Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Sun, Oct 28, 2012 at 5:48 AM, Craig Weinberg wrote: >> It seems that you do not understand the meaning of the term "consistent >> with the laws of physics". It means that when you decide to play tennis the >> neurons in your brain will depolarise because of the ionic gradients, > > > If you can't see how ridiculous that view is, there is not much I can say > that will help you. My decision to play tennis *IS* the depolarization of > neurons. That sounds like eliminative materialism. It is a bit like saying that the movement of the car down the road *IS* the combustion of fuel in the cylinders, transmission of power to the wheels, and all the other lower level phenomena that make up the car. > The ionic gradients have no opinion of whether or not I am about to > play tennis. The brain as a whole, every cell, every molecule, every charge > and field, is just the spatially extended shadow of *me* or my 'life'. I am > the event which unites all of the functions and structures together, from > the micro to the macro, and when I change my mind, that change is reflected > on every level. You change your mind because all the components of your brain change configuration. If this did not happen, your mind could not change. The mind is the higher level phenomenon. The analogy is as above with the car: it drives down the road because of all the mechanics functioning in a particular way, and you could say that driving down the road is equivalent to the mechanics functioning in a particular way. >> the permeability of the membrane to different ions, the way the ion >> channels change their conformation in response to an electric field, and >> many other such physical factors. It is these physical factors which result >> in your decision to play tennis and then your getting up to retrieve your >> tennis racquet. If it were the other way around - your decision causes >> neurons to depolarise - then we would observe miraculous events in your >> brain, ion channels opening in the absence of any electric field or >> neurotransmitter change, and so on. > > > No. The miraculous event is viewable any time we look at how a conscious > intention appears in an fMRI. We see spontaneous simultaneous activity in > many regions of the brain, coordinated on many levels. This is the footprint > of where we stand. When we take a step, the footprint changes. We are the > leader of these brain processes, not the follower. You completely misunderstand these experiments. Please read about excitable cells before commenting further. The following online articles seem quite good. The third is about spontaneous neuronal activity. http://users.rcn.com/jkimball.ma.ultranet/BiologyPages/E/ExcitableCells.html http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Membrane_potential http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neural_oscillation >> Cells don't defy entropy and planes don't defy gravity. Their respective >> behaviour is consistent with our theories about entropy and gravity. > > > Cells defy entropy locally. Planes allow us to get around some constraints > of gravity. If your definition of any law is so broad that it includes all > possible technological violations of it, then how does it really give us any > insight? The laws of nature are broad enough to determine everything everywhere that has happened and will happen. >> How the computer was made would have no effect on its behaviour or >> consciousness. > > Yes, it would. If I make a refrigerator, I can assume that it is a box with > cooling mechanism. If I find an organism which has evolved to cool parts of > itself to store food, then that is a completely different thing. The question was about two identical computers, one made in a factory, the other assembled with fantastic luck from raw materials moving about randomly. Will there be any difference in the functioning or consciousness (or lack of it) of the two computers? >> >> If a biological >> >> human were put together from raw materials by advanced aliens would >> >> that make any difference to his consciousness or intelligence? >> > >> > It would if we were automaton servants of their agendas. >> >> If the created human had a similar structure to a naturally developed >> human he would have similar behaviour and similar experiences. How could it >> possibly be otherwise? > > Because consciousness is not a structure, it is an event. It is an > experience which unifies bodies from the inside out, not a configuration of > bodies which has an experience because of external conditions. So how would a human put together by molecular assembly machines using the template of a regular human be different from the regular human in either behaviour or consciousness? -- Stathis Papaioannou -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
On mathematical modeling
From Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective by Bas C Van Fraassen. p. 40 'Of course the story is apocryphal, that a professional gambler funded a mathematician to analyze horse-racing, and was thoroughly unhappy with the report that began "Let each horse be a perfect sphere, rolling along a Euclidean straight line ...". But is that so far from real examples of mathematical modeling?' Evgenii -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: A mirror of the universe.
On 27 Oct 2012, at 17:02, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/27/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 Oct 2012, at 20:30, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/26/2012 8:44 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Dear Bruno and Alberto, I agree some what with both of you. As to the idea of a "genetic algorithm can isolate anticipative programs", I think that anticipation is the analogue of inertia for computations, as Mach saw inertia. It is a relation between any one and the class of computations that it belongs to such that any incomplete string has a completion in the collections of others like it. This is like an error correction or compression mechanism. -- Onward! Stephen ROGER: For what it's worth--- like Mach's inertia, each monad mirrors the rest of the universe. Dear Roger, Yes, but the idea is that the mirroring that each monad does of each other's "percepts" (not the universe per se!) is not an exact isomorphism between the monads. There has to be a difference between monads or else there is only One. Right, and in the arithmetical Indra Net, all universal numbers are different. And the, by the first person indeterminacy it is like there is a competition between all of them to bring your most probable next "instant of life". It looks that, at least on the sharable part, there are big winners, like this or that quantum hamiltonian. But we have to explain them through the arithmetical Net structure, if we want separate properly the quanta from the qualia. Bruno Dear Bruno, A slightly technical question. In the arithmetic IndraNet idea, what plays the role of the "surface" that is reflective? reread carefully the UDA. You should understand by yourself that the "surface" role is played by the first person experience. This is due to the fact that the experience are UD-delay invariant, and is a limiting sum on the infinite works of an infinite collection of universal numbers. How do we get the numbers to appear separated from each other? This comes from elementary arithmetic, although I am not sure why you are using of the word "appear" instead of "are". This seems necessary for the appearance of physical space. It is necessary to have anything. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On 27 Oct 2012, at 17:49, John Mikes wrote: On Sat, Oct 27, 2012 at 9:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 Oct 2012, at 14:24, Craig Weinberg wrote: On Friday, October 26, 2012 1:01:34 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 12:41 PM, Craig Weinberg wrote: > We are atoms, molecules, cells, tissues, and organisms. Whatever we do is > what the laws of physics *actually are*. Your assumptions about the laws of > physics are 20th century legacy ideas based on exterior manipulations of > exterior instruments to measure other exterior phenomena. Whatever we do is determined by a small set of rules, No. What we as humans do is determined by human experiences and human character, which is not completely ruled externally. We participate directly. It could only be a small set of rules if those rules include 'do whatever you like, whenever you have the chance'. JM: who is that agency "we"? having 'human experiences and human character'? You were quoting Craig. Nt sure I understand Craig paragraph, nor your question here. Bruno the rules being as you say what matter actually does and not imposed by people or divine whim. Matter is a reduced shadow of experiences. Matter is ruled by people and people are ruled by matter. Of the two, people are the more directly and completely real phenomena. This is correct, but not obvious at all (for aristotelicians), and yet a logical consequence of comp, with "people" replaced by Löbian universal machine. This has been be put in a constructive form, with computer science. It makes comp (+ reasonable definition of knowledge, observation, in the UD context) testable, and already tested on non trivial relations between what is observable (quantum logic). The science and the math already exist. All machines looking inward deep enough will develop a non comp intuition, and some can go beyond. Bruno I really don't understand where you disagree with me, since you keep making statements then pulling back if challenged. I don't see where I am pulling back. I disagree with you in that to you any description of the universe which is not matter in space primarily is inconceivable. I am saying that what matter is and does is not important to understanding consciousness itself. It is important to understanding personal access to human consciousness, i.e. brain health, etc, but otherwise it is consciousness, on many levels and ranges of quality, which gives rise to the appearance of matter and not the other way around. Do you think the molecules in your brain follow the laws of physics, such as they may be? The laws of physics have no preference one way or another whether this part of my brain or that part of my brain is active. I am choosing that directly by what I think about. If I think about playing tennis, then the appropriate cells in my brain will depolarize and molecules will change positions. They are following my laws. Physics is my servant in this case. Of course, if someone gives me a strong drink, then physics is influencing me instead and I am more of a follower of that particular chemical event than a leader. If so, then the behaviour of each molecule is determined or follows probabilistic laws, and hence the behaviour of the collection of molecules also follows deterministic or probabilistic laws. I am determining the probabilities myself, directly. They are me. How could it be otherwise? If consciousness, sense, will, or whatever else is at play in addition to this then we would notice a deviation from these laws. Not in addition to, sense and will are the whole thing. All activity in the universe is sense and will and nothing else. Matter is only the sense and will of something else besides yourself. That is what it would MEAN for consciousness, sense, will or whatever else to have a separate causal efficacy; No. I don't know how many different ways to say this: Sense is the only causal efficacy there ever was, is, or will be. Sense is primordial and universal. Electromagnetism, gravity, strong and weak forces are only examples of our impersonal view of the sense of whatever it is we are studying secondhand. absent this, the physical laws, whatever they are, determine absolutely everything that happens, everywhere, for all time. Which part of this do you not agree with? None of it. I am saying there are no physical laws at all. There is no law book. That is all figurative. What we have thought of as physics is as crude and simplistic as any ancient mythology. What we see as physical laws are the outermost, longest lasting conventions of sense. Nothing more. I think that the way sense works is that it can't contradict itself, so that these oldest ways of relating, once they are established, are no longer easy to change, but higher levels of sense arise out of the loopholes and can influence lower levels of
Re: Against Mechanism
On 27 Oct 2012, at 19:27, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Oct 27, 2012 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> your eyes are sending signals to your brain of the White House and not of the Kremlin, and there is nothing more profound about it. > But the eyes of the copy get also the signals from Moscow. Yes, so the guy in Moscow feels like the guy in Moscow because he's the guy in Moscow. Big deal. > So your explanation does not help to predict what will happen if the experience is reitired. True, it can't predict what will happen because what will happen is a function of the external environment and how it stimulates the eyes and it has nothing to do with the original or either copy. Your entire philosophy is built on top of the question "Why is the guy in Washington the guy in Washington?" and the answer of course is "because he's the guy in Washington". With such a foundation its no wonder it can't do much. > The correct comp explanation, deep or not, explains why we cannot make a better prediction Then I no longer know what "comp" means because the real reason we can't do better is the same reason we can't do better at predicting next weeks weather, its too complicated. Predicting is hard, especially the future. Predicting the weather is hard, but in principle possible. predicting the personal outcome of the self-duplication is easily show impossible in theory, even for a god, and this without physical assumption (unlike QM). That's the difference. But if you agree that the self-duplication leads to indeterminacy, you could tell me if you agree with the step 4 of the UDA: http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Code length = probability distribution
On 27 Oct 2012, at 21:35, meekerdb wrote: On 10/27/2012 7:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 Oct 2012, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote: On 10/26/2012 6:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Oh yes, I remember that you did agree once with the 323 principle, but I forget what is your problem with the movie- graph/step-8, then. If you find the time, I am please if you can elaborate. I think Russell too is not yet entirely convinced. What bothers me about it is that counterfactuals are virtually infinite. So to make the argument go through I think it implicitly requires a whole 'world'; Not really, as here, you can use Maudlin who showed that the conuterfactuals does not require physical activity. In MGA, if you give a role to the conuterfactual, you violate the 323 principle, so that you attribute a functional role in a particular computation to object having no physical activity for the actual computation. But I'm not sure about the 323 principle in a QM world. Even QM worlds, with QM observers, even having Q brains, are emulated in the UD, or in arithmetic. If the 323 principles does not hold for them, it might mean that QM is the winning computation, but then you have to explain this from arithmetic. Or you are meaning that you need a *primary* QM world and brain? In that case, my consciousness would not be invariant when the Q brain is entirely simulated by a classical machine, and comp is made false. The latter. But why the restriction to "my consciousness"? Only a small fraction of thought is conscious. Consciousness is what will select the arithmetical or computer-science- theoretical branches in the arithmetical reality. It is not a fraction of thought which is conscious, it is a person, supported by infinities of "unconscious" computations. If you opt for the latter, you can't accept a digital brain, not even a quantum one, per computatio. You negate comp, by putting something magical, needed for your consciousness, in the quantum material reality. In that non comp reality you are back with all questions unsolved: where does that QM reality comes from, how do you singularize actual conscious experiences in it, etc. Bruno Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: mega-consciousness,created by bio-electrical circuitry?
Very interesting. I think that in the long run, we will come back to being bacteria, but with cables, with ultra redundant coding of our humanity. Those bacteria seems to already do the cables. Why? Nice discovery. Bruno On 27 Oct 2012, at 21:59, meekerdb wrote: UH OH! We may have to consider the ethics of our treatment of bacteria next. Brent The seafloor is home to a vast electrical network created by bacteria Annalee Newitz It sounds a little bit like one of the subplots in Avatar, where we discover that the moon Pandora possesses a kind of mega-consciousness created by bio-electrical circuitry. But this is actually real. Two years ago, researchers discovered a strange electro-chemical signature in the sludge at the bottom of Aarhus Bay in Denmark. Now, they've discovered what was causing it: a vast network of bacteria that form electrical connections with each other, almost like nerve cells in the brain. Above, you can see what you might call tiny electrical wires that connect each bacterial cell, under an electron microscope. The wires are blue, and they are running through a piece of sediment, or sand from the seafloor. Over at Wired Science, Brandon Keim explains: The bacteria were first detected in 2010 by researchers perplexed at chemical fluctuations in sediments from the bottom of Aarhus Bay . . . Almost instantaneously linking changing oxygen levels in water with reactions in mud nearly an inch below, the fluctuations occurred too fast to be explained by chemistry. Only an electrical signal made sense — but no known bacteria could transmit electricity across such comparatively vast distances. Were bacteria the size of humans, the signals would be making a journey 12 miles long. Now the mysterious bacteria have been identified. They belong to a microbial family called Desulfobulbaceae, though they share just 92 percent of their genes with any previously known member of that family. They deserve to be considered a new genus, the study of which could open a new scientific frontier for understanding the interface of biology, geology and chemistry across the undersea world. Even more incredible, it turns out these bacteria are found all over the world, their tiny electrical cables woven deeply into the mud of the ocean bottom. Keim writes that the scientists found "a full half-mile of Desulfobulbacea cable" in one teaspoonful of mud. The seafloor is home to a vast electrical network created by bacteria In other words, the entire ocean bed may be electrified in the same way our nervous systems are. They're networks of individual cells connected by electro-chemical signals — essentially they are an enormous multi-cellular organism. These bacteria "breathe" by absorbing oxygen and hydrogen sulfide, emitting water as a byproduct. They might be serving as a vast water purification system on the ocean bottom, or they might be part of a geological process that's a lot more complex. We also have no way of knowing how other sea creatures are interacting with this giant electrical grid organism. What matters here is that we've just discovered a new kind of life that is not only ubiquitous, but also engaging in electro-chemical processes throughout the oceans. There's no evidence that this life form is "thinking" in any way that we'd recognize, but it certainly sounds like the perfect opening to a science fiction story. Read more about this bacterial network, and see more amazing pictures, in Wired. Read the scientists' paper in Nature. Images via Nils Risgaard-Petersen; schematic via Nature http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2012/10/bacteria-electric-wires -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com . For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en . http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Solipsism = 1p
On Sunday, October 28, 2012 5:48:29 AM UTC-4, stathisp wrote: > > On Sun, Oct 28, 2012 at 5:48 AM, Craig Weinberg > > > wrote: > > >> It seems that you do not understand the meaning of the term "consistent > >> with the laws of physics". It means that when you decide to play tennis > the > >> neurons in your brain will depolarise because of the ionic gradients, > > > > > > If you can't see how ridiculous that view is, there is not much I can > say > > that will help you. My decision to play tennis *IS* the depolarization > of > > neurons. > > That sounds like eliminative materialism. It is a bit like saying that > the movement of the car down the road *IS* the combustion of fuel in > the cylinders, transmission of power to the wheels, and all the other > lower level phenomena that make up the car. > But you forgot the movements of the driver, pushing pedals and turning the steering wheel. The problem is that you are only seeing it one way, so that if I say that my impulse to move my arm is the electromagnetic changes in my brain and arm, you see that as meaning that the experience of moving my arm is not actually real. What I am saying is the opposite - that all material interactions in the universe are, on some scale, experiences. I'm not eliminating consciousness in favor of materialism, I am expanding materialism to include primordial subjective awareness. > > > The ionic gradients have no opinion of whether or not I am about to > > play tennis. The brain as a whole, every cell, every molecule, every > charge > > and field, is just the spatially extended shadow of *me* or my 'life'. I > am > > the event which unites all of the functions and structures together, > from > > the micro to the macro, and when I change my mind, that change is > reflected > > on every level. > > You change your mind because all the components of your brain change > configuration. No. A single change of my mind is seen in the brain as millions of cellular events. Your view is factually incorrect. > If this did not happen, your mind could not change. I can make it happen voluntarily by changing my mind. It's like a see-saw. If I push down, my brain goes up. They are two views of the same thing which can be leveraged from either the outside in or the inside out. A lot of people can't seem to understand this. It may not be your fault. > The > mind is the higher level phenomenon. The analogy is as above with the > car: it drives down the road because of all the mechanics functioning > in a particular way, and you could say that driving down the road is > equivalent to the mechanics functioning in a particular way. > The car is a tool used by a driver. No amount of mechanism in the car can replace the driver (except on a superficial level). Without someone to use the car for a human purpose, there is no driver and the car is a pointless automation. The same is true for the brain. Without a person to care about a human lifetime, there is no point to a brain. > > >> the permeability of the membrane to different ions, the way the ion > >> channels change their conformation in response to an electric field, > and > >> many other such physical factors. It is these physical factors which > result > >> in your decision to play tennis and then your getting up to retrieve > your > >> tennis racquet. If it were the other way around - your decision causes > >> neurons to depolarise - then we would observe miraculous events in your > >> brain, ion channels opening in the absence of any electric field or > >> neurotransmitter change, and so on. > > > > > > No. The miraculous event is viewable any time we look at how a conscious > > intention appears in an fMRI. We see spontaneous simultaneous activity > in > > many regions of the brain, coordinated on many levels. This is the > footprint > > of where we stand. When we take a step, the footprint changes. We are > the > > leader of these brain processes, not the follower. > > You completely misunderstand these experiments. I'm talking about *every experiment* that has been done. There is nothing to misunderstand. When I change my mind, through my own thought or though some image or suggestion, that change is reflected as a passive consequence of the macro-level event. I am not at the mercy of the cellular agendas of my brain - I can think about all kinds of things. I can take drugs to further impose my high level agenda on low level neurology. > Please read about > excitable cells before commenting further. The following online > articles seem quite good. The third is about spontaneous neuronal > activity. > > > http://users.rcn.com/jkimball.ma.ultranet/BiologyPages/E/ExcitableCells.html > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Membrane_potential > http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Neural_oscillation > Yeah, I know about all of this stuff. > >> Cells don't defy entropy and planes don't defy gravity.
Re: On mathematical modeling
On 28 Oct 2012, at 11:22, Evgenii Rudnyi wrote: From Scientific Representation: Paradoxes of Perspective by Bas C Van Fraassen. p. 40 'Of course the story is apocryphal, that a professional gambler funded a mathematician to analyze horse-racing, and was thoroughly unhappy with the report that began "Let each horse be a perfect sphere, rolling along a Euclidean straight line ...". But is that so far from real examples of mathematical modeling?' It just means that there are bad and good modeling. Sometimes we cannot know in advance. Note that with comp, the brain is not modeled by a computer, it is identified (can even be replaced in principle) with a computer. But here again, that might be false. To model a horse by a sphere is funny. But to study the solar system, you can model the sun by a "material point", and everything seems OK. To find the good models and theories is an art. There are no mechanical procedure to do that, neither for us, nor for the machines. Most of the times we must take decision with limited informations, deformed by the current perspective, and we will use the simplest model we have at our disposition. To get an idea of what could be like being under a horse falling on you from a 15 story building, maybe it might make sense to model the horse by a big heavy potatoes. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Code length = probability distribution
On 28 Oct 2012, at 00:19, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 05:13:50PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: Oh yes, I remember that you did agree once with the 323 principle, but I forget what is your problem with the movie-graph/step-8, then. If you find the time, I am please if you can elaborate. I think Russell too is not yet entirely convinced. Bruno Indeed I still have problems with step 8, and want to get back to that. But I want to do it when it when you're not exhausted arguming other points... Ah well, that's nice. Part of the problem, is that I already agree with the reversal at step 7, so in some sense step 8 is redundant for me. That is interesting. You are not alone. I have made attempt to make that precise, and it leads to some use of stronger form of Occam razor. How do you answer the person who get the 1-7 points, and concludes (as he *believes* in a primary material world, and in comp) that this proves that a physical universe, to procede consciousness, has to be "little" (never run a big portion of the UD, so that it maintain the brain-consciousness identity thesis). I understand that a familiarity with digital machines and computer science can make us feeling that this is really an had move, almost inventing the physical universe, to prevent its possible explanation and origin in dreams interferences. But, still, logically, he is still consistent. he can say yes to the doctor, and believes he is a "unique" owner of, perhaps in the quantum weaker sense, primitively material machine/body. The Movie-Graph is just a way to show more precisely that such a move is *very* ad hoc, and will ask for non Turing emulable, nor 1-person comp-indeterminacy recoverable elements in the computation. They can only been missed by the digitalist doctor, and so it would contradict the "yes doctor" assumption. There may be an issue with the interpretation of the 323 principle. I have no problems with the removal of a register that is never physically used in the calculation of a consious computation. OK. The nuances arise when we consider Everett's many-minds picture. Do you mean the Albert-Loewer many-mind theory? I guess you mean it in a more general sense. A counterfactually used register will still be used by one of my differentiated copies, and ISTM that these alternate differentiated minds are essential to my consciousness, What trans-world, or trans-terms of a superposition, interaction would made this senseful? I mean, is the consciousness of the one in Washington dependent of the consciousness of the one in Moscow? It *might* be the case, if the brain was a quantum computer. In that case we could put ourselves in the W+M superposition state, do some different task, get some result, and then operate a Fourier rotation on our resulting W'+M' state and extract some consciousness relevant information. But if this is what you mean, it would just mean that we need to emulate the brain at a lower level. A simulation of that quantum brain can be done classically, and we can reiterate the 323 question at that level. and that removing the counterfactually-used register in this case may well prevent my consciousness. To sum up, a counterfactually-used register is being physically used if many-worlds is accepted, so therefore the 323 principle isn't applicable. In what sense is it more used than the person in Washington and its doppelganger in Moscow? They both handle just a different part of the initial person counterfactuals. Again, that would play a comp genuine role only if there is a mechanism to extract information from the counterfactuals, but this means the substitution level is the quantum level, which is still emulable by, and actually even emulated by elementary arithmetic. All right? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Code length = probability distribution
On 10/28/2012 8:28 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 Oct 2012, at 21:35, meekerdb wrote: On 10/27/2012 7:56 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 Oct 2012, at 21:30, meekerdb wrote: On 10/26/2012 6:57 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: Oh yes, I remember that you did agree once with the 323 principle, but I forget what is your problem with the movie-graph/step-8, then. If you find the time, I am please if you can elaborate. I think Russell too is not yet entirely convinced. What bothers me about it is that counterfactuals are virtually infinite. So to make the argument go through I think it implicitly requires a whole 'world'; Not really, as here, you can use Maudlin who showed that the conuterfactuals does not require physical activity. In MGA, if you give a role to the conuterfactual, you violate the 323 principle, so that you attribute a functional role in a particular computation to object having no physical activity for the actual computation. But I'm not sure about the 323 principle in a QM world. Even QM worlds, with QM observers, even having Q brains, are emulated in the UD, or in arithmetic. If the 323 principles does not hold for them, it might mean that QM is the winning computation, but then you have to explain this from arithmetic. Or you are meaning that you need a *primary* QM world and brain? In that case, my consciousness would not be invariant when the Q brain is entirely simulated by a classical machine, and comp is made false. The latter. But why the restriction to "my consciousness"? Only a small fraction of thought is conscious. Consciousness is what will select the arithmetical or computer-science-theoretical branches in the arithmetical reality. It is not a fraction of thought which is conscious, it is a person, supported by infinities of "unconscious" computations. If you opt for the latter, you can't accept a digital brain, not even a quantum one, per computatio. That doesn't follow. My new digital brain will be entangled with this QM world, just as my biological one was. It may not be exactly the same consciousness but I think it will be similar; just as I think general intelligence will always be accompanied by some kind of consciousness. Supposing this entanglement is necessary is why I think a simulation must simulate a whole world in order to instantiate human like consciousness. You negate comp, by putting something magical, needed for your consciousness, in the quantum material reality. Not magical. As you often point out, QM is computable. You are making an assumption that the substitution can be done at the classical level where 'classical' is taken not as an approximation but to be fundamental. In that non comp reality you are back with all questions unsolved: where does that QM reality comes from, how do you singularize actual conscious experiences in it, etc. Good questions, but just because I don't know the answers it doesn't follow that I should accept your answer. Your theory also has unanswered questions. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: wave function collapse
On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 8:52 AM, Richard Ruquist wrote: > Well Bruno, > > If the "measure problem" (which I take to be the assignment of > probabilities) is intrinsic to Everett's MWI, does that not amount to > negating it? I did not suggest that it negated comp, which is what you > responded to. > Richard > Richard, I don't think the measure problem is a problem in the sense of a flaw or contradiction, but rather it is the mystery "why the Born rule?". There are, in my opinion, more and much larger problems inherent to single universe interpretations, which are described well on this post: http://lesswrong.com/lw/q7/if_manyworlds_had_come_first/ Jason -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: wave function collapse
Bruno, But it seems that the Gleason Theorem assigns probabilities to the different universes in the multiverse that are not there in Everett's MWI in the first place. Richard On Sat, Oct 27, 2012 at 9:46 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > On 26 Oct 2012, at 15:52, Richard Ruquist wrote: > >> Well Bruno, >> >> If the "measure problem" (which I take to be the assignment of >> probabilities) is intrinsic to Everett's MWI, does that not amount to >> negating it? > > > Why? I think that it is beautifully solved by Gleason theorem, for the > Hilbert space of dim bigger or equal to 3. > > > >> I did not suggest that it negated comp, which is what you >> responded to. > > > I think comp will confirms Everett QM, and this would make our sharable > human or animal substitution level very plausibly at the Heisenberg > uncertainty level, this for surviving even a long run, without detecting any > difference. > > In that case, the Gleason solution will be the solution for comp. For this > the X and Z logics (alreeady extracted) must conforms to some desiderata, > already expressed by von Neumann, for a quantum logic, and which is that > mainly it defines the searched measure. > > I m not sure I can understand string theory or any fundamental QM without > Everett. > > I agree that the idea that we are multiplied by infinities at each instant > is not attractive, but science is not wishful thinking, and besides, I don't > take any theory too much seriously (we don't know). I also know that > different theories can happen to be equivalent. > > Of course, to be sure, comp has also many attractive features, mainly its > conceptual simplicity and naturalness. It really explains almost why there > is something instead of nothing, as it assumes only 0 and the successor and > the very simple laws, and explain from that how that very explanation > emerges in some collection of stable numbers' dream. > > Bruno > > > > > > >> Richard >> >> On Fri, Oct 26, 2012 at 9:35 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>> >>> Richard, >>> >>> On 25 Oct 2012, at 18:42, Richard Ruquist wrote: >>> Bruno, Doesn't the Gleason Theorem negate MWI by assigning probabilities? Richard >>> >>> >>> >>> On the contrary. Gleason theorem solves the "measure problem" intrinsic >>> in >>> the Everett MWI, it makes the probabilities into comp (or weakening) >>> first >>> person indeterminacies. >>> >>> Unfortunately, comp necessitates a version of Gleason theorem for all >>> comp >>> states, not just the quantum one, as the quantum law must be derived from >>> the 1p indeterminacies, occurring in arithmetic. >>> >>> The advantage is that comp provides the theory of both quanta and qualia >>> (and a whole theology actually). >>> Unfortunately, it is not yet clear if those quanta behave in a >>> sufficiently >>> quantum mechanical way, like making possible quantum computers, hydrogen, >>> strings may be, etc. >>> >>> Bruno >>> >>> >>> >>> On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 9:38 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > > On 24 Oct 2012, at 19:53, meekerdb wrote: > > On 10/24/2012 4:31 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > > On 23 Oct 2012, at 14:50, Roger Clough wrote: > > Hi meekerdb > > There are a number of theories to explain the collapse of the quantum > wave > function > (see below). > > 1) In subjective theories, the collapse is attributed > to consciousness (presumably of the intent or decision to make > a measurement). > > > This leads to ... solipsism. See the work of Abner Shimony. > > > > > 2) In objective or decoherence theories, some physical > event (such as using a probe to make a measurement) > in itself causes decoherence of the wave function. To me, > this is the simplest and most sensible answer (Occam's Razor). > > > This is inconsistent with quantum mechanics. It forces some devices > into > NOT > obeying QM. > > > No, it's only inconsistent with a reified interpretation of the wf. > It's > perfectly consistent with an instrumentalist interpretation. > Decoherence > is > a prediction of QM in any interpretation. It's the einselection that's > a > problem. > > > > > > > But instrumentalism is just an abandon of searching knowledge. There is > no > more what, only how. > An instrumentalist will just not try to answer the question of betting > if > there is 0, 1, 2, ... omega, ... universes. > > And the einselection is not a problem at all, in QM + comp. It is > implied. > And, imo, the QM corresponding measure problem is solved by Gleason > theorem > (basically). > > And then, keeping that same 'everything' spirit, the whole QM is > explained > by comp. We have just to find the equivalent of "Gleason theorem" for > the > "material hypostases". > > Bruno > >
Re: Against Mechanism
On 10/28/2012 10:23 AM, John Clark wrote: On Sat, Oct 27, 2012 Jason Resch mailto:jasonre...@gmail.com>> wrote: > I am not sure if you are being consistent here. Earlier you said you said you identify yourself with a stream of thoughts Obviously. >If you are identified with a stream of thoughts then you can't simply say one brain is in Moscow and one is in Washington Three things: 1) Saying that thoughts have a position (like Moscow or Washington) is not a useful concept. 2) Talking about 2 identical streams of thought is not useful because in that case there is only one stream of thought. 3) It is useful to say that one stream of thought diverged when one started to form memories of Moscow and the other started to form memories of Washington. At that point they were no longer the same but they were both still Jason Resch. Odd certainly but not paradoxical. > you must consider the first person continuum of experience Yes, and both the Washington and Moscow man have a continuum of experience going back to Jason Resch's early childhood, that's why they are both Jason Resch. However the Washington man does not have a continuum of experience of being in Moscow and the Moscow man does not have a continuum of experience of being in Washington, and that's why they are not each other. > and what they can predict about where their consciousness will take them. Nobody can ever do a very good job at predicting where there consciousness will take them, not even in a predictable environment. > You agreed if you were instantly halted, taken apart and rebuilt again (even with different atoms) from your own perspective nothing would have skipped a beat, your stream of consciousness continues right where it left off. Yes. > But when you are taken apart and two copies are created at two locations your stream diverges among two paths Yes because the environments of Washington and Moscow were different, and as weathermen will tell you it's difficult to predict what the environment will be. To ask "but which one is really ME?" presumes that there is only one correct answer but that is not true because you have been duplicated and it was caused by differences in the environment. > which gives rise to true unpredictability in the first person perspective. As Godel and Turing proved 80 years ago even in a unchanging environment there can be unpredictability in the first person perspective. John K Clark So do you agree that there is some kind of uncertainty in the MW thought experiment? I take it to be subjective uncertainty in anticipation of the transport. But for Bruno's theory, whether you call the MW result uncertain or not, the question is whether it models or explains quantum randomness. It seems to me that it models Everett MWI randomness. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Code length = probability distribution
On 10/28/2012 10:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 28 Oct 2012, at 00:19, Russell Standish wrote: On Thu, Oct 25, 2012 at 05:13:50PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: Oh yes, I remember that you did agree once with the 323 principle, but I forget what is your problem with the movie-graph/step-8, then. If you find the time, I am please if you can elaborate. I think Russell too is not yet entirely convinced. Bruno Indeed I still have problems with step 8, and want to get back to that. But I want to do it when it when you're not exhausted arguming other points... Ah well, that's nice. Part of the problem, is that I already agree with the reversal at step 7, so in some sense step 8 is redundant for me. That is interesting. You are not alone. I have made attempt to make that precise, and it leads to some use of stronger form of Occam razor. How do you answer the person who get the 1-7 points, and concludes (as he *believes* in a primary material world, and in comp) that this proves that a physical universe, to procede consciousness, has to be "little" (never run a big portion of the UD, so that it maintain the brain-consciousness identity thesis). I understand that a familiarity with digital machines and computer science can make us feeling that this is really an had move, almost inventing the physical universe, to prevent its possible explanation and origin in dreams interferences. But, still, logically, he is still consistent. he can say yes to the doctor, and believes he is a "unique" owner of, perhaps in the quantum weaker sense, primitively material machine/body. The Movie-Graph is just a way to show more precisely that such a move is *very* ad hoc, and will ask for non Turing emulable, nor 1-person comp-indeterminacy recoverable elements in the computation. They can only been missed by the digitalist doctor, and so it would contradict the "yes doctor" assumption. There may be an issue with the interpretation of the 323 principle. I have no problems with the removal of a register that is never physically used in the calculation of a consious computation. OK. The nuances arise when we consider Everett's many-minds picture. Do you mean the Albert-Loewer many-mind theory? I guess you mean it in a more general sense. A counterfactually used register will still be used by one of my differentiated copies, and ISTM that these alternate differentiated minds are essential to my consciousness, What trans-world, or trans-terms of a superposition, interaction would made this senseful? I mean, is the consciousness of the one in Washington dependent of the consciousness of the one in Moscow? It *might* be the case, if the brain was a quantum computer. In that case we could put ourselves in the W+M superposition state, do some different task, get some result, and then operate a Fourier rotation on our resulting W'+M' state and extract some consciousness relevant information. The brain is a quantum object. It doesn't do quantum computations in the sense of existing in superpositions of what we regard as different conscious classical propositions. But it does quantum computations at the microscopic level that maintain it's identity as an (approximately) classical object, i.e. it must be entangled with the environment to maintain classicality. So the experience of being in Washington may, because of the way the transporter is constructed to send to both places, depend on the *possibility* of an experience of being in Moscow. But if this is what you mean, it would just mean that we need to emulate the brain at a lower level. A simulation of that quantum brain can be done classically, and we can reiterate the 323 question at that level. But then I think your simulation needs to include the environment with which the brain interacts to produce its quasi-classical character. Brent -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
One world versus many
Hi, Since the subject has been broached... /http://arxiv.org/pdf/0905.0624.pdf One world versus many: the inadequacy of Everettian accounts of evolution,// //probability, and scientific confirmation/ by Adrian Kent (Dated: August 24, 2010) "There is a compelling intellectual case for exploring whether purely unitary quantum theory defines a sensible and scientifically adequate theory, as Everett originally proposed. Many different and incompatible attempts to define a coherent Everettian quantum theory have been made over the past fifty years. However, no known version of the theory (unadorned by extra ad hoc postulates) can account for the appearance of probabilities and explain why the theory it was meant to replace, Copenhagen quantum theory, appears to be confirmed, or more generally why our evolutionary history appears to be Born-rule typical. This article reviews some ingenious and interesting recent attempts in this direction by Wallace, Greaves-Myrvold and others, and explains why they don't work. An account of one-world randomness, which appears scientifically satisfactory, and has no many-worlds analogue, is proposed. A fundamental obstacle to confirming many-worlds theories is illustrated by considering some toy many-worlds models. These models show that branch weights can exist without having any role in either rational decision-making or theory confirmation, and also that the latter two roles are logically separate. Wallace's proposed decision theoretic axioms for rational agents in a multiverse and claimed derivation of the Born rule are examined. It is argued that Wallace's strategy of axiomatizing a mathematically precise decision theory within a fuzzy Everettian quasiclassical ontology is incoherent. Moreover, Wallace's axioms are not constitutive of rationality either in Everettian quantum theory or in theories in which branchings and branch weights are precisely defined. In both cases, there exist coherent rational strategies that violate some of the axioms." -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: A mirror of the universe.
On 10/28/2012 10:52 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 27 Oct 2012, at 17:02, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/27/2012 10:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: On 26 Oct 2012, at 20:30, Stephen P. King wrote: On 10/26/2012 8:44 AM, Roger Clough wrote: Dear Bruno and Alberto, I agree some what with both of you. As to the idea of a "genetic algorithm can isolate anticipative programs", I think that anticipation is the analogue of inertia for computations, as Mach saw inertia. It is a relation between any one and the class of computations that it belongs to such that any incomplete string has a completion in the collections of others like it. This is like an error correction or compression mechanism. -- Onward! Stephen ROGER: For what it's worth--- like Mach's inertia, each monad mirrors the rest of the universe. Dear Roger, Yes, but the idea is that the mirroring that each monad does of each other's "percepts" (not the universe per se!) is not an exact isomorphism between the monads. There has to be a difference between monads or else there is only One. Right, and in the arithmetical Indra Net, all universal numbers are different. And the, by the first person indeterminacy it is like there is a competition between all of them to bring your most probable next "instant of life". It looks that, at least on the sharable part, there are big winners, like this or that quantum hamiltonian. But we have to explain them through the arithmetical Net structure, if we want separate properly the quanta from the qualia. Bruno Dear Bruno, A slightly technical question. In the arithmetic IndraNet idea, what plays the role of the "surface" that is reflective? reread carefully the UDA. You should understand by yourself that the "surface" role is played by the first person experience. This is due to the fact that the experience are UD-delay invariant, and is a limiting sum on the infinite works of an infinite collection of universal numbers. Dear Bruno, My worry is that you seem to assume the equivalent of an absolute observer that acts to distinguish the content of the first person experience (1p) from each other, as simply an inherent difference between "universal numbers". Given that one number can be used to code for other numbers, ala Godel numbering schemes, how is it that universal numbers can be said to have any thing unique that would identify them in a non-trivial way? How do we get the numbers to appear separated from each other? This comes from elementary arithmetic, although I am not sure why you are using of the word "appear" instead of "are". "Are"? To who are they different? Your idea here seems to depend on a pre-established harmony like situation. -- Onward! Stephen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: Dennett and others on qualia
Hi Bruno Marchal Yes, my error, quanta are in spacetime too. I'm still adjusting to some of these concepts. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/28/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-27, 09:01:08 Subject: Re: Dennett and others on qualia On 26 Oct 2012, at 13:51, Roger Clough wrote: > Hi meekerdb > > Quanta do exist, and can be measured, > but by definition they can only be experienced as qualia, > (another word for experience) which can't be measured. > > Quanta are within spacetime, qualia are beyond spacetime. Not with comp (in the precise form "yes doctor" + Church Thesis). In that case quanta are also beyond space-time, like the numbers. Bruno > > > Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net > 10/26/2012 > "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen > > > - Receiving the following content - > From: meekerdb > Receiver: everything-list > Time: 2012-10-25, 12:57:11 > Subject: Re: Dennett and others on qualia > > > Good points. The contrast is usually qualia-v-quanta. I think color > can be communicated > and we have an "RGB" language for doing so that makes it more quanta > than qualia. So > extending your point to Schrodinger, if you're a wine connoisseur > you have a language for > communicating the taste of wine. Most of us don't speak it, but most > people don't speak > differential equations either. But those are all things that can be > shared. The pain of > a headache generally can't be perceived by two different people. But > there are > experiments that use small electric shocks to try to produce > objective scales of pain. So > I think you are right that it is a matter of having developed the > language; I just don't > think color is the best example. > > Brent > > On 10/25/2012 6:11 AM, Alberto G. Corona wrote: >> I agree. >> >> is there something that can be perceived that is not qualia? It? >> less qualia the shape and location of a circle in ha sheet of paper >> than its color?.The fact that the position and radius of the circle >> can be measured and communicated does not change the fact that they >> produce a subjective perception. so they are also qualia. Then the >> question becomes why some qualia are communicable (phenomena) and >> others do not? It may be because shape and position involve a more >> basic form of processing and the color processing is more >> complicated? >> O is because shape and position processing evolved to be communicable >> quantitatively between humans, while color had no evolutionary >> pressure to be a quantitative and communicable ? >> >> If everithig perceived is qualia, then the question is the opposite. >> Instead of ?hat is qualia under a materialist stance?, the question >> is why some qualia are measurable and comunicable in a mentalist >> stance, where every perception is in the mind, including the >> perception that I have a head with a brain? >> >> 2012/10/25 Roger Clough: >>> Dennett and others on qualia >>> >>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Qualia#Daniel_Dennett >>> >>> 1) Schroedinger on qualia. >>> >>> "Examples of qualia are the pain of a headache, the taste of wine, >>> the experience of taking a recreational drug, >>> or the perceived redness of an evening sky. Daniel Dennett writes >>> that qualia is "an unfamiliar term for >>> something that could not be more familiar to each of us: the ways >>> things seem to us."[1] Erwin Schr?inger, >>> the famous physicist, had this counter-materialist take: "The >>> sensation of colour cannot be accounted for by >>> the physicist's objective picture of light-waves. Could the >>> physiologist account for it, if he had fuller >>> knowledge than he has of the processes in >>> the retina and the nervous processes set up by them in the optical >>> nerve bundles and in the brain? I do not think so." [2] >>> >>> The importance of qualia in philosophy of mind comes largely from >>> the fact that they are seen as posing a >>> fundamental problem for materialist explanations of the mind-body >>> problem. Much of the debate over their >>> importance hinges on the definition of the term that is used, >>> as various philosophers emphasize or deny the existence of certain >>> features of qualia. As such, >>> the nature and existence of qualia are controversial. >>> >>> >>> 2) Dennett on qualia >>> >>> "In Consciousness Explained (1991) and "Quining Qualia" (1988), >>> [19] Daniel Dennett offers an argument against qualia that >>> attempts to >>> show that the above definition breaks down when one tries to make >>> a practical application of it. In a series of thought experiments, >>> which he calls "intuition pumps," he brings qualia into the world >>> of neurosurgery, clinical psychology, and psychologic
Hurricane
Hi everything-list If things go as expected, meaning that the power goes off, I may be offline for a couple of days. Washington DC is just about to be hit by a hurricane. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/28/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Re: Re: A mirror of the universe.
Hi Bruno Marchal I still haven't sorted the issue of numbers out. I suppose I ought to do some research in my Leibniz books. Aside from that, monads have to be attached to corporeal bodies, and numbers aren't like that. I find the following unsatisfactory, but since numbers are like ideas, they can be in the minds of individual homunculi in individual monads, but that doesn't sound satisfactoriy to me. Not universakl enough. My best guess for now is that the supreme monad (the One) undoubtedly somehow possesses the numbers. Hurricane coming. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/28/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-27, 09:31:59 Subject: Re: A mirror of the universe. On 26 Oct 2012, at 14:44, Roger Clough wrote: >> > Dear Bruno and Alberto, > > I agree some what with both of you. As to the idea of a "genetic > algorithm can isolate anticipative programs", I think that > anticipation > is the analogue of inertia for computations, as Mach saw inertia. It > is > a relation between any one and the class of computations that it > belongs > to such that any incomplete string has a completion in the collections > of others like it. This is like an error correction or compression > mechanism. > > -- > Onward! > > Stephen > > ROGER: For what it's worth--- like Mach's inertia, each monad > mirrors the rest of the universe. In arithmetic, each universal numbers mirrors all other universal numbers. The tiny Turing universal part of arithmetical truth is already a dynamical Indra Net. Your monad really looks like the (universal) intensional numbers. Bruno > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
Numbers in Leibniz
Hi Bruno Still waiting for the storm to shut things down. Numbers are not discussed specifically as far as I can find yet, in my books on Leibniz. Which probably means that they are simply numbers, with no ontological status. Sort of like space or time. Inextended and everywhere. Numbers are definitely not monads, because no corporeal body is attached. Although they can whenever thought of appear in the minds of particular men in the intellects of their monads. Leibniz does refer to a proposed "universal" language, which is simply everywhere as well as possibly in each head. Numbers would no doubt be the same, both everywhere and in individual minds at times. So numbers are universal and can be treated mathematically as always. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/29/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Roger Clough Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-28, 18:31:25 Subject: Re: Re: A mirror of the universe. Hi Bruno Marchal I still haven't sorted the issue of numbers out. I suppose I ought to do some research in my Leibniz books. Aside from that, monads have to be attached to corporeal bodies, and numbers aren't like that. I find the following unsatisfactory, but since numbers are like ideas, they can be in the minds of individual homunculi in individual monads, but that doesn't sound satisfactoriy to me. Not universakl enough. My best guess for now is that the supreme monad (the One) undoubtedly somehow possesses the numbers. Hurricane coming. Roger Clough, rclo...@verizon.net 10/28/2012 "Forever is a long time, especially near the end." -Woody Allen - Receiving the following content - From: Bruno Marchal Receiver: everything-list Time: 2012-10-27, 09:31:59 Subject: Re: A mirror of the universe. On 26 Oct 2012, at 14:44, Roger Clough wrote: >> > Dear Bruno and Alberto, > > I agree some what with both of you. As to the idea of a "genetic > algorithm can isolate anticipative programs", I think that > anticipation > is the analogue of inertia for computations, as Mach saw inertia. It > is > a relation between any one and the class of computations that it > belongs > to such that any incomplete string has a completion in the collections > of others like it. This is like an error correction or compression > mechanism. > > -- > Onward! > > Stephen > > ROGER: For what it's worth--- like Mach's inertia, each monad > mirrors the rest of the universe. In arithmetic, each universal numbers mirrors all other universal numbers. The tiny Turing universal part of arithmetical truth is already a dynamical Indra Net. Your monad really looks like the (universal) intensional numbers. Bruno > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google > Groups "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en > . > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en.
