Re: Time and Freewill
On Sep 9, 11:30 pm, "Jason Resch" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Tue, Sep 9, 2008 at 7:44 PM, Stathis Papaioannou <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>wrote: > > 2008/9/10 Jason Resch <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > > Uv, > > > > One of the concerns people have with free will or the lack thereof is > > that > > > if physics is deterministic, one's future actions can predicted > > beforehand, > > > without them even having to exist. However, an interesting consequence > > of > > > computationalism is this: One's future actions cannot be predicted > > without a > > > simulation that goes into enough detail to instantiate that person's > > > consciousness. As conscious creatures, our wills cannot be calculated > > > without our consciousness being invoked by the calculations, just as the > > > physics of this universe is doing now. > > > Hm, sounds good, but is that true? > > I think it is, if you ignoring unpredictability due to QM, measurement > problems, need to simulate the environment etc. We can set aside the debate > on these other issues for the purposes of this thought experiment by saying > there exists a simulated mind and environment together inside a computer and > both the mind and environment evolve according to deterministic rules which > can be computed in finite time. > > Within that situation, it is clear that there is no way to leap to future > states of the system other than having the computer compute each > intermediate step, skipping or abridging finer details of the system > (environment or the mind) will lead to ever growing inaccuracies later down > the road, as Rich mentioned a sensitive dependence on initial conditions. > The only sure way to _know_ with certainty what the future holds is to > process every instruction of the program. Unless you believe in the > possibility of philosophical zombies, a conscious being cannot be accurately > simulated without simulating its mind in enough detail for that being to be > conscious. Jason, I agree with what you say about simulating minds. It seems very reasonable to me that attempting to simulate a consciousness in detail that is sufficient to reproduce behavior of that consciousness with arbitrary precision would require processing of all intermediate time steps. Also the point about identifying such a simulation with the original consciousness. If it worked precisely the same, and received exactly the same sensory input, the simulated consciousness and the original would be one and the same. (And, since this assumes determinism, free will must be an illusion, though choice most definitely is not.) But what I wonder about is the implication that the physics of the universe are themselves unfolding in a computation of some sort. I mean, I agree with this idea, with this model of thinking about physics. But I am afraid the analogy breaks down, because I am unsure how we can know anything about the direction in which this presumed computation is occurring relative to our experience of time. We all know that the fundamental laws of physics are time reversible. How can someone living in the universe tell which direction the underlying program is executing in relative to the evolution of the universe in the up entropy direction. Perhaps, for all we know, the direction of computation is counter to the direction in which we seem to experience time. Perhaps it is in some orthogonal direction. Is there any way to tell? Maybe not, until we can finally understand the most fundamental physical laws governing our existence. These are thoughts that bug me late at night. But understand that I am not disagreeing with anything you said. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: All feedback appreciated - An introduction to Algebraic Physics
You mean, besides the archive of this list? ;) On May 1, 2:16 pm, "Brian Tenneson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Hi All, > > I was wondering if there was a tome where all these ideas have been > collected? I would like to get my hands on such. > > --Brian > > > > On Thu, May 1, 2008 at 12:11 PM, Marchal Bruno <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > Hello Günther, > > > >> I have already presented an argument (an easy consequence of the > > >> Universal Dovetailer Argument, which is less easy probably) showing > > that: > > > >> - CRH implies COMP > > >> - COMP implies the negation of CRH > > >> - Thus, with or without COMP (and with or without the MUH) the CRH does > > >> not hold. > > > >Regarding: > > > >COMP implies the negation of CRH > > > >Is this also in your Sane 2004 paper? (then I missed that point) - if > > >not, where did you argue this? > > > It is not in the Sane 2004 paper. I have argue that COMP imples NOT-CRH > > online, in reply to Schmidhuber or someone defending the idea that the > > universe could be the product of a computer program. > > > Universality, Sigma_1 completeness, m-completness, creativity (in Post > > sense), all those equivalent notion makes sense only through complementary > > notion which are strictly sepaking more complex (non RE, productive, ...). > > The self-introspecting universal machine can hardly miss the inference of > > such "realities", and once she distinguishes the 1, 1-plural, 3-person > > points of view, she has to bet on the role of the non computable realities > > (even too much getting not just randomness, like QM, but an hard to compute > > set of anomalous stories (white rabbits, coherent but inconsistent dreams). > > > It's a bit like "understanding" (putting in a RE set) the (code of) the > > total computable functions, forces us to accept the existence of only > > partially computable functions, which sometimes (most of the time, see the > > thesis by Terwijn) have a non recursive domain. > > OK, the ontic part of a comp TOE can be no *more* than Sigma_1 complete, > > but a non self-computable part of Arithmetical truth and analytical truth, > > is needed to get the *internal* measure, we can't even give a name to our > > first person plenitude and things like that. > > > The quantified "angel guardian" of a simple Lobian machine like PA, that > > is qG*, is itself Pi_1 in the Arithmetical Truth (see Boolos 1993 book). > > The "God" of PA (already unameable by PA) is already NOT omniscient about > > PA's intelligible reality, if you follow the arithmetical interpretation of > > Plotinus I did propose. > > Perhaps this is why the Intelligible has been discovered (Plato) before > > the "ONE" (Plotin). It is far bigger. With comp you can restrict the ontic > > to the Universal Machine (the baby ONE), but its intelligible realm is well > > beyond its grasp. > > All this is related to the fact, already understood by Judson Webb, that > > comp is truly a vaccine against reductionist theories of the mind. > > > Have a good day, > > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text - --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Which mathematical structure -is- the universe in Physics?
On Apr 25, 5:27 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Le 24-avr.-08, à 18:26, nichomachus a écrit : > > > > > > > > > On Apr 22, 11:28 pm, "Brian Tenneson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> Perhaps Hilbert was right and Physics ought to have been axiomatized > >> when he > >> suggested it. ;) Then again, there might not have been a motivation > >> to > >> until recently with Tegmark's MUH paper and related material (like by > >> David > >> Wolpert of NASA). > > > The logical positivists were motivated to axiomatize in the predicate > > calculus the laws of scientific theories in the early 20th century, > > first because they believed that it would guarantee the cognitive > > significance of theoretical terms in the theory (such as the > > unphysical ether of maxwell's electromagnetism), and then later > > because it had evolved into an attempt to specify the proper form of a > > scientific theory. In practice this had too many problems and was > > eventually abandoned. One of the consequences of this program was that > > axiomatizing the laws of a theory in first order predicate calculus > > with equality was that such a formulation of a theory always implied > > various unintended interpretations. The amount of effort needed to > > block these unintended interpretations was out of proportion with the > > benefit received by axiomatization. > > It is a bit weird because it is just logically impossible to block > those unintended interpretations. And This should not be a problem. > The reason why physical theories are not axiomatize is more related to > the fact that axiomatization does not per se solve or even address the > kind of conceptual problem raised by physics. Also to this point, that it is impossible to identify a theory with any particular linguistic formulation of it. Theories are not linguistic entities. And since we’re on the subject: according to Max Tegmark, given the apparent direction of inter-theoretic reduction, one may assume that the foundational physics of our universe should be able to be expressed in a completely “baggage-free” description that is without reference to any human-specific concepts. This presumed most basic law of the universe would be capable of being axiomatized without unintended implications since the mathematical structure expressing the most basic law would be isomorphic with the law itself to the degree that it may appropriately be identified with it. The mathematical laws which describe the phenomena of all of the emergent levels or organization diverge from this ideal more and more the further one proceeds from this unknown foundational theory. > > Also, I > > personally remain unconvinced that there is anything problematic about > > the exitence of the universe of universes, or the ensemble of all > > possible mathematical structures, thought it may not be well defined > > at present. I don't believe that this is simply the union of all > > axiomatic systems. If trying to define the Everything as a set implies > > a contradiction, then fine -- it isn't a set, it's an ensemble, which > > doesn't carry any of the connotations that are implied by the use of > > "set" in the mathematical sense. Therefore each entity in the ensemble > > is a unique collection of n axioms that has no necessary relationship > > to any other axiom collection. What happens in an axiom system stays > > in that axiom system, and can't bleed over to the next one on the > > list. Some of these may be equivalent to each other. > > > A = The collection of all finite axiom systems > > B = The collection of all consistent finite axiom systems > > I guess you mean "recursively enumerable" instead of finite. You would > loose first order Peano Arithmetic (my favorite lobian machine :). Really? It would seem that all recursively enumerable axiom systems would exist in A. > Note also that SAS occurs very quickly. SAS occur in theories which are > much weaker than the SAS themselves (ex: SAS occur in Robinson > Arithmetic, i.e. when you can define successor, addition and > multiplication. SAS themselves need induction. I don’t understand. Are you saying that Self Aware Substructures exist in the Robinson Arithmetic? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Which mathematical structure -is- the universe in Physics?
On Apr 24, 12:08 pm, "Brian Tenneson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I was attempting to -invalidate- that argument against the existence of the > universe, actually, by saying that in three truth values, which the > Physicists can't rule out as being the more accurate logic of their > universe, the argument "reductio ad absurdum" is not a tautology and, > therefore, can't necessarily be applied. > > However, in binary logic, the Physicist's universe (or whatever Everything > means) can't exist. I take your point about the reductio not working in three valued logic. I am not convinced that the problem you are attempting to solve is necessarily a problem since I haven’t been able to construe the proposed reductio ad absurdum argument in a way that seems coherent to my way of thinking. However, you may be on to something with the general program that you have embarked upon. Maybe there is a need for a mathematics to describe the everything ensemble. Something along those lines is likely the only way to define the everything with any sort of rigor. I think it is a good idea. Set theory does seem to be too rich for the job. Determining what type of formalism is apropriate is a task. I think that such a mathematical formalism may be precisely what is called for in order to define the everything, as well as analyze it any useful sort of way. I am still confused by what you mean by certain terms. What is meant by the Physicist’s universe? Even more to the point, what is meant by saying that it cannot exist in binary logic? The propositional calculus, for example, does not even satisfy the conditions the Godel theorems, i.e. there are no undecidable propositions possible in it. To think that the axioms of any two valued logic could be sufficient to produce a physical existence for self-aware substructures is distinctly overstepping what Max Tegmark suggests in his metaphysical theory. > > I doubt self-reference is inherently the problem in light of things like > Tarski's fixed point theorems which provide concrete examples of wffs that > are self-referencing, in terms of Godel numbers, if I recall. That proof I > was exposed to was not an existence proof of self-referencing wffs merely by > "logical flamboyancy" but by the providing an example of an actual -class- > of self-referencing wffs. Obviously, the above argument does not explicitly > involve wffs (it does, however, implicitly), and I am -only- making a case > for plausibility at this particular moment. > > I see no problems with the argument given that in binary logic, their > universe can't exist; this, to me, convinces me that the Physicist's > universe can't operate on binary logic by Occam's Razor as -none- of the > data in any experiment would fit the result that confirms their speculation > that their universe exists. > > Ergo, the Physicist's universe must operate on at least three truth values. > (Consequently, it exists.) This to me is a more elegant solution to the > argument than citing self-referencing issues as automatically damning. If > natural language can be used to prove the Heine-Borel theorem, without the > need for wffs, then why must a statement about Everything be formalized in > machine-level code with wffs? > > If there is further objection to my line of thinking, -please- point it out > to Everyone (which I hope is well-defined or else no one would know what I > mean, right?) ;) > > Thank you for your remarks; I find all input extremely productive!! I too appreciate the chance to talk about such interesting ideas. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Which mathematical structure -is- the universe in Physics?
On Apr 22, 11:28 pm, "Brian Tenneson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Perhaps Hilbert was right and Physics ought to have been axiomatized when he > suggested it. ;) Then again, there might not have been a motivation to > until recently with Tegmark's MUH paper and related material (like by David > Wolpert of NASA). The logical positivists were motivated to axiomatize in the predicate calculus the laws of scientific theories in the early 20th century, first because they believed that it would guarantee the cognitive significance of theoretical terms in the theory (such as the unphysical ether of maxwell's electromagnetism), and then later because it had evolved into an attempt to specify the proper form of a scientific theory. In practice this had too many problems and was eventually abandoned. One of the consequences of this program was that axiomatizing the laws of a theory in first order predicate calculus with equality was that such a formulation of a theory always implied various unintended interpretations. The amount of effort needed to block these unintended interpretations was out of proportion with the benefit received by axiomatization. > > I was trying to answer Bruno's objections regarding set theory being too > rich to be the 'ultimate math' the MUH needs to propose what the universe is > and I quipped that that was because math is invented or discovered to > further its own end by logicians, for the most part, and that > metamathematicians such as Cantor had no apparent interest in physical > things or furthering the pursuit of Physics. > > Another question of Bruno's was my motivation. I started this quest hoping > that three truth values were sufficient to develop a set theory with a > universal set that was in a classical logic sense consistent to ZFC set > theory. Or, if not true, prove that and figure out why. Perhaps more truth > values would solve that. My main motivation has definitely not been to > "rescue" a major apparent shortcoming in the MUH as I started this > on-and-off quest in 2003 with no internet connection or resources such as a > deluge of journals (ie, a good library). How it started was that someone > online in a place such as this used Russell-like arguments to -prove- that > the Physic's universe -does not exist- for essentially the same reasons a > universal set can't seem to be non-antimonious. > > Suppose Everything is well defined along with its partner, containment (such > as the earth is contained in the solar system by the definitions of both). > Then Everything does not exist. Proof: > Consider the thing, call it "this something," that is the qualia of all > things that do not contain themselves. > Then this something contains itself if and only if this something does not > contain itself. I am suspect of the claim that a logical argument such as the above, which relies on a paradox of self-reference, could be used to demonstrate the non-existence of the so-called Everything. Also, I personally remain unconvinced that there is anything problematic about the exitence of the universe of universes, or the ensemble of all possible mathematical structures, thought it may not be well defined at present. I don't believe that this is simply the union of all axiomatic systems. If trying to define the Everything as a set implies a contradiction, then fine -- it isn't a set, it's an ensemble, which doesn't carry any of the connotations that are implied by the use of "set" in the mathematical sense. Therefore each entity in the ensemble is a unique collection of n axioms that has no necessary relationship to any other axiom collection. What happens in an axiom system stays in that axiom system, and can't bleed over to the next one on the list. Some of these may be equivalent to each other. A = The collection of all finite axiom systems B = The collection of all consistent finite axiom systems The "cardinality" of B is not greater than the "cardinality" of A. (Scare qutoes since cardinality is a property of sets and these may not be sets if that would imply contradiction.) It is B that is interesting from the point of this discussion since it is believed (I don't know of any proof of this) that only systems in B could produce the type of rational and orderly physical existence capable of containing observers who can think about their existence as we do (SASs, or Self-Aware Substructures). The collection of all those systems capable of containing SASs is the most interesting from the point of view of the present discussion, and must have a "cardinality" not greater than that of B, since many axiom systems are too simple to contain SAS, and the ones with them are expected to predominate. The idea of this ensemble so propounded does not seem to entail an ad absurdum paradox such as you gave above. Further, didn't I see you say somewhere that you don't even believe in sets? I apologize if I am mistaken, but if that is true, I can't see how that statement would re
Re: Quantum Immortality = no second law
On Apr 19, 3:46 pm, Günther Greindl <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Dear Nichomachus, > > > decision. If she measures the particle's spin as positive, she will > > elect to switch cases, and if she measures it with a negative spin she > > will keep the one she has. This is because she wants to be sure that, > > having gotten to this point in the game, there will be at least some > > branches of her existence where she experiences winning the grand > > prize. She is not convinced that, were she to decide what to do using > > only the processes available to her mind, she would guarantee that > > same result since it is just possible that all of the mutiple versions > > of herself confronted with the dilemma may make the same bad guess. > > I have also thought along these lines some time ago (to use a qubit to > ensure that all outcomes are chosen, because one should not rely on > one's mind decohering into all possible decisions). > > The essential question is this: what worlds exist? All possible worlds. > But which worlds are possible? We have, on the one hand, physical > possibility (this also includes other physical constants etc, but no > totally unphysical scenarios). > > I have long adhered to this "everything physically possible", but this > does break down under closer scrutiny: first of all, physical relations > are, when things come down to it, mathematical relations. > > So we could conclude with Max Tegmark: all possible mathematical > structures exist; this is ill defined (but then, why should the > Everything be well defined?) > > Alastair argues in his paper that everything logically possible exists > (with his non arbitrariness principle) but, while initially appealing, > it leads to the question: what is logically possible? In what logic? > Classical/Intuitionist/Deviant logics etc etc...then we are back at > Max's all possible structures. > > For all this, I am beginning very much to appreciate Bruno's position > with the Sigma_1 sentences; but I still have to do more reading and > catch up on some logic/recursion theory for a final verdict ;-)) > > One objection comes to mind immediately (already written above): why > should the Everything be well defined? > > To go back to your original question: to consider if both variants are > chosen by the player of the game by herself (without qubit) seems to > depend on which kind of Everything you choose. And that, I think, is the > crux of the matter. > > Cheers, > Günther Thank you for your illuminating comments, Günther. And though Tegmark's ensemble may be less than well-defined right now, there are other ensembles that are. My understanding of the Universal Dovetailer is that it will generate the output of every possible computer program, which, assuming that our universe is computable, implies that it contains ours and every other possible version of our universe. And unless there are any mathematical entities or structures in Max Tegmark's ensemble that are not computable, then Tegmark's enseble should be a subset of Schmidhuber's. On this note I can't do any better than Russell's discussion in section 3.2 of Theory of Nothing, which says that Schmidhuber's plentitude should properly be considered a subset of Tegmark's ensemble. Are there any "Mathematical Structures" that are not computable? Surely any finite axiom system, if consistent, would have a finite number of non-trivial theorems. It is said that a program could be written to generate all theorems of any consistent axiom system, so that would seem to imply computability. (Although Goedel's theorem indicates that any system of sufficient complexity cannot be both consistent and complete, so it follows that consistent axiom systems of sufficient complexity will allow for the existence of undecidable propositions. But what bearing this has on the present discussion about the computability of these systems is sort of unclear to me.) What would constitute an uncomputable mathematical structure? I don't know, but I admit that my ignorance on the subject doesn't demonstrate their non-existence. And yes, Günther, I agree with your wholeheartedly that "physical relations are mathematical relations" at their core. However, simply because a mathematical expression may model a given physical process or relationship leaves us in the dark as to the reason why this equation models this particular phenomenon. Feynman gives as example in his book The Charater of Physical Law of an equation used in electrolysis that relates the current, the time exposed, and the concentration of the solution to the amount of a metal that is deposited. But the relationship so expressed is clearly seen to be a result of physical proc
Re: QTI ---> Expanding brains
On Apr 20, 6:10 pm, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > On Sun, Apr 20, 2008 at 01:20:21PM -0700, Tom Caylor wrote: > > > Except that the evidence seems to support that our past is also > > recorded in a reality "out there" that seems independent of our > > brains. For example when we are reminded of something from our past, > > from looking at old photos, or from someone from our past telling a > > story about us, which as far as we can tell we would have never > > remembered without that reminder from outside of our possible streams > > of consciousness without the reminder. > > You have to distinguish between "being reminded of something" - here > an external event triggers our brain to recall a memory that is really > there, and "finding out about our past" by performing a > measurement. The latter entails completely new knowledge. It is no > different in principle to finding out about the present by performing > a normal measurement. > > I would argue that this implies our past (that which is beyond our > memories) is a superposition of those histories prior to any > measurement that might distinguish them, just as it might be in an > experimental apparatus measure circular polarisation. > > The independent "out there" feeling is just the self consistency of > all our observations - one that is nevertheless quite remarkable, but > not entailing the existence of something that is out there. I find this to be a fascinating idea, to relate mutiple possible histories to quantum superpositions. How does this notion relate to the idea that mutiple possible histories may degenerate to single "now"? Information about the past states of the universe being lost is equivalent to a gain in entropy, such that the state of the universe at time = t may not uniquely identify the state of the universe at time < t. Superficially this appears to be symmetrical with the notion of many possible worlds at time > t springing from a single state at t, another example of time invariance. However, it would be impossible, even in principle, to determine which one of these possible histories is the real one, since it would be meaningless to claim that only one led to the current state. If more than one history degenerate in to a particular state, then they are all correct in this scenario since irreversible steps make recovering one unique history impossible. But the meaning of the notion that the outcome an experiment performed in the past exists in a superposition of outcomes until the moment of an observation probably does depend greatly on whether one considers the existence of the world to be observer-dependent or independent. Is the ensemble merely the set of all possible observer experiences? Or are there ensembles that are at least as valid that take reality to be external and observer independent? I intuitively suspect that there is nothing special about what we call consciousness, and that an observation is any physical measurement, be it a photon impinging on a retina or a photodetector or whatever. It does not seem as sensical to me to claim that a measurement made with instruments does not constitute an observation until looked at by a conscious observer. However, I am trying to understand the differences in these two views -- not the easiest task to do since I am invested in one of them already. I hate to tax the patience of those who read this list with yet another thought experiment, but I think it may be useful to illustrate this with an example. Suppose that there is a distant galaxy that has never been observed from Earth, but only because no one has yet looked it with a sufficiently powered telescope. When we do decide to point the Hubble at it, we either will or will not observe the aftermath of a particularly dramatic supernova whose light would have been visible from earth centuries ago, assuming that it in fact happened, and someone had looked at it. If I look at it with the Hubble tomorrow and I see the results of a powerful supernova, I can safely assume that the version of me observing it exists within the same reality as one that experienced that supernova. If I do not see the results of the supernova (which would have been evident if it had taken place) then that means that the 'I' who sees the galaxy exists in a branch that did not experience that supernova. The superposition would be resolved into actualities by my observation. Here is the problem: the light from that supernova would have first reached earth centuries before I made that observation. Hence, I would not be the first earthbound entity to observe that event. Perhaps the first conscious entity, but inanimate objects on the Earth also "saw" the light from that supernova. It would seem that in this case the superpostion was not one of genuine quantum superposition but only uncertainty about history from our own ignorance. Suppose that I do see that a supernova occurred, but unbeknownst to me, an ancient astronomer had
Re: Quantum Immortality = no second law
On Apr 19, 4:26 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > nichomachus wrote: > > On Apr 19, 11:51 am, "Telmo Menezes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >>> Those branches exist even if the experiment is not set > >>> up. This follows necessarily from the MWI. Pick any date in history > >>> that you like. There must exist fluke branches that have experienced > >>> unlikely histories since that time. The example I mentioned previously > >>> was no atomic decay since January 1, 1900. > >> Yes I agree. The second law is just a statistical property, is it not? > >> I believe it is possible to observe cases where the second law does > >> not hold, even for a long time. But it's extremely unlikely. That > >> being said, I would argue that it would be nice if we could come to > >> the conclusion that the quantum suicider experiment can work even > >> without the need to resort to an highly unlikely stacking of quantum > >> choices. > > > How would it work? The point of the suicider experiement is that the > > suicider is able to prove to himself the reality of MWI by forcing > > himself to experience only an absurdly low probability set of events. > > Thus, he demonstrates to the few versions of himself who remain the > > existence of fluke branches, and by extension the truth of the MWI. > > > Right, I agree that a universe in which entropy decreases > > monotonically would be unlikely since it would only happen in those > > exceedingly rare fluke branches. > > If it were also expanding in spacetime it would be exactly like our universe. I read recently that entropy is increasing, but a measure called entropy density is decreasing due to inflation. This is how it was supposed that a universe tending toward maximum entropy could avoid heat death, as the theoretical entropy max grows along with the universe. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Quantum Immortality = no second law
On Apr 19, 11:51 am, "Telmo Menezes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > Those branches exist even if the experiment is not set > > up. This follows necessarily from the MWI. Pick any date in history > > that you like. There must exist fluke branches that have experienced > > unlikely histories since that time. The example I mentioned previously > > was no atomic decay since January 1, 1900. > > Yes I agree. The second law is just a statistical property, is it not? > I believe it is possible to observe cases where the second law does > not hold, even for a long time. But it's extremely unlikely. That > being said, I would argue that it would be nice if we could come to > the conclusion that the quantum suicider experiment can work even > without the need to resort to an highly unlikely stacking of quantum > choices. How would it work? The point of the suicider experiement is that the suicider is able to prove to himself the reality of MWI by forcing himself to experience only an absurdly low probability set of events. Thus, he demonstrates to the few versions of himself who remain the existence of fluke branches, and by extension the truth of the MWI. Right, I agree that a universe in which entropy decreases monotonically would be unlikely since it would only happen in those exceedingly rare fluke branches. However, the point of the quantum suicide experiment is to prove to the suicider the reality of the MWI by verifying the existence of fluke branches, and by extension, all of the other, more likely worlds as well. The suicider steps in for the cat in the schrodinger experiment. The QTI suicide experiment simply asks what its like for the cat, instead of the observers who open the box. You can stay in that box for any length of time, and if MWI is true, which implies the QTI, you won't die. this only works because we are eliminating the consciousness of the observer in a great many more branches. But it isn't a healthy way to prove MWI in practice. "Don't try this at home." :) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Quantum Immortality = no second law
On Apr 19, 10:42 am, "Telmo Menezes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > But the gun would only fire if the atom did in fact decay. It would > > not fire in the branches where no decay was detected. > > I am not proposing that it is the firing of the gun that causes the > entropy increase that compensates for the atom not decaying. What > increases entropy is the initial setup of the all experimental > apparatus (gun + geiger counter) plus operation and maintenance. The > geiger counter needs energy to operate and the apparatus needs > maintenance over larger periods of time. I understand, Telmo. But you must admit that those branches that experience no atomic decay exist whether the suicider bothers to kill himself or not. Those branches exist even if the experiment is not set up. This follows necessarily from the MWI. Pick any date in history that you like. There must exist fluke branches that have experienced unlikely histories since that time. The example I mentioned previously was no atomic decay since January 1, 1900. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Quantum Immortality = no second law
On Apr 19, 2:17 am, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > nichomachus wrote: > > > On Apr 17, 1:21 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >> Telmo Menezes wrote: > >>> On Thu, Apr 17, 2008 at 2:37 PM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > >>>> Are you saying that the second law is verified in each of all > >>>> "branches" of the (quantum) multiverse? > >>> I'm not saying that. > >>>> I would say the second law is > >>>> statistical, and is verified in most branches. In the MWI applied to > >>>> quantum field it seems to me that there can be branches with an > >>>> arbitrarily high number of photon creation without annihilation, and > >>>> this for each period of time. > >> I'm not sure what source of photon creation you have in mind, but QFT > >> doesn't allow violation of energy conservation. > > > Maybe it was vacuum energy Bruno was referring to, or else perhaps the > > creation of virtual particle pairs? Stephen Hawking (who by the way > > apparently regards Everett's theory as trivally true, in other words, > > instrumentalistic and without physical significance) used virtual > > particles to explain how black holes may evaporate. But I don't want > > to put words in anyone's mouth, and plus, I am not knowledgeable > > enough on these matters to discuss them. > > > But if I may raise one possibility, it seems to me that despite the > > existence of fluke branches in which the second law is not inviolate, > > there are no possible branches that experience the outcome of a double > > slit experiment that does not result in an interference pattern. > > > This is according to my understanding that the interference actually > > takes place across branches, as each path of the photon interferers > > constructively and destructively with itself. > > But that interference is of the wave-function with itself. It's squared > modulus only determines a probability. So, thru a fluke of probability, > the photons could strike the screen in a pattern that is arbitrarily close > to the naive no-interference pattern. I say "arbitrarily close" since in > principle no photon could land where the probability was zero. But the zero > probability region is a line of measure zero. > > It's not very clear to me how MWI accounts for the pattern. Is it supposed > that there is a separate world for every point each photon could land; the > separate worlds having a certain probability weight. Or are there multiple > worlds for each spot in order that the probability be proportional to the > number of worlds? And what if the probability is an irrational number? Mutiple worlds for each spot on the screen, according to my understanding of Feynman's explanation of the experiment. However, I think it is important to distinguish between the probability function that describes the interference pattern registering on the screen/ photodetector array, and the probability function that results from the square of the psi modulus. IIRC, Feynman said that the interference pattern from the double slit experiment (or equivalently, the emergent probability function that is the same across branches) results from the fact that for any point on the screen where a photon may fall from the slits there are multiple paths that one photon may take to get to that point. The next step is to say that there are other branches (due to MWI), each of which describes another possible path taken by that same photon, and that, depending on the relative difference in path lengths to the point in question, summing over all possible paths taken by a photon to that point results in a value somewhere between completely desctructive interference and completely constructive. I take this scenario to mean that the total interference pattern is a probability function describing how likely it is to measure a single photon at any point on the screen, and that this probability function is an emergent property of light particles interfering with parallel versions of themselves across branches. Since they are summed across the branches, so to speak, the interference pattern resulting from the double slit experiement is one example of getting a deterministic result from probabilistic interactions, and is in fact the same pattern across all branches representing outcomes of the experiment. So the psi function may be thought of as being proportional to the number of universes, but the probability function representing the distribution of photons on the screen is not. This is what I was thinking when I first mentioned the experiment, although I didn't express what I
Re: Quantum Immortality = no second law
On Apr 17, 1:21 pm, Brent Meeker <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Telmo Menezes wrote: > > On Thu, Apr 17, 2008 at 2:37 PM, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > >> Are you saying that the second law is verified in each of all > >> "branches" of the (quantum) multiverse? > > > I'm not saying that. > > >> I would say the second law is > >> statistical, and is verified in most branches. In the MWI applied to > >> quantum field it seems to me that there can be branches with an > >> arbitrarily high number of photon creation without annihilation, and > >> this for each period of time. > > I'm not sure what source of photon creation you have in mind, but QFT > doesn't allow violation of energy conservation. Maybe it was vacuum energy Bruno was referring to, or else perhaps the creation of virtual particle pairs? Stephen Hawking (who by the way apparently regards Everett's theory as trivally true, in other words, instrumentalistic and without physical significance) used virtual particles to explain how black holes may evaporate. But I don't want to put words in anyone's mouth, and plus, I am not knowledgeable enough on these matters to discuss them. But if I may raise one possibility, it seems to me that despite the existence of fluke branches in which the second law is not inviolate, there are no possible branches that experience the outcome of a double slit experiment that does not result in an interference pattern. This is according to my understanding that the interference actually takes place across branches, as each path of the photon interferers constructively and destructively with itself. The upshot of this is simply a recognition that not every outcome is possible, and there remain situations that are not realized in any extant universe. > > > Yes, I would tend to agree with that, although I can't say I'm 100% > > convinced. Anyway I'm a relative newcomer to this list so I don't feel > > I have an informed opinion yet. Need to catch up with all the > > arguments. Also have a thesis to finish, which tends to get in the way > > :) > > > I'm just arguing that the experiment with the rifle and the geiger > > counter does not imply any second law anomaly. Yes, you are "forcing" > > your consciousness to "move" to states where the atom never decays, > > but if you consider the larger system, entropy is increasing as normal > > because of the preparation and maintenance of the apparatus needed for > > the experiment. > > > Do you think this makes sense? > > > Telmo Menezes. > > The idea of the multiverse derives from quantum mechanics, e.g. the > Everett no-collapse interpretation. But in that model the (microscopic) > entropy never increases (or decreases), because QM evolution is unitary. > It is only the coarse-grained entropy, i.e. restricted to this branch, > that increases. Certainly within this branch you are correct that the > entropy increase due to firing a gun is very much greater than the > decrease due to an atom not decaying. But the gun would only fire if the atom did in fact decay. It would not fire in the branches where no decay was detected. > > Brent Meeker- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text -- Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text - --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: The prestige
On Apr 17, 5:17 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Le 16-avr.-08, à 15:13, nichomachus (Steve) a écrit : > > > The Prestige, with Christian Bale, Hugh Jackman, Michael Caine, Andy > > Serkis and David Bowie as Nikola Tesla... I also highly recommend > > this very entertaining movie that I saw last week. > > > Unfortunately, Bruno, I don't see the connection between this film and > > the computationalist hypothesis. > > Hmmm I don't want to spoil the movie either ... Have you study the > Universal Dovetailer Argument, or just the third key step? > > Note that from a purely strict logical point of view you don't need > comp but a weakening of it. But the comp hyp makes something (in the > movie) possible and even "real", and even already "real" in a sense > made explicit in the movie. > > Perhaps I will say more later, when more people (of the list) will have > seen the movie. You're right, of course. Although I suppose we could just change the subject to: "Spoiler Alert" :) > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Quantum Immortality = no second law
On first blush, it would seem to be irrelevant to the fact that there are possible histories in which the second law is not found to hold. All the atom and rifle apparatus does is eliminate the living subject in those branches where the decay occurs, leaving the subject alive in only the unlikely fluke branches where no decay is detected. It must be the case that the the question of whether or not the decay takes place is independent of the scientist making his quietus. On Apr 18, 11:10 am, "Telmo Menezes" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > entropy is increasing as normal > > > because of the preparation and maintenance of the apparatus needed for > > > the experiment. > > > > Do you think this makes sense? > > > I am not sure I understand. I do agree with Brent Meker's comment > > though. If you agree with him, take his answer as mine (hope Brent does > > not mind). > > I don't think I was clear enough, but Russell's rephrasing a few mails > ago was excellent. > > Have a great weekend, > Telmo Menezes. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Quantum Immortality = no second law
On Apr 16, 11:16 am, "Quentin Anciaux" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > HI, > > 2008/4/16, nichomachus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > > > > > > > > On Apr 16, 4:54 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > Le 16-avr.-08, à 03:24, Russell Standish a écrit : > > > > On Wed, Apr 16, 2008 at 02:22:23AM +0200, Saibal Mitra wrote: > > > > >>> First off, how is it that the MWI does not imply > > > >>> quantum immortality? > > > > >> MWI is just quantum mechanics without the wavefunction collapse > > > >> postulate. > > > >> This then implies that after a measurement your wavefuntion will be > > > >> in a > > > >> superposition of the states corresponding to definite outcomes. But we > > > >> cannot just consider suicide experiments and then say that just > > > >> because > > > >> branches of the wavefuntion exist in which I survive, I'll find > > > >> myself there > > > >> with 100% probability. The fact that probabilities are conserved > > > >> follows > > > >> from unitary time evolution. If a state evolves into a linear > > > >> combination of > > > >> states in which I'm dead and alive then the probabilities of all these > > > >> states add up to 1. The probability of finding myself to be alive at > > > >> all > > > >> after the experiment is then less than the probability of me finding > > > >> myself > > > >> about to perform the suicide experiment. > > > > >> The probability of me finding myself to be alive after n suicide > > > >> experiments > > > >> decays exponentially with n. Therefore I should not expect to find > > > >> myself > > > >> having survived many suicide experiments. Note that contrary to what > > > >> you > > > >> often read in the popular accounts of the multiverse, the multiverse > > > >> does > > > >> not split when we make observations. The most natural state for the > > > >> entire > > > >> multiverse is just an eigenstate of the Hamiltonian. The energy can > > > >> be taken > > > >> to be zero, therefore the wavefunction of the multiverse satisfies the > > > >> equation: > > > > > One should also note that this is the ASSA position. The ASSA was > > > > introduced by Jacques Mallah in his argument against quantum > > > > immortality, and a number of participants in this list adhere to the > > > > ASSA position. Its counterpart if the RSSA, which does imply quantum > > > > immortality (provided that the no cul-de-sac conjecture holds), and > > > > other list participants adhere to the RSSA. To date, no argument has > > > > convincingly demonstrated which of the ASSA or RSSA should be > > > > preferred, so it has become somewhat a matter of taste. There is some > > > > discussion of this in my book "Theory of Nothing". > > > > Actually, I am not sure the ASSA makes sense once we take into account > > > the distinction between first and third person point of view. Comp > > > immortality is an almost trivial consequence that personal death cannot > > > be a first person experience at all. Quantum immortality is most > > > plausibly equivalent with comp immortality if the "quantum level" > > > describes our correct comp substitution level. But this does not mean > > > that we can know what shape the comp immortality can have, given that > > > comp forbids us to know which machine we are or which computations bear > > > us. > > > Why is this the case? Whether Comp is true or not, it would seem that > > the direction of physical research and investigation is in the > > direction of discovering the presumed foundational TOE that accounts > > for everything we observe. Say, for example, that it were possible to > > create in a computer simulation an artificial universe that would > > evolve intelligent life forms by virtue of the "physics" of the > > artificial universe alone. Why, in principle, is it not possible for > > those intelligent beings to discover the fundamental rules that > > underlie their existence? They will not be able to discover any > > details of the architecture of the particular turing machine th
Re: Quantum Immortality = no second law
On Apr 16, 4:54 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Le 16-avr.-08, à 03:24, Russell Standish a écrit : > > On Wed, Apr 16, 2008 at 02:22:23AM +0200, Saibal Mitra wrote: > > >>> First off, how is it that the MWI does not imply > >>> quantum immortality? > > >> MWI is just quantum mechanics without the wavefunction collapse > >> postulate. > >> This then implies that after a measurement your wavefuntion will be > >> in a > >> superposition of the states corresponding to definite outcomes. But we > >> cannot just consider suicide experiments and then say that just > >> because > >> branches of the wavefuntion exist in which I survive, I'll find > >> myself there > >> with 100% probability. The fact that probabilities are conserved > >> follows > >> from unitary time evolution. If a state evolves into a linear > >> combination of > >> states in which I'm dead and alive then the probabilities of all these > >> states add up to 1. The probability of finding myself to be alive at > >> all > >> after the experiment is then less than the probability of me finding > >> myself > >> about to perform the suicide experiment. > > >> The probability of me finding myself to be alive after n suicide > >> experiments > >> decays exponentially with n. Therefore I should not expect to find > >> myself > >> having survived many suicide experiments. Note that contrary to what > >> you > >> often read in the popular accounts of the multiverse, the multiverse > >> does > >> not split when we make observations. The most natural state for the > >> entire > >> multiverse is just an eigenstate of the Hamiltonian. The energy can > >> be taken > >> to be zero, therefore the wavefunction of the multiverse satisfies the > >> equation: > > > One should also note that this is the ASSA position. The ASSA was > > introduced by Jacques Mallah in his argument against quantum > > immortality, and a number of participants in this list adhere to the > > ASSA position. Its counterpart if the RSSA, which does imply quantum > > immortality (provided that the no cul-de-sac conjecture holds), and > > other list participants adhere to the RSSA. To date, no argument has > > convincingly demonstrated which of the ASSA or RSSA should be > > preferred, so it has become somewhat a matter of taste. There is some > > discussion of this in my book "Theory of Nothing". > > Actually, I am not sure the ASSA makes sense once we take into account > the distinction between first and third person point of view. Comp > immortality is an almost trivial consequence that personal death cannot > be a first person experience at all. Quantum immortality is most > plausibly equivalent with comp immortality if the "quantum level" > describes our correct comp substitution level. But this does not mean > that we can know what shape the comp immortality can have, given that > comp forbids us to know which machine we are or which computations bear > us. Why is this the case? Whether Comp is true or not, it would seem that the direction of physical research and investigation is in the direction of discovering the presumed foundational TOE that accounts for everything we observe. Say, for example, that it were possible to create in a computer simulation an artificial universe that would evolve intelligent life forms by virtue of the "physics" of the artificial universe alone. Why, in principle, is it not possible for those intelligent beings to discover the fundamental rules that underlie their existence? They will not be able to discover any details of the architecture of the particular turing machine that is simulating their universe (even whether or not they are in fact being computed), but I don't see any a priori reason why they would not be able to discover their own basic physical laws. Max Tegmark has indicated that it may be possible to get some idea of which mathematical structure bears our own existence by approaching from the opposite direction. Though we may never know which one contains ourselves, it may be possible to derive a probability distribution describing the likelihood of our location in the ensemble. To go back to the comments you were making about the Prestige: If the subject of a quantum immortality experiment finds himself improbably alive, is he in some sense guilty of the murder of the other versions of himself? Or not, since those are merely third person experiences. What constitutes a first person experience? It seems that you are defining it as an uninterrupted consciousness since comp implies the "almost trivial consequence that personal death cannot be a first person experience at all." I am confused by exactly what is meant by first and third person experiences. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: The prestige
The Prestige, with Christian Bale, Hugh Jackman, Michael Caine, Andy Serkis and David Bowie as Nikola Tesla... I also highly recommend this very entertaining movie that I saw last week. Unfortunately, Bruno, I don't see the connection between this film and the computationalist hypothesis. -steve On Apr 16, 5:06 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I recommend the movie "The prestige". (2006 movie by Christopher Nolan > based on a novel by Christopher Priest). > > Simulacron three (the book by Galouye, or "the thirteen floor" movie) > is the best introduction to our general topic (imo), especially through > comp and simulated reality. Matrix and many similar movies or novels > (Blade Runner for example) can be seen in that spirit too. > > But "The prestige" got the point, (without hiding the cruelty, and > using "magic" to make communicable the non communicable). "The > prestige" can be seen as a conclusion! I can hardly add anything. To > see twice! > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Quantum Immortality = no second law
On Apr 14, 6:26 pm, Saibal Mitra <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Citeren nichomachus <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > > > > In the description of the quantum immortality gedanken experiment, a > > physicist rigs an automatic rifle to a geiger counter to fire into him > > upon the detection of an atomic decay event from a bit of radioactive > > material. If the many worlds hypothesis is true, the self-awareness of > > the physicist will continue to find himself alive after any length of > > time in front of his gun, since there exist parallel worlds where the > > decay does not occur. > > This has never been rigorously proven. I can give you some argumetns > why the MWI does not imply Quantum Immortality. Ok. I would like to hear them. > > > > > On a microscopic scale this is analogous to the observing a reality in > > which the second law of thermodynamics does not hold. for example, > > since there is a non-zero probability that molecular interactions will > > result in a decrease in entropy in a particular sealed volume under > > observation, there exist histories in which this must be observed. > > > This is never observed. Therefore the MWI is shown to be false. > > This is also not a correct conclusion (if you replace MWI by quantum > immortality). I agree. I don't believe the argument truly works whether we are talking about WMI or quantum immortality. But what I am interested in is why not. That is why I posed the argument. If it is flawed, it will help me understand everything better if you could tell me how you think it is flawed. First off, how is it that the MWI does not imply quamtum immortality? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Quantum Immortality = no second law
On Apr 14, 9:21 pm, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Further to this, to say that the 2nd law is falsified, we'd have to > have circumstances where the less likely outcome ocurred more > frequently than the more often. (ie entropy decreases more often than > it increases). But this begs the question of what we mean by > likelihood of outcome, if not related to frequency of occurrence. Hi, Russell, Surely the framework of the Many Worlds interpretation would say that the likelyhood of measuring a quantum observable in state A rather than B reflects the number of histories in which the observable is measured as being in state A divided by number of histories in which either is seen. Molecules in a gas chamber may not be the best example, as I am personally unclear as to whether the macroscopic behavior of the aggregate is reduceable to probabilistic quantum events. But the point remains that it is impossible to adhere to the MWI without also affirming not only the existence of histories in which unlikely events happen, but also ones in which *only* unlikely events happen. This includes universes where the cat never dies, uranium never decays, and (perhaps) the second law does not hold. Is it right to think that this is unproblematic? Or perhaps we should regard the Many Worlds formalism as merely an instrumentalistic interpretation, similar to how Bohr and Heisenberg regarded their Copenhagen interpretation, rather than granting full ontological significance to alternate possible histories. > > In any case, QTI does not change the observed outcome of likely versus > unlikely events, it just changes the set of possible outcome on which > to apply the second law. What does QTI stand for? So our suicidal physicist would have enabled himself to observe the extremely scenario of seeing radioactive elements never decay, by killing himself in all histories where decay ocurred and thereby selecting only the ones where it did not take place to continue his awareness in.Of course, those branches of his identity would still have observed the same outcomes even if the gun was unloaded, so he doesn't really have to kill himself in nearly all universes in order to get to see it. But if I accept the above as true, then I must also accept that there are histories that have been experienced in which no atom of an unstable element has decayed since Jan. 1, 1900. (or any date you prefer) When Thomas Young performed his double slit experiment, were there any versions of himself that did not observe an interference pattern? Why not? I appreciate the replies as I am more questions than answers at this point on these topics. > > On Tue, Apr 15, 2008 at 11:30:05AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > On 15/04/2008, Michael Rosefield <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > No, it just means no-one's put enough stress on the 2nd Law yet :) > > > > Besides, it's not so much a law as a guideline. Well, a strong statistical > > > tendency > > > As Michael pointed out, the 2nd law is a statistical law, which says > > that a decrease in entropy is unlikely, not impossible.. QTI predicts > > that you will survive the most probable way possible. This means it is > > unlikely that you will find yourself in a world where you choose to > > attempt quantum suicide experiments in the first place, but if you do > > the least improbable way of surviving is very improbable in absolute > > terms, but not impossible. > > > -- > > Stathis Papaioannou > > -- > > ---- > A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Mathematics > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au > ----- > Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text - --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Quantum Immortality = no second law
In the description of the quantum immortality gedanken experiment, a physicist rigs an automatic rifle to a geiger counter to fire into him upon the detection of an atomic decay event from a bit of radioactive material. If the many worlds hypothesis is true, the self-awareness of the physicist will continue to find himself alive after any length of time in front of his gun, since there exist parallel worlds where the decay does not occur. On a microscopic scale this is analogous to the observing a reality in which the second law of thermodynamics does not hold. for example, since there is a non-zero probability that molecular interactions will result in a decrease in entropy in a particular sealed volume under observation, there exist histories in which this must be observed. This is never observed. Therefore the MWI is shown to be false. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Discussion of Logic re Physics
I have been following this discussion and I wanted to respond to this point because I fail to see why this is such a damning criticism of the MUH. How is in inconsistent to affirm the existence and reality of mututally exclusive axiom sets? I realize how that sounds so I would like to amplify this point with the example that a mathematical platonist may believe in the independent existence of both Euclidean and non-Euclidean geometries. Each system is defined by its own set of axioms and though any two may be mutually inconsistent, any one alone may be entirely self-consistent. In other words, we don't merge the axiom sets. Rather, each set defines one mathematical object or entity that exists independently and in its own right. This is the way that I read Tegmark's work anyway. I am interested to get other takes on this point. On Mar 9, 5:28 pm, Russell Standish <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > John, I think you're missing the point. MUH is the Mathematical > Universe Hypothesis from Tegmark's paper. Fuzzy Logic means something > quite precise - it is a mathematical theory where truth values take on > a real value in [0,1], which is called a membership function. > > Brian is proposing something quite specific - to use fuzzy logic to > resolve the contradictions in merging contradictory axiom sets, which > would be needed to make Tegmark's proposal work. I am somewhat > sceptical this can be made to work, but prima facie I cannot see any > showstopper. Brian might just be right, so if he wants to pursue this > as a PhD topic, then good on him. > > Cheers > > > > > > On Sun, Mar 09, 2008 at 05:43:29PM -0400, John Mikes wrote: > > > Jamie, before you and correspondents enter that 50,000 line write-up > > about the 'impressions' > > of concepts you mentioned and asked for, a warning: > > > Impressions, even definitions/identifications are very personal. A > > vocabulary of one's terms can't be just 'translated': it has to be > > adapted to the entire 'mindset' of the person who uses it. > > You have to 'walk in my shoes' to rightfully apply MY definitions from > > MY vocabulary. > > George L remarked that MUH is superceding Fuzzy Logic (George, pls. > > correct me if I read you wrong) as a mathematically describable > > theorem, what I take with a grain of salt: maybe F.L. is based on a > > root what also sprouted mathematical thinking as well? (Even if I > > deckipher the M in MUH as Multiple, when in my opinion every one of > > the U-multitude is fundamentally different and no individual can (in > > toto) exist identically in them all or do the same activity as he > > does:here(?). ) > > I considered the original F.L. idea as a diversion from the > > quantizable (mathematical?) formal logic, just before mathematically > > impaired minds adopted the idea into the math-based TOE. > > (Remember: my 'everything' includes more than the ' numbers-based' > > part of it and here I am still missing a (common sense) advice from > > the list) how to understand 'numbers' (especially in the Bruno defined > > "integers only" sense differently from "numbers - as in integers". *) > > I still did not reject David Bohm's "numbers are human invention" > > groundrule. > > > So Your escapade into Fuzzy Logic is a valid one for me, irrespective > > of a (narrowly cut) MUH > > only I don't see the possibility of a wide-range agreement in > > 'concepts' among people with different - well - what? sci. worldview? > > basic (sci.) philosophy? specialization? or even the not-so-obvious > > "common sense". > > > John M > > > *) the statement that everything (including mentality-terms) can be > > described by numbers in long enough series means in my vocabulary: > > "SOMEHOW", the same as in assigning ALL mental finctionality to the > > physiological neuronal brain (somehow). JM > > -- > > ---- > A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 0425 253119 (mobile) > Mathematics > UNSW SYDNEY 2052 [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Australia http://www.hpcoders.com.au > ----- > Hide quoted text - > > - Show quoted text - --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Discussion of the MUH
Hi, I am new to this list. I am glad to see that there are others interested in Tegmark's ideas. I have been aware of his ideas since October but have largely agreed with them since prior to that. by that I mean that I had reasoned to similar conclusions prior to leaning that they had been so well developed and articulated by Tegmark. There are a few problems that I see with the MUH paper, although it could be that I just do not entirely understand all of it. Before I mention those I will just say that I believe his main thesis is correct. That is, his theory explains correctly the relationship between mathematics and physics, the reason why it is that mathematics has been so "unreasonably effective" at describing natural phenomena. I with the idea that the physical world is what Tegmark calls a mathematical structure -- a timeless entity that exists by virtue of its own logical possibility -- the only type of thing that truly exists. In his paper he defines a mathematical structures perhaps overly generally as "abstract entities with relations between them. This would seem to include a great many things besides the type of thing we would to call a mathematical structure. Personally I think we would want a definition that include things like fractals, logical calculi, and the outputs of algorithms to name a few examples, while excluding other types of things, such as Platonic forms (which would have to be included in the definitions provided). However, this ontology them classifies everything that we naturally think of as real as just substructures of something that is truly real: this universe. We ourselves are merely substrutures, albeit the self-aware kind, of this larger, real universe, and we therefore derive our being vicariously from it. I would like to see that the relationship of the computable universe hypothesis to the MUH be clarified. Is our universe's physics classically computable at the quantum scale? If not, how does it follow that the macroscopic universe, or the universe as a whole is classically computable if its operation at the quantum level is not? I apologize if this question displays my naivete on the subject, but it is something I am currently endeavoring to more clearly understand. I am particularly interested in information-theoretic descriptions of the this universe, or more precisely, information theory measures of the complexity of of this universe's presumed most basic laws (or Grand Unified Theory, Max Tegmark's level I TOE). What exactly does it mean to assign a value to the complexity of our still-undiscovered GUT? Would competing notions of algorithmic complexity yield discordant results in this case? Which measure of complexity is to be preferred? If we defined the complexity to be the length of the shortest possible computer program that could generate the results, doesn't this definition imply a particular computational architecture that would itself be necessary to account for in measuring algorithmic complexity? Also, does having the property of universality imply a definite lower-bound to the complexity of a hypothetical physics? once again, probably very naive questions on my part, but I would like to better understand these matters. Probably what I find most appealing about the MUH is how it simplifies things. To me it answeres the age-old question, why is there something rather than nothing by boldly asserting that the universe is a member of the category of being for which there is no difference between possibility and necessity. However, this formulation leads to speculation on the ontic status of paraconsistent systems. I look forward to any replies on this extremely interesting topic. On Mar 4, 9:15 pm, Brian Tenneson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > I'm trying to strike up a discussion of the MUH but my discussion > started at sci.logic and apparently, not many logicians are interested > in Physics, or something... :P > > Here is a link (two, actually) to the discussion. I don't know how to > proceed, to discuss here or there. It does not matter to me. > > http://groups.google.sh/group/sci.logic/browse_thread/thread/b0ed9baa... > > http://groups.google.sh/group/sci.logic/browse_thread/thread/ > b0ed9baa707749ad/ef7752e4bcfc2631#ef7752e4bcfc2631>MUH Discussion at > Google Groups --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
