date:20130921

On 9/20/2013 8:49 PM, Chris de Morsella wrote:

>>The way to completely avoid Landauer's limit is to make all operations reversible, never
lose any information so that the whole calculation could be reversed. Then there's no
entropy dumped to the environment and Landauer's limit doesn't apply.

Intriguing thought, but hard to see how it could be done. Not sure I understand what you
mean by a reversible operation and how would a fully reversible universe square with
causality

It squares just fine. Newtonian physics modeled the universe as a perfect clockwork that
could run either way. Which was cause and which was effect was just a convention: effect
is later than cause. Feynman already wrote about making quantum computers reversible 30yrs
ago:

http://www.cs.princeton.edu/courses/archive/fall05/frs119/papers/feynman85_optics_letters.pdf

Brent

... unless of course causality is a side effect of some other deeper process that we
experience as the irreversible vector of time. But at least within the universe we
experience, some processes are not reversible. In order to unwind a transaction a log is
required and a log requires the recording of information, which requires space. When the
log runs out of room then what happens? Without erasure memory will run out.

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Re: When will Popperian come back.Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-09-21 Thread Alberto G. Corona

The most interesting and less known work of Popper is the foundation of
evolutionary epistemology

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-evolutionary/

which is much more ambitious that falsacionism and mere demarcation and is
far far more interesting.


2013/9/20 Bruno Marchal 

> Hi Chris,
>
>
> On 20 Sep 2013, at 02:45, chris peck wrote:
>
>
>
>
> Hi John
>
> *>>It doesn't take a genius to realize that if a idea isn't getting
> anywhere, that is to say if it doesn't produce new interesting ideas, your
> time would be better spent doing something else. *
>
> Whats with this idea that the only good ideas are ones it would take a
> genius to realize? The best ideas are ones kids can understand. Your idol
> Feynmann would have put you over his lap and spanked you for saying that.
> Few people had greater contempt for 'ideas' only 'geniuses' could
> understand.
>
> Anyway, its at the core of Popper's view that theories should aim to be
> productive in making falsifiable predictions and you are only regurgitating
> that view because rightly or wrongly, via Popper, it has seeped into our
> culture's conception of what good science is. 150 years ago, you wouldn't
> have really cared. You would have been happy had scientists worked purely
> inductively. Most likely you'ld have swallowed psychoanalysis hook line and
> sinker without even considering whether it could be falsified.
>
>
>
> OK. I think (like Clark) that all good scientists are Popperian (or
> locally so) since Pythagorus and much before.
> Then Popper made the discovery that this is the case, normally, in those
> domain qualified as scientific. As such I think (unlike Clark) that Popper
> put his finger on something important.
>
> Alas, "Popperianity" has not been allowed in the human science, in *some*
> type of philosophy, and in theology, since some times.
>
> Neoplatonist theologians were more Popperian than most theologians' today,
> with many exception of course like Trouillard, Valadier and Torrance, and
> even Alan Watts, I think.
>
> Then, a friend just sent me a paper showing that machines just have
> succeeded in verifying Gödel's proof of the existence of God.
>
> http://arxiv.org/abs/1308.4526
>
> Too bad I don't believe in the S5 modal logic, nor do I think  that
> St-Anselm definition of God is the best one. But who knows?
>
> So you see Popperian theology is *more and more* coming back, after all.
>
> It is indisputably valid mathematical theology. This does not mean
> interesting, of course.
>
> It is probably a difficult question to see if such a notion of God is
> compatible or related with the "natural" platonic Gods of the universal
> machine (Arithmetical Truth, Truth).
>
> Note also that Truth, by definition cannot be Popperian: it is not
> falsifiable, of course. That's a common point with consciousness
> "here-and-now", which is not falsifiable nor doubtable, yet true (except
> for the zombies of course). OK?
>
> That's why a scientist will never assert that his statement are truthful,
> he will always remind the assumptions used to link the measurement results.
>
> Note also that many scientists lose Popperianity at the pose café.
>
> I find Popperianity as a very important principle of science, yet I do
> think it is false in many other important case. I can doubt all theories,
> but not all experiences (or I lie to myself).
>
> Bruno
>
>
>  http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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Re: Implicate order

2013-09-21 Thread Russell Standish

On Fri, Sep 20, 2013 at 05:08:00PM -0700, meekerdb wrote:
> On 9/20/2013 3:50 PM, LizR wrote:
> >It's a long time since I read "Wholeness" but I seem to recall
> >coming to the conclusion that Bohm's version was like the MWI with
> >one world singled out (somehow) to be "real".
> >
> >Or am I getting mixed up? Was it him who had the idea of "pilot waves" ?
> 
> DeBroglie originated the idea, but Bohm developed it.  There's a
> pilot wave of the universe that provides guiding 'channels' for
> particles.
> 
> Brent
> 

>From what I took away from Science, Order and Creativity, this pilot
wave idea he calls a quantum potential, which take the form of a
nonlocal force field acting on the particles. This quantum potential
is also what he calls the "implicate order", contrasting the the
"explicate order" of the particles. I get the impression from the late
Bohm writing that the implicate order is more fundamental than the
explicate order.

Also, an MWIer would say that the implicate order is the Hilbert space
in which Schrodinger's equation evolves - the explicate order is the
Multiverse, the parallel universes of particles as seen by the
observers after decoherence has taken place.

Cheers

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Re: When will Popperian come back.Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-09-21 Thread LizR

On 21 September 2013 12:15, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 9/20/2013 3:53 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 21 September 2013 05:48, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  On 9/20/2013 9:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>> Note also that Truth, by definition cannot be Popperian: it is not
>> falsifiable, of course. That's a common point with consciousness
>> "here-and-now", which is not falsifiable nor doubtable, yet true (except
>> for the zombies of course). OK?
>>
>>
>>  I think that is too quick.  First, what Popper meant by falsifiable was
>> that there be a test of a theory which we can conceive as having an outcome
>> contrary to its prediction.  Of course he knew that if the theory were
>> correct the outcome couldn't falisify it.  The point was that we could
>> only learn something if we didn't already know the answer.
>>
>> Second, that there is a conscious thought may be indubitable WHILE the
>> thought, "There is a conscious thought." is present.  But it doesn't follow
>> that the content of a conscious thought is indubitable.  The content might
>> be, "There is a flying pink elephant in my room."  which is both dubitable
>> and almost certainly false.  And if the thought is, "I had a conscious
>> thought." that too is dubitable.
>>
>>  The contents of consciousness are doubtable, of course, there might be
> a malicious demon or the Matrix or my addled senses or fallible memory
> involved. What isn't doubtable is the fact that I am conscious of them - at
> the time that I am conscious of them
>
>
> Right.  The only indubitable thought you can have is, "There's a
> thought".  You can't doubt any other thought, like, "I see red.", because
> doubting is a thought and you can't think two different conscious thoughts
> at the same time.  You can't think "I see red." AND "There is doubt this a
> thought." at the same time.  You can have the thought, "There is doubt that
> this is a thought.", and your thought would be false.
>

Yes, sorry, I expressed that a little colloquially. I wasn't intending to
assume the existence of an "I" - merely of consciousness. I think (!) one
could be wrong about having a thought (maybe someone else had the thought
and it only appears to be "mine" - or maybe there is only one cosmic
consciousness time-sharing between brains, etc) - but one (or whatever)
couldn't be wrong about being conscious of the thought at the time at which
one (or whatever) was conscious of the thought.

  - at least I can't see how that can be doubted. (This is hardly original
of course - Decartes reached the same conclusion about 500 years ago).

 Descarte assumed that there was an "I" having the thought and assumed it
> proved the existence of "I".
>

Yes, sure, I wasn't saying I accept everything Descartes said (stuff about
the pineal gland, I seem to recall, is probably dubious).

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Re: Scientists claim discovery of life coming to Earth from space

2013-09-21 Thread Telmo Menezes

Unfortunately this appears to be bs:
http://science.slashdot.org/story/13/09/20/136220/alien-life-story-of-dubious-provenance-goes-viral

(but what do I know!)

Best,
Telmo.


On Fri, Sep 20, 2013 at 11:53 PM, Chris de Morsella
 wrote:
> Seems like the Pangea hypothesis might have gotten some evidence... wouldn't
> say this is conclusive though, but it is intriguing.
> -Chris
>
> Scientists claim discovery of life coming to Earth from space
> Scientists from the University of Sheffield believe they have found life
> arriving to Earth from space after sending a balloon to the stratosphere.’
> After it landed, scientists discovered that they had captured a diatom
> fragment and some unusual biological entities from the stratosphere, all of
> which are too large to have come from Earth.
> Other scientists disagree, as noted here: New Alien Life Claim Far from
> Convincing, Scientists Say
> The team, led by Professor (Hon. Cardiff and Buckingham Universities) Milton
> Wainwright, from the University’s Department of Molecular Biology and
> Biotechnology found small organisms that could have come from space after
> sending a specially designed balloon to 27km into the stratosphere during
> the recent Perseid meteor shower.
> Professor Wainwright said: “Most people will assume that these biological
> particles must have just drifted up to the stratosphere from Earth, but it
> is generally accepted that a particle of the size found cannot be lifted
> from Earth to heights of, for example, 27km. The only known exception is by
> a violent volcanic eruption, none of which occurred within three years of
> the sampling trip.
> “In the absence of a mechanism by which large particles like these can be
> transported to the stratosphere we can only conclude that the biological
> entities originated from space. Our conclusion then is that life is
> continually arriving to Earth from space, life is not restricted to this
> planet and it almost certainly did not originate here.”
> Professor Wainwright said the results could be revolutionary: “If life does
> continue to arrive from space then we have to completely change our view of
> biology and evolution,” he added. “New textbooks will have to be written!”
> Professor Wainwright said stringent precautions had been taken against the
> possibility of contamination during sampling and processing, and said the
> group was confident that the biological organisms could only have come from
> the stratosphere.
> The group’s findings have been published in the Journal of Cosmology (open
> access) and updated versions will appear in the same journal, a new version
> of which will be published in the near future. Professor Chandra
> Wickramasinghe of the Buckingham, University Center for Astrobiology (of
> which Professor Wainwright is an Honorary Fellow) also gave a presentation
> of the group’s findings at a meeting of astronomers and astrobiologists in
> San Diego last month.
> Professor Wainwright added: “Of course it will be argued that there must be
> an, as yet, unknown mechanism for transferring large particles from Earth to
> the high stratosphere, but we stand by our conclusions. The absolutely
> crucial experiment will come when we do what is called ‘isotope
> fractionation’. We will take some of the samples which we have isolated from
> the stratosphere and introduce them into a complex machine – a button will
> be pressed. If the ratio of certain isotopes gives one number then our
> organisms are from Earth, if it gives another, then they are from space. The
> tension will obviously be almost impossible to live with!”
> The research was conducted by Professor (Hon. Cardiff and Buckingham
> Universities) Milton Wainwright from the University of Sheffield, Chris Rose
> and Alex Baker from the University of Sheffield’s Leonardo Centre for
> Tribology and Professor Chandra Wickramasinghe Director of the Centre for
> Astrobiology, University of Buckingham.
> http://www.kurzweilai.net/scientists-claim-discovery-of-life-coming-to-earth-from-space?utm_source=KurzweilAI+Daily+Newsletter&utm_campaign=60630eb1c2-UA-946742-1&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6de721fb33-60630eb1c2-281942553
>
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Re: Unexpected Hanging

2013-09-21 Thread Telmo Menezes

On Fri, Sep 20, 2013 at 6:36 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
> On 9/20/2013 2:13 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>
>> On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 9:04 PM, meekerdb  wrote:
>>>
>>> Also some serious mathematicians are finitists.
>>>
>>> The Meaning of Pure Mathematics
>>> Author(s): Jan MycielskiSource: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 18,
>>> No.
>>> 3 (Aug., 1989), pp. 315-320Published by: SpringerStable URL:
>>> http://www.jstor.org/stable/30227216 .
>>>
>>>
>>> Come on!  He believes that Platonism violates Occam. That is the same
>>> error
>>> than believing that Everett violates Occam. Sometimes more is
>>> considerably
>>> simpler than less, and that's the very inspiration of the "everything"
>>> list.
>>>
>>>
>>> Just because I subscribe to the list doesn't oblige me accept its dogma.
>>> I
>>> think  Mycielski remark is irrelevant.  Occam is no more than a rough
>>> guide
>>> anyway.
>>
>> Hi Brent,
>>
>> Arguably, Occam might gain the status of theory once we accept
>> self-sampling. Of course you're not forced to accept it -- I'm
>> agnostic on it myself. But it's not beyond the pale that Occam could
>> actually be theory. No?
>
>
> To be a theory there would have to be a clear meaning of what of is not to
> be multiplied beyond necessity.
> Occam said 'entities', but by that measure
> the atomic theory of matter is very much contrary to his principle.

Yes, if you consider two hydrogen atoms to be distinct entities. But
physics never does that. Hydrogen atoms are fungible in all of
physics. But I agree with your point, it's not clear.

>  It's
> now usually interpreted to mean a simple theory is best, without really
> specifying how 'simple' is to be measured.

I've been doing this work where I use evolutionary computation to
automatically generate theories that explain network growth. Theories
are mathematical expressions represented as Lisp-style computer
programs. I also automatically apply Occam by preferring the
explanations that can be expressed in the shortest possible program.
Maybe this sort of approach could be extended?

> The are proposals based on
> information theory and minimum message length, but even there it's not clear
> how to compare the measure of say general relativity and loop quantum
> gravity and string theory.

Good point.

Telmo

>
> Brent
>
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Re: Unexpected Hanging

2013-09-21 Thread Telmo Menezes

On Fri, Sep 20, 2013 at 3:58 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> On 19 Sep 2013, at 16:51, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 4:31 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 18 Sep 2013, at 21:45, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>
 On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 6:13 PM, Bruno Marchal 
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On 18 Sep 2013, at 11:43, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> 
>>
>>
>> But maybe it doesn't. At least some week form of solipsism, where
>> there is in fact only me, but the notion of "I" is extended. No?
>
>
>
>
> I would say that there are as many notion of "I", that there are
> intensional
> nuances.
>
> The most basic is the 3-I, like when the machine says I have two arms,
> (Bp),
> then there is the 1-I, when the machine says that she has two arms, and
> it
> is the case that she has two arms (Bp & p), then there is the observer
> I,
> when the machine says that she has two arms, and it is possible, not
> contradictory, for that machine that she has two arms, or equivalently
> that
> 0=0 is not a contradiction, Bp & Dp,



> equivalent with Bp & Dt. Then the
> "feeler" whioch combines both Dt and "& p".



 Bruno, I don't understand these last two lines. What's Dt? What's a
 feeler?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> A feeler is someone who feels. My automated spelling verifier does not
>>> complain, but perhaps he get tired with me :)
>>
>>
>> Ok. No, it's right. I just thought there was something more to it.
>
>
> Nice!
>
>
>
>
>>
>>> D is for diamond. Dp, in modal logic, often written <>p is an
>>> abbreviation
>>> of ~B~p.
>>
>>
>> I know, I meant Dt vs. Dp. Was it a typo? Otherwise what's Dt as opposed
>> to Dp?
>
>
> OK, sorry. "t" is for the logical constant true. In arithmetic you can
> interpret it by "1=1". I use for  the logical constant false.
>
> As the modal logic G has a Kripke semantics (it is a so-called normal modal
> logic), The intensional nuance Bp & Dp is equivalent with Bp & Dt. "Dt" will
> just means that there is an accessible world, and by Bp, p will be true in
> that world.

Ok, thanks.
If there is one or more accessible worlds, why not say []t? (I'm using
[] for the necessity operator)
Is there any conceivable world where D~t? If so, can't we say ~D~t and thus []t?
Isn't the only situation where ~Dt the one where this is no world?

>
>
>
>>
>>> For example (possible p) is the same as (not necessarily not p). Like "it
>>> exists x such that p(x)" is the same as not for all x do e have not p(x).
>>>
>>> Bp & Dp, really means that p is true in all worlds (that I can access)
>>> and
>>> Dp really means that there is such a world (if not, classically Bp can be
>>> vacuously true). Normally there will be some explanations of modal logic
>>> (on
>>> FOAR). Older explanations on this list exists also, may be by searching
>>> on
>>> "modal" (hmm... you will probably get too many posts ...).
>>
>>
>> I've been slowly going through Chellas.
>
>
> It is a very good book. Boolos 1979 (and 1993) sum up very well Modal Logic
> too.
>
>>
>> Thanks!
>
>
> Welcome!
>
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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Re: Unexpected Hanging



On 20 Sep 2013, at 18:36, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/20/2013 2:13 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 9:04 PM, meekerdb   
wrote:

Also some serious mathematicians are finitists.

The Meaning of Pure Mathematics
Author(s): Jan MycielskiSource: Journal of Philosophical Logic,  
Vol. 18, No.

3 (Aug., 1989), pp. 315-320Published by: SpringerStable URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/30227216 .


Come on!  He believes that Platonism violates Occam. That is the  
same error
than believing that Everett violates Occam. Sometimes more is  
considerably
simpler than less, and that's the very inspiration of the  
"everything" list.



Just because I subscribe to the list doesn't oblige me accept its  
dogma.  I
think  Mycielski remark is irrelevant.  Occam is no more than a  
rough guide

anyway.

Hi Brent,

Arguably, Occam might gain the status of theory once we accept
self-sampling. Of course you're not forced to accept it -- I'm
agnostic on it myself. But it's not beyond the pale that Occam could
actually be theory. No?


To be a theory there would have to be a clear meaning of what of is  
not to be multiplied beyond necessity.  Occam said 'entities', but  
by that measure the atomic theory of matter is very much contrary to  
his principle.  It's now usually interpreted to mean a simple theory  
is best, without really specifying how 'simple' is to be measured.  
The are proposals based on information theory and minimum message  
length, but even there it's not clear how to compare the measure of  
say general relativity and loop quantum gravity and string theory.



Just formalize them in first order logic, or in a first order logical  
theory and count the number of bits used.


Bruno







Brent

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: How PIP solves the hard problem of consciousness



On 20 Sep 2013, at 19:06, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/20/2013 7:39 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

But monkey's fetus seems able to dream of trees before seeing them


Do you have a citation for that?


Hmm... Good question.

The answer is probably yes, hopefully not in a book in a furniture  
warehouse, where I put 4/5 of my books ...


I hope I have not having dreamed that, as I found no references  
online, but then when you type "dream" and any other words, you find  
mainly interpretations of the occurrence in dream of what the other  
words designate.


Need more time for this, sorry,

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

On 20 Sep 2013, at 19:08, meekerdb wrote:

On 9/20/2013 7:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Sep 2013, at 19:31, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 10:18 AM, Bruno Marchal  
 wrote:

>> A computation is a process.

> I can agree with this, unless you meant a "physical process", OK.

As Rolf Landauer said "Computation is physical",

Yes, Landauer is a major proponents of that idea. If that is true,  
then computationalism is false.

I don't see that.  I think it just requires a broader meaning of  
"physical" (which isn't well defined anyway).

You have to broaden "physical" so that 0 and his successors are  
physical object. But then the term "physical" has no more meaning at  
all, imo.

Bruno

Brent

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Re: When will Popperian come back.Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?



On 20 Sep 2013, at 19:48, meekerdb wrote:


On 9/20/2013 9:53 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Note also that Truth, by definition cannot be Popperian: it is not  
falsifiable, of course. That's a common point with consciousness  
"here-and-now", which is not falsifiable nor doubtable, yet true  
(except for the zombies of course). OK?


I think that is too quick.  First, what Popper meant by falsifiable  
was that there be a test of a theory which we can conceive as having  
an outcome contrary to its prediction.  Of course he knew that if  
the theory were correct the outcome couldn't falisify it.  The point  
was that we could only learn something if we didn't already know the  
answer.


Of course Popper talk about human presentable or axiomatizable  
theories, and truth (even just arithmetical truth) is not such a thing.






Second, that there is a conscious thought may be indubitable WHILE  
the thought, "There is a conscious thought." is present.


OK. That is what I meant.


But it doesn't follow that the content of a conscious thought is  
indubitable.


Sure, but in this case the content is the presence of a consciousness.


The content might be, "There is a flying pink elephant in my room."   
which is both dubitable and almost certainly false.  And if the  
thought is, "I had a conscious thought." that too is dubitable.


We agree on this. The indubitable thought is not "I was conscious",  
but "I am conscious".


Bruno


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Re: How PIP solves the hard problem of consciousness

On 20 Sep 2013, at 20:20, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Friday, September 20, 2013 10:39:09 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Sep 2013, at 18:47, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Thursday, September 19, 2013 10:55:15 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:

On 18 Sep 2013, at 22:11, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Wednesday, September 18, 2013 8:26:35 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
>
> 
>
> Beyond the ambiguities, comp put the physical universe in the gap,
> when the gap is modeled by the logic "*" minus the logic not-"*".
>
> Why just the physical universe though? Don't you think comp needs  
to

> put itself in the gap too?

Here I model the gap by the difference between true and provable,
versus true and not provable.

That's not the gap I'm talking about though (I didn't know that was  
even a gab that was being discussed anywhere, tbh.). The  
Explanatory Gap,

Yes, thats the one.

philosophically,

That means nothing for me.

I'm referring to the particular use of the term "Explanatory Gap" in  
philosophy of mind literature.

Yes, me too.

is about what is experienced directly and what is experienced as  
present independently of our direct experience.

You mean memories?

No, memories I consider direct experiences, since they require only  
that we are conscious. Indirect experiences would be experiences  
which we can only detect using our body's sense organs. Indirect  
experiences are 3p, thus they are bodies in space, direct  
experiences are 1p, so they can contain any combination of imagined  
forms, thoughts, feelings, etc.

That is not enough clear for me. I can't figure out what you mean by  
indirect experience. I guess you mean experience (1p) occurring when  
you think about a theory (like there is something on the other side of  
the moon). That kind of things can mix a lot first and first person  
plural aspects.
Keep also in mind that 'bodies in space' are first person plural  
notion, they are not 3p.

Direct experiences include those which seem true, experiences which  
seem provable, and experiences which seem unrelated to either proof  
or truth but are merely aesthetic, euphoric, qualitative, phenomena  
as sources of appreciation. Where does fiction fit into your gap?

In human imagination or delire, I guess. Not sure seeing any problem  
here.

But what makes imagination fictional in comp?

I don't see the problem here. The usual explanation should work in  
comp as far as it works in the mundane collective consciousness.  
Something is fictional if it is a construction of a mind, when not  
referring to an entity known (or believed) being there.

It amazes me at first that physics seems to appear only in the gap,
but then it is coherent with the idea that is is a first person  
plural
emergence, and that is confirmed by Everett QM. If we look at the  
same

particles we do get entangled and share the foregoing history. That's
why Everett saves computationalism from solipsism.

I don't know that we are looking at the right thing in QM. Instead  
of particles, or waves which physically exist, we should focus on  
what gives physics the ability to cohere as 'particles' or 'waves'  
in the first place - what would make laws of nature manifest as  
'forms', when they don't seem to do that in a pure computation  
(i.e. The Mandelbrot Set requires a graphic plot to visualize, it  
doesn't create graphics out of its arithmetic relation).

Yes it does. Graphic plots just make it easy, and pleasing, for  
humans to relate with them. The geometry is in the arithmetical  
relations.

Ah, see that's the problem. Why would humans be pleased by something  
different than what would please arithmetical relations? Why should  
any computation have a smell?

That's a difficult question, of course. I explain it through X* and  
X1*, but I cannot sum up it right now (but I have done that already,  
also).

But the point is for you: what is it in the smell that you find non  
computationally tractable. Smelling machines already exists. They  
might not have qualia, not because smell is not computable, but  
because they would not do the relevant self-reference as described by  
X*)

>
>
> I mean G* minus G, etc. In fact physics (should) appear in Z* minus
> Z, X* minus X.
>
> G* and G don't show up in a Google search. I've never really
> understood what you mean by that, but you're welcome to explain if
> you have time.

I have done this many times on this list,

I know, sorry about that. It hasn't sunk in yet for me.

OK. There are good books referred in the bibio of the book and  
papers, in my URL.

ok

but I will explain it again
on FOAR soon, or later. But I can say to words. G is the modal logic
of Gödel's beweisbar (provability by PM, or PA, I mean Principia
Mathematica, pr Peano Arithmetic, or any Löbian machine).
In fact G correspond to the provability proposition that the machine
can prove about herself, and G* corresponds t

Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

On 20 Sep 2013, at 21:00, John Clark wrote:

On Fri, Sep 20, 2013 at 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:

> As Rolf Landauer said "Computation is physical",

Yes, Landauer is a major proponents of that idea. If that is true,  
then computationalism is false.

Bullshit.

I gave you the reference, and you convince no one of any rational  
reason to stop at step 3 of the main reasoning, nor did you consider  
the mathematical theory.

So your "bulshit" seems  be a bit premature.

And the, what is the meaning of "computation is physical"? It looks to  
me that this consists in single out some universal system and declare  
that only running it makes things real. This implies ontologial  
commitment, reification of a level of description, etc. All those  
things which gives "philosophy" a bad reputation. That some scientists  
do that too does not makes such type of reasoning more correct or  
productive.

What does mean "physical"?. I don't take that notion for granted.

> With comp, a physical process is the result of the first person  
(plural) indeterminacy beaing on all computations.

So your great discovery is that you don't know what the end of a  
computation will be until you come to the end of the computation.

Some have said exactly this to Feynman for his sum over histories  
formulation of QM. It is the same problem, with similar conclusions,  
and both are testable and comparable.

Just that with comp we have more relative states, a priori. But the  
arithmetical quantization (I give the equations) shows that the  
problem is not trivial, and that comp is not yet refuted by physics.

You have study only 2/8 of part UDA, and 0/8 of AUDA, so you might try  
to be cautious in your judgment.

Bruno

  John K Clark

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Re: Unexpected Hanging

On 20 Sep 2013, at 21:18, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Friday, September 20, 2013 10:14:14 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 19 Sep 2013, at 17:48, Craig Weinberg wrote:

On Thursday, September 19, 2013 10:43:23 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal  
wrote:

On 18 Sep 2013, at 22:07, Craig Weinberg wrote:

>
>
> On Wednesday, September 18, 2013 9:14:21 AM UTC-4, Bruno Marchal
> wrote:
>
>>
>> Computers don't use symbols.
>
> ?
>
>
>> They use physics,
>
> ???
>
> You have been less Aristotelian in some other posts.
>
> If I build a computer out of gears, does it use physics? What
> symbols does it use?

it will use physics, and the program which run will use some symbols,
for example painted numbers like on the difference engine by Babbage.

The program can't see painted numbers though. How can it use them?

Well, actually those numbers are for a human debugger, as the  
program use only the gears, like a mechanical clock.

That's my point :)  Computers don't use symbols, symbols are for  
human debuggers.

yes, but only jokingly so.

But if it needs to use such symbols, he will use third person  
sensors, which are just some measuring apparatus.

Haha.. you have just reduced God to 'some measuring apparatus', and  
made the janitor king of the universe.

?

I didn't refer to God.

Why would a computer ever need to use sensors? It is quite happy to  
run in a loop for a thousand years. It is we, the human debuggers,  
who might want to attach devices to extend the machine's engagement  
with *our* human aesthetic world. The computer doesn't care about  
sense, because it's unconscious. It is perpetually under anesthetic.

What you say is correct, but only in a relative sense. We have  
discussed this already (with the simulation of the typhoon capable of  
making a  virtual person feeling wet).

Let us try not being in a loop ourselves!

Then he will not see, but the seeing will be made by the person (if  
there is one) enacted by that program.

That's an assumption that there is such a thing as computationally  
enacted person. If a program can function without such a person, or  
proto person, then why should it choose to enact one? Who is doing  
the enacting of a person if not a digital person?

The first person, which is not something entirely digital, as it is  
infinitely many computations, selected through consciousness.

I agree they are related, but the relation is person = fundamental  
experience, computer = derived non-experience.

Indeed.

So we agree that aesthetic personhood is more fundamental than  
computation,

I meant 'more fundamental than the physical computer'.

Then our personhood is more fundamental but only from our first person  
point of view, which arise from the (immaterial) computations, which  
arise from + and *.

yet you say that persons are enacted by programs? That's a  
contradiction, right?

False, see just above.

I'm open to it being the reverse,

I am afraid you are. That's the Aristotelian delusion (in case comp  
is true).

No, I mean I'm open to counter-arguments...I'm not saying that  
nobody can disagree with me.

So there is hope.

Why would non-human people be different?

OK, you are right. I wrote to quickly. If comp is correct the  
physics is the same for all conscious entities. (But salvia keeps  
contradicting me on this issue and I don't know what to think about  
that!).

Heheh. I liked Nitrous Oxide, myself. Never tried saliva. It looks  
kind of sloppy from the videos.

Salvia can provide a curious hallucination, which, even as an  
hallucination, seems to be an impossible thing to experience or  
remember. It is close to a total mystery for me.

It is interesting to realize how much altered a consciousness state  
can be.

But unlike most drugs, it is not euphoric. It is classified as  
dysphoric, and most people are very uneasy with that experience.

As I explained sometimes ago to Stephen King, non-well-foundness
appears naturally, in many places in computer science, and so is very
interesting, but it does not need to be postulated.
Your posts on your blog are not really intelligible to me. Sorry.

Postulating it is really only a disclaimer - that what this refers  
to is intentionally using a set which includes itself. The real  
substance of what I'm postulating is in the nested relation, where  
all x is not only simply x, but also it is a continuum of becoming  
x by its negative universality.

You should try to explain this like I was a nine years old.

Ok, let's say that the universe is only the visible spectrum. If we  
wanted a really Absolutely complete definition of one color in the  
spectrum - let's say blue, then we would want to reflect the fact  
that blueness includes all of its potential relations with all of  
the colors that are not blue. Blue and red have a certain relation.  
Blue plays a certain role in blue, red, and green, etc.

That set of {all color relations betwe

Re: Implicate order



On 20 Sep 2013, at 22:06, meekerdb wrote:

A book that presents Bohm's QM sympathetically is "Quantum  
Mechanics" by James T. Cushing.




Note that the book by David Albert,  "Quantum Mechanics", which  
introduces very well QM, including Everett, is also quite sympathetic  
with Bohm's theory. He consecrates a large and final part, and develop  
some interesting idea. But he does not convince me.


Bruno




Brent

On 9/20/2013 1:00 PM, John Mikes wrote:

Dear Russell,
the Peat book seems to be on the physicist's side, just as the  
Hiley-book (posthumus D.Bohm co-authored) which even pictures DB  
close to his 1952 image when his idea started to eliminate the  
differences of QM and Relativity...

I have a - sort of - high level science-reportage:  by Reneé Weber:
"Dialogues with Scientists and Sages" (Arkana, 1986) with a  
reasonable chapter with Bohm - also his references towards  
Krishnamurti and others.
I cannot activate my old computer's stuff on a discussion list  
stuff called:
'Friends of David Bohm' (early 90s)  with lots of details of his  
stuff.


My idea was the connection to Bishop Nicolaus de Cusa's 3 part  
world (implicare, explicare, complicare - where I figured the 3rd  
one as math)
base for his protegé: Copernicus, saving the latter from the  
Inquisition -

the way I deduced it from "Wholeness...", a tortuous 2 decade path.
I think the 'Explicate Order' is our physical-world figment, while  
from the 'Implicate' I erased the 'Order' in my mind: no knowledge  
about that part so to speak. An 'order' would be exaggerated.


After changing into a (similarly heretic?) Rosenite, the Bohm  
details faded.

My agnostic views give me the peace of mind in an extended "I dunno".
I have a vague idea how to figure the infinity of the complexity  
(the one(?)  beyond our conventional science 'model' of the world)  
- but only in terms of our knowable items - no hint how the 'beyond  
model' may be structured (if at all) and of what kind elements.


John M




On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 2:41 AM, Russell Standish > wrote:

I've just been reading a book that I procured at a school fete called
"Science, Order and Creativity", by David Bohm and David Peat.

I had read "Wholeness and the implicate order" in my youth, which on
the whole was confusing and unsatisfying. In many ways, this book is
too. Yet, I can't quite shake the feeling when reading that there  
must

be some connection between Bohm's implicate order and Hofstaedter's
strange loops, and so that he might be onto something important for  
an

understanding of creativity and consciousness. But his books leave me
unsatisfied and hungry. For one thing, there is too little contact
with the mathematics of QM.

Does anyone know of a good introduction to Bohm's ideas? It's clear  
I'm

not going to get it from Bohm himself.

Cheers

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Principal, High Performance Coders
Visiting Professor of Mathematics  hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
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Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

2013-09-21 Thread John Clark

On Sat, Sep 21, 2013  Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>  And the, what is the meaning of "computation is physical"?
>

Which word didn't you understand?

> It looks to me that this consists in single out some universal system and
> declare that only running it makes things real.[...] What does mean
> "physical"?. I don't take that notion for granted.
>

I'll explain what "physical" means just as soon as you explain what "real"
means, and what "means" means.

>>  So your great discovery is that you don't know what the end of a
>> computation will be until you come to the end of the computation.
>
>
>
> Some have said exactly this to Feynman for his sum over histories
> formulation of QM. It is the same problem, with similar conclusions, and
> both are testable and comparable.
>

Feynman's theory said the magnetic moment for the electron should not be
exactly 1 as had been thought but 1.00115965246, what number does your
theory say it should be?

> You have study only 2/8 of part UDA,
>

True, I have only read the first 2 steps (or maybe it was 3, I forget) of
your Ulster Defense Association proof, but proofs are built on the
foundation of what comes before, so when one comes upon a ridiculous
blunder in step 2 (or maybe 3) it would be equally ridiculous to keep
reading. And in none of your writings do you factor in the IHA principle.

> and 0/8 of AUDA, so you might try to be cautious in your judgment.
>

I don't see how friend of Lawrence of Arabia, Auda ibu Tayi, is relevant to
our conversation.

  John K Clark

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RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

Brent I believe you are correct; cellphones regularly broadcast in order to
participate in the network. A steerable antenna could cut power usage by a
large factor - maybe even by an order of magnitude - but it would need to be
able to constantly reorient itself as it gets shifted around the x,y & z
axis' while for example being in a pocket while someone is walking. 

I think in this case software could help on a couple levels. 

Obviously a lower powered antenna would be a huge win - and would make the
patent owner very wealthy, but absent that.

It could be possible, by using algorithmic means to improve and sharpen the
quality of an unusably poor signal thereby enabling the use of a much lower
powered antenna. Another possibility is in how the mobile unit and the
network synch. The network could buffer attempts to contact the mobile unit
for a short duration (from the human perspective, but an eon of time from
the machine perspective) without it being excessively noticeable to the
users. The mobile device would thus limit its communication back to the cell
network to a shared configuration ping schedule. The network would know when
to expect a ping and if there was anything in the mobile devices in buffer
it would at that time make the connection.

The second option of course relies on a controlled degradation of the
service that is kept below the level where users begin to notice the delays;
by sharing a configured schedule both the cell network and the mobile device
would have advance knowledge of when the next synch point would be
(something on the order of every seven seconds) enabling both sides of the
networked handshake to optimize for that synchronization sequence point.

A third option is to ramp up the number of base stations by several orders
of magnitude and go to a much lower powered signal - the antenna would still
be the main power draw perhaps, but overall energy would be saved because
the transmission signal strength could be much lower (because cell base
stations would be much more numerous).

-Chris

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of meekerdb
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2013 11:47 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

 

Correct me if I'm wrong, but isn't it worse than that.  Doesn't the
smartphone (or cel phone) radiate even when you're not talking, so that the
system knows where you are if someone calls you?  The only improvement in
efficiency I could suggest is electronically steerable antennae to reduce
the required radiated power.

Brent

On 9/20/2013 8:08 PM, L.W. Sterritt wrote:

Chris, Brent and meekerdb,  

While we have been considering optimizing the efficiency of circuitry and
software, we neglected that while talking on the smartphone, 1/2 of the
total power budget goes to radiation from the smartphone antenna - about 2
Watts as I remember.  That will drain a typical smartphone battery in less
than 3 hours, and there is not a lot we can do about it, except use the
phone for all of it's other functions and don't talk too much!  

LWSterritt

 

 

On Sep 20, 2013, at 5:24 PM, meekerdb  wrote:





On 9/20/2013 4:40 PM, Chris de Morsella wrote:

Current software is very energy efficient -- and on so many levels. I worked
developing code used in the Windows Smartphone and it was during that time
that I had to first think hard about the energy efficiency dimension in
computing -- as measured by useful work done per unit of energy. The
engineering management in that group was constantly harping on the need to
produce energy efficient code. 

 

Programmers are deeply engrained with a lot of bad habits -- and not only in
terms of producing energy efficient software. For example most developers
will instinctively grab large chunks of resources -- in order to ensure that
their processes are not starved of resources in some kind of peak scenario.
While this may be good for the application -- when measured by itself -- it
is bad for the overall footprint of the application on the device  (bloat)
and for the energy requirements that that software will impose on the
hardware. Another example of a common bad practice poorly written
synchronization code (or synchronized containers).

 

These bad practices (anti-patterns in the jargon) can not only have a huge
impact on performance in peak usage scenarios, but also act to increase the
energy requirements for that software to run.

 

I think that -- with a lot of programming effort of course (which is why it
will never happen) that the current code base, and not only in the mobile
small device space, where it is clearly important, but in datacenter scale
applications and service (exposed) applications as well -- that the energy
efficiency of software has a huge headroom for improvement. But in order for
this to happen there has to first be a profound cultural change amongst
software developers who are being driven by speed

RE: Scientists claim discovery of life coming to Earth from space

Damn there goes pangea lol

I saw this yesterday on Kurzweil's blog and went back to the post to check
it and saw they had put out this UPDATE to the original, which I am pasting
below.
-Chris

UPDATE Sept. 21, 2013 1:00 EDT

In a blog post on KurzweilAI, theoretical biologist Dr. Richard Gordon
called these conclusions into question, noting that just one broken diatom
shell was found (not statistically impressive), no controlled experiment was
reported in a dusty environment, collection methods and lab conditions were
unspecified, and the study failed to provide data on the condition of the
balloon-borne equipment.

He also noted that there is literature on how hurricanes and storms move
diatoms through the atmosphere, and that there have been several mechanisms
suggested for the transfer of particles to the upper atmosphere. For
example, bacteria and other biological materials are common components of
cloud condensation nuclei.

Professor Wainwright said: "Most people will assume that these biological
particles must have just drifted up to the stratosphere from Earth, but it
is generally accepted that a particle of the size found cannot be lifted
from Earth to heights of, for example, 27km. The only known exception is by
a violent volcanic eruption, none of which occurred within three years of
the sampling trip.

"In the absence of a mechanism by which large particles like these can be
transported to the stratosphere we can only conclude that the biological
entities originated from space. Our conclusion then is that life is
continually arriving to Earth from space, life is not restricted to this
planet and it almost certainly did not originate here."

Professor Wainwright said the results could be revolutionary: "If life does
continue to arrive from space then we have to completely change our view of
biology and evolution," he added. "New textbooks will have to be written!"

Professor Wainwright said stringent precautions had been taken against the
possibility of contamination during sampling and processing, and said the
group was confident that the biological organisms could only have come from
the stratosphere.

The group's findings have been published in the Journal of Cosmology (open
access) and updated versions will appear in the same journal, a new version
of which will be published in the near future. Professor Chandra
Wickramasinghe of the Buckingham, University Center for Astrobiology (of
which Professor Wainwright is an Honorary Fellow) also gave a presentation
of the group's findings at a meeting of astronomers and astrobiologists in
San Diego last month.

Professor Wainwright added: "Of course it will be argued that there must be
an, as yet, unknown mechanism for transferring large particles from Earth to
the high stratosphere, but we stand by our conclusions. The absolutely
crucial experiment will come when we do what is called 'isotope
fractionation'. We will take some of the samples which we have isolated from
the stratosphere and introduce them into a complex machine - a button will
be pressed. If the ratio of certain isotopes gives one number then our
organisms are from Earth, if it gives another, then they are from space. The
tension will obviously be almost impossible to live with!"

The research was conducted by Professor (Hon. Cardiff and Buckingham
Universities) Milton Wainwright from the University of Sheffield, Chris Rose
and Alex Baker from the University of Sheffield's Leonardo Centre for
Tribology and Professor Chandra Wickramasinghe Director of the Centre for
Astrobiology, University of Buckingham.

-Original Message-
From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of Telmo Menezes
Sent: Saturday, September 21, 2013 5:47 AM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Scientists claim discovery of life coming to Earth from space

Unfortunately this appears to be bs:
http://science.slashdot.org/story/13/09/20/136220/alien-life-story-of-dubiou
s-provenance-goes-viral

(but what do I know!)

Best,
Telmo.

On Fri, Sep 20, 2013 at 11:53 PM, Chris de Morsella 
wrote:
> Seems like the Pangea hypothesis might have gotten some evidence... 
> wouldn't say this is conclusive though, but it is intriguing.
> -Chris
>
> Scientists claim discovery of life coming to Earth from space 
> Scientists from the University of Sheffield believe they have found 
> life arriving to Earth from space after sending a balloon to the
stratosphere.'
> After it landed, scientists discovered that they had captured a diatom 
> fragment and some unusual biological entities from the stratosphere, 
> all of which are too large to have come from Earth.
> Other scientists disagree, as noted here: New Alien Life Claim Far 
> from Convincing, Scientists Say The team, led by Professor (Hon. 
> Cardiff and Buckingham Universities) Milton Wainwright, from the 
> University's Department of Molecular Biology and Biotechnology found 
> small organisms that could h

Re: Implicate order



On 21 Sep 2013, at 00:50, LizR wrote:

It's a long time since I read "Wholeness" but I seem to recall  
coming to the conclusion that Bohm's version was like the MWI with  
one world singled out (somehow) to be "real".


Or am I getting mixed up? Was it him who had the idea of "pilot  
waves" ?


It was De Broglie, if I remember well.

Yet, de Broglie made clear that the piloting mechanism was local. Not  
sure he would have followed Bohm, who after Bell-Aspect, accepts a non  
local hidden variable theory, with a potential guiding the particle in  
a field described by the wave.


Note that the potential which guides a universe in a universal wave  
does emulate the entire multiverse. We still have alternate  
doppelgangers, but they are not made of particles, despite they  
participate to the same conversation, about waves consciousness and  
particles.


They are not made of particles, and I guess Bohm would agree (for his  
theory making sense) that they are not conscious. But with comp there  
are conscious, in the sense "as conscious as us". Bohm leads to  
explosion of the number of zombies with bodies lacking particles!


Bohm's theory, like Copenhagen formulation,  postulates the universal  
wave (the QM multiverse) + a selection principle.


Everett's theory postulates the universal wave , but the selection is  
consciousness classical indeterminacy.

(This explains the illusion of the collapse)

Comp postulates + and *; and proves from that the existence of a multi- 
dream, then like in Everett, selection is consciousness classical  
indeterminacy.


(This explains (or must explain, by UDA) the illusion of the collapse  
*and* of the wave, i.e. the "non illusion" of matter, i.e. the  
arithmetical necessary probable perception of the wave in the mind of  
the average universal number.


Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Unexpected Hanging



On 21 Sep 2013, at 15:10, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Fri, Sep 20, 2013 at 3:58 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 19 Sep 2013, at 16:51, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 4:31 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:



On 18 Sep 2013, at 21:45, Telmo Menezes wrote:


On Wed, Sep 18, 2013 at 6:13 PM, Bruno Marchal 
wrote:




On 18 Sep 2013, at 11:43, Telmo Menezes wrote:






I know, I meant Dt vs. Dp. Was it a typo? Otherwise what's Dt as  
opposed

to Dp?



OK, sorry. "t" is for the logical constant true. In arithmetic you  
can

interpret it by "1=1". I use for  the logical constant false.

As the modal logic G has a Kripke semantics (it is a so-called  
normal modal
logic), The intensional nuance Bp & Dp is equivalent with Bp & Dt.  
"Dt" will
just means that there is an accessible world, and by Bp, p will be  
true in

that world.


Ok, thanks.
If there is one or more accessible worlds, why not say []t? (I'm using
[] for the necessity operator)


[] p means that p is true in all accessible worlds. But this makes []p  
true, for all p, in the cul-de-sac worlds. We reason in classical  
logic. "If alpha is accessible then p is true in alpha" is trivially  
true, because for any alpha "alpha is accessible" is false, for a cul- 
de-sac world.


And incompleteness makes such cul-de-sac worlds unavoidable (from each  
world), in that semantics. In fact [] t is provable in all worlds, but  
Dt is provable in none, meaning, in that semantics, that a cul-de-sac  
world is always accessible.


If you interpret "accessing a culd-de-sac world" as dying, the machine  
told us that she can die at each instant! (of course there are other  
interpretations).





Is there any conceivable world where D~t?


No.
But the Z logic can have DDf, like the original (non normal) first  
modal logic of Lewis (the S1, S2, S3, less known than S4 (knowlegde)  
and S5 (basically Leibniz many-worlds, used by Gödel in his formal  
"proof of the existence of God")




If so, can't we say ~D~t and thus []t?


Yes, []t is a theorem, of G and most modal logic, but not of Z!




Isn't the only situation where ~Dt the one where this is no world?


~Dt, that is [] f, inconsistency, is the type of the error, dream,  
lie, and "near-death", or in-a-cul-de-sac.


We should *try* to avoid it, but we can't avoid it without loosing our  
universality.


The consistent machines face the dilemma between security and lack of  
freedom-universality.  With <>p = ~[] ~p, here are equivalent way to  
write it:


<>t -> ~[]<>t
<>t -> <> [] f
[]<>t -> [] f

In G (and thus in arithmetic, with [] = beweisbar, and f = "0 = 1",  
and t = "1= 1".


Bruno




http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Unexpected Hanging

On 9/21/2013 7:06 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 20 Sep 2013, at 18:36, meekerdb wrote:

On 9/20/2013 2:13 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Thu, Sep 19, 2013 at 9:04 PM, meekerdb wrote:

Also some serious mathematicians are finitists.

The Meaning of Pure Mathematics
Author(s): Jan MycielskiSource: Journal of Philosophical Logic, Vol. 18, No.
3 (Aug., 1989), pp. 315-320Published by: SpringerStable URL:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/30227216 .

Come on! He believes that Platonism violates Occam. That is the same error
than believing that Everett violates Occam. Sometimes more is considerably
simpler than less, and that's the very inspiration of the "everything" list.

Just because I subscribe to the list doesn't oblige me accept its dogma. I
think Mycielski remark is irrelevant. Occam is no more than a rough guide
anyway.

Hi Brent,

Arguably, Occam might gain the status of theory once we accept
self-sampling. Of course you're not forced to accept it -- I'm
agnostic on it myself. But it's not beyond the pale that Occam could
actually be theory. No?

To be a theory there would have to be a clear meaning of what of is not to be
multiplied beyond necessity. Occam said 'entities', but by that measure the atomic
theory of matter is very much contrary to his principle. It's now usually interpreted
to mean a simple theory is best, without really specifying how 'simple' is to be
measured. The are proposals based on information theory and minimum message length, but
even there it's not clear how to compare the measure of say general relativity and loop
quantum gravity and string theory.

Just formalize them in first order logic, or in a first order logical theory and count
the number of bits used.

I can count the bits in a formalization of "There is a differentiable metric manifold" but
I'm not sure that captures the complexity or whatever it is that we're supposed to be
minimizing.

Brent

Re: When will Popperian come back.Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?


On 9/21/2013 7:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


The content might be, "There is a flying pink elephant in my room."  which is both 
dubitable and almost certainly false.  And if the thought is, "I had a conscious 
thought." that too is dubitable.


We agree on this. The indubitable thought is not "I was conscious", but "I am 
conscious".



Without the assumption of "I".

Brent

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RE: What gives philosophers a bad name?

Reversible computing seems like a fascinating possibility, but it is pretty
far off. even if economically feasible and mass producible reversible
physical logic gates and chip architectures were to be discovered today, the
inertia of the existing code base would take many decades to work its way
through the life cycle. Attempts to promote the parallelization of
algorithms also face this legacy problem as well.

But by the time (if ever) a reversible set of the basic logic gates AND,
NAND, OR, XOR are discovered - perhaps algorithms will have become so
sophisticated that an existing legacy code base could be run through the
various analyzers etc. and the "intent" of the code could be discovered by
an automatic self-tending process that could then use this map as a template
in order to perform code generation of equivalent user facing functionality
- and so is an essentially seamless experience for the user - but that has
been radically re-architected, re-factored & recompiled into code that works
with a reversible architecture.

A similar strategy could be used for achieving the maximum feasible
parallelization of algorithms/code - by automatically re-writing the code
base.. For quantum computing algorithms (i.e. code) as well. 

All still some ways off into the future though. just somewhat pie in the sky
musings.

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of John Clark
Sent: Friday, September 20, 2013 8:50 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: What gives philosophers a bad name?

On Fri, Sep 20, 2013 at 4:22 PM, Chris de Morsella 
wrote:

>> A computation always takes a nonzero amount of energy to perform,
theoretically you can make the energy used be as close to zero as you like,
but the less energy you use the slower the calculation.

> How does that square with the increased (well measured) energy efficiency
per fundamental unit of logic (single machine operation) -- it takes far
less energy to perform an elementary logic operation on a modern CPU than it
did on say a CPU from ten years ago 

I'm talking about the theoretical limit dictated by the laws of physics,
right now we are nowhere near that and technological factors are
astronomically more important. According to Landauer's principle the minimum
energy to change one bit of information is, in joules, kT*ln2 where k is
Boltzmann's constant and T is the temperature in degrees kelvin of the
object doing the computation. A joule is a very small amount of energy, one
watt hour is equal to 3600 joules, and Boltzmann's constant is a very very
small number, about 10^-23, so it will be some time before we have to start
thinking seriously about ways to overcome this theoretical limit with
something like reversible computing. 

   John K Clark

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Re: How PIP solves the hard problem of consciousness


On 9/21/2013 9:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
No, memories I consider direct experiences, since they require only that we are 
conscious. Indirect experiences would be experiences which we can only detect using our 
body's sense organs. Indirect experiences are 3p, thus they are bodies in space, direct 
experiences are 1p, so they can contain any combination of imagined forms, thoughts, 
feelings, etc.


That is not enough clear for me. I can't figure out what you mean by indirect 
experience. I guess you mean experience (1p) occurring when you think about a theory 
(like there is something on the other side of the moon). That kind of things can mix a 
lot first and first person plural aspects.
Keep also in mind that 'bodies in space' are first person plural notion, they are not 3p. 


No he means 'indirect' because you could experience the same vision by having your optic 
nerve properly stimulated.  So when you 'see a chair' that is indirect - it is an 
interpretation of what your optic nerve is doing.


Brent

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Russell's question about D. Bohm

2013-09-21 Thread John Mikes

Dear Russell,
(some computer-glitch prevented this post to arrive at the list for an
automatically included additional addressee's rejection yesterday.)

the Peat book seems to be on the physicist's side, just as the Hiley-book
(posthumus D.Bohm co-authored) which even pictures DB close to his 1952
image when his idea started to eliminate the differences of QM and
Relativity...
I have a - sort of - high level science-reportage:  by Reneé Weber:
"Dialogues with Scientists and Sages" (Arkana, 1986) with a reasonable
chapter with Bohm - also his references towards Krishnamurti and others.
I cannot activate my old computer's stuff on a discussion list stuff called:
'Friends of David Bohm' (early 90s)  with lots of details of his stuff.

My idea was the connection to Bishop Nicolaus de Cusa's 3 part world
(implicare, explicare, complicare - where I figured the 3rd one as math)
base for his protegé: Copernicus, saving the latter from the Inquisition -
the way I deduced it from "Wholeness...", a tortuous 2 decade path.
I think the 'Explicate Order' is our physical-world figment, while from the
'Implicate' I erased the 'Order' in my mind: no knowledge about that part
so to speak. An 'order' would be exaggerated.

After changing into a (similarly heretic?) Rosenite, the Bohm details
faded.
My agnostic views give me the peace of mind in an extended "I dunno".
I have a vague idea how to figure the infinity of the complexity (the
one(?)  beyond our conventional science 'model' of the world) - but only in
terms of our knowable items - no hint how the 'beyond model' may be
structured (if at all) and of what kind elements.

John M

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Re: Scientists claim discovery of life coming to Earth from space

2013-09-21 Thread John Mikes

Telmo:

would you have (by any chance...) a brief identification of something that
comes to your mind when speaking about  " l i f e "  ? (And please, forget
about the"bio" of this Earthbound Terrestrial Biosphere).
(To identify " live " is a bit easier I think.)

John M


On Sat, Sep 21, 2013 at 8:46 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:

> Unfortunately this appears to be bs:
>
> http://science.slashdot.org/story/13/09/20/136220/alien-life-story-of-dubious-provenance-goes-viral
>
> (but what do I know!)
>
> Best,
> Telmo.
>
>
> On Fri, Sep 20, 2013 at 11:53 PM, Chris de Morsella
>  wrote:
> > Seems like the Pangea hypothesis might have gotten some evidence...
> wouldn't
> > say this is conclusive though, but it is intriguing.
> > -Chris
> >
> > Scientists claim discovery of life coming to Earth from space
> > Scientists from the University of Sheffield believe they have found life
> > arriving to Earth from space after sending a balloon to the
> stratosphere.’
> > After it landed, scientists discovered that they had captured a diatom
> > fragment and some unusual biological entities from the stratosphere, all
> of
> > which are too large to have come from Earth.
> > Other scientists disagree, as noted here: New Alien Life Claim Far from
> > Convincing, Scientists Say
> > The team, led by Professor (Hon. Cardiff and Buckingham Universities)
> Milton
> > Wainwright, from the University’s Department of Molecular Biology and
> > Biotechnology found small organisms that could have come from space after
> > sending a specially designed balloon to 27km into the stratosphere during
> > the recent Perseid meteor shower.
> > Professor Wainwright said: “Most people will assume that these biological
> > particles must have just drifted up to the stratosphere from Earth, but
> it
> > is generally accepted that a particle of the size found cannot be lifted
> > from Earth to heights of, for example, 27km. The only known exception is
> by
> > a violent volcanic eruption, none of which occurred within three years of
> > the sampling trip.
> > “In the absence of a mechanism by which large particles like these can be
> > transported to the stratosphere we can only conclude that the biological
> > entities originated from space. Our conclusion then is that life is
> > continually arriving to Earth from space, life is not restricted to this
> > planet and it almost certainly did not originate here.”
> > Professor Wainwright said the results could be revolutionary: “If life
> does
> > continue to arrive from space then we have to completely change our view
> of
> > biology and evolution,” he added. “New textbooks will have to be
> written!”
> > Professor Wainwright said stringent precautions had been taken against
> the
> > possibility of contamination during sampling and processing, and said the
> > group was confident that the biological organisms could only have come
> from
> > the stratosphere.
> > The group’s findings have been published in the Journal of Cosmology
> (open
> > access) and updated versions will appear in the same journal, a new
> version
> > of which will be published in the near future. Professor Chandra
> > Wickramasinghe of the Buckingham, University Center for Astrobiology (of
> > which Professor Wainwright is an Honorary Fellow) also gave a
> presentation
> > of the group’s findings at a meeting of astronomers and astrobiologists
> in
> > San Diego last month.
> > Professor Wainwright added: “Of course it will be argued that there must
> be
> > an, as yet, unknown mechanism for transferring large particles from
> Earth to
> > the high stratosphere, but we stand by our conclusions. The absolutely
> > crucial experiment will come when we do what is called ‘isotope
> > fractionation’. We will take some of the samples which we have isolated
> from
> > the stratosphere and introduce them into a complex machine – a button
> will
> > be pressed. If the ratio of certain isotopes gives one number then our
> > organisms are from Earth, if it gives another, then they are from space.
> The
> > tension will obviously be almost impossible to live with!”
> > The research was conducted by Professor (Hon. Cardiff and Buckingham
> > Universities) Milton Wainwright from the University of Sheffield, Chris
> Rose
> > and Alex Baker from the University of Sheffield’s Leonardo Centre for
> > Tribology and Professor Chandra Wickramasinghe Director of the Centre for
> > Astrobiology, University of Buckingham.
> >
> http://www.kurzweilai.net/scientists-claim-discovery-of-life-coming-to-earth-from-space?utm_source=KurzweilAI+Daily+Newsletter&utm_campaign=60630eb1c2-UA-946742-1&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_6de721fb33-60630eb1c2-281942553
> >
> > --
> > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> > "Everything List" group.
> > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> > To post to this group, send email to everything-li

RE: How PIP solves the hard problem of consciousness

In fact the chair the mind sees is quite often a low fidelity rendition of
the chair - with by far most sense data discarded along the way, especially
if it is on the periphery of the mind's current focus. The "chair", in the
mind, is rendered only as well as it need be in order for the mind to
experience it's 3d frame of reference and the world aligned around it in a
manner with the best evolutionary fitness. The chair the mind "sees" is
subject to the mind's current needs and the chair's relative centrality with
respect to those shifting priorities. The mind is a most masterful
reification engine. 

Because the mind is so involved in constructing the "chair" or at least our
perception of it - in any given moment  -- and is involved at every step
along the way of rendition, it must have a pretty vast inventory of "chair"
models  (and all the underlying abstract modeling such as edge rendering,
shape skinning/coloring etc. that are required in order to render the chair)
in its repertoire. And the chair we see is always the indirect rendition
presented to us by our minds; our minds are always manufacturing the reality
we perceive. Try to set the mind aside; it is harder than it sounds. The
mind is always filtering our experienced reality as actual reality impinges
on us and interacts with our own inner selves to generate our own individual
perception. or esthetic.

Thus a vision of the chair should be able to be generated in a subject's
mind by a proper stimulation of critical brain areas (obviously would need
to be a lot more fine grained than anything we can do with our current crude
tool set. and perhaps it is a good thing too -- IMO -- for re-writing
memory, opens all kind of scary Orwellian doors) 

-Chris

 

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of meekerdb
Sent: Saturday, September 21, 2013 2:19 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: How PIP solves the hard problem of consciousness

 

On 9/21/2013 9:18 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

No, memories I consider direct experiences, since they require only that we
are conscious. Indirect experiences would be experiences which we can only
detect using our body's sense organs. Indirect experiences are 3p, thus they
are bodies in space, direct experiences are 1p, so they can contain any
combination of imagined forms, thoughts, feelings, etc. 


That is not enough clear for me. I can't figure out what you mean by
indirect experience. I guess you mean experience (1p) occurring when you
think about a theory (like there is something on the other side of the
moon). That kind of things can mix a lot first and first person plural
aspects. 
Keep also in mind that 'bodies in space' are first person plural notion,
they are not 3p. 


No he means 'indirect' because you could experience the same vision by
having your optic nerve properly stimulated.  So when you 'see a chair' that
is indirect - it is an interpretation of what your optic nerve is doing.

Brent

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Re: How PIP solves the hard problem of consciousness