Re: Fwd: Let There Be Something
On 11/12/05, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > But extracting something from the Plenitude is trivial, or so it seems > to most people. If I have an infinite bin of dollar coins, and I owe > you $10, I don't see any difficulty in paying you the $10. Do you? > Please quote something from practical experience to the following effect: 1. you have an INFINITE amount of "something" (forAll x belongsTo Ints, INFINITE > x) 2. you can extract a known Finite amount of that "something" (in finite time) from the given INFINITE set. The point is that we can only claim the ability to (physically) "extract" elements from FINITE sets. In the physical sense we never deal with "true infinity". Unless your Plenitude is finite, you cannot talk of extracting some finite amount of it with confidence. I can extract $10 from $100, but I do not know whether I can extract $10 from $INFINITE. Truely "continuous" entities do not exist (atleast in the "matter" sense). -- Aditya Varun Chadha adichad AT gmail.com http://www.adichad.com
Re: What Computationalism is and what it is *not*
At the risk of digressing... Here are two questions to ponder: Can the entire collection of minds (human at least) that exists be simulated as one computer? That is, is it possible to design a computer such that it behaves exactly like the whole of "intellectual existence" does? conversely, is it possible to bring together currently existing minds to behave exactly like a HUGE computer? (this questin has a much more practical and "sinister" motive) any takers? -- Aditya Varun Chadha adichad AT gmail.com http://www.adichad.com Mobile: +91 98 400 76411
Re: subjective reality
Greetings, > In what way dont I have experience of myself? Who am I experiencing now? > Someone else? You have no guarantee of "whom" you are "experiencing". it is your belief that you are experiencing something that is "yourself". > That I exist is more certain than any scientific truth. This is what I said. > We can argue about experiences, illusions and being misled by perception if > you like, the argument that will come back is that the very fact I am being > misled by perception or undergoing an illusion proves beyond doubt to me > that I exist. you have no guarantee whether you exist in any one ELSE's reality. That you are sure that you exist in YOUR reality is a useless idea to the ME that is seperate from YOU. To ME it is no more than a belief. Any statement that is not verifiable is usually not taken as "fact". anything that is not known to be a "fact" is not "completely certain". Descartes tried to describe one such verification in "I think therefore I am", but this is also just a "thought", so it is more accurate to say "I think I think, therefore I think I am" [ www.cs.iitm.ernet.in/~swamy ]. Descartes was wrong in thinking that his statement was the final verification of self-existance. I admit that truth and provability are not the same thing, but by the same token, "something is not disproven, or not disprovable" is not necessarily true. Ofcourse you CAN say that your body exists, your brain exists, even probably that the software in your brain exists, these even a realist would admit, because now you are in the realm of VERIFIABLE statements. notice that I am not disproving your claim, because you qualify it as being true if and only if YOU think you have verified it as true. So basically going by your own claim that subjectivity is "more certain" than science, I can have my "subjective truth" that you don't exist. I can be morbid enough to take "I exist if and only if your self does not exist" as my subjective reality. What if I believe "I don't exist" (most times I really do believe that), can you disprove it? As soon as you say something that is not universally verifiable (note that verifiability is different from provability, Godel sentences are trivially verified to be true, but unprovable) you are stating a belief, something "certain" for you, but maybe not for others. you accept it on faith because you cannot prove it to yourself if you honestly treat yourself in the third person for a second. Faith MAY be true, there's no denying that. but till it is verified as such, it should not be classified as that. and science DOES deal with this issue, refining its axioms based on verifiable facts that aught to be derivable from the axiomatic system. realists don't pack it away in "laziness", they just don't presume to assign truth values to such statements until verification. > Given its certainty, it demands some kind of explanation Verifiability is a prerequisite for certainty. If we don't agree on the definition of "verifiability", then there can be no reconciliation between us, because you can never convince ME that you exist, I can always think you are a figment of my imagination with no personal experiences of your own, and therefore you don't experience anything, and your non-existence is subject only to a reconfiguration of my mind (your deletion from it). Ofcourse this is my subjective "truth" which you yourself are allowing me to have. But my whole point is that assuming things that are "unverifiable universally" as true leads to these conflicting "truths". This is what a realist begs: "please admit only LOGICALLY verifiable things are true or false". A realist is even humbler: he knows that even the logic we use is open to questioning, in other words verifiable. true/false applies only to verifiable things. in not assigning truth values to such statement a realist is not being lazy, only being cautious (or realistic if you may). -- Aditya Varun Chadha adichad AT gmail.com http://www.adichad.com
Re: Re: subjective reality]
Yes indeed, one may take this as their idea of "objective reality", but then by its very definition, this objective reality is "unknowable". In fact, its not only "until we wait for the photons to reach us" that we can't know this reality, even when they reach us, it is only our brain telling us that the "simplest" explaination is a supernova in the distant past. our estimate of the event can only be built from the event of our observing it. Yes, in theory you could say that take ALL possible "observation events" and then with ALL this information you can rebuild "reality" with hundred percent confidence, but then we are talking of pure theory, because we simply are not omniscient/omnipresent in space-time to ever make that possible. and here's a kick in the head: while I am sounding like a non-realist, this non-realism comes from one very realist assumption: "pure theory" is just the mechanics of the brain. In essence, our belief that "objective reality" exists is a simplifying assumption that our minds find pleasant. in fact, even the argument that testable predictability is a measure of "objectivity" fails somewhat, because our tests of our predictions yield results again only from our viewpoints, not the omniscient, omnipresent "objective" viewpoint. remember, Occum's razer and such "laws" that promote simplicity in reason are great tools for doing science from our perspective, but they cannot and should not be taken to be "objective" laws themselves. it would be like saying "I can drive this nail into the wall with my hammer, therefore ALL nails that are EVER driven into the wall can only be driven with my hammer". there HAS to be scepticism in ANY possible theory of everything, realists are sceptic about the abilities of our minds, idealists are sceptic about things outside our minds. The more I hear these two schools argue, the more I want to try to find the "common ground" theory that permits both views as "accurate". On 8/8/05, Norman Samish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Even though the theory of relativity says that information cannot be > transmitted faster than the speed of light, why does that make it > nonsensical to talk about "objective reality"? I realize that different > observers must see different versions of events, but so what? In our 3+1 > dimensional universe, couldn't "objective reality" be defined as the state > of events at a "time slice," as though the universe had frozen at the > instant chosen? Granted, we can't know what this distant objective reality > is until we wait for the photons to reach us, but that doesn't make it > nonsense. The supernova that occurs at a million-light year distant galaxy > is objective reality, even though our subjective reality is that the > supernova has not occurred. We have to wait a million years to make the > discovery. > Norman Samish > > Aditya Varun Chadha adichad AT gmail.com http://www.adichad.com
Re: OMs are events
Greetings, Not sure of the exact formal meaning but I think Bruno is talking something related to Godel's incompleteness for second order and "higher" logics. (sorry if that was already obvious) > > > Of course > > provability can obey universal principles: for example the notion of > > classical checkable proof in sufficiently rich system is completely > > captured by the modal logics G and G*. > > Well, you lost me on that one! > > Hal Finney I'd guess that this can be translated into the computability problem (problems of the class of HALTING) for the Universal TM. i.e. "Reachability" in ANY Turing Machine is limited to "sub-HALTING" problems (very very vague and informal on my part). The church turing thesis also is infact a statement about computability in the universal sense, independant of the model of computation used. Or maybe I am totally off, in that case, sorry for blabbering without reading up what "modal logics G and G*" exactly are. -- Aditya Varun Chadha adichad AT gmail.com http://www.adichad.com
Re: Clarification of Terms (was RE: What We Can Know About the World)
[LC]: > Well, Russell did also say that OMs and events seemed to him about as > alike as chalk and cheese. It's starting to look that way: > So, alas, it seems that the firmly established meanings of > "event" and "observer moment" can't really be said to be at > all the same thing. (Folks like Russell and Hal have been > using the term "OM" for years and years, and "event" has > a pretty standard meaning in physics.) Observer moments have > to do with something conscious (and, evidently, pretty complex). > And of course, as Hal wrote later on, consciousness exists on > a gray scale. Then dare I say that any Theory based on this "restricted" definition of OMs (happening to observers with consciousness/intelligence "comparable" to ours) can never be as complete as a theory based on the much simpler (and encompassing) notion of events. Ok, the above sounds a bit arrogant on my part, but its just that when I think of Big things like ToEs, I am much more comfortable without the burden of assuming that I am special in some way. If it were so, It would either be too much of a coincidence, or some act of a God that I can never hope to explain to myself. I can only agree to disagree by saying that any theory that explains consciousness in terms of something more than just "interference of events" on a HUGE scale, is pretty much the same as explaining away coincidents as acts of a God: that unreachable, unfathomable "entity". -- Aditya Varun Chadha adichad AT gmail.com http://www.adichad.com
Re: What We Can Know About the World
[RS] On 7/31/05, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Sat, Jul 30, 2005 at 12:25:48PM -0700, Lee Corbin wrote: > > > > This is not to say that progress is impossible. Consider an idea > > like Aditya has: what is the real difference between an event > > and an observer-moment? In trying to answer that question, many > > of us may learn something (at least for our own purposes). > > > > Err, an event is a particular set of coordinates (t,x,y,z) in 4D > spacetime. This is how it is used in GR, anyway. > > An observer moment is a set of constraints, or equivalently > information known about the world (obviously at a moment of time). It > corresponds the the "state" vector \psi of quantum mechanics. > > Perhaps you have different definitions of these terms, but it seems > like chalk and cheese to me. > Lets not constrain an "event" to mean something only in 4-space. Take any N-Space and you can define it in terms of a set of N-dim. events. Ofcourse I agree with your definition, am just making it scale over dimensions. Now consider an "observer moment" to be exactly what you are defining it to be: information KNOWN about the world at a moment of time. The "coming to know" of any information corresponds to an "event". Thus an "observer moment" is well-defined if and only if "event" is defined. In other words, an Observer-Moment exists iff it's corresponding "coming to know" event exists for "some" observer. In terms of light cones, OMs are the Events at and "after" the crossing over of light cones. I think the distinction is not a qualitative one between the two, only those events which interfere with the set of events "observable" by "us" (who are also just sets of events) correspond to "observer-moments" in "our universe". So the set of OMs is simply a subset of the set of all events. refer to my previous mail about the multiverse as a partition with equivalence classes which are maximal sets of connected "observer moments", in other words, maximal sets of "mutually interfering events". visualize this as connected components of a graph. Defining entities in more than one different sets of words does not rule out their qualitative identity. Every Observer-Moment is an event. Every event is an Observer-Moment in some universe. -- Aditya Varun Chadha adichad AT gmail.com http://www.adichad.com
Re: What We Can Know About the World
Whoa! A simple question that just opened up SO many things in my mind! (maybe a few screws too:-) ) Blabber on I shall! [LC]: > By "event" do you mean an event that leaves a record? Just > wondering. "leaves a record" is the same as saying "affects/causes/interferes with other events". Side Note: Beware the pitfalls of visualizing this as a temporal cause-effect relationship though, we are talking of events, which happen in space-time, not space. Better to understand it as "interference". I think that if we consider an ENTIRE intricate interference-connected web of events, we are in fact considering one equivalence class from the partition called "multiverse". The equivalence relation creating this partition is the "interferes with" relation. And each equivalence class is a "universe". Side Note: If you are following till here, then please help me a bit with the reflexive part of the "interferes with" equivalence. How does an event interfere with itself? I am going the base the rest of the post on this assumption, and unfortunately I currently cannot substantiate it. But now this is a perfect example of something that our brain can "define" but not model. Because from our perspective, until and unless an event "interferes with" our universe, it is in "some other universe" which we have no way of describing. Therefore yes, for us the "knowable universe" at any time can only have events that leave records in our universe, or events that form part of our interference web. BUT, since "coming to know" is itself only an event, it is ALWAYS possible that even our notion of "knownable universe" is incomplete. This is because we ALWAYS have the potential to be "unlucky enough" to not "feel" some interference from an event that we currently believe is in "some other universe" and therefore "unknowable". It is just a matter of not being in the right place at the right time. So although I cannot say for sure whether there even exist events that "do not leave a record", but if they do exist, then they are unknowable. By their very definition they do not "affect" us in ANY way, and therefore can be ignored in a ToE. But the problem is, we have NO way of knowing that an event SURELY does NOT leave a record! Having said this, the universe seems to be at BEST only recursively enumerable to us, not recursive. Because while we CAN observe what's INSIDE it, we have NO way of saying what's OUTSIDE (yet INSIDE the "multiverse"). So my concluding claim is this: We may some day have a ToE that is in fact Consistent and Complete (finally TRUE), but we will NEVER be sure that it is so. [LC] > Thanks for a nice try at clearing up what Jesse, at least, > and I were discussing. Maybe now I have managed to complicate things again:-) -- Aditya Varun Chadha adichad AT gmail.com http://www.adichad.com
Fwd: What We Can Know About the World
sorry for the misaddressing... -- Forwarded message -- From: Aditya Varun Chadha <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Jul 30, 2005 8:47 PM Subject: Re: What We Can Know About the World To: Jesse Mazer <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> At the risk of barging in once again, > Since there is nothing specifically human about my idea of > "observer-moments" this analogy doesn't really work. > > Jesse I agree more with this version of "observer-moments". An assumption that an "observer" is a human or even a "biological" entity is being narrow-minded IMO. I think a common error that we make is to assume some vague concept of "consciousness" and then limit our notion of observation as a process that only "conscious" entities can undertake/undergo. We only believe we are conscious, we have no "proof" or "physical evidence", because ALL our thought-systems ASSUME consciousness, it is just a human axiom. Or taken another way, conscious is a human-made word representing just the way we (and our "close relatives" for the relatively liberal) work. Nothing special about it. Why not allow "observation" to be any event in which any set of entities (even the most "fundamental" entities) interact among each other in any way? After all, human observation can be explained as the "physical" interactions of our senses/brain with "other" entities. (i.e. just events) Notice that this "definition" (or description, for the "definition"-averse) cuts through a WHOLE lot of assumptions, ultimately revealing (at least to me) the IDENTITY (sameness) of the terms "Event" and "Observer-Moment". Further, no version of "Observation" adopted by any Idealists violates this definition. Also, the converse is not hard to accept if we are just a bit more open minded (doing away with the "speciality" of human thought). In the system that emerges, yes, Observer-Moments alone ARE a candidate for giving us a ToE, but for this, they cannot be differentiated from our simple notion of "Event". (The realist favours the term Event, the Idealist favours Observer-Moment) I have been tilted towards what this list seems to call "realism" since the start, but I maintain that digging deep enough, the realism and idealism being discussed here aren't that different if we just use a "Realish-Idealish, Idealish-Realish" dictionary, and I believe all terms in either "language" have equivalent translations in the other. I think Mazer has put this across quite nicely, so I pause here. -- Aditya Varun Chadha adichad AT gmail.com http://www.adichad.com
Re: what relation do mathematical models have with reality?
I think a reconciliation between Bruno and Lee's arguments can be the following: Our perception of reality is limited by the structure and composition of brains. (we can 'enhance' these to be able to perceive and understand 'more', but at ANY point of time the above limitation holds). I think this is closer to what Lee wants to say, and I totally agree with it. This is what I have tried to elaborate on in my earlier (my first here) email. But the very fact that this limitation is absolutely inescapable (observation and understanding is ALWAYS limited to the observer's capabilities) gives us the following insight: That which cannot be modelled (understood) cannot figure in ANY of our "models of reality". Therefore although our models of reality keep changing, at any given time instance there is no way for us to perceive anything beyond the model, because as soon as something outside our current model is perceived, we have moved to a future instance, and can create a model that includes it. Thus it is kind of senseless to talk of a reality beyond our perception. In other words, we can call something "reality" only once we perceive it. In this sense "models may be more real than reality" to us. This is an argument of the "Shroedinger's Cat" kind. In fact if I am correct about what both Bruno and Lee want to say, then Lee's arguments are a prerequisite to understanding to what Bruno is hinting at. Quantum Physics says that an observer and his observation are impossible to untangle. >From the above fact, A Realist (Lee) would conclude that "absolute reality" is unknowable. (follows from heisenburg's uncertainty also btw:-) ). But for this the realist assumes that this "absolute reality" exists. A Nihilist (Bruno) would conclude that since this tanglement of observer and observation is inescapable, it is meaningless to talk about any "absolute reality" outside the perceived and understood reality (models). None of the views is "naive". In fact neither view can ever disprove the other, because both belong to different belief (axiomatic) systems. apples and oranges, both tasty. P.S.: If what I have said above sounds ok and does help put things in perspective, then I would like to think that in this WHOLE discussion there is NO NEED of invoking terms like "comp hyp", "ASSA", "RSSA", "OMs", etc. I, being clearly a lesser being in this new domain of intellectual giants at eskimo.com, would highly appreciate if atleast the full forms are given so that I can google them and put them in context. On 7/27/05, Lee Corbin <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Bruno writes > > > > Look, it's VERY simple: take as a first baby-step the notion > > > that the 19th century idea of a cosmos is basically true, and > > > then add just the Big Bang. What we then have is a universe > > > that operates under physical laws. So far---you'll readily > > > agree---this is *very* simple conceptually. > > > > > > Next, look at this picture after 14.7 billion years. Guess > > > what has evolved? Finally, there is intelligence and there > > > are entities who can *perceive* all this grandeur. > > > > > > So, don't forget which came first. Not people. Not perceptions. > > > Not ideas. Not dich an sich. Not 1st person. Not 3rd person. > > > NOT ANY OF THIS NONSENSE. Keep to the basics and we *perhaps* > > > will have a chance to understand what is going on. > > > > > > But both the quantum facts, and then just the comp hyp are incompatible > > with that type of naive realism. > > At this level of discourse, dear Bruno, I don't give a ___ > for your *hypothesis*. > > Moreover, please google for "naive realism". You'll find that this > is the world view of children who have *no* idea of the processes > by which their brains are embedded in physical reality. > > Since no one claims to be a naive realist, this rises to the level > of insult. > > But then, I'm not too surprised that the most *basic* understanding > of our world has been forgotten by some who deal everyday with only > the most high level abstractions. > > Lee > > -- Aditya Varun Chadha [EMAIL PROTECTED] Mobile: +91 98 400 76411 Home: +91 11 2431 4486 Room #1034, Cauvery Hostel Indian Institute of Technology, Madras Chennai - 600 036 India
Re: what relation do mathematical models have with reality?
ext and thus the main source of > counterintuitive aspects that make QM so difficult to deal with when we > approach the subject of Realism. OTOH, we have to come up with an > explanation of how it is that our individual experiences of a world seem to > be confined to sharp valuations and the appearance of property definiteness. > Everett and others gave us the solution to this conundrum with the MWI. Any > given object has eigenstates (?) that have eigenvalues (?) that are sharp > and definite relative to some other set of eigenstates, but as a whole a > state/wave function is a superposition of all possible. > So, what does this mean? We are to take the a priori and context > independent aspect of *reality* as not having any one set of sharp and > definite properties, it has a superposition of all possible. The trick is to > figure out a reason why we have one basis and not some other, one > partitioning of the eigenstates and not some other. > > What does this have to do with mathematics and models? If we are going > to create/discover models of what we can all agree is sharp and definite- > our physical world, we must be sure that our models agree with each other. > This, of course, assumes that there is some connection between abstract and > concrete aspect of *reality*. > > Stephen > > -- Aditya Varun Chadha [EMAIL PROTECTED] Mobile: +91 98 400 76411 Home: +91 11 2431 4486 Room #1034, Cauvery Hostel Indian Institute of Technology, Madras Chennai - 600 036 India
