Re: Autonomy?
On 24 Jun 2012, at 22:29, meekerdb wrote: On 6/24/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: And then if I luckily succeed in computing the electron mass 9.10938291×10-31kg, Brent will tell me that we already knew that, and ask for something else. Well if you do it by luck... But of course I'd be very impressed if you could calculate it just from comp+arithmetic. But I'd be less impressed if you just showed that it must be one of all possible numbers. Sure. We might try to define physics, and with comp, physics is independent of the ontological theory, which is just any UD, or, axiomatical description of a universal system. Physics is independent of the choice of the base phi_i. But is the mass of the electron really a physical law, or a contingent fact? I am not sure all actual theories answer this in the same way. I think it is an open problem, necessitating the correct unification of gravitation and quantum mechanics. It is of course an open problem in the comp physics. More realistically, shouldn't comp+arithmetic be able to make some basic predictions like: QM must be based on complex Hilbert spaces (not real, quateronic or octonic). Or the level at which spacetime is discrete (if it is). It is too early to address such question, and it all depends technically of the possible semantics for the material hypostases (like S4Grz1, Z1*, X1*). But there are technical reason to believe that it should not be impossible to derive the presence of the necessity of a quantum computing nature of reality, in which case quantum mechanics would be shown to be a necessity. The arithmetical quantization does seem to be able to already implement some quantum gates, except that it looks like some infinities are introduced, and that a full treatment of the measure (not just the measure one) is needed to make it working. Even for QM, and for QM+GR, or for QED, some people do defend the use of quaternions, or even the octonions. Also, you can derive the quantum digital rule from 5 Stern-Gerlach experiments (like Schwinger did). You get the QM matrices rule from the four first one, and the 5th one imposes the complex numbers. The material hypostases already give the comp quantum logics, and it is just a problem of optimizing the theorem prover to see if the comp physics makes the same prediction, so it might be relatively easy to justify the use of the complex numbers, like the use of real number is already justify in the comp physics intuitively. But again, I insist, that the comp physics is a necessity with comp. My technical point is that we have no choice in this matter, even if it was just impractical (like the use of string theory is impractical in the kitchen). And, then the comp physics is the first theory which unifies quanta and qualia, where the empirical physics still ignores the problem by using an ad hoc supervenience thesis which is just incompatible with the comp hypothesis. Remember that comp is a theory in the mind studies, not a priori matter. It shows that the laws of physics have a reason deeper than an inference from what we can see (which is nice for the applications, but explains virtually nothing). Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Autonomy?
On 25 Jun 2012, at 01:08, Russell Standish wrote: On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 at 01:29:31PM -0700, meekerdb wrote: On 6/24/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: And then if I luckily succeed in computing the electron mass 9.10938291×10^-31 kg, Brent will tell me that we already knew that, and ask for something else. Well if you do it by luck... But of course I'd be very impressed if you could calculate it just from comp+arithmetic. But I'd be less impressed if you just showed that it must be one of all possible numbers. More realistically, shouldn't comp+arithmetic be able to make some basic predictions like: QM must be based on complex Hilbert spaces (not real, quateronic or octonic). I do think this is a very interesting question. I do have a good reason for supposing it is must be complex, not real, but then it fails to say why it shouldn't be quarternionic in preference to complex. The trouble is it is so difficult to work out what a quarternionic QM would really mean. Or the level at which spacetime is discrete (if it is). Spacetime must emerge from relationships between events. The set of events must be countable, but the relationships between them is a power set of this, which is uncountable. This would imply continuity of spacetime, I think. This is a flipside of Bruno's argument that COMP entails physics (ie phenomenal physics) is not computable. Comp already explains a lot of what physicists accepts, but find very weird, like appearances of a pure strong form indeterminacy/parallel realities, non locality, non cloning. It predicts the existence of continuous observable, and of non computable sequences of definite observations. Unfortunately it does not seems to be able to derive easily the empirically simpler aspect of physics, like the existence and structure of space-time, or the existence of computable hamiltonian/ energy. But comp is not a proposal for doing physics differently. Comp is just the most simple and reasonable hypothesis in the cognitive science, and then it transforms the mind-body problem into the necessity of deriving physics from arithmetic or any universal system. In that sense it already explains why there is a physical quantum-like reality. Comp discovers the realm in which the physical laws appeared and logically evolved, and this in a way which saves the persons from metaphysical elimination. The reversal is more theological than physical. it introduces rigor in the human or spiritual sciences. It is up to the materialists, if they want to stay materialist, to provide their non-comp theory of mind. But with the exception of Penrose, ... and Craig, no one seems to be aware of that necessity. UDA is supposed to make that clear, though. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: truth
Hello John, On 24 Jun 2012, at 21:43, John Mikes wrote: Bruno: Doesn't it emerge in this respect WHAT truth? or rather WHOSE truth? is there an accepted authority to verify an absolute truth judgeable from a different belief system? I don't think such authority exists. We can only agree on hypotheses, about such truth, concerning some domain of investigation. We can also agree on the existence or non existence of facts confirming some truth concerning some reality. But we can bet such truth exists, even if we cannot believe it or know it for sure. Examples: - Few people doubt that 1+1=2 is an absolute truth, when 1 and 2 are used as the usual name for the standard natural numbers, and + represents the standard addition operation. Likewise for the whole elementary (first order) arithmetic. - We usually don't doubt the mundane informations. So, 'Obama is the actual president of the US' can reasonably be assumed as absolute. I mean, with actual, that Obama is the actual president of the US in our reality is the absolute truth. Not the proposition Obama is the actual president of the US which might be false in the universe next door. Most theoretical truth are absolute, thanks to their conditional shapes. For example the existence of parallel universes in the theoretical framework of QM-without-collapse is absolute, accepting some reasonable definition of what is a universe (a set of events closed for interaction, for example). This is absolute as it is a theorem in QM-without-collapse (or of comp). Of course the proposition parallel universes exist is not absolute at all. Bruno On Sat, Jun 23, 2012 at 4:50 AM, Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: On 23 Jun 2012, at 09:47, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: On 22.06.2012 08:03 Stephen P. King said the following: On 6/22/2012 1:50 AM, Brian Tenneson wrote: I have many questions. One is what if truth were malleable? -- HI Brian, If it was malleable, how would we detect the modifications? If our standards of truth varied, how could we tell? This reminds me of the debate between Leibniz and Newton regarding the notion of absolute space. If one assumes the correspondence theory of truth, then the question would be if a reality were malleable. Right. Which leads to the question; what does Brian mean by truth is malleable? Would this entail that arithmetical truth is malleable? What would it mean that the truth of 17 is prime is malleable. It looks like we need a more solid truth than arithmetic in which we can make sense of the malleability of the truth in arithmetic, but I cannot see anything more solid than elementary arithmetic. Some truth can be malleable in some operational sense, but this will be only metaphorical. For example the truth that cannabis is far more safe than alcohol, appears to be quite malleable, but this is just because special interest exploits the lack of education in logic. People driven by power are used to mistreat truth, but it is just errors or lies. I guess Brian's question is more metaphysical, but then in which non malleable context can we make sense of metaphysically malleable truth? Perhaps Brian should elaborate on what he means by truth is malleable? It seems to me that such an idea is similar to complete relativism, which defeats itself by not allowing that very idea to be relativized. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Autonomy?
On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The first person indeterminacy is a fact, with respect to comp. First person indeterminacy is a fact with respect to ANYTHING, sometimes you don't know what you're going to do till you do it. I find your theoretical prediction of this less than impressive. And then if I luckily succeed in computing the electron mass 9.10938291×10-31kg, Brent will tell me that we already knew that, and ask for something else. Don't be ridiculous! If you can produce the value of 9.10938291×10^-31kg from nothing but pure numbers you would be universally hailed as the greatest logician or mathematician or physicist (there would no longer be any difference between the three professions) who ever lived. Philosophical theories are a dime a dozen but theories that can produce numbers are not, and theories where the numbers match the numbers obtained from experiment are even less common. If you want your ideas to go mainstream there is just no alternative, you've got to find a way for those ideas to churn out numbers, numbers that can be tested. You need also to be interested in consciousness, and capable of distinguishing first and third person points of view I'm interested in consciousness but I am not capable of always making the distinction between the first and third person points of view, but you have admitted you can't do it either. On March 27 2012 I said: Give me a example of 2 conscious beings that are identical by what you call 3-view but NOT identical by what you call 1-view, show they deserve different names, do that and I might get a idea what you're talking about; but don't give me that diaries business, if the diaries are different a third party can see that just as well as the individuals who wrote them. Just one clear non mystical example where objectively 2 things are identical but subjectively they are not, that's all I ask and I don't think it's a unreasonable request as your proof depends on there being such a difference. You responded to my request with: You ask me something impossible I agree it is impossible. I can conceive of 2 conscious minds being identical from the 1- view but not from the 3-view, for example a mind generated from a biological brain and a uploaded mind generated from a computer, in which case there really wouldn't be two minds but only one. However 2 minds identical from the 3- view but not from the 1-view makes no sense. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Autonomy?
On 25 Jun 2012, at 18:24, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Jun 24, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The first person indeterminacy is a fact, with respect to comp. First person indeterminacy is a fact with respect to ANYTHING, sometimes you don't know what you're going to do till you do it. I find your theoretical prediction of this less than impressive. The question is do you agree with it, or not. So that we can move to step 4. And then if I luckily succeed in computing the electron mass 9.10938291×10-31kg, Brent will tell me that we already knew that, and ask for something else. Don't be ridiculous! If you can produce the value of 9.10938291×10^ -31kg from nothing but pure numbers you would be universally hailed as the greatest logician or mathematician or physicist (there would no longer be any difference between the three professions) who ever lived. Philosophical theories are a dime a dozen but theories that can produce numbers are not, and theories where the numbers match the numbers obtained from experiment are even less common. If you want your ideas to go mainstream there is just no alternative, you've got to find a way for those ideas to churn out numbers, numbers that can be tested. You ignore that we can test inequalities, even without probability. I do produce the description of the devices so that we can test the hypotheses. All you have to do is proceed in the argument, even if you need this to understand that it is more modest than you extrapolate. Please do the reasoning, before extrapolating on assertions I do not provide. You need also to be interested in consciousness, and capable of distinguishing first and third person points of view I'm interested in consciousness but I am not capable of always making the distinction between the first and third person points of view, but you have admitted you can't do it either. On March 27 2012 I said: Give me a example of 2 conscious beings that are identical by what you call 3-view but NOT identical by what you call 1-view, show they deserve different names, do that and I might get a idea what you're talking about; but don't give me that diaries business, if the diaries are different a third party can see that just as well as the individuals who wrote them. Just one clear non mystical example where objectively 2 things are identical but subjectively they are not, that's all I ask and I don't think it's a unreasonable request as your proof depends on there being such a difference. You responded to my request with: You ask me something impossible I agree it is impossible. I can conceive of 2 conscious minds being identical from the 1- view but not from the 3-view, for example a mind generated from a biological brain and a uploaded mind generated from a computer, in which case there really wouldn't be two minds but only one. However 2 minds identical from the 3- view but not from the 1-view makes no sense. We agree on that indeed. And ? For the reasoning, we don't have to attribute two first person povs to one 3-viewed machine, but to attribute one first person povs to two different 3-viewed machine, and eventually number relations. It looks like you want me to believe that the relation of mind and machine is one-one, by telling me to give an example of 2 different minds for one machine, which we agree is impossible, but this does not mean that we cannot attach one mind to two different machines, or to two identical (similar at the subst. level) machine put in different environment, like Sidney and Beijing, for example. It is crucially important, because machine cannot know in which computations there are among the infinities which exists in the solution of a universal diophantine equation, and in a sense, she belongs to all those computations that she cannot distinguishes. That makes a big infinity. I am not solving a problem, I am reducing a philosophical problem to a mathematical problem, assuming comp. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Autonomy?
On 6/25/2012 10:08 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: For the reasoning, we don't have to attribute two first person povs to one 3-viewed machine, but to attribute one first person povs to two different 3-viewed machine, and eventually number relations. It looks like you want me to believe that the relation of mind and machine is one-one, by telling me to give an example of 2 different minds for one machine, which we agree is impossible, But of course we can have two minds attributed to the same brain - just not at the same (3p) time. A computer can be used to run two different AI programs, and even mutlitask them. And some people exhibit mutliple-presonality disorder. If thoughts are discrete things, do they come with markers. If you had multiple-personalities would you always know which personality you were at a given moment? but this does not mean that we cannot attach one mind to two different machines, or to two identical (similar at the subst. level) machine put in different environment, like Sidney and Beijing, for example. It is crucially important, because machine cannot know in which computations there are among the infinities which exists in the solution of a universal diophantine equation, and in a sense, she belongs to all those computations that she cannot distinguishes. That makes a big infinity. An infinite-personality disorder. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Autonomy?
On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The question is do you agree with it, or not. So that we can move to step 4. I've lost track, is step 3 the trivial observation that sometimes we don't know what we're going to do, or was that step 2? You ignore that we can test inequalities, even without probability. I do produce the description of the devices so that we can test the hypotheses. Then tell me of an experiment that a scientist can perform in a lab where if XY then your theory is wrong but if Y X then your theory is probably right, where X and Y are objectively measurable quantities of some sort; just tell me what X and Y are. but this does not mean that we cannot attach one mind to two different machines, Yes provided the machines were identical, or at least functionally identical. or to two identical (similar at the subst. level) machine put in different environment, If they were in different environments then the machines would not be identical or even functionally identical and their associated minds would be different because they would have different memories. John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Autonomy?
On 6/25/2012 12:01 PM, John Clark wrote: or to two identical (similar at the subst. level) machine put in different environment, If they were in different environments then the machines would not be identical or even functionally identical and their associated minds would be different because they would have different memories. They would become different as they interacted with the different environments. But the environments might be so nearly identical that the difference is not perceptible. Would there then be two minds, or only one? Or is it a moot question because brains (and computers and environments) have a lot of random variation below the level of perception and so the minds/brains would diverge unless the whole system, brain+environment, were cloned and isolated at the quantum level (which we can't do). This why I suspect that Bruno's idea requires that physics and consciousness are inseparable, even if they can be derived from number and computation theory. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Autonomy?
On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 2:01 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The question is do you agree with it, or not. So that we can move to step 4. I've lost track, is step 3 the trivial observation that sometimes we don't know what we're going to do, or was that step 2? http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm It's not that we don't know what we are going to do, but we don't know what we are going to experience (even if we could have complete information about our mind). It is impossible to have complete information about one's environment because we exist within an infinite number of them. Acquiring information from our environment is a process that occurs over time. This information can differentiate some of the infinite environments from others, but there will never be certainty regarding the stability or continuity of the environment because some fraction of our infinite environments will take highly divergent paths. In the next second you could find yourself a trillion light-years from your current location if someone there happened to recreated you in your current form. Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
I am the de-phlogistonator!
Hi, Hales, C. G. 2012 The modern phlogiston: why 'thinking machines' don't need computers TheConversation. The Conversation media Group. http://www.theconversation.edu.au/the-modern-phlogiston-why-thinking-machines-dont-need-computers-7881 Cheers Colin P.S. I am done with this issue. I'll just 'Lavoisier' my way through the phlogiston. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Autonomy?
On 6/25/2012 3:54 PM, Jason Resch wrote: On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 at 2:01 PM, John Clark johnkcl...@gmail.com mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com wrote: On Mon, Jun 25, 2012 Bruno Marchal marc...@ulb.ac.be mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be wrote: The question is do you agree with it, or not. So that we can move to step 4. I've lost track, is step 3 the trivial observation that sometimes we don't know what we're going to do, or was that step 2? http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/%7Emarchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.htm It's not that we don't know what we are going to do, but we don't know what we are going to experience (even if we could have complete information about our mind). It is impossible to have complete information about one's environment because we exist within an infinite number of them. Acquiring information from our environment is a process that occurs over time. This information can differentiate some of the infinite environments from others, but there will never be certainty regarding the stability or continuity of the environment because some fraction of our infinite environments will take highly divergent paths. In the next second you could find yourself a trillion light-years from your current location if someone there happened to recreated you in your current form. Or find 'yourself' a Boltzmann brain. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: I am the de-phlogistonator!
On 6/25/2012 6:22 PM, Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote: Hi, Hales, C. G. 2012 The modern phlogiston: why 'thinking machines' don't need computers TheConversation. The Conversation media Group. http://www.theconversation.edu.au/the-modern-phlogiston-why-thinking-machines-dont-need-computers-7881 Cheers Colin P.S. I am done with this issue. I'll just 'Lavoisier' my way through the phlogiston. Good luck. I agree with your point: Engineering first, then science. But you must know it's not as simple as tissue implying some undifferentiated stuff. Even planaria have a wiring diagram, so to get AGI you probably need to start with the right wiring diagram. And if it is right it will still take a long time to educate it. Brent Artificial intelligence is just whatever doesn't work yet. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
