FW: FIN insanity
> -Original Message- > From: Jacques Mallah [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > > >2) You would also be the same person if the surgeon made a new brain > >identically to yours. > > I'm not sure what you mean here. The new brain would be > the same as the > old you, the old one would remain the same, the old one was > destroyed, or > what? As far as I understand quantum physics, this is only true if the new brain is in the same quantum state as the old one - like atoms in a bose-einstein condensate, they would then be literally, physically indistinguishable. However (also as far as I understand quantum physics) it's actually impossible to create two macroscopic objects in the same quantum state, at least, it's impossible to measure the state of one object accurately enough to create one which is idnetical in this sense (which is the only sense the universe recognises). This does not, however, prevent the universe itself from creating two objects in the same quantum state, if it's allowed to generate every conceivable arrangement of mass-energy - as may be the case in a single, infinite universe, and is definitely the case according to the MWI. Charles
RE: fin insanity
> -Original Message- > From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > > So, I would say that you will always find yourself alive > somewhere. But it > is interesting to consider only our universe and ignore > quantum effects. > Even then you will always find yourself alive somewhere, but > you won't find > yourself becoming infinitely old (see above). Because this is > a classical > continuation of you, it is much more likely than any quantum > continuation > that allows you to survive an atomic bomb exploding above your head. QTI can give you some idea of the "size" of the multiverse if you consider that there are "branches" in which every organism that has ever existed (including bacteria, viruses etc) are immortal - as well as every non-living configuration of matter (e.g. snowflakes, rocks, grains of sand...) - on every planet (and star, and empty space) in the universe ... According to QTI *no* observer moments ever lead to death. Every observer moment of every organism that has ever lived has "timelike-infinite" continuity. This leads to very very very big numbers, even if we allowed the output from the SWE to be quantised - which it isn't. Charles
Re: fin insanity
Charles Goodwin wrote: > > -Original Message- > > From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > > > > As I have written before, a person is just a computation being implemented > > somewhere. Suppose that the person has discovered that he suffers from a > > terminal ilness and he dies (the computation ends). Now in principle the > > person in question could have lived on if he wasn't diagnosed with this > > terminal ilness. Somewhere in the multiverse this person exists. Some time > > ago I wrote (I think on the FoR list) that the transformation from the old > > dying person to the new person is a continuous one. The process of death > > must involve the destruction of the brain. At some time the information > > that the person is dying will be lost to the person. The person might even > > think he is 20 years old while in reality he is 92. Anyway, the point is > > that his brain had stored so much information that adding new information > > would lead to an inconsistency. By dumping some of the information, the > > information left will be identical to the information in a similar brain > > somewhere else of a younger person, free from disease. > > Hmm.and this is a simpler theory, with more explanatory power, than that people are just material objects which eventually wear > out? People are material objects, but the materials out of which people are made don't matter. If your neurons were replaced by artifiicial ones that would function in the same way, would you not be the same person? You would answer any question in the same way as the original version of you would. I conclude that it is the computation that is performed by your brain that generates you. The materials don't matter. I could just as well generate you by a primitive analog computer. What matters is the computer program that is running on the machine, not the machine itself. If you believe that all possible universes exist (universes that can be generated by a computer program), then you ``always´´ exist in some universe, because, by definition, you are a computer program. So, I would say that you will always find yourself alive somewhere. But it is interesting to consider only our universe and ignore quantum effects. Even then you will always find yourself alive somewhere, but you won't find yourself becoming infinitely old (see above). Because this is a classical continuation of you, it is much more likely than any quantum continuation that allows you to survive an atomic bomb exploding above your head. Saibal
Re: FIN insanity
Charles Goodwin wrote: > FIN stands for something ...invented by Jaques Mallah (in much the way > that Fred Hoyle coined the term 'Big Bang' Yes I like that! The reliance by Jacques on the concept of measure is critical to his thinking. He believes that measure is ABSOLUTE and therefore decreases upon the trimming of (death of a person in) one branch of the multiverse. In other words, no matter who does the observing, measure is the same and goes down upon the trimming of a branch. For those of us who believe that FIN is possible, we must assume that measure does not go down upon trimming (death). More precisely, first person measure as observed by a first person observer remains constant. Of course third person measure can change. But the critical point is that measure of self as seen by the self should remain constant. In other words measure is RELATIVE to the observer. Who is right? The only assumption is that of an infinite plenitude where all possible worlds exist. Let's proceed by reductio ad absurdum. Let say that I have a measure that can be measured in absolute terms. Then this particular me will be one instance of many other instances. However, in the plenitude all instances exist which means other instances like me have other measures. Contradiction. Therefore measure cannot be stated in absolute terms. Hence measure must be relative. If one tried to obtain an absolute measure one would find an infinite number. George
RE: FIN insanity
That was before I joined, and I haven't had much chance to examine the archives. Charles > -Original Message- > From: Russell Standish [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > Sent: Friday, 7 September 2001 1:23 p.m. > To: Charles Goodwin > Cc: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: FIN insanity > > > Good grief - Jacques said it often enough (F)allacious > (I)nsane (N)onsense! > > Charles Goodwin wrote:
Re: FIN insanity
Good grief - Jacques said it often enough (F)allacious (I)nsane (N)onsense! Charles Goodwin wrote: > > Thank you for the explanation. I think FIN stands for something derogatory - >possibly invented by Jaques Mallah (in much the way > that Fred Hoyle coined the term 'Big Bang' to make his opponents' views sound >ridiculous, or art critics coined 'Cubism' for similar > reasons, only to see the derisively-termed ideas go on to achieve fame while the >original reason for the name was forgotten). The > "IN" part of FIN is (I think) "Immortality Nonsense" - the "F" I'm not sure about >although some ideas come to mind . . . so anyway, > it *is* another name for QTI. > > I think the idea of continuity of consciousness between duplicates, no matter how >widely separated in space, time or the multiverse, > assumes that they are (at least momentarily) in the same quantum state. According to >quantum theory this means that they are > literally identical, as atoms in a Bose-Einstein condensate are identical - there is >no test, even in theory, that will distinguish > them. > > The MWI postulates that the initial state of some system evolves through the >schrodinger wave eqn to a continuum of derived states, > and hence that a person (for example) is continuously becoming an (uncountably >infinite) number of copies, all of which have > continuity of consciousness with the original. > > Of these outcomes, we typically experience the most likely, which is to say that our >experiences are normally of the laws of physics > holding, including probablistic 'laws' like thermodynamics. There are SOME copies of >me who are experiencing their PCs turning into > a bowl of petunias, or all the air molecules rushing out of the room, but the >chances that you will be getting an email from one of > them rather than one in which things go on as normal is very unlikely - >"thermodynamically unlikely". > > As I understand the QTI (from your post and others) it goes on to postulate that in >the event of imminent death (including the > infamous "quantum suicide" experiment) we would start to experience *unlikely* >outcomes, because in all the likely ones we'd die > (which we wouldn't experience for the reasons you mention below). So if in a fit of >depression I try to shoot myself, the QTI > suggests that I would experience the most likely outcome that provides continuity of >consciousness. (This reminds me of a Larry > Niven story in which a race of aliens discovered the meaning of life (I forget how >they managed this) and promptly committed suicide > en masse.) Of course the most likely outcome that provides continuity of >consciousness is unlikely to be pleasant: if I shot myself, > I'd probably experience acquiring very bad injuries (and doctors exclaiming in >delight over the opportunity to work out how someone > can survive with half his head missing). > > The QTI assumes that the possibility of identical quantum states arising for any >arbitrary collection of matter is 100% - which is > true in the MWI (or any infinite collection of space-time slices which have the same >laws of physics). So it actually seems at least > a possible theory, given certain assumptions - but not easily testable in the sense >that most theories try to be (i.e. "third person > testable", so to speak). > > Charles > > > -Original Message- > > From: Jesse Mazer [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > > Sent: Friday, 7 September 2001 7:21 a.m. > > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > Subject: RE: FIN insanity > > > > > > >From: "Charles Goodwin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > >To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > >Subject: RE: FIN insanity > > >Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2001 12:26:24 +1200 > > > > >On the other hand I can't see how FIN is supposed to work, either. I > > >*think* the argument runs something like this... > > > > > >Even if you have just had, say, an atom bomb dropped on you, > > there's still > > >SOME outcomes of the schrodinger wave equation which just > > >happen to lead to you suriviving the explosion. Although > > these are VERY > > >unlikely - less likely than, say, my computer turning into a > > >bowl of petunias - they do exist, and (given the MWI) they > > occur somewhere > > >in the multiverse. For some reason I can't work out, all > > >the copies who are killed by the bomb don't count. Only the > > very very very > > >(etc) small proportion who miraculously survive do, and > > >these a
RE: FIN insanity
Thank you for the explanation. I think FIN stands for something derogatory - possibly invented by Jaques Mallah (in much the way that Fred Hoyle coined the term 'Big Bang' to make his opponents' views sound ridiculous, or art critics coined 'Cubism' for similar reasons, only to see the derisively-termed ideas go on to achieve fame while the original reason for the name was forgotten). The "IN" part of FIN is (I think) "Immortality Nonsense" - the "F" I'm not sure about although some ideas come to mind . . . so anyway, it *is* another name for QTI. I think the idea of continuity of consciousness between duplicates, no matter how widely separated in space, time or the multiverse, assumes that they are (at least momentarily) in the same quantum state. According to quantum theory this means that they are literally identical, as atoms in a Bose-Einstein condensate are identical - there is no test, even in theory, that will distinguish them. The MWI postulates that the initial state of some system evolves through the schrodinger wave eqn to a continuum of derived states, and hence that a person (for example) is continuously becoming an (uncountably infinite) number of copies, all of which have continuity of consciousness with the original. Of these outcomes, we typically experience the most likely, which is to say that our experiences are normally of the laws of physics holding, including probablistic 'laws' like thermodynamics. There are SOME copies of me who are experiencing their PCs turning into a bowl of petunias, or all the air molecules rushing out of the room, but the chances that you will be getting an email from one of them rather than one in which things go on as normal is very unlikely - "thermodynamically unlikely". As I understand the QTI (from your post and others) it goes on to postulate that in the event of imminent death (including the infamous "quantum suicide" experiment) we would start to experience *unlikely* outcomes, because in all the likely ones we'd die (which we wouldn't experience for the reasons you mention below). So if in a fit of depression I try to shoot myself, the QTI suggests that I would experience the most likely outcome that provides continuity of consciousness. (This reminds me of a Larry Niven story in which a race of aliens discovered the meaning of life (I forget how they managed this) and promptly committed suicide en masse.) Of course the most likely outcome that provides continuity of consciousness is unlikely to be pleasant: if I shot myself, I'd probably experience acquiring very bad injuries (and doctors exclaiming in delight over the opportunity to work out how someone can survive with half his head missing). The QTI assumes that the possibility of identical quantum states arising for any arbitrary collection of matter is 100% - which is true in the MWI (or any infinite collection of space-time slices which have the same laws of physics). So it actually seems at least a possible theory, given certain assumptions - but not easily testable in the sense that most theories try to be (i.e. "third person testable", so to speak). Charles > -Original Message- > From: Jesse Mazer [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > Sent: Friday, 7 September 2001 7:21 a.m. > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: RE: FIN insanity > > > >From: "Charles Goodwin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > >To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > >Subject: RE: FIN insanity > >Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2001 12:26:24 +1200 > > >On the other hand I can't see how FIN is supposed to work, either. I > >*think* the argument runs something like this... > > > >Even if you have just had, say, an atom bomb dropped on you, > there's still > >SOME outcomes of the schrodinger wave equation which just > >happen to lead to you suriviving the explosion. Although > these are VERY > >unlikely - less likely than, say, my computer turning into a > >bowl of petunias - they do exist, and (given the MWI) they > occur somewhere > >in the multiverse. For some reason I can't work out, all > >the copies who are killed by the bomb don't count. Only the > very very very > >(etc) small proportion who miraculously survive do, and > >these are the only ones you personally experience. > > > >Is that a reasonable description of FIN? Ignoring > statistical arguments, > >what is wrong with it? > > > >Charles > > What does FIN stand for, anyway? Is it just another version > of the quantum > theory of immortality? Anyway, the idea behind the QTI is not > just that we > arbitrarily decide copies who die "don't count," rather it > has to do with > some supplemental assumptions about the "
RE: FIN insanity
>From: "Charles Goodwin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >Subject: RE: FIN insanity >Date: Fri, 31 Aug 2001 12:26:24 +1200 >On the other hand I can't see how FIN is supposed to work, either. I >*think* the argument runs something like this... > >Even if you have just had, say, an atom bomb dropped on you, there's still >SOME outcomes of the schrodinger wave equation which just >happen to lead to you suriviving the explosion. Although these are VERY >unlikely - less likely than, say, my computer turning into a >bowl of petunias - they do exist, and (given the MWI) they occur somewhere >in the multiverse. For some reason I can't work out, all >the copies who are killed by the bomb don't count. Only the very very very >(etc) small proportion who miraculously survive do, and >these are the only ones you personally experience. > >Is that a reasonable description of FIN? Ignoring statistical arguments, >what is wrong with it? > >Charles What does FIN stand for, anyway? Is it just another version of the quantum theory of immortality? Anyway, the idea behind the QTI is not just that we arbitrarily decide copies who die "don't count," rather it has to do with some supplemental assumptions about the "laws" governing first-person experience, namely: 1. Continuity of consciousness is real (see my recent post on this) 2. Continuity of consciousness does not depend on spatial or temporal continuity, only on some kind of "pattern continuity" between different observer moments. I won't try to explain #1 any more for now, but I'll try explaining #2 (Bruno Marchal is much better at this sort of thing). Basically, you want to imagine something like a star trek transporter, which disassembles me at one location and reassembles me at another. Will this mean that the original version of me "died" and that a doppelganger with false memories was created in his place? If computationalism/functionalism is true, it would seem the answer is no--who "I" am is a function of my pattern, not the particular particles I'm made of, so as long as the pattern is preserved my continuity of consciousness will be too (and after all, the molecules of my body all end up being totally replaced by new ones every few years anyway). But if this is true, the spatial/temporal separation of the two transporter chambers shouldn't matter--the imaging chamber could be on 21st century earth and the replication chamber in the Andromeda Galaxy in the year 5000, and I would still have a continuous experience of stepping into the imaging chamber and instantaneously finding myself in the replication chamber, wherever/whenever that may be. A naturally corrolary of this is that my stream of consciousness can be "split"--if there are two replication chambers which create copies of me just as I was when I stepped into the imaging chamber, then "I" before the experiment could experience becoming either of the two copies. All other things being equal, it seems reasonable to assume the chances of experiencing becoming one copy vs. the other are 50/50. But now suppose we do a similar duplication experiment, except we forget to plug in the second replication chamber, so only one "copy" is created. Should I assume that I have a 50% chance of becoming the real copy and a 50% chance of "finding myself" in an empty chamber, and thus being "dead?" That doesn't seem to make sense--after all, a duplication experiment where one chamber fails to create a copy is just like a standard Star-Trek-style transporter, and I assume that in that case I have a 100% chance of finding myself as the single "copy." But it's easy to imagine extending this--suppose instead of failing to replicate anything, the second chamber replicates a copy of my body with the brain totally scrambled, so that the body dies pretty rapidly. Do I have a 50% chance of dying in this experiment because I become the copy with the scrambled brain? If only "pattern continuity" is important, the fact that this copy has a body which resembles mine shouldn't matter, its brain-pattern doesn't resemble mine in any way so there's no reason I should become that copy. It's not too hard to see how all this would be analogous to what would be happening all the time in a MWI-style multiverse. Why should I "become" those copies of me who experience death in various possible histories? There shouldn't be any more danger of that than there is of me suddenly "becoming" the dead body of a complete stranger, or of finding myself in a universe where I was never born in the first place and being "dead" for that reason. So, that's the basic argument
RE: FIN insanity
> -Original Message- > From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > > As I have written before, a person is just a computation being implemented > somewhere. Suppose that the person has discovered that he suffers from a > terminal ilness and he dies (the computation ends). Now in principle the > person in question could have lived on if he wasn't diagnosed with this > terminal ilness. Somewhere in the multiverse this person exists. Some time > ago I wrote (I think on the FoR list) that the transformation from the old > dying person to the new person is a continuous one. The process of death > must involve the destruction of the brain. At some time the information > that the person is dying will be lost to the person. The person might even > think he is 20 years old while in reality he is 92. Anyway, the point is > that his brain had stored so much information that adding new information > would lead to an inconsistency. By dumping some of the information, the > information left will be identical to the information in a similar brain > somewhere else of a younger person, free from disease. Hmm.and this is a simpler theory, with more explanatory power, than that people are just material objects which eventually wear out? Charles
FW: FIN insanity
> -Original Message- > From: Jacques Mallah [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > > >2) You would also be the same person if the surgeon made a new brain > >identically to yours. > > I'm not sure what you mean here. The new brain would be > the same as the > old you, the old one would remain the same, the old one was > destroyed, or > what? As far as I understand quantum physics, this is only true if the new brain is in the same quantum state as the old one - like atoms in a bose-einstein condensate, they would then be literally, physically indistinguishable. However (also as far as I understand quantum physics) it's actually impossible to create two macroscopic objects in the same quantum state, at least, it's impossible to measure the state of one object accurately enough to create one which is idnetical in this sense (which is the only sense the universe recognises). This does not, however, prevent the universe itself from creating two objects in the same quantum state, if it's allowed to generate every conceivable arrangement of mass-energy - as may be the case in a single, infinite universe, and is definitely the case according to the MWI. Charles
FW: FIN insanity
> -Original Message- > From: Saibal Mitra [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > > There are different versions of QTI (let's not call it FIN). The most > reasonable one (my version, of course) takes into account the possibility > that you find yourself alive somewhere else in the universe, without any > memory of the atomic bomb that exploded. I totally ignore the possibility > that one could survive an atomic bomb exploding above one's head. My > version doesn't imply that your a priory expected lifetime should be > infinite. > > Death involves the destruction of your brain. But there are many brains in > the universe which are almost identical to yours. Jacques says that you > can't become one of them. > > I say: > > 1) If you are hurt in a car accident and the surgeon performes brain surgery > and you recover fully, then you are the same person. > > 2) You would also be the same person if the surgeon made a new brain identically to >yours. > > 3) From 2) it follows that if your brain was first copied and then destroyed, you >would become the copy. > > 4) From 3) you can thus conclude that you will always experience yourself being >alive, because copies of you always exist. > > 5) It doesn't follow that you will experience surviving terrible accidents. > > Saibal Ok, that's a similar argument to the one Frank Tipler used in 'The physics of immortality' (except that he allowed a simulation of a brain to have continuous consciousness with the original physical brain). Your version is more reasonable that Tiplers, imo, because it only assumes that 2 objects in the same quantum state *are* the same object (rather than an object and its simulation). There will almost certainly be objects in the same quantum state if the universe is infinite OR the MWI is correct, AND space-time really is quantised, AND quantum-identical objects really *are* the same object. This seems like a reasonable theory on the face of it. Hard to prove, though, unless you've had personal experience of living a *very* long time Charles
RE: FIN insanity
Jacques Mallah wrote (to Charles Goodwin): > [...] As for religion, it shows that most people are either >ignorant, stupid, and/or irrational, since those are the only ways to >believe in it. If you believe that there is a clear frontier between Sciences and Religions, it means you are believing religiously in some pseudoscience. (I know you are not the only one). The only problem with religion, and (in a lesser extent) with science, is the institutionalisation, which transforms creative inspiration into senseless repetition, if not (admittedly sad) fanatical proselytism. To qualify someone ignorant, stupid, and/or irrational for having religious belief is pure megalomaniac superstitious arrogance. I consider atheism as a form of positive religious belief. If D represents the proposition "God exists" (let us say), then -the believer says []D (I believe in God) -the atheist says []-D (I believe in the inexistence of God) -the agnostic says -[]D and -[]-D (I don't believe in God and I don't believe in the inexistence of God) The agnostic is either indifferent or is awaiting for more information. I just say this because I consider real atheist as very religious people, and, what is worth is that most of the time they want us to believe they have no religion. Only the agnostic can be said not having still made its religion (yet). The problem arises because the modalities []-x and -[]x are confused in most natural language. Bruno
Re: FIN insanity
Jacques Mallah wrote: > >From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > >There are different versions of QTI (let's not call it FIN). > > I'm certainly not going to call it a "theory". Doing so lends it an a > priori aura of legitimacy. Words mean things, as Newt Gingrich once said in > one of his smarter moments. > > >The most reasonable one (my version, of course) takes into account the > >possibility that you find yourself alive somewhere else in the universe, > >without any memory of the atomic bomb that exploded. I totally ignore the > >possibility that one could survive an atomic bomb exploding above one's > >head. My version doesn't imply that your a priory expected lifetime should > >be infinite. > > Your version may not imply immortality, but I don't really see how it's > different from other versions (and thus why it doesn't). As I have written before, a person is just a computation being implemented somewhere. Suppose that the person has discovered that he suffers from a terminal ilness and he dies (the computation ends). Now in principle the person in question could have lived on if he wasn't diagnosed with this terminal ilness. Somewhere in the multiverse this person exists. Some time ago I wrote (I think on the FoR list) that the transformation from the old dying person to the new person is a continuous one. The process of death must involve the destruction of the brain. At some time the information that the person is dying will be lost to the person. The person might even think he is 20 years old while in reality he is 92. Anyway, the point is that his brain had stored so much information that adding new information would lead to an inconsistency. By dumping some of the information, the information left will be identical to the information in a similar brain somewhere else of a younger person, free from disease. > > >I say: > >1) If you are hurt in a car accident and the surgeon performes brain > >surgery and you recover fully, then you are the same person. > > OK, that's merely a matter of definition though. > > >2) You would also be the same person if the surgeon made a new brain > >identically to yours. > > I'm not sure what you mean here. The new brain would be the same as the > old you, the old one would remain the same, the old one was destroyed, or > what? > Well, suppose that the damaged brain contains enough information to reconstruct the original one. It doesn't matter if you repair the old one or create a new one. > >3) From 2) it follows that if your brain was first copied and then > >destroyed, you would become the copy. > > A matter of definition agin, but let me point out something important. > If your brain is copied, then there is a causal link between the old brain > and any copies. Thus it's quite possible for an extended implementation of > a computation to start out in the old brain and end up in the copy, without > violating the requirement that implementations obey the proper direct causal > laws. > > >4) From 3) you can thus conclude that you will always experience yourself > >being alive, because copies of you always exist. > > I don't see how 4 is supposed to follow from 3. In any case, it's > certainly not true that copies of you always exist. Rather, people who are > structurally identical do exist, but they are not copies as they are not > causally linked. Even if they were linked in the past, they have diverged > on the level of causal relationships between your brain parts vs. their > brain parts. I don't understand why it is necessary for one person to qualify as a copy of another iff there is a causal link. > > >5) It doesn't follow that you will experience surviving terrible accidents. > > If 4 were true, I don't see how 5 could be true. 5) is true because you can survive with memory loss (see above). You would be killed, but copies of you exist that never experienced the accident. Saibal
RE: FIN insanity
>From: "Charles Goodwin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >I have had this problem trying to explain why I believe the theory of >evolution (with 99.999...% certainty) to various religious >types. It happens exactly as you describe. This isn't a form of insanity, >though: it appears to be a common human trait (presumably >you can't define MOST people as insane . . . or can you???) Maybe you should. As for religion, it shows that most people are either ignorant, stupid, and/or irrational, since those are the only ways to believe in it. - - - - - - - Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Physicist / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum My URL: http://hammer.prohosting.com/~mathmind/ _ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp
Re: FIN insanity
>From: "Saibal Mitra" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >There are different versions of QTI (let's not call it FIN). I'm certainly not going to call it a "theory". Doing so lends it an a priori aura of legitimacy. Words mean things, as Newt Gingrich once said in one of his smarter moments. >The most reasonable one (my version, of course) takes into account the >possibility that you find yourself alive somewhere else in the universe, >without any memory of the atomic bomb that exploded. I totally ignore the >possibility that one could survive an atomic bomb exploding above one's >head. My version doesn't imply that your a priory expected lifetime should >be infinite. Your version may not imply immortality, but I don't really see how it's different from other versions (and thus why it doesn't). >I say: >1) If you are hurt in a car accident and the surgeon performes brain >surgery and you recover fully, then you are the same person. OK, that's merely a matter of definition though. >2) You would also be the same person if the surgeon made a new brain >identically to yours. I'm not sure what you mean here. The new brain would be the same as the old you, the old one would remain the same, the old one was destroyed, or what? >3) From 2) it follows that if your brain was first copied and then >destroyed, you would become the copy. A matter of definition agin, but let me point out something important. If your brain is copied, then there is a causal link between the old brain and any copies. Thus it's quite possible for an extended implementation of a computation to start out in the old brain and end up in the copy, without violating the requirement that implementations obey the proper direct causal laws. >4) From 3) you can thus conclude that you will always experience yourself >being alive, because copies of you always exist. I don't see how 4 is supposed to follow from 3. In any case, it's certainly not true that copies of you always exist. Rather, people who are structurally identical do exist, but they are not copies as they are not causally linked. Even if they were linked in the past, they have diverged on the level of causal relationships between your brain parts vs. their brain parts. >5) It doesn't follow that you will experience surviving terrible accidents. If 4 were true, I don't see how 5 could be true. - - - - - - - Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Physicist / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum My URL: http://hammer.prohosting.com/~mathmind/ _ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp
Re: FIN insanity
<> I do not know, unfortunately. But, to me, the interesting point is this one. About what are "these" (the only ones you personally experience) talking about, after the explosion? Because "these", due to linearity and superposition of states, after the explosion, and subsequent time evolution, do interfere. -scerir
Re: FIN insanity
Charles Goodwin wrote: > > -Original Message- > > From: Jacques Mallah [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > On the other hand I can't see how FIN is supposed to work, either. I *think* the argument runs something like this... > > Even if you have just had, say, an atom bomb dropped on you, there's still SOME outcomes of the schrodinger wave equation which just > happen to lead to you suriviving the explosion. Although these are VERY unlikely - less likely than, say, my computer turning into a > bowl of petunias - they do exist, and (given the MWI) they occur somewhere in the multiverse. For some reason I can't work out, all > the copies who are killed by the bomb don't count. Only the very very very (etc) small proportion who miraculously survive do, and > these are the only ones you personally experience. > > Is that a reasonable description of FIN? Ignoring > statistical arguments, what is wrong with it? There are different versions of QTI (let's not call it FIN). The most reasonable one (my version, of course) takes into account the possibility that you find yourself alive somewhere else in the universe, without any memory of the atomic bomb that exploded. I totally ignore the possibility that one could survive an atomic bomb exploding above one's head. My version doesn't imply that your a priory expected lifetime should be infinite. Death involves the destruction of your brain. But there are many brains in the universe which are almost identical to yours. Jacques says that you can't become one of them. I say: 1) If you are hurt in a car accident and the surgeon performes brain surgery and you recover fully, then you are the same person. 2) You would also be the same person if the surgeon made a new brain identically to yours. 3) From 2) it follows that if your brain was first copied and then destroyed, you would become the copy. 4) From 3) you can thus conclude that you will always experience yourself being alive, because copies of you always exist. 5) It doesn't follow that you will experience surviving terrible accidents. Saibal
RE: FIN insanity
> -Original Message- > From: Jacques Mallah [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > At first the problem seems simple: they need someone to explain some > physics to them and correct their misconceptions. Explaining the physics to > them doesn't work, though. They rationalize their way around anything you > can say to them. I know I'm personally somewhat ineloquent and tend to be > overly frank, but I've seen many other people try to help out as well. The > observing crowd is firmly on the side of accepted science, so someone will > often help. I have had this problem trying to explain why I believe the theory of evolution (with 99.999...% certainty) to various religious types. It happens exactly as you describe. This isn't a form of insanity, though: it appears to be a common human trait (presumably you can't define MOST people as insane . . . or can you???) On the subject of FIN, I don't believe it myself, but I haven't yet seen good arguments either for or against it. The SSA argument fails because if FIN is true, we would still expect to see what we do in fact see, i.e. observers who (appear to) die at roughly their appointed times while we personally get older. So FIN has not yet been shown to be incompatible with observation (regardless of how (er) religiously one applies Bayesian arguments) On the other hand I can't see how FIN is supposed to work, either. I *think* the argument runs something like this... Even if you have just had, say, an atom bomb dropped on you, there's still SOME outcomes of the schrodinger wave equation which just happen to lead to you suriviving the explosion. Although these are VERY unlikely - less likely than, say, my computer turning into a bowl of petunias - they do exist, and (given the MWI) they occur somewhere in the multiverse. For some reason I can't work out, all the copies who are killed by the bomb don't count. Only the very very very (etc) small proportion who miraculously survive do, and these are the only ones you personally experience. Is that a reasonable description of FIN? Ignoring statistical arguments, what is wrong with it? Charles
Re: FIN insanity
>From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >So you believe these people are insane, that they are mentally ill. >You believe that they perhaps would benefit from consulting a doctor. >Perhaps they are even a danger to themselves or others? Yes. Themselves primarily, but possibly others too. >What category of mental illness would you attribute to those who >believe in quantum immortality? Looking at the list of disorders at >http://www.mentalhealth.com/, the most likely possibility seems to be >Delusional Disorder, http://www.mentalhealth.com/dis1/p21-ps02.html, >or perhaps Schizophrenia. These are the ones which mention delusions, >which is apparently what you consider this belief to entail. Delusional of grandiose type, perhaps. Shared Psychotic Disorder (http://www.mentalhealth.com/fr20.html) seems a better fit. But I'm no doctor and even a doctor would need to learn a lot more about people's personal lives than I would care to to make a diagnosis. But I'll tell you what I do know. I have had many encounters with crackpots on the internet. I'm talking about people who believe in perpetual motion (free energy), that relativity is wrong, that quantum mechanics is wrong, etc. These people do not simply hold mistaken beliefs. They hold them religiously. At first the problem seems simple: they need someone to explain some physics to them and correct their misconceptions. Explaining the physics to them doesn't work, though. They rationalize their way around anything you can say to them. I know I'm personally somewhat ineloquent and tend to be overly frank, but I've seen many other people try to help out as well. The observing crowd is firmly on the side of accepted science, so someone will often help. I don't know if there is a medically accepted disorder that covers crackpots, but there should be. Perhaps their ego is so much on the line that it blinds them. It doesn't help that the arguments end up getting bogged down deeper and deeper into technical issues simply because the rationalizations they use get more complicated. Well, I would say that I've seen a similar phenomenon with the FIN crowd. You may not agree, but at least you should believe that I do think they aren't rational, and am not just saying that as a rhetorical device. >Despite the difficulty of the concepts, the slipperiness of the reasoning, >the many alternative interpretations, you are so convinced of your own >correctness that you think someone must be insane to disagree with you? On the matter of FIN, yes. Of course I do not think that anyone who merely entertains the idea is insane, just those who hold to it. For example, Don Page at one time thought "quantum suicide" would work. Another person (and I) explained the problems with it, and he soon realized that it wouldn't. I have no problem with that. (see http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m592.html, ironically with a comment by James Higgo that presumably he would have later disclaimed.) In the case of James Higgo, I actually think that the fact that there was a long pause at a certain time in the activity of this list, and especially in my posts, allowed him time to come to his own rational conclusions (and thus reject FIN) without the ego-problem of losing a heated argument. Perhaps my posts do more harm to the anti-FIN cause than good you might then say, but on the other hand the alternative of letting the FIN go unchallenged and presumably be likely to snare new recruits seems a larger risk. - - - - - - - Jacques Mallah ([EMAIL PROTECTED]) Physicist / Many Worlder / Devil's Advocate "I know what no one else knows" - 'Runaway Train', Soul Asylum My URL: http://hammer.prohosting.com/~mathmind/ _ Get your FREE download of MSN Explorer at http://explorer.msn.com/intl.asp
