Re: 1p 3p comparison
On 11 Feb 2012, at 03:01, Craig Weinberg wrote: Dennett's Comp: Human 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - What do you mean precisely by np(np) n = 1 or 3. ? Subjectivity is an illusion And I guess we agree that this is total nonsense. Machine 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - Subjectivity is not considered formally My view: Human 1p = (1p(1p(1p))) - Subjectivity a fundamental sense modality which is qualitatively enriched in humans through multiple organic nestings. Even infinite organic nestings, which might not even make sense. Machine 1p = (3p(3p(1p))) - Machine subjectivity is limited to hardware level sense modalities, which can be used to imitate human 3p quantitatively but cannot be enriched qualitatively to human 1p. Which seems ad hoc for making machine non conscious. Again we see here that you accept that your position entails the existence of philosophical zombies, that is: the existence of unconscious machines perfectly imitating humans in *all* circumstances. Bruno: Machine or human 1p = (1p(f(x)) - Subjectivity arises as a result of the 1p set of functional consequences of specific arithmetic truths, which (I think) are neither object, subject, or sense, but Platonic universal numbers. Is that close? I just say that IF we are machine, then some tiny part of arithmetical truth is ontologically enough, to derive matter and consciousness, and is necessary (up to recursive equivalence). Subjectivity comes from self-reference + Truth. Truth about a weaker LUM is definable by a stronger LUM, but no LUM can defined its own global notion of truth (which will play the role of the first greek God, like Plotinus ONE). Weak and String are defined in term of the set of provable (by the entity in question) arithmetical (or equivalent) propositions. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Information: a basic physical quantity or rather emergence/supervenience phenomenon
On 11.02.2012 04:27 Russell Standish said the following: On Fri, Feb 10, 2012 at 09:39:50PM +0100, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: Let me ask you the same question that I have recently asked Brent. Could you please tell me, the thermodynamic entropy of what is discussed in Jason's example below? Evgenii If you're asking what is the conversion constant between bits and J/K, the answer is k_B log(2) / log(10). I'm not sure what else to tell you... Cheers I am asking what a thermodynamic system is to be considered in this case. I understand that you can convert it his way, the question would be the thermodynamic entropy of what you receive this way. Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP theology (was: Ontological Problems of COMP)
On 11 Feb 2012, at 07:32, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi ACW, Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!! On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote: Bruno has always said that COMP is a matter of theology (or religion), that is, the provably unprovable, and I agree with this. However, let's try and see why that is and why someone would take COMP as an assumption: - The main assumption of COMP is that you admit, at some level, a digital substitution, and the stronger assumption that if you were to implement/run such a Turing-emulable program, it would be conscious and you would have a continuation in it. Isn't that a strong theological assumption? [SPK] Yes, but it is the substitution of one configuration of stuff with another such that the functionality (that allows for the implementation/running of the Turing-emulable (Turing equivalence!)) program to remain invariant. One thing interesting to point out about this is that this substitution can be the replacement of completely different kinds of stuff, like carbon based stuff with silicon based stuff and does not require a continuous physical process of transformation in the sense of smoothly morphism the carbon stuff into silicon stuff at some primitive level. B/c of this it may seem to bypass the usual restrictions of physical laws, but does it really? What exactly is this physical stuff anyway? If we take a hint from the latest ideas in theoretical physics it seems that the stuff of the material world is more about properties that remain invariant under sets of symmetry transformations and less and less about anything like primitive substances. So in a sense, the physical world might be considered to be a wide assortment of bundles of invariants therefore it seems to me that to test COMP we need to see if those symmetry groups and invariants can be derived from some proposed underlying logical structure. This is what I am trying to do. I am really not arguing against COMP, I am arguing that COMP is incomplete as a theory as it does not yet show how the appearance of space, time and conservation laws emerges in a way that is invariant and not primitive. So you miss the UDA point. The UDA point is that if COMP is true, it has to be complete as a theory, independently of the fact that the shorter time to derive physics might be 10^1000 millenia. Comp explains, by the UDA, that whatever you add to comp, or to RA, or to the UD, cannot play any role in consciousness, including the feeling that the worlds obeys some role. So if comp is correct the las of physics have to be derived from arithmetic alone. Then AUDA makes a non trivial part of the derivation. We have already the symmetry of the core bottom physics, the quantum indeterminacy, non locality, non cloning. But this is just for illustrating the consistency: the UDA conclusion is that no matter what, the appearance of matter cannot use any supplementary assumption to comp and/or arithmetic. You can sum up the UD by comp is not completable. It is the Bell-von Neuman answer to Einstein, in your analogy below. Arithmetic is made conceptually complete. Whatever you add to it will prevent the comp solution of the mind-body problem, a bit like evruthing you add to the SWE will reintroduce the measurement problem in quantum physics. Comp and arithmetic are conceptually complete, but of epistemologically highly incomplete and uncompletable. Also, once you agree that stuff is not primitive, you have to define it from your primitive terms, which I don't see possible given that your primitive is the word existence which is not defined, nor even a theory. I guess I have the temerity to play Einstein against Bruno's Bohr. :-) See just above. OTOH, I am not arguing for any kind of return to naive realism or that the physical world is the totality of existence. I do know that I am just a curious amateur, so I welcome any critique that might help me learn. Comp like QM does not admit supplementary axioms, or variables, to reinstall a physical realism. I think it is, but at the same time, it has solid consequences and a belief in it can be justified for a number of reasons: a) Fading qualia thought experiment, which shows that consciousness is utterly fickle if it doesn't follow a principle of functional / organizational invariance. Most of our sense data tends to point that such a principle makes sense. Avoiding it means consciousness does not correspond to brain states and p. zombies. Certainly! We need a precise explanation for psycho-physical parallelism. But there is no psycho-physical parallelism. The metaphysical physical *is* an illusion, naïve or not. The physical itself is arithmetical truth see from the observable point of view (suggested to be handled by the logics of observation Bp Dt ( p), at the G and G* levels). My tentative
Re: 1p 3p comparison
On Feb 11, 4:03 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 11 Feb 2012, at 03:01, Craig Weinberg wrote: Dennett's Comp: Human 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - What do you mean precisely by np(np) n = 1 or 3. ? I'm using 1p or 3p as names only, first person direct phenomenology or third person objective mechanism. The parenthesis is hierarchical/ holarchical nesting or you could say multiplication. Dennett thinks that we know that there are only mechanical processes controlling each other. Subjectivity is an illusion And I guess we agree that this is total nonsense. Yes. But only because we have first hand experience ourselves and cannot doubt it. If we could doubt it then there would be no reason to imagine that there could be such a thing as subjectivity. Machine 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - Subjectivity is not considered formally My view: Human 1p = (1p(1p(1p))) - Subjectivity a fundamental sense modality which is qualitatively enriched in humans through multiple organic nestings. Even infinite organic nestings, which might not even make sense. No, only seven or so nestings: Physical Chemical Biological Zoological Neurological Anthropological Individual Machine 1p = (3p(3p(1p))) - Machine subjectivity is limited to hardware level sense modalities, which can be used to imitate human 3p quantitatively but cannot be enriched qualitatively to human 1p. Which seems ad hoc for making machine non conscious. Again we see here that you accept that your position entails the existence of philosophical zombies, I call them puppets. Zombies are assumed to have absent qualia, puppets are understood not to have any qualia in the first place. that is: the existence of unconscious machines perfectly imitating humans in *all* circumstances. Not perfectly imitating, no. That's what that whole business of substitution being indexical is about. I propose more of a formula of substitution, like in pharmacological toxicity where LD50 represents a lethal dose in 50% of animal test population. Let's call it TD (Turing Discovery). What you are talking about is a hypothetical puppet with a TD00 value - it fails the Turing Test for 0% of test participants (even itself - since if it didn't then an identical program could be used to detect the puppet strings). The first consideration with this is that it would need to be extended to have a duration value because any puppet might not reveal it's strings in a short conversation. A TD00 program might decay to TD75 in an hour, and TD99 in two hours, so there could be a function plotted there. It may not be a simple arithmetic rise over time, participants may change their mind back and forth (and I think that they might) over time. There could be patterns in that too, where our expectations wax and wane with some kind of regularity for some people and not for others. It's not just time duration though, we would need to factor in the quantity and quality of data. How hard the questions are and how many of them. Answering long questions too fast would be a dead giveaway. A sparse conversation may have giveaways too - how they express impatience with long delays, whether they bring up parts of the conversation during the gaps, all kinds of subtle clues in the semantic character of what the program focuses on. There are so many variables that it may not even be useful to try to model it. The TD will undoubtedly be affected by how the participants have been prepared, whether they have experience with AI or have seen documentaries about it just before or whether they have been instead prepared with sentimental stories or crime dramas which sensitize them or desensitize them to certain attitudes and behavior. If the program speaks in LOL INTERWEBZ slang, or general informal terms vs precise scientific terms that would have an effect as well. Whether or not a true TD00 - universal human puppet could be possible in theory or practice is not what I'm speculating on. If I were to speculate, I would say that no, it is not possible. I don't think that even a real human could be TD00 to all other humans for all times and situations. That's because it's a continuum of 'seems like' rather than a condition which 'simply is' - it's indexical to subject and circumstance. All of this in no way means that the TD level implies actual simulation of subjectivity. TD is only a measure of imitation success. As I have said, the only way I can think of to come close to knowing whether a given imitation is a simulation is to walk your brain function over to the program, one hemisphere at a time, and then walk it back after a few hours or days. Short of that, we can either be generous with our projection and imagine that puppets, computers, and programs are potential human beings given the right degree of sophistication, or we can be more conservative and limit our scope so that we only give other humans, animals, or living organisms the benefit of the doubt. I think the more
Re: The free will function
On Feb 11, 1:24 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: I'm not trying to convince anyone that I'm brilliant, I'm explaining why the popular ideas and conventional wisdom of the moment are misguided. You need to explain, non-question-beggingly.. What a computer does is arithmetic to us, but to the computer it's billions of separate electronic or mechanical events that signify nothing to it. ...why that is a problem with the computer being a computer and not with the computer being too dumb. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP theology
On 2/11/2012 6:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Feb 2012, at 07:32, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi ACW, Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!! On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote: Bruno has always said that COMP is a matter of theology (or religion), that is, the provably unprovable, and I agree with this. However, let's try and see why that is and why someone would take COMP as an assumption: - The main assumption of COMP is that you admit, at some level, a digital substitution, and the stronger assumption that if you were to implement/run such a Turing-emulable program, it would be conscious and you would have a continuation in it. Isn't that a strong theological assumption? [SPK] Yes, but it is the substitution of one configuration of stuff with another such that the functionality (that allows for the implementation/running of the Turing-emulable (Turing equivalence!)) program to remain invariant. One thing interesting to point out about this is that this substitution can be the replacement of completely different kinds of stuff, like carbon based stuff with silicon based stuff and does not require a continuous physical process of transformation in the sense of smoothly morphism the carbon stuff into silicon stuff at some primitive level. B/c of this it may seem to bypass the usual restrictions of physical laws, but does it really? What exactly is this physical stuff anyway? If we take a hint from the latest ideas in theoretical physics it seems that the stuff of the material world is more about properties that remain invariant under sets of symmetry transformations and less and less about anything like primitive substances. So in a sense, the physical world might be considered to be a wide assortment of bundles of invariants therefore it seems to me that to test COMP we need to see if those symmetry groups and invariants can be derived from some proposed underlying logical structure. This is what I am trying to do. I am really not arguing against COMP, I am arguing that COMP is incomplete as a theory as it does not yet show how the appearance of space, time and conservation laws emerges in a way that is invariant and not primitive. So you miss the UDA point. The UDA point is that if COMP is true, it has to be complete as a theory, independently of the fact that the shorter time to derive physics might be 10^1000 millenia. Comp explains, by the UDA, that whatever you add to comp, or to RA, or to the UD, cannot play any role in consciousness, including the feeling that the worlds obeys some role. So if comp is correct the las of physics have to be derived from arithmetic alone. Then AUDA makes a non trivial part of the derivation. We have already the symmetry of the core bottom physics, the quantum indeterminacy, non locality, non cloning. But this is just for illustrating the consistency: the UDA conclusion is that no matter what, the appearance of matter cannot use any supplementary assumption to comp and/or arithmetic. You can sum up the UD by comp is not completable. It is the Bell-von Neuman answer to Einstein, in your analogy below. Arithmetic is made conceptually complete. Whatever you add to it will prevent the comp solution of the mind-body problem, a bit like evruthing you add to the SWE will reintroduce the measurement problem in quantum physics. Comp and arithmetic are conceptually complete, but of epistemologically highly incomplete and uncompletable. Also, once you agree that stuff is not primitive, you have to define it from your primitive terms, which I don't see possible given that your primitive is the word existence which is not defined, nor even a theory. Hi Bruno, You are still not addressing my questions and what I see as a problem. The speed issue and completeness is not just addressing from an internal perspective since we have to have invariance over many different internal perspectives and these can vary over speed and complexity. This is illustrated by the discussion of how stuff can vary while preserving the functionality. The 'theory' of existence follows naturally from neutral monism, you just need spend the effort to understand it. Think of this another way, we have a choice between belief that COMP is true or COMP is false. In order to have a coherent notion of a bet, both COMP is True and COMP is false have to exist side by side as equivalently possible. If we consider that they only can have this side by side equivalence in the mind, then we obtain the situation that their truth value is dependent on the choice, but that would contradict COMP since built into it is the postulate that truth is independent of belief. We have to look at COMP from the point of view of many minds and not just one, but so far you have stoically resisted doing this. Why? OTOH, I am not arguing for any kind of return to naive realism or that the physical world is the totality of
Re: Time and Concurrency Platonia?
On 2/10/2012 13:54, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote: [SPK] I do not see how this deals effectively with the concurrency problem! :-( Using the Platonia idea is a cheat as it is explicitly unphysical. But physics by itself does not explain consciousness either (as shown by MGA). Maybe I just don't see what the concurrency problem is. It has no constraints of thermodynamics, no limits on speeds of signals, no explanation as to how an Ideal Form is defined, e.g. what is the standard of its perfection, ect. It is no different from the Realm of God in religious mythos, so what is it doing here in our rational considerations? Forgive me but I was raised by parents that where Fundamentalists Believers, so please understand that I have an allergy to ideas that remind me of the mental prison that I had to work so hard to escape. I'm not asking you to share all of Plato's beliefs here. It's merely a minimal amount of magic, not unlike the magic you have to accept by positing a 3p world. The amount is basically this: arithmetical (or computational) sentences have truth values independent of anything physical and consciousness/qualia may be how some such arithmetical truth feels from the inside. Without at least some axioms, one cannot get anywhere, you can't reduce arithmetic to only logic and so on. Why would Platonia have to have the same constraints as our physical realms - it need only obey to constraints of logic and math, which usually means stuff that is contained within the Church Turing Thesis and its implications. Speed of signals? If some theory is inconsistent, it's only there as part of the reasoning of some other machine. Ideal Form? How do you define an integer or the axioms that talk about arithmetic? Popular religious mythos tend to be troublesome because they involve *logically impossible* properties being attributed to Gods and other beings - things which are inconsistent. It's not like one doesn't assume some axioms in any theory - they are there in almost any scientific theory. Yet, unlike popular religions, you're free to evaluate your hypotheses and use evidence and meta-reasoning to decide which one is more likely to be true and then try to use the results of such theories to predict how stuff will behave or bet on various things. Of course, it's not hard to get trapped in a bad epistemology, and I can see why you'd be extra skeptical of bad theories, however nobody is telling you to believe a theory is true or false, instead it asks you to work out the consequences of each theory's axioms (as well as using meta-reasoning skills to weed down overly complex theories, if you prefer using Occam's) and then either choose to use or not use that particular theory depending if the results match your observations/expectations/standards/... (if expectations are broken, one would either have to update beliefs or theories or both). Hi ACW, What ever the global structure that we use to relate our ideas and provide explanations, it makes sense that we do not ignore problems that are inconvenient. A big problem that I have with Platonia is that it does not address the appearance of change that we finite semi-autonomous beings observe. The problem of time is just a corollary to this. I would prefer to toss out any postulates that require *any* magic. Magic is like Arsenic poison, every little bit doubles the harmful effects. Magic is only used for things which have to either be axioms or which just cannot be reduced further. Arithmetic cannot be reduced further. What we have as subjective experience is not directly communicable, it is very 'magical', yet our theories must explain it somehow. We may want to have no axioms at all, but such theories are inconsistent as they can prove anything at all. Why do we even need a notion of 3p except as a pedagogical tool? What we need, at least, is a stratification scheme that allows us to represent these differences, but we need to understand that in doing this we are sneaking in the notion of a 3p that is equivalent to some kind of agent whose only mission is to observe differences and that is a fallacy since we are trying to explain observers in the first place. Unless we have some way to handle a fundamental notion of change, there is no way to deal with questions of change and time. Please notice how many instances we are using verbs in our considerations of COMP ideas. Where and how does the change implicit in the verb, as like running the UD, obtain? We cannot ignore this. I am highlighting the concurrency problem b/c it shows how this problem cannot be ignored. The Platonic Realm, especially the Arithmetic Realist one, is by definition fixed and static, nothing changes in it at all! How do we get the appearance of time from it? It is possible to show how, but the proponents of COMP need to explain this, IMHO. It is incoherent at best to make statements like the UD is running on the walls of Platonia. How is that even a
Re: The free will function
On Feb 11, 12:01 pm, 1Z peterdjo...@yahoo.com wrote: On Feb 11, 1:24 am, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: I'm not trying to convince anyone that I'm brilliant, I'm explaining why the popular ideas and conventional wisdom of the moment are misguided. You need to explain, non-question-beggingly.. I have been accused of that sometimes, but I have never been guilty of it that I have seen. What a computer does is arithmetic to us, but to the computer it's billions of separate electronic or mechanical events that signify nothing to it. ...why that is a problem with the computer being a computer and not with the computer being too dumb. All computers are as dumb as anything could be. Any computer will run the same loop over and over forever if you program them to do that. Craig -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP theology
On 11 Feb 2012, at 18:41, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/11/2012 6:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Feb 2012, at 07:32, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi ACW, Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!! On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote: Bruno has always said that COMP is a matter of theology (or religion), that is, the provably unprovable, and I agree with this. However, let's try and see why that is and why someone would take COMP as an assumption: - The main assumption of COMP is that you admit, at some level, a digital substitution, and the stronger assumption that if you were to implement/run such a Turing-emulable program, it would be conscious and you would have a continuation in it. Isn't that a strong theological assumption? [SPK] Yes, but it is the substitution of one configuration of stuff with another such that the functionality (that allows for the implementation/running of the Turing-emulable (Turing equivalence!)) program to remain invariant. One thing interesting to point out about this is that this substitution can be the replacement of completely different kinds of stuff, like carbon based stuff with silicon based stuff and does not require a continuous physical process of transformation in the sense of smoothly morphism the carbon stuff into silicon stuff at some primitive level. B/c of this it may seem to bypass the usual restrictions of physical laws, but does it really? What exactly is this physical stuff anyway? If we take a hint from the latest ideas in theoretical physics it seems that the stuff of the material world is more about properties that remain invariant under sets of symmetry transformations and less and less about anything like primitive substances. So in a sense, the physical world might be considered to be a wide assortment of bundles of invariants therefore it seems to me that to test COMP we need to see if those symmetry groups and invariants can be derived from some proposed underlying logical structure. This is what I am trying to do. I am really not arguing against COMP, I am arguing that COMP is incomplete as a theory as it does not yet show how the appearance of space, time and conservation laws emerges in a way that is invariant and not primitive. So you miss the UDA point. The UDA point is that if COMP is true, it has to be complete as a theory, independently of the fact that the shorter time to derive physics might be 10^1000 millenia. Comp explains, by the UDA, that whatever you add to comp, or to RA, or to the UD, cannot play any role in consciousness, including the feeling that the worlds obeys some role. So if comp is correct the las of physics have to be derived from arithmetic alone. Then AUDA makes a non trivial part of the derivation. We have already the symmetry of the core bottom physics, the quantum indeterminacy, non locality, non cloning. But this is just for illustrating the consistency: the UDA conclusion is that no matter what, the appearance of matter cannot use any supplementary assumption to comp and/or arithmetic. You can sum up the UD by comp is not completable. It is the Bell-von Neuman answer to Einstein, in your analogy below. Arithmetic is made conceptually complete. Whatever you add to it will prevent the comp solution of the mind-body problem, a bit like evruthing you add to the SWE will reintroduce the measurement problem in quantum physics. Comp and arithmetic are conceptually complete, but of epistemologically highly incomplete and uncompletable. Also, once you agree that stuff is not primitive, you have to define it from your primitive terms, which I don't see possible given that your primitive is the word existence which is not defined, nor even a theory. Hi Bruno, You are still not addressing my questions and what I see as a problem. The speed issue and completeness is not just addressing from an internal perspective since we have to have invariance over many different internal perspectives and these can vary over speed and complexity. This is illustrated by the discussion of how stuff can vary while preserving the functionality. The 'theory' of existence follows naturally from neutral monism, you just need spend the effort to understand it. But I have not yet seen the theory. Existence is a word. A theory, when presented, is a set of axioms and inference rules. Think of this another way, we have a choice between belief that COMP is true or COMP is false. Assuming classical logic applies at the metalevel, and this is not obvious to me. In order to have a coherent notion of a bet, both COMP is True and COMP is false have to exist side by side as equivalently possible. To bet on comp would be an error like Pascal gambit. You can only evaluate the theory by yourself, trusting the doctor, and makes some bet in case it is the only hope possible.
Re: 1p 3p comparison
On 11 Feb 2012, at 15:56, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Feb 11, 4:03 am, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 11 Feb 2012, at 03:01, Craig Weinberg wrote: Dennett's Comp: Human 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - What do you mean precisely by np(np) n = 1 or 3. ? I'm using 1p or 3p as names only, first person direct phenomenology or third person objective mechanism. The parenthesis is hierarchical/ holarchical nesting or you could say multiplication. ? Dennett thinks that we know that there are only mechanical processes controlling each other. Yes. Even in the physical sense. I am not sure if he really means that we know that, but then I am used to give a strong sense to knowing. Subjectivity is an illusion And I guess we agree that this is total nonsense. Yes. But only because we have first hand experience ourselves and cannot doubt it. OK. If we could doubt it then there would be no reason to imagine that there could be such a thing as subjectivity. OK. If we doubt it, we have a subjective experience. If we don't doubt it, too. So we cannot doubt it. Machine 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - Subjectivity is not considered formally My view: Human 1p = (1p(1p(1p))) - Subjectivity a fundamental sense modality which is qualitatively enriched in humans through multiple organic nestings. Even infinite organic nestings, which might not even make sense. No, only seven or so nestings: Physical Chemical Biological Zoological Neurological Anthropological Individual By UDA to have no comp you will have to continue such nesting in the Physical. I let you this as a non completely trivial exercise. I know you will invoke finite things non Turing emulable, but I cannot ascribe any sense to that. When you gave me yellow as example, you did not convince me. The qualia yellow is 1p simple, but needs a complex 3p relation between two universal numbers to be able to be manifested in a consistent history. Machine 1p = (3p(3p(1p))) - Machine subjectivity is limited to hardware level sense modalities, which can be used to imitate human 3p quantitatively but cannot be enriched qualitatively to human 1p. Which seems ad hoc for making machine non conscious. Again we see here that you accept that your position entails the existence of philosophical zombies, I call them puppets. Zombies are assumed to have absent qualia, puppets are understood not to have any qualia in the first place. Puppets don't handle complex counterfactuals, like humans and philosophical zombie. I don't know the difference between absent qualia and having no qualia, also. that is: the existence of unconscious machines perfectly imitating humans in *all* circumstances. Not perfectly imitating, no. Sorry but it is the definition. That's what that whole business of substitution being indexical is about. I propose more of a formula of substitution, like in pharmacological toxicity where LD50 represents a lethal dose in 50% of animal test population. Let's call it TD (Turing Discovery). What you are talking about is a hypothetical puppet with a TD00 value - it fails the Turing Test for 0% of test participants (even itself - since if it didn't then an identical program could be used to detect the puppet strings). ? By definition, a philosophical zombie win all Turing test, (except if he imitates a human so awkward that people take him for a machine. (That happens!)). By definition philophical zombies behave identically to humans. The only difference is that they lack the 1p experience. The first consideration with this is that it would need to be extended to have a duration value because any puppet might not reveal it's strings in a short conversation. A TD00 program might decay to TD75 in an hour, and TD99 in two hours, so there could be a function plotted there. It may not be a simple arithmetic rise over time, participants may change their mind back and forth (and I think that they might) over time. There could be patterns in that too, where our expectations wax and wane with some kind of regularity for some people and not for others. It's not just time duration though, we would need to factor in the quantity and quality of data. How hard the questions are and how many of them. Answering long questions too fast would be a dead giveaway. A sparse conversation may have giveaways too - how they express impatience with long delays, whether they bring up parts of the conversation during the gaps, all kinds of subtle clues in the semantic character of what the program focuses on. There are so many variables that it may not even be useful to try to model it. The TD will undoubtedly be affected by how the participants have been prepared, whether they have experience with AI or have seen documentaries about it just before or whether they have been instead prepared with sentimental stories or crime dramas which sensitize them or desensitize them to certain attitudes and
Re: Free Floating entities
On 2/10/2012 14:01, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote: Another way to think of it would be in the terms of the Church Turing Thesis, where you expect that a computation (in the Turing sense) to have result and that result is independent of all your implementations, such a result not being changeable in any way or by anything - that's usually what I imagine by Platonia. It is a bit mystical, but I find it less mystical than requiring a magical physical substrate (even more after MGA) - to me the platonic implementation seems to be the simplest possible explanation. If you think it's a bad explanation that introduces some magic, I'll respond that the primitively physical version introduces even more magic. Making truth changeable or temporal seems to me to be a much stronger, much more magical than what I'm considering: that arithmetical sentences do have a truth value, regardless if we know it or not. [SPK] I am only asking that we put the abstract world of mathematics on an even footing with the physical world, I am _not_ asking for a primitive physical world. I will say again, just because a computation is independent for any particular implementation that I, you or any one else is capable of creating does not eliminate the necessity that somehow it must be implemented physically. Universality of computation is NOT the severing of computation from its physical implementability. This is not the same kind of claim as we see of the ultrafinitist and/or constructivist; it is just a realistic demand that ideas cannot be free floating entities. We cannot believe in free floating numbers any more than we can believe in disembodies spirits and ghosts. What is a non-primitive physical world, what is it based on? 'Existence'? What is that, sounds primitive to me. If we accept 'existence' as primitive, how does math and physical arise out of it? It seems so general to me that I can't imagine anything at all about it, to the point of being a God-like non-theory (although I can sympathize with it, just that it cannot be used as a theory because it's too general. We'll probably have to settle with something which we can discuss, such as a part of math.) Why is 'physical' implementation so important? Those free floating numbers could very well represent the structures that we and our universe happen to be and their truths may very well sometimes be this thing we call 'consciousness'. As for 'spirits' - how does this 'consciousness' thing know which body to follow and observe? How does it correlate that it must correlate to the physical states present in the brain? How does it know to appear in a robotic body or VR environment if someone decides to upload their mind (sometime in the far future)? What's this continuity of consciousness thing? Granted that some particular mathematical structure could represent the physical, I'm not sure it makes sense gran the physical any more meaning than that which we(our bodies) observe as being part of. Hi ACW, A non-primitive world would be a world that is defined by a set of communications between observers, however the observers are defined. The notion of a cyclical gossiping as used in graph theory gives a nice model of how this would work and it even shows a nice toy model of thermodynamic entropy. See #58 here http://books.google.com/books?id=SbZKSZ-1qrwCpg=PA32lpg=PA32dq=cyclical+gossiping+graph+theorysource=blots=NAvDjdj7u-sig=kk03XrGRBzdVWI09bh_-yrACM64hl=ensa=Xei=jCI1T8TpM4O4tweVgMG_Agsqi=2ved=0CC8Q6AEwAg#v=onepageqf=false for a statement of this idea. Also see http://mathworld.wolfram.com/Gossiping.html A model which allows communication might be nicer to look at, but I don't see why it's *required*. I also don't see how it predicts different things than a model which just has a 'shared computation'/'shared substrate' for each observer? Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: COMP theology
On Sat, Feb 11, 2012 at 11:41 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: On 2/11/2012 6:29 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 11 Feb 2012, at 07:32, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi ACW, Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!! On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote: Bruno has always said that COMP is a matter of theology (or religion), that is, the provably unprovable, and I agree with this. However, let's try and see why that is and why someone would take COMP as an assumption: - The main assumption of COMP is that you admit, at some level, a digital substitution, and the stronger assumption that if you were to implement/run such a Turing-emulable program, it would be conscious and you would have a continuation in it. Isn't that a strong theological assumption? [SPK] Yes, but it is the substitution of one configuration of stuff with another such that the functionality (that allows for the implementation/running of the Turing-emulable (Turing equivalence!)) program to remain invariant. One thing interesting to point out about this is that this substitution can be the replacement of completely different kinds of stuff, like carbon based stuff with silicon based stuff and does not require a continuous physical process of transformation in the sense of smoothly morphism the carbon stuff into silicon stuff at some primitive level. B/c of this it may seem to bypass the usual restrictions of physical laws, but does it really? What exactly is this physical stuff anyway? If we take a hint from the latest ideas in theoretical physics it seems that the stuff of the material world is more about properties that remain invariant under sets of symmetry transformations and less and less about anything like primitive substances. So in a sense, the physical world might be considered to be a wide assortment of bundles of invariants therefore it seems to me that to test COMP we need to see if those symmetry groups and invariants can be derived from some proposed underlying logical structure. This is what I am trying to do. I am really not arguing against COMP, I am arguing that COMP is incomplete as a theory as it does not yet show how the appearance of space, time and conservation laws emerges in a way that is invariant and not primitive. So you miss the UDA point. The UDA point is that if COMP is true, it has to be complete as a theory, independently of the fact that the shorter time to derive physics might be 10^1000 millenia. Comp explains, by the UDA, that whatever you add to comp, or to RA, or to the UD, cannot play any role in consciousness, including the feeling that the worlds obeys some role. So if comp is correct the las of physics have to be derived from arithmetic alone. Then AUDA makes a non trivial part of the derivation. We have already the symmetry of the core bottom physics, the quantum indeterminacy, non locality, non cloning. But this is just for illustrating the consistency: the UDA conclusion is that no matter what, the appearance of matter cannot use any supplementary assumption to comp and/or arithmetic. You can sum up the UD by comp is not completable. It is the Bell-von Neuman answer to Einstein, in your analogy below. Arithmetic is made conceptually complete. Whatever you add to it will prevent the comp solution of the mind-body problem, a bit like evruthing you add to the SWE will reintroduce the measurement problem in quantum physics. Comp and arithmetic are conceptually complete, but of epistemologically highly incomplete and uncompletable. Also, once you agree that stuff is not primitive, you have to define it from your primitive terms, which I don't see possible given that your primitive is the word existence which is not defined, nor even a theory. Hi Bruno, You are still not addressing my questions and what I see as a problem. The speed issue and completeness is not just addressing from an internal perspective since we have to have invariance over many different internal perspectives and these can vary over speed and complexity. This is illustrated by the discussion of how stuff can vary while preserving the functionality. The 'theory' of existence follows naturally from neutral monism, you just need spend the effort to understand it. Think of this another way, we have a choice between belief that COMP is true or COMP is false. In order to have a coherent notion of a bet, both COMP is True and COMP is false have to exist side by side as equivalently possible. Yet COMP is true AND COMP is false is necessarily false. If we consider that they only can have this side by side equivalence in the mind, then we obtain the situation that their truth value is dependent on the choice, How? Just because you bet on something doesn't make it a correct bet. Just because you hold two contradictory propositions to have equal credence, doesn't make them both correct. I don't see where this is
Re: Truth values as dynamics?
On 2/11/2012 05:49, Stephen P. King wrote: On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote: I think the idea of Platonia is closer to the fact that if a sentence has a truth-value, it will have that truth value, regardless if you know it or not. Sure, but it is not just you to whom a given sentence may have the same exact truth value. This is like Einstein arguing with Bohr with the quip: The moon is still there when I do not see it. My reply to Einstein would be: Sir, you are not the only observer of the moon! We have to look at the situation from the point of view of many observers or, in this case, truth detectors, that can interact and communicate consistently with each other. We cannot think is just solipsistic terms. Sure, but what if nobody is looking at the moon? Or instead of moon, pick something even less likely to be observed. To put it differently, Riemann hypothesis or Goldbach's conjecture truth-value should not depend on the observers thinking of it - they may eventually discover it, and such a discovery would depend on many computational consequences, of which the observers may not be aware of yet, but doesn't mean that those consequences don't exist - when the computation is locally performed, it will always give the same result which could be said to exist timelessly. [SPK] My point is that any one or thing that could be affected by the truth value of the moon has X, Y, Z properties will, in effect, be an observer of the moon since it is has a definite set of properties as knowledge. The key here is causal efficacy, if a different state of affairs would result if some part of the world is changed then the conditions of that part of the world are observed. The same thing holds for the truth value Riemann hypothesis or Goldbach's conjecture, since there would be different worlds for each of their truth values. My point is that while the truth value or reality of the moon does not depend on the observation by any _one_ observer, it does depend for its definiteness on the possibility that it could be observed by some observer. It is the possibility that makes the difference. A object that cannot be observer by any means, including these arcane versions that I just laid out, cannot be said to have a definite set of properties or truth value, to say the opposite is equivalent to making a truth claim about a mathematical object for whom no set of equations or representation can be made. You're conjecturing here that there were worlds where Riemann hypothesis or Goldbach's conjecture have different truth values. I don't think arithmetical truths which happen to have proofs have indexical truth values, this is due to CTT. Although most physical truths are indexical (or depend on the axioms chosen). We could limit ourselves to decidable arithmetical truths only, but you'd bump into the problem of consistency of arithmetic or the halting problem. It makes no sense to me that a machine which is defined to either halt or not halt would not do either. We might not know if a machine halts or not, but that doesn't mean that if when ran in any possible world it would behave differently. Arithmetical truth should be the same in all possible worlds. An observer can find out a truth value, but it cannot alter it, unless it is an indexical (context-dependent truth, such as what time it is now or where do you live). Of course, we cannot talk about the truth value of undefined stuff, that would be non-sense. However, we can talk about the truth value of what cannot be observed - this machine never halts is only true if no observation of the machine halting can ever be made, in virtue of how the machine is defined, yet someone could use various meta-reasoning to reach the conclusion that the machine will never halt (consistency of arithmetic is very much similar to the halting problem - it's only consistent if a machine which enumerates proofs never finds a proof of 0=1; of course, this is not provable within arithmetic itself, thus it's a provably unprovable statement for any consistent machine, thus can only be a matter of theology as Bruno calls it). Hi ACW, I am considering that the truth value is a function of the theory with which a proposition is evaluated. In other words, meaningfulness, including truth value, is contextual while existence is absolute. Of course it's a function of the theory. Although, I do think some theories like arithmetic, computability and first-order logic are so general and infectious that they can be found in literally any non-trivial theory. That is, one cannot really escape their consequences. At that point, one might as well consider them absolute. That said, an axiom that says you're now in structure X and state Y would be very much contextual. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send
Re: COMP theology (was: Ontological Problems of COMP)
On Sat, Feb 11, 2012 at 12:32 AM, Stephen P. King stephe...@charter.netwrote: Hi ACW, Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!! On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote: Bruno has always said that COMP is a matter of theology (or religion), that is, the provably unprovable, and I agree with this. However, let's try and see why that is and why someone would take COMP as an assumption: - The main assumption of COMP is that you admit, at some level, a digital substitution, and the stronger assumption that if you were to implement/run such a Turing-emulable program, it would be conscious and you would have a continuation in it. Isn't that a strong theological assumption? [SPK] Yes, but it is the substitution of one configuration of stuff with another such that the functionality (that allows for the implementation/running of the Turing-emulable (Turing equivalence!)) program to remain invariant. One thing interesting to point out about this is that this substitution can be the replacement of completely different kinds of stuff, like carbon based stuff with silicon based stuff and does not require a continuous physical process of transformation in the sense of smoothly morphism the carbon stuff into silicon stuff at some primitive level. B/c of this it may seem to bypass the usual restrictions of physical laws, but does it really? What exactly is this physical stuff anyway? If we take a hint from the latest ideas in theoretical physics it seems that the stuff of the material world is more about properties that remain invariant under sets of symmetry transformations and less and less about anything like primitive substances. So in a sense, the physical world might be considered to be a wide assortment of bundles of invariants therefore it seems to me that to test COMP we need to see if those symmetry groups and invariants can be derived from some proposed underlying logical structure. This is what I am trying to do. I am really not arguing against COMP, I am arguing that COMP is incomplete as a theory as it does not yet show how the appearance of space, time and conservation laws emerges in a way that is invariant and not primitive. I guess I have the temerity to play Einstein against Bruno's Bohr. :-) OTOH, I am not arguing for any kind of return to naive realism or that the physical world is the totality of existence. I do know that I am just a curious amateur, so I welcome any critique that might help me learn. I think it is, but at the same time, it has solid consequences and a belief in it can be justified for a number of reasons: a) Fading qualia thought experiment, which shows that consciousness is utterly fickle if it doesn't follow a principle of functional / organizational invariance. Most of our sense data tends to point that such a principle makes sense. Avoiding it means consciousness does not correspond to brain states and p. zombies. Certainly! We need a precise explanation for psycho-physical parallelism. My tentative explanation is that at our level a form of dualism holds. A dualism quite unlike that of Descartes, since instead of separate substances, it is proposed that the logical and the physical are two distinct aspect of reality that follow on equal yet anti-parallel tracks. As Vaughan Pratt explains in his papers, the logical processes and the physical processes have dynamics that have arrows that point in opposite directions. Schematically and crudely we can show a quasi-category theory diagram of this duality: X - Y - | | - A --B - The vertical lines represent the Stone duality relation and the horizontal arrow represent logical entailment and physical causation. The chaining (or *residuation*) rule is X causes Y iff B necessitates A, where X and A and duals and Y and B and duals. This duality prohibits zombies and disembodied spirits. There is much more to this diagram as it does not include the endomorphisms, homeomorphisms and other mappings and objects that are involved in the full implementation of the *residuation*rule. I just found a paper by Martin Wehr www.dcs.ed.ac.uk/home/wehr/newpage/Papers/qc.ps.gz that elaborates on Pratt's idea and explains *residuation* better! Here is the abstract: Quantum Computing: A new Paradigm and it's Type Theory Martin Wehr Quantum Computing Seminar, Lehrstuhl Prof. Beth, Universitat Karlsruhe, July 1996 To use quantum mechanical behavior for computing has been proposed by Feynman. Shor gave an algorithm for the quantum computer which raised a big stream of research. This was because Shor's algorithm did reduce the yet assumed exponential complexity of the security relevant factorization problem, to a quadratic complexity if quantum computed. In the paper a short introduction to quantum mechanics can be found in the appendix. With this material the operation
Re: COMP theology
On 2/11/2012 06:32, Stephen P. King wrote: Hi ACW, Thank you for the time and effort to write this up!!! On 2/9/2012 3:40 PM, acw wrote: Bruno has always said that COMP is a matter of theology (or religion), that is, the provably unprovable, and I agree with this. However, let's try and see why that is and why someone would take COMP as an assumption: - The main assumption of COMP is that you admit, at some level, a digital substitution, and the stronger assumption that if you were to implement/run such a Turing-emulable program, it would be conscious and you would have a continuation in it. Isn't that a strong theological assumption? [SPK] Yes, but it is the substitution of one configuration of stuff with another such that the functionality (that allows for the implementation/running of the Turing-emulable (Turing equivalence!)) program to remain invariant. One thing interesting to point out about this is that this substitution can be the replacement of completely different kinds of stuff, like carbon based stuff with silicon based stuff and does not require a continuous physical process of transformation in the sense of smoothly morphism the carbon stuff into silicon stuff at some primitive level. B/c of this it may seem to bypass the usual restrictions of physical laws, but does it really? It bypasses a lot of restrictions, see UDA step 1-7, and my previous example with the past time-travel. With UDA step 7, it makes the primitively physical either forever unknowable and with step 8 and MGA it makes it superfluous/unnecessary. What exactly is this physical stuff anyway? If we take a hint from the latest ideas in theoretical physics it seems that the stuff of the material world is more about properties that remain invariant under sets of symmetry transformations and less and less about anything like primitive substances. So in a sense, the physical world might be considered to be a wide assortment of bundles of invariants therefore it seems to me that to test COMP we need to see if those symmetry groups and invariants can be derived from some proposed underlying logical structure. This is what I am trying to do. I am really not arguing against COMP, I am arguing that COMP is incomplete as a theory as it does not yet show how the appearance of space, time and conservation laws emerges in a way that is invariant and not primitive. I guess I have the temerity to play Einstein against Bruno's Bohr. :-) Yes, modern physics does indeed point us toward our physics being quite simple and symmetrical, where by 'simple' I mean 'low complexity' (in the Occam, or Solomonoff inductive sense, Kolmogorov complexity, ...). COMP seems to argue toward that as well, although I don't think we can just look at some UD implementation and find some machines partially implementing our universe right at the start - we don't have those kinds of computational resources. Smarter ways to get to physics through AUDA might be better ideas, but I do think that whatever our physics is, we'll have to use some indexical properties, we cannot rely on a single universe assumption. OTOH, I am not arguing for any kind of return to naive realism or that the physical world is the totality of existence. I do know that I am just a curious amateur, so I welcome any critique that might help me learn. I'm a novice myself. You seem to be much more knowledgeable than me in some subjects (such as category theory). I think it is, but at the same time, it has solid consequences and a belief in it can be justified for a number of reasons: a) Fading qualia thought experiment, which shows that consciousness is utterly fickle if it doesn't follow a principle of functional / organizational invariance. Most of our sense data tends to point that such a principle makes sense. Avoiding it means consciousness does not correspond to brain states and p. zombies. Certainly! We need a precise explanation for psycho-physical parallelism. In COMP, the physical is a shadow of arithmetical truth. Making it too much more than that will either introduce zombies or some substrate dependence (which part of the UDA do you disagree with?). My tentative explanation is that at our level a form of dualism holds. A dualism quite unlike that of Descartes, since instead of separate substances, it is proposed that the logical and the physical are two distinct aspect of reality that follow on equal yet anti-parallel tracks. As Vaughan Pratt explains in his papers, the logical processes and the physical processes have dynamics that have arrows that point in opposite directions. Schematically and crudely we can show a quasi-category theory diagram of this duality: X - Y - | | - A --B - The vertical lines represent the Stone duality relation and the horizontal arrow represent logical entailment and physical causation. The chaining (or /residuation/) rule is X causes Y iff B necessitates A, where X and A and duals and Y
Re: COMP theology
On 2/11/2012 2:16 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: What exactly is this physical stuff anyway? If we take a hint from the latest ideas in theoretical physics it seems that the stuff of the material world is more about properties that remain invariant under sets of symmetry transformations and less and less about anything like primitive substances. So in a sense, the physical world might be considered to be a wide assortment of bundles of invariants therefore it seems to me that to test COMP we need to see if those symmetry groups and invariants can be derived from some proposed underlying logical structure. This is what I am trying to do. I am really not arguing against COMP, I am arguing that COMP is incomplete as a theory as it does not yet show how the appearance of space, time and conservation laws emerges in a way that is invariant and not primitive. I guess I have the temerity to play Einstein against Bruno's Bohr. :-) OTOH, I am not arguing for any kind of return to naive realism or that the physical world is the totality of existence. I do know that I am just a curious amateur, so I welcome any critique that might help me learn. The only way I can see for the physical to emerge is from some 'anthropic' 3p argument. For example, energy conservation is implied by time-translation invariance and without time-translation invariance we wouldn't call something a 'physical law'. A 'law' that varied with time would be regarded as an 'accident'. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: 1p 3p comparison
On Feb 11, 3:51 pm, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 11 Feb 2012, at 15:56, Craig Weinberg wrote: Dennett's Comp: Human 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - What do you mean precisely by np(np) n = 1 or 3. ? I'm using 1p or 3p as names only, first person direct phenomenology or third person objective mechanism. The parenthesis is hierarchical/ holarchical nesting or you could say multiplication. ? I'm not using 1p and 3p in any standard way. 3p(3p(3p)) represents a top level mechanical process that is controlled by lower level mechanical processes that are controlled by lower level mechanical processes. 1p(1p(1p)) represents a top level self that contains or incorporates sub-selves and their sub-selves. This is a very different scaling than 3p, since there is a continuum of voluntary and involuntary incorporation. It's not a bunch of discrete gears or subroutines, it is a fugue of directly and indirectly experienced motives Dennett thinks that we know that there are only mechanical processes controlling each other. Yes. Even in the physical sense. I am not sure if he really means that we know that, but then I am used to give a strong sense to knowing. Subjectivity is an illusion And I guess we agree that this is total nonsense. Yes. But only because we have first hand experience ourselves and cannot doubt it. OK. If we could doubt it then there would be no reason to imagine that there could be such a thing as subjectivity. OK. If we doubt it, we have a subjective experience. If we don't doubt it, too. So we cannot doubt it. Yes! Machine 1p = 3p(3p(3p)) - Subjectivity is not considered formally My view: Human 1p = (1p(1p(1p))) - Subjectivity a fundamental sense modality which is qualitatively enriched in humans through multiple organic nestings. Even infinite organic nestings, which might not even make sense. No, only seven or so nestings: Physical Chemical Biological Zoological Neurological Anthropological Individual By UDA to have no comp you will have to continue such nesting in the Physical. I let you this as a non completely trivial exercise. I call the intra-physical nesting (quantum-arithmetic) a virtual nesting. I think that what we measure at that level is literally the most 'common sense' of matter, and not an independent phenomena. It is the logic of matter, not the embodiment of logic. It's a small detail really, but when logic is the sense of matter then all events are anchored in the singularity, so that ultimately the cosmos coheres as a single story. If matter is the embodiment of logic then authenticity is not possible, and all events are redundant and arbitrary universes unto themselves. I know you will invoke finite things non Turing emulable, but I cannot ascribe any sense to that. When you gave me yellow as example, you did not convince me. The qualia yellow is 1p simple, but needs a complex 3p relation between two universal numbers to be able to be manifested in a consistent history. I think that the 1p simplicity is all that is required. It does not need to be understood or sensed as a complex relation at all, indeed it isn't even possible to bridge the two descriptions. The 3p quant correlation is not yellow, nor does it need yellowness to accomplish any computational purpose whatsoever. Even if it did, where would it get yellowness from? Why not gribbow or shlue instead? Of all beings in the universe, we are the only ones we know of who can even conceive of a 3p quant correlation to 1p qualities. Most things will live and die with nothing but the 1p descriptions, therefore we cannot assume the universe to be incomplete for those beings. If they had the power to create a copy of their universe, they could do it based only on their naive perception, just as our ability to create a copy of the universe we understand would not be limited by our incomplete understanding of the universe. The 1p experiences make sense on their own. Machine 1p = (3p(3p(1p))) - Machine subjectivity is limited to hardware level sense modalities, which can be used to imitate human 3p quantitatively but cannot be enriched qualitatively to human 1p. Which seems ad hoc for making machine non conscious. Again we see here that you accept that your position entails the existence of philosophical zombies, I call them puppets. Zombies are assumed to have absent qualia, puppets are understood not to have any qualia in the first place. Puppets don't handle complex counterfactuals, like humans and philosophical zombie. I don't know the difference between absent qualia and having no qualia, also. A puppet could handle any degree of complexity that was anticipated by the puppet master. The difference between absent qualia and no qualia is that absent qualia presumes the possibility of presence. We already know from blindsight that qualia can indeed be absent as well. that is: the existence of
Re: COMP theology
On 2/11/2012 6:13 PM, meekerdb wrote: On 2/11/2012 2:16 PM, Joseph Knight wrote: What exactly is this physical stuff anyway? If we take a hint from the latest ideas in theoretical physics it seems that the stuff of the material world is more about properties that remain invariant under sets of symmetry transformations and less and less about anything like primitive substances. So in a sense, the physical world might be considered to be a wide assortment of bundles of invariants therefore it seems to me that to test COMP we need to see if those symmetry groups and invariants can be derived from some proposed underlying logical structure. This is what I am trying to do. I am really not arguing against COMP, I am arguing that COMP is incomplete as a theory as it does not yet show how the appearance of space, time and conservation laws emerges in a way that is invariant and not primitive. I guess I have the temerity to play Einstein against Bruno's Bohr. :-) OTOH, I am not arguing for any kind of return to naive realism or that the physical world is the totality of existence. I do know that I am just a curious amateur, so I welcome any critique that might help me learn. The only way I can see for the physical to emerge is from some 'anthropic' 3p argument. For example, energy conservation is implied by time-translation invariance and without time-translation invariance we wouldn't call something a 'physical law'. A 'law' that varied with time would be regarded as an 'accident'. Brent Hi Brent, Your point here is powerful and is part of my argument against any form of ideal monism, such as Platonism. Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Intelligence and consciousness
On Fri, Feb 10, 2012 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: I think you are radically overestimating the size of the book and the importance of the size to the experiment. ELIZA was about 20Kb. TO HELL WITH ELIZA That prehistoric program is NOT intelligent! What is the point of a though experiment that gives stupid useless answers to questions? If it's a thousand times better than ELIZA, then you've got a 20 Mb rule book. For heavens sake, if a 20 Mb look-up table was sufficient we would have had AI decades ago. Since you can't do so let me make the best case for the Chinese Room from your point of view and the most difficult case to defend from mine. Let's say you're right and the size of the lookup table is not important so we won't worry that it's larger than the observable universe, and let's say time is not a issue either so we won't worry that it operates a billion trillion times slower than our mind, and let's say the Chinese Room doesn't do ELIZA style bullshit but can engage in a brilliant and interesting (if you are very very very patient) conversation with you in Chinese or any other language about anything. And lets have the little man not only be ignorant of Chinese but be retarded and thus not understand anything in any language, he can only look at input symbols and then look at the huge lookup table till he finds similar squiggles and the appropriate response to those squiggles which he then outputs. The man has no idea what's going on, he just looks at input squiggles and matches them up with output squiggles, but from outside the room it's very different. You ask the room to produce a quantum theory of gravity and it does so, you ask it to output a new poem that a considerable fraction of the human race would consider to be very beautiful and it does so, you ask it to output a original fantasy children's novel that will be more popular than Harry Potter and it does so. The room certainly behaves intelligently but the man was not conscious of any of the answers produced, as I've said the man doesn't have a clue what's going on, so does this disprove my assertion that intelligent behavior implies consciousness? No it does not, or at least it probably does not, this is why. That reference book that contains everything that can be said about anything that can be asked in a finite time would be large, astronomical would be far far too weak a word to describe it, but it would not be infinitely large so it remains a legitimate thought experiment. However that astounding lookup table came from somewhere, whoever or whatever made it had to be very intelligent indeed and also I believe conscious, and so the brilliance of the actions of the Chinese Room does indeed imply consciousness. You may say that even if I'm right about that then a computer doing smart things would just imply the consciousness of the people who made the computer. But here is where the analogy breaks down, real computers don't work like the Chinese Room does, they don't have anything remotely like that astounding lookup table; the godlike thing that made the Chinese Room knows exactly what that room will do in every circumstance, but computer scientists don't know what their creation will do, all they can do is watch it and see. But you may also say, I don't care how the room got made, I was talking about inside the room and I insist there was no consciousness inside that room. I would say assigning a position to consciousness is a little like assigning a position to fast or red or any other adjective, it doesn't make a lot of sense. If your conscious exists anywhere it's not inside a vat made of bone balancing on your shoulders, it's where you're thinking about. I am the way matter behaves when it is organized in a johnkclarkian way and other things are the way matter behaves when it is organized in a chineseroomian way. And by the way, I don't intend to waste my time defending the assertion that intelligent behavior implies intelligence, that would be like debating if X implies X or not, I have better things to do with my time. The King James Bible can be downloaded here No thanks, I'll pass on that. Only?! Einstein only seemed intelligent to scientifically literate speakers in the outside world. No, he was aware of his own intelligence too. How the hell do you know that? And you seem to be using the words intelligent and conscious interchangeably, they are not synonyms. If you start out defining intelligence as an abstract function and category of behaviors Which is the only operational definition of intelligence. rather than quality of consciousness Which is a totally useless definition in investigating the intelligence of a computer or a person or a animal or of ANYTHING. I use ELIZA as an example because you can clearly see that it is not intelligent So can I, so when you use that idiot program to try to advance your antediluvian ideas it proves
Re: Intelligence and consciousness
I don't really understand this thread - magical thinking? The neural network between our ears is who / what we are, and everything that we will experience. It is the source of consciousness - even if consciousness is regarded as an epiphenomenon. Gandalph On Feb 11, 2012, at 9:34 PM, John Clark wrote: On Fri, Feb 10, 2012 Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.com wrote: I think you are radically overestimating the size of the book and the importance of the size to the experiment. ELIZA was about 20Kb. TO HELL WITH ELIZA That prehistoric program is NOT intelligent! What is the point of a though experiment that gives stupid useless answers to questions? If it's a thousand times better than ELIZA, then you've got a 20 Mb rule book. For heavens sake, if a 20 Mb look-up table was sufficient we would have had AI decades ago. Since you can't do so let me make the best case for the Chinese Room from your point of view and the most difficult case to defend from mine. Let's say you're right and the size of the lookup table is not important so we won't worry that it's larger than the observable universe, and let's say time is not a issue either so we won't worry that it operates a billion trillion times slower than our mind, and let's say the Chinese Room doesn't do ELIZA style bullshit but can engage in a brilliant and interesting (if you are very very very patient) conversation with you in Chinese or any other language about anything. And lets have the little man not only be ignorant of Chinese but be retarded and thus not understand anything in any language, he can only look at input symbols and then look at the huge lookup table till he finds similar squiggles and the appropriate response to those squiggles which he then outputs. The man has no idea what's going on, he just looks at input squiggles and matches them up with output squiggles, but from outside the room it's very different. You ask the room to produce a quantum theory of gravity and it does so, you ask it to output a new poem that a considerable fraction of the human race would consider to be very beautiful and it does so, you ask it to output a original fantasy children's novel that will be more popular than Harry Potter and it does so. The room certainly behaves intelligently but the man was not conscious of any of the answers produced, as I've said the man doesn't have a clue what's going on, so does this disprove my assertion that intelligent behavior implies consciousness? No it does not, or at least it probably does not, this is why. That reference book that contains everything that can be said about anything that can be asked in a finite time would be large, astronomical would be far far too weak a word to describe it, but it would not be infinitely large so it remains a legitimate thought experiment. However that astounding lookup table came from somewhere, whoever or whatever made it had to be very intelligent indeed and also I believe conscious, and so the brilliance of the actions of the Chinese Room does indeed imply consciousness. You may say that even if I'm right about that then a computer doing smart things would just imply the consciousness of the people who made the computer. But here is where the analogy breaks down, real computers don't work like the Chinese Room does, they don't have anything remotely like that astounding lookup table; the godlike thing that made the Chinese Room knows exactly what that room will do in every circumstance, but computer scientists don't know what their creation will do, all they can do is watch it and see. But you may also say, I don't care how the room got made, I was talking about inside the room and I insist there was no consciousness inside that room. I would say assigning a position to consciousness is a little like assigning a position to fast or red or any other adjective, it doesn't make a lot of sense. If your conscious exists anywhere it's not inside a vat made of bone balancing on your shoulders, it's where you're thinking about. I am the way matter behaves when it is organized in a johnkclarkian way and other things are the way matter behaves when it is organized in a chineseroomian way. And by the way, I don't intend to waste my time defending the assertion that intelligent behavior implies intelligence, that would be like debating if X implies X or not, I have better things to do with my time. The King James Bible can be downloaded here No thanks, I'll pass on that. Only?! Einstein only seemed intelligent to scientifically literate speakers in the outside world. No, he was aware of his own intelligence too. How the hell do you know that? And you seem to be using the words intelligent and conscious interchangeably, they are not synonyms. If you start out defining intelligence as an
Re: Intelligence and consciousness
On 2/11/2012 9:34 PM, John Clark wrote: You may say that even if I'm right about that then a computer doing smart things would just imply the consciousness of the people who made the computer. But here is where the analogy breaks down, real computers don't work like the Chinese Room does, they don't have anything remotely like that astounding lookup table; the godlike thing that made the Chinese Room knows exactly what that room will do in every circumstance, but computer scientists don't know what their creation will do, all they can do is watch it and see. Not only that, a computer implementing AI would be able to learn from it's discussion. Even if it started with an astronomically large look-up table, the look-up table would grow. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
