Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Bruce Kellett]

On 10/06/2017 4:21 am, David Nyman wrote:
On 9 June 2017 at 12:34, Bruno Marchal > wrote:




OK. In this case, Alice choose to measure her spin. This will only
self-localized here in one (actually still aleph_0) histories,
where she will know her states, and the states of any Bob she
could soon or later interact with, but not of the inaccessible
Bobs, who might found non correlated result. yet,n him too will be
able to met only the Alice(s) having the correlated spin.


​Why?


Very good question!

Bruce

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Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Bruce Kellett]

On 10/06/2017 2:36 am, Telmo Menezes wrote:

On Fri, Jun 9, 2017 at 12:37 AM, Bruce Kellett


The idea that the explanation is epistemological rather that ontological has
been my preferred position for a long time. If the wave-function is merely
an epistemological device for calculating probabilities and not a really
existing object, all worries about collapse and action-at-a-distance vanish.
Of course, multi worlds also vanish, but in my opinion that is no bad thing.

So what's your position on Deutsch's argument about quantum computers?
Where does the extra computing power come from?


It has long been understood that Deutsch is out to lunch on this. He 
appears to assume that a quantum computer is just using the same 
algorithms that a classical computer would use, only executing them in a 
massively parallel manner. This is manifestly false. Quantum computers 
operate in a completely different way -- that is why there are so few 
actual algorithms for quantum computers to execute that gain massive 
speed improvements.


As Brent says in his recent post, Scott Aaronson points out:
"The way a quantum algorithms work is that they arrange for wrong 
answers to destructively interfere while the desired answer interferes 
constructively. Interference requires that they take place in the same 
world."


Classical computers do not have quantum interference. Quantum computing 
does not prove the existence of parallel worlds -- there is no need for 
other worlds in which to find the computational power, you just need a 
modicum of insight into how quantum computing algorithms work.


You might claim that Deutsch is a known expert on quantum computing, but 
more commonly, Deutsch is known for having way out, non-standard ideas 
on quantum mechanics.


Bruce

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Deutsch's multiverses

[Brent Meeker]

Here's Alastair Rae's review of Deutsch's book "The Beginning of 
Infinity".  Rae notes that the basis problem seems to bring back the 
Heisenberg cut problem in a different form.


He mentions Deutsch's idea which is popularly used to describe a quantum 
computer as being massively parallel.


/Deutsch's belief in the existence of the multiverse inspired his 
ground-breaking contributions to quantum computing, and he believes that 
a successful implementation of a quantum computer would constitute 
incontrovertible evidence for it. He argues that the reason a quantum 
computer can carry out some tasks very much faster than a classical one 
is because the former performs a large number of calculations 
simultaneously in parallel universes. However, I believe that this idea 
is also challenged by the preferred-basis problem.


/But Scott Aaronson points out that the way quantum algorithms work is 
that they arrange for wrong answers to destructively interfere while the 
desired answer interferes constructively. Interference requires that 
they take place in the same world. /


/Brent

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Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[David Nyman]

On 9 June 2017 at 12:34, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

>
> On 08 Jun 2017, at 02:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> On 7/06/2017 10:38 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>
>>> On 07 Jun 2017, at 11:42, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>>> On 7/06/2017 7:09 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>>>
 On 06 Jun 2017, at 01:23, Bruce Kellett wrote:
>
> I have been through this before. I looked at Price again this morning
>> and was frankly appalled at the stupidity of what I saw.
>> Let me summarize briefly what he did. He has a very cumbersome
>> notation, but I will attempt to simplify as far as is possible. I will 
>> use
>> '+' and '-' as spin states, rather than his 'left', 'right'.
>>
>> He write the initial wave function as for the case when you and I
>> agree in advance to have aligned polarizers:
>>
>> |psi_1> = }me, electrons,you> = |me>(|+-> - |-+>)|you>
>>   = |me, +,-,you> - |me,-,+,you>
>>
>> He says that at this point no measurements have been made, and
>> neither observer is split. But his fundamental mistake is already 
>> present.
>>
>> A little test for you: what is wrong with the above set of equations
>> from a no-collapse pov?
>>
>> skipping some tedium, he then gets
>>
>> |psi_3> = |me[+],+,-,you[-]> - |me[-],-,+,you[+]>
>>
>> where the notation me[+] etc means I have measured '+', you[-] means
>> you have measured '-'.
>>
>> He then claims that the QM results of perfect anticorrelation in the
>> case of parallel polarizers has been recovered without any non-local
>> interaction!
>>
>> Spoiler -- in order to write the final line for |psi_1> he has
>> already assumed collapse, when I measure '+', you are presented *only* 
>> with
>> '-', so of course you get the right result -- he has built that
>> non-locality in from the start.
>>
>
> ?
>
> From the start shows that it is local.
>

 Your failure to see the problem here is symptomatic of your complete
 failure to understand EPR in the MWI.

>>>
>>> I could say the same, but emphatic statements are not helping. My
>>> feeling is that you interpret the singlet state above like if it prepares
>>> Alice and Bob particles in the respective + and - states, but that is not
>>> the case. The singlet state describe a multiverse where Alice and Bob have
>>> all possible states, yet correlated.
>>>
>>
>> The singlet state is rotationally invariant, yes, and can be expanded in
>> any basis of the 2-d complex Hilbert space. That has never been in doubt.
>>
>
> OK.
>
>
>
>> Then in absence of collapse, all interactions, and results are obtained
>>> locally, and does not need to be correlated until they spread at low speed
>>> up their partners.
>>>
>>
>> That does not follow. Although there are an infinity of possible bases
>> for the singlet state, these are potential only,
>>
>
> I don't understand this. Potential? That is no more the MW.
>
>
>
>
>
> and do not exist in any operative sense until the state interacts with
>> something that sets a direction.
>>
>
> That looks more like Bohr than Everett.
>
>
>
>
> You appear to claim that A and B exist in separate worlds corresponding to
>> each of this infinity of bases.
>>
>
> Yes. It is the rotaional invariance of the singlet states "taken
> seriously" when we drop the idea of collapse, or of special dualism between
> observer and the observed.
>
>
>
>
> But that is a misunderstanding. They are in superpositions in every base,
>> sure, but that does not mean that there are 'worlds' corresponding to each
>> possible base until some external interaction occurs.
>>
>
> This is even more fuzzy than the collapse. It looks like consciousness not
> only reduce the wave, but create the physical reality. That is correct in
> Mechanism, but that is another story.
>
>
>
> As you yourself have said, a world is something that is closed to
>> interaction. But superpositions are not closed to interaction, they can
>> interfere -- as in the two slit experiment, and essentially every other
>> application of QM.
>>
>
> Right.
>
>
>
>> So there are no separate worlds corresponding to every possible
>> orientation of the polarizers. Worlds can arise only after interaction and
>> decoherence has progressed so that the overlap between the branches of the
>> superposition is zero (FAPP if you like). It is only then that the branches
>> can no longer interfere (interact) and are closed to interaction, and thus
>> constitute different worlds.
>>
>
> We will have to disagree with this. I use the Y=II rules, like Deutsch. In
> this case the reading of the singlet state gives 2^aleph_zero constantly
> spreading histories figuring Bob and Alice. With mechanism, those
> worlds/histories are more like dreams. They will be epistemological
> personal (and plural in the spreading interaction based spheres).
>
>
>
>
>> The standard procedure in quantum mechanics 

Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Telmo Menezes]

On Fri, Jun 9, 2017 at 12:37 AM, Bruce Kellett
 wrote:
> On 8/06/2017 11:25 pm, David Nyman wrote:
>
> On 8 Jun 2017 12:50 p.m., "Bruce Kellett"  wrote:
>
> On 8/06/2017 9:06 pm, David Nyman wrote:
>
>
> Yes, this is also the point where I stumble. I've been trying somewhat
> inarticulately to characterise a possibly non-miraculous approach from a
> slightly different perspective. Suppose we think about the matter from the
> point of view of Hoyle's pigeonholes. Perhaps there are pigeonholes that in
> some sense correspond to observations that are 'malformed' with respect to
> the predictions of QM. Now, we are presumably to suppose that the
> entanglement which leads to well-formed predictions embodies a very
> fundamental aspect of physical reality and consequently also the possibility
> of meaningful observation. Hence any such malformed 'observations' should by
> the same assumption be considered of very low measure, in the sense of any
> possible contribution to Hoyle's conceptualised sum of well-formed
> observation.
>
> I suppose what I'm suggesting is that something fundamental and highly
> constraining about the demands of observation of a consistent physical
> environment itself effectively filters out what is possible but incompatible
> with those demands. Is this irretrievably circular?
>
>
> I don't think it is so much circular as conspiratorial. If physical results
> were to come about in such a conspiratorial way, rather than
> straightforwardly from the formalism as in quantum non-locality, one might
> wonder what the scientific enterprise is really all about. (Rather as
> Zeilinger wondered about superdeterminism.)
>
>
> I'm not sure I agree that it would be conspiratorial. Non-locality as a
> consequence of entanglement would be central to the explanation in that it
> would fix the very limits of what it would be possible to observe for a
> deeply physical reason. I'm also not entirely convinced that the idea would
> necessarily be at odds with the scientific enterprise per se. That would be
> a question of the restrictions one wished to place on its explanatory
> approach. Much the same has been remarked about cosmological Multiverse
> theories, or the String Landscape, but ISTM that those judgements - whether
> they turn out to be right or wrong -  are based on little more than a
> long-standing presupposition that there must be a unique solution to certain
> equations.
>
> However I concede that whereas what I've outlined isn't necessarily
> inconsistent with the predictions of the quantum formalism (else it would
> just be wrong) it would depend on a presently rather non-standard notion of
> 'unobservable'. That notion would in turn require us to understand the
> formalism, at a very fundamental level, as describing an emergent
> epistemological phenomenon rather than a basic ontological one. To that
> degree it may be more compatible with an explanatory schema such as
> computationalism, in terms of which physics is indeed an epistemological
> emergent, as distinct from physics tout simple.
>
>
> The idea that the explanation is epistemological rather that ontological has
> been my preferred position for a long time. If the wave-function is merely
> an epistemological device for calculating probabilities and not a really
> existing object, all worries about collapse and action-at-a-distance vanish.
> Of course, multi worlds also vanish, but in my opinion that is no bad thing.

So what's your position on Deutsch's argument about quantum computers?
Where does the extra computing power come from?

Telmo.

> Bruce
>
>
>
>
>
>
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Re: substitution level

[Telmo Menezes]

On Wed, Jun 7, 2017 at 11:41 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>
> On 06 Jun 2017, at 15:52, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>
>> On Mon, Jun 5, 2017 at 6:07 PM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>> On 05 Jun 2017, at 16:07, Telmo Menezes wrote:
>>>
>>> I guess you mean that it does not violate Church thesis.
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes.
>>>
>>> Of course, it can
>>>
>>> "do" things impossible to do in real time, or without emulating the
>>> subject,
>>>
>>> that a classical computer cannot do. For example, it can generate a
>>> genuine
>>>
>>> random bit. To do emulate this with a non-quantum computer, you need to
>>>
>>> emulate the duplication of the observer, like in the WM duplication.
>>>
>>>
>>> Well ok, but this part is easy to solve on a classical computer:
>>> https://www.random.org/
>>>
>>> :)
>>>
>>>
>>> Using atmospheric noise as an oracle.
>>>
>>> OK, it is better than than using PI or sqrt(2), but is really a computer
>>> with an oracle (which by the way has the same theology than a computer
>>> without oracle, but this is just a note in passing).
>>
>>
>> On the other hand (and I think Russell said it before here), I am
>> convinced that randomness plays a role in creativity, and there is
>> some evidence from the evolutionary computation community that true
>> randomness is better than pseudo-random generators for this purpose.
>
>
> It is a complex issue. From the strict theoretical view, it can be proved
> that the class of problem solvable by a machine using a "true" random oracle
> is bigger than with any pseudo-random oracle. But the proof I saw is
> second-recursion ironical, which means that we need to go in Heaven to
> really solve those problem.

If you can find the reference, I would like to take a look.

> That can play a role in the derivation of physics, though, as the UD*
> introduce a random oracle in physics. It might be the usual quantum
> indeterminacy.

This random oracle would come from FPI, correct?

>
>
>>
>>> Now, prove me that random.org really use the oracle. May be it uses Pi or
>>> 1/Pi. Not sure we could see the difference, if they change the seed
>>> regularly.
>>
>>
>> There is an independent master thesis on this, but I'm not willing to
>> read more than 100 pages on the subject and take their word for it :)
>>
>> It cannot be proved, of course, but there are statistical methods to
>> measure the "quality" of random numbers. Overall, I believe random.org
>> passes several independent tests as is well-regarded.
>
>
> Oh, it is cute for sure. I did need some energy to sop generating random
> number ...

:)

>
>
>>
>>> Well, thanks for letting me know that you are not serious :)
>>
>>
>> I was not :)
>>
>> But if you want real randomness and do not trust a third party, there
>> are other options:
>> https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardware_random_number_generator
>
>
>
> You really seems to want me to become an addict!  :)

Sorry! But I understand, I love random numbers too.

>
>>
>>> but with comp it would have consequences regarding
>>>
>>> our "insertion" in reality, so to say. Correct?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> I am not sure of what you mean exactly. It would not change the physics,
>>> but
>>>
>>> allow us to exploit more directly the FPI.
>>>
>>>
>>> Yes, I meant simply that our mind would supervene on more branches.
>>>
>>>
>>> And we would become able to compute Fourier transform on the result of
>>> some
>>> computations made in all branches. According to Deustch we would be able
>>> to
>>> detect the "parallel universes".  We would be able to find quickly a
>>> needle
>>> in a stack, and I would have less problem to find my glasses on my
>>> dekstop
>>> :)
>>
>>
>> :)
>>
>>> I am completely agnostic on this,
>>>
>>> but I am not convince by the current argument that there are evidences
>>> that
>>>
>>> a brain could be a quantum computer. They might be right, but I wait for
>>>
>>> more evidences.
>>>
>>>
>>> Me too.
>>>
>>> Elementary arithmetic is full of quantum computing machineries. I even
>>>
>>> suspect that the prime number distribution encodes a universal quantum
>>>
>>> chaotic dovetailing,
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Can you explain what you mean by chaotic dovetailing?
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Have you heard about quantum chaos?
>>>
>>>
>>> No, interesting. I'm starting to read about it. I always loved
>>> standard chaos theory. It was one of the first things that profoundly
>>> changed my map of reality.
>>>
>>>
>>> A not to bad intro is
>>>
>>> "http://assets.cambridge.org/97805210/27151/excerpt/9780521027151_excerpt.pdf;
>>
>>
>> Thanks!
>
>
>
> OK.
>
>
>
>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Here I meant classical usual dovetailing
>>>
>>> on the classical emulation of quantum chaos. From the FPI, it can
>>> converge
>>>
>>> on "genuine" quantum chaos. There are some evidences, related to the
>>> Riemann
>>>
>>> hypothesis that the "spectrum" or he critical zero of zeta might
>>> correspond
>>>
>>> to some quantum chaoitic hamiltonian's eigenvalue. I read that a long
>>> time
>>>
>>> 

Re: A thought on MWI and its alternative(s)

[Bruno Marchal]

On 08 Jun 2017, at 02:05, Bruce Kellett wrote:


On 7/06/2017 10:38 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 07 Jun 2017, at 11:42, Bruce Kellett wrote:
On 7/06/2017 7:09 pm, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 06 Jun 2017, at 01:23, Bruce Kellett wrote:

I have been through this before. I looked at Price again this  
morning and was frankly appalled at the stupidity of what I saw.
Let me summarize briefly what he did. He has a very cumbersome  
notation, but I will attempt to simplify as far as is possible.  
I will use '+' and '-' as spin states, rather than his 'left',  
'right'.


He write the initial wave function as for the case when you and  
I agree in advance to have aligned polarizers:


|psi_1> = }me, electrons,you> = |me>(|+-> - |-+>)|you>
  = |me, +,-,you> - |me,-,+,you>

He says that at this point no measurements have been made, and  
neither observer is split. But his fundamental mistake is  
already present.


A little test for you: what is wrong with the above set of  
equations from a no-collapse pov?


skipping some tedium, he then gets

|psi_3> = |me[+],+,-,you[-]> - |me[-],-,+,you[+]>

where the notation me[+] etc means I have measured '+', you[-]  
means you have measured '-'.


He then claims that the QM results of perfect anticorrelation in  
the case of parallel polarizers has been recovered without any  
non-local interaction!


Spoiler -- in order to write the final line for |psi_1> he has  
already assumed collapse, when I measure '+', you are presented  
*only* with '-', so of course you get the right result -- he has  
built that non-locality in from the start.


?

From the start shows that it is local.


Your failure to see the problem here is symptomatic of your  
complete failure to understand EPR in the MWI.


I could say the same, but emphatic statements are not helping. My  
feeling is that you interpret the singlet state above like if it  
prepares Alice and Bob particles in the respective + and - states,  
but that is not the case. The singlet state describe a multiverse  
where Alice and Bob have all possible states, yet correlated.


The singlet state is rotationally invariant, yes, and can be  
expanded in any basis of the 2-d complex Hilbert space. That has  
never been in doubt.


OK.




Then in absence of collapse, all interactions, and results are  
obtained locally, and does not need to be correlated until they  
spread at low speed up their partners.


That does not follow. Although there are an infinity of possible  
bases for the singlet state, these are potential only,


I don't understand this. Potential? That is no more the MW.





and do not exist in any operative sense until the state interacts  
with something that sets a direction.


That looks more like Bohr than Everett.




You appear to claim that A and B exist in separate worlds  
corresponding to each of this infinity of bases.


Yes. It is the rotaional invariance of the singlet states "taken  
seriously" when we drop the idea of collapse, or of special dualism  
between observer and the observed.





But that is a misunderstanding. They are in superpositions in every  
base, sure, but that does not mean that there are 'worlds'  
corresponding to each possible base until some external interaction  
occurs.


This is even more fuzzy than the collapse. It looks like consciousness  
not only reduce the wave, but create the physical reality. That is  
correct in Mechanism, but that is another story.




As you yourself have said, a world is something that is closed to  
interaction. But superpositions are not closed to interaction, they  
can interfere -- as in the two slit experiment, and essentially  
every other application of QM.


Right.




So there are no separate worlds corresponding to every possible  
orientation of the polarizers. Worlds can arise only after  
interaction and decoherence has progressed so that the overlap  
between the branches of the superposition is zero (FAPP if you  
like). It is only then that the branches can no longer interfere  
(interact) and are closed to interaction, and thus constitute  
different worlds.


We will have to disagree with this. I use the Y=II rules, like  
Deutsch. In this case the reading of the singlet state gives  
2^aleph_zero constantly spreading histories figuring Bob and Alice.  
With mechanism, those worlds/histories are more like dreams. They will  
be epistemological personal (and plural in the spreading interaction  
based spheres).






The standard procedure in quantum mechanics when one is faced with a  
superposition that interacts with something external, is to expand  
the superposition in a base that corresponds to the external context.


OK. In this case, Alice choose to measure her spin. This will only  
self-localized here in one (actually still aleph_0) histories, where  
she will know her states, and the states of any Bob she could soon or  
later interact with, but not of the inaccessible Bobs, who might found  
non correlated 

Re: Carlo Rovelli's critique of Platonism

[Bruno Marchal]

On 08 Jun 2017, at 03:34, Bruce Kellett wrote:

I have just come across this paper from a year or so ago. Rovelli  
essentially summarizes many of my own negative feelings about  
mathematical platonism.


https://arxiv.org/pdf/1508.1.pdf


Exercise. Show that the Church-Turing-Post-Kleene thesis refutes  
Rovelli's  idea that "if it is little, it depends on us". In fact the  
question is "who us?", But you don't need mechanism to refute Rovelli.  
The CT part of "YD + CT" is enough .  Sorry for the exercise, but I am  
under the june torture time (exams, corrections).


Mechanism, and Occam, says that the sigma_1 platonism is enough. It is  
the Brouwer separable part of mathematic, where classical  
mathematicians and intuitionist mathematicians "agree" (extensionally).


The interesting things are invariant for the choice of the phi_i. The  
choice of Fortran-phi_i, or the LISP-phi_i, or -phi_i will  
be locally circumstancial, but the laws of mind and matter are  
independent of that base, and their truth-notion are equivalent. This  
needs no more than the common arithmetical realisim needed to make  
sense of the Church-Turing thesis and of any Turing universal system.


That minimal number realism is conceptually interesting (cf. Number  
Theory, the Music of the primes or the crazy partitions of natural  
numbers (Ramanujan), etc.), and familiar, to humans since long (taught  
in primary school). There are also arithmetic problem in newspapers,  
and not much lambda expression problem, nor combinators one.


But the theology (mind and matter) is independent of the basic choice,  
the "initial church-turing universal reality.


A measure of the complexity of universal computability in  
"provability" scale is the sigma completeness. It is the ability to  
search the numbers and find those having a verifiable provable  
(decidable) property. A sigma1, or simply sigma formula has the shape  
EnP(n) with P decidable.  With the Matiyasevich-Robinson-Davis-Putnam  
result this amounts to the belief in the existence of solution or non  
solution to diophantine polynomial equations!


That part assumed is very small compared to basically all theories,  
especially in metaphysics. But it does not depend on us more than it  
depends on all universal numbers.


In category theory you can see them as cartesian closed categories  
with a natural numbers object, the literature is very rich on this.


We can limit the use of the excluded middle to the "EnP(n)".

That is where I stop to be platonist, and I do not assume the  
induction principle at the ontological level. Indeed at that level  
"observer/believer"' dream, made by machine having much richer belief,  
like including many induction axioms, can be proven to exist (in  
infinitely many histories).


Little does not mean it depends on us, except if you meant by us:  us  
the universal numbers.


Bruno

PS I will comment your other post, at some time, as it is a busy  
period of time, but in one word: you don't take the absence of  
collapse enough into account.
I want take some time to read the post. You might try to avoid the  
patronizing insulting tone which is the tool of those who does not  
believe themselves in their own arguments.









Bruce

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http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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