Fw: H+ Summit @Melbourne 25-26th of June 2011 (Australia)

2011-06-07 Thread Wei Dai
From: Adam A. Ford 
Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2011 7:30 PM
To: Wei Dai 
Subject: H+ Summit @Melbourne 25-26th of June 2011 (Australia)

Hi Wei Dai,

I saw your everything list, and wanted to post an event there, but I am not a 
member, and even if I became one would just be a newbie.
So if you feel like this is appropriate to your list, please post it!

---
The H+ Summit @Melbourne is Coming to Town (25-26th June 2011)! The H+ Summit @ 
Melbourne brings together an eclectic mix of rationalists, futurists, science 
fiction writers, AI experts, scientists, biotechnology experts, philosophers 
and theorists to pursue deep philosophical, scientific and technological 
inquiry, with the aim of being able to discern those changes which are likely 
to have profound impacts and those which are merely transient and or 
fashionable.

Technological innovation permeates all aspects of society — from tiny water 
purification packets and 3d printers, to GPS tracking devices, wearable smart 
devices, decision support systems, replaceable body parts and personal genome 
tests. Because technology and society evolve together, it has become 
increasingly important to develop a greater understanding of how technology is 
shaping the course of our lives. We are faced with the challenge to 
continuously become innovative in harnessing and controlling technological 
development as it accelerates on many diverse fronts. The "pioneers of the 
future" are faced with the necessity to become ever more resourceful. Even the 
most conservative thinkers agree that we have already stepped into an era of a 
profound change. The good news is that our human diversity continues to spawn 
both inventiveness and novelty.

This conference is brought to you by Humanity+ @ Melbourne (Victoria, 
Australia). Humanity+ explores how society might use and profit from a variety 
of creative and innovative thought. Join us for this adventurous journey into 
the future where you can make a difference! This conference will challenge and 
enhance your view of the future.


Seating is limited, so Secure your tickets now! >>

The conference will be held at the Melbourne Uni Graduate House.

www.humanityplus.org.au


Partial list of Speakers and subjects:

  a.. Sean McMullen – “Doing It Now” - (As of writing, a Hugo Nominee for short 
story) 
  b.. Hugo de Garis – Nanotech, Femtotech – Lots of room at the bottom, | 
Quantum Topological Computing – Much More than Moore’s Law 
  c.. Meredith Doig – “Rationalism, Transhumanism & the Singuarlity” – 
(President of the Rationalist Society Australia) 
  d.. Colin Kline – “Logics - Boonlean (Pascalian) logic, Fuzzy Logic and 
Bayes” – Academic 
  e.. Greg Adamson – “Technology and social control“ – (Chairman of the Society 
for Social Implications of Technology IEEE) 
  f.. Binh Nguyen – “Evolutionary AI” – (PHD)

  g.. Lev Lafayette – “More Human Than Human: The Computation of Moral 
Reasoning” – Philosopher

  h.. Slade Beard – “Architecting the Future” (Complex Systems) - (IEEE)

  i.. Avatar Polymorph – “The ethics of boosting animals from sentience to 
self-aware consciousness” - Extropian from way back

  j.. Tony Smith – “The Plurality: Why everyting is all over the place” – 
(Chaos, Complex Systems) 
  k.. Jon Oxer – “The Maker Revolution” 
  l.. Andy Gelme – “The Internet of Things” 
  m.. Jeremy Nagel – “Open Source Biotech” 
Feel free to pass this on.  See you there!

---

Kind regards,

Adam A. Ford
Singularity Summit Australia Coordinator
H+ Australia, H+ @ Melbourne Summit Coordinator

Mob: +61 421 979 977 | Email:  tech...@gmail.com 

SinginstAU | Singularity Summit (AU) | Facebook | Twitter | Youtube | Singinst 
media (US) | H+ @ Melb Summit (AU)

“The significant problems we face today cannot be solved at the same level of 
thinking we were at when we created them” – Albert Einstein
 
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Re: TIME warp

2011-06-07 Thread Felix Hoenikker
Hi guys,

Time travel is actually possible, as long as you are consistent (i.e.
Novikov self-consistency principle).  Please consider the argument for
it, beginning at:

http://www.reddit.com/r/askscience/comments/hr4x2/physicists_what_do_you_think_of_the_following/

Continue the discussion there at reddit if you would like.

Thank you!
F.H.


On Fri, Jun 3, 2011 at 12:09 PM, Travis Garrett
 wrote:
> Hi Roc,
>
>   Sure.  Let me go ahead and start by assuming that we need to exist
> in an environment that began in a state of low entropy (so that life
> can evolve during the "increasing entropy phase" - I could also
> examine this assumption, but that's another discussion...).  GR then
> does some interesting things.  First, gravity in GR couples to energy
> and momentum, and everything has energy and momentum, so, er, it
> couples to everything (binding them all together like the one ring I
> suppose).  It can thus essentially "get everybody on the same page"
> when things are starting out - forcing "everybody" (all the particle
> species) to "pay attention" and synchronize their behavior...
>
>  GR can then do something quite cool.  If you feed the Einstein
> equations with a scalar field that happens to have much more potential
> energy than kinetic energy, then the spacetime responds by growing
> exponentially (i.e. the curvature is in the time direction - the
> spatial directions are driven to be very flat (i.e. the angles inside
> a triangle add up to 180 degrees), with the overall scale factor
> growing exponentially (i.e. the overall size of the triangle is
> growing exponentially in time)).  Thus, consider some complex universe
> with a lot of entropy.  Entropy is an extensive quantity, and thus if
> we consider some tiny volume element dV then there can't be much
> "stuff" inside dV, and therefore there is very little entropy inside
> dV.  If we can get a scalar field inside that dV to satisfy the
> condition that its potential energy is much larger than its kinetic
> energy, then blammo, we get inflation and that dV region can grow
> larger than our Hubble volume in a tiny fraction of a second (and then
> scalar field can decay, ending inflation, to be followed by a
> "standard" big bang...).
>
>  It is by no means an open and shut case - there are lots of details
> to be filled in - but I think the overall picture makes a lot of
> sense...
>
>    Sincerely,
>           Travis
>
> On Jun 2, 6:35 am, Roc  wrote:
>> nice answer.
>> could you elaborate on this, though?
>>
>> Why then should spacetime be curved?  There are at least 2 good reasons:
>>
>> 1) it allows for a big bang to happen, thus "starting things off" in a state
>>
>> > of low entropy.
>>
>> thanks
>
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Fwd: Physics

2011-06-07 Thread Felix Hoenikker
Hi everything-list guys, does anyone have any suggestions for our
friend Pete down here? He is eager to learn physics!
Contact him directly if you have any suggestions.
Stephen

-- Forwarded message --
From: Felix Hoenikker 
Date: Tue, Jun 7, 2011 at 10:10 PM
Subject: Re: Physics
To: Pete Hughes 


Peter,

Please consider reading "Cat's Cradle" by Kurt Vonnegut. I think
you'll find that this till be truly all that you need to know :)

Also, as you read "Cat's Cradle," please post some messages at on the
following discussion list:

http://www.reddit.com/r/askscience/comments/hr4x2/physicists_what_do_you_think_of_the_following/

Best,
F.H.

On Tue, Jun 7, 2011 at 2:25 PM, Pete Hughes  wrote:
> Dear Felix,
> I was just reading your post about GR and QM and their unification, my eyes
> glazed over somewhat, I do not understand 'superposition' or 'hubble
> volume', I am somebody cursed with great epistemic hunger, a high
> intelligence and a low academic rigour and I spend hours hating the fact
> that I do not know the theory of everything.
> I recently realised that we live in a mathematical inevitability and that
> physics was approaching simply describing mathematics and saying 'it is
> because it is'.
> I just hoped that you can point me to a book which explains either general
> relativity (I recently purchased 'why does E=MC^2' but I am not quite onto
> it), quantum mechanics, many worlds and their implications for free will,
> consciousness, dreams and death.
> I am sorry to bother you,
> Regards,
> Peter

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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-06-07 Thread Colin Hales

Hi,
JoMC is relatively new. My own institution (Unimelb) doesn't 
subscribe the Journal is very specialized as well
The ISI search engine won't see it either. It takes time for the 
journals to earn enough cred to get visible and accessible... even the 
Journal of Consciousness Studies has eventually made it into ISI 
search... one day JoMC will, I hope.


Those interested enough to send a private enquiry to me can get an 
earlier preprint version...close enough to the original to be readable.


cheers
Colin
BTW I finally submitted my PhD thesis recently WOOHOO!



meekerdb wrote:

Even an affiliation doesn't seem to help.

Brent

On 6/7/2011 1:49 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Hi Colin,

   Any chance that us non-university affiliated types can get a copy 
of your paper?


Onward!

Stephen

-Original Message- From: Colin Hales
Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2011 3:42 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: COMP refutation paper - finally out

Hi,

Hales, C. G. 'On the Status of Computationalism as a Law of Nature',
International Journal of Machine Consciousness vol. 3, no. 1, 2011. 
1-35.


http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000613


The paper has finally been published. Phew what an epic!

cheers

Colin





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Re: Mathematical closure of consciousness and computation

2011-06-07 Thread Stephen Paul King
Dear Bruno,

I agree with your assessment of that Wiki article. In most universities the 
prevalent ontological doctrine is “dialectical materialism” and such has no 
allowance for any competition in the realm of ideas. I have pointed out that 
your result is similar to solipsism but never as an insult. It was just that I 
do not see a means to extend it to being able to consider the appearance of 
interactions between many minds. As far as I have studied, it seems only to be 
able to make statements about itself. Until you can show how it can be 
individuated for many minds this problem will remains, with or without a 
solution to the measure problem.
The difficulty is that the numbers, alone, do not have any of the 
properties that we would associate with a mind with the notable exception of 
self-referential logical structure. If we might extend comp with the idea of 
the isomorphism with topological spaces (via the representation theorem) then 
we might have a notion of concrete persistence over transitions that allows for 
a notion of memory – since a single logical algebra is isomorphic to an entire 
class of stone spaces when we consider the relation of diffeomorphism. The 
inclusion of topological spaces allows us a coherent notion of “inside” and 
“outside” that can be used to distinguish multiple minds from each other, if 
only by having the possibility of differing positions in space. 
The self-awareness that you mention would, in turn, allow for the expansion 
of the group of symmetries that can be considered as “internal” that they can 
be broken and mapped (via fiber bundles) onto the set complement of the stone 
spaces, that yields field theories.
The “glue” that binds them all together is a combination of bisimulation 
chaining ( a form of homomorphism) on the abstract side and various other 
morphisms on the concrete “physical” side, all woven together by the wonderful 
natural contravariance of the stone duality.

Onward!

Stephen

From: Bruno Marchal 
Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2011 12:31 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
Subject: Re: Mathematical closure of consciousness and computation

On 07 Jun 2011, at 16:32, Jason Resch wrote:





  On Tue, Jun 7, 2011 at 5:22 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:


On 07 Jun 2011, at 04:00, Jason Resch wrote:

I guess you mean some sort of "spiritualism" for immaterialism, which is a 
consequence of comp (+ some Occam). Especially that you already defend the idea 
that the computations are in (arithmetical) platonia.
Note that AR is part of comp. And the UD is the Universal dovetailer. (UDA 
is the argument that comp makes elementary arithmetic, or any sigma_1 complete 
theory, the theory of everything. Quanta and qualia are justified from inside, 
including their incommunicability.



  By immaterialism I mean the type espoused by George Berkeley, which is more 
accurately described as subjective idealism: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immaterialism
  I think it is accurate to call it is a form of spiritualism.


Well I am not even sure. Frankly, this is wikipedia's worst article.  It 
represents well the current Aristotelian reconsideration or non-consideration 
of immaterialism. Among the Platonists were the Mathematicians, the ideal 
platonic worlds for them was either mathematics, or what is just beyond 
mathematics (like neoplatonist will distinguish the intelligible (the nous) 
from the ONE behind (and like all self-referentially correct machine will 
eventually approximate by the notion of theories and the (possible) truth 
behind).
The "enemy" of "immaterialism" try to mock it by reducing it to solipsism 
(which is typically "childish), or to the naive believe in angels and fairy 
tales.
But immaterialism is not a believe in an immaterial realm, it is before all a 
skepticism with respect to the physical realm, or to the primacy of the 
physical realm. It is the idea that there is something behind our observations. 
The early academical debate was more to decide if mathematics or physics was 
the fundamental science.

Aristotelian's successors take primitive materiality as a fact, where the 
honest scientist should accept that scientists have not yet decide that 
fundamental question. Today physics relates observable to measurable numbers, 
and avoid cautiously any notion of matter, which is an already undefined vague 
term. The nature of matter and of reality makes only a  re-apparition in 
discussion through the quantum weirdness.

I argue that if we assume that there is a level of description of ourselves 
which is Turing emulable, then, to be short and clear (albeit not diplomatical) 
Plato is right, and physics becomes a modality: it emerges from 
self-observation by relative universal numbers. The quantum weirdness becomes 
quasi- trivial, the existence of Hamiltonians also, the precise form and 
simplicity of those Hamiltonians becomes the hard question. Comp does not yet 
explain the notion of space, although 

Re: Mathematical closure of consciousness and computation

2011-06-07 Thread Russell Standish
On Mon, Jun 06, 2011 at 08:31:35PM -0400, Stephen Paul King wrote:
> Hi Russell,
> 
>I would like to be sure that I understand your point here. Would
> you say that "true determinism", as opposed to "true indeterminism",
> requires one-to-one mappings between any two adjoining links in the
> causal chain of events, each of which is said to be uniquely
> determined by its prior?
> 
> Onward!
> 
> Stephen

That is what determinism means. I don't think there can be any meaning
attached to false determinism, however, so the true is a little
redundant.

That is also the case of indeterminism, but some might think that
ignorance is a form of indeterminism (which it needn't be). Hence my
sticking the redundant "true" tag to make the point.

Cheers

-- 


Prof Russell Standish  Phone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
University of New South Wales  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: Mathematical closure of consciousness and computation

2011-06-07 Thread Brian Tenneson
Self aware in what sense?

On Sat, Jun 4, 2011 at 2:09 AM, Felix Hoenikker wrote:

> Sorry again, but I want to add one thing:
>
> The broadest mathematical closure of "the existence of computation",
> "the observation of consciousness anywhere" suggests the following, in
> my mind: all possible numbers (including transfinite-ones) are, in
> fact, self aware substructures in the mathematical universe,
> recursively "communicating" to "each other" by exchanging bits in an
> attempt to develop the algorithm which compresses themselves to a
> single state, which represents the number "one", after which it
> promptly forgets and starts all over again, everywhere, and all at
> once.
>
> -- Forwarded message --
> From: Felix Hoenikker 
> Date: Sat, Jun 4, 2011 at 3:03 AM
> Subject: The final TOE?
> To: Everything List 
>
>
> Hi all,
>
> Consider the following fully general way of saying this is the
> following: quantum mechanics and general relativity are symmetrically
> "the exact same theory", modulo the additional "bit" of information
> that quantum entanglement reduces net gravitational energy.  This is
> the EXACT answer to the EPR paradox, and all paradoxes about
> singularities, and consistent with our picture of reality in every
> respect, as it "necessarily must be" since it follows exactly from the
> asssumption of 3+1 spacetime embedded within some higher dimensional
> structure of "any" form (i.e. including string theory).
>
> Since no "true" gravitational singularities exist, then "every point
> in space is an apparent black hole" because "no point in space is an
> apparent black hole".  Thus, at every point in space, a "bit" of
> information (or a "photon") can escape from the "observable" universe
> on our scale, "go into the past", and come out "in the future" in a
> symmetric manner for all observers, without considering your frame of
> reference in 3+1 space time.  This qualitatively predicts all features
> of GR without QCD or QFT.  However, since photons travelling through
> locally closed loops can look like "point" particles with some net
> entanglement coming out, then they can look like bundles that, for all
> intents and purposes, appear to randomly add information in some way,
> and in some spherically symmetric fashion, which predicts the
> divergence and appearance of other "fundamental forces" early in the
> inflating universe.
>
> It is often said that QM and GR differ from each other exactly by the
> contemplation of the "singularity", and that our inability to discover
> the "true" laws of the universe has been limited by our lack of
> knowledge about the twin singularities: the inflationary bubble and
> the black hole.  It follows that this fact was "exactly true" all
> along, and the laws of physics are a completely dimensionless
> consequences of our "local" geometry of space, and our civilization
> has, in fact, rather than been trying to "discover" the next laws of
> physics, has in fact been struggling to "unlearn" the concept of
> "Indeterminacy" and "quantum mechanics", since QM follows from GR, the
> postulate of 3+1 spacetime and E = mc^2 (a nice, dimensionless
> equation).  Einstein, in fact, was right all along, and successfully
> completed the "fully" deterministic general laws of physics.
>
> Consider then, the reason why indeterministic QM was ever suggested:
> the apparently subjective indeterminacy of the universe from each
> "observer" point of view (i.e. the uncertainty principle).  Or
> actually, consider the fact that, if the universe is completely
> deterministic, and "you" for any defined "you" is getting non-random
> information from any source, then that information must, in fact, be
> added to you by the "rest of the universe" in some systematic fashion,
> down to the tiniest quantum of "universe".  This implies that there
> "is" actually, some "quanta" of the universe, a "photon", and each
> "photon" is having information added to "it" from the "rest of the
> universe", in a systematic fashion, and recursively so for every
> "observer".  This is actually a fully generic model for the universe,
> and the absolute generalization of QM and SR.
>
> Next, consider the fact that you are "conscious" and possibly
> "indeterminstic" (i.e. have subjective free will).  I think I do.
> Therefore, I am not a "quanta" of information, or a "bit", but it was
> "added to me" from "somewhere".  No, consider the mathematical closure
> of this observation.  What does this imply about and anthropic
> principle and "fine tuning"? Does that make sense anymore.  Also, does
> this not mean that our "observable universe", for "some definition of
> observable", from "any subjective observer's point of view", is
> constantly being added non-random information from "outside".
>
> I truly beg you all to consider this argument fully.
>
> Please let me know what you think,
> F.H.
>
> On Fri, Jun 3, 2011 at 7:16 PM, Felix Hoenikker 
> wrote:
> > Every "apparent" event ho

Re: Mathematical closure of consciousness and computation

2011-06-07 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 07 Jun 2011, at 16:32, Jason Resch wrote:




On Tue, Jun 7, 2011 at 5:22 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 07 Jun 2011, at 04:00, Jason Resch wrote:

I guess you mean some sort of "spiritualism" for immaterialism,  
which is a consequence of comp (+ some Occam). Especially that you  
already defend the idea that the computations are in (arithmetical)  
platonia.
Note that AR is part of comp. And the UD is the Universal  
dovetailer. (UDA is the argument that comp makes elementary  
arithmetic, or any sigma_1 complete theory, the theory of  
everything. Quanta and qualia are justified from inside, including  
their incommunicability.




By immaterialism I mean the type espoused by George Berkeley, which  
is more accurately described as subjective idealism: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immaterialism

I think it is accurate to call it is a form of spiritualism.



Well I am not even sure. Frankly, this is wikipedia's worst article.   
It represents well the current Aristotelian reconsideration or non- 
consideration of immaterialism. Among the Platonists were the  
Mathematicians, the ideal platonic worlds for them was either  
mathematics, or what is just beyond mathematics (like neoplatonist  
will distinguish the intelligible (the nous) from the ONE behind (and  
like all self-referentially correct machine will eventually  
approximate by the notion of theories and the (possible) truth behind).
The "enemy" of "immaterialism" try to mock it by reducing it to  
solipsism (which is typically "childish), or to the naive believe in  
angels and fairy tales.
But immaterialism is not a believe in an immaterial realm, it is  
before all a skepticism with respect to the physical realm, or to the  
primacy of the physical realm. It is the idea that there is something  
behind our observations.
The early academical debate was more to decide if mathematics or  
physics was the fundamental science.


Aristotelian's successors take primitive materiality as a fact, where  
the honest scientist should accept that scientists have not yet decide  
that fundamental question. Today physics relates observable to  
measurable numbers, and avoid cautiously any notion of matter, which  
is an already undefined vague term. The nature of matter and of  
reality makes only a  re-apparition in discussion through the quantum  
weirdness.


I argue that if we assume that there is a level of description of  
ourselves which is Turing emulable, then, to be short and clear  
(albeit not diplomatical) Plato is right, and physics becomes a  
modality: it emerges from self-observation by relative universal  
numbers. The quantum weirdness becomes quasi- trivial, the existence  
of Hamiltonians also, the precise form and simplicity of those  
Hamiltonians becomes the hard question. Comp does not yet explain the  
notion of space, although it paves the way in sequence of precise  
(mathematical) questions.


Unfortunately, the computationalist philosophers of mind, as reflected  
at least in wiki, seems to ignore everything of theoretical computer  
science, including the key fact that it is a branch of math, even of  
number theory (or combinator theory, of creative sets, Sigma_1  
complete finite systems, ...). Now I see they have a simplistic (and  
aristotelian) view on immaterialism.












Okay, this makes sense given your solipism/immaterialism.



I would like to insist that comp leads to immaterialism, but that  
this is very different from solipsism. Both are idealism, but  
solipsism is "I am dreaming", where comp immaterialism is "all  
numbers are dreaming", and a real sharable physical reality emerges  
from gluing properties of those dreams/computations.





You are right, I should find a less general term.  It is the missing  
of the glue I think that differentiates the immaterialism of comp  
from the immaterialism of Berkeley.



Don't worry too much on the terms once you get the idea. We can always  
decide on vocabulary issue later.


You sum very well the problem. The glue is really provably missing  
only in solipsism. There is just no reason to believe that numbers  
could miss the glue, that is more than quarks and waves. At least  
before we solve the (measure) problem. Math is there to see what  
happens. People seems to have the same reluctance to let math enter  
the subject than the old naturalists.


Now, the only way for the numbers to win the measure problem is by  
self-multiplication, and coherent multiplication of populations, that  
is sharing stories/computations. The only reason why I can dialog with  
you must be that we share a 'big number' of similar histories, and  
those have to be observable below our substitution levels. If those  
did not exist, keeping comp could lead to solipsism. But then QM, or  
the MW understanding of QM, shows that we do share indeed big sets, if  
not a continuum of similar histories, saving comp, empirically, of  
solipsism. Gödel-Church-Tarski saves mechanism

Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-06-07 Thread meekerdb

Even an affiliation doesn't seem to help.

Brent

On 6/7/2011 1:49 AM, Stephen Paul King wrote:

Hi Colin,

   Any chance that us non-university affiliated types can get a copy 
of your paper?


Onward!

Stephen

-Original Message- From: Colin Hales
Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2011 3:42 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: COMP refutation paper - finally out

Hi,

Hales, C. G. 'On the Status of Computationalism as a Law of Nature',
International Journal of Machine Consciousness vol. 3, no. 1, 2011. 1-35.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000613


The paper has finally been published. Phew what an epic!

cheers

Colin



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Re: Mathematical closure of consciousness and computation

2011-06-07 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Jun 7, 2011 at 5:53 AM, Pete Hughes  wrote:

> Jason,
>
> I found this compelling, are you saying that the difficulty of explaining
> qualia is due to the language centre of the brain being able to access only
> an abstract 'interface' (I'm a object oriented thinker) of the sensors? then
> what about emotions? I'm trying to pre-empt your response to 'why don't you
> put your hand in the fire and enjoy the information' and I just can't, I
> like the way you talk so I will pester you with the question.
>

Peter,

Thanks, I am happy to attempt an answer.  The below is a conclusion from
taking seriously http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Modularity_of_mind which is
supported by several pieces of evidence:

1. Anesthesia

The naive view is that anesthetics work by turning off the brain or causing
activity in it to cease.  This is incorrect, there is still a great deal of
activity within an anestetized mind, yet consciousness is abolished.  The
person is unable to move, remember, sense pain, etc.  Yet other brain
functions, such as regulating blood pressure or heart rate continue.  The
leading theory for why this is, is called cognitive unbinding.  Anesthetics
operate by confusing or dampening communication between neurons.
 Cognitive unbinding proposes that this causes disparate brain regions to
become cut off from each other as neural signals can only travel so far
given the interference of the chemicals.  The result is different brain
regions are cut off from each other, the pain processing part of the brain
doesn't receive information from the touch processing part of the brain, the
hippocampus doesn't receive information to encode as memories, the muscles
don't receive signals to move which are under conscious control, yet
independent brain functions (which don't require interaction with other
brain regions) such as those that control breathing or heart rate continue
to function.  It is not the sheer will to survive which keeps the lungs
breathing or heart pumping, as animals which are conscious breathers (such
as the dolhpins and whales) will suffocate under anesthesia.  This also
forbids them from sleeping, they rest only one hemisphere of their brain at
a time.

2. Different forms of brain damage

Visual information is a cast collection of processed information.  Before
the image reaches your conscious awareness your brain has applied edge
detection, depth and color perception, object recognition, motion sensing,
and blind spot extrapolation, among other things.  Each of these functions
independently and can be impaired or lost without affecting other parts of
the brain.  There are cases where brain damage to the V5 section of the
brain causes motion blindness (sufferers see the world as a collection of
static frames, devoid of any concept of motion), likewise people can lose
the ability to recognize faces, or recognize objects (these functions occur
in different parts of the brain, so while someone might lose the ability to
recognize objects they can still recognize faces and vice versa), finally
there are people who have lost the ability to process colors.  Not only can
they no longer see colors, but they lose the ability to recall colors
altogether.  Since the processing is done in specific areas of the brain,
these modules share only the high-level results of their processing with
other brain regions.  (This is the limited-access part of modularity).  It
is not possible for all areas of the brain to do everything independently of
course, so if they interact with other brain regions, they must receive high
level results, not the raw input that a particular module processed.

3. Pain perception

This is getting close to your question on emotions and why people don't
stick their hand in the fire.  It's been found that the perception of pain
is handlered in one part of the brain, but what makes pain painful
(unpleasent) is handled by an entirely different part of the brain: the
anterior cingulate cortex.  Damage to this part of the brain (or severing
nerves connected to it in an operation called a cingulatomy) brings about
the curious phenomenon of pain dissociation.  Someone with pain dissociation
can provide specific information about the location and intensity of the
pain, but it no longer bothers them or causes any distress.  An example:

Paul Brand, a surgeon and author on the subject of pain recounted the case
of a woman who had suffered with a severe and chronic pain for more than a
decade: She agreed to a surgery that would separate the neural pathways
between her frontal lobes and the rest of her brain.  The surgery was a
success.  Brand visited the woman a year later, and inquired about her pain.
 She said, “Oh, yes, its still there.  I just don't worry about it anymore.”
 With a smile she continued, “In fact, it's still agonizing.  But I don't
mind.”




To answer your question about emotion I think Marvin Minsky provides a good
answer.  You might say that given the above description of pain

Re: Mathematical closure of consciousness and computation

2011-06-07 Thread Stephen Paul King
Dear Bruno,

From: Bruno Marchal 
Sent: Monday, June 06, 2011 9:00 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
Subject: Re: Mathematical closure of consciousness and computation
Hi Stephen, 

On 06 Jun 2011, at 05:27, Stephen Paul King wrote:


  Hi Bruno, Rex and Friends,

  My .002$...


  [BM]
  No theories nor machine can reach all arithmetical truth, but few  
  people doubt that closed arithmetical propositions are either true or  
  false. We do share a common intuition on the nature of arithmetical  
  truth.
  I have doubt on any notion of global mathematical truth. Sets, real  
  numbers, complex numbers, etc. are simplifications of the natural  
  numbers. They are convenient fictions, I think. If we are machine, it  
  is undecidable if ontology is more than N.


  [SPK]
  
  I think that there is some differences in opinion about this but it seems 
to me that we need to look at some details. For example, there should exist a 
theory that could reach all arithmetic truth given an eternity of time or an 
unnamable number of recursions or steps. 
[BM]
?

No this cannot exist. It is precluded by the incompleteness theorem. Eternity 
can't help. Unless you take a non axiomatisable theory, or some God-like 
entities. 

[SPK]

Yes, you are correct. I miswrote. I had even developed an informal proof of 
this in my critique of Leibniz’ Monadology. But this still presents a 
challenge.. Umm, maybe this is where Cantor et al considered this idea in terms 
of unnamable cardinals...
**




  This by definition would put them forever beyond human (finite entity) 
comprehension. Whether or not there is closure or a closed form of some theory 
does not make it realistic or not. AFAIK, closed arithmetic propositions are 
tautologies, no? 
[BM]
They are not tautologies, unless you mean by this "propositions true in *all* 
models of Peano Arithmetic. But then "tautology" means "theorem", and that 
would be an awkward terminology. Ax(0 ≠ s(x)) is not a tautology (it is already 
false in (Z,+), nor is Fermat last theorem.

[SPK]
Yes, I did mean it that way, as in “propositions that are true in *all* 
models” but not just of Peano Arithmetic. I was considering all Arithmetics, 
especially Robinson’s. Usually one thinks of tautologies as A = A. What I am 
trying to weaken is the way that the so called law of identity is usually 
defined. I am working toward a notion of equivalence that allows for not just 
strict equality but a more general notion of “bisimilarity”. In this way 
theorems would be tautologies in this weaker form of Identity.
**



  That we share a common intuition of truth may follow from a common local 
measure of truth within each of us. (Here the "inside" implied by the word 
"within" is the logical/Arithmetic/abstract aspect of the duality that I 
propose.)
  Additionally, we should be careful not to conflate a plurality of 
fungible individuals with a multiplicity of non-fungible entities. We can set 
up a mental hall of mirrors and generate an infinite number of self-images in 
it, but this cannot *exactly* map to all of the selves that could exist without 
additional methods to break the symmetries. 

  I have been waiting a long time for you to state this belief of yours, 
Bruno! That "Sets, real  numbers, complex numbers, etc." are simplifications of 
(mappings on/in?) the Natural Numbers. This seems to be the Pythagorean 
doctrine that I suspected that you believed. 
[BM]
Would you take the time to study the papers, you would have understood that 
this is a result of comp. Comp transforms the very banal arithmetical realism 
in an authentic Pythagorean neoplatonist theology, i.e.  with some use of OCCAM 
razor.

[SPK]
I am studying the papers, but I need to clarify some ideas by asking 
questions to the Professor. ;-) I do not think the way you do and must 
translate your mental language into my own to understand them.
**



  It has a long history and a lot of apostles that have quite spectacular 
histories. I think that there is a deep truth in this belief, but I think that 
it needs to be more closely examined.
[BM]
It can be derived from Church thesis and the assumption that "we" are Turing 
emulable.

[SPK]
OK, but would you allow me to say that it seems that you are considering a 
form of Turing emulation that is vastly more sophisticated and subtle than the 
purely mechanical one that Turing, for example, considered with his A machines? 
The fact that you are considering infinities of computations as “running” each 
instance of us, is pushing the idea of a recursive algorithm into places it is 
never been before.
**



  >
  > Perhaps there is just human belief.

  [BM]
  Jason said it. If you follow that slope you may as well say that there  
  is only belief by Rex. You can also decide that there is nothing to  
  explain, no theories to find, and go walking in the woods. Science, by  
  definition, assumes something beyond (human) belief.

  [SPK]

Re: Mathematical closure of consciousness and computation

2011-06-07 Thread Jason Resch
On Tue, Jun 7, 2011 at 5:22 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 07 Jun 2011, at 04:00, Jason Resch wrote:
>
> I guess you mean some sort of "spiritualism" for immaterialism, which is a
> consequence of comp (+ some Occam). Especially that you already defend the
> idea that the computations are in (arithmetical) platonia.
> Note that AR is part of comp. And the UD is the Universal dovetailer. (UDA
> is the argument that comp makes elementary arithmetic, or any sigma_1
> complete theory, the theory of everything. Quanta and qualia are justified
> from inside, including their incommunicability.
>
>
>
By immaterialism I mean the type espoused by George Berkeley, which is more
accurately described as subjective idealism:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immaterialism
I think it is accurate to call it is a form of spiritualism.


> Okay, this makes sense given your solipism/immaterialism.
>
>
>
> I would like to insist that comp leads to immaterialism, but that this is
> very different from solipsism. Both are idealism, but solipsism is "I am
> dreaming", where comp immaterialism is "all numbers are dreaming", and a
> real sharable physical reality emerges from gluing properties of those
> dreams/computations.
>
>
>

You are right, I should find a less general term.  It is the missing of the
glue I think that differentiates the immaterialism of comp from the
immaterialism of Berkely.



>
>
>> >
>> > If by representation you mean the representation of consciousness, then
>> this
>> > is the functionalist/computationalist philosophy in a nutshell.
>>
>> Computationalism says that representation *is* something you are.
>>
>> I say the opposite.  Representation is something you do, which is so
>> natural to you and so useful to you that you’ve mistaken it as the
>> explanation for everything.
>>
>
>
> You should read this
> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Functionalism_(philosophy_of_mind)
>
> Functionalism is the idea that it is what the parts do, not what they are
> that is important in a mind.
>
> Computatalism is a more specific form of functionalism (it assumes the
> functions are Turing emulable)
>
>
> I disagree with this. Putnam' functionalism is at the start a fuzzy form of
> computationalism (the wiki is rather bad on those subjects). It is fuzzy
> because it is not aware that IF we are machine, then we cannot know which
> machine we are. That is why it is a theology, you need an act of faith
> beyond just trusting the 'doctor'. In a sense functionalism is a specific
> form of computationalism because functionalist assumes by default some high
> level of comp. They are just fuzzy on the term "function", and seems unaware
> of the tremendous progress made on this by logicians and theoretical
> computer scientists.
>
> Note also that comp makes *1-you* different from any representation, from
> you first person perspective. So, the owner of the soul is the (immaterial)
> person, not the body. A body is already a representation of you, relatively
> to some universal numbers.
>
> In a sense we can sum up comp's consequence by: If 3-I is a machine, then
> 1-I is not. The soul is not a machine *from its point of view". He has to
> bet on its own G* to say 'yes' to the doctor. Of course, once we accept
> comp, we can retrospectively imagine that "nature" has already bet on it,
> given that the genome is digital relatively to chemistry, and given the
> evidences for evolution, and our very deep history.
>
> Bruno
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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Re: Mathematical closure of consciousness and computation

2011-06-07 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 07 Jun 2011, at 05:58, Richard Ruquist wrote:


Rex,

Is not what you attribute to Bruno just standard MWI (Many Worlds)  
thinking?


Many Worlds usually assumes the existence of (a) physical world(s).

The point is that digital mechanism *entails* already a testable form  
of many-worlds/many-dreams/many-computations. And there is nothing  
physical at the start. Physicalness is a quite special emerging  
pattern. Like with Plato, the physical reality is the border/shadow of  
something else. With comp, the physical reality is the border of  
arithmetical truth as seen by the (locally) arithmetical creatures.  
The first person is distributed on that border, preventing any  
intuitive picture of the relationship between soul and body. In fact  
each soul has a continuum of distinct bodies. So comp indeed leads to  
a very specific everything-like theory, which is confirmed (not  
proved!) by the quantum empiric MW.


Bruno







Richard

On Mon, Jun 6, 2011 at 6:52 PM, Rex Allen   
wrote:
On Mon, Jun 6, 2011 at 6:13 PM, Russell Standish > wrote:

> On Mon, Jun 06, 2011 at 04:42:46PM -0400, Rex Allen wrote:
>>
>> How can any of those questions be approached by conscious  
entities in

>> a deterministic computational framework?
>>
>> Everything you’ll ever learn, every mistake you’ll ever make, every
>> belief you’ll ever have is already locked in.
>>
>> Your life is “on rails”.  Maybe your final destination is good,  
maybe
>> it’s bad - but both the destination and the path to it are static  
and

>> fixed in Platonia.
>
> This is provably false.

What, exactly, are you claiming is provably false?


> One of Bruno's important results is 3-determinism
> implies 1-indeterminism.

This is sort of anti-climactic after your initial statement.

One of Bruno's important results is that if my future is determined,
in some sense it's not determined "for me" as an individual.


> It is not that hard to get, so would be worth your
> while trying to understand.

I think I understand this already.  The whole teleporting
moscow-washington thing, right?

In Platonia, there are many computational paths that branch out from
the current state that represents "me".

Each of these paths looks like a "possible future" from my subjective
standpoint.

But, they're not possible, they're actual.  In Platonia, they all
exist.  And they do so timelessly...so they're not "futures" they're a
series of "nows".

So, subjectively, I have the "illusion" of an undetermined "future".

But...really, it's determined.  Every one of those paths is
objectively actualized.

So how does this prove what I said false?  All those static "futures"
are mine.  They're all determined.  I'm still on rails...it's just
that the rails split in a rather unintuitive way.

Even if we say that what constitutes "me" is a single unbranched
path...this still doesn't make what I said false.  I'm one of those
paths, I just don't know which.  But ignorance of the future is not
indeterminism.  Ignorance of the future is ignorance of the (fully
determined)
future.

Rex

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Re: Mathematical closure of consciousness and computation

2011-06-07 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 07 Jun 2011, at 04:00, Jason Resch wrote:




On Mon, Jun 6, 2011 at 3:42 PM, Rex Allen   
wrote:
On Sun, Jun 5, 2011 at 8:34 PM, Jason Resch   
wrote:
> On Sun, Jun 5, 2011 at 11:58 AM, Rex Allen  
 wrote:
>> On Sat, Jun 4, 2011 at 4:14 PM, Jason Resch  
 wrote:
>>> Perhaps so, perhaps there is only Rex's beliefs.  Perhaps only  
rex's

>>> beliefs at this exact moment.
>>
>> Not obviously impossible.  Thought not obviously necessitated  
either.

>>
>> Does the possibility that there are only Jason’s beliefs at this  
exact

>> moment scare you?
>>
>> Would you prefer it to be otherwise?
>>
>
> It makes the universe much smaller, less varied, less fascinating,  
etc. to
> believe my current thought is all there is.  It also makes  
answering any
> questions futile (why does this thought exist?, can I change it?   
Am I a
> static thought or an evolving thought?  What determines or  
controls the
> content of this thought?)  How can any of those questions be  
approached if

> only thought exists?

How can any of those questions be approached by conscious entities in
a deterministic computational framework?

Everything you’ll ever learn, every mistake you’ll ever make, every
belief you’ll ever have is already locked in.

This is fatalism.  By AR+Comp you will experience all possible  
experiences, perhaps an infinite number of times (recurring  
endlessly?).  But this does not mean we are powerless to affect the  
measure of those experiences.  A simple example: Some think that QM  
implies that in half the universes they put on the seatbelt and in  
half the others they don't.  This is not true, if the person is  
conscientious enough they probably put on the seat belt in >99% of  
the universes.  That depends entirely on them.  A less safety- 
concerned individual may have the opposite probabilities.



Your life is “on rails”.  Maybe your final destination is good, maybe
it’s bad - but both the destination and the path to it are static and
fixed in Platonia.

Further, nothing about computationalism promises truth or anything
else desirable...or even makes them likely.

In fact, surely lies are far more common than truths in Platonia.
There are few ways to be right, but an infinite number of ways to be
wrong.  If you think you exist in Platonia, then surely you also have
to conclude that nearly everything else you believe is a lie.


What is true in this universe may be false or meaningless in most of  
the universes, but there might be some things which are true in  
every universe (such as 2+2 = 4).  If it is true in every universe,  
even in those having fewer than 4 things to count then by extension  
they are true even in universes with nothing to count, and  
correspondingly, would be true even if there was nothing anywhere.   
Math is self-existent (I can easily prove to you at least one thing  
must be self-existent for there to be anything at all) and it is  
much easier to see how math can be self-existent compared to  
observable physical universe.



***

Computationalism’s answers to the questions you pose are:

Why does this thought exist?  There is no reason except that
computation exists.  Big whoop.

Computationalism (mechanism, functionalism) is a theory of mind,  
which I believe is superior to its contenders (immaterialism,  
interactionalist dualism, epiphenominalism, biological naturalism,  
mind-brain identity theory, etc.) which all have big flaws.  While  
immaterialism cannot be disproved, it explains nothing and therefore  
fails as an explanatory or scientific theory.  It


I guess you mean some sort of "spiritualism" for immaterialism, which  
is a consequence of comp (+ some Occam). Especially that you already  
defend the idea that the computations are in (arithmetical) platonia.
Note that AR is part of comp. And the UD is the Universal dovetailer.  
(UDA is the argument that comp makes elementary arithmetic, or any  
sigma_1 complete theory, the theory of everything. Quanta and qualia  
are justified from inside, including their incommunicability.










Can I change it?  No.

Then why bother to get food when you are hungry?


Am I a static or evolving thought?  Neither.  Your are computation.

What determines or controls the content of this thought?  The brute
fact of computational structure.

***

Why did your momma love you?  It was computationally entailed.

Why did Jeffry Dahlmer kill those people?  It was computationally  
entailed.


Why 9/11, Auschwitz, AIDS, famine, bigotry, hate, suffering?  They are
computationally entailed.

This is just reductionism taken beyond the level where it should be  
taken.  You might as well answer: It is physically entailed,  
chemically entailed, biologically entailed, etc.  I don't see the  
point of the argument.


Neither do I. Nor do I see what Rex is proposing, except perhaps  
abandoning research, meditating or what?








Platonia actually sounds like more hell than heaven.

You base that on the small part of Plat

Re: Mathematical closure of consciousness and computation

2011-06-07 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 07 Jun 2011, at 00:52, Rex Allen wrote:

On Mon, Jun 6, 2011 at 6:13 PM, Russell Standish > wrote:

On Mon, Jun 06, 2011 at 04:42:46PM -0400, Rex Allen wrote:


How can any of those questions be approached by conscious entities  
in

a deterministic computational framework?

Everything you’ll ever learn, every mistake you’ll ever make, every
belief you’ll ever have is already locked in.

Your life is “on rails”.  Maybe your final destination is good,  
maybe
it’s bad - but both the destination and the path to it are static  
and

fixed in Platonia.


This is provably false.


What, exactly, are you claiming is provably false?



One of Bruno's important results is 3-determinism
implies 1-indeterminism.


This is sort of anti-climactic after your initial statement.

One of Bruno's important results is that if my future is determined,
in some sense it's not determined "for me" as an individual.



It is not that hard to get, so would be worth your
while trying to understand.


I think I understand this already.  The whole teleporting
moscow-washington thing, right?

In Platonia, there are many computational paths that branch out from
the current state that represents "me".

Each of these paths looks like a "possible future" from my subjective
standpoint.

But, they're not possible, they're actual.  In Platonia, they all
exist.  And they do so timelessly...so they're not "futures" they're a
series of "nows".

So, subjectively, I have the "illusion" of an undetermined "future".

But...really, it's determined.  Every one of those paths is
objectively actualized.

So how does this prove what I said false?  All those static "futures"
are mine.  They're all determined.  I'm still on rails...it's just
that the rails split in a rather unintuitive way.

Even if we say that what constitutes "me" is a single unbranched
path...this still doesn't make what I said false.  I'm one of those
paths, I just don't know which.  But ignorance of the future is not
indeterminism.  Ignorance of the future is ignorance of the (fully
determined)
future.


This is an argument against any determinist theory, or any block- 
universe theory. It is an argument again compatibilist theory of free  
will, and an argument against science in general, not just the  
mechanist hypothesis.


Just to make things clear, although I have not yet seen an evidence  
against digital mechanism, my point is just that IF mechanism is true  
then the physical reality is an arithmetical emerging phenomenon, and  
physics is a branch of machine's theology. Given that theology and  
physics is derivable by the self-reference logic, my point is that  
mechanism is Popper refutable.


Now anyone pretending that comp (digital mechanism) is false has to  
say what is not Turing emulable in their (generalized) brain, above  
its constitutive matter and its consciousness, which comp makes  
already non Turing emulable, or they have to prove that nature refute  
the physics of comp (but up to now, thanks to QM, it is much more  
confirmed than refuted).


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-06-07 Thread Stephen Paul King

Hi Colin,

   Any chance that us non-university affiliated types can get a copy of 
your paper?


Onward!

Stephen

-Original Message- 
From: Colin Hales

Sent: Tuesday, June 07, 2011 3:42 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: COMP refutation paper - finally out

Hi,

Hales, C. G. 'On the Status of Computationalism as a Law of Nature',
International Journal of Machine Consciousness vol. 3, no. 1, 2011. 1-35.

http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000613


The paper has finally been published. Phew what an epic!

cheers

Colin

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COMP refutation paper - finally out

2011-06-07 Thread Colin Hales

Hi,

Hales, C. G. 'On the Status of Computationalism as a Law of Nature', 
International Journal of Machine Consciousness vol. 3, no. 1, 2011. 1-35.


http://dx.doi.org/10.1142/S1793843011000613


The paper has finally been published. Phew what an epic!

cheers

Colin

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