Re: Dreaming On
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > 2009/8/22 Brent Meeker : > >> That's an interesting question and one that I think relates to the >> importance of context. A scan of your brain would capture all the >> information in the Shannon/Boltzman sense, i.e. it would determine which >> of the possible configurations and processes were realized. However, >> those concerned about the "hard problem", will point out that this >> misses the fact that the information represents or "means" something. >> To know the meaning of the information would require knowledge of the >> world in which the brain acts and perceives, including a lot of >> evolutionary history. Image scanning the brain of an alien found in a >> crash at Roswell. Without knowledge of how he acts and the evolutionary >> history of his species it would be essentially impossible to guess the >> meaning of the patterns in his brain. My point is that it is not just >> computation that is consciousness or cognition, but computation with >> meaning, which means within a certain context of action. > > You wouldn't be able to guess what the alien is thinking by scanning > his brain, but you could then run a simulation, exposing it to various > environmental stimuli, and it should behave the same way as the > original brain (if weak AI is true) and have the same experiences as > the original brain (if strong AI is true). > > True. But the point was directed at the MGA. Part of the simulation must be outside the brain - and possibly are very great deal. So while it seems intuitively clear that the brain can be emulated, it's not so clear that the brain + enough environment can be. Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
2009/8/22 Brent Meeker : > That's an interesting question and one that I think relates to the > importance of context. A scan of your brain would capture all the > information in the Shannon/Boltzman sense, i.e. it would determine which > of the possible configurations and processes were realized. However, > those concerned about the "hard problem", will point out that this > misses the fact that the information represents or "means" something. > To know the meaning of the information would require knowledge of the > world in which the brain acts and perceives, including a lot of > evolutionary history. Image scanning the brain of an alien found in a > crash at Roswell. Without knowledge of how he acts and the evolutionary > history of his species it would be essentially impossible to guess the > meaning of the patterns in his brain. My point is that it is not just > computation that is consciousness or cognition, but computation with > meaning, which means within a certain context of action. You wouldn't be able to guess what the alien is thinking by scanning his brain, but you could then run a simulation, exposing it to various environmental stimuli, and it should behave the same way as the original brain (if weak AI is true) and have the same experiences as the original brain (if strong AI is true). -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The seven step series
Mirek, I think it must be a very effective method of teaching binary numbers. Perhaps I'll try it on my grandchildren. My four-year-old grandson calls VCR tapes "rectangular DVD's". So he's probably ready for abstract thinking. Thanks for the lesson. marty a. - Original Message - From: "Mirek Dobsicek" To: Sent: Saturday, August 22, 2009 11:05 AM Subject: Re: The seven step series > > Marty, > > If I can ask, I'd be really interested what do you think of this > socratic experiment > http://www.garlikov.com/Soc_Meth.html > > Cheers, > mirek > > > > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 22 Aug 2009, at 20:06, Brent Meeker wrote: > >> Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> >>> >>> If the context, or even the whole physical universe, is needed, it is >>> part of the "generalized" brain. Either the "generalized" brain is >>> Turing emulable, and the reversal reasoning will proceed, or it is >>> not, and the digital mechanist thesis has to be abandoned. >> That's what makes the point interesting. Many, even most, >> materialists suppose that a brain can be replaced by functionally >> identical elements with no dimunition of consciousness and that a >> brain is Turing-emulable BUT the "generalized brain" may not be >> Turing-emulable. I personally would say no to a doctor who proposed >> to replace the whole physical universe (and me) with an emulation. > > > OK. > Do you agree that this, not only entails the falsity of CTM > (computationalist theory of mind), but also on any computationalist > theory of matter. Yes, so long as by "computation" you mean only the Church-Turing definitions of computation. > > Your consciousness has to be related to a non computable physical > process, in actuality. Quantum computer would not be universal in > Deutsch sense. > > I am OK, with this. My point is not to convince people that comp is > correct, but only that comp makes physics "coming from number dreams", > to be short. > > Saying "no" to the doctor, is your right (even your comp justifiable > right), but relatively to the reasoning it is equivalent with stopping > at step zero. > > So now, your mind is free to look if the reasoning is valid. No worry > with the uncomfortable consequences, given that you don't believe in > the initial axiom. Right? > > Well, you may be not interested in the consequence of a theory in > which you don't believe, but you may be intrigued. I am interested. I don't believe or disbelieve. Maybe the "generalized brain" is Turing emulable. I'm just not nearly so confident that it is as I am that my brain is emulable. > > Unless you believe the comp hypothesis is inconsistent? I don't think > you believe this either. Not inconsistent; but I have considerable empathy with Peter's view. My general attitude is that "exist" is just a word to name a concept we invent and we can invent different kinds of existence: physical it-kicks-back existence, mathematical it's-provable-from-axioms existence, etc. I may not agree that arithmetic is what's really real, but I regard your theory as an interesting model and I hope it leads to predicting something we don't know. Brent > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
On 22 Aug 2009, at 20:06, Brent Meeker wrote: > > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> >> >> >> If the context, or even the whole physical universe, is needed, it is >> part of the "generalized" brain. Either the "generalized" brain is >> Turing emulable, and the reversal reasoning will proceed, or it is >> not, and the digital mechanist thesis has to be abandoned. > > That's what makes the point interesting. Many, even most, > materialists suppose that a brain can be replaced by functionally > identical elements with no dimunition of consciousness and that a > brain is Turing-emulable BUT the "generalized brain" may not be > Turing-emulable. I personally would say no to a doctor who proposed > to replace the whole physical universe (and me) with an emulation. OK. Do you agree that this, not only entails the falsity of CTM (computationalist theory of mind), but also on any computationalist theory of matter. Your consciousness has to be related to a non computable physical process, in actuality. Quantum computer would not be universal in Deutsch sense. I am OK, with this. My point is not to convince people that comp is correct, but only that comp makes physics "coming from number dreams", to be short. Saying "no" to the doctor, is your right (even your comp justifiable right), but relatively to the reasoning it is equivalent with stopping at step zero. So now, your mind is free to look if the reasoning is valid. No worry with the uncomfortable consequences, given that you don't believe in the initial axiom. Right? Well, you may be not interested in the consequence of a theory in which you don't believe, but you may be intrigued. Unless you believe the comp hypothesis is inconsistent? I don't think you believe this either. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 21 Aug 2009, at 22:01, Brent Meeker wrote: > >> Flammarion wrote: >>> Do you think that if you scanned my brain right down to the atomic >>> level, >>> you still wouldn't have captured all the information? >>> >> That's an interesting question and one that I think relates to the >> importance of context. A scan of your brain would capture all the >> information in the Shannon/Boltzman sense, i.e. it would determine >> which >> of the possible configurations and processes were realized. However, >> those concerned about the "hard problem", will point out that this >> misses the fact that the information represents or "means" something. >> To know the meaning of the information would require knowledge of the >> world in which the brain acts and perceives, including a lot of >> evolutionary history. Image scanning the brain of an alien found >> in a >> crash at Roswell. Without knowledge of how he acts and the >> evolutionary >> history of his species it would be essentially impossible to guess the >> meaning of the patterns in his brain. My point is that it is not just >> computation that is consciousness or cognition, but computation with >> meaning, which means within a certain context of action. > > > > If the context, or even the whole physical universe, is needed, it is > part of the "generalized" brain. Either the "generalized" brain is > Turing emulable, and the reversal reasoning will proceed, or it is > not, and the digital mechanist thesis has to be abandoned. That's what makes the point interesting. Many, even most, materialists suppose that a brain can be replaced by functionally identical elements with no dimunition of consciousness and that a brain is Turing-emulable BUT the "generalized brain" may not be Turing-emulable. I personally would say no to a doctor who proposed to replace the whole physical universe (and me) with an emulation. Brent > > Humans, and actually, any mechanical entity cannot understand their > own patterns in their brains, but we don't need to do that to be able > to "use" our brain and be conscious. If the crash at Roswell has not > demolished the brain of E.T., or if the scan of his brain his > faithful, so that his brain can be reconstituted, nobody has to > understand the brain pattern for the E.T. himself to have an > experience of his consciousness. > > > > >> In fact the fact that we can't see the workings of consciousness is >> inherent it it. We see through it. > > Exactly, and this can related to what I say above. > > >> It is notorious that thoughts come >> into consciousness with no discernible cause - as in the Poincare >> effect. > > That is most plausible, and there are evidence that life (notably the > heart and the brain) exploits the so called deterministic chaos (like > in Verhulst bifurcation, and the Mandelbrot set). > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The seven step series
m.a. wrote: > a towel into the ring. > I simply don't have the sort of mind that takes to juggling letters, > numbers and symbols in increasingly fine-grained, complex arrangements. [...] Marty, If I can ask, I'd be really interested what do you think of this socratic experiment http://www.garlikov.com/Soc_Meth.html Cheers, mirek --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Emulation and Stuff
On 19 Aug 2009, at 22:26, Flammarion wrote: >> >> I understand both your discomfort with arithmetical realism and your >> defence of PM, but this discussion hinges on "CTM +PM = true". >> Couldn't we try to focus on the validity or otherwise of this claim? > > OK. It's invalid because you can't have computaiton with zero phyiscal > activity. This could be a critic to Maudlin's Olympia argument, it does not apply to MGA. Precisely, it does not apply to MGA1+MGA2 (see the MGA thread). MGA3 makes a link between Olympia and MGA, but is not needed. MGA1+MGA2 shows that if we accept the physical supervenience thesis, then we have to accept that consciousness supervenes "in real time" on the movie of a computation, which, I think, is already ridiculous. In MGA3 the stroboscope illustrates this, without reducing any physical activity at all. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Emulation and Stuff
On 21 Aug 2009, at 10:28, Flammarion wrote: > 1. Something that ontologically exists can only be caused or generated > by something else that does > 2. I ontologically exist > 3. According to you, I am generated by the UD > 4. Therefore the UD must ontologically exist. > > Step 4 is really step 0 which I have worked backwards > to here 5. But the UD exists only mathematically. Thus, ontological existence = mathematical existence. > There is no usual one, since there is no one agreed ontology > of mathematics. For sets and functions, you may be right. For numbers, there is a general mathematical agreement. There may be no philosophical argument, but this is not relevant to undersatnd the non philosophical reasoning. > You are aware. are you not, that philosophers > and mathematicians are still writing books and papers attacking > and defending Platonism and other approaches? Platonism is used by both philosopher and mathematician as something far more general than arithmetical realism, on which all mathematicians agree. It is believed explcitly by many physicists too, like David Deutsch, Roger Penrose, and those who use math in physics. >> By comp, the ontic >> theory of everything is shown to be any theory in which I can >> represent the computable function. The very weak Robinson Arithmetic >> is already enough. > > I am not interested in haggling over which pixies exist. This may be the root of your problem. >> comp = CTM. > > It clearly isn't by the defintiion you gave in > your SANE paper. All right. As I said: comp is CTM + "2 + 2 = 4". > Classical logic is just a formal rule. It depends on the realm in which you apply classical logic. In computer science people admit that a running program will either halt, or not halt, even in case we don't know. This is a non formal use of classical logic. > Bivalence is not Platonism Exactly. This is one more reason to distinguish carefully "arithmetical realism" (bivalence in the realm of numbers), and Platonism (something huge in philosophy and theology). > So what? If I am material the reasoning is correct. Since the > alternatives > to my being material are inherently unlikely, my reasoning is still > *probably* correct. You are telling me that if you are material, then you are material. > >> I begin to believe what Jesse and David says: you are dodging the >> issue. > > What issue? CTM and weak materialism are epistemologically incompabible. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Dreaming On
On 21 Aug 2009, at 22:01, Brent Meeker wrote: > > Flammarion wrote: >> >> Do you think that if you scanned my brain right down to the atomic >> level, >> you still wouldn't have captured all the information? >> > > That's an interesting question and one that I think relates to the > importance of context. A scan of your brain would capture all the > information in the Shannon/Boltzman sense, i.e. it would determine > which > of the possible configurations and processes were realized. However, > those concerned about the "hard problem", will point out that this > misses the fact that the information represents or "means" something. > To know the meaning of the information would require knowledge of the > world in which the brain acts and perceives, including a lot of > evolutionary history. Image scanning the brain of an alien found > in a > crash at Roswell. Without knowledge of how he acts and the > evolutionary > history of his species it would be essentially impossible to guess the > meaning of the patterns in his brain. My point is that it is not just > computation that is consciousness or cognition, but computation with > meaning, which means within a certain context of action. If the context, or even the whole physical universe, is needed, it is part of the "generalized" brain. Either the "generalized" brain is Turing emulable, and the reversal reasoning will proceed, or it is not, and the digital mechanist thesis has to be abandoned. Humans, and actually, any mechanical entity cannot understand their own patterns in their brains, but we don't need to do that to be able to "use" our brain and be conscious. If the crash at Roswell has not demolished the brain of E.T., or if the scan of his brain his faithful, so that his brain can be reconstituted, nobody has to understand the brain pattern for the E.T. himself to have an experience of his consciousness. > In fact the fact that we can't see the workings of consciousness is > inherent it it. We see through it. Exactly, and this can related to what I say above. > It is notorious that thoughts come > into consciousness with no discernible cause - as in the Poincare > effect. That is most plausible, and there are evidence that life (notably the heart and the brain) exploits the so called deterministic chaos (like in Verhulst bifurcation, and the Mandelbrot set). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
