Materialism was:Re: KIM 2.3
Brent, I wonder, what do you mean with materialism (I ask this having been a materialist myself)? Physics only describes relations. (see for instance here http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/structural-realism/) I gather you accept MWI, so quite a lot of relations hold. The question is, why the quantum (as Wheeler, I think, put it)? Bruno's COMP gives a very elegant _explanation_. Also, with COMP, the mind-body problem indeed disappears. We have computations within computations within computations. (And I think that Bruno is correct when assuming that there is no _lowest_ level). It needn't even be a pure idealism, but rather Russelian neutral monism - some states more or less conscious - the degree of consciousness depending on the degree of self-reflexivity (see for instance here for a theory of consciousness which works well with COMP: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-higher/) Back to the ontological problem of the "grounding": materialism is in essence the thesis that there is, at bottom, a "substance", which has no independent properties, but serves as instantiator for other properties. But why should such a strange thing exist? Why not let the relations stand for themselves? Especially for an MWI-theorist; if you only accept a single world, matter does seem much more plausible - going through diverse transformations, that being all there is, and located somewhere in an otherwise empty spacetime or whatever - but those are all very naive intuitions which modern physics has moved beyond (and all the more so critical reflection on the results of modern physics). A big question: why should there be such a thing as a lowest level, a grounding? While for a materialist, the imagination of "turtles all the way down" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turtles_all_the_way_down is quite strange, computations all the way down is very intuitive. Well, awe-inspiring intuitive ;-)) Think of the fractal video Bruno sent out a little while ago. What explanatory power does matter hold? None, I conjecture. Please give at least one so we can discuss. Cheers, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Materialism was:Re: KIM 2.3
Günther Greindl wrote: > Brent, > > I wonder, what do you mean with materialism (I ask this having been a > materialist myself)? I didn't use the term - it is one being attributed to me simply because I question the adequacy of logic and mathematics to instantiate physics. > > Physics only describes relations. (see for instance here > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/structural-realism/) > > I gather you accept MWI, so quite a lot of relations hold. I don't accept any such esoteric theories - I merely entertain them. > > The question is, why the quantum (as Wheeler, I think, put it)? Bruno's > COMP gives a very elegant _explanation_. I agree it is elegant, but whether it can really explain the world remains to be seen. > > Also, with COMP, the mind-body problem indeed disappears. We have > computations within computations within computations. (And I think that > Bruno is correct when assuming that there is no _lowest_ level). But the problem reappears as the body-problem. Why is materialism so successful as a model of the world? > > It needn't even be a pure idealism, but rather Russelian neutral monism > - some states more or less conscious - the degree of consciousness > depending on the degree of self-reflexivity (see for instance here for a > theory of consciousness which works well with COMP: > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-higher/) > > > Back to the ontological problem of the "grounding": materialism is in > essence the thesis that there is, at bottom, a "substance", which has no > independent properties, but serves as instantiator for other properties. It seems somewhat gratuitous to call this a "substance". I'd say materialism holds (on simple empirical grounds) that some things exist and some don't. > But why should such a strange thing exist? Why should some things exist and others not - because if everything existed there would be no distinction between "exist" and "not-exist" (I know that's a stilly argument, but it is similar to the kind of logic chopping I sometimes see from the proponents of "everything exists"). >Why not let the relations > stand for themselves? Especially for an MWI-theorist; if you only accept > a single world, matter does seem much more plausible - going through > diverse transformations, that being all there is, and located somewhere > in an otherwise empty spacetime or whatever - but those are all very > naive intuitions which modern physics has moved beyond (and all the more > so critical reflection on the results of modern physics). I think I'm as qualified to speak for modern physics as you and I don't think it has "moved beyond". MWI is attractive for several reasons, but it is well short of Tegmarkia. > > A big question: why should there be such a thing as a lowest level, a > grounding? While for a materialist, the imagination of "turtles all the > way down" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turtles_all_the_way_down > is quite strange, computations all the way down is very intuitive. Well, > awe-inspiring intuitive ;-)) Think of the fractal video Bruno sent out > a little while ago. I think Tegmark grounded his "everything" by supposing that the lowest level was uncomputable. > > What explanatory power does matter hold? None, I conjecture. Please give > at least one so we can discuss. Materialism has been very effective in not only explaining, but in predicting things. That doesn't prove it's right, but I could ask what explanatory power does "everything exists" hold. Remember that a theory that could explain anything, fails to explain at all. For myself, I find Bruno's theory very intriguing. It is more specific than Tegmark's and so I believe has more hope of making contact with empiricism. But for me that is the proof of the pudding - not logical arguments about how nature "must be". Brent --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Materialism was:Re: KIM 2.3
Hi Brent, > I didn't use the term - it is one being attributed to me simply because I > question the adequacy of logic and mathematics to instantiate physics. That is ok - there are different versions of materialism/physicalism etc. > I don't accept any such esoteric theories - I merely entertain them. That is well put, I agree - as rational people we all hold tentatively, we entertain - with "accept" I mean that it passes enough tests that it can be entertained - versus other theories that are so unprobable that one does not have the time to concern oneself with them...(although one never knows ;-) > But the problem reappears as the body-problem. Why is materialism so > successful > as a model of the world? No, the problem is of a quite different nature than the mind-body problem. I would not call the white rabbit problem as a body problem. Besides, materialism also faces this issue in an infinite universe if you accept unification of mind states (remember the Bostrom paper?). > It seems somewhat gratuitous to call this a "substance". I'd say materialism > holds (on simple empirical grounds) that some things exist and some don't. Hmm, that is too little I think to distinguish materialism from, say, Pythagorean views or even Platonic views. Saying that "everything" exists does not quite capture what Everythingers believe. Everything never means everything conceivable - but everything that is possible. What is possible, is, of course, the question. > Why should some things exist and others not - because if everything existed > there would be no distinction between "exist" and "not-exist" With the restriction to "everything possible" (and not plain everything) exists, we still have to distinguish accessible regions. Or do you mean "can influence us causally" by exists? But then you would deny existence to parts outside the observable universe - which is of course dependent from where you look (Earth), so I think it is not a good criterion for existence. But if we accept that "material" things exist which can never affect us causally, why not accept that there are other, mathematically even more remote entitities? Or, consider decoherence - here mathematically very similar branches are suddenly inaccessible. > I don't think it has "moved beyond". MWI is attractive for several reasons, > but it is well short > of Tegmarkia. Of course - what I mean that it has "moved beyond" is a lot of Absolutes: absolute space, absolute time etc - what remains are relations. And there _are_ defenders in philosophy of physics which retain some anthropomorphic Absolutes, but I think they are fighting a losing battle. > I think Tegmark grounded his "everything" by supposing that the lowest level > was > uncomputable. Ok thanks I missed that, will have to read the paper again. > Materialism has been very effective in not only explaining, but in predicting > things. That doesn't prove it's right, but I could ask what explanatory power > does "everything exists" hold. Remember that a theory that could explain > anything, fails to explain at all. Indeed, and that is what makes materialism very enticing, but then the question immediately crops up: why this, and not something else? I think materialism would have a much better stance if one would find one set of equations which describes our universe (that is, of logical necessity), but it doesn't look likely. And every contingent description leads to multiversal concepts. Best Wishes, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Materialism was:Re: KIM 2.3
On 20 Jan 2009, at 05:22, Brent Meeker wrote: > > Günther Greindl wrote: > >> >> The question is, why the quantum (as Wheeler, I think, put it)? >> Bruno's >> COMP gives a very elegant _explanation_. > > I agree it is elegant, but whether it can really explain the world > remains to be > seen. I am not proposing a new explanation. It is the contrary. I show that if we assume digital mechanism, more or less the current theory of mind, especially among materialist, then materialism not only fail on mind and consciousness (like I would say all experts know), but materialism stop to work for matter itself. Iy is a theorem, in a venerable old theory. > > >> >> Also, with COMP, the mind-body problem indeed disappears. We have >> computations within computations within computations. (And I think >> that >> Bruno is correct when assuming that there is no _lowest_ level). > > But the problem reappears as the body-problem. Why is materialism > so successful > as a model of the world? Probably because materialism provides an excellent approximation for most concerns. > > >> >> It needn't even be a pure idealism, but rather Russelian neutral >> monism >> - some states more or less conscious - the degree of consciousness >> depending on the degree of self-reflexivity (see for instance here >> for a >> theory of consciousness which works well with COMP: >> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/consciousness-higher/) >> >> >> Back to the ontological problem of the "grounding": materialism is in >> essence the thesis that there is, at bottom, a "substance", which >> has no >> independent properties, but serves as instantiator for other >> properties. > > It seems somewhat gratuitous to call this a "substance". I'd say > materialism > holds (on simple empirical grounds) that some things exist and some > don't. ? Computationalist or digital mechanist too. They assert that numbers bigger than two, even and prime does not exist, and that numbers with odd divisors exist. If you meant "exist physically", then I can agree, yet I have to define "exist physically" in arithmetic if comp is assumed. > > > >> But why should such a strange thing exist? > > Why should some things exist and others not - because if everything > existed > there would be no distinction between "exist" and "not-exist" (I > know that's a > stilly argument, but it is similar to the kind of logic chopping I > sometimes see > from the proponents of "everything exists"). > >> Why not let the relations >> stand for themselves? Especially for an MWI-theorist; if you only >> accept >> a single world, matter does seem much more plausible - going through >> diverse transformations, that being all there is, and located >> somewhere >> in an otherwise empty spacetime or whatever - but those are all very >> naive intuitions which modern physics has moved beyond (and all the >> more >> so critical reflection on the results of modern physics). > > I think I'm as qualified to speak for modern physics as you and I > don't think it > has "moved beyond". MWI is attractive for several reasons, but it > is well short > of Tegmarkia. > >> >> A big question: why should there be such a thing as a lowest level, a >> grounding? While for a materialist, the imagination of "turtles all >> the >> way down" http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turtles_all_the_way_down >> is quite strange, computations all the way down is very intuitive. >> Well, >> awe-inspiring intuitive ;-)) Think of the fractal video Bruno sent >> out >> a little while ago. > > I think Tegmark grounded his "everything" by supposing that the > lowest level was > uncomputable. With comp, the 3-person ultimate everything is digital, or combinatorial, or arithmetical, or Diophantine. There are lower first order citizens; the digits, the combinators, the numbers, etc. It is the first person realities, including the physics which are no no more grounded in the digital or the computable. > > >> >> What explanatory power does matter hold? None, I conjecture. Please >> give >> at least one so we can discuss. > > Materialism has been very effective in not only explaining, but in > predicting > things. That doesn't prove it's right, but I could ask what > explanatory power > does "everything exists" hold. Before seraching explanation we have to well understand the problem. With comp we have this problem: it predicts the observability of the many worlds, when we observe ourselves. And with current physics (quantum mechanic) we have this problem: we observe, albeit indirectly, many worlds, or superposition of histories. > Remember that a theory that could explain > anything, fails to explain at all. I agree. > > > For myself, I find Bruno's theory very intriguing. It is more > specific than > Tegmark's I have no theory, except a widely believed (but not understood) digital version of Milinda-Descartes' Mecha
