Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)

[meekerdb]

On 3/26/2012 9:14 PM, John Clark wrote:
On Sun, Mar 25, 2012 at 10:07 AM, Bruno Marchal > wrote:



>> Give me a example of 2 conscious beings that are identical by what 
you call
"3-view" but NOT identical by what you call "1-view", show they deserve
different names, do that and I might get a idea what you're talking 
about; but
don't give me that diaries business, if the diaries are different a 
third party
can see that just as well as the individuals who wrote them. Just one 
clear non
mystical example where objectively 2 things are identical but 
subjectively they
are not, that's all I ask and I don't think it's a unreasonable request 
as your
proof depends on there being such a difference.


> You ask me something impossible


I agree it is impossible, so this distinction between "3-view" and "1-view" that is so 
important in your proof turns out to be rather silly.


> They are different because one live in W and the other live in W.


I previously said that it is probably meaningless to talk about the position of a 
consciousness and you agreed with me, so all the above means is that one consciousness 
forms memories caused by images of Moscow the other forms memories caused by images of 
Washington, the images are different so the memories are different, so the consciousness 
of the two is different so they become different people. The thing that differentiates 
the minds is not position but different memories, if Washington and Moscow were 
identical cities then there would still be just one consciousness, but the cities are 
very different so the two minds are two. Everybody agrees that if 2 minds are different 
then there are 2 different minds, but I insist that if 2 minds are identical then there 
is really only one mind (not to be confused with brains) while your proof is built on 
the assumption that if 2 minds are identical they are still distinguishable at least to 
themselves,


I don't see that Bruno has argued that.  He has only argued that the two minds become 
different when they have different experiences (in M and W) and they are both the same 
person (in the usual sense) as the one in Helsinki.



and that is the reason I don't think its productive to study your proof after 
that point.

> No 1-view can be duplicated.


Why the hell not?


Because a 1-view=mind; they can only be two if they are different (c.f. your own 
explication above).




> Both people in the two cities feel one and entire.


Both people will feel IDENTICALLY until differences between Moscow and Washington cause 
them to form different memories.


>>> There is a sense for the guy in W to say that he has been 
annihilated in
Helsinki and reconstituted in W.


>> Then you get annihilated every time you get on a bus going from 
point A to
point B. Do you really want to say that?


> That will be indeed a consequence of comp. It can be said that quantum 
mechanics,
which I do not assume, *confirms* that aspect of comp. Good point.


So you have redefined the word "annihilated" so that it now means pretty much nothing at 
all, and thus  we will need to invent a new word if we wish to communicate the old 
meaning of "annihilated".


You seem to recognize that things are different when SOMEONE IS DUPLICATED!  So you should 
recognize that words like "annihilated" may take a different meaning when you can 
duplicate a person and destroy one copy.




> The 1-comp indeterminacy is not controversial


If this thing you call "1-comp indeterminacy" were untrue then we would always know what 
the environment was going to throw at us next and we could always predict our actions, 
very obviously this is untrue so of course "1-comp indeterminacy" is not controversial. 
It's not new or deep either.


> The quantum indeterminacy is controversial,


The explanation for quantum indeterminacy is controversial but the fact that we observe 
quantum indeterminacy is not.


Did you read Adrian Kent's paper?
http://arxiv.org/pdf/0905.0624v1.pdf
He raises some of the same problems you do, except he is pointing out they occur in 
quantum mechanics and Everett's interpretation has the same problems as Bruno's 
transporter thought experiment.




> Indeed in most textbooks that indeterminacy is still explained by the 
collapse of
the wave, etc.


The Copenhagen theory does explain it. And the non-local hidden variable pilot wave 
theory explains it. And the Many Worlds theory explains it. We have too many 
explanations, and although they are very different at least so far they all predict the 
same experimental results. I admit to having a personal preference for Many Worlds but 
that's not how truth is determined, the Universe doesn't care if I approve of it or not.


>> "you" have been duplicated


> The "3-you" has been duplicated. Not the 1-you.


Right the

Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)

[John Clark]

On Sun, Mar 25, 2012 at 10:07 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:


>> Give me a example of 2 conscious beings that are identical by what you
>> call "3-view" but NOT identical by what you call "1-view", show they
>> deserve different names, do that and I might get a idea what you're talking
>> about; but don't give me that diaries business, if the diaries are
>> different a third party can see that just as well as the individuals who
>> wrote them. Just one clear non mystical example where objectively 2 things
>> are identical but subjectively they are not, that's all I ask and I don't
>> think it's a unreasonable request as your proof depends on there being such
>> a difference.
>>
>
> > You ask me something impossible
>

I agree it is impossible, so this distinction between "3-view" and "1-view"
that is so important in your proof turns out to be rather silly.

> They are different because one live in W and the other live in W.
>

I previously said that it is probably meaningless to talk about the
position of a consciousness and you agreed with me, so all the above means
is that one consciousness forms memories caused by images of Moscow the
other forms memories caused by images of Washington, the images are
different so the memories are different, so the consciousness of the two is
different so they become different people. The thing that differentiates
the minds is not position but different memories, if Washington and Moscow
were identical cities then there would still be just one consciousness, but
the cities are very different so the two minds are two. Everybody agrees
that if 2 minds are different then there are 2 different minds, but I
insist that if 2 minds are identical then there is really only one mind
(not to be confused with brains) while your proof is built on the
assumption that if 2 minds are identical they are still distinguishable at
least to themselves, and that is the reason I don't think its productive to
study your proof after that point.

> No 1-view can be duplicated.
>

Why the hell not?

> Both people in the two cities feel one and entire.
>

Both people will feel IDENTICALLY until differences between Moscow and
Washington cause them to form different memories.

>>> There is a sense for the guy in W to say that he has been annihilated
>>> in Helsinki and reconstituted in W.
>>>
>>
>> >> Then you get annihilated every time you get on a bus going from point
>> A to point B. Do you really want to say that?
>>
>
> > That will be indeed a consequence of comp. It can be said that quantum
> mechanics, which I do not assume, *confirms* that aspect of comp. Good
> point.
>

So you have redefined the word "annihilated" so that it now means pretty
much nothing at all, and thus  we will need to invent a new word if we wish
to communicate the old meaning of "annihilated".

> The 1-comp indeterminacy is not controversial
>

If this thing you call "1-comp indeterminacy" were untrue then we would
always know what the environment was going to throw at us next and we could
always predict our actions, very obviously this is untrue so of course
"1-comp indeterminacy" is not controversial. It's not new or deep either.

> The quantum indeterminacy is controversial,
>

The explanation for quantum indeterminacy is controversial but the fact
that we observe quantum indeterminacy is not.

> Indeed in most textbooks that indeterminacy is still explained by the
> collapse of the wave, etc.
>

The Copenhagen theory does explain it. And the non-local hidden variable
pilot wave theory explains it. And the Many Worlds theory explains it. We
have too many explanations, and although they are very different at least
so far they all predict the same experimental results. I admit to having a
personal preference for Many Worlds but that's not how truth is determined,
the Universe doesn't care if I approve of it or not.

>> "you" have been duplicated
>>
>
> > The "3-you" has been duplicated. Not the 1-you.
>

Right there is the key to our disagreement. In my symmetrical duplicating
room thought experiment even the "1-you" can not tell the difference
between the "3-you" and the "1-you"! The copy appears back to back with the
original a equal distance from the center of the room, both are watching a
video display from a camera in the center of the ceiling of the cylindrical
room. You insist that you are the original but so does the copy (or maybe
he really is the original and you are the copy), you raise your right hand
and you see on the video monitor the both images do too, you jump up and
down but you see both images jump up and down. Not only can't you tell if
you are the copy or the original you can't even tell which image on that
video screen is you and which is the other fellow. If subjectively there is
no difference and objectively there is no difference then there is no
difference between "3-you" and "1-you".

> you just show that you miss or avoid the difference between the 1-view
> and the 3-view.
>

Between IDENTICAL

Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)

[Craig Weinberg]

On Mar 26, 11:41 am, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
> On 25 Mar 2012, at 22:59, Craig Weinberg wrote:

> > What is it you think my theory wants you not to ask?
>
> Where does matter come from?

Matter comes from sense, as does 'where' and 'come from'.

> Where does sense come from?

Everywhere

Craig

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Re: This Week in Physics - March 26, 2012

[meekerdb]

*Synopsis: * *Send in the Clones 
 
*

Published March 22, 2012

Although perfect copies of a quantum state are prohibited, theory shows that recombining 
all imperfect clones recovers the original quantum state.




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Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Mar 2012, at 21:10, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/24/2012 12:37 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:


> You keep asking who is this "you"

Yes.

>  it is the usual you, as the one you use in your everyday

The word "you" works fine in the usual everyday world,

No, please answer the last part of the message. The everyday world  
if MWI is true, is a duplicating chamber.


Yes, and I think Bruno's argument is to show that if consciousness  
is a kind of computation


It is not exactly that, but OK. Comp is really just "yes doctor". A  
belief in a sort of possible reincarnation. It is better to see it  
that way, so that we don't need to decide, in the attempt to figure  
out what matter and consciousness is, between what is Turing  
computable and what is Turing recoverable through the first person  
indeterminacies. I currently tend to think that consciousness is not  
Turing computable, but 100% Turing recoverable. Consciousness is the  
quintessence of the 1-view.



then diverging computations would produce the same kind of  
uncertainty that QM does in the MW interpretation.  However, that  
doesn't solve the problem it just makes two problems the same.


Well, assuming both COMP, *and* QM.

So we don't know that yet.

COMP makes the problem more complex, because the SWE itself has to be  
explained phenomenologically or epistemologically. If both COMP and QM  
are correct, then UDA proves the existence of a deduction of QM from  
COMP, that is from the comp TOE of your choice, like the tiny sigma_1  
complete fragment of arithmetic.


The advantage of comp is that if you accept the knowledge notion given  
by Theaetetus then COMP explains both the quanta and the qualia (by  
the "divine hypostases", the intensional variant of G* minus G).  
Technically the quanta seem to appear there, and this makes the quanta  
into first person (plural) notion, which is confirmed by Everett's  
multiplication of populations of persons, the contagiousness of the  
linear superposition. At the bottom of what is observable, the linear  
rules, comp-apparently.


Unfortunately, the arithmetical quantization []<> p is written in Z1*,  
that is precisely that [] p is Bp & Dp, that <>p is, dually, Bp v Dp,  
so that []<>p is [](Bp v Dp) = B(Bp v Dp) & D(Bp v Dp), and then to  
translate some Bell inequality, you need to evaluate formula nesting  
the quantization ([]<> ([] <> # ...), which makes most quantum logical  
assertion of that complexity still untractable today, despite the  
decidability of Z1*).


Bruno


In Everett's MWI there is a problem saying what probabilities mean,  
which is just the same as the one in the transporter thought  
experiment(c.f. arXiv:0905.0624v1 by Ardian Kent).


Brent



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Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 24 Mar 2012, at 21:21, meekerdb wrote:


On 3/24/2012 12:58 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Google on "theaetetus".
Socrates asked to Theaetetus to define "knowledge". Theatetus gives  
many definitions that Socrates critizes/refutes, each of them. One  
of them consists in defining knowledge by belief, in "modern time"  
the mental state, or the computational state of the belief and the  
knowledge is the same, and a belief becomes a knowledge only when  
it is (whatever the reason or absence of reason) true. Another one  
is the justified true belief, which is the one which you can  
translate in arithmetic with Gödel's predicate. You can read "Bp &  
p" by I can justify p from my previous beliefs AND it is the case  
that p. To give you an example, if the snow was blue, a machine  
asserting "snow is blue" can be said to know that snow is blue.  
Indeed, the machine asserts "the snow is blue", and it is the case  
that snow is blue (given the assumption).


The "problem" (for some) with that theory is that it entails that,  
when awake, we cannot know if we are dreaming or not, although in  
dream we can know that we are dreaming, the same for "being not  
correct". It is not a problem for comp which makes that ignorance  
unavoidable.


For a machine that "we" know to be arithmetically correct, we know  
that Bp and Bp & p are equivalent. Yet, the machine cannot know  
that about herself, and the logic of Bp and of "Bp & p" are  
different. They obeys to the modal logics G and S4Grz, but I guess  
you need to read some book or some web pages to see what I mean here.


I find your explications of knowledge to be confusing.  You refer to  
Theaetetus who said knowledge = true belief.  But in your modal  
logic formulation B stands for either provable or proven  
(Beweisbar).  "Provable" and "believed" are too very different things.


Hmm... I am just using Dennett's intentional stance toward machine. A  
machine believes p, really means only that the machine assert p.
I limit myself to machine having their beliefs closed from the modus  
ponens rule, and obeying classical logic, and applying classical logic  
on their description etc. I limit myself on classically self- 
referentially correct machine with respect to some other possible  
machines or oracles.





I think that knowledge consists of a belief that is both true and  
causally connected to the thing believed (c.f. Gettier's paradox).


That is not incompatible with the Theaetetus' idea. Somehow the whole  
problem is there.




  Of course belief that is held because the proposition is proven  
from some axioms does have a causal connection to the axioms.


Yes. And the axioms can be any successful "memes" in the way to  
unravel a difficulty. Axioms which solves many problems and many class  
of problems can win local games.


I identify partially a person with the set of its beliefs. More  
concrete person can revised beliefs (normally), which is not used  
here, given that I restrict myself of the math of the correct machine.




But that is more than just "believed".


Because you talk from the point of view of a much more complex  
consistent (let us hope) extension, viewed at some level.
For the interview I limit myself to an apparently simple machine with  
beliefs, that we all believe in (I hope).






The problem then arises when you say things like, "We know there are  
true but unprovable facts about arithmetic."


No. About the machine. Sometimes that machine is Peano Arithmetic,  
because it is the better known Löbian theory. It is an axiomatizable  
theory, which means, by a theorem of Craig, a recursively enumerable  
set of beliefs.



We only 'know' those things in different meta-system where they do  
have a causal connection to  other axioms we hypothesize as true.


Of course. The points is that the Löbian machine does that too, and  
can even do it for themselves. This gives them ability to climb the  
constructive transfinite, and to develop talks and mind tools from  
beyond the constructive.



But ultimately we cannot 'know' that axioms are true - as you say we  
just bet on them.


I think so. Even unconsciously, when our brain conceptualizes that  
there is a reality behind the back of the computer screen. We  
extrapolate all the times, and we have partial controls and partial  
responsibilities and those kinds of things.


The nice happening here is that by the incompleteness, Bp can't be  
confused with Bp & p. By incompleteness Bf does not imply f, so Bf is  
not the same as Bf & f. (Beliefs can be wrong. Knowledge can't, by  
definition).


This shows that the same set of believed arithmetical sentences can be  
seen from many points of views. They provide an arithmetical  
interpretation of Plotinus, through what happens when a universal  
machine looks inward.


It applies to us, tangentially, as far as we are self-referentially  
correct ourselves, tangentially.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marcha

Re: First person indeterminacy (Re: COMP theology)

[Bruno Marchal]

Hi John,

On 24 Mar 2012, at 21:05, John Mikes wrote:

Bruno, I did not branch out into the 1st line of my 1st quote of  
your sentence.
Not that 2^16 is 'a' number, but "parallel" gives the idea of  
identicity (at least in main qualia) which are (both) human talk.  
(Of course that's what we can do).


Parallel world means only quantum superposition. It emphasizes the  
fact that superposition is contagious through interaction.





I am glad that you agreed with my (generalized!) remark.
Now: to your question:
  - Which logics? Classical logic? -
Any one you may call 'logic(s?)' in today's HUMAN thinking.


Why humans? Why not mammals, or machines, or divine entities? Humans  
are not the only one entities suffering from limitations.




It is beyond our capabilities to even imagine (more sophisticated)  
ways of thinking, which does not mean an exclusion of such.


But this is too vague. It seems to apply to all theories.



I did not visualize a "change" in logic, simply assumed the  
possibility of "thinking differently (not necessarily using OUR math  
terms). (Cf: Cohen-Stewart's "Zarathustrans" - a fictional reference).


But may be it is a human limitation to believe that their logic is  
human.
By the way we define machine, they are machine when viewed by human or  
by non-human, so with comp we can grasp better the human limitations  
by studying the machine's limitations.






 "- we have to take our theories seriously, -"
Not in my agnosticism.


You know it is hard to be more agnostic than me :)
But it is because I am agnostic that I remind that theories are  
temporary belief, and that we can progress only by taking them  
seriously (which does NOT mean true!!!), so we can at least one day  
change our mind on them.




In conventional sciences a 'theory' is taken seriously upon  
assumptions based on other (accepted?) theories (calculations?). To  
let your ideas wander and look for yes/no consequences (within  
today's knowledge) is a game of creativity, not established science.


What do you mean by "established science"? I don't believe that make  
sense. Actually I don't believe in "Science", only in "scientific  
attitude", which, basically is only "modesty".



This is how I ended up with many of my patents. For the same reason  
do I NOT call my 'Plenitude-story' of generating universes a  
NARRATIVE, not a theory.


I don't see the problem with the word "theory", but you can call that  
a "narrative" if you prefer. You are right that the popular media  
confuse "theory" and knowledge, but for me it is a reason to use the  
right word in the correct way. If not, it is like with the religious  
notion, you encourage the use of the word by those who missed the  
idea. I think.


Bruno



On Sat, Mar 24, 2012 at 5:12 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 23 Mar 2012, at 17:34, John Mikes wrote:


Bruno:
thanks for the considerate reply. Let me pick some of your sentences:

  2^16 parallel universes needed to implement  the   
quantum  superposition  -  used in Shor's quantum algorithm  
to find the prime factors of numbers.


I would not limit the numbers and fix the quality of future  
development.


Me neither.


Nor do I take it for granted that today's logic in math  
(arithmetics) will hold.


Which logics? Classical logic?
In which logic will you describe the change of logics.
Not sure that I can give meaning to your sentence here, John. You  
seem to believe in some absolute logic to make sense of change in  
logic.






I have few doubts that quantum computers will appear, but I am  
quite uncertain if it is for this century of for the next  
millennium.


Ihave more faith in 'the new': maybe that will be something better  
than today's uncertainty-riding "quantum" idea.


We can only *assume* theories, and then we can hope we will see them  
to be refuted. That's how we learn. But this means we have to take  
our theories seriously, which does not mean "true".


Bruno




 John M
On Thu, Mar 15, 2012 at 1:41 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 14 Mar 2012, at 21:41, John Mikes wrote:


Brent and Bruno:
you both have statements in this endless discussion about  
processing ideas of quantum computers.
I would be happy to read about ONE that works, not a s a  
potentiality, but as a real tool, the function of which is  
understood and APPLIED. (Here, on Earth).


It is an *immense* technical challenge. Up to now, a quantum  
circuit has only succeeded in showing that 15 is equal to 3*5,  
which might seems ridiculous for todays applied computing domains,  
but which is still an extraordinary technical prowess as it  
involves handling of the 2^16 parallel universes needed to  
implement the quantum superposition used in Shor's quantum  
algorithm to find the prime factors of numbers.


The amazing thing is that all the arguments of unfeasibility of  
quantum computers have been overcome by quantum software, like the  
quantum error corre

Re: Theology or not theology (Re: COMP theology)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 25 Mar 2012, at 06:09, John Clark wrote:




On Sat, Mar 24, 2012  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> >Then what the hell IS the point you are making?

> That comp entails 1-indeterminacy.

Comp entails indeterminacy PERIOD.


Comp is widely known as a 3-deterministic theory.



Give me a example of 2 conscious beings that are identical by what  
you call "3-view" but NOT identical by what you call "1-view", show  
they deserve different names, do that and I might get a idea what  
you're talking about; but don't give me that diaries business, if  
the diaries are different a third party can see that just as well as  
the individuals who wrote them. Just one clear non mystical example  
where objectively 2 things are identical but subjectively they are  
not, that's all I ask and I don't think it's a unreasonable request  
as your proof depends on there being such a difference.


You ask me something impossible, and provably impossible once we  
assume comp. It is not related to the 1-indeterminacy.






> I mean that's the pont of the step 3

And that's why I think it's a waste of time to even read step 4,  
it's built on a distinction without a difference.


Where is such a thing? The 1-difference does not come from the 3- 
difference between the copies, but between their reconstitution in  
different places.






> The point of the whole UDA is to understand that physics is a  
branch of arithmetic/computer science.


As I said before, although I'm not certain I think you could very  
well be right about that, but you have not proven it because in your  
proof you make a assumption that is not only far from obvious but  
one that I believe is downright false, the assumption that 2  
identical consciousness are not identical and thus need different  
names, like view-1 and view-3.


I don't do that assumption. Tell me where. You have introduce that  
idea, in a different thought experiences, and I said that I agree with  
you. It is just non relevant.







>> when the diaries diverge the person will too and become 2, both  
are the original person and neither is each other.


> Correct. That is part of the explanation of the comp indeterminacy.

I'm glad you agree that the one becomes 2 during the duplicating  
process, then obviously you cannot predict a single unique  
occurrence that those 2 things will experience because no such thing  
exists to predict,


Of course those things exist, because the copies, by comp, are not  
zombie, and, by comp, have both the same right to claim to be the  
original. They are different because one live in W and the other live  
in W.




two things can not be unique. All you're really saying in this 1- 
indeterminism stuff is that 2 is not equal to one, you can not put 2  
things (like you) into a one to one correspondence with one thing  
(like Moscow or like Washington).


I might say that indeed. I just make it more precise. And explain the  
consequences.




All your confusion stems from the fact that you say "I have been  
duplicated" but don't really mean it and still assume there is only  
one "I". You say Bruno Marchal will feel he is in Washington only  
and Bruno Marchal will feel he is in Moscow only but "I" will feel  
like he is in one city and one city only, and that would be true if  
there were only one "I", but there is not because *YOU* HAVE BEEN  
DUPLICATED.


This does not make sense. No 1-view can be duplicated. Both people in  
the two cities feel one and entire. So they can say "I have been 3- 
duplicated (like my body in Helsinki has been duplicated), but they  
will add "but now I feel one and entire in W, and I could not have  
predicted that".
The same, but more strikingly, with the movie-multiplication. Each  
resulting copies will say I have been 3-multiplied every 1/24 second  
for 90 minutes, but my personal experience is that I have seen one  
definite and precise movie, and I have no clue how I could predict  
which one I was about to see personally.






> There is a sense for the guy in W to say that he has been  
annihilated in Helsinki and reconstituted in W.


Then you get annihilated every time you get on a bus going from  
point A to point B. Do you really want to say that?


That will be indeed a consequence of comp. It can be said that quantum  
mechanics, which I do not assume, *confirms* that aspect of comp. Good  
point.




> if you grasp the 1-indeterminacy, you grasp step 3,

I grasped indeterminacy long before I started talking with you, but  
you claim that "1-indeterminacy" is different from "3-indeterminacy"  
and from physical indeterminacy and from mathematical indeterminacy  
and your claim is based on nothing more than the fact that the  
number 1 is not the same as the number 2.


Like you were thinking that there is only one kind of random string,  
you seems to believe that all indeterminacy are equivalent. But  
phenomenologically identical indeterminacy does not need to have the  
same 3-explanation.
Jus