Re: MGA 1
Bruno: I think you and John touched the fundamental issues of human rational. It's a dilemma encountered by phenomenology. Now I have a question: In theory we can't distinguish ourselves from a Lobian Machine. But can lobian machines truly have sufficient rich experiences like human? For example, is it possible for a lobian machine to "still its mind' or "cease the computational logic" like some eastern philosophy suggested? Maybe any of the out-of-loop experience is still part of the computation/logic, just as our out-of-body experiences are actually the trick of brain chemicals? Gordon --- On Thu, 11/20/08, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: MGA 1 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Thursday, November 20, 2008, 12:05 PM Hi John, > It boils down to my overall somewhat negative position (although > I have no better one) of UDA, MPG, comp, etc. - all of them are > products of HUMAN thinking and restrictions as WE can imagine > the unfathomable existence (the totality - real TOE). > I find it a 'cousin' of the reductionistic conventional sciences, just > a bit 'freed up'. Maybe a distant cousin. Meaning: it handles the > totality WITHIN the framework of our limited (human) logic(s). I think that Human logic is already a progress compared to Russian, or Belgian, or Hungarian, or American logic, or ... And then you know how much I agree with you, once you substitute "human" by "lobian" (where a lobian machine/number is a universal machine who know she is universal, and bet she is a machine). > Alas, we cannot do better. I'm afraid so. Thanks for acknowledging. > just want to take all this mental > exercise with the grain of salt of "there may be more to all of it" Sure. And if we take ourself too much seriously, we can miss the ultimate cosmic divine joke (if there is one). > > what we cannot even fancy (imagine, fantasize of) today, > with our mind anchored in our restrictions. (Including 'digital', > 'numbers', learned wisdom, etc.). Be careful and be open to your own philosophy. The idea that "digital" and "numbers" (the concept, not our human description of it) are restrictions could be due to our human prejudice. May be a machine could one day believes this is a form of unfounded prejudicial exclusion. I hope you don't mind my frank attitude, and I wish you the best, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: MGA 1
Bruno: I'm intested to see the second part. Thanks! --- On Wed, 11/19/08, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: MGA 1 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Wednesday, November 19, 2008, 3:59 AM Le 19-nov.-08, à 07:13, Russell Standish a écrit : > I think Alice was indeed not a zombie, I think you are right. COMP + MAT implies Alice (in this setting) is not a zombie. > and that her consciousness > supervened on the physical activity stimulating her output gates (the > cosmic explosion that produced the "happy rays"). Are you suggesting > that she was a zombie? Not at all. (Not yet ...). > > I can see the connection with Tim Maudlin's argument, but in his case, > the machinery known as Olympia is too simple to be conscious (being > nothing more than a recording - simpler than most automata anyway), > and the machinery known as Klara was in fact stationary, leading to a > rather absurd proposition that consciousness would depend on a > difference in an inactive machine. > > In your case, the cosmic explosion is far from inactive, This makes the movie graph argument immune against the first half of Barnes objection. But let us not anticipate on the sequel. > and if a star > blew up in just such a way that its cosmic rays produced identical > behaviour to Alice taking her exam (consciously), I have no problems > in considering her consciousness as having supervened on the cosmic > rays travelling from that star for that instant. It is no different to > the proverbial tornado ripping through one of IBM's junk yards and > miraculously assembling a conscious computer by chance. Does everyone accept, like Russell, that, assuming COMP and MAT, Alice is not a zombie? I mean, is there someone who object? Remember we are proving implication/ MAT+MECH => . We never try to argue about that per se. Eventually we hope to prove MAT+MECH => false, that is NOT(MAT & MECH) which is equivalent to MAT implies NOT MECH, MECH => NOT MAT, etc. (by MAT i mean materialism, or naturalism, or physicalism or more generally "the physical supervenience thesis", according to which consciousness supervenes on the physical activity of the brain. If no one objects, I will present MGA 2 (soon). > > Of course you know my opinion that the whole argument changes once you > consider the thought experiment taking place in a multiverse. We will see (let us go step by step for not confusing the audience). Thanks for answering. Bruno Marchal http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon)
Bruno: I'd like to hear more details about MGA if you don't mind. I tried to find the detailed description with no avail. Even though I am new and still sipping through the snipits here, I feel the potential of this hypothesis. I think the all the hard problems (mind/body, subjectivity/objectivity, dualism/non-dual) are basically circular dependent, like two coupled subsystems, perhaps neither of them fundamental. How do we gain ‘the outside view’ of a closed-system if we are inside or we are the system? It’s like chess pieces being aware of their existence and searching for underneath rules by observation. I also like your ideas such as ‘self-observing ‘ideal’ machine discovers the arithmetic truth by looking inside’ (pardon my poetic distortion). How close can we look? The light is on but nobody’s home? Gordon --- On Thu, 11/13/08, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: From: Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Subject: Re: QTI & euthanasia (brouillon) To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Date: Thursday, November 13, 2008, 9:38 AM On 13 Nov 2008, at 00:16, Kory Heath wrote: > > > On Nov 12, 2008, at 9:33 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote: >> First, I have never stop to work on that and try to share the >> argument >> with people interested in the matter. > > True. You're tireless! (That's a complement.) > >> Second, it happens that sometimes I think the burden his on him to >> tell us what he means by a physical universe. > > I totally agree. But most people will just wave their arms and say, > "What do you mean? We're obviously in a physical universe. What's > problematic about that?" I think there is a reason for that. Million of years of Darwinian brain washing. But we can't complain, it has also been brain-building. Note that the Greek are the first to rationally take a distance from that, and by this move created modern science including theology as the most fundamental science. But humanity was perhaps not mature enough, so when Aristotle reintroduced the idea that matter is basic, both scientist and theologian get back to it. Of course poets and mystics know better > And then the burden is back on us to explain > why the concept of "physical existence" is more problematic than it > seems. Burden Tennis. This is the reason why I have developed the Movie Graph Argument (hereafter MGA). > > >> It is not a question of taste. It is a question of acknowledging use >> of logic and assumptions, and finding either hidden assumptions, or >> imprecise statements or invalid argument step(s). > > I see your point. But there are issues of clarity or focus, and to > some extent those are a matter of taste. I'd like to read an essay (by > anyone) that lays out a clear argument in favor of the position that > computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious. Be careful with the term. The MGA is subtle and to explain it we will have to be more precise. For example here it is better to remember that only *person* are conscious. Computations are not conscious (be it soft or hard wired). > I > believe this argument can be made without reference to Loebian > machines, first-person indeterminacy, or teleportation thought- > experiments. MGA is a completely different thought experiment. It looks a bit like UDA, but it is deeply different. > > > I hope you don't find my criticism too annoying. Not at all. But many in this list said it was obvious that the UD does not need to be run, and I remember that I thought that explaining MGA was not really necessary. Even you, right now, seem to agree that computation does not need to be implemented. This does not motivate me too much. The MGA is far more subtle than UDA, and it is a bit frustrating to explain it to people who says in advance that they already agree with the conclusion. Even Maudlin did complain to me that few people have understand its Olympia reasoning. Many confuses it with other type of criticism of comp. > It's easy for me to > sit on the sidelines and take potshots, while you've done a lot of > actual work. And remember that I do, in fact, believe that > computations don't need to be implemented in order to be conscious, so > you're usually preaching to the choir with me. You see! > My point is that, I can > imagine Dennett reading your posts, and saying "Ok, that makes sense > *if* we accept that computations don't need to be implemented in order > to be conscious. But I still don't see why I should believe that." Dennett, like many "naturalist" is not aware that the notion of matter is not obvious at all. The greeks were much more aware than all those who followed, of the mind body problem (except Descartes and Malebranche). Today people thought about the "consciousness" problem, when the real trouble is in defining both mind and matter and relating them. And Dennett seems not to be aware that modern physics has not progressed at all in the "hard prob
