Re: Compatibilism
On Nov 21, 6:43 pm, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:36 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 19, 3:11 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Thu, Nov 18, 2010 at 9:56 AM, Jason Resch jasonre...@gmail.com wrote: Rex, Your post reminded me of the quote (of which I cannot recall the source) where someone asked Who pushes who around inside the brain?, meaning is it the matter that causes thought to move around a certain way, or is it the opposite? The looped hierarchies described by Hofstadter, if present, make this a difficult question to answer. If the highest levels of thought and reason are required in your decision making, does it still make sense to say we are slaves of deterministic motions of particles or is that missing a few steps? Well, I find it entirely conceivable that fundamental physical laws acting on fundamental physical entities (particles, fields, strings, whatever) could account for human behavior and ability. So if human behavior and ability is what we are trying to explain, then I see no reason to invoke thought and reason as causal forces No-one is. They are just valid descriptions. There is no argument to the effect that logic is causal or it is nothing. It is not the case that causal explanation is the only form of explanagion “Valid descriptions” don’t account for why things are this way rather than some other way. If a higher level description is a valid description of some microphysics, then it will be an explanation of why the result happened given the initial conditions It won't solve the trilemma, but neither will microphysical causality Only causal explanations do that. . And, even if you wanted to, I don't see how they could be made to serve that role. 1Z and I discussed this in the other thread. We don't invoke thought and reason to explain the abilities and behavior of chess playing computers Sometimes we do...see Dennett;s intentional stance See my other post in the previous thread on shortcuts, forests, and trees. - and while human behavior and ability is much more complex and extensive, I think it can be put in the same general category. Dennett would agree, but push the logic in the other direction: Humans are a complex sort of robot. Wild speculation. As I said before, materialism could conceivably explain human ability and behavior, but in my opinion runs aground at human consciousness. Therefore, I doubt that humans are a complex sort of robot. Is human consciousness causally effective? Humans have intentionality. Granted. I do anyway. So at least one human does. Therefore some other, sufficiently complex, robots have intentionality Not proven. Neither is your version of the argument -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Compatibilism
On Nov 21, 6:35 pm, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: On Fri, Nov 19, 2010 at 7:28 AM, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Nov 18, 6:31 am, Rex Allen rexallen31...@gmail.com wrote: My position is: So either there is a reason for what I choose to do, or there isn't. If there is a reason, then the reason determined the choice. No free will. Unless you determined the reason. How would you do that? By what means? According to what rule? Using what process? If you determined the reason, what determined you? Why are you in the particular state you're in? If there exists some rule that translates your specific state into some particular choice, then there's still no free will. The rule determined the choice. And if there isn't...you have an action that is reasoned yet undetermined, as required =*=*=*= As for my definition of free will: The ability to make choices that are neither random nor caused. Obviously there is no such ability, since random and caused exhaust the possibilities. But some people believe in the existence of such an ability anyway. Free Will is defined as the power or ability to rationally choose and consciously perform actions, at least some of which are not brought about necessarily and inevitably by external circumstances. How does this differ in meaning from my definition? I don't think it does. Not that according to this definition: 1. Free will is not deterministic behaviour. It is not driven by external circumstances. OK. Not in conflict with my definition. 2. Nor is free will is randomness or mere caprice. (Rationally choose and consciously perform). OK. Not in conflict with my definition. 3. Free will requires independence from external circumstances. It does not require independence or separation from one's own self. Ones actions must be related to ones thoughts and motives Related by what? Deterministic rules? Probabilistic? If one's actions are determined by ones thoughts and motives, what determines one's thoughts and motives? And why do some particular set of thoughts and motives result in one choice instead of some other? If there is no reason for one choice instead of the other, the choice was random. 4. But not complete independence. Free will does not require that all our actions are free in this sense, only that some actions are not entirely un-free. (...at least some of which...). OK. Not in conflict with my definition. 5. Free will also does not require that any one action is entirely free. In particular, free will s not omnipotence: it does not require an ability to transcend natural laws, only the ability to select actions from what is physically possible. Select using what rule? What process? What mechanism? Magic? Either there is a reason that you selected the action you did, in which case the reason determined the selection - or there isn't, in which case the selection was random. Also the phrase from what is physically possible is suspicious. If the natural laws determine what is physically possible, don't they determine everything? Not if they are probablistic. In a probablistic universe, some things are still impossible Where does this leave room for free will? the ability to select actions from what is physically possible Select by means that is neither random nor caused. Okay. That's what I said. Select means it is neither determined nor unreasoned 6. Free will as defined above does not make any assumptions about the ontological nature of the self/mind/soul. There is a theory, according to which a supernatural soul pulls the strings of the body. That theory is all too often confused with free will. It might be taken as an explanaiton of free will, but it specifies a kind of mechanism or explanation — not a phenomenon to be explained. OK. Not in conflict with my definition. I.1.v Libertarianism — A Prima Facie case for free will As for the rest of it, I read it, but didn't find it convincing on any level. RIG + SIS Free Will A random process coupled to a deterministic process isn't free will. It's just a random process coupled to a deterministic process. If you insist that FW is a Tertium Datur that is fundamenally different from both determinism and causation, then you won't accept a mixture. However, I don;t think Tertium Datur is a good definition of DW sinc e it is too question begging If you ask most people is this free will? - they will say no. Free will (in most peoples estimation) requires a process that is neither random *nor* determinstic. Surely not most people. Theres a lot of compatibilists about, for instance. Not one that is both. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
