Re: The size of the universe

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sun, May 24, 2020 at 9:37 AM Russell Standish 
wrote:

> On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 12:05:08PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
> List wrote:
> >
> >
> > On 5/23/2020 4:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > >
> > > Well, those are theorem provable in very weak theories. It is more a
> > > question of grasping the proof than subscribing to a philosophical
> idea.
> > > That arithmetic executes all programs is a theorem similar to Euclid’s
> > > theorem that there is no biggest prima numbers. It is more a fact, than
> > > an idea which could be debated. I insist on this as I realise this is
> > > less known by the general scientists than 20 years ago. We knew this
> > > implicitly since Gödel 1931, and explicitly since Church, Turing and
> > > Kleene 1936.
> >
> > Recently you have said that your theory is consistent with finitism, even
> > ultrafinitism.  But the idea that arithemtic exectues all programs
> certainly
> > requires infinities.
>
> Only potential infinities, not actual infinities. For the UD (a finite
> object) to execute any given program, one only needs to wait a finite
> amount of time.
>


I thought the UD executing in arithmetic was timeless: so all the infinity
of possible programs have already been executed before you even start
thinking about it. So computationalism has actual infinities built in.

Bruce

> However, I would think that ultrafinitism would change COMP's
> predictions, and in a sense be incompatibe with it. Some programs will
> not exist, because one would need to wait too long for them to be
> executed by the UD. In fact, the choice of reference universal machine
> would be significant in ultrafinitism, IIUC.
>

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Re: The size of the universe

[Russell Standish]

On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 12:05:08PM -0700, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
wrote:
> 
> 
> On 5/23/2020 4:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> > 
> > Well, those are theorem provable in very weak theories. It is more a
> > question of grasping the proof than subscribing to a philosophical idea.
> > That arithmetic executes all programs is a theorem similar to Euclid’s
> > theorem that there is no biggest prima numbers. It is more a fact, than
> > an idea which could be debated. I insist on this as I realise this is
> > less known by the general scientists than 20 years ago. We knew this
> > implicitly since Gödel 1931, and explicitly since Church, Turing and
> > Kleene 1936.
> 
> Recently you have said that your theory is consistent with finitism, even
> ultrafinitism.  But the idea that arithemtic exectues all programs certainly
> requires infinities.

Only potential infinities, not actual infinities. For the UD (a finite
object) to execute any given program, one only needs to wait a finite
amount of time.

However, I would think that ultrafinitism would change COMP's
predictions, and in a sense be incompatibe with it. Some programs will
not exist, because one would need to wait too long for them to be
executed by the UD. In fact, the choice of reference universal machine
would be significant in ultrafinitism, IIUC.


-- 


Dr Russell StandishPhone 0425 253119 (mobile)
Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: The size of the universe

[Russell Standish]

On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 08:33:03PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> Is it correct to say that almost surely any sequence can be found?
> 
> 
> Hmm… “almost” has already a technical meaning in computer science. It means 
> for
> all but a finite number exceptions. It  existential dual is “there is
> infinitely many …”.
> 
> Then, I don’t want to look like pick nicking, but “almost” and “sure” seems a
> bit antinomic. 

Not to pick nits, but it actually means the exceptions are of measure
zero. There may well still be an infinite number of them. After all,
the set of rational numbers (which is infinite) is of measure zero.


-- 


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Principal, High Performance Coders hpco...@hpcoders.com.au
  http://www.hpcoders.com.au


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Re: "Shape" of the universe

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Saturday, May 23, 2020 at 4:32:05 PM UTC-5, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>
> On Friday, May 22, 2020 at 8:30:10 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, May 19, 2020 at 11:18:15 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, May 19, 2020 at 6:26:08 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:

 You cannot of course circumnavigate the spatial manifold of the 
 universe. Anything beyond the cosmological horizon moves away faster than 
 you can ever catch up. It is a bit like the part in the movie The Shining 
 with Jack Nicholson where the hotel hallway expanded faster than he could 
 run. If we could though observe this, say analogous to Jack Nicholson in 
 the film, there would be optical effects. The spatial manifold could be a 
 k 
 = 1 closed or k = -1 hyperbolic or the dodecahedral tessellated universe 
 of 
 Poincaré. Yet so far data is not forthcoming.

 A Planck energy of quanta, say a UV graviton, could have causal 
 influence on us is it expands to the cosmological horizon or near so. The 
 B-modes of inflation, which are still being pursued, represent Planck 
 units 
 redshifted to some appreciable scale comparable to the cosmological 
 horizon. This is a z factor z = 10^{10}ly/ℓ_p = 6.3×10^{60}, where taking 
 the nat-log of this and multiplying by the horizon scale 1.3×10^{10}ly we 
 get 1.8×10^{12}ly. The furthest out anything can have traversed at the 
 speed of light to reach is from that distance and from the earliest near 
 Planck time in the universe. What this means is the source or emitter of 
 this graviton was early on close to our region and the source is not that 
 incredible distance away. 

 LC

>>>
>>> Is this estimate reasonable, also from  
>>>
>>> https://www.forbes.com/sites/startswithabang/2020/05/19/would-a-long-journey-through-the-universe-bring-us-back-to-our-starting-point/#fe376fef6c50
>>>
>>>
>>> The appearance of different angular sized of fluctuations in the CMB 
>>> results in different spatial curvature scenarios. Presently, the 
>>> Universe appears to be flat, but we have only measured down to about the 
>>> 0.4% level. At a more precise level, we may discover some level of 
>>> intrinsic curvature, after all, but what we've observed is enough to tell 
>>> us that if the Universe is curved, it's only curved on scales that are 
>>> ~(250)^3 times (or more than 15 million times) larger than our 
>>> presently-observable Universe is.
>>>
>>> AG
>>>
>>
>> What I'm asking is whether, based on current measurements, if the 
>> universe is curved, can we conclude that the universe is *15 million 
>> times larger* than our presently observable universe? TIA, AG 
>>
>
> Without data there is nothing we can conclude. The spatial surface of the 
> universe appears to be flat or without curvature that is 300 or so larger 
> than the cosmological horizon distance. That is about 4 trillion light 
> years, or about 2 times the possible distance any causal connection from 
> inflation could reach us, Beyond that we know absolutely nothing. Unless 
> some sensitive optical work is done with CMB imaging that can push this 
> further we may never know. 
>
> In the end physics and observable cosmology is local, and we are 
> approaching certain limits due to our locality as observers. If we measure 
> much further out and closer to inflation and the initial quantum event we 
> will only push out about 1.8 trillion light years. It is unclear if any ray 
> tracing measurement of gravitons or neutrinos from this earliest moment of 
> the observable universe. 
>
> LC
>

I watched the following a few days ago that is related to this topic.

LC 

https://youtu.be/e1dOnqCu9pQ

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Re: "Shape" of the universe

[Lawrence Crowell]

On Friday, May 22, 2020 at 8:30:10 PM UTC-5, Alan Grayson wrote:
>
>
>
> On Tuesday, May 19, 2020 at 11:18:15 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Tuesday, May 19, 2020 at 6:26:08 PM UTC-6, Lawrence Crowell wrote:
>>>
>>> You cannot of course circumnavigate the spatial manifold of the 
>>> universe. Anything beyond the cosmological horizon moves away faster than 
>>> you can ever catch up. It is a bit like the part in the movie The Shining 
>>> with Jack Nicholson where the hotel hallway expanded faster than he could 
>>> run. If we could though observe this, say analogous to Jack Nicholson in 
>>> the film, there would be optical effects. The spatial manifold could be a k 
>>> = 1 closed or k = -1 hyperbolic or the dodecahedral tessellated universe of 
>>> Poincaré. Yet so far data is not forthcoming.
>>>
>>> A Planck energy of quanta, say a UV graviton, could have causal 
>>> influence on us is it expands to the cosmological horizon or near so. The 
>>> B-modes of inflation, which are still being pursued, represent Planck units 
>>> redshifted to some appreciable scale comparable to the cosmological 
>>> horizon. This is a z factor z = 10^{10}ly/ℓ_p = 6.3×10^{60}, where taking 
>>> the nat-log of this and multiplying by the horizon scale 1.3×10^{10}ly we 
>>> get 1.8×10^{12}ly. The furthest out anything can have traversed at the 
>>> speed of light to reach is from that distance and from the earliest near 
>>> Planck time in the universe. What this means is the source or emitter of 
>>> this graviton was early on close to our region and the source is not that 
>>> incredible distance away. 
>>>
>>> LC
>>>
>>
>> Is this estimate reasonable, also from  
>>
>> https://www.forbes.com/sites/startswithabang/2020/05/19/would-a-long-journey-through-the-universe-bring-us-back-to-our-starting-point/#fe376fef6c50
>>
>>
>> The appearance of different angular sized of fluctuations in the CMB 
>> results in different spatial curvature scenarios. Presently, the 
>> Universe appears to be flat, but we have only measured down to about the 
>> 0.4% level. At a more precise level, we may discover some level of 
>> intrinsic curvature, after all, but what we've observed is enough to tell 
>> us that if the Universe is curved, it's only curved on scales that are 
>> ~(250)^3 times (or more than 15 million times) larger than our 
>> presently-observable Universe is.
>>
>> AG
>>
>
> What I'm asking is whether, based on current measurements, if the universe 
> is curved, can we conclude that the universe is *15 million times larger* 
> than our presently observable universe? TIA, AG 
>

Without data there is nothing we can conclude. The spatial surface of the 
universe appears to be flat or without curvature that is 300 or so larger 
than the cosmological horizon distance. That is about 4 trillion light 
years, or about 2 times the possible distance any causal connection from 
inflation could reach us, Beyond that we know absolutely nothing. Unless 
some sensitive optical work is done with CMB imaging that can push this 
further we may never know. 

In the end physics and observable cosmology is local, and we are 
approaching certain limits due to our locality as observers. If we measure 
much further out and closer to inflation and the initial quantum event we 
will only push out about 1.8 trillion light years. It is unclear if any ray 
tracing measurement of gravitons or neutrinos from this earliest moment of 
the observable universe. 

LC
 

>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>  
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Tuesday, May 19, 2020 at 1:41:45 AM UTC-5, Philip Thrift wrote:
>>>


 *Would traveling out in a "straight" line bring you back to where you 
 started?*


 https://www.forbes.com/sites/startswithabang/2020/05/19/would-a-long-journey-through-the-universe-bring-us-back-to-our-starting-point/#1781c2ccf6c5

 In the writer's (Ethan Siegel's) *opinion*:


 On a cosmic scale, there is no indication that the Universe is anything 
 other than infinite and flat. There is no evidence that features in one 
 region of space also appear in any other well-separated region, nor is 
 there evidence of a repeating pattern in the Universe's large-scale 
 structure or the Big Bang's leftover glow. The only way we know of to turn 
 a freely moving object around is via gravitation slingshot, not from 
 cosmic 
 curvature.

 And yet, it's a legitimate possibility that the Universe may, in fact, 
 be finite in extent, but larger than our observations can currently take 
 us. As the Universe unfolds over the coming billions of years, more and 
 more of it (about 135% more, by volume) will become visible to us. If 
 there's any hint that a long-distance journey would bring us back to our 
 starting point, that's the only place we'll ever find it. Our only hope 
 for 
 discovering a finite but traversible Universe lies, quite ironically, in 
 our far dista

Re: STEP 3

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/23/2020 11:51 AM, smitra wrote:

My point is that identity is an intrinsic property of what something
is now. The history of the of the constituent particles have no affect
on the behaviors or operation of those particles. To say the history
is relevant to identity is to add an arbitrary extrinsic property
which can be of no physical relevance.

This is a direct consequence of QM, you can't distinguish two
electrons, from each other.
But they still have locations and histories, c.f. Griffiths consistent
histories interpretation of QM or Feynmann's path integral QM. When
electrons make spots on the film in an EPR experiment the electron
that made this spot is not identical with the electron that made that
spot in the sense of being the same electron.  And in any case I don't
see how the sameness of particles implies the sameness of complex
structures made of particles, i.e. persons.

Brent



Physics is local, all the relevant information to describe what I feel 
right now is contained in my brain at this exact moment. While this 
can all be explained in terms of information in the past, that doesn't 
take away from the fact that it is also present right here in my head. 
Also, not all the information was present in the past state due to 
effective collapse of the wavefunction. In general, I end up in a 
superposition of states which has the exact same information content 
as the past state. I then find myself in one of the possible 
components of such a superposition (in the computational basis states 
of the classical algorithm that my brain is running).


Saibal 


In the MWI, there is never any increase in the total information. All 
evolution is unitary and reversible.  Local information appears because 
event horizons make correlations (negative information) inaccessible.


Brent

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Re: STEP 3

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/23/2020 11:38 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 1:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:




On 5/23/2020 1:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Friday, May 22, 2020, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



On 5/22/2020 1:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Fri, May 22, 2020 at 3:27 PM 'Brent Meeker' via
Everything List mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



On 8/4/2019 10:44 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Friday, August 2, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via
Everything List mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



On 8/2/2019 1:06 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Fri, Aug 2, 2019 at 1:40 PM 'Brent Meeker' via
Everything List mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



On 8/2/2019 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
> It is like Saibal Mitra said, the person he
was when he was 3 is
> dead.  Too much information was added to his
brain.  If his 3 year old
> self were suddenly replaced with his much
older self, you would
> conclude the 3 year old was destroyed, but
when gradual changes are
> made, day by day, common-sense and
convention maintains that the
> 3-year-old was not destroyed, and still
lives. This is the
> inconsistency of continuity theories.

On the contrary I'd say it illustrates the
consistency of causal
continuity theories.


Your close friend walks into a black  box, and
emerges 1 hour later.

In case A, he was destroyed in a discontinuous
way, and a new version of that person was formed
having the mind of your friend as it might have
been 1 hour later.
In case B, he sat around for an hour before emerging.

You later meet up with the entity who emerges from
this black box for coffee.

From your point of view, neither case A nor B is
physically distinguishable. Yet under your casual
continuity theory, your friend has either died or
survived entering the black box.  You have no way
of knowing if the entity you are having coffee
with is your friend or not.   Is this a legitimate
and consistent way of looking at the world?


Did the black box take A's information in order to
copy him, or did it make a copy accidentally.


Would that change the result?


Holevo's theorem says it's impossible to copy A's state.


It's a thought experiment. Do you think the quantum state is
relevant? One typically doesn't track of the quantum state
of their friend's atoms and use that information as part of
their recognition process.





Incidentally, my not knowing the difference between
two things is not very good evidence that they are
the same.


That there's no physical experiment, even in principle,
that could differentiate the two cases, I take as
evidence that notions of identity holding there to be a
difference are illusory.


But you haven't postulated a case in which it is
impossible to differentiate the two cases.  It's not
clear what degree of differentiation is relevant.


If Holebo's theorem remains fundamental problems, then let's
move everything into virtual reality, and repeat the experiment.

In one case your friend's mind file is deleted and restored
from a backup, and in another he continued without
interruption. Do not the same conclusions I suggest follow?


So you're postulating that your friend has been duplicated
but in a way that you have no way of knowing.  And then you
ask, "Is this a legitimate and consistent way of looking at
the world?"  I guess I don't understand the question.  If you
have no way of knowing, then you don't know...ex hypothesi.


Brnet


My point is that identity is an intrinsic property of what
something is now. The history of the of the constituent particles
have no affect on the behaviors or operation of those particles.
To say the history is relevant to identity is to add an arbitrary
extrinsic property which can be of no physical relevance.

This is a direct consequence of QM, you can't distinguish two
electro

Re: The size of the universe

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/23/2020 4:42 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


Well, those are theorem provable in very weak theories. It is more a 
question of grasping the proof than subscribing to a philosophical 
idea. That arithmetic executes all programs is a theorem similar to 
Euclid’s theorem that there is no biggest prima numbers. It is more a 
fact, than an idea which could be debated. I insist on this as I 
realise this is less known by the general scientists than 20 years 
ago. We knew this implicitly since Gödel 1931, and explicitly since 
Church, Turing and Kleene 1936.


Recently you have said that your theory is consistent with finitism, 
even ultrafinitism.  But the idea that arithemtic exectues all programs 
certainly requires infinities.


Brent

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Re: STEP 3

[smitra]

On 23-05-2020 20:35, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List wrote:

On 5/23/2020 1:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote:


On Friday, May 22, 2020, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
 wrote:

On 5/22/2020 1:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, May 22, 2020 at 3:27 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
 wrote:

On 8/4/2019 10:44 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Friday, August 2, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
 wrote:

On 8/2/2019 1:06 PM, Jason Resch wrote:

On Fri, Aug 2, 2019 at 1:40 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List
 wrote:

On 8/2/2019 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:

It is like Saibal Mitra said, the person he was when he was 3 is
dead.  Too much information was added to his brain.  If his 3 year

old

self were suddenly replaced with his much older self, you would
conclude the 3 year old was destroyed, but when gradual changes

are

made, day by day, common-sense and convention maintains that the
3-year-old was not destroyed, and still lives. This is the
inconsistency of continuity theories.


On the contrary I'd say it illustrates the consistency of causal
continuity theories.

Your close friend walks into a black  box, and emerges 1 hour later.


In case A, he was destroyed in a discontinuous way, and a new
version of that person was formed having the mind of your friend as
it might have been 1 hour later.
In case B, he sat around for an hour before emerging.

You later meet up with the entity who emerges from this black box
for coffee.

From your point of view, neither case A nor B is physically
distinguishable.  Yet under your casual continuity theory, your
friend has either died or survived entering the black box.  You have
no way of knowing if the entity you are having coffee with is your
friend or not.   Is this a legitimate and consistent way of looking
at the world?


Did the black box take A's information in order to copy him, or did it
make a copy accidentally.

Would that change the result?
Holevo's theorem says it's impossible to copy A's state.

It's a thought experiment. Do you think the quantum state is relevant?
One typically doesn't track of the quantum state of their friend's
atoms and use that information as part of their recognition process.


Incidentally, my not knowing the difference between two things is
not very good evidence that they are the same.

That there's no physical experiment, even in principle, that could
differentiate the two cases, I take as evidence that notions of
identity holding there to be a difference are illusory.


But you haven't postulated a case in which it is impossible to
differentiate the two cases.  It's not clear what degree of
differentiation is relevant.

If Holebo's theorem remains fundamental problems, then let's move
everything into virtual reality, and repeat the experiment.

In one case your friend's mind file is deleted and restored from a
backup, and in another he continued without interruption. Do not the
same conclusions I suggest follow?

So you're postulating that your friend has been duplicated but in a
way that you have no way of knowing.  And then you ask, "Is this a
legitimate and consistent way of looking at the world?"  I guess I
don't understand the question.  If you have no way of knowing, then
you don't know...ex hypothesi.

Brnet

My point is that identity is an intrinsic property of what something
is now. The history of the of the constituent particles have no affect
on the behaviors or operation of those particles. To say the history
is relevant to identity is to add an arbitrary extrinsic property
which can be of no physical relevance.

This is a direct consequence of QM, you can't distinguish two
electrons, from each other.
But they still have locations and histories, c.f. Griffiths consistent
histories interpretation of QM or Feynmann's path integral QM.  When
electrons make spots on the film in an EPR experiment the electron
that made this spot is not identical with the electron that made that
spot in the sense of being the same electron.  And in any case I don't
see how the sameness of particles implies the sameness of  complex
structures made of particles, i.e. persons.

Brent



Physics is local, all the relevant information to describe what I feel 
right now is contained in my brain at this exact moment. While this can 
all be explained in terms of information in the past, that doesn't take 
away from the fact that it is also present right here in my head. Also, 
not all the information was present in the past state due to effective 
collapse of the wavefunction. In general, I end up in a superposition of 
states which has the exact same information content as the past state. I 
then find myself in one of the possible components of such a 
superposition (in the computational basis states of the classical 
algorithm that my brain is running).


Saibal

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Re: STEP 3

[Jason Resch]

On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 1:35 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 5/23/2020 1:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Friday, May 22, 2020, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 5/22/2020 1:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Fri, May 22, 2020 at 3:27 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 8/4/2019 10:44 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Friday, August 2, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>>


 On 8/2/2019 1:06 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



 On Fri, Aug 2, 2019 at 1:40 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
 everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 8/2/2019 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
> > It is like Saibal Mitra said, the person he was when he was 3 is
> > dead.  Too much information was added to his brain.  If his 3 year
> old
> > self were suddenly replaced with his much older self, you would
> > conclude the 3 year old was destroyed, but when gradual changes are
> > made, day by day, common-sense and convention maintains that the
> > 3-year-old was not destroyed, and still lives. This is the
> > inconsistency of continuity theories.
>
> On the contrary I'd say it illustrates the consistency of causal
> continuity theories.
>
>
 Your close friend walks into a black  box, and emerges 1 hour later.

 In case A, he was destroyed in a discontinuous way, and a new version
 of that person was formed having the mind of your friend as it might have
 been 1 hour later.
 In case B, he sat around for an hour before emerging.

 You later meet up with the entity who emerges from this black box for
 coffee.

 From your point of view, neither case A nor B is physically
 distinguishable.  Yet under your casual continuity theory, your friend has
 either died or survived entering the black box.  You have no way of knowing
 if the entity you are having coffee with is your friend or not.   Is this a
 legitimate and consistent way of looking at the world?


 Did the black box take A's information in order to copy him, or did it
 make a copy accidentally.

>>>
>>> Would that change the result?
>>>
>>>
>>> Holevo's theorem says it's impossible to copy A's state.
>>>
>>
>> It's a thought experiment. Do you think the quantum state is relevant?
>> One typically doesn't track of the quantum state of their friend's atoms
>> and use that information as part of their recognition process.
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>>


 Incidentally, my not knowing the difference between two things is not
 very good evidence that they are the same.



>>>
>>> That there's no physical experiment, even in principle, that could
>>> differentiate the two cases, I take as evidence that notions of identity
>>> holding there to be a difference are illusory.
>>>
>>>
>>> But you haven't postulated a case in which it is impossible to
>>> differentiate the two cases.  It's not clear what degree of differentiation
>>> is relevant.
>>>
>>
>> If Holebo's theorem remains fundamental problems, then let's move
>> everything into virtual reality, and repeat the experiment.
>>
>> In one case your friend's mind file is deleted and restored from a
>> backup, and in another he continued without interruption. Do not the same
>> conclusions I suggest follow?
>>
>>
>> So you're postulating that your friend has been duplicated but in a way
>> that you have no way of knowing.  And then you ask, "Is this a legitimate
>> and consistent way of looking at the world?"  I guess I don't understand
>> the question.  If you have no way of knowing, then you don't know...ex
>> hypothesi.
>>
>>
>> Brnet
>>
>
> My point is that identity is an intrinsic property of what something is
> now. The history of the of the constituent particles have no affect on the
> behaviors or operation of those particles. To say the history is relevant
> to identity is to add an arbitrary extrinsic property which can be of no
> physical relevance.
>
> This is a direct consequence of QM, you can't distinguish two electrons,
> from each other.
>
>
> But they still have locations and histories, c.f. Griffiths consistent
> histories interpretation of QM or Feynmann's path integral QM.  When
> electrons make spots on the film in an EPR experiment the electron that
> made this spot is not identical with the electron that made that spot in
> the sense of being the same electron.
>



> And in any case I don't see how the sameness of particles implies the
> sameness of  complex structures made of particles, i.e. persons.
>
>
>
The indistinguishability of two electrons, means there's no detectable
difference between Person A assembled from *this* pile of atoms, and Person
B (of a sa

Re: STEP 3

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/23/2020 1:42 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Friday, May 22, 2020, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> wrote:




On 5/22/2020 1:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Fri, May 22, 2020 at 3:27 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
List mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



On 8/4/2019 10:44 AM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Friday, August 2, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything
List mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



On 8/2/2019 1:06 PM, Jason Resch wrote:



On Fri, Aug 2, 2019 at 1:40 PM 'Brent Meeker' via
Everything List mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> wrote:



On 8/2/2019 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
> It is like Saibal Mitra said, the person he was
when he was 3 is
> dead.  Too much information was added to his
brain.  If his 3 year old
> self were suddenly replaced with his much older
self, you would
> conclude the 3 year old was destroyed, but when
gradual changes are
> made, day by day, common-sense and convention
maintains that the
> 3-year-old was not destroyed, and still lives.
This is the
> inconsistency of continuity theories.

On the contrary I'd say it illustrates the
consistency of causal
continuity theories.


Your close friend walks into a black  box, and emerges
1 hour later.

In case A, he was destroyed in a discontinuous way, and
a new version of that person was formed having the mind
of your friend as it might have been 1 hour later.
In case B, he sat around for an hour before emerging.

You later meet up with the entity who emerges from this
black box for coffee.

From your point of view, neither case A nor B is
physically distinguishable.  Yet under your casual
continuity theory, your friend has either died or
survived entering the black box.  You have no way of
knowing if the entity you are having coffee with is
your friend or not.  Is this a legitimate and
consistent way of looking at the world?


Did the black box take A's information in order to copy
him, or did it make a copy accidentally.


Would that change the result?


Holevo's theorem says it's impossible to copy A's state.


It's a thought experiment. Do you think the quantum state is
relevant? One typically doesn't track of the quantum state of
their friend's atoms and use that information as part of their
recognition process.





Incidentally, my not knowing the difference between two
things is not very good evidence that they are the same.


That there's no physical experiment, even in principle, that
could differentiate the two cases, I take as evidence that
notions of identity holding there to be a difference are
illusory.


But you haven't postulated a case in which it is impossible
to differentiate the two cases.  It's not clear what degree
of differentiation is relevant.


If Holebo's theorem remains fundamental problems, then let's move
everything into virtual reality, and repeat the experiment.

In one case your friend's mind file is deleted and restored from
a backup, and in another he continued without interruption. Do
not the same conclusions I suggest follow?


So you're postulating that your friend has been duplicated but in
a way that you have no way of knowing.  And then you ask, "Is this
a legitimate and consistent way of looking at the world?"  I guess
I don't understand the question.  If you have no way of knowing,
then you don't know...ex hypothesi.


Brnet


My point is that identity is an intrinsic property of what something 
is now. The history of the of the constituent particles have no affect 
on the behaviors or operation of those particles. To say the history 
is relevant to identity is to add an arbitrary extrinsic property 
which can be of no physical relevance.


This is a direct consequence of QM, you can't distinguish two 
electrons, from each other.


But they still have locations and histories, c.f. Griffiths consistent 
histories interpretation of QM or Feynmann's path integral QM.  When 
electrons make spots on the film in an EPR experiment the electron that 
made this spot is not identical with the electron that made that spot in 
the sense of being the same electron.  And in any case I don't see how 
the sameness of particles implies the sameness of  complex structures 
made of particles, i.e. persons.


Brent



I reach

Re: Coordinate time vs Proper time

['Brent Meeker' via Everything List]

On 5/22/2020 11:25 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:



On Friday, May 22, 2020 at 11:03:40 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



On 5/22/2020 9:48 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:



On Friday, May 22, 2020 at 9:05:23 PM UTC-6, Brent wrote:



On 5/22/2020 6:26 PM, Alan Grayson wrote:



On Monday, May 18, 2020 at 3:28:40 PM UTC-6, Alan Grayson
wrote:

Suppose the universe is a hyper-sphere, not expanding,
and an observer travels on a closed loop and returns to
his spatial starting point. His elapsed or proper time
will be finite, but what is his coordinate time at the
end of the journey? TIA, AG


It's not a dumb question IMO. If you circumnavigate a
spherical non-expanding universe, what happens to coordinate
time at the end of the journey? Does something update the
time coordinate? Or does it somehow miraculously(?) remain
fixed? TIA, AG


Are you supposing the universe is a 3-sphere?  In that case
It's just like going around a circle.  The degree marks on
the circle are coordinates, they have no physical meaning
except to label points.  So if you walk around the circle you
measure a certain distance (proper time) but come back to the
same point.

Or are you supposing it's a 4-sphere so that all geodesics
are closed time-like curves?  I don't know how that would
work.  I don't think there's any solution of that form to
Einstein's equations.

Brent


I'm supposing a 4-sphere and (I think) closed time-like curves.
The traveler returns presumably to his starting position, but is
the time coordinate unchanged? AG


I don't think there's any very sensible answer in that case. 
Goedel showed there can be solutions with closed time-like curves
if the universe is rotating.  But solutions of GR don't have any
dynamic connection to matter and the entropy of matter.  In the
same spirit there could be a solution to quantum field theory that
was close around the time like curve...in which case you'd
experience "Groundhog Day"...including your thoughts.

Brent


What does entropy have to do with this problem? AG


Increasing entropy points the direction of time.

Brent

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Re: The size of the universe

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 22 May 2020, at 19:11, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Fri, May 22, 2020 at 9:23 AM Bruno Marchal  > wrote:
> 
>> On 21 May 2020, at 21:43, Jason Resch > > wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> On Thu, May 21, 2020 at 1:33 PM Bruno Marchal > > wrote:
>> 
>>> On 20 May 2020, at 18:45, Jason Resch >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Wed, May 20, 2020 at 7:05 AM Bruno Marchal >> > wrote:
>>> 
 On 19 May 2020, at 05:20, Jason Resch >>> > wrote:
 
 I recently wrote an article on the size of the universe and the scope of 
 reality:
 https://alwaysasking.com/how-big-is-the-universe/ 
 
 
 It's first of what I hope will be a series of articles which are largely 
 inspired by some of the conversations I've enjoyed here. It covers many 
 topics including the historic discoveries, the big bang, inflation, string 
 theory, and mathematical realism.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> 
>>> It has not been proved that the decimal expansion of PI contains all 
>>> (finite codes of all) sequences.
>>> 
>>> I understand that Pi is proven to be normal,
>> 
>> 
>> (Oops I meant to say "Pi is not proven to be normal" somehow I deleted the 
>> not while refactoring the sentence)
> 
> OK. 
> 
> 
> 
>>  
>> 
>> But that is not the case. Pi win all experimental test, but the normality of 
>> basically all irrational numbers are open problems. It is generally 
>> conjectured that they are all normal.
>> For the Champernow number, the normality is easy to prove, but it has been 
>> build that way.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> but is it true for the irrational numbers (Pi, e, sqrt(2), etc.) that 
>>> probabilistically the chance of not finding a given finite sequence of 
>>> digits goes to zero?
>> 
>> Most would bet that this is indeed the case, but that is unsolved today.
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> Is it correct to say that almost surely 
>>>  any sequence can be found?
>> 
>> Hmm… “almost” has already a technical meaning in computer science. It means 
>> for all but a finite number exceptions. It  existential dual is “there is 
>> infinitely many …”.
>> 
>> Then, I don’t want to look like pick nicking, but “almost” and “sure” seems 
>> a bit antinomic. 
>> 
>> Some intuition of infinite decimal series, and of irrational numbers (which 
>> have no infinite repetition, etc.) gives a feeling that it would be quite 
>> astonishing that it is not the case, even for sqrt(2), and we can say that 
>> this has been experimentally verified, but mathematicians ask for proof, and 
>> some ask for an elementary proof (not involving second order arithmetic or 
>> analysis).
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> If it does not hold for Pi, are there other numbers that would be better 
>>> examples for the type of analogy I am making?
>> 
>> 
>> The Champernowne Number
>> 
>> https://mathworld.wolfram.com/ChampernowneConstant.html 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>> 
>>> I want to show why statistically an infinite space leads to near certainty 
>>> of repetitions of material arrangements assuming some kind of infinite 
>>> uniformity, just like the infinity of random-looking digits of an 
>>> irrational number leads to infinite repetitions among any finite sequence.
>> 
>> 
>> You get this with Champernowne number. It is normal, despite extraordinarily 
>> compressible.  It is about equal to 0.123.., but all kids can easily write 
>> the decimals without ending!  It is obviously normal, as it goes through all 
>> the numbers, and thus all the sequences. 
>> 
>> But the universe appears more random than something so well structured like 
>> the Champernowne constant.
> 
> 
> I doubt this. Most subsequence of the Champernowne number are completely 
> random, and *very* long. Only the tiny initial segment does not look random, 
> when you know the algorithm to generate it. It can be proved that most 
> natural number have incompressible sequences. The number of compressed 
> algorithm grows much less that the numbers of number (for each finite 
> length). 
> 
> I think like Pi, reality itself could be generated by a short compressible 
> algorithm (like the UD).

Neither the mathematical reality, nor the physical reality can be generated by 
an algorithm. The physical reality emerges from all algorithm. Keep in mind 
that if you are cut and paste in two places at very different “moments of time” 
(like with delay of a billions years for one of the reconstitution), that 
delays is not first person knowable. So the number of steps is not relevant for 
a computational state to exist. What is relevant is the relative measure on the 
continuations, but we have to take them all into account, and that is not a 
recursive set, making the physical reality NOT Turing emulable. This means al

Re: STEP 3

[Bruce Kellett]

On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 7:48 PM Bruno Marchal  wrote:

> On 23 May 2020, at 01:31, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
>
> On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 6:48 AM Jason Resch  wrote:
>
>>
>> If Holebo's theorem remains fundamental problems, then let's move
>> everything into virtual reality, and repeat the experiment.
>>
>> In one case your friend's mind file is deleted and restored from a
>> backup, and in another he continued without interruption. Do not the same
>> conclusions I suggest follow?
>>
>
>
> Thought experiments in virtual reality (where you get to make up the laws
> of physics) have no relevance for the world we observe.
>
>
> It is relevant once you assume the minimal amount of Mechanism to make
> sense of Darwin, or of Everett, etc.
>
> If you assume a primitive physical reality, you have to put something non
> Turing emulable in the brain so that it can differentiate being run by that
> physical reality from being run by arithmetic (which run all computations,
> with a specific redundancy from which the physical appearances proceed. But
> then, adding that non Turing emulable composant in the brain makes you
> violating Mechanism.
>


Blah, blah, blah.

Bruce

> At least you are coherent. Unlike some others here, you don’t try to
> defend both Mechanism and (weak) Materialism (the existence of some
> ontological material reality). Now, I don’t think that there is any
> evidences for such primary matter, and a lot of evidence for Mechanism
> (from Darwin to QM many-histories).
>

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Re: STEP 3

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 23 May 2020, at 01:31, Bruce Kellett  wrote:
> 
> On Sat, May 23, 2020 at 6:48 AM Jason Resch  > wrote:
> 
> If Holebo's theorem remains fundamental problems, then let's move everything 
> into virtual reality, and repeat the experiment.
> 
> In one case your friend's mind file is deleted and restored from a backup, 
> and in another he continued without interruption. Do not the same conclusions 
> I suggest follow?
> 
> 
> Thought experiments in virtual reality (where you get to make up the laws of 
> physics) have no relevance for the world we observe.

It is relevant once you assume the minimal amount of Mechanism to make sense of 
Darwin, or of Everett, etc.

If you assume a primitive physical reality, you have to put something non 
Turing emulable in the brain so that it can differentiate being run by that 
physical reality from being run by arithmetic (which run all computations, with 
a specific redundancy from which the physical appearances proceed. But then, 
adding that non Turing emulable composant in the brain makes you violating 
Mechanism. 

At least you are coherent. Unlike some others here, you don’t try to defend 
both Mechanism and (weak) Materialism (the existence of some ontological 
material reality). Now, I don’t think that there is any evidences for such 
primary matter, and a lot of evidence for Mechanism (from Darwin to QM 
many-histories).

Bruno




> 
> Bruce
> 
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>  
> .

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Re: STEP 3

[Bruno Marchal]

> On 22 May 2020, at 22:48, Jason Resch  wrote:
> 
> 
> 
> On Fri, May 22, 2020 at 3:27 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
> wrote:
> 
> 
> On 8/4/2019 10:44 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On Friday, August 2, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>> mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com>> 
>> wrote:
>> 
>> 
>> On 8/2/2019 1:06 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On Fri, Aug 2, 2019 at 1:40 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List 
>>> >> > wrote:
>>> 
>>> 
>>> On 8/2/2019 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>> > It is like Saibal Mitra said, the person he was when he was 3 is 
>>> > dead.  Too much information was added to his brain.  If his 3 year old 
>>> > self were suddenly replaced with his much older self, you would 
>>> > conclude the 3 year old was destroyed, but when gradual changes are 
>>> > made, day by day, common-sense and convention maintains that the 
>>> > 3-year-old was not destroyed, and still lives. This is the 
>>> > inconsistency of continuity theories.
>>> 
>>> On the contrary I'd say it illustrates the consistency of causal 
>>> continuity theories.
>>> 
>>> 
>>> Your close friend walks into a black  box, and emerges 1 hour later.
>>> 
>>> In case A, he was destroyed in a discontinuous way, and a new version of 
>>> that person was formed having the mind of your friend as it might have been 
>>> 1 hour later.
>>> In case B, he sat around for an hour before emerging.
>>> 
>>> You later meet up with the entity who emerges from this black box for 
>>> coffee.
>>> 
>>> From your point of view, neither case A nor B is physically 
>>> distinguishable.  Yet under your casual continuity theory, your friend has 
>>> either died or survived entering the black box.  You have no way of knowing 
>>> if the entity you are having coffee with is your friend or not.   Is this a 
>>> legitimate and consistent way of looking at the world?
>> 
>> Did the black box take A's information in order to copy him, or did it make 
>> a copy accidentally.
>> 
>> Would that change the result?
> 
> Holevo's theorem says it's impossible to copy A's state.
> 
> It's a thought experiment. Do you think the quantum state is relevant? One 
> typically doesn't track of the quantum state of their friend's atoms and use 
> that information as part of their recognition process.
> 
>  
> 
>>  
>> 
>> 
>> Incidentally, my not knowing the difference between two things is not very 
>> good evidence that they are the same.
>> 
>> 
>>  
>>  
>> That there's no physical experiment, even in principle, that could 
>> differentiate the two cases, I take as evidence that notions of identity 
>> holding there to be a difference are illusory.
> 
> But you haven't postulated a case in which it is impossible to differentiate 
> the two cases.  It's not clear what degree of differentiation is relevant.
> 
> If Holebo's theorem remains fundamental problems, then let's move everything 
> into virtual reality, and repeat the experiment.

Yes. We cannot clone unknown quantum state, but that is not relevant. What is 
relevant is that arithmetic emulates all quantum state preparation, and this in 
infinitely many occurrences. What remains to be explained is why the quantum 
computation win the measure games, but this is partially answered by the fact 
that the logic of the measure one are quantum logics.

Note that in the mechanist setting, we already know that matter is not clonable 
given that it does not exist, and its appearances requires the entire universal 
dovetailing. 

Bruno




> 
> In one case your friend's mind file is deleted and restored from a backup, 
> and in another he continued without interruption. Do not the same conclusions 
> I suggest follow?
> 
> Jason
> 
>  
> 
> -- 
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> "Everything List" group.
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>  
> .

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Re: STEP 3

[Jason Resch]

On Friday, May 22, 2020, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
> On 5/22/2020 1:48 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>
>
>
> On Fri, May 22, 2020 at 3:27 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On 8/4/2019 10:44 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>
>>
>>
>> On Friday, August 2, 2019, 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On 8/2/2019 1:06 PM, Jason Resch wrote:
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>> On Fri, Aug 2, 2019 at 1:40 PM 'Brent Meeker' via Everything List <
>>> everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:
>>>


 On 8/2/2019 11:03 AM, Jason Resch wrote:
 > It is like Saibal Mitra said, the person he was when he was 3 is
 > dead.  Too much information was added to his brain.  If his 3 year
 old
 > self were suddenly replaced with his much older self, you would
 > conclude the 3 year old was destroyed, but when gradual changes are
 > made, day by day, common-sense and convention maintains that the
 > 3-year-old was not destroyed, and still lives. This is the
 > inconsistency of continuity theories.

 On the contrary I'd say it illustrates the consistency of causal
 continuity theories.


>>> Your close friend walks into a black  box, and emerges 1 hour later.
>>>
>>> In case A, he was destroyed in a discontinuous way, and a new version of
>>> that person was formed having the mind of your friend as it might have been
>>> 1 hour later.
>>> In case B, he sat around for an hour before emerging.
>>>
>>> You later meet up with the entity who emerges from this black box for
>>> coffee.
>>>
>>> From your point of view, neither case A nor B is physically
>>> distinguishable.  Yet under your casual continuity theory, your friend has
>>> either died or survived entering the black box.  You have no way of knowing
>>> if the entity you are having coffee with is your friend or not.   Is this a
>>> legitimate and consistent way of looking at the world?
>>>
>>>
>>> Did the black box take A's information in order to copy him, or did it
>>> make a copy accidentally.
>>>
>>
>> Would that change the result?
>>
>>
>> Holevo's theorem says it's impossible to copy A's state.
>>
>
> It's a thought experiment. Do you think the quantum state is relevant? One
> typically doesn't track of the quantum state of their friend's atoms and
> use that information as part of their recognition process.
>
>
>
>>
>>
>>
>>>
>>>
>>> Incidentally, my not knowing the difference between two things is not
>>> very good evidence that they are the same.
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>
>> That there's no physical experiment, even in principle, that could
>> differentiate the two cases, I take as evidence that notions of identity
>> holding there to be a difference are illusory.
>>
>>
>> But you haven't postulated a case in which it is impossible to
>> differentiate the two cases.  It's not clear what degree of differentiation
>> is relevant.
>>
>
> If Holebo's theorem remains fundamental problems, then let's move
> everything into virtual reality, and repeat the experiment.
>
> In one case your friend's mind file is deleted and restored from a backup,
> and in another he continued without interruption. Do not the same
> conclusions I suggest follow?
>
>
> So you're postulating that your friend has been duplicated but in a way
> that you have no way of knowing.  And then you ask, "Is this a legitimate
> and consistent way of looking at the world?"  I guess I don't understand
> the question.  If you have no way of knowing, then you don't know...ex
> hypothesi.
>
>
> Brnet
>

My point is that identity is an intrinsic property of what something is
now. The history of the of the constituent particles have no affect on the
behaviors or operation of those particles. To say the history is relevant
to identity is to add an arbitrary extrinsic property which can be of no
physical relevance.

This is a direct consequence of QM, you can't distinguish two electrons,
from each other.

I reach the opposite conclusion of Davidson in his swampman thought
experiment: https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Swampman

Jason




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> 
> .
>

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