Re: Dreams and Machines

2009-07-18 Thread Rex Allen

On Sat, Jul 18, 2009 at 11:55 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
> I am OK with all this. It has to be like this if we take the comp hyp

So what are your thoughts on my question as to whether abstract
concepts other than numbers also exist in a platonic sense?  For
example, the idea of "red"?

So obviously we can cast everything as numbers and say, "In this
program, 0xff00 represents red".  But RED is what we're really
talking about here, and 0xff00 is just a place holder...a symbol
for what actually exists.

In your view, Bruno (or David, or anyone else who has an opinion),
what kinds of things actually "exist"?  What does it mean to say that
something "exists"?

It seems to me that maybe consciousness is actually very simple.  It
is just a group of platonic ideals, like red, that are related to each
other by a point of view:  "I like red", or "I see a red sphere."

Maybe what is complicated is constructing or identifying a causal
structure (e.g., a machine, a brain, a program, etc) whose evolving
state can be interpreted as representing a series of "connected" or
"related" instances of consciousness.  But the machine (physical or
otherwise) is NOT that consciousness, the machine just represents that
consciousness.

In this view, consciousness itself consists directly of the abstract
platonic ideals that form the contents of a given moment of
consciousness.


> It remains to explain the relative stability of that illusion. How and
> why some dreams glue, in a way sufficiently precise for making
> predictions about them.

Maybe unstable illusions exist, but, being unstable, don't ponder such
questions?

Obviously we have such conscious beings here in this world, with
schizophrenics and the like.

So your questions about "why are my perceptions so orderly", would NOT
be universally valid questions, because there are conscious entities
whose perceptions are NOT orderly.

And I would say that even my perceptions are not consistently orderly,
as when I dream I often experience strange scenarios.

To say that dreaming and hallucinating are special cases I think is to
make an unfounded assumption.  It would seem to me that orderly
perceptions are the special case, and dream-logic realities would be
the norm.

If consciousness is in some way a result of computation, then a
program that generates all possible mind-simulations will surely
result in the vast majority of resulting minds experiencing
dream-logic realities, not "law-and-order" realities like ours.

I think Sean Carroll (who I'm reasonably sure would disagree with
everything I've proposed above, but still) had a pretty good point on
such "counter-intuitive" predictions:

"The same logic applies, for example, to the highly contentious case
of the multiverse. The multiverse isn’t, by itself, a theory; it’s a
prediction of a certain class of theories. If the idea were simply
“Hey, we don’t know what happens outside our observable universe, so
maybe all sorts of crazy things happen,” it would be laughably
uninteresting. By scientific standards, it would fall woefully short.
But the point is that various theoretical attempts to explain
phenomena that we directly observe right in front of us — like
gravity, and quantum field theory — lead us to predict that our
universe should be one of many, and subsequently suggest that we take
that situation seriously when we talk about the “naturalness” of
various features of our local environment. The point, at the moment,
is not whether there really is or is not a multiverse; it’s that the
way we think about it and reach conclusions about its plausibility is
through exactly the same kind of scientific reasoning we’ve been using
for a long time now. Science doesn’t pass judgment on phenomena; it
passes judgment on theories."

So, I could continue further and go into a lengthy defense of why I
think this supports what I'm saying, BUT maybe you'll come to the same
conclusion I have and I can save myself a lot of typing!  So, I'll
just try that approach first.

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Re: Dreams and Machines

2009-07-18 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 17 Jul 2009, at 09:08, Rex Allen wrote:

>
> On Thu, Jul 16, 2009 at 8:38 PM, David Nyman  
> wrote:
>> In COMP, the 'mechanism and language of dreams' is
>> posited to be those elements of the number realm and its operators
>> that are deemed necessary to instantiate a 'universal TM' (i.e. one
>> that - assuming CT to be true - is capable of computing any  
>> computable
>> function).
>
> So it occurs to me to ask:  do abstract concepts other than numbers
> also exist in a platonic sense?
>
> What about "red", for example?  Does the concept of red exist in a way
> that is similar to the concept of "3"?
>
> So if I write a computer program that deals with colors, red might be
> represented by the hex number 0xff00.  The hex number itself is
> represented in memory by a sequence of 32 bits.  Each bit is
> physically represented by some electrons and atoms in a microchip
> being in some specific state.
>
> But ultimately what is being represented is the idea of "red".  So in
> this particular example, does this not make "red" a more fundamental
> concept than the number that is used to represent it in the computer
> program?  Is not "red" the MOST fundamental concept in this scenario?
>
> So the typical materialist view is that we are in some way made from
> atoms, though they don't usually go so far as to say that we ARE those
> atoms.  Rather we are the information that is stored by virtue of the
> atoms being in a particular configuration.  The "actually existing"
> atoms of our body form a vessel for our information, and thus for our
> consciousness.  But in their view, we exist only because the atoms
> exist.  When the vessel is destroyed, so are we.  The atoms are
> fundamental, our consciousness is derivative.
>
> But taking a more platonic view, abstract concepts also exist.  And if
> this is so, could we not just as well say that our conscious
> subjective experience is formed from particular configurations of
> these platonically existing abstract concepts?
>
> In this view, these abstract concepts stand in specific relations to
> one another, like symbols on a map, representing the layout (the
> landscape) of a particular moment of consciousness.
>
> And such subjective conscious experiences would include (but are not
> limited to) those that lead us to mistakenly infer the actual
> existence of an external world whose fundamental constituents are
> electrons and atoms and photons and all the rest.


I am OK with all this. It has to be like this if we take the comp hyp  
(this is not trivial).
It remains to explain the relative stability of that illusion. How and  
why some dreams glue, in a way sufficiently precise for making  
predictions about them. Computer science provides hints.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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