date:20150417


On 4/17/2015 12:38 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Comp explains why this is impossible. The finest details of physics are given by sum on 
many computations, the finer the details, the more there are. To get the numbers right 
up to infinite decimals, you need to run the entire dovetailer in a finite time. We 
can't do that. 


?? The UD runs in Platonia, so what does "a finite time" refer to?

Brent

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Re: Food for thought


On 4/17/2015 11:56 AM, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List wrote:


Current global growth estimates are that every two days, the world is now creating as 
much new digital information as all the data ever created from the dawn of humans 
through the current century. It has been estimated that by 2020, the size of the world’s 
digital universe will be close to 44 trillion gigabytes


If I take a picture with my smartphone is that counted as "creating 
information"?

Brent

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 4/17/2015 5:35 AM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
If you had an actual Turing machine and unlimited time, you could by brute force
emulate everything. However, that is not the point. If you car needs a part replaced,
you don't need to get a replacement exactly the same down to the quantum level. This is
the case every machine, and there is no reason to believe biological machines are
different: infinite precision parts would mean zero robustness.

I think you miss the point. If you want to emulate a car or a biological machine, then
some classical level of exactness would suffice. But the issue is the wider program that
wants to see the physical world in all its detail emerge from the digital computations
of the dovetailer. If that is your goal, then you need to emulate the finest details of
quantum mechanics. This latter is not possible on a Turing machine because of the
theorem forbidding the cloning of a quantum state. Quantum mechanics is, after all, part
of the physical world we observe.

But the goal is not to emulate an existing physical world, it's to instantiate a physical
world as a computation. There's no requirement to measure a quantum state and reproduce it.

Brent

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On Saturday, April 18, 2015, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 4/17/2015 12:35 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> But physics itself is not Turing emulable. The no-cloning theorem of
>> quantum physics precludes it.
>>
>
>  Do you mean because you can't exactly copy a given physical state? That
> doesn't necessarily mean the physical world as a whole cannot be emulated.
> And if it turns out that physics is continuous rather than than discrete
> you could still come arbitrarily close with digital models of the brain; if
> that was not good enough you would be saying that the brain is a machine
> with components of zero engineering tolerance.
>
>
> The no-cloning theorem doesn't say you can't produce a copy, it says you
> can't get the information in order to know what the copy should be.  You
> could make a copy by accident, by guess, but you couldn't know it was a
> correct copy.  It doesn't have anything to do with discrete vs continuous.
>

Yes, that's what I meant. You might not be able to copy a quantum state but
you could create it by creating every possible quantum state. Analogously,
you might not be able to copy a classical system due to chaotic effects but
you could make a similar chaitic system. The difficulty of copying a brain
exactly is sometimes raised as an argument against computationalism but
this is due to a misapprehension.


> If consciousness depends on quantum level states then Bruno's duplication
> machine will necessarily introduce a gap or discontinuity in consciousness
> - but then so does a concussion.  And there are good reasons (c.f. Tegmark)
> to think that, even on a supervenience theory, consciousness is a classical
> phenomenon.
>

And the same consideration applies for classical copying.


-- 
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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 4/17/2015 12:37 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Apr 2015, at 21:54, meekerdb wrote:

On 4/16/2015 1:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So consciousness is not 1-duplicable, but can be considered as having been
duplicated in some 3-1-view, even before it diverges.

How can it be considered duplicated before it diverges?

By associating it with different token of the machinery implementing it.

Are you assuming consciousness is physical and so having different spacetime location
can distinguish two otherwise indiscernible set of thoughts?

No, it can't, in the 1-view, but it can in the 3-1 view. OK?

I'm not sure what 3-1 view means,

It is the content of the diary of the observer outside the box (like in sane04), but on
the consciousness of the copies involved. This is for the people who say that they will
be conscious in W and M. That is true, but the "pure" 1-view is that they will be
conscious in only one city (even if that happens in both cities).

In the math part, this is captured by [1][0]A, with [0]A = the usual bewesibar of Gödel,
and [1]A = [0]A & A (Theaetetus).

but if you mean in the sense of running on two different machines then I agree.

OK.

That means duplication of consciousness/computation depends on distinguishability of
the physical substrate with no distinction in the consciousness/computation.

OK. Like when the guy has already been multiplied in W and M, but has not yet open the
door. We assume of course that the two boxes are identical from inside, no windows, and
the air molecules at the same place (for example). That can be made absolutely identical
in the step 6, where the reconstitutions are made in a virtual environment.

But is that the duplication envisioned in the M-W thought experiment?

Yes, at different steps.

I find I'm confused about that. In our quantum-mechanical world it is impossible to
duplicate something in an unknown state. One could duplicate a human being in the
rough classical sense of structure at the molecular composition level, but not the
molecular states. Such duplicates would be similar as I'm similar to myself of
yesterday - but they would instantly diverge in thoughts, even without seeing Moscow or
Washington.

In practice, yes. Assuming the duplication is done in a real world, and assuming QM. But
in step six, you can manage the environments to be themselves perfectly emulated and
100% identical. That is all what is needed for the reasoning.

Yet it seems Bruno's argument is based on deterministic computation

At my substitution level. But this will entail that the real world, whatever it can be,
is non deterministic. We "WM" duplicate on all the different computations in the UD* (in
arithmetic) which go through my local current state.

and requires the duplication and subsequent thoughts to be duplicates at a
deterministic classcial level so that the M-man and W-man on diverge in thought when
they see different things in their respective cities.

Yes. That is why the H-man cannot predict which divergence he will live. But sometimes
we mention the state of the person before he or she open the doors, for example to
address a question like "would a tiny oxygen atom in the box makes a difference in the
measure or not", Here there is almost a matter of convention to say that there are two
or one consciousness. We can ascribe consciousness to the different people in the
different box, but that is a 3-1 view. The 1-views feels to be in once city, and not in
the other.

No, things like radioactive decay of K40 atoms is the blood will very quickly cause the
W-man and M-man to diverge no matter how precisely the duplicate recievers are made. But
I'm not sure why this would matter to your argument? Is it important to the argument that
they diverge *only* because of a difference in perception?

Brent

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness


On 4/17/2015 12:35 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:


But physics itself is not Turing emulable. The no-cloning theorem of 
quantum physics
precludes it.


Do you mean because you can't exactly copy a given physical state? That doesn't 
necessarily mean the physical world as a whole cannot be emulated. And if it turns out 
that physics is continuous rather than than discrete you could still come arbitrarily 
close with digital models of the brain; if that was not good enough you would be saying 
that the brain is a machine with components of zero engineering tolerance.


The no-cloning theorem doesn't say you can't produce a copy, it says you can't get the 
information in order to know what the copy should be.  You could make a copy by accident, 
by guess, but you couldn't know it was a correct copy.  It doesn't have anything to do 
with discrete vs continuous.


If consciousness depends on quantum level states then Bruno's duplication machine will 
necessarily introduce a gap or discontinuity in consciousness - but then so does a 
concussion.  And there are good reasons (c.f. Tegmark) to think that, even on a 
supervenience theory, consciousness is a classical phenomenon.


Brent

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Re: Food for thought

2015-04-17 Thread LizR

Of course about 99% of the information being generated is porn and/or
pictures of cats with silly captions. (Or both.)

On 18 April 2015 at 12:15, Kim Jones  wrote:

>
>
>
> On 18 Apr 2015, at 4:56 am, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>
> Current global growth estimates are that every two days, the world is now
> creating as much new digital information as all the data ever created from
> the dawn of humans through the current century. It has been estimated that
> by 2020, the size of the world’s digital universe will be close to 44
> trillion gigabytes
>
> Current estimates are that only around 7 percent of the world’s devices
> are connected and communicating today. The amount of data that these 7
> percent of connected devices generate is estimated to represent only 2
> percent of the world’s total data universe today.
>
>
>
> So only 2 per cent of all 'data' that exists can be reached online?
>
> So - where's the rest of it? Sounds like a case for Dark Matter!
>
>
> Current projections are for this number to grow to about 10 percent of the
> world’s data by the year 2020.
>
>
>
> Dark Energy is causing everything to expand at an accelerated rate.
> Everything includes the human part of everything. Everything is being
> emulated, simulated, duplicated, cloned, copied at every instant. Data are
> like Bruno's amoebas, they have achieved self-replication. Memes
> proliferate at a faster rate than genes, so we will reasonably soon leave
> the genetic plane altogether and merge with our data.
>
> I mean - we, I, you; we are all DATA.
>
>
>
> This explosion of the internet of things is very rapidly happening as we
> speak --
>
>
>
>
> Did somebody only just realise this or something? Is that supposed to be
> news?
>
>
>
> and it is happening, on top of the already exploding volumes of data
> getting generated as a result of human activity -- and as the internet of
> things very rapidly growsm all of these connected, chatting, devices will
> begin
>
>
>
> Will? WILL? Have you time-travelled back to 1934 or something?
>
>
>
> creating huge new volumes of actionable real time data flowing on top of
> the existing mushrooming volumes resulting from human interactions -- and
> also interacting with the hman driven data streams in many interesting and
> perhaps unforeseen ways.
>
>
> Well, maybe talk about that, then
>
>
>
> The growth rates in information volumes are staggering really.
>
>
>
> Well stagger me with some new ideas about that. The transhumanist takeover
> seems the only likely outcome of letting this process run its course. The
> elites will benefit as usual.
>
> K
>
>
>
>
>
>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
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> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
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>

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Re: Food for thought

2015-04-17 Thread Kim Jones

> On 18 Apr 2015, at 4:56 am, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List 
>  wrote:
> 
> 
> Current global growth estimates are that every two days, the world is now 
> creating as much new digital information as all the data ever created from 
> the dawn of humans through the current century. It has been estimated that by 
> 2020, the size of the world’s digital universe will be close to 44 trillion 
> gigabytes
> 
> Current estimates are that only around 7 percent of the world’s devices are 
> connected and communicating today. The amount of data that these 7 percent of 
> connected devices generate is estimated to represent only 2 percent of the 
> world’s total data universe today.

So only 2 per cent of all 'data' that exists can be reached online?

So - where's the rest of it? Sounds like a case for Dark Matter!

> Current projections are for this number to grow to about 10 percent of the 
> world’s data by the year 2020.

Dark Energy is causing everything to expand at an accelerated rate. Everything 
includes the human part of everything. Everything is being emulated, simulated, 
duplicated, cloned, copied at every instant. Data are like Bruno's amoebas, 
they have achieved self-replication. Memes proliferate at a faster rate than 
genes, so we will reasonably soon leave the genetic plane altogether and merge 
with our data.

I mean - we, I, you; we are all DATA. 

> 
> This explosion of the internet of things is very rapidly happening as we 
> speak --

Did somebody only just realise this or something? Is that supposed to be news?

> and it is happening, on top of the already exploding volumes of data getting 
> generated as a result of human activity -- and as the internet of things very 
> rapidly growsm all of these connected, chatting, devices will begin

Will? WILL? Have you time-travelled back to 1934 or something? 

> creating huge new volumes of actionable real time data flowing on top of the 
> existing mushrooming volumes resulting from human interactions -- and also 
> interacting with the hman driven data streams in many interesting and perhaps 
> unforeseen ways.
> 

Well, maybe talk about that, then

> 
> The growth rates in information volumes are staggering really.

Well stagger me with some new ideas about that. The transhumanist takeover 
seems the only likely outcome of letting this process run its course. The 
elites will benefit as usual. 

K

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 17 Apr 2015, at 14:35, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett > wrote:

   Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
   On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett
   mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>>
   wrote:
   Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
   Physicalism reduces to computationalism if the physics
   in the
   brain is Turing emulable, and then if you follow  
Bruno's

   reasoning in the UDA computationalism leads to
   elimination of a
   primary physical world.
   But physics itself is not Turing emulable. The no-cloning
   theorem of
   quantum physics precludes it.
   Do you mean because you can't exactly copy a given physical
   state? That doesn't necessarily mean the physical world as a
   whole cannot be emulated. And if it turns out that physics is
   continuous rather than than discrete you could still come
   arbitrarily close with digital models of the brain; if that  
was
   not good enough you would be saying that the brain is a  
machine

   with components of zero engineering tolerance.
   An exact copy of an unknown quantum state is not possible. It most
   certainly does mean that the physical world as a whole cannot be
   emulated. Quantum mechanics is based on the incommensurability of
   pairs of conjugate variables. Because you cannot measure both the
   position and momentum of a quantum state to arbitrary precision
   simultaneously, we find that there are two complementary
   descriptions of the physical system -- the description in position
   space and the description in momentum space. These are related by
   Fourier transforms. Any complete description of the physical world
   must take this into account.
You can't copy an arbitrary quantum state, but you could copy it by  
emulating a series of quantum states.


?


   If a quantum state could be duplicated, then you could measure
   position exactly on one copy and momentum on the other. Exact  
values

   for these two variables simultaneously contradicts the basis of
   quantum mechanics. And there are very good arguments for the view
   that the world is at base quantum: the classical picture only
   emerges from the quantum at some coarse-grained level of
   description. You cannot describe everything that happens in the
   physical world from this classical, coarse-grained perspective.
If you had an actual Turing machine and unlimited time, you could  
by brute force emulate everything. However, that is not the point.  
If you car needs a part replaced, you don't need to get a  
replacement exactly the same down to the quantum level. This is the  
case every machine, and there is no reason to believe biological  
machines are different: infinite precision parts would mean zero  
robustness.


I think you miss the point. If you want to emulate a car or a  
biological machine, then some classical level of exactness would  
suffice. But the issue is the wider program that wants to see the  
physical world in all its detail emerge from the digital  
computations of the dovetailer.


By the FPI on all computations. This will be a priori not computable.  
That the universe looks some much predictable is the mystery with  
comp. We must fight the white rabbits away.





If that is your goal,


The result is that we have to do that if we assume computationalism in  
the cognitive science.




then you need to emulate the finest details of quantum mechanics.


Comp explains why this is impossible. The finest details of physics  
are given by sum on many computations, the finer the details, the more  
there are. To get the numbers right up to infinite decimals, you need  
to run the entire dovetailer in a finite time. We can't do that.



This latter is not possible on a Turing machine because of the  
theorem forbidding the cloning of a quantum state.


Same with comp.


Quantum mechanics is, after all, part of the physical world we  
observe.


It might be part of the reality we live, but it might be explained by  
the arithmetical FPI on the computations seen from inside. IF QM is  
correct, and if comp is correct, QM has to be a theorem in comp, that  
is, the logic of []p & <>t have to give a quantization on the sigma_1  
arithmetical sentences. And that is the case.


([]p is Gödel's beweisbar(x), meaning provable(x), and <>t is the dual  
~beweisbar('~(1=1)').


Don't confuse Digital physics (the universe is a machine) and comp (my  
body/brain is a machine), as they are incompatible (and as Digital  
physics entails comp, but comp entails ~Digital-physics, so digital  
physics entails ~digital physics, so digital physics is self- 
contradictory. With, or without comp, we are confronted to something  
non Turing emulable. No need to go outside arithmetic, as we know  
since Gödel, Church, Turing, Post, ... that arithmetical rea

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-17 Thread 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List



On 17 Apr 2015, at 18:55, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:




On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett   
wrote:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au 
>> wrote:


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>>
wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Physicalism reduces to computationalism if the physics
in the
brain is Turing emulable, and then if you follow  
Bruno's

reasoning in the UDA computationalism leads to
elimination of a
primary physical world.

But physics itself is not Turing emulable. The no-cloning
theorem of
quantum physics precludes it.

Do you mean because you can't exactly copy a given physical
state? That doesn't necessarily mean the physical world as a
whole cannot be emulated. And if it turns out that physics is
continuous rather than than discrete you could still come
arbitrarily close with digital models of the brain; if that  
was
not good enough you would be saying that the brain is a  
machine

with components of zero engineering tolerance.

An exact copy of an unknown quantum state is not possible. It most
certainly does mean that the physical world as a whole cannot be
emulated. Quantum mechanics is based on the incommensurability of
pairs of conjugate variables. Because you cannot measure both the
position and momentum of a quantum state to arbitrary precision
simultaneously, we find that there are two complementary
descriptions of the physical system -- the description in position
space and the description in momentum space. These are related by
Fourier transforms. Any complete description of the physical world
must take this into account.

You can't copy an arbitrary quantum state, but you could copy it by  
emulating a series of quantum states.


?

If a quantum state could be duplicated, then you could measure
position exactly on one copy and momentum on the other. Exact  
values

for these two variables simultaneously contradicts the basis of
quantum mechanics. And there are very good arguments for the view
that the world is at base quantum: the classical picture only
emerges from the quantum at some coarse-grained level of
description. You cannot describe everything that happens in the
physical world from this classical, coarse-grained perspective.

If you had an actual Turing machine and unlimited time, you could by  
brute force emulate everything. However, that is not the point. If  
you car needs a part replaced, you don't need to get a replacement  
exactly the same down to the quantum level. This is the case every  
machine, and there is no reason to believe biological machines are  
different: infinite precision parts would mean zero robustness.


I think you miss the point. If you want to emulate a car or a  
biological machine, then some classical level of exactness would  
suffice. But the issue is the wider program that wants to see the  
physical world in all its detail emerge from the digital  
computations of the dovetailer. If that is your goal, then you need  
to emulate the finest details of quantum mechanics. This latter is  
not possible on a Turing machine because of the theorem forbidding  
the cloning of a quantum state. Quantum mechanics is, after all,  
part of the physical world we observe.


Although you cannot clone an arbitrary quantum state, you might be  
able to simulate the set of all possible quantum states of which the  
unknown state is one. No cloning is needed.


However, for Bruno's argument this level of simulation is not  
needed. What is needed is a level of simulation sufficient to  
reproduce consciousness, and this may be well above the quantum level.


That is certainly needed for the first six steps, but at step seven,  
we can relax comp up to the quantum level, and below. The UD emulates  
all programs, including all quantum computer, because the quantum  
computer are Turing emulable, sure with an exponential slow down, but  
the UD does not care, as, in arithmetic, it has "all the time".


In fact, as I said to Bruce, at step seven, we can understand why  
"matter" cannot be duplicated exactly, because "matter", in term of  
computation, is the result of the FPI on the whole work of the UD.  
Below your substitution level, you cannot entangle yourself with token  
facts, as they are not relevant for your most probable computational  
history, so you multiply yourself more and more on the details.  
Eventually, to get all the decimal exact, you need to run the entire  
dovetailing, which is impossible.


Bruno




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Food for thought


Current global growth estimates are that every two days, the world is now 
creating as muchnew digital information as all the data ever created from the 
dawn of humans through the currentcentury. It has been estimated that by 2020, 
the size of the world’s digital universe will be close to 44trillion gigabytes

Current estimates are that onlyaround 7 percent of the world’s devices are 
connected and communicating today. The amount of datathat these 7 percent of 
connected devices generate is estimated to represent only 2 percent of 
theworld’s total data universe today. Current projections are for this number 
to grow to about 10 percentof the world’s data by the year 2020.

This explosion of the internet of things is very rapidly happening as we speak 
-- and it is happening, on top of the already exploding volumes of data getting 
generated as a result of human activity -- and as the internet of things very 
rapidly growsm all of these connected, chatting, devices will begin creating 
huge new volumes of actionable real time data flowing on top of the existing 
mushrooming volumes resulting from human interactions -- and also interacting 
with the hman driven data streams in many interesting and perhaps unforeseen 
ways.

The growth rates in information volumes are staggering really.

-- 
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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-17 Thread John Clark

On Thu, Apr 16, 2015  meekerdb  wrote:

 >> Even if the laws of physics are deterministic and time-symmetric
>>  events would still not be time symmetrical if the initial condition was a
>> state of minimum entropy because then any change in that state would lead
>> to a increase in entropy, and the arrow of time would be born.
>
>
> > In a deterministic, time-symmetric system  there is no information loss
> with evolution either to the past or future.
>

True there is no information loss, in fact there is a information increase
and thus a entropy increase because it would take more information to
describe the new more complex higher entropy state than the previous
simpler state.

Well OK I've over simplified a bit, when entropy gets high enough it
actually takes less information to describe it, although the present
universe is nowhere near that point yet. Maximum information is about
midway between maximum and minimum entropy. Put some cream in a glass
coffee cup and then very carefully put some coffee on top of it. For a
short time the 2 fluids will remain segregated and the entropy will be low
and the information needed to describe it would be low too, but then
tendrils of cream will start to move into the coffee and all sorts of
spirals and other complex patterns will form, the entropy is higher now and
the information needed to describe it is higher, but after that the fluid
in the cup will reach a dull uniform color that is darker than coffee but
lighter than cream, the entropy has reached a maximum but it would take
less information to describe it. Another example is smoke from a cigarette
in a room with no air currents, it starts out as a simple smooth laminar
flow but then turbulence kicks in and very complex patterns form, and after
that it diffuses into uniform featureless fog.

> > So the entropy is zero and stays zero
>

That doesn't follow. If you knew all the information in the present state
(but both Many Worlds and Copenhagen agree that can never happen) you could
calculate from that the initial conditions of the original very low entropy
state, but calculations are physical and calculations take energy give off
heat and thus increase entropy. Yes you could use reversible computing and
reduce the energy needed to perform a calculation to an arbitrarily low
figure, but the less energy you use the slower the calculation is, so by
the time you've finished the calculation about how to put things back to
their original simple state the universe has kept on evolving and is now in
a new much more complex state than when you started. So you'd have to start
all over again.

But all that is just hypothetical because although they think so for
different reasons both Many Worlds and Copenhagen agree that you can never
have complete information even in theory.

  John K Clark

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>>
>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett
>> mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>>
>> wrote:
>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> Physicalism reduces to computationalism if the physics
>> in the
>> brain is Turing emulable, and then if you follow Bruno's
>> reasoning in the UDA computationalism leads to
>> elimination of a
>> primary physical world.
>>
>> But physics itself is not Turing emulable. The no-cloning
>> theorem of
>> quantum physics precludes it.
>>
>> Do you mean because you can't exactly copy a given physical
>> state? That doesn't necessarily mean the physical world as a
>> whole cannot be emulated. And if it turns out that physics is
>> continuous rather than than discrete you could still come
>> arbitrarily close with digital models of the brain; if that was
>> not good enough you would be saying that the brain is a machine
>> with components of zero engineering tolerance.
>>
>> An exact copy of an unknown quantum state is not possible. It most
>> certainly does mean that the physical world as a whole cannot be
>> emulated. Quantum mechanics is based on the incommensurability of
>> pairs of conjugate variables. Because you cannot measure both the
>> position and momentum of a quantum state to arbitrary precision
>> simultaneously, we find that there are two complementary
>> descriptions of the physical system -- the description in position
>> space and the description in momentum space. These are related by
>> Fourier transforms. Any complete description of the physical world
>> must take this into account.
>>
>> You can't copy an arbitrary quantum state, but you could copy it by
>> emulating a series of quantum states.
>>
>
> ?
>
>  If a quantum state could be duplicated, then you could measure
>> position exactly on one copy and momentum on the other. Exact values
>> for these two variables simultaneously contradicts the basis of
>> quantum mechanics. And there are very good arguments for the view
>> that the world is at base quantum: the classical picture only
>> emerges from the quantum at some coarse-grained level of
>> description. You cannot describe everything that happens in the
>> physical world from this classical, coarse-grained perspective.
>>
>> If you had an actual Turing machine and unlimited time, you could by
>> brute force emulate everything. However, that is not the point. If you car
>> needs a part replaced, you don't need to get a replacement exactly the same
>> down to the quantum level. This is the case every machine, and there is no
>> reason to believe biological machines are different: infinite precision
>> parts would mean zero robustness.
>>
>
> I think you miss the point. If you want to emulate a car or a biological
> machine, then some classical level of exactness would suffice. But the
> issue is the wider program that wants to see the physical world in all its
> detail emerge from the digital computations of the dovetailer. If that is
> your goal, then you need to emulate the finest details of quantum
> mechanics. This latter is not possible on a Turing machine because of the
> theorem forbidding the cloning of a quantum state. Quantum mechanics is,
> after all, part of the physical world we observe.
>

Although you cannot clone an arbitrary quantum state, you might be able
to simulate the set of all possible quantum states of which the unknown
state is one. No cloning is needed.

However, for Bruno's argument this level of simulation is not needed. What
is needed is a level of simulation sufficient to reproduce consciousness,
and this may be well above the quantum level.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 17 Apr 2015, at 08:26, Bruce Kellett wrote:


meekerdb wrote:

On 4/15/2015 11:16 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 15:37, Bruce Kellett  
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>>  
wrote:


   Bruno has said to me that one cannot refute a scientific  
finding by
   philosophy. One cannot, of course, refute a scientific  
observation

   by philosophy, but one can certainly enter a philosophical
   discussion of the meaning and interpretation of an  
observation. In

   an argument like Bruno's, one can certainly question the
   metaphysical and other presumptions that go into his discourse.

Yes, of course. I don't think anyone is denying that - quite the  
reverse, people who argue /against /Bruno often do so on the  
basis of unexamined metaphysical assumptions (like primary  
materialism)


And the contrary, that primary materialism is false, is just as  
much an unevidenced metaphysical assumption.
But it's not an assumption in Bruno's argument. As I understand it,  
his theory in outline is:

1. All our thoughts are certain kinds of computations.
2. The physical world is an inference from our thoughts.
3. Computations are abstract relations among mathematical objects.
4. The physical world is instantiated by those computations that  
correspond to intersubjective agreement in our thoughts.
5. Our perceptions/thoughts/beliefs about the world are modeled by  
computed relations between the computed physics and our computed  
thoughts.
6. The UD realizes (in Platonia) all possible computations and so  
realizes the model 1-5 in all possible ways and this produces the  
multiple-worlds of QM, plus perhaps infinitely many other worlds  
which he hopes to show have "low measure".


I leave it to Bruno to comment on whether this is a fair summary of  
his theory.


It is not a theory. It is an argument. it is dangerous to sum it by  
"thought = computation" . The only axiom is that consciousness is  
locally invariant for a digital substitution made at some level. It is  
a very weak version of Descartes Mechanism. It implies all form of  
mechanism and computationalism studied in the literature. It is my  
theory if you want, but my theory is believed by basically all  
rationalists by default. Only precise and rare people, usually  
philosophers, but also some scientists, like Penrose, defends  
different theory.
What makes it stronger than the STRONG AI thesis, is that it is  
supposed to apply to us.
What makes it weaker than most computationalist thesis, is that there  
is no bound delimited for the substitution level.


Then, I argue that this leads to the fact that all first order  
specification of any universal machine/program/number gives a TOE. In  
particular the laws of physics have to de derived in any of those  
TOEs. It gives actually much more and the whole stuff I like to call  
it theology, because it is arguably isomorphic to Proclus theology,  
and Plotinus, Plato. But all this are in the results. The theory is  
only that I am Turing emulable. Even if the brain is a quantum  
computer (which I doubt), I remain Turing emulable, (see the paper of  
Deutsch).







I have difficulties with several of the points you list. But that  
aside, one has to ask exactly what has bee achieved, even if all of  
this goes through?


Everyone knows that Aristotle physics has been refuted. Already by  
Galilee.
The achievement here is a refutation of Aristotle's theology, in  
computationalist frame (the one believed usually by materialist,  
atheists, but also many religious people).






I do not think it explains consciousness.


That was not the goal. But yet, I can argue that 99% of the conceptual  
problem is solved, and that the remaining 1% is simply unsolvable. But  
for the origin of matter appearances, the explanation is conceptually  
100% solved. In that frame, and assuming it true, as the result is  
also that this can be tested.




It seems to stem from the idea that consciousness is a certain type  
of computation (that can be emulated in a universal Turing machine,  
or general purpose computer.)


Not really. Consciousness is 1p, and it the math explains why  
consciousness, like truth, are not definable in arithmetic, unlike  
computations. In fact consciousness is not definable in any third  
person way.


It certainly does not ring right, that consciousness would be a  
computation, and already the FPI suggests that consciousness is  
related to infinities of computations, and in the meaning or semantic  
of those computation, which the machine are unable to define entirely  
by themselves.





This is then developed as a form of idealism (2 above) to argue that  
the physical world and our perceptions, thoughts, and beliefs about  
that world, are also certain types of computations.


Not at all. It is just that if your brain is Turing emulable, it is  
Turing emulated infinitely often in arithmetic (in a tiny part of the  
standard model of Peano Arithm

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-17 Thread Bruce Kellett


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>>
wrote:
Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Physicalism reduces to computationalism if the physics
in the
brain is Turing emulable, and then if you follow Bruno's
reasoning in the UDA computationalism leads to
elimination of a
primary physical world.

But physics itself is not Turing emulable. The no-cloning
theorem of
quantum physics precludes it.

Do you mean because you can't exactly copy a given physical
state? That doesn't necessarily mean the physical world as a
whole cannot be emulated. And if it turns out that physics is
continuous rather than than discrete you could still come
arbitrarily close with digital models of the brain; if that was
not good enough you would be saying that the brain is a machine
with components of zero engineering tolerance.

An exact copy of an unknown quantum state is not possible. It most
certainly does mean that the physical world as a whole cannot be
emulated. Quantum mechanics is based on the incommensurability of
pairs of conjugate variables. Because you cannot measure both the
position and momentum of a quantum state to arbitrary precision
simultaneously, we find that there are two complementary
descriptions of the physical system -- the description in position
space and the description in momentum space. These are related by
Fourier transforms. Any complete description of the physical world
must take this into account.

You can't copy an arbitrary quantum state, but you could copy it by 
emulating a series of quantum states.


?


If a quantum state could be duplicated, then you could measure
position exactly on one copy and momentum on the other. Exact values
for these two variables simultaneously contradicts the basis of
quantum mechanics. And there are very good arguments for the view
that the world is at base quantum: the classical picture only
emerges from the quantum at some coarse-grained level of
description. You cannot describe everything that happens in the
physical world from this classical, coarse-grained perspective.

If you had an actual Turing machine and unlimited time, you could by 
brute force emulate everything. However, that is not the point. If you 
car needs a part replaced, you don't need to get a replacement exactly 
the same down to the quantum level. This is the case every machine, and 
there is no reason to believe biological machines are different: 
infinite precision parts would mean zero robustness.


I think you miss the point. If you want to emulate a car or a biological 
machine, then some classical level of exactness would suffice. But the 
issue is the wider program that wants to see the physical world in all 
its detail emerge from the digital computations of the dovetailer. If 
that is your goal, then you need to emulate the finest details of 
quantum mechanics. This latter is not possible on a Turing machine 
because of the theorem forbidding the cloning of a quantum state. 
Quantum mechanics is, after all, part of the physical world we observe.


Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>> On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>>
>> Physicalism reduces to computationalism if the physics in the
>> brain is Turing emulable, and then if you follow Bruno's
>> reasoning in the UDA computationalism leads to elimination of a
>> primary physical world.
>>
>> But physics itself is not Turing emulable. The no-cloning theorem of
>> quantum physics precludes it.
>>
>> Do you mean because you can't exactly copy a given physical state? That
>> doesn't necessarily mean the physical world as a whole cannot be emulated.
>> And if it turns out that physics is continuous rather than than discrete
>> you could still come arbitrarily close with digital models of the brain; if
>> that was not good enough you would be saying that the brain is a machine
>> with components of zero engineering tolerance.
>>
>
> An exact copy of an unknown quantum state is not possible. It most
> certainly does mean that the physical world as a whole cannot be emulated.
> Quantum mechanics is based on the incommensurability of pairs of conjugate
> variables. Because you cannot measure both the position and momentum of a
> quantum state to arbitrary precision simultaneously, we find that there are
> two complementary descriptions of the physical system -- the description in
> position space and the description in momentum space. These are related by
> Fourier transforms. Any complete description of the physical world must
> take this into account.


You can't copy an arbitrary quantum state, but you could copy it by
emulating a series of quantum states.


> If a quantum state could be duplicated, then you could measure position
> exactly on one copy and momentum on the other. Exact values for these two
> variables simultaneously contradicts the basis of quantum mechanics. And
> there are very good arguments for the view that the world is at base
> quantum: the classical picture only emerges from the quantum at some
> coarse-grained level of description. You cannot describe everything that
> happens in the physical world from this classical, coarse-grained
> perspective.
>

If you had an actual Turing machine and unlimited time, you could by brute
force emulate everything. However, that is not the point. If you car needs
a part replaced, you don't need to get a replacement exactly the same down
to the quantum level. This is the case every machine, and there is no
reason to believe biological machines are different: infinite precision
parts would mean zero robustness.


-- 
Stathis Papaioannou

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 17 Apr 2015, at 07:12, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:




On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 2:36 PM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


On 16 Apr 2015, at 06:34, Platonist Guitar Cowboy wrote:




On Thu, Apr 16, 2015 at 5:33 AM, Bruce Kellett > wrote:

LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


LizR wrote:

On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com> >> wrote:

Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing  
that

Bruno
had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
uncertainty That's hardly what Bruno is claiming.  
Step 3 is only a small
step in a logical argument. It shows that if our normal  
everyday

consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be
duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter
duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to
what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.


You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the
case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large  
distance
and don't further interact. You might come to a different  
conclusion

if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.

That doesn't make any difference to the argument. "Will I be the  
copy sitting in the chair on the left?" is less dramatic than "Will  
I be transported to Moscow or Washington?" and hence, I suspect,  
might not make the point so clearly. But otherwise the argument  
goes through either way.


No, because as I argued elsewhere, the two 'copies' would not agree  
that they were the same person.


Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different
worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.

I don't know where Bruno says he's mimicking the MWI (at this  
stage) ? This is a classical result, assuming classical computation  
(which according to Max Tegmark is a reasonable assumption for  
brains).


In the protracted arguments with John Clark, the point was repeated  
made that he accepted FPI for MWI, so why not for Step 3.


Discussion or fruitful argument assume mutual respect. The respect/ 
civility in the exchange is one-sided however, and has remained so  
for years. It's not an argument; closer to an experiment of John to  
see how often he can get away with airing personal issues clothed  
in sincerity of intellectual debate.


This occupies too much bandwidth and is a turn off from where I'm  
sitting. I'd much rather see the comp related discussions go to  
address say Telmo's request for clarification in Bruno's use of  
phi_i, or G/G* distinctions, or pedagogical demonstrations on "the  
work arithmetic existentially actualizes/gets done", clarification  
on Russell's use of "robust", physicalist theories that don't  
eliminate consciousness etc.


Good and interesting questions indeed.

I, of course would be delighted if people try to really grasp the  
phi_i, the G/G* distinction, and the subtle but key point of the  
fact that the arithmetical reality simulates computations, as  
opposed to merely generates descriptions of them.


I am bit buzy right now.  Feel free to tell me which one of those  
point seems to you the more interesting, or funky.


Funkiest would be "arithmetical reality simulates computations" aka  
free lunch :)


OK, that is important, also. And it is is importantly related to the  
difference between a computation and a description of a computation,  
which is important in step 8, but also for the very meaning of what a  
computation can be.






But I've picked up and guess that people seem to miss use of "phi_i"  
or "Sigma 1 sentences" and such terms.


Are you sure? that is mathematics which frighten sometimes people.




So, you thought you could offer me a hand and... I take the arm and  
more: 1 of those point = 3 + infinite possibility of "other such  
terms". PGC- Zombie hunting armchair ninja of numbers.


OK. Not today, as my deadline for the paper which has been asked by  
very nice people, is ... today.
But I will create a thread on the first question above. A difficult  
point ...


Liz, it is time to find back your notes, or buy a new diary :)

Don't worry, Liz, I will try to annoy/shake everyone this time ...

Thanks for the suggestion PGC,

Bruno





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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-17 Thread Bruce Kellett


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett > wrote:

Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

Physicalism reduces to computationalism if the physics in the
brain is Turing emulable, and then if you follow Bruno's
reasoning in the UDA computationalism leads to elimination of a
primary physical world.

But physics itself is not Turing emulable. The no-cloning theorem of
quantum physics precludes it.

Do you mean because you can't exactly copy a given physical state? That 
doesn't necessarily mean the physical world as a whole cannot be 
emulated. And if it turns out that physics is continuous rather than 
than discrete you could still come arbitrarily close with digital models 
of the brain; if that was not good enough you would be saying that the 
brain is a machine with components of zero engineering tolerance. 


An exact copy of an unknown quantum state is not possible. It most 
certainly does mean that the physical world as a whole cannot be 
emulated. Quantum mechanics is based on the incommensurability of pairs 
of conjugate variables. Because you cannot measure both the position and 
momentum of a quantum state to arbitrary precision simultaneously, we 
find that there are two complementary descriptions of the physical 
system -- the description in position space and the description in 
momentum space. These are related by Fourier transforms. Any complete 
description of the physical world must take this into account.


If a quantum state could be duplicated, then you could measure position 
exactly on one copy and momentum on the other. Exact values for these 
two variables simultaneously contradicts the basis of quantum mechanics. 
And there are very good arguments for the view that the world is at base 
quantum: the classical picture only emerges from the quantum at some 
coarse-grained level of description. You cannot describe everything that 
happens in the physical world from this classical, coarse-grained 
perspective.


Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 16 Apr 2015, at 23:23, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/16/2015 6:14 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Apr 2015, at 13:55, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Apr 2015, at 01:51, Bruce Kellett wrote:


Yes. I think that Bruno's treatment sometimes lacks  
philosophical sophistication. Computationalism is based on the  
idea that human consciousness is Turing emulable,
This is an acceptable terming for some argument, but at some  
point you might understand that this is not really the case. Comp  
assumes only that we can survive ith a digital brain, in the  
quasi-operational meaning of the "yes doctor" scenario.  
Consciousness is a first person notion, and that is not Turing  
emulable per se, in fact that is not even definable in any 3p  
term. That is part of the difficulty of the concept.


In COMP(2013) you write:
"The digital mechanist thesis (or computationalism, or just  
"comp") is then equivalent to the hypothesis that there is a level  
of description of that part of reality in which "my" consciousness  
remains invariant through a functional digital emulation of that  
generalized brain at that particular level."


I think this is saying that human consciousness is Turing emulable.


Only by using an identity thesis, which later will need to be  
abandonned. My consciousness is in Platonia, out of time and space,  
and might rely on infinities of computations. What the brain does   
consists in making it possible for that consciousness to manifest  
itself.


That seems problematic.  What is a consciousness conscious of when  
it is not manifesting itself?


It means it manifest itself elsewhere. It can be in a dream, like a  
sleepy person, or in a parallel universe, or in heaven or God knows  
what.


It can also be conscious of nothing, like with some powerful amnesia  
drug, like Salvia, which put yourself in the state of a sort of baby  
having not yet live any experience, but this is not needed to get the  
points, so I would prefer not insist on this in this thread, as it  
mention a consciousness state in which I would not have believed  
before trying salvia. We can indeed be conscious, and highly  
conscious, yet without any memory. That is even more spectacular with  
only a dissociative state, where you keep your memory, but stop  
completely to identify yourself with those memory. In that state, you  
get the "higher self" experience: where your memories, and your body  
appears to be like a window through which the real person you are can  
observe a world, but knows that such meories are just contingent and  
play no part in defining what you are (the Plotinus and mystic notion  
of inner god).




 To whom does it manifest itself when it is manifest?  ISTM it's  
only manifest to itself - which on your theory wouldn't require a  
brain.


You alway need a relative brain to manifest yourself with respect to  
some other universal number (a physical universe, a friend, a  
correspondent on a list, etc.). But the real you need only the  
arithmetical reality, and "you" can dissociate yourself from your  
infinitely many brains in arithmetic, and get the consciousness state  
of the most elementary virgin (unprogrammed, unexperienced) universal  
numbers, which is common among all living organism.


Here salvia is more amazing than comp, as it suggests intermediate  
realms, where that virgin consciousness can experience heaven or  
hellish sort of dreams. The most amazing thing is that you experience  
or hallucinate that this is your normal state, and that your live here  
was a sort of dream. The feeling of realness is vastly superior than  
the feeling of realness we usually experience in life, and this can be  
frightening for people who believe we can know that we are awake by  
introspection, like with the people who believe that reality is  
WYSIWYG. As a friend of mine said after a salvia experience, you get  
new doubts, new fears, etc.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 16 Apr 2015, at 21:54, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/16/2015 1:36 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
So consciousness is not 1-duplicable, but can be considered as  
having been duplicated in some 3-1-view, even before it diverges.


How can it be considered duplicated before it diverges?


By associating it with different token of the machinery  
implementing it.




Are you assuming consciousness is physical and so having different  
spacetime location can distinguish two otherwise indiscernible set  
of thoughts?


No, it can't, in the 1-view, but it can in the 3-1 view. OK?


I'm not sure what 3-1 view means,


It is the content of the diary of the observer outside the box (like  
in sane04), but on the consciousness of the copies involved. This is  
for the people who say that they will be conscious in W and M. That is  
true, but the "pure" 1-view is that they will be conscious in only one  
city (even if that happens in both cities).


In the math part, this is captured by [1][0]A, with [0]A = the usual  
bewesibar of Gödel, and [1]A = [0]A & A (Theaetetus).



but if you mean in the sense of running on two different machines  
then I agree.


OK.


That means duplication of consciousness/computation depends on  
distinguishability of the physical substrate with no distinction in  
the consciousness/computation.


OK. Like when the guy has already been multiplied in W and M, but has  
not yet open the door. We assume of course that the two boxes are  
identical from inside, no windows, and the air molecules at the same  
place (for example). That can be made absolutely identical in the step  
6, where the reconstitutions are made in a virtual environment.




  But is that the duplication envisioned in the M-W thought  
experiment?


Yes, at different steps.




I find I'm confused about that.  In our quantum-mechanical world it  
is impossible to duplicate something in an unknown state.  One could  
duplicate a human being in the rough classical sense of structure at  
the molecular composition level, but not the molecular states.  Such  
duplicates would be similar as I'm similar to myself of yesterday -  
but they would instantly diverge in thoughts, even without seeing  
Moscow or Washington.


In practice, yes. Assuming the duplication is done in a real world,  
and assuming QM. But in step six, you can manage the environments to  
be themselves perfectly emulated and 100% identical. That is all what  
is needed for the reasoning.





Yet it seems Bruno's argument is based on deterministic computation


At my substitution level. But this will entail that the real world,  
whatever it can be, is non deterministic. We "WM" duplicate on all the  
different computations in the UD* (in arithmetic) which go through my  
local current state.



and requires the duplication and subsequent thoughts to be  
duplicates at a deterministic classcial level so that the M-man and  
W-man on diverge in thought when they see different things in their  
respective cities.


Yes. That is why the H-man cannot predict which divergence he will  
live. But sometimes we mention the state of the person before he or  
she open the doors, for example to address a question like "would a  
tiny oxygen atom in the box makes a difference in the measure or  
not",  Here there is almost a matter of convention to say that there  
are two or one consciousness. We can ascribe consciousness to the  
different people in the different box, but that is a 3-1 view. The 1- 
views feels to be in once city, and not in the other.


Bruno





Brent

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett  wrote:

> Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>>
>> meekerdb wrote:
>>
>> On 4/15/2015 11:16 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>
>> LizR wrote:
>>
>> On 16 April 2015 at 15:37, Bruce Kellett
>> > > wrote:
>>
>> Bruno has said to me that one cannot refute a
>> scientific finding by
>> philosophy. One cannot, of course, refute a
>> scientific observation
>> by philosophy, but one can certainly enter a
>> philosophical
>> discussion of the meaning and interpretation of an
>> observation. In
>> an argument like Bruno's, one can certainly question
>> the
>> metaphysical and other presumptions that go into his
>> discourse.
>>
>> Yes, of course. I don't think anyone is denying that -
>> quite the reverse, people who argue /against /Bruno
>> often do so on the basis of unexamined metaphysical
>> assumptions (like primary materialism)
>>
>>
>> And the contrary, that primary materialism is false, is just
>> as much an unevidenced metaphysical assumption.
>>
>>
>> But it's not an assumption in Bruno's argument. As I understand
>> it, his theory in outline is:
>>
>> 1. All our thoughts are certain kinds of computations.
>> 2. The physical world is an inference from our thoughts.
>> 3. Computations are abstract relations among mathematical objects.
>> 4. The physical world is instantiated by those computations that
>> correspond to intersubjective agreement in our thoughts.
>> 5. Our perceptions/thoughts/beliefs about the world are modeled
>> by computed relations between the computed physics and our
>> computed thoughts.
>> 6. The UD realizes (in Platonia) all possible computations and
>> so realizes the model 1-5 in all possible ways and this produces
>> the multiple-worlds of QM, plus perhaps infinitely many other
>> worlds which he hopes to show have "low measure".
>>
>>
>> I leave it to Bruno to comment on whether this is a fair summary of
>> his theory. I have difficulties with several of the points you list.
>> But that aside, one has to ask exactly what has bee achieved, even
>> if all of this goes through? I do not think it explains
>> consciousness. It seems to stem from the idea that consciousness is
>> a certain type of computation (that can be emulated in a universal
>> Turing machine, or general purpose computer.) This is then developed
>> as a form of idealism (2 above) to argue that the physical world and
>> our perceptions, thoughts, and beliefs about that world, are also
>> certain types of computations.
>>
>> But this is no nearer to an explanation of consciousness than the
>> alternative model of assuming a primitive physical universe and
>> arguing that consciousness supervenes on the physical structure of
>> brains, and that mathematics is an inference from our physical
>> experiences. Consciousness supervenes on computations? What sort of
>> computation? Why on this sort and not any other sort? Similar
>> questions arise in the physicalist account of course, but proposing
>> a new theory that does not answer any of the questions posed by the
>> original theory does not seem like an advance to me. At least
>> physicalism has evolutionary arguments open to it as an explanation
>> of consciousness
>>
>> The physicalist model has the advantage that it gives the physical
>> world directly -- physics does not have to be constructed from some
>> abstract computations in Platonia (even if such a concept can be
>> given any meaning.) If you take the degree of agreement with
>> observation as the measure of success of a theory, then physicalism
>> wins hands down. Bruno's theory does not currently produce any real
>> physics at all.
>>
>> The discussion of the detailed steps in the argument Bruno gives is
>> merely a search for clarification. As I have said, many things seem
>> open to philosophical discussion, and some of Bruno's definitions
>> seem self-serving. When I seek clarification, the ground seems to
>> move beneath me. The detailed argument is hard to pin down for these
>> reasons.
>>
>>
>> Physicalism reduces to computationalism if the physics in the brain is
>> Turing emulable, and then if you follow Bruno's reasoning in the UDA
>> computationalism leads to elimination of a primary physical world.
>>
>
> But physics itself is not Turing emulab

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 16 Apr 2015, at 21:18, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/16/2015 1:01 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 16 Apr 2015, at 05:33, Bruce Kellett wrote:


LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 12:53, Bruce Kellett  
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>>  
wrote:

  LizR wrote:
  On 15 April 2015 at 10:15, John Clark mailto:johnkcl...@gmail.com> >> wrote:
  Yes but I'm confused, I though you were the one arguing  
that

  Bruno
  had discovered something new under the sun, a new sort of
  uncertainty That's hardly what Bruno is claiming.  
Step 3 is only a small
  step in a logical argument. It shows that if our normal  
everyday

  consciousness is the result of computation, then it can be
  duplicated (in principle - if you have a problem with matter
  duplicators, consider an AI programme) and that this leads to
  what looks like uncertainty from one person's perspective.
  You only get that impression because in Bruno's treatment of the
  case -- the two copies are immediately separated by a large  
distance
  and don't further interact. You might come to a different  
conclusion

  if you let the copies sit down together and have a chat.
That doesn't make any difference to the argument. "Will I be the  
copy sitting in the chair on the left?" is less dramatic than  
"Will I be transported to Moscow or Washington?" and hence, I  
suspect, might not make the point so clearly. But otherwise the  
argument goes through either way.


No, because as I argued elsewhere, the two 'copies' would not  
agree that they were the same person.



  Separating them geographically was meant to mimic the different
  worlds idea from MWI. But I think that is a bit of a cheat.
I don't know where Bruno says he's mimicking the MWI (at this  
stage) ? This is a classical result, assuming classical  
computation (which according to Max Tegmark is a reasonable  
assumption for brains).


In the protracted arguments with John Clark, the point was  
repeated made that he accepted FPI for MWI, so why not for Step 3.  
Step 3 is basically to introduce the idea of FPI, and hence form a  
link with the MWI of quantum mechanics. This may not always have  
been made explicit, but the intention is clear.


It is not made at all. people who criticize UDA always criticize  
what they add themselves to the reasoning. This is not valid.  
People who does that criticize only themselves, not the argument  
presented.



Step 3 does not succeed in this because the inference to FPI  
depends on a flawed concept of personal identity.



Step 3 leads to the FPI, and to see what happens next, there is  
step 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. Then the translation in arithmetic show how  
to already extract the logic of the observable so that we might  
refute a form of comp (based on comp + the classical theory of  
knowledge). That main point there is that incompleteness refutes  
Socrates argument against the Theaetetus,


Which argument do you refer to?  Theaetetus puts forward several  
theories of knowledge which Socrates attempts to refute.


That's true.
I was referring to the definition of knowledge by "true justified  
opinion": the passage from []A (rational opinion, justified  
proposition)  to []A & A (justified opinion which is also true).


Incompleteness (the impossibility to prove []f -> f) gives an  
arithmetical sense to that move, as the logic of []A, which is G, will  
obey to a different logic than the logic of []A & A.  []f does not  
imply f, from the machine's view, but []f & f does trivially imply f.


Bruno





Brent

and we can almost directly retrieve the Parmenides-Plotinus  
"theology" in the discourse of the introspecting universal (Löbian)  
machine.


Bruno




Bruce

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To po

Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

2015-04-17 Thread Bruce Kellett


Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On Friday, April 17, 2015, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


meekerdb wrote:

On 4/15/2015 11:16 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

LizR wrote:

On 16 April 2015 at 15:37, Bruce Kellett
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>> wrote:

Bruno has said to me that one cannot refute a
scientific finding by
philosophy. One cannot, of course, refute a
scientific observation
by philosophy, but one can certainly enter a
philosophical
discussion of the meaning and interpretation of an
observation. In
an argument like Bruno's, one can certainly question the
metaphysical and other presumptions that go into his
discourse.

Yes, of course. I don't think anyone is denying that -
quite the reverse, people who argue /against /Bruno
often do so on the basis of unexamined metaphysical
assumptions (like primary materialism)


And the contrary, that primary materialism is false, is just
as much an unevidenced metaphysical assumption.


But it's not an assumption in Bruno's argument. As I understand
it, his theory in outline is:

1. All our thoughts are certain kinds of computations.
2. The physical world is an inference from our thoughts.
3. Computations are abstract relations among mathematical objects.
4. The physical world is instantiated by those computations that
correspond to intersubjective agreement in our thoughts.
5. Our perceptions/thoughts/beliefs about the world are modeled
by computed relations between the computed physics and our
computed thoughts.
6. The UD realizes (in Platonia) all possible computations and
so realizes the model 1-5 in all possible ways and this produces
the multiple-worlds of QM, plus perhaps infinitely many other
worlds which he hopes to show have "low measure".


I leave it to Bruno to comment on whether this is a fair summary of
his theory. I have difficulties with several of the points you list.
But that aside, one has to ask exactly what has bee achieved, even
if all of this goes through? I do not think it explains
consciousness. It seems to stem from the idea that consciousness is
a certain type of computation (that can be emulated in a universal
Turing machine, or general purpose computer.) This is then developed
as a form of idealism (2 above) to argue that the physical world and
our perceptions, thoughts, and beliefs about that world, are also
certain types of computations.

But this is no nearer to an explanation of consciousness than the
alternative model of assuming a primitive physical universe and
arguing that consciousness supervenes on the physical structure of
brains, and that mathematics is an inference from our physical
experiences. Consciousness supervenes on computations? What sort of
computation? Why on this sort and not any other sort? Similar
questions arise in the physicalist account of course, but proposing
a new theory that does not answer any of the questions posed by the
original theory does not seem like an advance to me. At least
physicalism has evolutionary arguments open to it as an explanation
of consciousness

The physicalist model has the advantage that it gives the physical
world directly -- physics does not have to be constructed from some
abstract computations in Platonia (even if such a concept can be
given any meaning.) If you take the degree of agreement with
observation as the measure of success of a theory, then physicalism
wins hands down. Bruno's theory does not currently produce any real
physics at all.

The discussion of the detailed steps in the argument Bruno gives is
merely a search for clarification. As I have said, many things seem
open to philosophical discussion, and some of Bruno's definitions
seem self-serving. When I seek clarification, the ground seems to
move beneath me. The detailed argument is hard to pin down for these
reasons.


Physicalism reduces to computationalism if the physics in the brain is 
Turing emulable, and then if you follow Bruno's reasoning in the 
UDA computationalism leads to elimination of a primary physical world.


But physics itself is not Turing emulable. The no-cloning theorem of 
quantum physics precludes it.


Bruce

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness

On 16 Apr 2015, at 21:18, meekerdb wrote:

On 4/16/2015 1:11 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 16 Apr 2015, at 02:52, meekerdb wrote:

On 4/15/2015 5:29 PM, LizR wrote:

On 15 April 2015 at 04:40, meekerdb  wrote:
On 4/13/2015 11:31 PM, Quentin Anciaux wrote:

Le 14 avr. 2015 08:04, "Stathis Papaioannou"  
 a écrit :

> Certainly some theories of consciousness might not allow  
copying, but

> that cannot be a logical requirement. To claim that something is
> logically impossible is to claim that it is self-contradictory.

I don't see why a theory saying like I said in the upper  
paragraph that consciousness could not be copied would be  
selfcontradictory... You have to see that when you say  
consciousness is duplicatable, you assume a lot of things about  
the reality and how it is working, and that you're making a  
metaphysical commitment, a leap of faith concerning what you  
assume the real to be and the reality itself. That's all I'm  
saying, but clearly if computationalism is true consciousness is  
obviously duplicatable.

Quentin
In order to say what duplication of consciousness is and whether  
it is non-contradictory you need some propositional definition of  
it.  Not just, an instrospective "well everybody knows what it is".

Comp assumes it's an outcome of computational processes, at some  
level. Is that enough to be a propositional definition?

I don't think it's specific enough because it isn't clear whether  
computational process means a physical process or an abstract  
one.  If you take "computational process" to be the abstract  
process "in Platonia" then it would not be duplicable;

?

The UD "copied" the "abstract" process an infinity of times. It  
might appear in

phi_567_(29)^45, phi_567_(29)^46, phi_567_(29)^47, phi_567_(29)^48,  
phi_567_(29)^49, phi_567_(29)^50, ... and in

phi_8999704_(0)^89,   phi_8999704_(0)^90,  phi_8999704_(0)^91,   
phi_8999704_(0)^92,  phi_8999704_(0)^93,

I don't understand your notation here.  Does phi_i(x) refer to the  
ith function in some list of all functions?

Yes. The computably enumerable (with repetitions) list of the partial  
computable functions. You get one, you choose your favorite universal  
programming language, and order the programs lexicographically. This  
determines a list of the phi_i.

And does the exponent refer to repeated iteration: phi_i(x)^n+1 :=  
phi_i(phi_i(x)^n)?

No. phi_i(x)^n represents the nth first step of the computation.

A universal dovetailer is given by the following program:

FOR ALL x, y, z
compute phi_x(y)^z
END

Here the dovetailing is managed by the infinite FOR ALL.

Bruno

every copy would just be a token of the same process.  I think  
that's what Bruno means.

The consciousness will be the same, but it is multiplied (in some  
3-1 sense) in UD* (sigma_1 truth).

Are you saying that identity of indiscernibles doesn't apply to  
these computations?

Brent

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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness



On 16 Apr 2015, at 20:24, meekerdb wrote:


On 4/15/2015 11:16 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

LizR wrote:
On 16 April 2015 at 15:37, Bruce Kellett  
mailto:bhkell...@optusnet.com.au>>  
wrote:


   Bruno has said to me that one cannot refute a scientific  
finding by
   philosophy. One cannot, of course, refute a scientific  
observation

   by philosophy, but one can certainly enter a philosophical
   discussion of the meaning and interpretation of an observation.  
In

   an argument like Bruno's, one can certainly question the
   metaphysical and other presumptions that go into his discourse.


Yes, of course. I don't think anyone is denying that - quite the  
reverse, people who argue /against /Bruno often do so on the basis  
of unexamined metaphysical assumptions (like primary materialism)


And the contrary, that primary materialism is false, is just as  
much an unevidenced metaphysical assumption.


But it's not an assumption in Bruno's argument. As I understand it,  
his theory in outline is:


1. All our thoughts are certain kinds of computations.
2. The physical world is an inference from our thoughts.
3. Computations are abstract relations among mathematical objects.
4. The physical world is instantiated by those computations that  
correspond to intersubjective agreement in our thoughts.
5. Our perceptions/thoughts/beliefs about the world are modeled by  
computed relations between the computed physics


Computed or not.




and our computed thoughts.
6. The UD realizes (in Platonia) all possible computations and so  
realizes the model 1-5 in all possible ways and this produces the  
multiple-worlds of QM, plus perhaps infinitely many other worlds  
which he hopes to show have "low measure".


Well, better to talk in term of the continuations. The indeterminacy  
is relative, for the physics. There is another more geographical  
indterminacy, which is more Bayesian, like if there are carbon atoms,  
I have to find myself in a reality with carbon maker (like stars).  
That indeterminacy still requires a notion of normal (Gaussian)  
reality, and thus a solution to the general measure problem.


Rather good summary Brent!

Bruno




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Re: Michael Graziano's theory of consciousness