Re: Answer to Job

[Brent Meeker]

I don't know if God exists, but it would be better for His reputation if 
He did not.

  --- Jules Renard


On 8/11/2016 12:15 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

Interesting ideas on the everything, problem of evil, and maximum good:

http://slatestarcodex.com/2015/03/15/answer-to-job/

Jason


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Answer to Job

[Jason Resch]

Interesting ideas on the everything, problem of evil, and maximum good:

http://slatestarcodex.com/2015/03/15/answer-to-job/

Jason

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Re: "We spent a long time trying to convince ourselves this wasn’t real"

[John Clark]

On Tue, Aug 9, 2016 at 9:17 AM, Telmo Menezes 
wrote:


​> ​
> Those are all good points, but it is not necessary that the Dyson
> ​ ​
> builders are native of the star where they are building a certain
> ​ ​
> sphere, right?
>

​Maybe, but if interstellar travel was common ​
we'd expect to see lots of Dyson spheres instead of (at best) one partially
constructed one.

 John K Clark  ​

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Re: Holiday Exercise

[John Clark]

On Thu, Aug 11, 2016 at 10:55 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​>> ​in general it's not true that they will
>> ​
>> perceiving different things
>> ​
>> , if you were the identical copy and in a symmetrical  environment and
>> facing your original the two of you would see identical things, and if your
>> position was instantaneously exchanged with the original there would be no
>> change in your consciousness or of that of the original, neither of you
>> could even tell an exchange had occurred. So in that situation how could it
>> make sense to talk of "
>> ​
>> two different consciousnesses" when there is clearly no difference
>> between them?
>
>
> ​> ​
> And this shows that you agree (implicitly at least) that in the step 3
> case, the two identical bodies interact with quite different environment,
> and get their consciousness bifurcating/differentiating.
>

​Well of course I agree with that! One is conscious of Moscow and the other
is conscious of Washington, how could anyone say that's not a difference,
how could anyone say they're still identical?

​> ​
> The "identical copies"
>

​They were once identical but after seeing different cities ​they are now
nonidentical copies. And yet both are the Helsinki man. And that is why
establishing a personal sense of self can only come from remembering the
past and never from trying to predict the future.

​> ​
> could not predict the first person result of the differentiation.
>

​Nobody and nothing will ever be able to predict ​"*THE* first person
result of the differentiation" because after differentiation "*THE* first
person result of the differentiation" is pure triple distilled extra virgin
100% gibberish.  Nobody will ever be able to predict "sjhfhzbawhfd" either.

 John K Clark

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Re: That stupid diary

[John Clark]

On Thu, Aug 11, 2016 at 11:11 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​> ​
> In a post you agreed with principle 1:
> Principle 1:  if the guy in Helsinki is assured that the event X will be
> statified/realized at both W and M, then P(X) = 1.
>

​Probability is a measure of confidence, so ​

​obviously ​if the
guy in Helsinki is assured that
​event X will happen ​
then ​for him P(X)= 1 because that's what being assured means.
Yes
 that's not very deep but hey, it's your thread not mine.

​> ​
> and you have agreed with principle 2:  P_t(X_q) ≠ 1 => P_t'(X_q) ≠ 1, if
> t' < t, and q > t (P_t = probability evaluated at t, and X_q = some event
> at time q.
>

​I don't know if I agree with that or not because the above is confusing, a
event has a specified time and place but you're talking about
the same event at different times, t and t'. And what exactly does P refer
to? I know it's probability but the probability that who assigns to what as
seen by who? I will say that if I know something today I will know it
tomorrow unless I've forgotten it.  And I will say if I'm certain about
something today then I will be certain about it tomorrow unless I was
wrong. And I will say that if I assign a probability that fact X is true
and I receive more information about fact X tomorrow then tomorrow I will
assign a new probability to fact X, and that new probability could be
larger or smaller than yesterday's probability depending on what that new
information is.

​

​> ​
> From this I have derived the indeterminacy
>

​It's not a big news flash that the future is uncertain.​


> ​> ​
> and apparently you change your mind on principle 1.
>

​No I still think that if I am certain of ​something then I would assign a
100% probability of it happening, and only time will tell if my confidence
was justified.

​
>> ​
>> ​>> ​
>> BOTH copies are absolutely convinced that they are the Helsinki man and
>> BOTH are correct, I think you agree on that.
>
>
> ​> ​
> Yes.
>

​At least we agree on one thing.​



​> ​
>> So it makes sense to ask what one city the Moscow man sees and​
>> ​ ​
>> it makes sense to ask what one city the
>> ​ Washington man sees but it makes no sense to ask what one city the
>> Helsinki man will see. ​
>>
>
> ​> ​
> Why?
>

​*WHY*?? Because ​the two see two cities and
BOTH
​of the two ​
are absolutely convinced that they are the Helsinki man and BOTH
​of the two ​
are correct
​, so if the Helsinki man will see two cities it makes no sense to ask the
Helsinki man what one and only one city the Helsinki man will see! And that
is why establishing personal identity can only come from remembering the
past and never from trying to predict the future.


> ​> ​
> He knows that he will
> ​ [...]
>

​... and the pronoun party continues

 John K Clark

​


>
>

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Re: Step 4? (Re: QUESTION 2 (Re: Holiday Exercise

[Bruno Marchal]

On 09 Aug 2016, at 19:32, John Clark wrote:

On Sun, Aug 7, 2016 at 10:40 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


​> ​a nine years old child get the point

​And I might get your point if I had the mentality of a nine year  
old child, or of something similar like an ancient Greek.



Feeling superior? That might be the root of your difficulties here.

Bruno





 John K Clark​



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Re: That stupid diary

[Bruno Marchal]

On 09 Aug 2016, at 19:24, John Clark wrote:



On Tue, Aug 9, 2016 at 11:58 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


 ​> ​I am still waiting for an explanation about your two recent  
posts which contradicted themselves.


​What are you talking about?​



In a post you agreed with principle 1:

Principle 1:  if the guy in Helsinki is assured that the event X will  
be statified/realized at both W and M, then P(X) = 1.


and you have agreed with principle 2:  P_t(X_q) ≠ 1 => P_t'(X_q) ≠  
1, if t' < t, and q > t (P_t = probability evaluated at t, and X_q =  
some event at time q.


From this I have derived the indeterminacy, and apparently you change  
your mind on principle 1.









​> ​The first person remains singular for both copies.

​Yes, and BOTH copies are absolutely convinced that they are the  
Helsinki man and BOTH are correct, I think you agree on that.


Yes.



So it makes sense to ask what one city the Moscow man sees and​ it  
makes sense to ask what one city the​ Washington man sees but it  
makes no sense to ask what one city the Helsinki man will see. ​


Why? He knows that he will push a button, and that he will survive one  
and entire, and this in once of the two city, hetting a doppelganger  
in the other corresponding cities.
If it does not make sense here, it does not make sense in a quantum  
superposition either.







​> ​One is:​ ​I am in Helsinki. I push on a button. I find  
myself in a box, I open the door, and I see Moscow. (and for Bruce:  
and yes, I am conscious of Moscow  and of my consciousness (life,  
experience, first person stories) here in Moscow.​ ​I definitely  
get the bit "M".


​Bruno continues to use a personal pronoun smokescreen to cover  
logical contradictions. I have defined "I" as any chunk of matter  
that behaves in a Johnkclarkian way, and before I pushed the button  
I already said that I would see Moscow and turn into the Moscow man,  
and that is exactly precisely what happened. ​ ​So I did not  
receive one single bit of new information after I pushed the  
button. ​


​> ​The other is:​ ​I am in Helsinki. I push on a button. I  
find myself in a box, I open the door, and I see Washington. (and  
for Bruce: and I am conscious of Washington  and of my consciousness  
(life, experience, first person stories) here in Washington. I  
definitely get the bit "W".


I have defined "I" as any chunk of matter that behaves in a  
Johnkclarkian way, and before I pushed the button I already said  
that I would see Washington and turn into the Washington man, and  
that is exactly precisely what happened. ​ ​So I did not receive  
one single bit of new information after I pushed the button. ​


No need for Bruno to post a reply, I already know Bruno's response,  
I confuse the peepee with the poopoo (or maybe it's the poopoo with  
the peepee). But I have already given a clear non contradictory  
definition of the personal pronoun "I", what is Bruno Marchal​'s  
meaning of that word?​


The 3p-self is the code of the machine. It is simple by ostentation,  
but technically, it needs the diagonal D'X' = 'X'X'' trick, as  
explained previously, but that is not needed for the reversal.
The 1p self is the owner of the memory (in UDA), and the Theatetetus'  
knower in AUDA, and I show there that it makes sense thanks to  
incompleteness. No machine can give a description, but all löbian  
machine can prove that no machine can give a description of it.


Bruno






 John K Clark






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Re: Holiday Exercise

[Bruno Marchal]

On 09 Aug 2016, at 23:30, John Clark wrote:

On Mon, Aug 8, 2016 at 8:51 PM, Brent Meeker   
wrote:


​> ​I think the default assumption is that consciousness  
supervenes on the brain, so two different brains will realize two  
different consciousnesses because they are at different locations  
and perceiving different things.


​But in general it's not true that they will​ perceiving  
different things​, if you were the identical copy and in a  
symmetrical  environment and facing your original the two of you  
would see identical things, and if your position was instantaneously  
exchanged with the original there would be no change in your  
consciousness or of that of the original, neither of you could even  
tell an exchange had occurred. So in that situation how could it  
make sense to talk of "​two different consciousnesses" when there  
is clearly no difference between them?



And this shows that you agree (implicitly at least) that in the step 3  
case, the two identical bodies interact with quite different  
environment, and get their consciousness bifurcating/differentiating.


The "identical copies" could not predict the first person result of  
the differentiation. That follows from question 1 and question 2,  
notably, or question 1a and question 1b, + question 2, to take account  
of a remark by Bruce.


Bruno








​  ​John K Clark





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Re: Holiday Exercise

[Bruno Marchal]

On 09 Aug 2016, at 07:28, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 9/08/2016 3:14 pm, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 8/8/2016 7:03 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 9/08/2016 10:51 am, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 8/8/2016 4:32 PM, Bruce Kellett wrote:

On 9/08/2016 3:01 am, Brent Meeker wrote:
I think Russell is just saying we take it as an added axiom/ 
assumption that the duplicated brain/bodies must have separate  
consciousnesses at least as soon as they have different  
perceptions


If that is what you have to do, why not admit it openly?

This is exactly what you would predict from supposing that  
consciousness is a product of physical processes in the brain -  
something that is supported by lots and lots of evidence.


Yes, if consciousness supervenes on the physical brain, then of  
course that is what we might expect -- two brains ==> two  
consciousnesses. But that says nothing about the case of two  
identical brains -- is there one or two consciousnesses? The  
default assumption around here appears to be that the identity  
of indiscernibles will mean that there is only one conscious  
being. The question is then how this consciousness evolves as  
inputs change?


I think the default assumption is that consciousness supervenes  
on the brain, so two different brains will realize two different  
consciousnesses because they are at different locations and  
perceiving different things.


That is fine if they started off different, and were never  
identical -- identical in all details, not just sharing single  
"observer moments", even if such can be well-defined.


I would speculate that it would be just like having two  
autonomous Mars rovers that "wake up" at different points on the  
surface.  They may have the same computers and sensors and  
programs, but their data and memories will immediately start to  
diverge.  They won't be "completely" different, as identical  
twins aren't completely different.  They may even occasionally  
think the same thoughts.  But relativity tells us there's no  
sense to saying they think them at the same time.


But Mars  rovers are not conscious -- or are they?

I don't think this does much to invalidate Bruno's argument.   
He just wants to show that the physical is derivative, not that  
it's irrelevant.


I disagree. I think it is crucial for Bruno's argument. He  
cannot derive the differentiation of consciousness in this  
duplication case from the YD+CT starting point, so where does it  
come from?


In his theory, it the physics and the consciousness must both  
derive from the infinite threads of computation by the UD. I'm  
just making the point that he does need to derive the physics,  
specifically the finite speed of communication in order to show  
that the duplication results in two different consciousnesses.


The finite speed of communication is a problem only if  
consciousness is localized to the physical brain -- if it is a non- 
local computation, this might not be an issue.


It seems to me an experimental matter -- until we have  
duplicated a conscious being, we will not know whether the  
consciousnesses differentiate on different incomes or not.


Suppose their is an RF link between them so they can share  
computation, memory, sensor data,...  Then we'd be inclined to  
say that they could be a single consciousness.  But now suppose  
they are moved light-years apart.  They could still share  
computation, memory, etc.  But intelligent action on the scale of  
an autonomous rover would have to be based on the local resources  
of a single rover.  So they would have to effectively  
"differentiate".  It wouldn't be some kind of axiomatic,  
mathematically provable differentiation - rather a practical,  
observable one.


Yes, that makes sense. But the rovers are not conscious.


Why not?  Suppose they are.  If you would say "yes to the doctor"  
then you must believe that AI is possible.


I have no reason to suppose that AI is not possible. But the Mars  
rovers are unlikely to be sufficiently complex/self referential to  
be conscious. Do they have an inner narrative?


And if they were placed at different points on the surface of  
Mars, they would have to start with at least some different data  
-- viz., their location on the surface relative to earth. The  
general issue I am raising is that consciousness could be non- 
local, in which case separated duplicates would not need any form  
of subluminal physical communication in order to remain a single  
conscious being.


You seem to be agreeing that this is, at bottom, an empirical  
matter. If we do the experiment and duplicate a conscious being,  
then separate the duplicates, we could ask one whether or not it  
was still aware of its duplicate. If the answer is "No", then we  
know that consciousness is localized to a particular physical  
body. If the answer is "Yes", then we know that consciousness is  
non-local, even though it might still supervene on the physical  
bodies.


I don't think 

Re: Holiday Exercise

[Bruno Marchal]

On 09 Aug 2016, at 02:57, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:




On 9 August 2016 at 03:52, Brent Meeker  wrote:


On 8/8/2016 6:18 AM, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:



On Monday, 8 August 2016, Brent Meeker  wrote:


On 8/7/2016 11:20 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Not necessarily. A digital computer also requires that time be  
digitized so that its registers run synchronously.  Otherwise "the  
state" is ill defined.  The finite speed of light means that  
spacially separated regions cannot be synchronous.  Even if neurons  
were only ON or OFF, which they aren't, they have frequency  
modulation, they are not synchronous.


Synchronous digital machine can emulate asynchronous digital  
machine, and that is all what is needed for the reasoning.


If the time variable is continuous, i.e. can't be digitized, I  
don't think you are correct.


If time is continuous, you would need infinite precision to exactly  
define the timing of a neuron's excitation, so you are right, that  
would not be digitisable. Practically, however, brains would have  
to have a non-zero engineering tolerance, or they would be too  
unstable. The gravitational attraction of a passing ant would  
slightly change the timing of neural activity, leading to a change  
in mental state and behaviour.


I agree that brains must be essentially classical computers, but no  
necessarily digital.  The question arose as to what was contained in  
an Observer Moment and whether, in an infinite universe there would  
necessarily be infinitely many exact instances of the same OM.


Even in a continuum, there would be brain states and mental states  
that are effectively identical to an arbitrary level of precision.  
We maintain a sense of continuity of identity despite sometimes even  
gross changes to our brain. At some threshold there will be a  
perceptible change, but the threshold is not infinitesimal.


  But having a continuous variable doesn't imply instability.
First, the passing ant is also instantiated infinitely many times.   
Second, if a small cause has only a proportionately small effect  
then there is no "instability", more likely the dynamics diverge as  
in deterministic chaos.  But in any case it would allow an aleph-1  
order infinity of  OMs which would differ by infinitesimal amounts.


But I also question the coherence of this idea.  As discussed (at  
great length) by Bruno and JKC, two or more identical brains must  
instantiate the same experience, i.e. the same OM.  So if there are  
only a finite number of possible brain-states and universes are made  
of OMs, then there can only be a finite number of finite universes.


A human brain can probably only have a finite number of thoughts,  
being of finite size, but a turing machine is not so limited.




Turing machines, combinators, programs, numbers, ... are finite  
entities. The universal Turing machine is a number/finite-code. During  
any computation, the Turing machine look only at a finite portion of  
its tape, but it can be as great as needed. Similarly, the humans can  
see only finite number of things at a time, and when they have a  
memory brain overflow, they will use wall, or paper, or magnetic tape.  
It is the essence of a machine to be a finite entity---I would say,  
and it is the essence of a digital machine to be a finite entity  
admitting a finite description (that we can put into a number, and  
store on a disk).


Bruno







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