start on my own (online
 mostly) and ALL started using signs not even reproducible on keyboards and
 not explained what they are standing for. As I guessed: the 'professors'
 issued notes at the beginning of the college-courses (($$s?)) and THERE
 the students could learn the 'vocabulary' of those signs.
 You also use some of them.

 I was looking at a dozen books as well and did not find those signes
 explained, not in footnotes, not in appendicis, not as intro- or post-
 chapters. They were just applied from page 1.
 So I gave up.

 John M

 On Mon, May 18, 2009 at 12:54 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 Hi Abram,


 On 24 Apr 2009, at 18:55, Abram Demski wrote:

 
  I'm starting a mailing list for logic, and I figured some people from
  here might be interested.
 
  http://groups.google.com/group/one-logic

 Interesting! Thanks for the link. But logic is full of mathematical
 mermaids and I am personally more problem driven. I may post some day
 an argument for logical pluralism (even a classical logical argument
 for logical pluralism!), though. Ah! but you can easily guess the
 nature of the argument ...


 
 
  I've looked around for a high-quality group that discusses these
  things, but I haven't really found one. The logic-oriented mailing
  lists I've seen are either closed to the public (being only for
  professional logicians, or only for a specific university), or
  abandoned, filled with spam, et cetera.



 But it is a very large domain, and a highly technical subject. It is
 not taught in all the universities. It is not a well known subject.
 Unlike quantum mechanics and theoretical computer science, the
 difficulty is in grasping what the subject is about.
 It take time to understand the difference between formal implication
 and deduction. I have problem to explain the difference between
 computation and description of computation ...




  So, I figured, why not try to
  start my own?


 Why not?  Actually I have many questions in logic, but all are
 technical and long to explain. Some have been solved by Eric, who then
 raised new interesting question.

 Have you heard about the Curry Howard isomorphism? I have send posts
 on this list on the combinators, and one of the reason for that is
 that combinators can be used for explaining that CH correspondence
 which relates in an amazing way logic and computer science.

 Do you know Jean-Louis Krivine? A french logician who try to extend
 the CH (Curry Howard) isomorphism on classical logic and set theory. I
 am not entirely convinced by the details but I suspect something quite
 fundamental and important for the future of computer science and logic.
 You can take a look, some of its paper are in english.
 http://www.pps.jussieu.fr/~krivine/
 Jean-Louis Krivine wrote also my favorite book in set theory.
 The CH correspondence of the (classical) Pierce law as a comp look!

 Don't hesitate to send us link to anything relating computer science
 and logic (like the Curry-Howard isomorphism), because, although I
 doubt it can be used easily in our framework, in a direct way, it
 could have some impact in the future.  Category theory is a very nice
 subject too, but is a bit technically demanding at the start. Yet, it
 makes possible to link knot theory, quantum computation, number
 theory, gravity, ...
 Not yet consciousness, though. Intensional free mathematics still
 resist ...


 
 
  In fact, I originally joined this list hoping for a logic-oriented
  mailing list. I haven't been entirely disappointed there,

 You are kind!


  but at the
  same time that isn't what this list is really intended for.

 Logic is a very interesting field. Too bad it is not so well known by
 the large public. The everything list is more theory of everything
 oriented. Logic has a big role to play, (assuming comp) but physics,
 cognitive science and even theology can hardly be avoided in a truly
 unifying quest ... And we try to be as less technic as possible, which
 is for me very hard,  ... oscillating between 

Re: logic mailing list

2009-05-18 Thread Abram Demski

Bruno,

I know just a little about the curry-howard isomorphism... I looked
into it somewhat, because I was thinking about the possibility of
representing programs as proof methods (so that a single run of the
program would correspond to a proof about the relationship between the
input and the output). But, it seems that the curry-howard
relationship between programs and proofs is much different than what I
was thinking of. In the end, I don't really see any *use* to the
curry-howard isomorphism! Sure, the correspondence is interesting, but
what can we do with it? Perhaps you can answer this.

--Abram

On Mon, May 18, 2009 at 12:54 PM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote:

 Hi Abram,


 On 24 Apr 2009, at 18:55, Abram Demski wrote:


 I'm starting a mailing list for logic, and I figured some people from
 here might be interested.

 http://groups.google.com/group/one-logic

 Interesting! Thanks for the link. But logic is full of mathematical
 mermaids and I am personally more problem driven. I may post some day
 an argument for logical pluralism (even a classical logical argument
 for logical pluralism!), though. Ah! but you can easily guess the
 nature of the argument ...




 I've looked around for a high-quality group that discusses these
 things, but I haven't really found one. The logic-oriented mailing
 lists I've seen are either closed to the public (being only for
 professional logicians, or only for a specific university), or
 abandoned, filled with spam, et cetera.



 But it is a very large domain, and a highly technical subject. It is
 not taught in all the universities. It is not a well known subject.
 Unlike quantum mechanics and theoretical computer science, the
 difficulty is in grasping what the subject is about.
 It take time to understand the difference between formal implication
 and deduction. I have problem to explain the difference between
 computation and description of computation ...




 So, I figured, why not try to
 start my own?


 Why not?  Actually I have many questions in logic, but all are
 technical and long to explain. Some have been solved by Eric, who then
 raised new interesting question.

 Have you heard about the Curry Howard isomorphism? I have send posts
 on this list on the combinators, and one of the reason for that is
 that combinators can be used for explaining that CH correspondence
 which relates in an amazing way logic and computer science.

 Do you know Jean-Louis Krivine? A french logician who try to extend
 the CH (Curry Howard) isomorphism on classical logic and set theory. I
 am not entirely convinced by the details but I suspect something quite
 fundamental and important for the future of computer science and logic.
 You can take a look, some of its paper are in english.
 http://www.pps.jussieu.fr/~krivine/
 Jean-Louis Krivine wrote also my favorite book in set theory.
 The CH correspondence of the (classical) Pierce law as a comp look!

 Don't hesitate to send us link to anything relating computer science
 and logic (like the Curry-Howard isomorphism), because, although I
 doubt it can be used easily in our framework, in a direct way, it
 could have some impact in the future.  Category theory is a very nice
 subject too, but is a bit technically demanding at the start. Yet, it
 makes possible to link knot theory, quantum computation, number
 theory, gravity, ...
 Not yet consciousness, though. Intensional free mathematics still
 resist ...




 In fact, I originally joined this list hoping for a logic-oriented
 mailing list. I haven't been entirely disappointed there,

 You are kind!


 but at the
 same time that isn't what this list is really intended for.

 Logic is a very interesting field. Too bad it is not so well known by
 the large public. The everything list is more theory of everything
 oriented. Logic has a big role to play, (assuming comp) but physics,
 cognitive science and even theology can hardly be avoided in a truly
 unifying quest ... And we try to be as less technic as possible, which
 is for me very hard,  ... oscillating between UDA and AUDA.

 Best,

 Bruno



 http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




 




-- 
Abram Demski
http://dragonlogic-ai.blogspot.com/

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Re: Consciousness is information?

2009-05-18 Thread George Levy
Kelly Harmon wrote:

 What if you used a lookup table for only a single neuron in a computer
 simulation of a brain?
   
Hi Kelly

Zombie arguments involving look up tables are faulty because look up 
tables are not closed systems. They require someone to fill them up.
To resolve these arguments you need to include the creator of the look 
up table in the argument. (Inclusion can be across widely different time 
periods and spacial location)

George

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