Djinni vs. White Rabbit

2004-08-19 Thread Jeff Bone
	
At some point in the past various of us have argued about whether the 
simulation argument and / or the multiple worlds interpretation of 
quantum mechanics implies an every possible world (EPW) 
interpretation, i.e. one in which highly improbable events, laws of 
physics, etc. obtain.

Stumbled across an interesting if tangential paper that has something 
to say about this.  First some terminology:  let's call events that are 
highly improbable white rabbits and universes in which such events 
happen frequently (or universes with entirely inscrutable laws of 
physics) white rabbit worlds.

Let's further adopt the term djinni or (to follow Gott's 
nomenclature) jinni to refer to closed time-like (causally cyclic) 
curves, and jinn worlds as worlds (n-dimensional spacetime slices 
of the higher-order spacetime, or rather n-m dimensional phase-space 
volumes where n is the total dimensionality of the phase space) that 
contain such causal cycles.  In order to explain what this means:  
these are causally consistent chains of events in which there is no 
ultimate cause, but rather a closed causal chain that traverses both 
forward and backward along the time dimension.  A peculiarity of this 
idea is that, in such a world, information appears without cause.  
For example a computer employing a closed time-like curve as a register 
can compute hard problems, but when one examines the execution 
history of the computer through time one finds that it never actually 
executes the computation!  Cf.:

http://arxiv.org/pdf/gr-qc/0209061
Anyway, jinni are these little closed curves of causality in the 
presence of time travel that are consistent but defy common sense.

David G. Boulware of the University of Washington published this paper 
in PRD:

http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/9207054
...in which he studies the behavior of quantum fields in spaces with 
closed time-like curves.  What he finds is that probabilities are not 
conserved, i.e. not unitary, in such spaces.  That is, the Feynman 
sum-over-histories approach always yields precisely 1 --- except when 
space contains one or more jinn.  In such cases, there are quantum 
events that simply cannot occur.

So:  jinn defeat white rabbits.  If any world-line through the phase 
space is cyclic / allowed to self-intersect, the overall phase-space is 
constrained, presumably to those set of configurations which are of 
higher probability.  The very existence of such causal cycles may 
indeed be --- meta-paradoxically ;-) --- essential in stabilizing the 
overall structure of the phase space.  It would seem that these cycles 
act as a kind of strange attractor around which probable configurations 
(universes) coalesce.

Speculation:  it may be that through studying the impact of such closed 
time-like curves in various spacetimes that we ultimately reconcile 
Cramer's transactional interpretation (retarded waves moving forward in 
time, advance waves reaching back to handshake on each quantum event, 
producing a kind of causal contract) of QM with MWI --- and ultimately 
COMP.  Indeed, each retarded wave-advance wave pair *is* a jinni.  
Cramer doesn't just embrace jinn in his interpretation --- he bases the 
whole idea on their existence!  (FWIW:  this seems to me an 
embarrassment of riches.  Why should *every* quantum event require a 
jinni, when a few --- acting as strange attractors --- might suffice?  
Though admittedly the latter leads to the questions which few, and 
why?)

The implication ala Boulware is that if this is a real physical effect, 
then this provides a kind of global probabilistic censorship that makes 
the world the predictable place that it is!  And --- connectionism --- 
it's rather ironic that Cramer's transactional hypothesis is based in 
part on some of Feynman's own speculation, when Feynman probably didn't 
realize the essential seemingly paradoxical consequences of pairing the 
histories approach with cyclic causality.

So that's all well and good for physics, but what about the more 
algorithmic cosmologies?  One school of thought regarding the COMP 
hypothesis is that it is easier to simulate all possible worlds than it 
is to simulate any subset of them.  (Cf. previously-discussed 
Champernowne machine / everything algorithm.)  But what if the 
dynamics of the simulation are such that these jinni exist as a priori 
structural parameters, roots if you will of the computation?  In such 
an environment, every computable universe is NOT every possible 
universe.

Curiouser and curiouser,
jb


Re: Djinni vs. White Rabbit

2004-08-19 Thread Hal Finney
I'll have to look more closely at those papers, but I have a couple
of quick comments.

Jeff Bone, [EMAIL PROTECTED], writes:
 Stumbled across an interesting if tangential paper that has something 
 to say about this.  First some terminology:  let's call events that are 
 highly improbable white rabbits and universes in which such events 
 happen frequently (or universes with entirely inscrutable laws of 
 physics) white rabbit worlds.

I think this is an unfortunate terminology choice, although it is true
that we have occasionally used it here.  The truth is, there is nothing
remarkable about white rabbits.  Our world is full of white rabbits.
Using the term to refer to worlds which are utterly improbable is
confusing.  I think we got into it by reference to Alice in Wonderland,
where the White Rabbit character walks, talks and wears clothes, but
by itself, especially without capitals, the term white rabbit does not
connote improbability.  I would prefer flying rabbit or just magical.

 Let's further adopt the term djinni or (to follow Gott's 
 nomenclature) jinni to refer to closed time-like (causally cyclic) 
 curves, and jinn worlds as worlds (n-dimensional spacetime slices 
 of the higher-order spacetime, or rather n-m dimensional phase-space 
 volumes where n is the total dimensionality of the phase space) that 
 contain such causal cycles.

It's not clear to me that causality and time are inherent properties
of worlds.  I include worlds which can be thought of as n-dimensional
cells that satisfy some constraints.  Among those constraints could be
ones which induce the effects we identify as causality and time.  For
example, a two-dimensional cell where C[i,j] == C[i-1,j] XOR C[i-1,j-1].
This particular definition has the property that C[i,.] depends only on
C[i-1,.], which lets us identify i as time, and introduce a notion of
causality where conditions at time i depend on conditions at time i-1.

But we could just as easily create a cell system where there was no
natural definition of time, where C[i,j] depended on i+1, i-1, j+1
and j-1.  You could still imaging satisfying this via some constraint
satisfaction algorithm.

Now these jinni worlds are ones which mostly have these conditions we
identify as time and causality, but which locally, or perhaps rarely,
do not satisfy such rules.  Seen in this perspective, there is a full
range of possibilities, from fully causal worlds, to ones which are
99.999% causal and only .0001% noncausal, to ones which are 50-50, to
ones for which no meaningful concept of causality can be defined.

Your perspective seems to be that those worlds which are very, very
slightly non-causal are particularly interesting.  If all you thought
existed were causal worlds, then opening the door to slight non-causality
may seem like a big step.  But from my perspective, causality is not
that significant, it is merely an accidental property of some worlds,
so it is no big deal to imagine non-causal universes of varying degrees.

[Skipping...]
 David G. Boulware of the University of Washington published this paper 
 in PRD:

   http://arxiv.org/abs/hep-th/9207054

 ...in which he studies the behavior of quantum fields in spaces with 
 closed time-like curves.  What he finds is that probabilities are not 
 conserved, i.e. not unitary, in such spaces.  That is, the Feynman 
 sum-over-histories approach always yields precisely 1 --- except when 
 space contains one or more jinn.  In such cases, there are quantum 
 events that simply cannot occur.

I'll have to look at this.  It doesn't sound quite right.  If
probabilities are non-unitary that violates the fundamental rules of QM,
which would suggest that jinns and QM cannot exist, or in other words,
that if QM describes our universe, we have no jinns.

Now, I do recall some earlier famous papers by Novikov in which he found
consistent solutions for closed timelike paths, which were presumably
unitary.  So I will have to look more closely and see how these results
compare.

 So:  jinn defeat white rabbits.  If any world-line through the phase 
 space is cyclic / allowed to self-intersect, the overall phase-space is 
 constrained, presumably to those set of configurations which are of 
 higher probability.  The very existence of such causal cycles may 
 indeed be --- meta-paradoxically ;-) --- essential in stabilizing the 
 overall structure of the phase space.  It would seem that these cycles 
 act as a kind of strange attractor around which probable configurations 
 (universes) coalesce.

I think you're getting awfully speculative here.  I don't know where
all this is coming from, why you think that jinn would particularly make
unlikely events even less likely to occur.

[skipping]
 So that's all well and good for physics, but what about the more 
 algorithmic cosmologies?  One school of thought regarding the COMP 
 hypothesis is that it is easier to simulate all possible worlds than it 
 is to simulate any subset of them.  (Cf.