Re: Neurobiologists Find that Weak Electrical Fields in the Brain Help Neurons Fire Together
Hi Russel & Gang, I just sent this around to an internal email group === Hi, It occurred to me that the latest empirical evidence surrounding brain endogenous fields (the subject of my PhD thesis) may be of general interest to the group. The actual science (and supplementary material) is here: *Anastassiou, C. A., Perin, R., Markram, H. and Koch, C. 'Ephaptic Coupling of Cortical Neurons' Nature Neuroscience vol. 14, no. 2, 2011. 217-223. * The result has also been summarized at physorg here "Neurobiologists find that weak electrical fields in the brain help neurons fire together" http://www.physorg.com/news/2011-02-neurobiologists-weak-electrical-fields-brain.html I'd like to encourage everyone to consider that the role of fields is likely to impact neural modelling in due course. The little capacitor in the Hodgkin Huxley model is going to get a lot of attention! Meanwhile, the context of my PhD is one of supplying the mechanism. The empirical work reveals the phenomenon. The researchers involved have no mechanism. It is, formally, a mystery. In my PhD I have described the most plausible mechanism - ion-channel fields - for the action potential component only. I am setting out at the moment to add the chemical synapse component and electrical synapse (gap-junction) components. Hopefully I'll get a chance to actually demonstrate how the fields involve themselves in the variability in firing synchrony (as a separate feedback mechanism). If you want to be able to communicate the effect, the buzzword (which I don't like!) is 'ephaptic coupling'. It is also interesting to note that the scientist behind the 'Blue Brain' project (Markram) has teamed up with one of the worlds heavy hitters in the realm of the neurobiology of consciousness (Koch). cheers colin hales === In my PhD I it took >150,000 hours of supercomputing to show that the EM fields have a whole degree of freedom not in existing neural modelling. The exact same action potential firing can result in an infinity of different local field potentials and these are not merely the result of chemical synapses. Action potentials and electrical synapses contribute their component. I have provided the ultimate mechanism for the fields (electric AND magnetic). The empirical work mentioned above is the 'icing on the cake'. It shows empirically that the fields themselves self-impact the neural processes and alter the firing dynamics in radical ways at microscopic levels within the tissue. The days of the fields as epiphenomena are over. The view my work supports is one where the EM fields and the action potentials act in a sort of longitudinal/transverse quadrature resonance, two axes mutually altering each other. The mutual interaction does not require large fields ...1v/m will do at the membrane level. These fields have a radical effect on action potential _phase_ and thereby impact whole-tissue field coherence from the single neuron level up. If you plot the field due to a single neuron action potential it beams and dwells and rotates like an active phased array antenna. Baths itself and its neighbours within 1mm with a highly controlled, directed beam effect. "Ephaptic coupling" is the effect...for some reason biosciences think their EM is different! :-) We all know it as simple EM coupling. Pretty cool huh? Change is afoot. cheers colin Russell Standish wrote: Neurobiologists Find that Weak Electrical Fields in the Brain Help Neurons Fire Together http://media.caltech.edu/press_releases/13401 Reminds me of what Colin says he is doing... Cheers -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Are our brains in that VAT? Yep.
On Mon, Feb 7, 2011 at 8:53 AM, John Mikes wrote: > Stathis, > "upload the human brain?" > > I suppose (and hope) you are talking about the wider meaning of "brain", not > the physiological tissue (fless) figment the 2002 medical science tackles > with in our crania. THAT extended brain which is ready to monitor (report?) > unexpect(able)ed mental functions, as I wrote: e.g. the difference in > meaning between "I missed you yesterday" vs. "I hate broccoli". > Not just mAmp-s and tissue-encephalograms. > We know so little about our (extendable?) mental functions, every second may > bring novelty into it, so where would you draw the line for the 'upload'? at > yesterday's inventory? Imagine that you are an alien scientist who encounters humans for the first time and you don't realise that they have minds. You do, however, notice that the humans behave in complex ways, and that their behaviour seems to be controlled by electrical impulses originating in the brain. So you set yourself the task of making a computer model of the matter in the brain, using your advanced scanning techniques to determine its precise composition, and your advanced knowledge of computational chemistry. That model programmed into a computer is called a brain upload. You can run it and predict what the human would do in various situations: if you poked him with a sharp stick, if you asked him a certain question, if you withheld food from him for a certain period. You would run the model and do the experiment in the real human to see if they match up. If they don't, then there is a problem with your model, and you have to examine the brain more closely or do more research into computational chemistry to rectify it. -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Observers and Church/Turing
Hi Bruno I will attempt to define the terms in a manner satisfactory to both of us, and maybe we will understand each other this way. CTM Computational Theory of Mind is the concept that "the mind literally is a digital computer ... and that thought literally is a kind of computation." from http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/computational-mind/ I understand your steps one to seven to be making this point. I have no difficulty with this point. This is what seems straightforward to me. Thought is a computation. OK. Experiential reality is a computation. OK. New Point Chalmers defines a 'Computational Hypothesis' The Computational Hypothesis says that "physics as we know it is not the fundamental level of reality." and "Just as chemical processes underlie biological processes, and microphysical processes underlie chemical processes, something underlies microphysical processes. Underneath the level of quarks, electrons, and photons is a further level: the level of bits. These bits are governed by a computational algorithm, which at a higher level produces the processes that we think of as fundamental particles, forces, and so on." This is what you claim to have established around point 7 in your paper. I do not follow the step from CTM to a Computational Hypothesis. (no, your last explanation did not help) Andrew -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Neurobiologists Find that Weak Electrical Fields in the Brain Help Neurons Fire Together
Neurobiologists Find that Weak Electrical Fields in the Brain Help Neurons Fire Together http://media.caltech.edu/press_releases/13401 Reminds me of what Colin says he is doing... Cheers -- Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) Mathematics UNSW SYDNEY 2052 hpco...@hpcoders.com.au Australiahttp://www.hpcoders.com.au -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Observers and Church/Turing
On Feb 6, 5:30 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 06 Feb 2011, at 16:30, 1Z wrote: > > > > > > > On Feb 6, 8:51 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 06 Feb 2011, at 01:02, 1Z wrote: > > >>> On Feb 5, 8:44 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > That's my point, COMP does not add more white rabbits from this > pov. > > >>> I dare say. But the Mathematical Multiverses do add a lot more WRs > >>> than > >>> physical multiverses. > > >> Prove this. > > > It's already stated by Tegmark. Further proof is given by the > > fact that physics uses only a subset of mathematics. > > Tegmark is right on third person mathematicalism. I did show before > that if you assume comp you don't need more than arithmeticalism. > good thing because "mathematical" is harder to define than > arithmeticalism. Note that mathematicalism subsumes the ontology of > arithmeticalism. But Tegmark doesn't take into account neither the > first person indeterminacy (local or global), nor a theory of mind > (which in case of comp it is easy, given that it is computer science > and computer's computer science, ...) > > > > >> Once you take into account the relative points of view (of the > >> machines, by using the self-reference logic for example > > > Prove that. > > Sorry. I don't have to do that. I am the one translating a problem > (the mind-body problem) into a body problem in computer science or in > arithmetic. > If you believe that comp leads to WR, show them to me, I believe that a level IV multiverse leads to WRs and you haven't explained how comp solves the problem. > and justify > your measure choice. I already have There are more physically incoherent universes than coherent ones. and there are many more that are mostly incoherent than those that are coherent, and there are many more that contain a little coherent me in a see of incoherence than there are that are wholly coherent. Beyond that, I don;t need any special measure: that's a hoop that those who are seeking to solve the WR problem need to jump through > Which is truly an open problem at the least. > And then I show that by taking the points of view of the self- > referentially correct machine into account (which is perhaps just an > elementary politesse) we have to take into account a catalog of points > of views to just formulate the problem. > > Bruno > > > > > > >> ) this is > >> already refuted. Mathematical reality kicks back. > > >> Bruno > > >>http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > > Groups "Everything List" group. > > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > > . > > For more options, visit this group > > athttp://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > > . > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Are our brains in that VAT? Yep.
Stathis, "upload the human brain?" I suppose (and hope) you are talking about the wider meaning of "brain", not the physiological tissue (fless) figment the 2002 medical science tackles with in our crania. THAT extended brain which is ready to monitor (report?) unexpect(able)ed mental functions, as I wrote: e.g. the difference in meaning between "I missed you yesterday" vs. "I hate broccoli". Not just mAmp-s and tissue-encephalograms. We know so little about our (extendable?) mental functions, every second may bring novelty into it, so where would you draw the line for the 'upload'? at yesterday's inventory? Then again your statement *"...I don't accept that computers cannot have the same qualia as brains..." * makes sense to me if we postulate that THOSE computers MUST HAVE the same qualia. Unknown ones, undetected ones, but ALL OF THEM. I find this condition beyond reason. Or would you restrict our science to yesterday? John M On Sat, Feb 5, 2011 at 4:19 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > On Sat, Feb 5, 2011 at 12:27 PM, Colin Hales > wrote: > > > I think perhaps the key to this can be seen in your requirement... > > > > " Doing this is equivalent to constructing a human level AI, since the > > simulation could be given information and would respond just as a human > > would given the same information." > > > > I would say this is not a circumstance that exemplified human level > > intellect. Consider a human encounter with something totally unknown but > > human and AI. Who is there to provide 'information'? If the machine is > like > > a human it shouldn't need someone there to spoon feed it answers. We let > the > > AGI loose to encounter something neither human nor AGI has encountered > > before. That is a real AGI. The AGI can't "be given" the answers. You may > be > > able to provide a software model of how to handle novelty. This requires > a > > designers to say, in software, "everything you don't know is to be known > > like this ". This, however, is not AGI (human). It is merely AI. It > may > > suffice for a planetary rover with a roughly known domain of unknowns of > a > > certain kind. But when it encounters a cylon that rips it widgets off it > > won't be able to characterize it like a human does. Such behaviour is not > an > > instance of a human encounter with the unknown. > > I am considering a special type of AI, an upload of a human brain. A > "bottom up" AI, if you like. SPICE allows you to simulate a complex > circuit by adding together simpler components. You can construct a > simulated amplifier out of simulated transistors, resistors, > capacitors etc., then input a simulated signal, and observe the > simulated output. You construct an uploaded brain out of simulated > neurons, input a simulated signal to simulated sense organs, and > observe the simulated output to simulated muscles. The input signal > could be a question and the output signal couldbe verbal output in > response to the question. If the SPICE model is a good one its output > would be the same as the output of a real circuit given the same > input. If the brain upload model is a good one its response to > questions would be the same as the responses of a biological brain. > For example, you could tell it the result of experiments, it would > come up with a hypothesis, propose further experiments for you to do, > then modify the hypothesis depending on the result of those > experiments. There is no specific novelty-handling model: the upload > is merely an accurate model of brain behaviour, and the > novelty-handling emerges from this. The analogy is that the SPICE > software does not have a specific model for what to when the input is > sine wave, what to do when the input is a square wave, and so on, but > rather the appropriate output is produced for any input given just the > models of the components and their connections. > > > Humans literally encounter the unknown in our qualia - an intracranial > > phenomenon. Qualia are the observation. We don't encounter the unknown in > > the single or collective behaviour of our peripheral nerve activity. > Instead > > we get a unified assembly of perceptual fields erected intra-cranially > from > > the peripheral feeds, within which the actual distal world is faithfully > > represented well enough to do science. > > > > These perceptual fields are not always perfect. The perceptual fields can > be > > fooled. You can perhaps say that a software-black-box-scientist could > guess > > (Bayesian stabs in the dark). But those stabs in the dark are guesses at > (a) > > how the peripheral siganlling measurement activity will behave, or > perhaps > > (b) a guess at the contents of a human-model-derived software > representation > > of the external world. Neither (a) or (b) can be guaranteed identical to > the > > human qualia version of the the external distal world _in a situation of > > encounter with radical novelty (that a human AI designer has never > > enco
Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?
On Feb 6, 6:45 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 06 Feb 2011, at 16:37, 1Z wrote: > > > > > > > On Feb 5, 7:43 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 05 Feb 2011, at 14:14, 1Z wrote: > > >>> On Feb 4, 4:52 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 04 Feb 2011, at 13:45, David Nyman wrote: > > I am saying that IF comp is true, then the laws of physics are > derivable/emerging on the computations, in the limit defined by the > first person indeterminacy. > So, for someone who want comp false, it has to hope the 'observed > physics' is different from the comp extracted physics. > > >>> They don't have to do that, because they can resist the conclusion > >>> by > >>> refuting AR (qua Platonism) or MGA > > >> Computationalism needs Church thesis which needs AR (Arithmetical > >> Realism). > > > Nope, just AT (arithmetic truth). > > Actually, comp needs only, for the ontology, the quite tiny complete > Sigma_1 truth. As I have stated many times, it doesn;t matter in the least how many or few immaterial objects you attribute existence to. It's like saying pixies exist, but only a few > Please don't put metaphysics where there is only > religion Believing in what is not proven is religion. I can argue for anti realism. > (saying yes to the admittedly betting doctor). Saying yes to the doctor will not guarantee your immaterial existence if there is no immaterial existence. AR/Platonism is a separate assumption to yes Dr. it is math, indeed, even (full, above Sigma_1 arithmetic. > Arithmetical realism is what you need to apply the excluded middle in > computer science and in arithmetic. The excluded middle is a much of a formal rule as anthing else. Formalists can apply it, so it is compatible with anti realism. >To understand the fundamental > consequences of Church thesis you need to accept that some program > computes function despite we have no means to know if it is total or > partial, or that a program will stop or not. And I can accept that by positing LEM as a formal rule. I don;t have to posit an immaterial Plato's heaven > Only ultrafinitist denies AR. Wrong. Anti realists deny it. I have pointed this out many times. You think the only debate is about the minimal set of mathematical objects, and that is not the only debate. Anti realists can accept a maximal set of objects, with the proviso that their existence is fictive and not real existence > AR+, the idea that we don't need more than AR, in this setting, is a > consequence of the math. From 'outside' the tiny effective universal > sigma_1 complete set is enough. from inside, even mathematicalism is > not enough (it is more 'theologicalism'). > > > The ontological status of > > mathematical > > objects is a area of contention in metaphysics, and not > > straightforwardly > > proven by mathematics itself. > > With comp, you don't need more than the part on which almost everybody > agrees: arithmetical realism. Anti realists do not agee on the real existence of any part. There are no pixies at all, not just a few pixies. >The engineers, the scientists, most > philosophers. > Except for Thorgny Tholerus I never met an ultrafinitist. You don't > have to decide if numbers are idea of the mind or sort of angel in > Plato Heaven. With comp the very idea of number will itself be a > number, a sort of second order number, relative to universes > (universal numbers). ULtrafinitism has nothing to do with it. For formalists no number exists. They have no prejudice about any kind, > >http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mathematics > > >> And you cannot refute an argument by anticipating a refutation. So if > >> you have a refutation of MGA you should present it. > > > See Colin Klein;s refutation of Maudlin's Olympia. > > We have already discussed this and Colin Klein does not touch the > movie graph argument. Then you had better stop saying the MGA and Olympia are equivalent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?
On 06 Feb 2011, at 16:37, 1Z wrote: On Feb 5, 7:43 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 05 Feb 2011, at 14:14, 1Z wrote: On Feb 4, 4:52 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 04 Feb 2011, at 13:45, David Nyman wrote: I am saying that IF comp is true, then the laws of physics are derivable/emerging on the computations, in the limit defined by the first person indeterminacy. So, for someone who want comp false, it has to hope the 'observed physics' is different from the comp extracted physics. They don't have to do that, because they can resist the conclusion by refuting AR (qua Platonism) or MGA Computationalism needs Church thesis which needs AR (Arithmetical Realism). Nope, just AT (arithmetic truth). Actually, comp needs only, for the ontology, the quite tiny complete Sigma_1 truth. Please don't put metaphysics where there is only religion (saying yes to the admittedly betting doctor). And with comp, it is math, indeed, even (full, above Sigma_1 arithmetic. Arithmetical realism is what you need to apply the excluded middle in computer science and in arithmetic. To understand the fundamental consequences of Church thesis you need to accept that some program computes function despite we have no means to know if it is total or partial, or that a program will stop or not. Only ultrafinitist denies AR. AR+, the idea that we don't need more than AR, in this setting, is a consequence of the math. From 'outside' the tiny effective universal sigma_1 complete set is enough. from inside, even mathematicalism is not enough (it is more 'theologicalism'). The ontological status of mathematical objects is a area of contention in metaphysics, and not straightforwardly proven by mathematics itself. With comp, you don't need more than the part on which almost everybody agrees: arithmetical realism. The engineers, the scientists, most philosophers. Except for Thorgny Tholerus I never met an ultrafinitist. You don't have to decide if numbers are idea of the mind or sort of angel in Plato Heaven. With comp the very idea of number will itself be a number, a sort of second order number, relative to universes (universal numbers). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mathematics And you cannot refute an argument by anticipating a refutation. So if you have a refutation of MGA you should present it. See Colin Klein;s refutation of Maudlin's Olympia. We have already discussed this and Colin Klein does not touch the movie graph argument. For now, I have not the time to evaluate if it really refutes Maudlin. (re)read the MGA posts and tell me how you solve the problem (without introducing non turing emulable magic in disguise). I am just translating the mind body problem in a language that a universal number can understand, and then this leads to the body problem, or the WR problem. We are just at the beginning of the formulation of the problem. yet, there is that radical idea that physics can be reduced to a part of universal number self-reflexion. Given that the mind body problem is not yet solved it seems obvious it is premature to say that science has decided between Plato and Aristotle. UDA is: comp entails a body-appearance problem. AUDA is: "Indeed. said the universal machine". But then it is a mathematical problem, and the universal machine, the Löbian one, can already provide a tiny modest hint to the quantum and the quale. The 1- comp white rabbits disappear by a similar process than the first person plural quantum rabbits, a sort of phase randomization. It is not my task to exhibit "anti-WR". I just show that IF comp is kept true, then there are "anti-WR", and let us search them, and if there are none, we can abandon comp, of course. You talk like if it was obvious that there is an irretrievable first person WR avalanche for a number/machine which experiences are distributed in a continuum of computational sequences (arithmetical relations). I just show that computer science makes this a non trivial (body appearance) problem at all, beyond the problem to define belief, knowledge, observability and sensibility in arithmetical or near arithmetical (for the non definable) one. AUDA is comp + classical theory of knowledge. Bruno I could say that Fermat theorem is false, because in one billion years someone will eventually find a flaw in Wiles' proof! Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To p
Re: Observers and Church/Turing
On 06 Feb 2011, at 16:30, 1Z wrote: On Feb 6, 8:51 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Feb 2011, at 01:02, 1Z wrote: On Feb 5, 8:44 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote: That's my point, COMP does not add more white rabbits from this pov. I dare say. But the Mathematical Multiverses do add a lot more WRs than physical multiverses. Prove this. It's already stated by Tegmark. Further proof is given by the fact that physics uses only a subset of mathematics. Tegmark is right on third person mathematicalism. I did show before that if you assume comp you don't need more than arithmeticalism. A good thing because "mathematical" is harder to define than arithmeticalism. Note that mathematicalism subsumes the ontology of arithmeticalism. But Tegmark doesn't take into account neither the first person indeterminacy (local or global), nor a theory of mind (which in case of comp it is easy, given that it is computer science and computer's computer science, ...) Once you take into account the relative points of view (of the machines, by using the self-reference logic for example Prove that. Sorry. I don't have to do that. I am the one translating a problem (the mind-body problem) into a body problem in computer science or in arithmetic. If you believe that comp leads to WR, show them to me, and justify your measure choice. Which is truly an open problem at the least. And then I show that by taking the points of view of the self- referentially correct machine into account (which is perhaps just an elementary politesse) we have to take into account a catalog of points of views to just formulate the problem. Bruno ) this is already refuted. Mathematical reality kicks back. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Observers and Church/Turing
On 06 Feb 2011, at 12:26, Andrew Soltau wrote: On 06/02/11 08:51, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Feb 2011, at 01:02, 1Z wrote: On Feb 5, 8:44 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote: That's my point, COMP does not add more white rabbits from this pov. I dare say. But the Mathematical Multiverses do add a lot more WRs than physical multiverses. Prove this. Once you take into account the relative points of view (of the machines, by using the self-reference logic for example) this is already refuted. Mathematical reality kicks back. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Hi Bruno How do you define the relative point of view? Do you know Gödel's provability predicate? The points of view are defined by intensional variants of the current provability predicate of the machine with or without some oracle. There are 8 basic points of view p (truth), Bp (provability/believability), Bp & p (knowability), Bp & Dp (observability), Bp & Dp & p (sensibility/ feelability). Three of them inherits the G/G* splitting, making a total of 8. It is really 4 + 4*infinity, because the 'material points of view' (with Dp) admits themselves graded variants. But this is in AUDA, and we have not finished the UDA (+MGA) discussion. Have you understand the step 7? Did my last explanations helped? Take your time, my next week will be rather busy. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Maudlin & How many times does COMP have to be false before its false?
On Feb 5, 7:43 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 05 Feb 2011, at 14:14, 1Z wrote: > > > > > On Feb 4, 4:52 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> On 04 Feb 2011, at 13:45, David Nyman wrote: > > >> I am saying that IF comp is true, then the laws of physics are > >> derivable/emerging on the computations, in the limit defined by the > >> first person indeterminacy. > >> So, for someone who want comp false, it has to hope the 'observed > >> physics' is different from the comp extracted physics. > > > They don't have to do that, because they can resist the conclusion by > > refuting AR (qua Platonism) or MGA > > Computationalism needs Church thesis which needs AR (Arithmetical > Realism). Nope, just AT (arithmetic truth). The ontological status of mathematical objects is a area of contention in metaphysics, and not straightforwardly proven by mathematics itself. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mathematics > And you cannot refute an argument by anticipating a refutation. So if > you have a refutation of MGA you should present it. See Colin Klein;s refutation of Maudlin's Olympia. > I could say that Fermat theorem is false, because in one billion years > someone will eventually find a flaw in Wiles' proof! > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Observers and Church/Turing
On Feb 6, 8:51 am, Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 06 Feb 2011, at 01:02, 1Z wrote: > > > > > On Feb 5, 8:44 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote: > > >> That's my point, COMP does not add more white rabbits from this pov. > > > I dare say. But the Mathematical Multiverses do add a lot more WRs > > than > > physical multiverses. > > Prove this. It's already stated by Tegmark. Further proof is given by the fact that physics uses only a subset of mathematics. > Once you take into account the relative points of view (of the > machines, by using the self-reference logic for example Prove that. >) this is > already refuted. Mathematical reality kicks back. > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Observers and Church/Turing
On 06/02/11 08:51, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 06 Feb 2011, at 01:02, 1Z wrote: On Feb 5, 8:44 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote: That's my point, COMP does not add more white rabbits from this pov. I dare say. But the Mathematical Multiverses do add a lot more WRs than physical multiverses. Prove this. Once you take into account the relative points of view (of the machines, by using the self-reference logic for example) this is already refuted. Mathematical reality kicks back. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ Hi Bruno How do you define the relative point of view? Andrew -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Observers and Church/Turing
On 06 Feb 2011, at 01:02, 1Z wrote: On Feb 5, 8:44 pm, Quentin Anciaux wrote: That's my point, COMP does not add more white rabbits from this pov. I dare say. But the Mathematical Multiverses do add a lot more WRs than physical multiverses. Prove this. Once you take into account the relative points of view (of the machines, by using the self-reference logic for example) this is already refuted. Mathematical reality kicks back. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
