RE: Rép : Thought Experiment #269-G (Duplicates)
Bruno writes > I asked you to predict your immediate first person experience, not a > bird's view of the situation. This explain why if I'm in good move you > just win nothing, and if I'm in bad mood you and all the Lees own me > five dollars! Of course, I predict that I'll have one 1st person experience at one location, and a different one at a different location. Instead of trying to trick me by doubling locations, just ask yourself the same questions beforehand by doubling times: "What do you expect, Bruno, to see?" when the situation is that every day at 9pm next week you will be shown a zero or a one. Well, you will naturally distinguish as to *when*, just as I am trying to distinguish as to *where*. But logically, you must admit that it is the same thing! > > When you then inform him that he has actually been copied and > > that there is another instance of him in the other room, then > > naturally he should say "Okay, here I am seeing a "0" and in > > the other room the opposite." > > Precisely: here I see without much doubt a 0, and I believe > intellectually, by trusting you, that another Lee see the opposite in > the other room. Do you agree it is very different sort of knowledge? > The question was concerning the first notion of knowledge. Okay, I'm glad you are making that clearer. But I think that my answer is still the same. I will be having two 1st person experiences, one in one room and another in another room. > > Here is the reason not to say that. As the person who is about > > to be duplicated knows all the facts, he is aware (from a 3rd > > person point of view) that scientifically there will be *two* > > processes both of which are very, very similar. > > Right. > > > It will be > > false that one of them will be more "him" than the other. > > Right. > > > Therefore he must identify equally with them. Therefore, > > it is wrong to imply that he "I" will be one of them but not > > the other of them. > > This is a matter of choice and personal opinion. It does not address > the question I asked. The question is not who you will be, but what > will be your immediate feeling. Given that we assume comp it is easy to > predict that you will either see 0 or see 1. You will not see a zero > blurred with a one. You can in advance bet you will see only a zero > (resp. one), and just intellectually know some "other you" will see a > one (resp. zero). > > But if you answer "I will see 0 on the wall OR I will see 1 on the > > wall" > > then it makes it sound as though one of those cases will obtain but > > not the other. > > Actually I was using the non-exclusive OR! But I do think that the > first person experiences of seeing 1 and 0 *are* indeed alternative > experience. After one duplication, those experience will be exclusive > of each other. You are not able to know the experience of the > doppelganger in the same sense that you will be able to see directly > the output on the wall. That's right, of course. If you are speaking of what an instance knows. > You shift from 1-person to 3-person, when the question is a bet, before > the duplication, of the immediate first person experience. > > But you know, before the duplication that all the Lee will have > alternate experiences. So I really don't understand you bet. > Mathematically your bets make you win 0 dollars. By betting on your > ignorance (1 OR 0), you will always be confirmed and you win 5 dollars > at each duplication. You and all the Lee. It seems to me you are hard > with your (first person) selves. What do you think about reworking your whole challenge with *time* instead of *place*? Especially if we allow memory to be erased. Same thing. Lee
RE: Rép : Thought Experiment #269-G (Duplicates)
Bruno writes > >>> You are asked to bet on your immediate and less immediate > >>> future feeling. Precisely: we ask you to choose among the > >>> following bets: > >>> > >>> Immediate: > >>> A. I will see 0 on the wall. > >>> B. I will see 1 on the wall. > >>> C. I will see 0 on the wall and I will see 1 on the wall. > >>> D. I will see 0 on the wall or I will see 1 on the wall. > As I said I have no problem with accepting Lee = Lee' = Lee'' (although > I think this will entail Lee = Bruno at some point, but I have no > problem with that and we can come back to this notion later). But I was > not argumentating on personal identity, only on the problem you face > when predicting your immediate future (or less future) experience. It > is a different matter. You asked me to *predict*. I did. > I duplicate you iteratively, by annihilating (painlessly!) you and > reconstituting you in the 0-room and the 1-room which differs from > having a 0 (resp. 1) painted on a wall. And I let you choose between > the bets A, B, C, D described above. > > You choose C, that is: "I will see 0 on the wall and I will see 1 on > the wall". > Now, as I said this is ambiguous. So if I am in a bad mood, asking the > first 0-Lee' about its immediate apprehension if he answers me "I am > seeing 0 and I am seeing 1" I consider it as false (0-Lee' sees only > 0!), and the same for the other Lee, so all the 2^n Lee must give 5$. Now you are asking an instance a question (since there are two of me), and it seems that you are playing on the ambiguity of the term "you". When you ask an instance---now, *after* the copying has been done---whether he is seeing a 1 or seeing a 0 or seeing both, he has to stop you (I mean I have to stop you) and ask exactly what kind of information you are after. Clearly, if you are talking to one instance (so far as that instance knows) he'll say that he is seeing a "1" or he will say that he is seeing a "0". This is because he'll take the usual meaning of terms. When you then inform him that he has actually been copied and that there is another instance of him in the other room, then naturally he should say "Okay, here I am seeing a "0" and in the other room the opposite." We know all the facts. What we want are two things: (1) we want to speak clearly. (2) we want to know whether or not to regard our duplicates as selves. I think that you've heard all my arguments. > Why not choose D, that is "I will see 0 on the wall OR I will see 1 > on the wall." Okay, now you have switched back to the prior (prediction) level. Here is the reason not to say that. As the person who is about to be duplicated knows all the facts, he is aware (from a 3rd person point of view) that scientifically there will be *two* processes both of which are very, very similar. It will be false that one of them will be more "him" than the other. Therefore he must identify equally with them. Therefore, it is wrong to imply that he "I" will be one of them but not the other of them. But if you answer "I will see 0 on the wall OR I will see 1 on the wall" then it makes it sound as though one of those cases will obtain but not the other. (This is usually how we talk when Bruno admits, for example, that tonight he either will watch TV *or* he will not watch TV. But the case of duplicates is not like that. In the case of duplicates, it is a scientific fact that Bruno will watch TV (in one room) and will not watch TV (in the other room). In short, it will be true that Bruno will watch TV and will not watch TV---simply because there will be two instances of Bruno.) > I recall you that "p or q" is true if p is true or q is true. > So with D all the Lee will win. D consists into admitting that > you are ignorant about your immediate apprehension after the > duplication. It has nothing to do with the fact that you are > the two Lee. > > OK? Nope. :-) With D, I am pretending that it is like you watching television---either 0 or 1. But with duplicates it is not like that: instead it is like 0 AND 1. Lee
Rép : Thought Experiment #269-G (Duplicates )
Le 08-juil.-05, à 00:59, Lee Corbin a écrit : Bruno writes Each Lee-i is offered 5$ each time his bet is confirmed, but loses 5$ if he makes a wrong bet. And yes, it would be possible to emphasize to each instance that he is to attempt to maximize "his own instance's" earnings. Quite correct. What will be your strategy in each version? Will your strategy differ? Now if the Lees know all these facts, then they'll anticipate being in both rooms upon each iteration. Therefore, they'll anticipate losing $5 in one room and gaining $5 in the other. They'll also realize that all bit sequences are being carried out. Therefore, it doesn't make any difference whatsoever. The expectation of each sequence is exactly the same number of dollars: zero. I don't get the significance of this. I don't understand your answer, and actually you did not answer. It looks like you are forgetting I give you the choice between A, B, C, D. Sorry. You are asked to bet on your immediate and less immediate future feeling. Precisely: we ask you to choose among the following bets: Immediate: A. I will see 0 on the wall. B. I will see 1 on the wall. C. I will see 0 on the wall and I will see 1 on the wall. D. I will see 0 on the wall or I will see 1 on the wall. I choose C: insofar as I consider myself as a program, then the program will see 0 on the wall and the program will also see 1 on the wall. The program will experienced both. I will experience both. I guess you did choose C, without saying. Right. In that case you are correct the expectation will be zero. Are you sure there is not a better strategy among A, B, C, D? Why do you think that there is a better strategy? C. will comport with all the facts. And afterwards, when a poll is conducted among all those who can prove that they are Lee Corbin it will be found that half of them saw a 1 and half saw a zero. It is preposterous to finger *any* of them and accuse them of not being me. They will each believe that they are me (i.e., the me here in the past). That is, for each Lee', they will assert Lee' = Lee. So also will Lee'' assert that Lee'' = Lee. So IT'S FREAKING OBVIOUS THAT Lee'' = Lee'. Yet substitute someone else's name for mine in those equations, and they'll demur. As I said I have no problem with accepting Lee = Lee' = Lee'' (although I think this will entail Lee = Bruno at some point, but I have no problem with that and we can come back to this notion later). But I was not argumentating on personal identity, only on the problem you face when predicting your immediate future (or less future) experience. It is a different matter. I duplicate you iteratively, by annihilating (painlessly!) you and reconstituting you in the 0-room and the 1-room which differs from having a 0 (resp. 1) painted on a wall. And I let you choose between the bets A, B, C, D described above. You choose C, that is: "I will see 0 on the wall and I will see 1 on the wall". Now, as I said this is ambiguous. So if I am in a bad mood, asking the first 0-Lee' about its immediate apprehension if he answers me "I am seeing 0 and I am seeing 1" I consider it as false (0-Lee' sees only 0!), and the same for the other Lee, so all the 2^n Lee must give 5$. If I am in a good mood, I accept your reasoning and you loose nothing, but also you win nothing. Why not choosing D, that is "I will see 0 on the wall OR I will see 1 on the wall." I recall you that "p or q" is true if p is true or q is true. So with D all the Lee will win. D consists into admitting that you are ignorant about your immediate apprehension after the duplication. It has nothing to do with the fact that you are the two Lee. OK? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
