Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: No, it won't be bored because there is no way for it to know that it is going through the first or the second run. The point I was trying to make is that there is no real basis for distinguishing between a recording and a program, There is a basis for distinguishing between a programme and a process. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
John, Le 23-août-06, à 22:24, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit : As I 'believe': anything recognized by our 'senses' are our mental interpretations of the unattainable 'reality' (if we condone its validity). My world is a posteriori. This is almost my favorite way to explain Plato in one sentence. Now with pythagorean-plato (discussed in Plato, but even more by the neoplatonists), the question is open that the ultimate reality is the reality of the numbers law. Note that after Godel-Turing-Post-Church... , betting on our own consistency, we know, at least, why and how such an ultimate reality (numbers) is forever unattainable (contrary to the pregodelian, leibnizian old belief that number are easy to get through. I mean natural number (real numbers or complex numbers are terrible simplification tools, unless you define the trigonometric function which reintroduce the natural numbers in the real or complex picture. Best regards, Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal): People who believes that inputs (being either absolute-material or relative-platonical) are needed for consciousness should not believe that we can be conscious in a dream, given the evidence that the brain is almost completely cut out from the environment during rem sleep. The brain didn't evolve to dream. Clearly the brain *did* evolve to dream, although we don't really understand the evolutionary advantage of dreaming, or for that matter sleeping. But that is beside the point: the question is whether interaction with an external environment is necessary for consciousness, and I think dreaming is one situation which shows that it is not. (To be fair, one could argue that dreaming does involve environmental input in that at the very least there is proprioceptive feedback from the rapid eye movements, and there is no dreaming during non-REM sleep. However, I think that is just a technical detail, as it is easy enough to imagine a brain dreaming without this input, or with the input provided by self-exciting neurons.) Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le 23-août-06, à 03:58, Brent Meeker a écrit : People who believes that inputs (being either absolute-material or relative-platonical) are needed for consciousness should not believe that we can be conscious in a dream, given the evidence that the brain is almost completely cut out from the environment during rem sleep. Almost is not completely. I am glad you don't insist. In any case, I don't think consciousness is maintained indefinitely with no inputs. I think a brain-in-a-vat would go into an endless loop without external stimulus. OK, but for our reasoning it is enough consciousness is maintained a nanosecond (relatively to us). I guess they have no problem with comatose people either. Comatose people are generally referred to as unconscious. ? ? ? I mean this *is* the question. In mind'sI (Dennett Hofstadter) we learn that a woman has been in comatose state during 50 years (if I remember correctly), and said she never stop to be conscious. They are more than one form of comatose state. To say they are unconscious is debatable at the least. And then there is the case of dreams. And for those who does not like dream, what about the following question: take a child and enclose him/her in a box completely isolated from the environement. Would that fact suppress his/her consciousness? Some parents will appreciate and feel less guilty with such ideas ... Of course they cannot be even just troubled by the UD, which is a program without inputs and without outputs. As I understood the UD the program itself was not conscious, but rather that some parts are supposed to be, relative to a simulated environment. Yes. some person attached to (infinity) of special computations, indeed. Now, without digging in the movie-graph, I would still be interested if someone accepting standard comp (Peter's expression) could explain how a digital machine could correctly decide that her environment is real-physical. Decide is ambiguous. She could very well form that hypothesis and find much confirming and no contrary evidence. What are you asking for? a proof from some axioms? Which axioms? Sorry, I have used the word decide in the logician sense (like in undecidable). To decide = to proof, or to test, or to solve, in some math sense. Which axioms? Indeed, good question, that's makes my point. Well, I was thinking about some physical theory the someone would argue for. Anyone a priori. If such machine and reasoning exist, it will be done in Platonia, and, worst, assuming comp, it will be done as correctly as the real machine argument. This would lead to the fact that in Platonia, there are (many) immaterial machines proving *correctly* that they are immaterial. Contradiction. Suppose a physical machine implements computation and proves relative to some axioms that physical machines don't exist. Contradiction? If by physical you mean what Peter Jones means, then indeed the physical machine is in contradiction. This means that her axioms are indeed contradictory. If moreover, the physical machine gives a correct proof, as as I say in the quotes, then we get a total contradiction, like a proof that PI is an integer, for example. That we are in contradiction. As far as we are consistent, this just means that no X-machine can correctly proof that X-machine does not exist. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: Almost is not completely. In any case, I don't think consciousness is maintained indefinitely with no inputs. I think a brain-in-a-vat would go into an endless loop without external stimulus. That's an assumption, No, it has empirical support. It is what is reported by people in extended sensory deprivation experiments. but even if true it would only say something about the nature of human brains. It is easy enough to imagine a brain with self-excitatory neurons that provide the same kind of input as the environment does, modulating their activity in response to feedback from other neurons. It would just be a technical problem to ensure that it didn't go into an endless loop. Without inherent (quantum) randomness? I don't think so. Close deterministic systems have a Poincare return time. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Bruno: why do I have difficulties to go along with many of you? E.g. when you wrote (and not you brought up the ominous "axiom"): "...Which axioms? Indeed, good question, that's makes my point. Well, I was thinking about some physical theory the "someone" would argue for. Anyone a priori." I dislike 'axioms', but do not trust my dislike, so I looked up Wikipedia's definition to have something to argue against G. It said: An axiom is a sentence or proposition that is taken for granted as true, and serves as a starting point for deducing other truths. In many usage axiom and postulate are used as synonyms. In certain epistemological theories, an axiom is a self-evident truth upon which other knowledge must rest, and from which other knowledge is built up. An axiom in this sense can be known before one knows any of these other propostions. Not all epistemologists agree that any axioms, understood in that sense, exist. In logic and mathematics, an axiom is not necessarily a self-evident truth, but rather a formal logical _expression_ used in a deduction to yield further results. To axiomatize a system of knowledge is to show that all of its claims can be derived from a small set of sentences that are independent of one another. This does not imply that they could have been known independently; and there are typically multiple ways to axiomatize a given system of knowledge (such as arithmetic). Mathematics distinguishes two types of axioms: logical axioms and non-logical axioms. It speaks for itself. "We" (not you and me) create axioms to make 'our' theories work. Then we consider the 'system' in question based on such axioms. I try to scrutinize them, to find alternates and scrutinize those also. The other one is an 'a priori (physical?) theory' - sounds in physics similar to 'your' numbers which you may consider 'a priori' existing. If I may ask: what 'natural' senses may detect numbers? Unless. of course, you consider our mind a 'natural sense' (what may be true). As I 'believe': anything recognized by our 'senses' are our mental interpretations of the unattainable 'reality' (if we condone its validity). "My world" is a posteriori. Cheerz John M - Original Message - From: "Bruno Marchal" [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Wednesday, August 23, 2006 10:31 AM Subject: Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really... Le 23-août-06, à 03:58, Brent Meeker a écrit : People who believes that inputs (being either absolute-material or relative-platonical) are needed for consciousness should not believe that we can be conscious in a dream, given the evidence that the brain is almost completely cut out from the environment during rem sleep. Almost is not completely.I am glad you don't insist. In any case, I don't think consciousness is maintained indefinitely with no inputs. I think a "brain-in-a-vat" would go into an endless loop without external stimulus.OK, but for our reasoning it is enough consciousness is maintained a nanosecond (relatively to us). I guess they have no problem with comatose people either. Comatose people are generally referred to as "unconscious".? ? ?I mean this *is* the question. In mind'sI (Dennett Hofstadter) we learn that a woman has been in comatose state during 50 years (if I remember correctly), and said she never stop to be conscious.They are more than one form of comatose state. To say they are "unconscious" is debatable at the least. And then there is the case of dreams. And for those who does not like dream, what about the following question: take a child and enclose him/her in a box completely isolated from the environement. Would that fact suppress his/her consciousness?Some parents will appreciate and feel less guilty with such ideas ... Of course they cannot be even just troubled by the UD, which is a program without inputs and without outputs. As I understood the UD the program itself was not conscious, but rather that some parts are supposed to be, relative to a simulated environment.Yes. some "person" attached to (infinity) of special computations, indeed. Now, without digging in the movie-graph, I would still be interested if someone accepting "standard comp" (Peter's _expression_) could explain how a digital machine could correctly decide that her environment is "real-physical". "Decide" is ambiguous. She could very well form that hypothesis and find much confirming and no contrary evidence. What are you asking for? a proof from some axioms? Which axioms?Sorry, I have used the word "decide" in the logician sense (like in undecidable). To decide = to proof, or to test, or to solve, in some math sense.Which axioms? Indeed, good question, that's makes my point. Well, I was thinking about some physical the
RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Brent meeker writes (quoting Peter Jones, Quentin Anciaux and SP): Hi, Le Dimanche 20 Août 2006 05:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): What about an inputless computer program, running deterministically like a recording. Would that count as a program at all, It would be a trivial case. Trivial does not mean false. It seems to me that the set of inputless programs contains the set of programs which have inputs. Because a program which have inputs could be written as the following inputless program : |HARDCODED INPUT||CODE| The resulting program is input less but the substructure denominated CODE here is not inputless, it takes the hardcoded input. So in any case I don't see why inputless program should be trivial case. Regards, Quentin I thought the question was not about computation, but whether a program was intelligent or conscious. I think that intelligence means being able to respond to a variety of differenet inputs. So above |CODE| might be intelligent but not the overall inputless program. OK, I suppose you could say I'm intelligent but not I + my environment are intelligent. That still allows that an inputless program might contain intelligent beings, and you are left with the problem of how to decide whether a physical system is implementing such a program given that you can't talk to it. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le 22-août-06, à 15:26, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : OK, I suppose you could say I'm intelligent but not I + my environment are intelligent. That still allows that an inputless program might contain intelligent beings, and you are left with the problem of how to decide whether a physical system is implementing such a program given that you can't talk to it. People who believes that inputs (being either absolute-material or relative-platonical) are needed for consciousness should not believe that we can be conscious in a dream, given the evidence that the brain is almost completely cut out from the environment during rem sleep. I guess they have no problem with comatose people either. Of course they cannot be even just troubled by the UD, which is a program without inputs and without outputs. Now, without digging in the movie-graph, I would still be interested if someone accepting standard comp (Peter's expression) could explain how a digital machine could correctly decide that her environment is real-physical. If such machine and reasoning exist, it will be done in Platonia, and, worst, assuming comp, it will be done as correctly as the real machine argument. This would lead to the fact that in Platonia, there are (many) immaterial machines proving *correctly* that they are immaterial. Contradiction. Remark: the key idea which is used here is that not only programs belong to Platonia, but their relative computations also. It is important to keep the distinction between (static) programs and their dynamical computations. I will write Fi, as the function computed by the ith programs in some universal enumeration of partial recursive functions (like an infinite list of fortran programs, say). I will write Fi(x) for the value of that function with input x, if that value exists. I will write sFi(x) the s-trace of that program (with input x), where the trace stops after the sth steps in the relative run of Fi(x). The trace is computer scientist name for a description of the computational steps---it can be shown that such computational steps can always be defined for the Fi and Wi. I will define a (3-PERSON) computation of Fi(x) as being the sequence 1Fi(x), 2Fi(x), 3Fi(x), etc ... This is well defined relatively to some universal number or code. In this sense, computations belong to Platonia. The reason why I feel myself here and now can then be reduced to the relative 1-person comp indeterminacy a-la Washington/Moscow. Note that the adjective relative is capital here. Without it, the indexical conception of time (and space) would not work. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 22-août-06, à 15:26, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : OK, I suppose you could say I'm intelligent but not I + my environment are intelligent. That still allows that an inputless program might contain intelligent beings, and you are left with the problem of how to decide whether a physical system is implementing such a program given that you can't talk to it. People who believes that inputs (being either absolute-material or relative-platonical) are needed for consciousness should not believe that we can be conscious in a dream, given the evidence that the brain is almost completely cut out from the environment during rem sleep. The brain didn't evolve to dream. I guess they have no problem with comatose people either. Of course they cannot be even just troubled by the UD, which is a program without inputs and without outputs. Now, without digging in the movie-graph, I would still be interested if someone accepting standard comp (Peter's expression) could explain how a digital machine could correctly decide that her environment is real-physical. A *person* can decide their enviroment is *uncomputable*. If classical physics had been true, the environment would have been uncomputable. If such machine and reasoning exist, it will be done in Platonia, and, worst, assuming comp, it will be done as correctly as the real machine argument. This would lead to the fact that in Platonia, there are (many) immaterial machines proving *correctly* that they are immaterial. Contradiction. If the mind is a computation, its errors are computations as well. Platonia wil contain every mathematical possibility -- every combination of mind and environment. Competent minds correctly judging their environments are computable, competent minds correctly judging their environments are uncomputable, incompetent minds incorrectly judging their environments are uncomputable, incompetent minds incorrectly judging their environments are computable. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 22-août-06, à 15:26, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : OK, I suppose you could say I'm intelligent but not I + my environment are intelligent. That still allows that an inputless program might contain intelligent beings, and you are left with the problem of how to decide whether a physical system is implementing such a program given that you can't talk to it. People who believes that inputs (being either absolute-material or relative-platonical) are needed for consciousness should not believe that we can be conscious in a dream, given the evidence that the brain is almost completely cut out from the environment during rem sleep. Almost is not completely. In any case, I don't think consciousness is maintained indefinitely with no inputs. I think a brain-in-a-vat would go into an endless loop without external stimulus. I guess they have no problem with comatose people either. Comatose people are generally referred to as unconscious. Of course they cannot be even just troubled by the UD, which is a program without inputs and without outputs. As I understood the UD the program itself was not conscious, but rather that some parts are supposed to be, relative to a simulated environment. Now, without digging in the movie-graph, I would still be interested if someone accepting standard comp (Peter's expression) could explain how a digital machine could correctly decide that her environment is real-physical. Decide is ambiguous. She could very well form that hypothesis and find much confirming and no contrary evidence. What are you asking for? a proof from some axioms? Which axioms? If such machine and reasoning exist, it will be done in Platonia, and, worst, assuming comp, it will be done as correctly as the real machine argument. This would lead to the fact that in Platonia, there are (many) immaterial machines proving *correctly* that they are immaterial. Contradiction. Suppose a physical machine implements computation and proves relative to some axioms that physical machines don't exist. Contradiction? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP): You might say that a computer program has a two-way interaction with its environment while a recording does not, but it is easy to imagine a situation where this can be perfectly reproduced by a recording. In run no. 1, you start up the computer program and have a conversation with it. In run no. 2 you start up the computer program and play it the recording of your voice from run no. 1. As far as the program is aware, it receives exactly the same inputs and goes through exactly the same responses on both runs, but one is a recording and the other is not. Run no. 2 is exactly analogous to a film: a fixed input resulting in a fixed output, even though if the input had been different the output would also have been different. I don't see how you could say that the computer is conscious in run no. 1 but not in run no. 2. If the program is intelligent it'll be bored by 2. :-) You seem to mixing questions of discovering whether a program is intelligent, with what it means for it to be intelligent. No, it won't be bored because there is no way for it to know that it is going through the first or the second run. The point I was trying to make is that there is no real basis for distinguishing between a recording and a program, and hence no basis for saying that a program can be intelligent or conscious and a recording cannot. A corrolary to this is that there can be no real distinction between program and data, or computer and environment: they are just artificially segregated parts within a larger system. This means that in general it is not possible to say whether a physical system is or isn't implementing a computation, because the usual test of whether it handles counterfactuals will not necessarily work. This would be a trivial result *unless* we say that a computation can be conscious, in which case self-contained universes of conscious beings are hidden all around us. To avoid this conclusion you either have to drop computationalism or drop the idea that consciousness supervenes on physical activity. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: Is it possible that we are currently actors in a single, deterministic, non-branching computer program, with the illusion of free will and if-then contingency in general being due to the fact that we don't know the details of how the program will play out? Lots of things are possible. The question is what to believe. True, but I thought you were saying that such a thing was incompatible with consciousness, and I see no reason to believe that. There are a lot of prolems with what you are saying. I don't think it is possible to get dynamism out of stasis, and I don't think it is possible to get qualia out of mathematical structues But what about a physical computer which creates an entire virtual environment, complete with sentient beings? Once started up it would be completely deterministic, just as a recording would be. It could have if-then statements but these would not make any difference, given initial conditions. (A recording also has if-then statements, in that if the input were different, the output would also be different.) This could as easily be a real model of a classical universe, with no interference from outside once initial conditions + laws of physics had been set. The if-then statements are implicit in the laws of physics: if I throw a rock, it will follow a parabolic trajectory and shatter the window. Yes, that is my point. Computationalsim requires processes that implement algorithms, algorithms require counterfactuals, counterfactuals are underpinned by physical causality. But all you can have in Plato's heaven is a recording that doesn't have counterfactual behaviour, or a programme (as opposed to a process) that isn't implemented. As an inhabitant of the univerese I think I have free will in deciding whether or not to throw the rock, but in fact this is no more indeterminate than the workings of a clockwork mechanism. Assuming the universe is detrerministic. (Actually, classical physics isn't computable...) My understanding is that standard computationalism allows for consciousness to occur in such a universe, even if it isn't the universe we actually live in. And such a universe could be emulated as a running, deterministic process. But that won't get you into Plato's heaven, because it is a *running* process -- it is still dynamic. A recording of the process could exist in Plato's heaven, but it wouldn't have all the counterfactuals, so the computationalist is not required to believe that it contains any real sentience -- the simulated beings in it would have no more consciousness of their own than the characters in a movie! Likewise, the computationalist is not required to believe that an unexecuted programme is sentient (even though it has, theoretically, the counterfactuals). No-one would believe that a brain-scan, however detailed, is conscious, so not computationalist, however ardent, is required to believe that a progamme gathering udston a shelf is sentient, however good a piece of AI code it is. If not, then you have to abandon computationalism and embrace something like Penrose's theory in which essentially non-computable quantum effects are responsible for consciousness; or maybe we've just all been issued with a soul by God. Standard computationalism refers to real, physical processes running on material computers. You have to show that the causality and dynamism are inessential (that there is no relevant difference between process and programme) before you can have consciousness implemented Platonically. (No *special* kind of physics is required). Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Right! From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really... Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2006 10:18:18 +0200 Hi, Le Dimanche 20 Août 2006 05:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): What about an inputless computer program, running deterministically like a recording. Would that count as a program at all, It would be a trivial case. Trivial does not mean false. It seems to me that the set of inputless programs contains the set of programs which have inputs. Because a program which have inputs could be written as the following inputless program : |HARDCODED INPUT||CODE| The resulting program is input less but the substructure denominated CODE here is not inputless, it takes the hardcoded input. So in any case I don't see why inputless program should be trivial case. Regards, Quentin I thought the question was not about computation, but whether a program was intelligent or conscious. I think that intelligence means being able to respond to a variety of differenet inputs. So above |CODE| might be intelligent but not the overall inputless program. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Peter Jones writes: And such a universe could be emulated as a running, deterministic process. But that won't get you into Plato's heaven, because it is a *running* process -- it is still dynamic. A recording of the process could exist in Plato's heaven, but it wouldn't have all the counterfactuals, so the computationalist is not required to believe that it contains any real sentience -- the simulated beings in it would have no more consciousness of their own than the characters in a movie! Likewise, the computationalist is not required to believe that an unexecuted programme is sentient (even though it has, theoretically, the counterfactuals). No-one would believe that a brain-scan, however detailed, is conscious, so not computationalist, however ardent, is required to believe that a progamme gathering udston a shelf is sentient, however good a piece of AI code it is. Leave aside for the moment the computer running in Platonia and consider a real computer. You say that a computer program is defined in part by its ability to handle counterfactuals, distinguishing it from a mere recording, but it is this distinction with which I have difficulties. The characters in a film are not conscious because the film only simulates external appearance, not because it lacks if-then statements. A film obviously does handle if-then statements, because if the patterns on the film are different the projection on the screen would also be different. A computer program basically does the same thing: it consistently produces a certain output for a certain input. In the MWI of QM a computer program or human mind may have more luxuriant branchings than a recording, but that is just a matter of degree, and in any case there is no reason to suppose that a program is any less valid or less conscious because of the presence or absence of near-copies segregated in parallel universes. In the CI of QM it would be possible to introduce true randomness into a computer program but the same could be done for a recording, and again there is no reason to suppose that a program is any less valid or less conscious because it isn't random. Randomness and/or parallel processes are not a prerequisite for a classical computer to function. You might say that a computer program has a two-way interaction with its environment while a recording does not, but it is easy to imagine a situation where this can be perfectly reproduced by a recording. In run no. 1, you start up the computer program and have a conversation with it. In run no. 2 you start up the computer program and play it the recording of your voice from run no. 1. As far as the program is aware, it receives exactly the same inputs and goes through exactly the same responses on both runs, but one is a recording and the other is not. Run no. 2 is exactly analogous to a film: a fixed input resulting in a fixed output, even though if the input had been different the output would also have been different. I don't see how you could say that the computer is conscious in run no. 1 but not in run no. 2. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: And such a universe could be emulated as a running, deterministic process. But that won't get you into Plato's heaven, because it is a *running* process -- it is still dynamic. A recording of the process could exist in Plato's heaven, but it wouldn't have all the counterfactuals, so the computationalist is not required to believe that it contains any real sentience -- the simulated beings in it would have no more consciousness of their own than the characters in a movie! Likewise, the computationalist is not required to believe that an unexecuted programme is sentient (even though it has, theoretically, the counterfactuals). No-one would believe that a brain-scan, however detailed, is conscious, so not computationalist, however ardent, is required to believe that a progamme gathering udston a shelf is sentient, however good a piece of AI code it is. Leave aside for the moment the computer running in Platonia and consider a real computer. You say that a computer program is defined in part by its ability to handle counterfactuals, distinguishing it from a mere recording, but it is this distinction with which I have difficulties. The characters in a film are not conscious because the film only simulates external appearance, not because it lacks if-then statements. A film obviously does handle if-then statements, because if the patterns on the film are different the projection on the screen would also be different. That's not a proper example though. It would imply to a rock - it would be different if it weren't a rock. To be intelligent (much less conscious) the if-then must be inresponse to different environmental inputs. A computer program basically does the same thing: it consistently produces a certain output for a certain input. That's why you can't tell whether a program is intelligent by giving it a certain input. There must be a variety of inputs and the response will in general be different depending on their order (smart programs have memory). In the MWI of QM a computer program or human mind may have more luxuriant branchings than a recording, This seems to reify the branches as part of the program. They are part of the *process of running* the program. The branches arise from different inputs. but that is just a matter of degree, and in any case there is no reason to suppose that a program is any less valid or less conscious because of the presence or absence of near-copies segregated in parallel universes. In the CI of QM it would be possible to introduce true randomness into a computer program but the same could be done for a recording, and again there is no reason to suppose that a program is any less valid or less conscious because it isn't random. Randomness and/or parallel processes are not a prerequisite for a classical computer to function. I agree with that. You might say that a computer program has a two-way interaction with its environment while a recording does not, but it is easy to imagine a situation where this can be perfectly reproduced by a recording. In run no. 1, you start up the computer program and have a conversation with it. In run no. 2 you start up the computer program and play it the recording of your voice from run no. 1. As far as the program is aware, it receives exactly the same inputs and goes through exactly the same responses on both runs, but one is a recording and the other is not. Run no. 2 is exactly analogous to a film: a fixed input resulting in a fixed output, even though if the input had been different the output would also have been different. I don't see how you could say that the computer is conscious in run no. 1 but not in run no. 2. If the program is intelligent it'll be bored by 2. :-) You seem to mixing questions of discovering whether a program is intelligent, with what it means for it to be intelligent. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Hi, Le Dimanche 20 Août 2006 05:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): What about an inputless computer program, running deterministically like a recording. Would that count as a program at all, It would be a trivial case. Trivial does not mean false. It seems to me that the set of inputless programs contains the set of programs which have inputs. Because a program which have inputs could be written as the following inputless program : |HARDCODED INPUT||CODE| The resulting program is input less but the substructure denominated CODE here is not inputless, it takes the hardcoded input. So in any case I don't see why inputless program should be trivial case. Regards, Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le 19-août-06, à 15:36, Günther wrote: The existence of numbers is not like the existence of objects, and I don't think that most mathematical Platonists would say that it is. I agree with them. We have to distinguish many forms of internal or epistemological existence, build from the simplest conceptual third person ontological commitments. Comp necessitates the numbers for the ontic part, and the rest emerges as coherent overlapping set of of computations (quotientized through some undistinguishability first person equivalence relation). To be short. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: Is it possible that we are currently actors in a single, deterministic, non-branching computer program, with the illusion of free will and if-then contingency in general being due to the fact that we don't know the details of how the program will play out? Lots of things are possible. The question is what to believe. True, but I thought you were saying that such a thing was incompatible with consciousness, and I see no reason to believe that. There are a lot of prolems with what you are saying. I don't think it is possible to get dynamism out of stasis, and I don't think it is possible to get qualia out of mathematical structues Oh, and Non-branching programme is close to being a cotnradiction in terms. You could replace computer program with machine and have a description of the universe. Really ? What would machine mean in that sentence ? And according to which theory of physics ? Actually, you could leave out non-branching as well: the MWI is branching but deterministic, and still leaves room for first person indeterminacy. There are problems with MWI as a purely physical theory. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, Le Dimanche 20 Août 2006 05:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): What about an inputless computer program, running deterministically like a recording. Would that count as a program at all, It would be a trivial case. Trivial does not mean false. It seems to me that the set of inputless programs contains the set of programs which have inputs. Because a program which have inputs could be written as the following inputless program : |HARDCODED INPUT||CODE| Which could be further simplified into |HARCODED OUTPUT| But not most people would call that data, not programme. (in any case, this kind of one-shot progamme is not a good model of mind. A mind is more like a fuzzy-logic real-time system). --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Right! From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really... Date: Sun, 20 Aug 2006 10:18:18 +0200 Hi, Le Dimanche 20 Août 2006 05:17, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): What about an inputless computer program, running deterministically like a recording. Would that count as a program at all, It would be a trivial case. Trivial does not mean false. It seems to me that the set of inputless programs contains the set of programs which have inputs. Because a program which have inputs could be written as the following inputless program : |HARDCODED INPUT||CODE| The resulting program is input less but the substructure denominated CODE here is not inputless, it takes the hardcoded input. So in any case I don't see why inputless program should be trivial case. Regards, Quentin _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Peter Jones writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: Is it possible that we are currently actors in a single, deterministic, non-branching computer program, with the illusion of free will and if-then contingency in general being due to the fact that we don't know the details of how the program will play out? Lots of things are possible. The question is what to believe. True, but I thought you were saying that such a thing was incompatible with consciousness, and I see no reason to believe that. There are a lot of prolems with what you are saying. I don't think it is possible to get dynamism out of stasis, and I don't think it is possible to get qualia out of mathematical structues But what about a physical computer which creates an entire virtual environment, complete with sentient beings? Once started up it would be completely deterministic, just as a recording would be. It could have if-then statements but these would not make any difference, given initial conditions. (A recording also has if-then statements, in that if the input were different, the output would also be different.) This could as easily be a real model of a classical universe, with no interference from outside once initial conditions + laws of physics had been set. The if-then statements are implicit in the laws of physics: if I throw a rock, it will follow a parabolic trajectory and shatter the window. As an inhabitant of the univerese I think I have free will in deciding whether or not to throw the rock, but in fact this is no more indeterminate than the workings of a clockwork mechanism. My understanding is that standard computationalism allows for consciousness to occur in such a universe, even if it isn't the universe we actually live in. If not, then you have to abandon computationalism and embrace something like Penrose's theory in which essentially non-computable quantum effects are responsible for consciousness; or maybe we've just all been issued with a soul by God. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: Even if you say that, there is still a sense in which arithmetic is independent of the real world. The same can be said of Euclidian geometry: it follows from Euclid's axioms *despite* the fact that real space is not Euclidian. The fact that real space is not Euclidian means that Euclidian geometry does not describe the real world, not that it is false or non-existent. Stathis Papaioannou But the fact that a theorem is true relative to some axioms doesn't make it true or existent. Some mathematicians I know regard it as a game. Is true that a bishop can only move diagonally? It is relative to chess. Does chess exist? It does in our heads. But without us it wouldn't. What more could we possibly ask of a theorem other than that it be true relative to some axioms? That a theorem should describe some aspect of the real world, or that it should be discovered by some mathematician, is contingent on the nature of the real world, but that it is true is not. That it is a true description of the real world, or that it is a true theorem relative to the axioms. It is a mistake to conflate the two, which I suspect is done by people claiming mathematical theorems are true. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes: Even if you say that, there is still a sense in which arithmetic is independent of the real world. The same can be said of Euclidian geometry: it follows from Euclid's axioms *despite* the fact that real space is not Euclidian. The fact that real space is not Euclidian means that Euclidian geometry does not describe the real world, not that it is false or non-existent. Stathis Papaioannou But the fact that a theorem is true relative to some axioms doesn't make it true or existent. Some mathematicians I know regard it as a game. Is true that a bishop can only move diagonally? It is relative to chess. Does chess exist? It does in our heads. But without us it wouldn't. What more could we possibly ask of a theorem other than that it be true relative to some axioms? That a theorem should describe some aspect of the real world, or that it should be discovered by some mathematician, is contingent on the nature of the real world, but that it is true is not. That it is a true description of the real world, or that it is a true theorem relative to the axioms? It is a mistake to conflate the two, which I suspect is done by people claiming mathematical theorems are true. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP): But the fact that a theorem is true relative to some axioms doesn't make it true or existent. Some mathematicians I know regard it as a game. Is true that a bishop can only move diagonally? It is relative to chess. Does chess exist? It does in our heads. But without us it wouldn't. What more could we possibly ask of a theorem other than that it be true relative to some axioms? That a theorem should describe some aspect of the real world, or that it should be discovered by some mathematician, is contingent on the nature of the real world, but that it is true is not. That it is a true description of the real world, or that it is a true theorem relative to the axioms. It is a mistake to conflate the two, which I suspect is done by people claiming mathematical theorems are true. OK then, I agree. The two should not be conflated. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le 19-août-06, à 08:48, Brent Meeker wrote quoting Stathis Papaioannou What more could we possibly ask of a theorem other than that it be true relative to some axioms? That a theorem should describe some aspect of the real world, or that it should be discovered by some mathematician, is contingent on the nature of the real world, but that it is true is not. That it is a true description of the real world, or that it is a true theorem relative to the axioms. It is a mistake to conflate the two, which I suspect is done by people claiming mathematical theorems are true. No. It is done by people claiming true mathematical propositions are theorem. Robinson Arithmetic (Q or RA) and Peano Arithmetic (PA), which in our context are better seen as a (mathematical) *machines*, are SOUND with respect to the so-called (by logicians) standard model of arithmetic, which is the mathematical structure (N,+,*) given by the non negative integers N together with addition and multiplication (learned in high school). Now RA and all its consistent extensions (and thus PA, ZF, ...) are INCOMPLETE with respect to that mathematical structure (N,+,*), in the sense that for any of those theories there exist always infinitely many true propositions, true meaning really: satisfied by (N,+,*) which are unprovable by those theories. There is no complete TOE for the standard additive and multiplicative behavior of the natural numbers. But there is nothing wrong asserting that a theorem of PA is true (always with that meaning of being statisfied in (N,+,*)), because nobody (serious) doubt the axioms of PA, or doubt truth couldn't be preserved by the modus ponens inference rule or by the quantifier rules (and thus nobody doubts in the theorems proved by PA). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le 18-août-06, à 17:02, 1Z a écrit : It is for Pythagorenas and Platonists to explain what they mean by exist. However, if you are going to claim that we are actually *in* Platonia, (mathematical monism) there must be some equivalence between the existence we have and the existence numbers have. Of course! But that is what I am currently explaining. If you have follow the UDA, then, even if you could not yet be completely convinced by each steps, you should at least be able to figure out in which sense you, here and now, in the shape of an OM, to borrow the list vocabulary, exist as a relative number. Third personally you exist in aleph-zero relative number form (like snapshots of a running program). First personally you exist in the same shape (although you cannot know that) but you are multiplied by a continuum: the computational histories generated by the UD, in the mathematical sense, going through those third person states. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le 18-août-06, à 17:38, 1Z a écrit : That is an explanation of mind-independence, not of existence. The anti-Platonist (e.g. the formalist) can claim that the truth of mathematical statments is mind-independent, but their existence isn't. Their existence ? Mathematical statements needs chatty machines. Mathematical truth, a priori doesn't (although free structures can feature some chatty aspects many times). Let us make the following convention. When I will say I believe there exist a perfect number, it is a shorter expression for, I believe the proposition There is a perfect number is true (satisfied in (N,+,*)) independently of me, or of any theory of cognition. (A good thing, giving that a theory of cognition is build *from* digital machine, that is from number theoretical relations). Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 18-août-06, à 17:38, 1Z a écrit : That is an explanation of mind-independence, not of existence. The anti-Platonist (e.g. the formalist) can claim that the truth of mathematical statments is mind-independent, but their existence isn't. Their existence ? Mathematical statements needs chatty machines. Mathematics proceded for centuries without any machines at all. Mathematical truth, a priori doesn't (although free structures can feature some chatty aspects many times). Let us make the following convention. When I will say I believe there exist a perfect number, it is a shorter expression for, I believe the proposition There is a perfect number is true (satisfied in (N,+,*)) independently of me, or of any theory of cognition. (A good thing, giving that a theory of cognition is build *from* digital machine, that is from number theoretical relations). If AR makes no existential commitments, it cannot lead to the existential conclusion that there is no such thing as matter. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 18-août-06, à 17:02, 1Z a écrit : It is for Pythagorenas and Platonists to explain what they mean by exist. However, if you are going to claim that we are actually *in* Platonia, (mathematical monism) there must be some equivalence between the existence we have and the existence numbers have. Of course! But that is what I am currently explaining. If you have follow the UDA, then, even if you could not yet be completely convinced by each steps, you should at least be able to figure out in which sense you, here and now, in the shape of an OM, to borrow the list vocabulary, exist as a relative number. I cna't be persuaded of that without first being persuaded that numbers exist. Third personally you exist in aleph-zero relative number form (like snapshots of a running program). First personally you exist in the same shape (although you cannot know that) but you are multiplied by a continuum: the computational histories generated by the UD, in the mathematical sense, going through those third person states. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur, I've explained that several times: computer programmes contain if-then statements. other than that otherwise any physical system could be seen as implementing any computation, which does not seem to me a good reason. In any case, Maudlin shows that the requirement for handling counterfactuals leads to a situation where of two systems with identical physical activity, one is conscious and the other not. If two systems differ counterfactually, they are not physically identical. What about an inputless computer program, running deterministically like a recording. Would that count as a program at all, It would be a trivial case. and could it be a conscious program, given that computationalism is true? Obviously not, since people have inputs. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Is it possible that we are currently actors in a single, deterministic, non-branching computer program, with the illusion of free will and if-then contingency in general being due to the fact that we don't know the details of how the program will play out? Lots of things are possible. The question is what to believe. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Günther writes: Well, let's see: in Alice in Wonderland, Humpty Dumpty fell off a wall. This is true, isn't it? It is certainly true independent of our minds. Indeed, it is true in such a way that even when all humans have died, this universe will have a contained a life-form which produced an author who wrote a book in which Humpty Dumpty fell off a wall. But neither Humpty Dumpty nor the fact that he fell off a wall were ever true in this universe - only that this story was written, and that many people read about it and could converse about it. So if you believe that numbers have an independent existence, then you would definitely also have to believe that Humpty Dumpty exists. Both are products of the mind. Either both exist, or both don't (other than as brain patterns). As much as I would like Humpty Dumpty to exist, I'm afraid that it is not so. The existence of numbers is not like the existence of objects, and I don't think that most mathematical Platonists would say that it is. Most Platonists ar not Mathematical Monists. M-Monists *do* have to think it is the same. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le 18-août-06, à 22:59, complexitystudies a écrit : As 1Z has so nicely put, existence implies causal interaction. Numbers cannot causally interact, therefore they do not exist, save as thoughts in our brains. Don(t say this to a logician. there are as many notion of causality than there are modal logics. (But I guess you assume a physical world and define causal by some interaction). I don't need that. I need only math causality, like if p divide 8 then p divides 24. Of course I do not believe that 37 could be a non prime number, simply because what it means to be prime has been exactly defined in arithmetic. You reassure me. I just say that these are thought constructs with no independent existence (independent of human brains, not of a concrete human brain). You might say, that 37 was prime even in the Jurassic, but I say: nobody had invented arithmetic yet, so it's about as true as the fact that James Bond was played by Sean Connery was in the Jurassic. I define a system: 1 + 1 = 2 2 + 1 = 1 1 + 2 = 1 That's all. Okay, it doesn't describe much and probably isn't very useful, but other than that it is not inferior to peano arithmetic. Does my system now exist mind-independtly for all eternity? Yes, and even Robinson Arithmetic can prove that. It exists because among all fortran programs there exist an infinity of programs which compute your table. (it is a Wi or a Fi) Of course existing does not mean interesting. Some numbers could be (relatively) boring, but that is hardly provably so in general. I have not yet seen a book on human brain which does not presuppose the understanding of the natural numbers. Of course, because it is a useful way to describe reality. But in our brains, not numbers operate, but chemicals. I agree. The question here is what are eventually the chemicals. Comp answers: it is necessarily an average of point of views on an infinity of possible computational continuations. Put in that way, it even looks like some formulation of QM. The details are tricky of course (both with comp and with the QM only). snip I let you discover that, and feel free to ask questions if you have a problem with UDA. Thank you, I will. It is really the point of the UDA. It shows that computationalism (the idea that I am a digitalizable machine) is incompatible with weak materialism (the idea that there is a primary stuff or matter or aristotelian substances). Ok, I'll watch for this in UDA. But until now, comp leads only to weirdness, not contradiction. And then that weirdness seems to explain the quantum weirdness ... Intuitively and qualitatively (already by UDA), and then technically through the interview of some universal turing machine. But wouldn't this universal turing machine need to be composed of matter, and then the whole caboodle starts from the beginning? No. The additive+multiplicative structure of the non negative integers (what logician called the natural numbers) is already a video-game rich enough to generate coherent and sharable set of computational first person plural histories. That *is* the point. Don't take this for granted at all. UDA explain why. The lobian interview explain how. The question is not does Humty-Dumpty exist? The question is does not comp entails too much probable Humpty-Dumpty in my neighborhood and how to test that. The question is does comp entails *more*, or *less* white rabbits than QM already predicts apparently with some accuracy. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): What about an inputless computer program, running deterministically like a recording. Would that count as a program at all, It would be a trivial case. Trivial does not mean false. and could it be a conscious program, given that computationalism is true? Obviously not, since people have inputs. There are several possible responses to that. Firstly, it isn't necessarily true that only people can be conscious, even if people (and maybe some animals) are the only entities we have good reason to believe are conscious. Secondly, there is always the possibility that an inputless, deterministic machine might be able to receive input. We might open the case, connect a lead with alligator clips, and start communicating with it in morse code. To the program, it would be like a message from God. You would then have to decide at which point the program became conscious: when the case was opened, when the message was sent, or was it conscious all along? If you say it was not conscious until the message was actually sent you would have to say that an entity was only conscious while receiving input, and stopped being conscious while it was analysing the input already received. Finally, it is possible to have the same kind of interaction that a machine with environmental inputs has by connecting two previously inputless machines to each other. They can then have a two way conversation, each surprised by the other's responses, but the system as a whole remains inputless and deterministic. The ultimate example of this is, as Brent Meeker suggested, a self-contained virtual reality. The universe as a whole could be seen as just this, unless you believe that God speaks to us from outside. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Peter Jones writes: Is it possible that we are currently actors in a single, deterministic, non-branching computer program, with the illusion of free will and if-then contingency in general being due to the fact that we don't know the details of how the program will play out? Lots of things are possible. The question is what to believe. True, but I thought you were saying that such a thing was incompatible with consciousness, and I see no reason to believe that. You could replace computer program with machine and have a description of the universe. Actually, you could leave out non-branching as well: the MWI is branching but deterministic, and still leaves room for first person indeterminacy. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal): Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just the belief that the propositions of elementary arithmetic are independent of you. Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical structures *exist* independently of you, not just that they are true independently of you. What's the difference? Things that exist are available for causal interaction. Numbers aren't. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Hi, Le vendredi 18 août 2006 11:52, 1Z a écrit : Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal): Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just the belief that the propositions of elementary arithmetic are independent of you. Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical structures *exist* independently of you, not just that they are true independently of you. What's the difference? Things that exist are available for causal interaction. Numbers aren't. You were defining arithmetical platonism and now you define existing. Your two comments are contradictory. Because following your description of existing, mathematical structure are not available for causal interaction (like numbers... ) If you think you're not contradicting yourself, could you explain more in detail what you mean. Regards, Quentin Anciaux --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Brent Meeker writes (quoting Peter Jones and SP): Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical structures *exist* independently of you, not just that they are true independently of you. What's the difference? Stathis Papaioannou You could regard the theorems of arithmetic as just being relative to Peano's axioms: 1+1=2 assuming Peano Somewhat as Bruno presents his theorems as relative to the axiom of COMP. Brent Meeker Even if you say that, there is still a sense in which arithmetic is independent of the real world. The same can be said of Euclidian geometry: it follows from Euclid's axioms *despite* the fact that real space is not Euclidian. The fact that real space is not Euclidian means that Euclidian geometry does not describe the real world, not that it is false or non-existent. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: A claim about truth as opposed to existence cannot support the conclusion that matter does not actually exist. It can if you can show that the mental does not supervene on the physical. I don't see how that is connected, and I don't want to claim that the mental does not supervene on the physical. This is far from a generally accepted fact, but there but I am not yet aware of convincing arguments against the sort of challenge posed to the supervenience theory by eg. Tim Maudlin - unless you reject computationalism. Materialism/physicalism is better supported than computationalism. Maudlin's arguments rest on the idea that physicalists must ignore counterfactuals. That assumption can easilly be abandoned. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, Le vendredi 18 août 2006 11:52, 1Z a écrit : Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal): Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just the belief that the propositions of elementary arithmetic are independent of you. Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical structures *exist* independently of you, not just that they are true independently of you. What's the difference? Things that exist are available for causal interaction. Numbers aren't. You were defining arithmetical platonism and now you define existing. Your two comments are contradictory. Not even remotely. I fact, what I have said can be written as two valid syllogisms. Existence is availability for causal interaction Numbers are not available for causal interaction Numbers do not exist Platonism is the claim that numbers exist Numbers do not exist Platonism is false --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Peter Jones writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal): Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just the belief that the propositions of elementary arithmetic are independent of you. Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical structures *exist* independently of you, not just that they are true independently of you. What's the difference? Things that exist are available for causal interaction. Numbers aren't. What could it possibly mean for numbers to exist in the sense you claim they do not? Could I be mugged by a burly number 6 in a dark alley? I don't think that even number-worshipping Pythagoras would have entertained such a notion. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Peter Jones writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: A claim about truth as opposed to existence cannot support the conclusion that matter does not actually exist. It can if you can show that the mental does not supervene on the physical. I don't see how that is connected, If you can conceptualise of a virtual reality generated by a computation or a mind, and that computation or mind does not require physical hardware on which to run, then it is possible (Bruno argues, necessary) that our reality is a virtual reality without any underlying real world. and I don't want to claim that the mental does not supervene on the physical. I didn't think you would. This is far from a generally accepted fact, but I am not yet aware of convincing arguments against the sort of challenge posed to the supervenience theory by eg. Tim Maudlin - unless you reject computationalism. Materialism/physicalism is better supported than computationalism. Maybe, but mind would be something very mysterious if it isn't computation, and mysteriouness goes against the grain for physicalists. Maudlin's arguments rest on the idea that physicalists must ignore counterfactuals. That assumption can easilly be abandoned. I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur, other than that otherwise any physical system could be seen as implementing any computation, which does not seem to me a good reason. In any case, Maudlin shows that the requirement for handling counterfactuals leads to a situation where of two systems with identical physical activity, one is conscious and the other not. If anyone should find such an idea unpalatable it should be the physicalists. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le Vendredi 18 Août 2006 14:21, 1Z a écrit : Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, Le vendredi 18 août 2006 11:52, 1Z a écrit : Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal): Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just the belief that the propositions of elementary arithmetic are independent of you. Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical structures *exist* independently of you, not just that they are true independently of you. What's the difference? Things that exist are available for causal interaction. Numbers aren't. You were defining arithmetical platonism and now you define existing. Your two comments are contradictory. Not even remotely. I fact, what I have said can be written as two valid syllogisms. Yes you were... You were denying the definition of Bruno (arithmetical realism) by giving yours... then Bruno and Stathis ask for the difference between yours and their definition... Which you respond with a contradiction to say platonism is false... then either you were effectively contradicting yourself or you did not answer Stathis and Bruno question (it's one or the other). Existence is availability for causal interaction Numbers are not available for causal interaction Numbers do not exist That's your definition of existence... this is your claim. Now a definition game will not resolve this problem obviously. Platonism is the claim that numbers exist Numbers do not exist Platonism is false Platonism does not claim number exist by your definition of existence hence your conclusion is ill based. Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: What's the difference? Things that exist are available for causal interaction. Numbers aren't. What could it possibly mean for numbers to exist in the sense you claim they do not? Could I be mugged by a burly number 6 in a dark alley? I don't think that even number-worshipping Pythagoras would have entertained such a notion. It is for Pythagorenas and Platonists to explain what they mean by exist. However, if you are going to claim that we are actually *in* Platonia, (mathematical monism) there must be some equivalence between the existence we have and the existence numbers have. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: A claim about truth as opposed to existence cannot support the conclusion that matter does not actually exist. It can if you can show that the mental does not supervene on the physical. I don't see how that is connected, If you can conceptualise of a virtual reality generated by a computation or a mind, and that computation or mind does not require physical hardware on which to run, then it is possible (Bruno argues, necessary) that our reality is a virtual reality without any underlying real world. A virtual reality that is being generated is an existing (in some sense) virtual reality that is being really (in some sense) generated. A computation that does not require physical hardware is either non-existent simpliciter (in which case we are simply not such a computation, since nothing existing is identical to anythig non-existing) or it exists Platonically (non-physically, in some sense), A valid argument cannot, in genral, come to a conlusion that is not already implcit in its premises. Either existence is implict in the virtual reality premiss, or it isn't. If it is, a Platonic quesiton is being begged. If it isn't, the existential conclusion is invalid. and I don't want to claim that the mental does not supervene on the physical. I didn't think you would. This is far from a generally accepted fact, but I am not yet aware of convincing arguments against the sort of challenge posed to the supervenience theory by eg. Tim Maudlin - unless you reject computationalism. Materialism/physicalism is better supported than computationalism. Maybe, but mind would be something very mysterious if it isn't computation, Most things aren't computation. Most things also aren't mysterious. and mysteriouness goes against the grain for physicalists. Maudlin's arguments rest on the idea that physicalists must ignore counterfactuals. That assumption can easilly be abandoned. I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur, I've explained that several times: computer programmes contain if-then statements. other than that otherwise any physical system could be seen as implementing any computation, which does not seem to me a good reason. In any case, Maudlin shows that the requirement for handling counterfactuals leads to a situation where of two systems with identical physical activity, one is conscious and the other not. If two systems differ counterfactually, they are not physically identical. If anyone should find such an idea unpalatable it should be the physicalists. So I am told, but I remain unconvinced. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le Vendredi 18 Août 2006 17:02, 1Z a écrit : Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: What's the difference? Things that exist are available for causal interaction. Numbers aren't. What could it possibly mean for numbers to exist in the sense you claim they do not? Could I be mugged by a burly number 6 in a dark alley? I don't think that even number-worshipping Pythagoras would have entertained such a notion. It is for Pythagorenas and Platonists to explain what they mean by exist. I think it has been said several times : The existence of a number/arithmetical proposition is the fact that its existence/truth does not depend on the fact that you exist/that it exists conscious beings capable of thinking of it. So the truth value of a proposition is independant of me. Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Quentin Anciaux wrote: Le Vendredi 18 Août 2006 17:02, 1Z a écrit : Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes: What's the difference? Things that exist are available for causal interaction. Numbers aren't. What could it possibly mean for numbers to exist in the sense you claim they do not? Could I be mugged by a burly number 6 in a dark alley? I don't think that even number-worshipping Pythagoras would have entertained such a notion. It is for Pythagorenas and Platonists to explain what they mean by exist. I think it has been said several times : The existence of a number/arithmetical proposition is the fact that its existence/truth does not depend on the fact that you exist/that it exists conscious beings capable of thinking of it. That is an explanation of mind-independence, not of existence. The anti-Platonist (e.g. the formalist) can claim that the truth of mathematical statments is mind-independent, but their existence isn't. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Quentin Anciaux wrote: Le Vendredi 18 Août 2006 14:21, 1Z a écrit : Quentin Anciaux wrote: Hi, Le vendredi 18 août 2006 11:52, 1Z a écrit : Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal): Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just the belief that the propositions of elementary arithmetic are independent of you. Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical structures *exist* independently of you, not just that they are true independently of you. What's the difference? Things that exist are available for causal interaction. Numbers aren't. You were defining arithmetical platonism and now you define existing. Your two comments are contradictory. Not even remotely. I fact, what I have said can be written as two valid syllogisms. Yes you were... You were denying the definition of Bruno (arithmetical realism) by giving yours Firstly, that isn't *self* contradiciton. Secondly, Bruno's approach is ambiguous. (If he clearly states that AR is only about truth and not about existence, he can't claim that matter doesn't exist if COMP is true, because matter doesn't exist is an existential statement and COMP (absent Platonism) isn't. If he clearly states AR ia about existence, he can no longer claim that COMP is his only premiss). ... then Bruno and Stathis ask for the difference between yours and their definition. Defintion of what ? Existence ? Yes, I do have a different definition. .. Which you respond with a contradiction to say platonism is false... Platonism *is* false using my definitions. They must be using a different defintion. That still doesn't mean I am contradicting *myself*. I may be comtradicting other peopel: well, people are allowed to contradict each other. then either you were effectively contradicting yourself or you did not answer Stathis and Bruno question (it's one or the other). Existence is availability for causal interaction Numbers are not available for causal interaction Numbers do not exist That's your definition of existence... this is your claim. Now a definition game will not resolve this problem obviously. Then the problem cannot be solved at all, since there is no other way of solving abstract problems. (All mathematical problems are solved using definitions!) Why, BTW, do you assume there is no way of arriving at the correct definition ? Isn't that what dictionaries are for. Platonism is the claim that numbers exist Numbers do not exist Platonism is false Platonism does not claim number exist by your definition of existence hence your conclusion is ill based. It isn't false if my definition of existence is the only defintion. The ball is in the Platonists' court: they need to come up with another definition of existence. However, they presumably don't have one, or they would not be asking me what existence means. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Brent Meeker writes (quoting Peter Jones and SP): Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical structures *exist* independently of you, not just that they are true independently of you. What's the difference? Stathis Papaioannou You could regard the theorems of arithmetic as just being relative to Peano's axioms: 1+1=2 assuming Peano Somewhat as Bruno presents his theorems as relative to the axiom of COMP. Brent Meeker Even if you say that, there is still a sense in which arithmetic is independent of the real world. The same can be said of Euclidian geometry: it follows from Euclid's axioms *despite* the fact that real space is not Euclidian. The fact that real space is not Euclidian means that Euclidian geometry does not describe the real world, not that it is false or non-existent. Stathis Papaioannou But the fact that a theorem is true relative to some axioms doesn't make it true or existent. Some mathematicians I know regard it as a game. Is true that a bishop can only move diagonally? It is relative to chess. Does chess exist? It does in our heads. But without us it wouldn't. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
1Z wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: ... I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur, I've explained that several times: computer programmes contain if-then statements. other than that otherwise any physical system could be seen as implementing any computation, which does not seem to me a good reason. In any case, Maudlin shows that the requirement for handling counterfactuals leads to a situation where of two systems with identical physical activity, one is conscious and the other not. If two systems differ counterfactually, they are not physically identical. I don't think I understand this either. Computer programs contain if-then statements which branch the process depending on the data input to the program. But there is no real distinction between data an program. So if you insist that computed intelligence or consciousness depends on counterfactuals in the program that seems to me to be the same as insisting that the computation is implemented in some way that divides it from input data, i.e. it is in an environment. I'm sympathetic to this view. I think intelligence is relative to an environment. But I'm not sure what computationalists think of this; I believe they suppose the environment can be simulated too and so then the whole thing is a closed system and there are no conuterfactual branchings. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Brent Meeker wrote: But the fact that a theorem is true relative to some axioms doesn't make it true or existent. It doesn't make it *false* relative to those axioms. It has to be estbalished that a mathematical statement needs to or can aspire to further kinds of truth, --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Brent Meeker wrote: 1Z wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: ... I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur, I've explained that several times: computer programmes contain if-then statements. other than that otherwise any physical system could be seen as implementing any computation, which does not seem to me a good reason. In any case, Maudlin shows that the requirement for handling counterfactuals leads to a situation where of two systems with identical physical activity, one is conscious and the other not. If two systems differ counterfactually, they are not physically identical. I don't think I understand this either. Either that, or counterfactuallity is asupernatural phenomenon. Computer programs contain if-then statements which branch the process depending on the data input to the program. But there is no real distinction between data an program. There is a difference between data and process --i.e. running programme. Standard computationalism says mentation (as an activity) is computation (as a process). It is a rare computationalist who think that a spool of tape gathering dust in a cupboardi is mentating. (Not much of a Yes Doctor). So if you insist that computed intelligence or consciousness depends on counterfactuals in the program that seems to me to be the same as insisting that the computation is implemented in some way that divides it from input data, i.e. it is in an environment. Well, it is divided -- by the programme/process distinction. I'm sympathetic to this view. I think intelligence is relative to an environment. But I'm not sure what computationalists think of this; I believe they suppose the environment can be simulated too and so then the whole thing is a closed system and there are no conuterfactual branchings. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
1Z wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: 1Z wrote: ... If two systems differ counterfactually, they are not physically identical. I don't think I understand this either. Either that, or counterfactuallity is asupernatural phenomenon. Computer programs contain if-then statements which branch the process depending on the data input to the program. But there is no real distinction between data an program. There is a difference between data and process --i.e. running programme. I don't disagree, but I don't see what that has to do with programs having if-thens. Given the program and the data, the process is only going down one branch. So when you talk about counterfactuals it must be because you are considering other possible data as input. Standard computationalism says mentation (as an activity) is computation (as a process). It is a rare computationalist who think that a spool of tape gathering dust in a cupboardi is mentating. (Not much of a Yes Doctor). So if you insist that computed intelligence or consciousness depends on counterfactuals in the program that seems to me to be the same as insisting that the computation is implemented in some way that divides it from input data, i.e. it is in an environment. Well, it is divided -- by the programme/process distinction. That's the (program+data)/process distinction. But ISTM that without a program/data distinction, counterfactuals are a distinction without a difference. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
I think it has been said several times : The existence of a number/arithmetical proposition is the fact that its existence/truth does not depend on the fact that you exist/that it exists conscious beings capable of thinking of it. So the truth value of a proposition is independant of me. Well, let's see: in Alice in Wonderland, Humpty Dumpty fell off a wall. This is true, isn't it? It is certainly true independent of our minds. Indeed, it is true in such a way that even when all humans have died, this universe will have a contained a life-form which produced an author who wrote a book in which Humpty Dumpty fell off a wall. But neither Humpty Dumpty nor the fact that he fell off a wall were ever true in this universe - only that this story was written, and that many people read about it and could converse about it. So if you believe that numbers have an independent existence, then you would definitely also have to believe that Humpty Dumpty exists. Both are products of the mind. Either both exist, or both don't (other than as brain patterns). As much as I would like Humpty Dumpty to exist, I'm afraid that it is not so. Regards, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
1Z wrote: Not even remotely. I fact, what I have said can be written as two valid syllogisms. Existence is availability for causal interaction Numbers are not available for causal interaction Numbers do not exist Platonism is the claim that numbers exist Numbers do not exist Platonism is false Wonderful! --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Brent Meeker wrote: 1Z wrote: Brent Meeker wrote: 1Z wrote: ... If two systems differ counterfactually, they are not physically identical. I don't think I understand this either. Either that, or counterfactuallity is asupernatural phenomenon. Computer programs contain if-then statements which branch the process depending on the data input to the program. But there is no real distinction between data an program. There is a difference between data and process --i.e. running programme. I don't disagree, but I don't see what that has to do with programs having if-thens. Given the program and the data, the process is only going down one branch. But that's not what makes it computation. What makes it computation is behaving differently for different data. So when you talk about counterfactuals it must be because you are considering other possible data as input. Standard computationalism says mentation (as an activity) is computation (as a process). It is a rare computationalist who think that a spool of tape gathering dust in a cupboardi is mentating. (Not much of a Yes Doctor). So if you insist that computed intelligence or consciousness depends on counterfactuals in the program that seems to me to be the same as insisting that the computation is implemented in some way that divides it from input data, i.e. it is in an environment. Well, it is divided -- by the programme/process distinction. That's the (program+data)/process distinction. But ISTM that without a program/data distinction, counterfactuals are a distinction without a difference. I am saying there is a programme/data distinction, which rests on the programme/process distinction. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Hi, Le Vendredi 18 Août 2006 22:17, complexitystudies a écrit : I think it has been said several times : The existence of a number/arithmetical proposition is the fact that its existence/truth does not depend on the fact that you exist/that it exists conscious beings capable of thinking of it. So the truth value of a proposition is independant of me. Well, let's see: in Alice in Wonderland, Humpty Dumpty fell off a wall. This is true, isn't it? It is certainly true independent of our minds. Indeed, it is true in such a way that even when all humans have died, this universe will have a contained a life-form which produced an author who wrote a book in which Humpty Dumpty fell off a wall. But neither Humpty Dumpty nor the fact that he fell off a wall were ever true in this universe - only that this story was written, and that many people read about it and could converse about it. So if you believe that numbers have an independent existence, then you would definitely also have to believe that Humpty Dumpty exists. Both are products of the mind. Either both exist, or both don't (other than as brain patterns). Well, if computationalism is true, then there exists observer moment of an I (not talking about me here ;) who is Humpty Dumpty, so there is an universe where Humpty Dumpty exists in the same sense I exist. The fact that in our universe Humpty Dumpty only exist in a story does not tell anything about a real Humpty Dumpty living in (at least) one (but in fact an infinity) of the computed universe by for example the UD (Universal Dovetailer). You must at least accept multiple world, ie a multiverse. This multiverse should also be fairly large (the UD trace is very very large ;). Now I think UD could be false if it is impossible to have a real turing machine (no memory bound, no time bound), because if it is possible then the majority of OM will be computed by the UD, so the probability of your current OM being computed on a physical computer is zero. UD could also be false if we are not turing emulable... ie consciousness is not a computation process... but physicalism doesn't tell what it is then. Regards, Quentin --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 17-août-06, à 00:14, complexitystudies a écrit : I recall it is just the belief that the propositions of elementary arithmetic are independent of you. Do you sincerley belief that 37 could be a non prime number? Or that the square root of 2 can equal to a ratio of two integers? Or that if you run a program fortran it could neither stop nor not stop? (When all the default assumption are on, to evacuate contingent stopping of a machine implemented in some deep story)? As 1Z has so nicely put, existence implies causal interaction. Numbers cannot causally interact, therefore they do not exist, save as thoughts in our brains. Of course I do not believe that 37 could be a non prime number, simply because what it means to be prime has been exactly defined in arithmetic. I just say that these are thought constructs with no independent existence (independent of human brains, not of a concrete human brain). You might say, that 37 was prime even in the Jurassic, but I say: nobody had invented arithmetic yet, so it's about as true as the fact that James Bond was played by Sean Connery was in the Jurassic. I define a system: 1 + 1 = 2 2 + 1 = 1 1 + 2 = 1 That's all. Okay, it doesn't describe much and probably isn't very useful, but other than that it is not inferior to peano arithmetic. Does my system now exist mind-independtly for all eternity? I have not yet seen a book on human brain which does not presuppose the understanding of the natural numbers. Of course, because it is a useful way to describe reality. But in our brains, not numbers operate, but chemicals. Numbers are not symbol. Symbols can be used to talk about numbers, but they should not be confused with numbers. You are right there of course. Symbols are only referents. What counts is meaning. What I meant to say is that the meanings we assign to number symbols exist only in our minds. Indeed, meaning _is_ only created by interactions between an agent and an environment. With both of these, no meaning. Indeed, in an mind-and-matter independent (=non existing )universe, arithmetic would be about as meaningless as it gets. The notion of same number seems to have occur much before we discovered counting. Farmers have most probably learn to compare the size of the herds of sheep without counting, just by associating each sheep from one herd to the another. But this as nothing to do with the fact that sheeps were countable before humans learn to count it. Humans and brains learn to count countable things because they are countable. Not exactly. Animals and babies can distinguish up to 2-3 objects (innate arithmetic, subitizing). The experiments with which this has been ascertained are both fascinating and entertaining (google is your friend ;-) This ability has an evolutionary advantage: it is necessary for higher organisms to distinguish more or less abundant food sources or numbers of predators. But this meaning this countability, arises out of the physical world, and is not independent of it. I think you are confusing the subject or object of math, and the human mathematical theories, which are just lantern putting a tiny light on the subject. Indeed I am not. I am just saying that there is no independent subject of math outside of human brains. Mathematics is the study of rules we make up (axioms) and what follows of them (theorems). If we pick our axioms wisely, we can even model some aspects of the real, physical world with it. If numbers and their math was really invented, why should mathematicians hide some results, like Pythagoras with the irrationality of the square root of two, ... As David Deutsch says: math kicks back. That is very easy: the Pythagoreans assumed axioms, and thought they knew what would follow from them. Then, to their dismay, they found out that also somewhat else followed from the axioms than they had ideally envisioned, something that displeased their aesthetic sense. Only human factors involved here, no independent existence of math. It just shows how limited our thought is, and that we do not even anticipate theorems that follow from our axioms when they are rather simple. Also, concepts like infinity are most definitely not universal concepts out there, but products of our mind. I doubt any mind could ever produce infinity. But indeed, _only_ minds produce them, because, as you say, infinity is a concept, and concepts exist only in minds. In reality, there is no such thing as infinity. Even if space would expand infinitely, this infinity would not exist as a thing (except in the trivial *lol* sense as the universe exists), but would be a concept for us humans to talk about it. Concepts need not be precisely understood as to be concepts. For example, consciousness is definitely not understood, but talked about a lot. How does the human mind create the concept of infinity: Lakoff and Nunez have a nice metaphor: Humans see
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
complexitystudies wrote: ... Not exactly. Animals and babies can distinguish up to 2-3 objects (innate arithmetic, subitizing). The experiments with which this has been ascertained are both fascinating and entertaining (google is your friend ;-) This ability has an evolutionary advantage: it is necessary for higher organisms to distinguish more or less abundant food sources or numbers of predators. But this meaning this countability, arises out of the physical world, and is not independent of it. The experiment I recall from the '50s was with crows. If men went into a blind in the middle of a corn field where crows were feeding the crows would fly up into the surrounding trees. Then the men would leave one or two at a time. If the number were five or fewer the crows would know when the last one had left and immediately come back to feed. With six they were sometimes wrong. With seven or more they would wait and then return cautiously a few at a time. Of course they probably weren't counting, mapping cardinality to sequence, but they had the concept of number. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
complexitystudies wrote: I think it has been said several times : The existence of a number/arithmetical proposition is the fact that its existence/truth does not depend on the fact that you exist/that it exists conscious beings capable of thinking of it. So the truth value of a proposition is independant of me. Well, let's see: in Alice in Wonderland, Humpty Dumpty fell off a wall. This is true, isn't it? It is certainly true independent of our minds. Indeed, it is true in such a way that even when all humans have died, this universe will have a contained a life-form which produced an author who wrote a book in which Humpty Dumpty fell off a wall. But neither Humpty Dumpty nor the fact that he fell off a wall were ever true in this universe - only that this story was written, and that many people read about it and could converse about it. So if you believe that numbers have an independent existence, then you would definitely also have to believe that Humpty Dumpty exists. Both are products of the mind. Either both exist, or both don't (other than as brain patterns). As much as I would like Humpty Dumpty to exist, I'm afraid that it is not so. Regards, Günther I agree. But truth need not imply existence. That's the idea of free logic (i.e. free of existential suppositions). So one can say Shelock Holmes lived on Baker Street. is true and Sherlock Holmes drove a car. is false. But then some statments, such as Sherlock Holmes had a mole on his left side. are neither true nor false. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
1Z wrote: Not even remotely. I fact, what I have said can be written as two valid syllogisms. Existence is availability for causal interaction Numbers are not available for causal interaction Numbers do not exist Platonism is the claim that numbers exist Numbers do not exist Platonism is false Wonderful! What about real-world 'existent' causal interaction that _causally_ behaves 'as-if' a platonic 'quantity' exists to interact with? Same for the non-existant platonic object RED. Same for the non-existant platonic object ORGASM. What is the existence status of the causality thus instantiated? What aspect of the platonic object map to the subsequent causally existent of the interaction? If it 'like something' to be an 'existent' causal interaction, ever(and it most certainly can be in brain material) then what would it be 'like' to be a virtual interaction with a platonic object? They may not exist, but they may be 'examinable'. Indeed... I'd say it could 'be like' QUANTITYness, REDness and ORGASMness... to some extent, anyway. If you insist that everything is shoved into 'realism' or 'platonism', just because we have the words...you miss entirely a wonderful intermediate class of existence. Colin Hales (where's my 'Law of Science' post gone?) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur, I've explained that several times: computer programmes contain if-then statements. other than that otherwise any physical system could be seen as implementing any computation, which does not seem to me a good reason. In any case, Maudlin shows that the requirement for handling counterfactuals leads to a situation where of two systems with identical physical activity, one is conscious and the other not. If two systems differ counterfactually, they are not physically identical. What about an inputless computer program, running deterministically like a recording. Would that count as a program at all, and could it be a conscious program, given that computationalism is true? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Brent Meeker writes: Even if you say that, there is still a sense in which arithmetic is independent of the real world. The same can be said of Euclidian geometry: it follows from Euclid's axioms *despite* the fact that real space is not Euclidian. The fact that real space is not Euclidian means that Euclidian geometry does not describe the real world, not that it is false or non-existent. Stathis Papaioannou But the fact that a theorem is true relative to some axioms doesn't make it true or existent. Some mathematicians I know regard it as a game. Is true that a bishop can only move diagonally? It is relative to chess. Does chess exist? It does in our heads. But without us it wouldn't. What more could we possibly ask of a theorem other than that it be true relative to some axioms? That a theorem should describe some aspect of the real world, or that it should be discovered by some mathematician, is contingent on the nature of the real world, but that it is true is not. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Brent Meeker writes: 1Z wrote: Stathis Papaioannou wrote: ... I've never really understood why computationalists insist that a system must be able to handle counterfactuals in order for consciousness to occur, I've explained that several times: computer programmes contain if-then statements. other than that otherwise any physical system could be seen as implementing any computation, which does not seem to me a good reason. In any case, Maudlin shows that the requirement for handling counterfactuals leads to a situation where of two systems with identical physical activity, one is conscious and the other not. If two systems differ counterfactually, they are not physically identical. I don't think I understand this either. Computer programs contain if-then statements which branch the process depending on the data input to the program. But there is no real distinction between data an program. So if you insist that computed intelligence or consciousness depends on counterfactuals in the program that seems to me to be the same as insisting that the computation is implemented in some way that divides it from input data, i.e. it is in an environment. I'm sympathetic to this view. I think intelligence is relative to an environment. But I'm not sure what computationalists think of this; I believe they suppose the environment can be simulated too and so then the whole thing is a closed system and there are no conuterfactual branchings. Brent Meeker Is it possible that we are currently actors in a single, deterministic, non-branching computer program, with the illusion of free will and if-then contingency in general being due to the fact that we don't know the details of how the program will play out? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Günther writes: Well, let's see: in Alice in Wonderland, Humpty Dumpty fell off a wall. This is true, isn't it? It is certainly true independent of our minds. Indeed, it is true in such a way that even when all humans have died, this universe will have a contained a life-form which produced an author who wrote a book in which Humpty Dumpty fell off a wall. But neither Humpty Dumpty nor the fact that he fell off a wall were ever true in this universe - only that this story was written, and that many people read about it and could converse about it. So if you believe that numbers have an independent existence, then you would definitely also have to believe that Humpty Dumpty exists. Both are products of the mind. Either both exist, or both don't (other than as brain patterns). As much as I would like Humpty Dumpty to exist, I'm afraid that it is not so. The existence of numbers is not like the existence of objects, and I don't think that most mathematical Platonists would say that it is. It is indeed true independent of our minds that, if someone were to write a story in which Humpty Dumpty falls off the wall, then Humpty Dumpty would fall off the wall in that story. That is different to saying that Humpty Dumpty actually did fall off the wall in the real world, such as it is. It is also true that given the axioms of Euclidian geometry, the angles in a triangle add up to 180 degrees, and this is so independently of whether the angles of a triangle in the real world add up to 180 degrees, or whether Euclid ever lived. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Le 17-août-06, à 00:14, complexitystudies a écrit : Again we are discussing the arithmetical realism (which I just assume). A bold assumption, if I may say so. Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just the belief that the propositions of elementary arithmetic are independent of you. Do you sincerley belief that 37 could be a non prime number? Or that the square root of 2 can equal to a ratio of two integers? Or that if you run a program fortran it could neither stop nor not stop? (When all the default assumption are on, to evacuate contingent stopping of a machine implemented in some deep story)? But my exploration into cognitive neuroscience has exposed to me how mathematical thinking comes about, and that it is indeed not separable from our human brains. I have not yet seen a book on human brain which does not presuppose the understanding of the natural numbers. Note just for using the index, but in the neuronal explanation themselves, implicitly or explicitly. Eventually with comp the brain itself appears as a construct of the mind. The mathematical mind of the Lobian machines. Those are the self-referentially correct universal (sufficiently chatty) machines. Numbers are symbols we create in our minds to communicate with fellow individuals about things of importance to us. Numbers are not symbol. Symbols can be used to talk about numbers, but they should not be confused with numbers. To paraphrase Descartes very liberally: We group, therefore we can count. Our act of arbitrary grouping (made a bit less arbitrary by evolution, which makes us group things which are good to our survival, like gazelles and spears or berries) let's us count and communicate the number. The notion of same number seems to have occur much before we discovered counting. Farmers have most probably learn to compare the size of the herds of sheep without counting, just by associating each sheep from one herd to the another. But this as nothing to do with the fact that sheeps were countable before humans learn to count it. Humans and brains learn to count countable things because they are countable. I think you are confusing the subject or object of math, and the human mathematical theories, which are just lantern putting a tiny light on the subject. If numbers and their math was really invented, why should mathematicians hide some results, like Pythagoras with the irrationality of the square root of two, ... As David Deutsch says: math kicks back. For the universe one apple may not exist, because in effect there are only quarks interacting. And at this level indeterminacy strikes mercilessly, making it all but meaningless to count quarks. You will not find a book explaining that meaninglessness without taking for granted the idea of counting at the start. Also, concepts like infinity are most definitely not universal concepts out there, but products of our mind. I doubt any mind could ever produce infinity. Of course, symbolisms are arbitrary, but physical instantiation makes all the difference. (note that my goal consists in explaining physical instantiation without using physical things at all. My point is that if we postulate comp, then we have to do this). Note that if you understand the whole UDA, Unfortunately, not yet, but I'm reading! Ah, ok. UDA mainly shows that the mind-body problem is two times more difficult than most materialist are thinking. Indeed, with comp, matter can no more be explained by postulating a physical world. I let you discover that, and feel free to ask questions if you have a problem with UDA. you should realize that the price of assuming a physical universe (and wanting it to be related with our experiences *and* our experiments) is to postulate that you (and us, if you are not solipsistic) are not turing emulable. No problem. Why is that so? Could you clarify this issue? It is really the point of the UDA. It shows that computationalism (the idea that I am a digitalizable machine) is incompatible with weak materialism (the idea that there is a primary stuff or matter or aristotelian substances). Absolutely. But I think we have to start with our assumptions and try to scrutinize them very carefully. After all, we want to devote our minds to problems arising out of them during our lives, and thus the initial choice should not be made rashly, but only after careful review of our current body of knowledge. OK, but don't forget that here the idea is also to get some contradiction from hypotheses, so as to abandon them. But until now, comp leads only to weirdness, not contradiction. And then that weirdness seems to explain the quantum weirdness ... Intuitively and qualitatively (already by UDA), and then technically through the
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 17-août-06, à 00:14, complexitystudies a écrit : Again we are discussing the arithmetical realism (which I just assume). A bold assumption, if I may say so. Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just the belief that the propositions of elementary arithmetic are independent of you. Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical structures *exist* independently of you, not just that they are true independently of you. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Bruno Marchal wrote: Le 17-août-06, à 16:41, 1Z a écrit : Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical structures *exist* independently of you, not just that they are true independently of you. What is the difference between the proposition it exists a prime number is true independently of me, and the proposition it exists a prime number (independently of me)? The contextual meaning of exists. What is the difference between Sherlock Holmes lives at 221B Baker Street and Sherlock Holmes lives ? I can see a nuance, and that is why I prefer to use the expression Arithmetical Realism (AR) (and then I always define what I mean by that) instead of platonism (which I prefer to reserve when Plato is actually mentionned, like with the Theatetical definition of knowledge). A claim about truth as opposed to existence cannot support the conclusion that matter does not actually exist. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal): Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just the belief that the propositions of elementary arithmetic are independent of you. Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical structures *exist* independently of you, not just that they are true independently of you. What's the difference? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Peter Jones writes: A claim about truth as opposed to existence cannot support the conclusion that matter does not actually exist. It can if you can show that the mental does not supervene on the physical. This is far from a generally accepted fact, but there but I am not yet aware of convincing arguments against the sort of challenge posed to the supervenience theory by eg. Tim Maudlin - unless you reject computationalism. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Peter Jones writes (quoting Bruno Marchal): Frankly I don't think so. Set platonism can be considered as a bold assumption, but number platonism, as I said you need a sophisticated form of finitism to doubt it. I recall it is just the belief that the propositions of elementary arithmetic are independent of you. Arithemtical Platonism is the belief that mathematical structures *exist* independently of you, not just that they are true independently of you. What's the difference? Stathis Papaioannou You could regard the theorems of arithmetic as just being relative to Peano's axioms: 1+1=2 assuming Peano Somewhat as Bruno presents his theorems as relative to the axiom of COMP. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
Hi Bruno, Again we are discussing the arithmetical realism (which I just assume). A bold assumption, if I may say so. To be clear on that hypothesis, I do indeed find plausible that the number six is perfect, even in the case the branes would not have collide, no big bang, no physical universe. Six is perfect just because its divisors are 1, 2, and 3; and that 1+2+3 = 6. Not because I know that. I blieve the contrary: it is the independent truth of 6 = sum of its proper divisors than eventually I, and you, can learn it. I understand your argumentation well, because maybe one or two years ago I said nearly the same sentences to colleagues. But my exploration into cognitive neuroscience has exposed to me how mathematical thinking comes about, and that it is indeed not separable from our human brains. If you want, numbers are what makes any counting possible. Numbers are symbols we create in our minds to communicate with fellow individuals about things of importance to us. To paraphrase Descartes very liberally: We group, therefore we can count. Our act of arbitrary grouping (made a bit less arbitrary by evolution, which makes us group things which are good to our survival, like gazelles and spears or berries) let's us count and communicate the number. For the universe one apple may not exist, because in effect there are only quarks interacting. And at this level indeterminacy strikes mercilessly, making it all but meaningless to count quarks. Also, concepts like infinity are most definitely not universal concepts out there, but products of our mind. It is not because some country put salt on pancakes that pancakes do not exist there. Roman where writing 8 -3 for us 8 - 2. It is like saying 3*7 = 25 on planet TETRA. They mean 3*7 = 21, they just put it differently. Of course, symbolisms are arbitrary, but physical instantiation makes all the difference. No problem. I see you assume a physical universe. I don't. We havejust different theories. So, which experiment decides which is true? I think platonism derives it's power from misconceptions of the human mind. The unthinking stone would never construe such a thing as platonism. It would just exist - in a very real world ;-) Note that if you understand the whole UDA, Unfortunately, not yet, but I'm reading! you should realize that the price of assuming a physical universe (and wanting it to be related with our experiences *and* our experiments) is to postulate that you (and us, if you are not solipsistic) are not turing emulable. No problem. Why is that so? Could you clarify this issue? (I like to separate issues concerning the choice of theory, and issues concerning propositions made *in* a theory, or accepting that theory). Absolutely. But I think we have to start with our assumptions and try to scrutinize them very carefully. After all, we want to devote our minds to problems arising out of them during our lives, and thus the initial choice should not be made rashly, but only after careful review of our current body of knowledge. Best Regards, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Platonism vs Realism WAS: ROADMAP (well, not yet really...
complexitystudies wrote: Hi Bruno, Again we are discussing the arithmetical realism (which I just assume). A bold assumption, if I may say so. To be clear on that hypothesis, I do indeed find plausible that the number six is perfect, even in the case the branes would not have collide, no big bang, no physical universe. Six is perfect just because its divisors are 1, 2, and 3; and that 1+2+3 = 6. Not because I know that. I blieve the contrary: it is the independent truth of 6 = sum of its proper divisors than eventually I, and you, can learn it. I understand your argumentation well, because maybe one or two years ago I said nearly the same sentences to colleagues. But my exploration into cognitive neuroscience has exposed to me how mathematical thinking comes about, and that it is indeed not separable from our human brains. If you want, numbers are what makes any counting possible. Numbers are symbols we create in our minds to communicate with fellow individuals about things of importance to us. To paraphrase Descartes very liberally: We group, therefore we can count. Our act of arbitrary grouping (made a bit less arbitrary by evolution, which makes us group things which are good to our survival, like gazelles and spears or berries) let's us count and communicate the number. For the universe one apple may not exist, because in effect there are only quarks interacting. And at this level indeterminacy strikes mercilessly, making it all but meaningless to count quarks. Also, concepts like infinity are most definitely not universal concepts out there, but products of our mind. This sounds very much like my view of math. It is not because some country put salt on pancakes that pancakes do not exist there. Roman where writing 8 -3 for us 8 - 2. It is like saying 3*7 = 25 on planet TETRA. They mean 3*7 = 21, they just put it differently. Of course, symbolisms are arbitrary, but physical instantiation makes all the difference. No problem. I see you assume a physical universe. I don't. We havejust different theories. So, which experiment decides which is true? I think platonism derives it's power from misconceptions of the human mind. The unthinking stone would never construe such a thing as platonism. It would just exist - in a very real world ;-) Note that if you understand the whole UDA, Unfortunately, not yet, but I'm reading! The UDA is not precise enough for me, maybe because I'm a mathematician? I'm waiting for the interview, via the roadmap. you should realize that the price of assuming a physical universe (and wanting it to be related with our experiences *and* our experiments) is to postulate that you (and us, if you are not solipsistic) are not turing emulable. No problem. Why is that so? Could you clarify this issue? (I like to separate issues concerning the choice of theory, and issues concerning propositions made *in* a theory, or accepting that theory). Absolutely. But I think we have to start with our assumptions and try to scrutinize them very carefully. After all, we want to devote our minds to problems arising out of them during our lives, and thus the initial choice should not be made rashly, but only after careful review of our current body of knowledge. Best Regards, Günther --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
