RE: A riddle for John Clark
Le 21 juil. 2015 01:05, "chris peck" a écrit : > > >> the question asked to him in Helsnki concerns his expectation of his experiences, and thus his experience content, which can only be "seeing one city among W and M", i.e. "W or M". > > nah. he can expect to have two mutually exclusive experiences. He will dream of being in Red Square and of having a coffee by the feet of the Lincoln memorial, all in vivid 1p. He will expect both experiences and look forward to them. If he only expected one then he would demand to go half price. Who would book a duplication to Moscow and Washington only expecting to see one? This double expectancy has nothing to do with confusing 1p 3-he 2-I or p p it just follows from the fact he will be multiplied. He can't avoid taking that into account. It will seem odd that these experiences will be separate from one another, particularly while he is in Helsinki where he is just one man, but relative to this situation in Helsinki he WILL expect to have both experiences. And he will be right. > > Consequently, P(W || M) = 1. P(W & M) = 1. Then under MWI, P(spin up & spin down) = 1, if you agree then fine. Quentin > > > From: marc...@ulb.ac.be > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark > Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 09:05:48 +0200 > > > > On 20 Jul 2015, at 01:17, John Clark wrote: > >> On Sun, Jul 19, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >>> > T >>> he probability of he (or anyone, actually) *experiencing* one and only one city is one. >> >> >> If you want that statement to be true then "he" can't mean somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki, you're going to have to change what "he" means to something else. >> But of course ICT1PWT3P, > > > > Not at all. "he" means the guy who remember being the man in Helsinki. But the question asked to him in Helsnki concerns his expectation of his experiences, and thus his experience content, which can only be "seeing one city among W and M", i.e. "W or M". > > >> >>> > >>> Proof: let do the experience and ask after the duplication has been completed to all the guys---who remembers being the guy who was in Helsinki before the duplication---how many cities they have seen behind the door. >> >> >> OK, "he" will say one city, Moscow. And "he" will say one city, Washington. > > > In the third person description of the first person experience, not in the content of each of those experience. > > > > >> So if 1+1 =2, and I really think it is, then "he" saw 2 cities. > > > Nobody see two cities from their first person points on view, which is what has to be taken into account to answer the question asked. Unless you believe that after a duplication you become a two head monster capable of seeing two cities at once (but you have already agreed that the two first person experience are independent, so ...). > > > > >> If you want that statement to be false then "he" can't mean somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki, > > > On the contrary, he can only mean that. Now there are two of them, so we must interview two of those man who have the Helsinki memory, and both confirms P(W v M) = 1, and both confirms P(W & M) = 0. > > I can't interview the two headed monster, as it is not even a man, but an imaginary being which makes no sense with computationalism. > > > > > >> you're going to have to change what "he" means to something else. >> >> But of course ICT1PWT3P, > > > Not at all. The definition of which we agree is fine. > > >> >>> >>> > >>> From a first person view, a duplication does not duplicate, >> >> >> If that first person wants to discuss what will happen to "him" after the people duplicator has been turned on that discussion will be gibberish unless it is realized that the first person view has been duplicated. >> But of course ICT1PWT3P, > > > The first person has been duplicated in the 3-1 view. Not in the 1-1 view. The question was about the 1-view to be expected. As none ever get the seeing of W and M, and as both get the seeing of W or M, the answer is rather easy. > > > >> >> >> >> > >> The only way to confirm the expectations is in interviewing the copies, about their experience >> >> I agree but one interview is not sufficient to confirm or refute the expectation, two are required. > > > Nobody has ever disagree on this. Yet, both interview confirms the "W v M" expectation, and both confirms "W & M" is never felt. The "W & M" does not even make sense for a first person content of self-localization. "W & M" is evacuated immediately once we understand that the question was about those first person experience. > > >> Not that expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have anything to do with consciousness or the unique feeling of self. > > > > Perhaps. Yet the question *is* about the unique city possible felt after the duplication. Both confirms the feeling of the uniqueness of the city seen when opening the door, and thus the "W or M" is c
Re: FPI & possible continuations
Hi Terren, so you think there ARE UFOs? just as you think there are those other features you mentioned (or even Telmo's Mongol invasions?) I could question TIME as well (Quentin) in my agnosticism. Our "knowable(??)" world/science is flexible and creative. I would not mix it up with 'reality' what we cannot know for sure. (Please, consider the English ambiguity in this last sentence: A. We cannot know for sure WHAT reality is, - or - B. I cannot mix up time and the other items with reality. ) John Mikes On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:40 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: > Question for Bruno or anyone else: > > Let's say I see a UFO. There are potentially many competing explanations > for what I saw. Does FPI entail that all of them could be a continuation > from my current state, so long as the explanation robustly produces the > phenomena I experienced? > > In other words, so long as what I experience is identical, relative to > each possible explanation of the phenomena (e.g. aliens / military > prototype / atmospheric disturbance / holographic projection / etc), does > that not entail computational equivalence among the potential > continuations, even if the measure would differ among them? Is my ongoing > experience the only thing that matters when it comes to the set of "the > infinite computations going through my state"? If not, what principle > could rule out a particular explanation despite it potentially being able > to produce identically the phenomena in my experience (UFO)? > > Terren > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
RE: A riddle for John Clark
>> the question asked to him in Helsnki concerns his expectation of his >> experiences, and thus his experience content, which can only be "seeing one >> city among W and M", i.e. "W or M". nah. he can expect to have two mutually exclusive experiences. He will dream of being in Red Square and of having a coffee by the feet of the Lincoln memorial, all in vivid 1p. He will expect both experiences and look forward to them. If he only expected one then he would demand to go half price. Who would book a duplication to Moscow and Washington only expecting to see one? This double expectancy has nothing to do with confusing 1p 3-he 2-I or p p it just follows from the fact he will be multiplied. He can't avoid taking that into account. It will seem odd that these experiences will be separate from one another, particularly while he is in Helsinki where he is just one man, but relative to this situation in Helsinki he WILL expect to have both experiences. And he will be right. Consequently, P(W || M) = 1. P(W & M) = 1. From: marc...@ulb.ac.be To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: A riddle for John Clark Date: Mon, 20 Jul 2015 09:05:48 +0200 On 20 Jul 2015, at 01:17, John Clark wrote:On Sun, Jul 19, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: > The probability of he (or anyone, actually) *experiencing* one and only one city is one. If you want that statement to be true then "he" can't mean somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki, you're going to have to change what "he" means to something else. But of course ICT1PWT3P, Not at all. "he" means the guy who remember being the man in Helsinki. But the question asked to him in Helsnki concerns his expectation of his experiences, and thus his experience content, which can only be "seeing one city among W and M", i.e. "W or M". > Proof: let do the experience and ask after the duplication has been completed to all the guys---who remembers being the guy who was in Helsinki before the duplication---how many cities they have seen behind the door. OK, "he" will say one city, Moscow. And "he" will say one city, Washington. In the third person description of the first person experience, not in the content of each of those experience. So if 1+1 =2, and I really think it is, then "he" saw 2 cities. Nobody see two cities from their first person points on view, which is what has to be taken into account to answer the question asked. Unless you believe that after a duplication you become a two head monster capable of seeing two cities at once (but you have already agreed that the two first person experience are independent, so ...). If you want that statement to be false then "he" can't mean somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki, On the contrary, he can only mean that. Now there are two of them, so we must interview two of those man who have the Helsinki memory, and both confirms P(W v M) = 1, and both confirms P(W & M) = 0. I can't interview the two headed monster, as it is not even a man, but an imaginary being which makes no sense with computationalism. you're going to have to change what "he" means to something else. But of course ICT1PWT3P, Not at all. The definition of which we agree is fine. > From a first person view, a duplication does not duplicate, If that first person wants to discuss what will happen to "him" after the people duplicator has been turned on that discussion will be gibberish unless it is realized that the first person view has been duplicated. But of course ICT1PWT3P, The first person has been duplicated in the 3-1 view. Not in the 1-1 view. The question was about the 1-view to be expected. As none ever get the seeing of W and M, and as both get the seeing of W or M, the answer is rather easy. > The only way to confirm the expectations is in interviewing the copies, about their experience I agree but one interview is not sufficient to confirm or refute the expectation, two are required. Nobody has ever disagree on this. Yet, both interview confirms the "W v M" expectation, and both confirms "W & M" is never felt. The "W & M" does not even make sense for a first person content of self-localization. "W & M" is evacuated immediately once we understand that the question was about those first person experience. Not that expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have anything to do with consciousness or the unique feeling of self. Perhaps. Yet the question *is* about the unique city possible felt after the duplication. Both confirms the feeling of the uniqueness of the city seen when opening the door, and thus the "W or M" is confirmed, and the "W & M" is refuted. For both of them. Bruno But of course ICT1PWT3P, John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+un
Re: FPI & possible continuations
Le 20 juil. 2015 23:14, "Telmo Menezes" a écrit : > > Hi Terren, > > I won't try to answer but instead increase the scope of the question. Could it also apply to the past? Could there be many (infinite?) possible histories that lead to the current state of affairs, but until you learn about, say, the Mongol invasions then the Mongol invasions are just a possibility? I think it is, as measure is a relative thing, it echoes also the memory erasure experiment that Saibal Mitra I think once told. So yes any moment has multiple past as well as multiple futures. Whatever the relative measure of each, each moment is as real as any other. Quentin > > Cheers, > Telmo. > > On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 9:40 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: >> >> Question for Bruno or anyone else: >> >> Let's say I see a UFO. There are potentially many competing explanations for what I saw. Does FPI entail that all of them could be a continuation from my current state, so long as the explanation robustly produces the phenomena I experienced? >> >> In other words, so long as what I experience is identical, relative to each possible explanation of the phenomena (e.g. aliens / military prototype / atmospheric disturbance / holographic projection / etc), does that not entail computational equivalence among the potential continuations, even if the measure would differ among them? Is my ongoing experience the only thing that matters when it comes to the set of "the infinite computations going through my state"? If not, what principle could rule out a particular explanation despite it potentially being able to produce identically the phenomena in my experience (UFO)? >> >> Terren >> >> >> >> >> >> -- >> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. >> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. >> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. >> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. >> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: FPI & possible continuations
Hi Terren, I won't try to answer but instead increase the scope of the question. Could it also apply to the past? Could there be many (infinite?) possible histories that lead to the current state of affairs, but until you learn about, say, the Mongol invasions then the Mongol invasions are just a possibility? Cheers, Telmo. On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 9:40 PM, Terren Suydam wrote: > Question for Bruno or anyone else: > > Let's say I see a UFO. There are potentially many competing explanations > for what I saw. Does FPI entail that all of them could be a continuation > from my current state, so long as the explanation robustly produces the > phenomena I experienced? > > In other words, so long as what I experience is identical, relative to > each possible explanation of the phenomena (e.g. aliens / military > prototype / atmospheric disturbance / holographic projection / etc), does > that not entail computational equivalence among the potential > continuations, even if the measure would differ among them? Is my ongoing > experience the only thing that matters when it comes to the set of "the > infinite computations going through my state"? If not, what principle > could rule out a particular explanation despite it potentially being able > to produce identically the phenomena in my experience (UFO)? > > Terren > > > > > > -- > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an > email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. > To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. > Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. > For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
FPI & possible continuations
Question for Bruno or anyone else: Let's say I see a UFO. There are potentially many competing explanations for what I saw. Does FPI entail that all of them could be a continuation from my current state, so long as the explanation robustly produces the phenomena I experienced? In other words, so long as what I experience is identical, relative to each possible explanation of the phenomena (e.g. aliens / military prototype / atmospheric disturbance / holographic projection / etc), does that not entail computational equivalence among the potential continuations, even if the measure would differ among them? Is my ongoing experience the only thing that matters when it comes to the set of "the infinite computations going through my state"? If not, what principle could rule out a particular explanation despite it potentially being able to produce identically the phenomena in my experience (UFO)? Terren -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A curious puzzle - teaching a computer to understand infinity
On Mon, Jul 20, 2015 at 3:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: > > The quantization of space time has no need to extend to the mathematical > space used to evaluate the amplitude of probability. > That probability is obtained by taking the square of the absolute value of Schrodinger's Wave Function, and normally that wave function has irrational numbers like PI and e in it, but if it turns out that spacetime is quantized then a more accurate probability could be obtained by replacing PI and e by rational numbers. This is what Peter Shore (the man who discovered the superfast quantum algorithm for factoring numbers) had to say when asked why physicists use Real Numbers: "We do it because it matches experiment ... why else? (And actually, strictly speaking, we don't---we use Minkowski coordinates for space-time.) If somebody can think of an experiment which will tell the difference between the reals and the hyperreals or surreals, we may eventually have to change the way we do things. I am actually interested in why we don't just use the the rationals to model things. Although I understand that the Pythagorean theorem demands irrational distances, the fact is that no device ever measures irrational values." John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A curious puzzle - teaching a computer to understand infinity
On 20 Jul 2015, at 00:38, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Jul 19, 2015 at 1:17 PM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >>But the truth is if space-time IS quantized then the Real Numbers are a mathematical fiction. > That does not follow. You might still need the real in the amplitudes. The irrational sqrt(2) will not go away so easily. If space-time is quantized (and it may or may not be) then the diagonal of a square that has a side of one unit is NOT the sqrt(2), instead its amplitude could be exactly described with a number with a finite number of digits to the right of the decimal point and physics would have no need of the Real Numbers except as a handy approximation. Actually the Real Numbers are already a mathematical fiction in experimental physics, perhaps someday the same will be true of theoretical physics. The quantization of space time has no need to extend to the mathematical space used to evaluate the amplitude of probability. Take the notion of qubit. This is a typical quantized object, yet to get all possible qubits, you need all linear combination of the I0> and I1> with all complex coefficients: a I0> + b I1>, with a^2 + b^2 = 1. Quantization does not eliminate per se the need of the real numbers. Bruno John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
Re: A riddle for John Clark
On 20 Jul 2015, at 01:17, John Clark wrote: On Sun, Jul 19, 2015 Bruno Marchal wrote: > The probability of he (or anyone, actually) *experiencing* one and only one city is one. If you want that statement to be true then "he" can't mean somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki, you're going to have to change what "he" means to something else. But of course ICT1PWT3P, Not at all. "he" means the guy who remember being the man in Helsinki. But the question asked to him in Helsnki concerns his expectation of his experiences, and thus his experience content, which can only be "seeing one city among W and M", i.e. "W or M". > Proof: let do the experience and ask after the duplication has been completed to all the guys---who remembers being the guy who was in Helsinki before the duplication---how many cities they have seen behind the door. OK, "he" will say one city, Moscow. And "he" will say one city, Washington. In the third person description of the first person experience, not in the content of each of those experience. So if 1+1 =2, and I really think it is, then "he" saw 2 cities. Nobody see two cities from their first person points on view, which is what has to be taken into account to answer the question asked. Unless you believe that after a duplication you become a two head monster capable of seeing two cities at once (but you have already agreed that the two first person experience are independent, so ...). If you want that statement to be false then "he" can't mean somebody who remembers being a man in Helsinki, On the contrary, he can only mean that. Now there are two of them, so we must interview two of those man who have the Helsinki memory, and both confirms P(W v M) = 1, and both confirms P(W & M) = 0. I can't interview the two headed monster, as it is not even a man, but an imaginary being which makes no sense with computationalism. you're going to have to change what "he" means to something else. But of course ICT1PWT3P, Not at all. The definition of which we agree is fine. > From a first person view, a duplication does not duplicate, If that first person wants to discuss what will happen to "him" after the people duplicator has been turned on that discussion will be gibberish unless it is realized that the first person view has been duplicated. But of course ICT1PWT3P, The first person has been duplicated in the 3-1 view. Not in the 1-1 view. The question was about the 1-view to be expected. As none ever get the seeing of W and M, and as both get the seeing of W or M, the answer is rather easy. > The only way to confirm the expectations is in interviewing the copies, about their experience I agree but one interview is not sufficient to confirm or refute the expectation, two are required. Nobody has ever disagree on this. Yet, both interview confirms the "W v M" expectation, and both confirms "W & M" is never felt. The "W & M" does not even make sense for a first person content of self- localization. "W & M" is evacuated immediately once we understand that the question was about those first person experience. Not that expectations, correct ones or incorrect ones, have anything to do with consciousness or the unique feeling of self. Perhaps. Yet the question *is* about the unique city possible felt after the duplication. Both confirms the feeling of the uniqueness of the city seen when opening the door, and thus the "W or M" is confirmed, and the "W & M" is refuted. For both of them. Bruno But of course ICT1PWT3P, John K Clark -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout. http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com. Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list. For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
