Re: Mind Uploading

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 11 Apr 2018, at 01:29, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Tue, Apr 10, 2018 at 11:19 AM, Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> ​>> ​We know for a fact that physics is not yet a fundamental theory because 
> it can’t explain what Dark Energy or Dark Matter is 
> 
> ​> ​That has nothing to do with physics being a fundamental theory or not.
> 
> If a theory can only explain how 6% of the matter/energy in the universe 
> works then it can't be fundamental.

?

I don’t see why. That simply does not follow. A theory can be simply 
incomplete, not advance enough, etc.

When a theory systematically misses some important fact, like physics miss 
consciousness (without adding more magic), we can suspect it to be not 
fundamental, but that still does not prove it is not.

With mechanism, when you will understand the famous step 3, it can be shown 
that a theory (physics) cannot be fundamental for logic reason, in the cadre of 
some metaphysical hypothesis.




>  
> ​> ​The metaphysical/theological question is the question of reductibility of 
> physics to another science.
> 
> Metaphysics is not a science, and theology is crap.
>   
> ​>It seems that you assume Aristotle’s metaphysics​ ​[ blah blah blah]
> 
> To hell with the damn idiot ancient Greeks!!
>  
> ​> ​Like Aristotle, you confuse​ [blah blah blah]​
> 
> Aristotle like all the ancient Greeks was confused about a great many things, 
> like where the sun went at night, and yet bizarrely you believe they can give 
> us insight into solving modern problems in science. It's utterly ridiculous!
> 
> ​> ​All what I see, when I observe physicians and their discourses are people 
> inferring from a finite number of personal but sharable experiences 
> 
> And you wouldn't be observing anything without something physical like light.
>  
> ​> ​But I see only the numbers
> 
> If you can see pure number show me one, I've always wanted to know where the 
> number eleven is located.

Between 10 and 12.




> 
> ​> ​Aristotle’s answer was​ [blah blah blah]
> 
>  I DON'T GIVE A DAMN WHAT ARISTOTLE'S ANSWER WAS!!
> 
> ​> ​Plato, and the “mystics”, were those who were skeptical about​ [BLAH 
> BLAH]​
> 
>  ​I DON'T GIVE A DAMN WHAT PLATO WAS SKEPTICAL ABOUT!!
> 
> ​> ​It does not really matter if you use number, or Turing machine (finite 
> set of quadruplets), or lambda expressions. Anything that you can define 
> inductively with some laws making the system Turing universal will do.
> 
> If atoms that obey physical laws are organized in certain ways they are 
> Turing Complete and thus capable of calculating anything that can be 
> calculated, but you need something to organize and that's why atoms are 
> needed. And Bruno, that is not an assumption that is an observation,

Plato is skeptical of observation. Using observation as a reality criteria is 
equivalent with assuming Aristotle’s metaphysical axiom. Sorry, that is not my 
religion.



> nobody has ever seed a calculation done by anything except by matter.  


False. If you are ok with the fact that (3^3) + (4^3) + (5^3) = (6^3) is true 
or false independently of you verifying this or not, then all computations are 
executed in arithmetic independently of you verifying the fact or not, and then 
physics appears as arithmetic seen from some self-referential modes.


We don’t see primitive matter either. Its existence is a metaphysical 
assumption. It has been useful for the progress of physics, but it has put the 
mind-body problem under the rug for long. You need to take into account that, 
without magic, a universal number/machine is indeterminate on which 
computations supports them, and physics becomes a statistics on computations 
based on self-reference (well handled by Gödel diagonalisation technic).




> 
> ​> ​Now, Robinson Arithmetic can count, because​ [blah blah blah]
> 
> If you know how to get ​Robinson Arithmetic​ to count don't tell me about it, 
> tell a venture capitalist in Silicon Valley and become richer than ​Mark 
> Zuckerberg.


He uses this implicitly. There would be no computer if the mathematician 
(Turing) did not discovered them in mathematics, and then in arithmetic. Then 
to use them relatively to you, you need to implement them relatively to you, 
but with mechanism, the couple made of you + the computer is distributed in 
infinitely many computations, and your seeing is an indexical view of 
arithmetic from inside arithmetic.

You tap like if you knew that there is a PRIMARY physical universe, but there 
are no evidence at all for that idea, and the known facts today put this in 
doubt. It certainly impossible once we assume digital indexical mechanism, 
which you will understand when you understand the step 3 of the UD “paradox”.



>  
> ​> ​You are even the only authentic practicer of indexical computationalism 
> in this list (that I know of). Perhaps Hal Finney?
> 
> I still don't know what "indexical computationalism" is except that its yet 
> another of your made

Re: Disproofs of Bell, GHZ, and Hardy Type Theorems and the Illusion of Entanglement

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Tuesday, April 10, 2018 at 2:05:29 PM UTC-5, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, April 10, 2018 at 4:57:35 PM UTC, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> On Tuesday, April 10, 2018 at 12:16:04 AM UTC-5, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Monday, April 9, 2018 at 11:11:21 PM UTC, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

 Joy Christian is a crank. Back in 2010 Moldoveanu and I tore him up. 
 His idea is a flawed idea of using Clifford algebras, where in effect he 
 converts a summation into a sum of absolute values. His so called QM is a 
 dead duck.

 LC

>>>
>>> *Presumably, you confronted him with your findings. What was his 
>>> response? Was the paper peer-reviewed? AG *
>>>
>>
>> I did not publish anything, but somebody (who's name I can't recall) in 
>> the FQXi forum did publish something based on these arguments. JC has been 
>> excoriated for this, not so much because he is wrong but because his 
>> refusal to admit error is an example of the Monty Python "Dead Parrot 
>> Skit." 
>>
>> LC
>>
>
> *This is it.   https://arxiv.org/pdf/1109.0535.pdf 
>    What's the dead parrot skit? AG*
>

I had forgotten that Florin wrote a paper on this too.

The dead parrot skit:  https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4vuW6tQ0218

LC

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Re: Entanglement

[John Clark]

On Tue, Apr 10, 2018 at 10:32 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​> ​
> It is easy to find them in the archive
>

​You've been telling me that for years but ​neither you nor me nor anybody
else has managed to find that wonderful post of yours that explained
everything.

​

 John K Clark​

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Re: Mind Uploading

[John Clark]

On Tue, Apr 10, 2018 at 11:19 AM, Bruno Marchal  wrote:

​>> ​
>> We know for a fact that physics is not yet a fundamental theory because
>> it can’t explain what Dark Energy or Dark Matter is
>
>
> ​> ​
> *That has nothing to do with physics being a fundamental theory or not.*
>

If a theory can only explain how 6% of the matter/energy in the universe
works then it can't be fundamental.


> ​> ​
> *The metaphysical/theological question is the question of reductibility of
> physics to another science.*
>

Metaphysics is not a science, and theology is crap.

>
> *​>It seems that you assume Aristotle’s metaphysics​ ​[ blah blah blah]*
>

To hell with the damn idiot ancient Greeks!!


> *​> ​Like Aristotle, you confuse​ [blah blah blah]​*
>

Aristotle like all the ancient Greeks was confused about a great many
things, like where the sun went at night, and yet bizarrely you believe
they can give us insight into solving modern problems in science. It's
utterly ridiculous!

​> *​*
> *All what I see, when I observe physicians and their discourses are people
> inferring from a finite number of personal but sharable experiences *
>

And you wouldn't be observing anything without something physical like
light.


> ​> ​
> But I see only the numbers
>

If you can see pure number show me one, I've always wanted to know where
the number eleven is located.

​>* ​*
> *Aristotle’s answer was​ [blah blah blah]*
>

 I DON'T GIVE A DAMN WHAT ARISTOTLE'S ANSWER WAS!!

​> *​*
> *Plato, and the “mystics”, were those who were skeptical about​ [BLAH
> BLAH]​*
>

 ​
I DON'T GIVE A DAMN WHAT PLATO WAS SKEPTICAL ABOUT!!

​> ​
> It does not really matter if you use number, or Turing machine (finite set
> of quadruplets), or lambda expressions. Anything that you can define
> inductively with some laws making the system Turing universal will do.
>

If atoms that obey physical laws are organized in certain ways they are
Turing Complete and thus capable of calculating anything that can be
calculated, but you need something to organize and that's why atoms are
needed. And Bruno, that is not an assumption that is an observation, nobody
has ever seed a calculation done by anything except by matter.

​> ​
> *Now, Robinson Arithmetic can count, because*
> *​ *[blah blah blah]
>

If you know how to get ​
Robinson Arithmetic
​ to count don't tell me about it, tell a venture capitalist in Silicon
Valley and become richer than ​Mark Zuckerberg.



> *​> ​You are even the only authentic practicer of indexical
> computationalism in this list (that I know of). Perhaps Hal Finney?*
>

I still don't know what "indexical computationalism" is except that its yet
another of your made up buzz words, when I Google it all I get is some of
your very recent posts to this very list; but I must say being compared to
Hal Finney I consider to be a very high complement.


> ​> ​
> I guess that what stuck you in the 3d step is only your big ego,
>

So you think the problem is my big ego, hmm, well there are 2 possibilities:

1) I know you made a enormous breakthrough but I refuse to publicly say so
because I don't want to admit
​anyone​
 is smarter than me.

​2) I don't understand how anybody with half a brain could think saying
 "THE first person" would uniquely specify one and only one thing if "THE
first person" duplicating machines are available.

I'll let others decide which of the two is true.. ​



> ​> ​
> you keep confusing physics and metaphysics, like Aristotle,
>


Aristotle didn't know his ass from a hole in the ground and neither did
Plato. Why do you keep talking about these ignoramuses?!

John K Clark

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Re: Entanglement

[agrayson2000]

On Tuesday, April 10, 2018 at 10:47:22 PM UTC, Bruce wrote:
>
> From: Bruno Marchal > 
>
> On 9 Apr 2018, at 18:19, John Clark < johnk...@gmail.com 
> > wrote:
>
> On Mon, Apr 9, 2018 at 8:30 AM, Bruno Marchal < 
> mar...@ulb.ac.be > wrote:
>
> On 9 Apr 2018, at 03:19, Bruce Kellett < 
> bhke...@optusnet.com.au > wrote:
>
>> >> Yes, Bruno is terminally confused about non-locality. He refused to 
>> even comment on my simple proof of non-locality in an Everettian context.
>
>  
>
> > ? I did answer to your remarks, anyone can verify this by looking at the 
>> archive.
>
> Bruce get used to it, Bruno has done the same thing with me for years. 
> I've lost count of how many times I've presented a long argument and Bruno 
> responds with "I've already debunked that argument in a previous post" but 
> he never says where all those brilliant posts are, 
>
> It is easy to find them in the archive, but as you are stuck in the step 3 
> of the universal dovetailer, and claim to have debunked where everyone on 
> the list point to you that you were dismissing the distinction between the 
> first person (1p) view and the third person view.
>
>
> or give any hint of what was in them, or point to anybody who has actually 
> seen one of them. As far as Everett is concerned long ago I tried to 
> explain to Bruno that a Everettian other world was about as non-local as 
> you can get,
>
> Phenomenologically only. But that non-locality does not allow any physical 
> influence at a distance. Even those not exploitable for communication at a 
> distance.
>
>
> Non-locality does not allow remote communication, but it does mean that 
> entangled physical systems are non separable, so what you do at one end of 
> the entanglement affects the behaviour of the other end.
>

Oh, but it does -- NOT in the sense of being able to send messages, but in 
the sense of each subsystem being in instantaneous contact with the other. 
To avoid this unpleasant, enigmatic result, the description used is 
"influence". Gotta luv it. AG 

>
> But, contrary to what you said, only Bruce has tried to show that we keep 
> some influence at a distance in Everett, but convince nobody, and his 
> “Everett interpretation” used a notion of “world” which has been shown 
> inconsistent already with Mechanism.
>
>
> So much the worse for mechanism. I imagine that you see yourself as living 
> in a "world"; and that that world has a set of relatively consistent 
> properties. Abolish that notion and life suddenly becomes very difficult 
> indeed!
>
>
> but once again he just said he already proved that was not true 
>
> ?
>
> Never said that. On the contrary I have always referred, for this non 
> locality question in Everett,  to either Deustch and Hayden paper, or 
> Tipler’s paper, or Price Webpage https://www.hedweb.com/manworld.htm
>
>
> Your authorities are terminally flawed, as I have repeatedly shown. If you 
> can't recall the refutations of these silly papers, then look in the 
> archives!
>
> Bruce
>

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Re: Entanglement

[Bruce Kellett]

From: *Bruno Marchal* mailto:marc...@ulb.ac.be>>
On 9 Apr 2018, at 18:19, John Clark > wrote:


On Mon, Apr 9, 2018 at 8:30 AM, Bruno Marchal > wrote:


On 9 Apr 2018, at 03:19, Bruce Kellett > wrote:


>> Yes, Bruno is terminally confused about non-locality. He refused
to even comment on my simple proof of non-locality in
an Everettian context.

> ? I did answer to your remarks, anyone can verify this by
looking at the archive.

Bruce get used to it, Bruno has done the same thing with me for 
years. I've lost count of how many times I've presented a 
long argument and Bruno responds with "I've already debunked that 
argument in a previous post" but he never says where all 
those brilliant posts are,


It is easy to find them in the archive, but as you are stuck in the 
step 3 of the universal dovetailer, and claim to have debunked where 
everyone on the list point to you that you were dismissing the 
distinction between the first person (1p) view and the third person view.



or give any hint of what was in them, or point to anybody who has 
actually seen one of them. As far as Everett is concerned long ago I 
tried to explain to Bruno that a Everettian other world was about as 
non-local as you can get,


Phenomenologically only. But that non-locality does not allow any 
physical influence at a distance. Even those not exploitable for 
communication at a distance.


Non-locality does not allow remote communication, but it does mean that 
entangled physical systems are non separable, so what you do at one end 
of the entanglement affects the behaviour of the other end.


But, contrary to what you said, only Bruce has tried to show that we 
keep some influence at a distance in Everett, but convince nobody, and 
his “Everett interpretation” used a notion of “world” which has been 
shown inconsistent already with Mechanism.


So much the worse for mechanism. I imagine that you see yourself as 
living in a "world"; and that that world has a set of relatively 
consistent properties. Abolish that notion and life suddenly becomes 
very difficult indeed!




but once again he just said he already proved that was not true


?

Never said that. On the contrary I have always referred, for this non 
locality question in Everett,  to either Deustch and Hayden paper, or 
Tipler’s paper, or Price Webpage https://www.hedweb.com/manworld.htm 



Your authorities are terminally flawed, as I have repeatedly shown. If 
you can't recall the refutations of these silly papers, then look in the 
archives!


Bruce

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Re: Disproofs of Bell, GHZ, and Hardy Type Theorems and the Illusion of Entanglement

[agrayson2000]

On Tuesday, April 10, 2018 at 4:57:35 PM UTC, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Tuesday, April 10, 2018 at 12:16:04 AM UTC-5, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Monday, April 9, 2018 at 11:11:21 PM UTC, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>>
>>> Joy Christian is a crank. Back in 2010 Moldoveanu and I tore him up. His 
>>> idea is a flawed idea of using Clifford algebras, where in effect he 
>>> converts a summation into a sum of absolute values. His so called QM is a 
>>> dead duck.
>>>
>>> LC
>>>
>>
>> *Presumably, you confronted him with your findings. What was his 
>> response? Was the paper peer-reviewed? AG *
>>
>
> I did not publish anything, but somebody (who's name I can't recall) in 
> the FQXi forum did publish something based on these arguments. JC has been 
> excoriated for this, not so much because he is wrong but because his 
> refusal to admit error is an example of the Monty Python "Dead Parrot 
> Skit." 
>
> LC
>

*This is it.   https://arxiv.org/pdf/1109.0535.pdf   What's the dead parrot 
skit? AG*

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Re: Indefinite truth

[Lawrence Crowell]

He might have been listening to The Rolling Stones, "I can't get no 
satisfaction." Hamkins is pretty reliable though.

LC

On Tuesday, April 10, 2018 at 1:39:54 AM UTC-5, Brent wrote:
>
> I wonder if Bruno is familiar with this paper? 
>
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1312.0670.pdf 
>
> Brent 
>

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Re: Indefinite truth

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 10 Apr 2018, at 08:39, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> I wonder if Bruno is familiar with this paper?
> 
> https://arxiv.org/pdf/1312.0670.pdf



Not bad at all, interesting! I did not got the time to verify all details, but 
it looks valid!

But all what they show is that , let me quote them:

<<
Thus, two models of set theory can agree on which natural numbers exist and 
agree on all the details of the standard model of arithmetic, yet disagree on 
which sentences are true in that model.
>>

The contrary would have been astonishing. That is part of why I insist 
Mechanism is a theology, a risky invitation of an unknown at the table, which 
looks strangely like yourself.

The Model of Set Theory have too much imagination. I am already happy that ZF 
and ZFC captured the same arithmetical truth. 

The paper does not illustrate that the notion of arithmetical truth is not 
definite. It illustrates that machine with diverse beliefs in diverse 
infinities will not find a common approximation oft that truth easily, and 
might indeed interpret it differently, and disagrees on many, arithmetical 
sentences.

The universal numbers are condemned to have difficulties to agree or disagree 
already on their relations with the “other” universal numbers. Set theory is a 
tool for understanding the numbers, but by incompleteness it cannot do that 
completely, and the paper here illustrates that ZF + very different axioms can 
get different part of the arithmetical truth, limited, and different from each 
others. That would not be the case, with semis-computable sets, so this is 
weakened, in the computationalist realm by the use of actual infinities.

You can relate this also to the fact that the Löbian universal machine 
disagrees already with all complete theories you would claim about it/her. 

Bruno


> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Entanglement

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 10 Apr 2018, at 17:14, agrayson2...@gmail.com wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Tuesday, April 10, 2018 at 2:32:50 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 9 Apr 2018, at 18:19, John Clark > wrote:
>> 
>> On Mon, Apr 9, 2018 at 8:30 AM, Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> On 9 Apr 2018, at 03:19, Bruce Kellett > > wrote:
>> 
>> >> Yes, Bruno is terminally confused about non-locality. He refused to even 
>> >> comment on my simple proof of non-locality in an Everettian context.
>>  
>> > ? I did answer to your remarks, anyone can verify this by looking at the 
>> > archive.
>> Bruce get used to it, Bruno has done the same thing with me for years. I've 
>> lost count of how many times I've presented a long argument and Bruno 
>> responds with "I've already debunked that argument in a previous post" but 
>> he never says where all those brilliant posts are,
>> 
> It is easy to find them in the archive, but as you are stuck in the step 3 of 
> the universal dovetailer, and claim to have debunked where everyone on the 
> list point to you that you were dismissing the distinction between the first 
> person (1p) view and the third person view.
> 
> 
> 
> 
>> or give any hint of what was in them, or point to anybody who has actually 
>> seen one of them. As far as Everett is concerned long ago I tried to explain 
>> to Bruno that a Everettian other world was about as non-local as you can get,
>> 
> Phenomenologically only. But that non-locality does not allow any physical 
> influence at a distance. Even those not exploitable for communication at a 
> distance.
> 
> But, contrary to what you said, only Bruce has tried to show that we keep 
> some influence at a distance in Everett, but convince nobody, and his 
> “Everett interpretation” used a notion of “world” which has been shown 
> inconsistent already with Mechanism.
> 
> 
> 
>> but once again he just said he already proved that was not true
>> 
> ?
> 
> Never said that. On the contrary I have always referred, for this non 
> locality question in Everett,  to either Deustch and Hayden paper, or 
> Tipler’s paper, or Price Webpage https://www.hedweb.com/manworld.htm 
> 
> 
> 
>> in yet another mysterious post nobody has ever seen.
>> 
>> > As usual, he is ruled by dogmatic beliefs rather than logical argument.
>> Yes,
>> 
> Yes? Which dogmatic belief. You are the one who invoke his ontological 
> commitment to stop reasoning (cf step 3).
> 
> You might try to explain this to Grayson, as he did not follow those 
> discussions, and seems like many to ignore the metaphysical consequence of 
> indexical computationalism.
> 
> 
> I have no clue what it is, to ignore or not. Also, in saying physics is a 
> work in progress, I didn't necessarily mean that consciousness couldn't 
> eventually be included in a Final Theory. So I am not an Aristotelian if that 
> means necessarily believing in the primary nature of physical matter. For me, 
> it's an open question. AG


Good. Then all you need to study is the (mathematical, indeed arithmetical) 
notion of computations. Then you might understand a little theory of 
everything, which I prefer to call “theology” for diverse reason.

But I do not propose that theory. I extracted it in two ways. 

In one way, I start from the intuitive indexical understanding of mechanism: it 
means practically that you survive with your brain/body substituted by a 
(indeed physical) computer. It is the idea that the basic process of my brain, 
at some level of description, are computable, in the precise mathematical sense 
allowed by the Church-Turing Thesis.

In the second way, I show that incompleteness forces the sound universal 
machine to distinguish the Platonic definitions of how the One get Multiple 
when observing itself, basically truth (p), belief (Bp), know (Bp & p), Observe 
(Bp & ~Bf (f is for 0 = 1)), feels (Bp & ~Bf & p).

With Church thesis it is an easy exercise, indeed solved in all textbook of 
mathematical logic, to figure out that the proof of the arithmetical 
existential relation, of the type ExP(x, y, z) with P decidable, emulates all 
computable processes. That’s the sigma_1 formula.

Now all computations are emulated in Arithmetic, indeed in all Models of 
Arithmetic. 

But for the first person views, with rather simple thought experiences you can 
understand what happens, which is that we (we the universal numbers) cannot, 
below our substitution level, determine which computations our consciousness 
differentiates on). We are distributed in a vast (infinite) ocean of dreams, 
which follows from a set of reason of the type (3^3) + (4^3) + (5^3) = (6^3). 
If you have enough faith and courage to believe this! 


Church thesis implies a very precise, and arithmetical, notion of universality, 
The mind body problem becomes an interesting body appearance problems, but the 
modal nuances imposed by incompleteness, and, amazingly enough completely 
axiomatised, at the propositional logical level (the

Re: Disproofs of Bell, GHZ, and Hardy Type Theorems and the Illusion of Entanglement

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Tuesday, April 10, 2018 at 12:16:04 AM UTC-5, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, April 9, 2018 at 11:11:21 PM UTC, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>
>> Joy Christian is a crank. Back in 2010 Moldoveanu and I tore him up. His 
>> idea is a flawed idea of using Clifford algebras, where in effect he 
>> converts a summation into a sum of absolute values. His so called QM is a 
>> dead duck.
>>
>> LC
>>
>
> *Presumably, you confronted him with your findings. What was his response? 
> Was the paper peer-reviewed? AG *
>

I did not publish anything, but somebody (who's name I can't recall) in the 
FQXi forum did publish something based on these arguments. JC has been 
excoriated for this, not so much because he is wrong but because his 
refusal to admit error is an example of the Monty Python "Dead Parrot 
Skit." 

LC

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Re: Entanglement

[agrayson2000]

On Monday, April 9, 2018 at 4:50:01 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>
>
>
> On Monday, April 9, 2018 at 4:59:38 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Sunday, April 8, 2018 at 1:09:23 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Sunday, April 8, 2018 at 12:05:28 PM UTC, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

 On Sunday, April 8, 2018 at 6:17:30 AM UTC-5, agrays...@gmail.com 
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Sunday, April 8, 2018 at 2:46:37 AM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Saturday, April 7, 2018 at 6:09:10 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Saturday, April 7, 2018 at 12:59:00 PM UTC, Lawrence Crowell 
>>> wrote:

 On Friday, April 6, 2018 at 9:35:18 PM UTC-5, agrays...@gmail.com 
 wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, April 6, 2018 at 4:04:55 PM UTC, agrays...@gmail.com 
> wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, April 6, 2018 at 2:45:40 PM UTC, Lawrence Crowell 
>> wrote:
>>>
>>> On Thursday, April 5, 2018 at 3:20:39 PM UTC-5, 
>>> agrays...@gmail.com wrote:

 Assuming that QM is a non-local theory, if two systems become 
 entangled, say via a measurement, do they necessary have a 
 non-local 
 connection? That is, does entanglement necessarily imply 
 non-locality? AG

>>>
>>> Entanglement is a form of nonlocality.
>>>
>>> LC
>>>
>>
>> OK, that's what I thought, but consider this. It's clear that 
>> information can't be transmitted due to entanglement or non 
>> locality. But 
>> aren't we entangled with the external world, yet receive information 
>> from 
>> it? TIA, AG 
>>
>
> Or look at it this way; if I am NOT entangled with the photons 
> coming my way allowing me to SEE the world, and NOT entangled with 
> the 
> various pressure waves that enable me to hear and feel the world, 
> what I am 
> entangled with? TIA, AG 
>

 The classical or macroscopic world is in part at least related to 
 how quantum states are entangled at different times with other states 
 in 
 the environment. This though is not a level of description that can 
 tell 
 you much about these specific interactions. The quantum world is in 
 effect 
 in a sort of random Zeno machine that continually reduces wave 
 functions, 
 and in effect it can be argued it does this to itself. Quantum phases 
 are 
 being continually mixed and re-entangled so as to generate a sort of 
 quantum phase chaos. 

 LC

>>>
>>> *This sounds reasonable, but when I try to apply I run into big 
>>> trouble. Suppose there's a free Nitrogen molecule coming my way, and 
>>> when 
>>> it strikes me I experience a breeze. Am I ever entangled with it prior 
>>> to 
>>> impact? IIUC, its wf spreads with time. Same for an assumed wave 
>>> packet. 
>>> Not sure which wf is appropriate to apply, That aside, but whichever, 
>>> that's an initial form which spreads and it is most concentrated when 
>>> initially observed. But where is the observer to set the initial 
>>> condition? 
>>> TIA, AG*
>>>
>>
>> *The general question is this; how does one get an entangled system 
>> from two UN-entangled systems, each with its own WF? TIA, AG  *
>>
>
> *I just don't see how we gets *spontaneous* entangled states from 
> unentangled states. In the free Nitrogen molecule case described above, 
> we 
> don't seem to even have a well defined WF of a free Nitrogen molecule to 
> use, to get entangled with any other system. This goes to the heart of 
> decoherence theory. It might be a lot of handwaving BS without substance. 
> TIA, AG* 
>

 Entanglement of quantum states occur through an interaction of these 
 states. Similarly decoherence occurs through an interactions. The quantum 
 phase of an entanglement or superposition is transferred through 
 interactions. To try to understand this requires some pretty serious work. 
 Entanglements are described by quotient spaces of groups, symmetric spaces 
 and are related to the universal bundle problem in differential geometry. 
 These spaces are related to the symmetries of interactions. 

 LC

>>>
>>> *OK, but in the case of the free Nitrogen molecule, can you define the 
>>> quantum state unambiguously in order to begin to think of how entanglement 
>>> might occur with its environment? If the state is undefined, all which 
>>> follows, fails. AG*
>>>
>>
>> *Let's simplify the model. Instea

Mind Uploading

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 9 Apr 2018, at 00:03, John Clark  > wrote:
> 
> On Sun, Apr 8, 2018 at 9:32 AM, Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
> > There is evidence for physical atoms, but there is no evidence that physics 
> > describe the fundamental theory. 
> 
> We know for a fact that physics is not yet a fundamental theory because it 
> can’t explain what Dark Energy or Dark Matter is 


That has nothing to do with physics being a fundamental theory or not. The 
metaphysical/theological question is the question of reductibility of physics 
to another science.

It seems that you assume Aristotle’s metaphysics, or that you take it for 
granted. It identifies the physical reality with the fundamental reality.
The antic dream argument already falsifies the necessity of this, in some sense 
(which can be made precise in such or such metaphysical theory).



> or why there is so much more matter than antimatter or tell us whats going on 
> at the singularity of a Black Hole. Our Physics is the most fundamental 
> theory we know of but we don’t know if THE Fundamental Theory even exists, it 
> might be like the layers of a onion or an infinite Matryoshka doll and then 
> will always be a more fundamental theory to find.  

It depends on the metaphysical/theological assumption.

Like Aristotle, you confuse physics and metaphysics. That explains probably why 
you confuse the notion of computation with the notion of physical computation. 
I guess you take the primary physical universe for granted. 





> 
> > That is just a metaphysical assumption which has been recently debunked. 
> 
> I'm tired of you saying that, stop tell me and show me!  But don’t show me a 
> textbook made of physical atoms and don’t send me a pulse of physical 
> electrons than my physical computer interprets as pixels on a physical 
> screen, show me a pure number and let me watch it while that pure number 
> performs a calculation, 2+2 would be good enough. Just do that and I will 
> concede the argument.
> 

All what I see, when I observe physicians and their discourses are people 
inferring from a finite number of personal but sharable experiences that there 
exists measurable numbers, and which then infer, still from finite number of 
experiences, that there are computable relations between those numbers, and 
that indeed they get better and better in that sport. But I see only the 
numbers, and usually they don’t even try to related them with the personal 
qualia. 

A (serious) metaphysician, or theologian, bet that, indeed, there is some 
Reality “out there”, but the question is what is it.

Aristotle’s answer was the rather intuitive answer: it is what we see, measure, 
observe …

Plato, and the “mystics”, were those who were skeptical about this, and 
believed in deeper (mathematical?) relations. They were searching for first 
principle.






> >>  In that sense, numbers can count given that all partial computable 
> >> functions are representable in Robinson Arithmetic
>  
>  ​> ​Numbers can't count, but I can count numbers.
> So what, all computable functions are also representable on a blank sheet of 
> paper if a pencil is available. But paper can't count and Robinson Arithmetic 
> can’t count and a textbook on Robinson Arithmetic can count no better than a 
> rock can because the atoms in the textbook and the rock and the blank paper 
> are not arranged in a way that allows them to do so. However if the same 
> atoms that were in the Robinson textbook or the rock were arranged 
> differently, as for example in the form of a computer, then those same atoms 
> could count.
> 

Relatively to you, yes.



> Finding the proper way to arrange those atoms took thousands of years to 
> figure out (the ancient Greeks who you’re always babbling about were 
> completely clueless on how to do it) but we eventually got the hang of it.
> 
> 


But if the ways are digital, and if Church-thesis is correct, then those 
computations are all emulated by anything satisfying the axiom of very 
elementary arithmetic, and worst, when you will acknowledge that you did 
understand the third step of the Universal Dovetailer argument, you will 
understand that 


if we are no more than universal 
machine/number/lamnda-expressions,/combinators/Game-of-life 
patterns/Diophantine-polynomials system,



then we are distributed in a very complex way in the logical consequence of 
that very elementary arithmetic, and physics has to be retrieved by the logic 
of self-reference of the universal machine, even the Löbian one, that is those 
who believe in the usual elementary arithmetic, which includes the induction 
axioms. This makes the machine able to be aware (in precise technical sense) 
that they are universal, and the know all the shit which comes with: more 
exactly they get a measure on their abyssal ignorance of arithmetic.







> 
> >> they are not arranged that way in a rock.
>  
> > I agree with this. A rock canno

Re: Entanglement

[agrayson2000]

On Tuesday, April 10, 2018 at 2:32:50 PM UTC, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>
>
> On 9 Apr 2018, at 18:19, John Clark > 
> wrote:
>
> On Mon, Apr 9, 2018 at 8:30 AM, Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
>
> On 9 Apr 2018, at 03:19, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
>
>> >> Yes, Bruno is terminally confused about non-locality. He refused to 
>> even comment on my simple proof of non-locality in an Everettian context.
>
>  
>
> > ? I did answer to your remarks, anyone can verify this by looking at the 
>> archive.
>
> Bruce get used to it, Bruno has done the same thing with me for years. 
> I've lost count of how many times I've presented a long argument and Bruno 
> responds with "I've already debunked that argument in a previous post" but 
> he never says where all those brilliant posts are, 
>
> It is easy to find them in the archive, but as you are stuck in the step 3 
> of the universal dovetailer, and claim to have debunked where everyone on 
> the list point to you that you were dismissing the distinction between the 
> first person (1p) view and the third person view.
>
>
>
>
> or give any hint of what was in them, or point to anybody who has actually 
> seen one of them. As far as Everett is concerned long ago I tried to 
> explain to Bruno that a Everettian other world was about as non-local as 
> you can get,
>
> Phenomenologically only. But that non-locality does not allow any physical 
> influence at a distance. Even those not exploitable for communication at a 
> distance.
>
> But, contrary to what you said, only Bruce has tried to show that we keep 
> some influence at a distance in Everett, but convince nobody, and his 
> “Everett interpretation” used a notion of “world” which has been shown 
> inconsistent already with Mechanism.
>
>
>
> but once again he just said he already proved that was not true 
>
> ?
>
> Never said that. On the contrary I have always referred, for this non 
> locality question in Everett,  to either Deustch and Hayden paper, or 
> Tipler’s paper, or Price Webpage https://www.hedweb.com/manworld.htm
>
>
> in yet another mysterious post nobody has ever seen.
>
>> > As usual, he is ruled by dogmatic beliefs rather than logical argument.
>
> Yes, 
>
> Yes? Which dogmatic belief. You are the one who invoke his ontological 
> commitment to stop reasoning (cf step 3).
>
> You might try to explain this to Grayson, as he did not follow those 
> discussions, and seems like many to ignore the metaphysical consequence of 
> indexical computationalism.
>


*I have no clue what it is, to ignore or not. Also, in saying physics is a 
work in progress, I didn't necessarily mean that consciousness couldn't 
eventually be included in a Final Theory. So I am not an Aristotelian if 
that means necessarily believing in the primary nature of physical matter. 
For me, it's an open question. AG*
 

> I doubt you will succeed to be franc, as you are the only person I met who 
> have a problem at this stage. Step seven is more often criticised, because 
> people, especially physicists tend to confuse a computation with a physical 
> computation, like they confuse the notion of reality with the notion of 
> physical reality, which is basically the Aristotelian theology/metaphysics.
>
>
> and yet Bruno claims to be a logician. Very odd.
>
>
> I have never claim anything like that. I did refer to my PhD thesis in 
> mathematical logic, for obvious reason.
>
> Bruno
>
>
>
>  John K Clark  
>
>
>
>
>
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>
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Re: The Origin of Physical Laws and Sensations - Bruno Marchal, Université de Bruxelles

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 9 Apr 2018, at 22:10, Brent Meeker  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On 4/9/2018 7:10 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 8 Apr 2018, at 19:42, agrayson2...@gmail.com 
>>>  wrote:
>>> 
>>> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHAL.pdf 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 3,) Arithmetic Realism (AR), why is the statement "1+1=2", equivalent to 
>>> the  Goldbach conjecture, or the inexistence of a bigger prime, or the 
>>> statement that some digital machine will stop?
>>> Please take each item in list separately? Goldbach conjecture? Inexistence? 
>>> Why stopping? And why can't the statement "1+1=2", just mean the symbols on 
>>> the left should be taken to mean the symbol on the right? TIA, AG
>> 
>> I did not claim that those statement are equivalent, I state only that they 
>> are true of false independently of me.
>> 
>> Then when and if  proved they will be automatically equivalent in the weak 
>> sense of classical mathematical logic, where all (known) truth are 
>> equivalent. 
>> 
>> The arithmetical realism is just the idea that a (closed) proposition is 
>> either false or truth in the standard model (N, 0, +, *).
> 
> But that depends on what "true" means.   Whether it refers to fact, a 
> theorem, or a convention of language.

Arithmetical truth can be defined in “usual mathematics”. If you agree with the 
concept of limit in analysis, although it is too long to do it here, you can 
define arithmetical truth by induction (of course you need more than arithmetic 
to do that).

The whole branch of logic known as “Model Theory” studies all such notion of 
truth, and usually "true in the model (N,0, +, *) is judged non problematic. To 
be honest, with mechanism it remains problematic, but for subtle “mechanist” 
reasons.

If you believe that 2+2= 4, you do have the right notion of truth. Or better, 
if you believe that a conjecture like Goldbach or Rieman hypothesis (which is 
provably a conjecture in arithmetic) you have this notion. 

That the machine i stop on input j is neither conventional, nor necessarily a 
theorem of PA, or of ZF, etc.

If truth was conventional, there would be no need to promise 1000,000 dollars 
to anyone solving Riemann hypothesis.






> 
>> 
>> We can limit realism to the sigma_1 sentences, which can be shown equivalent 
>> with the statements saying that a digital machine stops or does not stops in 
>> arithmetic.
>> 
>> 99,9 % of the mathematicians are mathematical realist, which means that they 
>> believe that the excluded middle principle is valid in very large part of 
>> math, like set theory, analysis, etc.
> 
> But valid =/= true.

Valid is “true in all models of the theory”, and for theories which are 
“complete” (in the sense of the completeness theorem, not incompleteness”, that 
is equivalent with “syntactically provable” in that theory.



>   It means it prevserves a presumption of true in the premises…

Only with that completeness result (Gödel 1930, simplified by Henkin later).



> but not that it is the only possible inference rule that does so.

Of course.



> 
>> 
>> Arithmetical realism is doubted only by ultra-finitist, who believe that 
>> there is no infinities at all, not even at the meta-level. 
> 
> No.  It is doubted by many mathematicians.  My mathematician friend Norm 
> Levitt used to say, "Mathematicians are Platonists Monday thru Friday and 
> Nominalists on the weekends.”

I have never met a mathematician doubting that Goldbach conjecture or Riemann 
hypothesis is non sense, nor any parents who take they kids out of school when 
they are told that there is no biggest prime number. 

I did met mathematicians which doubt that the cantorial conjecture (like the 
continuum hypothesis) makes sense, but none for the weak arithmetical realism 
used in Mechanist Philosophy/theology. As I explained once, Mechanism entails 
even the a form of  ultra-finitism for the ontology. Like with Nelson work, 
better to not add even the induction axioms to the base theory, and sees them 
as tools by the “Löbian observer” living in the consequence of Robinson 
arithmetic.


Bruno


> 
> Brent
> 
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Re: Entanglement

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 9 Apr 2018, at 15:51, Lawrence Crowell  
> wrote:
> 
> On Monday, April 9, 2018 at 7:26:43 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
>> On 9 Apr 2018, at 00:48, Lawrence Crowell > > wrote:
>> 
>> On Sunday, April 8, 2018 at 11:25:39 AM UTC-5, Bruno Marchal wrote:
>> 
>>> On 5 Apr 2018, at 22:20, agrays...@gmail.com <> wrote:
>>> 
>>> Assuming that QM is a non-local theory, if two systems become entangled, 
>>> say via a measurement, do they necessary have a non-local connection? That 
>>> is, does entanglement necessarily imply non-locality? AG
>> 
>> As Everett already understood, non-locality is itself phenomenological. But 
>> the violation of Bell’s inequality makes any mono-universe theory highly 
>> non-local. It is my main motivation to be skeptical in any mono-universe 
>> theory.
>> 
>> Some, even in this list, believes that in the many universe theory there are 
>> still some trace of no-locality, but generally, they forget to use the key 
>> fact, explains by Everett, that observation are independent of the choice of 
>> the experimental set up. In particular, a singlet Bell’s type of state, 
>> involves really a multi-multiverse, somehow. Better not to take the idea of 
>> “universe” to much seriously, as in fine, those are local first person 
>> plural relative states, and they emerges already from elementary arithmetic, 
>> in a way enough precise to be compared with the facts. 
>> 
>> Bruno
>> 
>> 
>> This sounds confused. There is noncontextuality in QM that states there is 
>> nothing in QM that determines how an apparatus is to be oriented.
> 
> OK.
> 
> 
>> This is in ways thinking if the Stern-Gerlach apparatus, where its 
>> orientation is a choice of basis vector. QM is invariant under choice of 
>> basis vectors. The context of the experiment is then due to the classical or 
>> macroscopic structure of the observer or apparatus. 
> 
> It seems you are saying the same thing as me.
> 
> But this does not entails any physical action at a distance, unless we 
> postulate a physical collapse of the wave (as opposed to a local entanglement 
> relative to the observer, which is local and which propagates only at the 
> speed of light. Then when Alice (say) measures its particle, it only tells 
> Alice in which partition of the multiverse she belongs, and where indeed Bob 
> will find the corresponding results. EPR and Bell assumes a mono-universe to 
> get the non locality.
> 
> Bruno
> 
> I don't have any serious objection with this. I though do not in thinking 
> about these things invoke quantum interpretations if possible. If I do I 
> often might appeal to a couple of them, usually MWI or Everett's and CI of 
> Bohr, to illustrate two ways of thinking.

OK. The point was just that with Everett, there is no *physical* non-locality, 
just the separability (which is the term used by Bernard d’Espagnat, to indeed 
avoid the common misunderstanding here).

About Bohr, it is unclear, but in his reply to EPR (Einstein Podolski Rosen 
paper) he mentions that indeed, the collapse cannot be a physical process, and 
then get unclear about what quantum mechanics is all about.




> There is also the Montevideo interpretation that takes off from Penrose's 
> idea of gravitation and R-process. However, I don't particularly believe in 
> any of them.

Me neither. It would be nice, though, as consciousness would be responsible for 
the curation of space (gravitation), but again, it is poorly convincing, 
especially after his misuse of Gödel’s theorem for defending a non-mechanist 
theory of consciousness.

Bruno



> 
> LC
> 
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Re: Entanglement

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 9 Apr 2018, at 18:19, John Clark  wrote:
> 
> On Mon, Apr 9, 2018 at 8:30 AM, Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> On 9 Apr 2018, at 03:19, Bruce Kellett  > wrote:
> 
> >> Yes, Bruno is terminally confused about non-locality. He refused to even 
> >> comment on my simple proof of non-locality in an Everettian context.
>  
> > ? I did answer to your remarks, anyone can verify this by looking at the 
> > archive.
> Bruce get used to it, Bruno has done the same thing with me for years. I've 
> lost count of how many times I've presented a long argument and Bruno 
> responds with "I've already debunked that argument in a previous post" but he 
> never says where all those brilliant posts are,
> 
It is easy to find them in the archive, but as you are stuck in the step 3 of 
the universal dovetailer, and claim to have debunked where everyone on the list 
point to you that you were dismissing the distinction between the first person 
(1p) view and the third person view.




> or give any hint of what was in them, or point to anybody who has actually 
> seen one of them. As far as Everett is concerned long ago I tried to explain 
> to Bruno that a Everettian other world was about as non-local as you can get,
> 
Phenomenologically only. But that non-locality does not allow any physical 
influence at a distance. Even those not exploitable for communication at a 
distance.

But, contrary to what you said, only Bruce has tried to show that we keep some 
influence at a distance in Everett, but convince nobody, and his “Everett 
interpretation” used a notion of “world” which has been shown inconsistent 
already with Mechanism.



> but once again he just said he already proved that was not true
> 
?

Never said that. On the contrary I have always referred, for this non locality 
question in Everett,  to either Deustch and Hayden paper, or Tipler’s paper, or 
Price Webpage https://www.hedweb.com/manworld.htm 



> in yet another mysterious post nobody has ever seen.
> 
> > As usual, he is ruled by dogmatic beliefs rather than logical argument.
> Yes,
> 
Yes? Which dogmatic belief. You are the one who invoke his ontological 
commitment to stop reasoning (cf step 3).

You might try to explain this to Grayson, as he did not follow those 
discussions, and seems like many to ignore the metaphysical consequence of 
indexical computationalism. I doubt you will succeed to be franc, as you are 
the only person I met who have a problem at this stage. Step seven is more 
often criticised, because people, especially physicists tend to confuse a 
computation with a physical computation, like they confuse the notion of 
reality with the notion of physical reality, which is basically the 
Aristotelian theology/metaphysics.


> and yet Bruno claims to be a logician. Very odd.
> 
> 

I have never claim anything like that. I did refer to my PhD thesis in 
mathematical logic, for obvious reason.

Bruno



>  John K Clark  
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
> 
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