Re: An invisible fuzzy amoral mindless blob, aka God

[John Clark]

On Mon, Jan 9, 2017 at 1:57 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​>>
>> A definition can't make something exist!​
>
>
> ​> ​
> Wrong.
>

​Are you being serious?​



> ​> ​
> Coiunterexample. I define a glodlyrapicul by a cat. That makes
> the glodlyrapiculs existing


​And ​
I define a glodlyrapicul by a
​dragon. Did my definition cause anything to come into existence? This
conversation is descending from science to mathematics to philosophy to
slapstick.

​> ​
> I cannot explain you the number without using our physical environment,
> but that does not mean that the notion of number depends on the existence
> of that physical environment.


​Never mind something as trivial as numbers, explain to me how the notion
of notion can exist without the physical environment!  ​



> ​>
>>> ​>>​
>>> ​
>>> and are realized in all models of Robinson Arithmetic.
>>
>>
> ​
>> ​>> ​
>> And dragons are realized in all the Harry Potter books,
>
>
> ​> ​
> Now in the sense of computer science, which is relevant here.
>

​Why Not? They seem equally relevant to me.  Both books are made of atoms
that obey the laws of physics, and neither of those arrangements of atoms
are organized is a way that enables them to perform calculations.

>
​>> ​
>> but none of them can burn my finger
>> ​.​
>>
>
> ​> ​
> If you are emulated at the right level in a finger burning situation, you
> will feel the pain,
>

​I agree, maybe we're all living in a computer ​simulation but if we are
it's a *computer* simulation, and computers are made of matter.


> ​>> ​
>> ​You can make any definition you want but if that's what you call
>> "computation" then I don't see why anybody would be interested in it.
>
>
> ​> ​
> Many people are interested. It is a branch of math, and it makes us able
> to show that some problem are not algorithmically solvable.
>

​Massive brainpower was not needed to conclude that no problem can be
solved without brains, but it was needed to discover ​some problems can't
be solved even with brains.



​>> ​
>> If you start with Robinson arithmetic rather than a physical device
>> you'll end up with nothing, not even the null set.
>
>
> ​> ​
> How could that be possible? We interrogate the machine *in* arithmetic.
>

​You interrogate the machine "in" physics because it's made of ​physical
stuff.


> ​> ​
> You are telling me that 3 does not divide 6 when nobody do the physical
> computation,
>

I'm telling you if there were not 6 physical things in the entire universe
or even 3 then "divide 6 by 3" would be meaningless because there would be
no one to give it a meaning. Or put it another way, it would make no
difference to ANYTHING if 6/3=2 was true or not.


> ​> ​
> even physicist can no more use arithmetic without a justification in
> physics that 3 divides 6. But that does not exist,
>

​Yes it does. It was discovered empirically that three apples and three
apples produces the same result as two apples and two apples and two
apples,  ​and "6" is as good a name for that sort of thing as any.




> ​
>> ​>> ​
>> Talk is cheap. We can talk about Faster That Light Spaceships, Star Trek
>> does it all the time, but we can't build one and that's why it's called
>> "fiction".
>
>
> ​> ​
> Except that star strek is fiction.
>

​It's fiction because faster than light spaceships ​doesn't correspond with
physical reality.


> ​> ​
> Arithmetical truth
> ​ [...]
>

​But Arithmetic does correspond with ​physical reality and that's why it's
nonfiction written in the language of mathematics.

​
>> ​>> ​
>> Nothing can be explained without matter ​and the laws of physics because
>> there would be nothing doing the explaining and nothing doing the
>> understanding.
>
>
> ​> ​
> How do you know?
>

​From ​
Induction, something
​ even more important than deduction and something
Robinson
​ ​
arithmetic doesn't have.
​ ​
There are countless examples of matter explaining things and countless
examples of matter understanding things, but there are no examples and no
evidence of anything else doing either.

>
> ​> ​
> then in your theory computationalism is false.
>

​
Maybe in Bruno-speak, but you are the only speaker of that language.
Everybody else means something different by words like "God" or "
computationalism". I just typed Computationalism
​
into Google and this is what I got:

​"*​*
*Computationalism is the view that intelligent behavior is causally
explained by computations performed by the agent's cognitive system (or
brain).​"*

That definition works for me.

I also asked Google to define "God":​

​*"T*
*he creator and ruler of the universe and source of all moral authority;
the supreme being.​ ​A superhuman being or spirit worshiped as having power
over nature or human fortunes​.​"*

​And that definition works for me too.​



> ​> ​
> No theories in math assumes anything in physics.
>

​Mathematicians can't derive the fundamental laws of physics and physics
can't do so either, but they don't need to because they can observe 

Re: An invisible fuzzy amoral mindless blob, aka God

[Bruno Marchal]

On 08 Jan 2017, at 03:16, John Clark wrote:

On Sat, Jan 7, 2017 at 5:23 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


​>>​ How can anything be "used" by anything if matter that obeys  
the laws of physics​ ​is not involved somewhere along the line ?


​> ​because with the standard definition of computation, they  
exist


​A definition can't make something exist!​



Wrong.

Coiunterexample. I define a glodlyrapicul by a cat. That makes the  
glodlyrapiculs existing (assuming you are OK that cat exists, for the  
sake of the argument at least).







​> ​and are realized in all models of Robinson Arithmetic.

​And dragons are realized in all the Harry Potter books,



Now in the sense of computer science, which is relevant here.





but none of them can burn my finger​.​



If you are emulated at the right level in a finger burning situation,  
you will feel the pain, and that will not depend locally from the fact  
that the emulation is made by this or that universal system. Globally,  
for the lasting aspect of the pain, some physics arise, but the theory  
explains why. It is not invoked like a god who could select a  
computation as more real than another.







 ​And without matter that obeys the laws of physics Robinson  
Arithmetic​ can't balance my checkbook, or do anything else  
either.​



That sentence is ambiguous. I can agree, but in the sense I can agree  
with, this does not make matter needed to be assumed in the axiom of  
the fundamental theory.








​> ​The definition of computation does not involve matter

​You can make any definition you want but if that's what you call  
"computation" then I don't see why anybody would be interested in it.



Many people are interested. It is a branch of math, and it makes us  
able to show that some problem are not algorithmically solvable. It is  
used to study our limitations, which is indeed the key of the negative- 
like machine theology, like the neoplatonist one.


Without that definition, we would not say that Hilbert 10th problem  
has been solved (in the negative), etc. recursion theory, and machine  
theology is full of negative result, like universal machine cannot  
named their god, or know if they halt or not, etc.










​> ​You do the same mistake than the people who say that a  
(physical) simulation of a typhoon cannot make us wet. The usual  
answer to this is that a simulation of "you + the typhoon" will make  
a "you" feeling being wet in a relative way.


I agree but there is a difference. I could ask the simulated person  
if the simulated typhoon makes him feel wet, but I don't know how to  
ask 3 if​ Robinson Arithmetic​ makes it feel like it's half of  
6.​



Me neither.

But you can ask the John Clark simulated together with the typhoon at  
the right level in arithmetic if he feels wet, and he will give the  
same answer, not depending if you simulated this in a fortran itself  
on a physical computer, or you trace by hand the theorem in arithmetic  
saying the equivalent situation. Then the feeling itself, of that John  
Clark does not depend of having made the simulation, if you agree that  
the truth of 24 is composite does not depend on you verifying that fact.










>  ​No universal Turing machine can distinguish the following  
situations:
A physical device simulating Robinson arithmetic simulating a Lisp  
universal program simulating that universal Turing machine,

and
Robinson arithmetic simulating a physical device simulating Robinson  
arithmetic simulating a Lisp universal program simulating that  
universal Turing machine.


That is incorrect, It's extraordinarily easy to distinguish between  
the two, one will produce an output and one will not. If you start  
with Robinson arithmetic rather than a physical device you'll end up  
with nothing, not even the null set.



How could that be possible? We interrogate the machine *in*  
arithmetic. The output are given by relative input. You are telling me  
that 3 does not divide 6 when nobody do the physical computation, but  
the even physicist can no more use arithmetic without a justification  
in physics that 3 divides 6. But that does not exist, because physics  
does not even address such question, and borrow from math the useful  
truth. String theory is happy that "1+2+3+4+5+ ... = -1/12" makes  
mathematical sense, so that the photon as a mass zero. They did not  
say "we have proven that 1+2+3+4+5+ ... = -1/12 in the theory string 
+photon-has zero-mass".







​> ​Is this OK for everybody?

​No I don't believe we are.​



I know. You are quite "religious" about this.







​​>> ​A definition is NOT a construction!

​> ​Yes, that is exactly the point.​ We can define the set of  
arithmetical true statements, and so we can *talk* about it, without  
being able to construct it, or to generate it mechanically.


​Talk is cheap. We can talk about Faster That Light Spaceships,  
Star Trek does it all the time, but we can't build one and 

Re: An invisible fuzzy amoral mindless blob, aka God

[Bruno Marchal]

On 07 Jan 2017, at 20:27, Brent Meeker wrote:




On 1/7/2017 2:23 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 07 Jan 2017, at 02:42, John Clark wrote:

On Thu, Jan 5, 2017 at 3:18 AM, Bruno Marchal   
wrote:


​ ​>>​ It is insufficient to explain what a computation is,  
what is needed is an explanation of how to perform a calculation.  
In textbooks on arithmetic it will say something like "take this  
number and place it in that set"  but how do I "take" a number and  
how do I "place" it in a set without matter that obeys the laws of  
physics?


By using the representation of finite sequence of number by a  
number, for example by using Gödel's numbering


​ What!? that's just passing the buck! How can anything be "used"  
by anything if matter that obeys the laws of physics ​ ​ is not  
involved somewhere along the line ?



because with the standard definition of computation, they exist and  
are realized in all models of Robinson Arithmetic. The definition  
of computation does not involve matter, and indeed we can  
eventually understand that matter is an appearance from the points  
of view of immaterial machine implemented in an non material reality.


You do the same mistake than the people who say that a (physical)  
simulation of a typhoon cannot make us wet. The usual answer to  
this is that a simulation of "you + the typhoon" will make a "you"  
feeling being wet in a relative way. It is the same in arithmetic,  
where a simulation (actually infinitely many) of "you", below your  
substitution level, will make you feel the appearance of matter  
relatively to you.


No universal Turing machine can distinguish the following situations:

A physical device simulating Robinson arithmetic simulating a Lisp  
universal program simulating that universal Turing machine,


and

Robinson arithmetic simulating a physical device simulating  
Robinson arithmetic simulating a Lisp universal program simulating  
that universal Turing machine.


Is this OK for everybody?


No.  What would it mean for a UTM, a logical abstraction, to  
"distinguish situations"?  Sounds like a category error.



It means that the proposition "the löbian UTM u proves that the UTM u  
see the difference between itself in this situation and/or that  
situation" is an arithmetical truth (provable in RA, or PA, or ZF).


Exemple. keep in mind that we assume mechanism. So when you can or  
cannot distinguish X from Y, there is a theorem in elementary  
arithmetic which proves that from the states "brent meeker" (you at a  
correct substitution level) relatively to some universal number ...  
relatively to arithmetic (chosen as the base) there is a possibility,  
or no possibility, to tell correctly the difference.


the notion of UTM is a logical abstraction, like the notion of dog,  
but when we talk about a special dog or a special utm, we give its  
precise specification, like the number sent on mars in a teleportation.








And what does it mean to simulate a physical device?  All the  
simulations of physical devices that I'm familiar with are really  
just simulations of some high-level model of the device.


Yes. necessarily so with computationalism given that any piece of  
matter is a first person plural notion summing up an infinity of  
computations.


You forget that I have proven here and there no physical device at all  
can be emulated by a digital machine, so the simulation concerns  
*only* "higher level model of the device".


Here, of course, I was talking abpout the Turing Universal higher  
level aspect of some subset of physical law.





Given the ubiquity of quantum entanglement, I doubt that it is  
possible to simulate a physical device in an absolute sense.



We agree on this since long!

That is a theorem of classical computer science, in the physics  
extracted from machine's self-reference.











If someone believes that some primary matter is needed to get  
consciousness of that matter appearance, it is up to them to  
explain how that primary matter can have a role in the computation.  
But if you succeed, then some primary matter has a rôle in  
consciousness which is no more Turing emulable, and  
computationalism is false.







​>> ​ And I still don't see how you can be blithely talking  
about the set that contains all true mathematical statements and  
no false ones when you must know there is no way to construct such  
a set even in theory.


​> ​ That set cannot be defined in arithmetic, but admit a  
simple definition in set theory or in analysis.


​ A definition is NOT a construction!



Yes, that is exactly the point. We can define the set of  
arithmetical true statements, and so we can *talk* about it,  
without being able to construct it, or to generate it mechanically.


The collection of definable set of numbers is larger than the  
collection of semi-computable, or recursively enumerable sets. The  
set of computable or recursive sets of numbers is not