Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]

2014-07-15 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 14 Jul 2014, at 20:43, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/14/2014 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 14 Jul 2014, at 02:07, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/13/2014 11:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Then, look at my preceding post to you. I don't know for Tegmark,  
but computationalism excels in differentiating and relating the  
different sort of existence: ontological, epistemological,  
observational, communicable or not, theological, etc.






Lists like this that subscribe to everythingism Bruno's "comp"  
and Tegmark's MUH completely erase the boundary between math and  
physics.


On the contrary, Comp introduces a clear distinction between the  
physical, core of all universal being, and the geographical,  
which are the contingencies of the normal universal numbers  
living above their substitution level.


Physics is done today is just fuzzy about such distinction.


That would be a nice result.  How does it differentiate different  
sorts existence?




ExP(x)(the arithmetical usual sense. It means that "ExP(x)"  
is true if there is number n such that P(n). It is the chosen  
ontology, although we could have taken any other first order  
specification of a universal base)


Modal nuances:

[]ExP(x)
[]Ex[]P(x)
[]<>ExP(x)
[]<>Ex[]<>P(x)

With either [] (<>) being the box (diamond) of the modal logics G,  
G*, S4Grz, , Z, Z*, X, X*, G1, G1*, S4Grz1, Z1, Z1*, X1, X1*.


Notions of physical existences are given by []<>Ex[]<>P(x)  in the  
S4Grz1,  Z1*, and X1* logics. Those logics are quantum logics. They  
are graded, as the logic of []p & <><>p, or [][]p & <><><>p, and  
any []^n p & <>^m p gives a quantum logic when n < m.


Hmmm.  I think I will have to take your course in modal logic before  
those become clear to me.



I think I could explain without using the modal logic. At step seven,  
it seems that you can intuitively understand that physics is somehow  
already reduced to a statistics on all computations, relative to your  
state, and the shape of that mathematics gives the core of the  
physical laws (for all universal machine).


The modal logic sum up in fact long series of theorems translating  
that measure question in arithmetical relations.


I have to go, and tomorrow is still busy, but I will try to say more  
later.


Bruno






Brent



In french, the basic ontology is given by the arithmetical  
existence of numbers, and the physical existence is given by the  
quantization provided by incompleteness on the consistent RE or  
sigma_1 extensions, as viewed from some machine points of view.  
Physics is the science of measurement of possibly alternated  
results (like W and M, in step 3 and 4, and like other  
computational states in the step seven generalization where the FPI  
is on UD*, or any sigma_1 complete reality).


All the boxes of G, G*, ... X1*, can be defined either in  
arithmetic, or in higher level arithmetical term, like the []p & p.


Bruno






Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com 
.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything- 
l...@googlegroups.com.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]

2014-07-14 Thread meekerdb 

On 7/14/2014 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:


On 14 Jul 2014, at 02:07, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/13/2014 11:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Then, look at my preceding post to you. I don't know for Tegmark, but computationalism 
excels in differentiating and relating the different sort of existence: ontological, 
epistemological, observational, communicable or not, theological, etc.






Lists like this that subscribe to everythingism Bruno's "comp" and Tegmark's MUH 
completely erase the boundary between math and physics.


On the contrary, Comp introduces a clear distinction between the physical, core of all 
universal being, and the geographical, which are the contingencies of the normal 
universal numbers living above their substitution level.


Physics is done today is just fuzzy about such distinction.


That would be a nice result.  How does it differentiate different sorts 
existence?




ExP(x)(the arithmetical usual sense. It means that "ExP(x)" is true if there is 
number n such that P(n). It is the chosen ontology, although we could have taken any 
other first order specification of a universal base)


Modal nuances:

[]ExP(x)
[]Ex[]P(x)
[]<>ExP(x)
[]<>Ex[]<>P(x)

With either [] (<>) being the box (diamond) of the modal logics G, G*, S4Grz, , Z, 
Z*, X, X*, G1, G1*, S4Grz1, Z1, Z1*, X1, X1*.


Notions of physical existences are given by []<>Ex[]<>P(x)  in the S4Grz1,  Z1*, and X1* 
logics. Those logics are quantum logics. They are graded, as the logic of []p & <><>p, 
or [][]p & <><><>p, and any []^n p & <>^m p gives a quantum logic when n < m.


Hmmm.  I think I will have to take your course in modal logic before those 
become clear to me.

Brent



In french, the basic ontology is given by the arithmetical existence of numbers, and the 
physical existence is given by the quantization provided by incompleteness on the 
consistent RE or sigma_1 extensions, as viewed from some machine points of view. Physics 
is the science of measurement of possibly alternated results (like W and M, in step 3 
and 4, and like other computational states in the step seven generalization where the 
FPI is on UD*, or any sigma_1 complete reality).


All the boxes of G, G*, ... X1*, can be defined either in arithmetic, or in higher level 
arithmetical term, like the []p & p.


Bruno






Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything 
List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com 
.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ 



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything 
List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com 
.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]

2014-07-14 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 14 Jul 2014, at 02:07, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/13/2014 11:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Then, look at my preceding post to you. I don't know for Tegmark,  
but computationalism excels in differentiating and relating the  
different sort of existence: ontological, epistemological,  
observational, communicable or not, theological, etc.






Lists like this that subscribe to everythingism Bruno's "comp" and  
Tegmark's MUH completely erase the boundary between math and  
physics.


On the contrary, Comp introduces a clear distinction between the  
physical, core of all universal being, and the geographical, which  
are the contingencies of the normal universal numbers living above  
their substitution level.


Physics is done today is just fuzzy about such distinction.


That would be a nice result.  How does it differentiate different  
sorts existence?




ExP(x)(the arithmetical usual sense. It means that "ExP(x)" is  
true if there is number n such that P(n). It is the chosen ontology,  
although we could have taken any other first order specification of a  
universal base)


Modal nuances:

[]ExP(x)
[]Ex[]P(x)
[]<>ExP(x)
[]<>Ex[]<>P(x)

With either [] (<>) being the box (diamond) of the modal logics G, G*,  
S4Grz, , Z, Z*, X, X*, G1, G1*, S4Grz1, Z1, Z1*, X1, X1*.


Notions of physical existences are given by []<>Ex[]<>P(x)  in the  
S4Grz1,  Z1*, and X1* logics. Those logics are quantum logics. They  
are graded, as the logic of []p & <><>p, or [][]p & <><><>p, and any  
[]^n p & <>^m p gives a quantum logic when n < m.


In french, the basic ontology is given by the arithmetical existence  
of numbers, and the physical existence is given by the quantization  
provided by incompleteness on the consistent RE or sigma_1 extensions,  
as viewed from some machine points of view. Physics is the science of  
measurement of possibly alternated results (like W and M, in step 3  
and 4, and like other computational states in the step seven  
generalization where the FPI is on UD*, or any sigma_1 complete  
reality).


All the boxes of G, G*, ... X1*, can be defined either in arithmetic,  
or in higher level arithmetical term, like the []p & p.


Bruno






Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google  
Groups "Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it,  
send an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.

To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]

2014-07-13 Thread meekerdb 

On 7/13/2014 11:17 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:
Then, look at my preceding post to you. I don't know for Tegmark, but computationalism 
excels in differentiating and relating the different sort of existence: ontological, 
epistemological, observational, communicable or not, theological, etc.






Lists like this that subscribe to everythingism Bruno's "comp" and Tegmark's MUH 
completely erase the boundary between math and physics.


On the contrary, Comp introduces a clear distinction between the physical, core of all 
universal being, and the geographical, which are the contingencies of the normal 
universal numbers living above their substitution level.


Physics is done today is just fuzzy about such distinction.


That would be a nice result.  How does it differentiate different sorts 
existence?

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]

2014-07-13 Thread meekerdb 

On 7/13/2014 8:51 AM, Telmo Menezes wrote:
That being said, I tend to become a postmodernist when the word "explanation" shows up. 
I see science as pure description. I find it is easy to fall into the trap of seeing 
"explanation" where none is given. People say to kids: the moon orbits the earth because 
the earth has more mass and generates a stronger attractive force. But if we look at the 
equations, this is not what they say. They contain no "because". They just describe.


The "why?" is a human construct. Possibly a language construct. I don't find it so 
unthinkable that it throws us into an ontological loop like Brent describes.


I don't agree with postmodernist epistemology. I bet that truth can be approximated by 
the scientific method. But still, I cannot do more than bet on this. The problem is that 
I'm not convinced that explanations or causations are part of The Truth. I see them more 
as tricks that the human mind uses to navigate reality, not so different from the ad hoc 
conventions we use to communicate.


I agree.  What we generally call a scientific explanation is just a description in terms 
of something we understand better than the thing being explained.  It includes things we 
can imagine being different or manipulating and it provides a model that predicts the 
result of such changes.  In the example of Newtonian gravity, the two masses and the 
distance between them are things we understand and can imagine manipulating.  But notice 
that this was not immediately considered a good explanation at the time.  Newton was 
asked, "But what provides the force?"


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]

2014-07-13 Thread Bruno Marchal 


On 12 Jul 2014, at 21:17, meekerdb wrote:


On 7/12/2014 1:23 AM, LizR wrote:

Brent,

You left me hanging a week or so ago, and never got back to me  
about something I'm interested in finding out more about.


On 2 July 2014 23:14, LizR  wrote:
On 2 July 2014 17:06, meekerdb  wrote:
On 7/1/2014 9:42 PM, LizR wrote:

On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb  wrote:
OK, so how does that work? Like I said, I don't understand it.  
Intuitively, saying that A causes B and B causes A doesn't appear  
to make sense,

It's not a causal relationship, it's an explanatory "->".

Sorry I should have said "explains" although I thought it was  
obvious I was using causal in an explanatory sense, not a physical  
one. Anyway, please continue the explanation.
You don't understand what is meant by "physics -> biology" or  
"biology -> evolution -> mathematics" or "mathematics -> physics"?


Yes I do.

And there you stopped. I'm still waiting for you to continue the  
explanation.


To refresh your memory, you said:

OK, except I think the chain is:
arithmetic -> information -> matter -> consciousness -> arithmetic

To which I objected that I couldn't see how this makes sense  
globally, even if each local step makes sense. You appear to be  
claiming that there is no such thing as a fundamental explanatory  
level. Since this flies in the face of 3+ centuries of scientific  
progress (based on reductionism, which assumes there is a  
fundamental explanatory level)


It's just that I noted that fundamental physics has become almost  
entirely abstract and mathematical, so that people like Tegmark and  
Wheeler started to speculate that the mathematics *is* the physics.


Not at all.
First, it is the physicalist, or metaphycaily naturalist which  
speculate on a primary physical universe.
As much I agree that there are evidence for a physica reality, there  
are no evidence for a primary physical reality.
Then, look at my preceding post to you. I don't know for Tegmark, but  
computationalism excels in differentiating and relating the different  
sort of existence: ontological, epistemological, observational,  
communicable or not, theological, etc.






Lists like this that subscribe to everythingism Bruno's "comp" and  
Tegmark's MUH completely erase the boundary between math and physics.


On the contrary, Comp introduces a clear distinction between the  
physical, core of all universal being, and the geographical, which are  
the contingencies of the normal universal numbers living above their  
substitution level.


Physics is done today is just fuzzy about such distinction.




The 3+ centuries of reductionist physics are also 3+ centuries of  
explaining things through synthesis of simpler (and presumably  
better understood) things.  At the same time I think mathematics is  
a human invention, a certain way of looking at the world made  
precise in language.  Humans and their inventions are explicable by  
evolution, biology, physics,...and mathematics.  So maybe the circle  
closes.  The usual objection of a circular explanation is it leaves  
stuff out, especially if it leaves out all the stuff you understand  
and just explains mystery X in terms of enigma Y.  But if the circle  
is big enough, if it encompasses everything, then either there's  
some part you understand and that allows you to reach all the rest;  
or you don't understand anything and there's no hope for you.


UD* is full of many circles. If some circle win, that needs to be  
explained.







, not to mention what most people would regard as logic (or at  
least common sense), this looks like a fairly radical revision of  
our theories of knowledge.


So I'd be interested to know more, if you're prepared to continue  
explaining.


As I said, I don't have my own TOE.  I just put forward the virtuous  
circle of explanation based on a suggestion of Bruno (which he's  
disavowed) as a counter example to the idea that reductionism must  
either bottom out or be like infinite Russian dolls.


With mechanism, you have a nice simple ontology, and besides, physics  
becomes "machine-independent". It does not depend which universal base  
of phi_i you start with. You appreciate how Vic Stenger (and Emmy  
Noether) derive some physical laws by postulating their invariance for  
some transformation. Comp gives a very strong invariance principle:  
indeed it redefines and explain physics in a new way which is  
invariant for universal base ontology. Useless in practice, but  
conceptually coherent with the canonical machine's sciences and  
correct theologies.


But again, my point is not that comp gives a better theory. My point  
is that you cannot have both  comp and primitive matter, and that if  
you keep comp, matter is refined as an computer-science-theoretical  
observational modality. We can test it, refute it, and measure our  
degree of non-computability, or improve it, etc.


No problem with physics. Only a problem with dogmatic Aristotelian  
belie

Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]

2014-07-13 Thread Telmo Menezes 
On Sun, Jul 13, 2014 at 4:51 AM, LizR  wrote:

> On 13 July 2014 07:17, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  On 7/12/2014 1:23 AM, LizR wrote:
>>
>>  Brent,
>>
>>  You left me hanging a week or so ago, and never got back to me about
>> something I'm interested in finding out more about.
>>
>>  On 2 July 2014 23:14, LizR  wrote:
>>
>>>   On 2 July 2014 17:06, meekerdb  wrote:
>>>
   On 7/1/2014 9:42 PM, LizR wrote:

  On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb  wrote:

>OK, so how does that work? Like I said, I don't understand it.
> Intuitively, saying that A causes B and B causes A doesn't appear to make
> sense,
>
>  It's not a causal relationship, it's an explanatory "->".
>

  Sorry I should have said "explains" although I thought it was obvious
 I was using causal in an explanatory sense, not a physical one. Anyway,
 please continue the explanation.

  You don't understand what is meant by "physics -> biology" or
 "biology -> evolution -> mathematics" or "mathematics -> physics"?

   Yes I do.
>>>
>>>   And there you stopped. I'm still waiting for you to continue the
>> explanation.
>>
>>  To refresh your memory, you said:
>>
>>  OK, except I think the chain is:
>>> arithmetic -> information -> matter -> consciousness -> arithmetic
>>
>>
>>  To which I objected that I couldn't see how this makes sense globally,
>> even if each local step makes sense. You appear to be claiming that there
>> is no such thing as a fundamental explanatory level. Since this flies in
>> the face of 3+ centuries of scientific progress (based on reductionism,
>> which assumes there *is* a fundamental explanatory level)
>>
>> It's just that I noted that fundamental physics has become almost
>> entirely abstract and mathematical, so that people like Tegmark and Wheeler
>> started to speculate that the mathematics *is* the physics.  Lists like
>> this that subscribe to everythingism Bruno's "comp" and Tegmark's MUH
>> completely erase the boundary between math and physics.  The 3+ centuries
>> of reductionist physics are also 3+ centuries of explaining things through
>> synthesis of simpler (and presumably better understood) things.  At the
>> same time I think mathematics is a human invention, a certain way of
>> looking at the world made precise in language.  Humans and their inventions
>> are explicable by evolution, biology, physics,...and mathematics.  So maybe
>> the circle closes.  The usual objection of a circular explanation is it
>> leaves stuff out, especially if it leaves out all the stuff you understand
>> and just explains mystery X in terms of enigma Y.  But if the circle is big
>> enough, if it encompasses everything, then either there's some part you
>> understand and that allows you to reach all the rest; or you don't
>> understand anything and there's no hope for you.
>>
>
> OK, thanks, I get all that, and I can see where you're coming from, up to
> the point where "maybe the circle closes". However at that point you appear
> to have veered off into fantasy (or at least you want to "have you cake and
> eat it too").
>
> It may well be that the MUH and comp will turn out to be castles in the
> air, or whatever is the appropriate metaphor. But I don't think a good way
> to show this is using something that appears at least equally
> ridiculous (to me at least, but I suspect others will have the same
> reaction). It's quite possible that physics is too abstract, but it's
> certainly less abstract than an explanatory circle in which *nothing* is
> considered axiomatic. That is equivalent to postmodernist arguments that
> since everything is part of a linguistic web, we can't actually know or
> even surmise *anything* about reality. I rejected that viewpoint a few
> decades ago (I was briefly an ardent postmodernist, at least until I
> managed to engage my brain) and before I embrace it again I will need some
> VERY convincing evidence.
>

Then you might like this:
http://xkcd.com/451/

That being said, I tend to become a postmodernist when the word
"explanation" shows up. I see science as pure description. I find it is
easy to fall into the trap of seeing "explanation" where none is given.
People say to kids: the moon orbits the earth because the earth has more
mass and generates a stronger attractive force. But if we look at the
equations, this is not what they say. They contain no "because". They just
describe.

The "why?" is a human construct. Possibly a language construct. I don't
find it so unthinkable that it throws us into an ontological loop like
Brent describes.

I don't agree with postmodernist epistemology. I bet that truth can be
approximated by the scientific method. But still, I cannot do more than bet
on this. The problem is that I'm not convinced that explanations or
causations are part of The Truth. I see them more as tricks that the human
mind uses to navigate reality, not so different from the ad hoc conventions
we use to communicate.

Cheers

Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]

2014-07-13 Thread LizR 
On 13 July 2014 17:18, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 7/12/2014 9:18 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 13 July 2014 15:53, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>  If you can explain what "axiomatic" means, I think you'll find it on
>> the circle.  For example, it might mean whatever seems necessarily true to
>> human beings, which could be explained in terms of physics, biology, and
>> evolution (c.f. William S. Coopers "The Origin of Reason").
>>
>
>  Well you appear to have defined it as necessarily true, which seems OK
> to me. But you can't find it on the circle, because each part of the circle
> relies on the previous one. So by your own definition there is nothing
> there that can seem necessarily true.
>
> Only as *seems* necessarily true to human beings.
>

As opposed to what? Do you have access to something other than human beings
to check what seems necessarily true to them?

> That is equivalent to postmodernist arguments that since everything is
>> part of a linguistic web, we can't actually know or even surmise
>> *anything* about reality.
>>
>> Interestingly I am also engaged today in editing and essay by Vic
> Stenger, James Lindsay, and Peter Boghossian which is intended to clarify
> the relation between philosophy and physics.  Something that was stirred up
> by Larry Kruass denigrating philosophy, at least as applied to physics.  In
> it, Stenger, who is as reductionist materialist as they come, says we can't
> know anything about reality; we only know our models.  I tried to get him
> to change it.
>

??? I thought you'd agree with that. What else can we know except our
models (plus experimental data used to test them) ?

> No it's not, because it's not just words.  For example, the explanation of
>> biology in terms of physics depends on scientific propositions which are
>> hypothesized and test in laboratories.
>>
>
>  I'm afraid it is, because it is free floating in exactly the same way
> that Pomo suggests all our explanations are. Each step relies on the
> previous one. There is no point at which you can claim the circle is
> anchored in reality.
>
> Do you thing strings are suitable to anchor reality?  Or set theory? I
> think they are anchored in experience and reason.  That's how you'd explain
> string theory to someone; you'd tell them about the particle data and
> mathematics.  But the truth of string theory is much shakier than the
> existence of what it purports to explain. I think parts of the circle,
> where science is well developed, are anchored in correspondence with facts.
>

Well, perhaps you can explain in more detail. This is looking a bit like
that hand waving I was worried about, when you start asking rhetorical
questions as though they explain something. Never mind what I think,
explain what you think.

>
> Post Modernism is more than Coherentism (
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-coherence/).  Pomos hold that
> reality is a social construct which varies with society.
>
> I was talking about a particular branch of pomo, I guess what should be
called Wittgensteinian (I forget if it's the early or late W). But what
pomo does or doesn't do doesn't make the "free floating ontology" (as you
originally presented it) any better anchored.

>   then for me at least it threatens to undermine everything else
>> you've said, some of which I thought at the time was quite sensible.
>>
>>  Apparently it can't undermine your confidence in judging what is
>> sensible.
>>
>>  No. Or my ability to spot snide remarks.
>
> Too bad.
>

Yes, sorry not to just agree but kick back. Must mean I exist or something.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]

2014-07-12 Thread meekerdb 

On 7/12/2014 9:18 PM, LizR wrote:

On 13 July 2014 15:53, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

If you can explain what "axiomatic" means, I think you'll find it on the circle. 
For example, it might mean whatever seems necessarily true to human beings, which

could be explained in terms of physics, biology, and evolution (c.f. 
William S.
Coopers "The Origin of Reason").


Well you appear to have defined it as necessarily true, which seems OK to me. But you 
can't find it on the circle, because each part of the circle relies on the previous one. 
So by your own definition there is nothing there that can seem necessarily true.


Only as *seems* necessarily true to human beings.


That is equivalent to postmodernist arguments that since everything is part 
of a
linguistic web, we can't actually know or even surmise /anything/ about 
reality.




Interestingly I am also engaged today in editing and essay by Vic Stenger, James Lindsay, 
and Peter Boghossian which is intended to clarify the relation between philosophy and 
physics.  Something that was stirred up by Larry Kruass denigrating philosophy, at least 
as applied to physics.  In it, Stenger, who is as reductionist materialist as they come, 
says we can't know anything about reality; we only know our models.  I tried to get him to 
change it.



No it's not, because it's not just words.  For example, the explanation of 
biology
in terms of physics depends on scientific propositions which are 
hypothesized and
test in laboratories.


I'm afraid it is, because it is free floating in exactly the same way that Pomo suggests 
all our explanations are. Each step relies on the previous one. There is no point at 
which you can claim the circle is anchored in reality.


Do you thing strings are suitable to anchor reality?  Or set theory? I think they are 
anchored in experience and reason.  That's how you'd explain string theory to someone; 
you'd tell them about the particle data and mathematics.  But the truth of string theory 
is much shakier than the existence of what it purports to explain. I think parts of the 
circle, where science is well developed, are anchored in correspondence with facts.


Post Modernism is more than Coherentism 
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/justep-coherence/).  Pomos hold that reality is a 
social construct which varies with society.



then for me at least it threatens to undermine everything else you've said, 
some of
which I thought at the time was quite sensible.

Apparently it can't undermine your confidence in judging what is sensible.

No. Or my ability to spot snide remarks.


Too bad.

Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]

2014-07-12 Thread LizR 
On 13 July 2014 15:53, meekerdb  wrote:

>  If you can explain what "axiomatic" means, I think you'll find it on the
> circle.  For example, it might mean whatever seems necessarily true to
> human beings, which could be explained in terms of physics, biology, and
> evolution (c.f. William S. Coopers "The Origin of Reason").
>

Well you appear to have defined it as necessarily true, which seems OK to
me. But you can't find it on the circle, because each part of the circle
relies on the previous one. So by your own definition there is nothing
there that can seem necessarily true.

>   That is equivalent to postmodernist arguments that since everything is
> part of a linguistic web, we can't actually know or even surmise
> *anything* about reality.
>
> No it's not, because it's not just words.  For example, the explanation of
> biology in terms of physics depends on scientific propositions which are
> hypothesized and test in laboratories.
>

I'm afraid it is, because it is free floating in exactly the same way that
Pomo suggests all our explanations are. Each step relies on the previous
one. There is no point at which you can claim the circle is anchored in
reality.

> then for me at least it threatens to undermine everything else you've
> said, some of which I thought at the time was quite sensible.
>
> Apparently it can't undermine your confidence in judging what is sensible.
>
> No. Or my ability to spot snide remarks.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]

2014-07-12 Thread meekerdb 

On 7/12/2014 7:51 PM, LizR wrote:

On 13 July 2014 07:17, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 7/12/2014 1:23 AM, LizR wrote:

Brent,

You left me hanging a week or so ago, and never got back to me about 
something I'm
interested in finding out more about.

On 2 July 2014 23:14, LizR mailto:lizj...@gmail.com>> 
wrote:

On 2 July 2014 17:06, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:

On 7/1/2014 9:42 PM, LizR wrote:

On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:


OK, so how does that work? Like I said, I don't understand it.
Intuitively, saying that A causes B and B causes A doesn't 
appear to
make sense,

It's not a causal relationship, it's an explanatory "->".


Sorry I should have said "explains" although I thought it was 
obvious I
was using causal in an explanatory sense, not a physical one. 
Anyway,
please continue the explanation.

You don't understand what is meant by "physics -> biology" or "biology 
->
evolution -> mathematics" or "mathematics -> physics"?

Yes I do.

And there you stopped. I'm still waiting for you to continue the 
explanation.

To refresh your memory, you said:

OK, except I think the chain is:
arithmetic -> information -> matter -> consciousness -> arithmetic


To which I objected that I couldn't see how this makes sense globally, even 
if each
local step makes sense. You appear to be claiming that there is no such 
thing as a
fundamental explanatory level. Since this flies in the face of 3+ centuries 
of
scientific progress (based on reductionism, which assumes there /is/ a 
fundamental
explanatory level)

It's just that I noted that fundamental physics has become almost entirely 
abstract
and mathematical, so that people like Tegmark and Wheeler started to 
speculate that
the mathematics *is* the physics.  Lists like this that subscribe to 
everythingism
Bruno's "comp" and Tegmark's MUH completely erase the boundary between math 
and
physics.  The 3+ centuries of reductionist physics are also 3+ centuries of
explaining things through synthesis of simpler (and presumably better 
understood)
things.  At the same time I think mathematics is a human invention, a 
certain way of
looking at the world made precise in language.  Humans and their inventions 
are
explicable by evolution, biology, physics,...and mathematics.  So maybe the 
circle
closes.  The usual objection of a circular explanation is it leaves stuff 
out,
especially if it leaves out all the stuff you understand and just explains 
mystery X
in terms of enigma Y.  But if the circle is big enough, if it encompasses
everything, then either there's some part you understand and that allows 
you to
reach all the rest; or you don't understand anything and there's no hope 
for you.


OK, thanks, I get all that, and I can see where you're coming from, up to the point 
where "maybe the circle closes". However at that point you appear to have veered off 
into fantasy (or at least you want to "have you cake and eat it too").


It may well be that the MUH and comp will turn out to be castles in the air, or whatever 
is the appropriate metaphor. But I don't think a good way to show this is using 
something that appears at least equally ridiculous (to me at least, but I suspect others 
will have the same reaction). It's quite possible that physics is too abstract, but it's 
certainly less abstract than an explanatory circle in which /nothing/ is considered 
axiomatic.


If you can explain what "axiomatic" means, I think you'll find it on the circle.  For 
example, it might mean whatever seems necessarily true to human beings, which could be 
explained in terms of physics, biology, and evolution (c.f. William S. Coopers "The Origin 
of Reason").


That is equivalent to postmodernist arguments that since everything is part of a 
linguistic web, we can't actually know or even surmise /anything/ about reality.


No it's not, because it's not just words.  For example, the explanation of biology in 
terms of physics depends on scientific propositions which are hypothesized and test in 
laboratories.


I rejected that viewpoint a few decades ago (I was briefly an ardent postmodernist, at 
least until I managed to engage my brain) and before I embrace it again I will need some 
VERY convincing evidence.


This gives me, at least, the same problem I would have with a time travel story in which 
a time traveller takes something back in time to the person who was supposed to have 
originated it and lets them crib it. Hence no one created whatever it is ("Doctor Who" 
did this with Shakespeare, with the Doctor quoting odd Shakespearisms and Will saying 
"Mind if I use that?" It's fine as a humorous device in fantasy, but les

Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]

2014-07-12 Thread meekerdb 

On 7/12/2014 7:51 PM, LizR wrote:
Sorry, as yet I don't see how it can work. It isn't a virtuous circle (which is 
generally taken to mean something like compound interest working on something which was 
generated, originally, by some other process) - it's a vicious circle, i.e. one that 
 pretends to explain something but in fact doesn't have any foundation. And it is, in 
fact, like infinite Russian dolls, in that the explanatory chain doesn't begin or end 
anywhere.


The point is that explanation must always begin from something you understand.  The sense 
in which this circle is 'virtuous' is that if you understand anything at all then it is 
somewhere on the circle and so explanation can begin from there.


Brent

--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

RE: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]

2014-07-12 Thread 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List 
 

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of LizR
Sent: Saturday, July 12, 2014 7:53 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]

 

 

 

On 13 July 2014 08:27, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List 
 wrote:

 

Or… perhaps it could it be like the mythical snake eating its tail.

By, invoking retro-causality

 

Brent isn't invoking retro-causality, but circular explanation. As he was at 
pains to point out to me, the arrows are explanatory, NOT causal.

 

I wasn’t suggesting he was, and apologize if you mistook, pure conjecture – on 
my part -- for being a misunderstanding of what he said. In truth I am agnostic 
on reality, realizing clearly that I operate in some relative degree of 
ignorance. I also however like conjecture… and airships too J (the steam punk 
esthetic)

A question for you… 

At some point doesn’t the search for a base level of fundamental reality lead 
you into an endless recursion or an arbitrary assignment of some, non-reducible 
fundamental  quality to some entity, whether this be particle or pure math. 

 

 

 

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]

2014-07-12 Thread LizR 
On 13 July 2014 08:27, 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List <
everything-list@googlegroups.com> wrote:

>
>
> Or… perhaps it could it be like the mythical snake eating its tail.
>
> By, invoking retro-causality
>

Brent isn't invoking retro-causality, but circular explanation. As he was
at pains to point out to me, the arrows are explanatory, NOT causal.

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.

Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]

2014-07-12 Thread LizR 
On 13 July 2014 07:17, meekerdb  wrote:

>  On 7/12/2014 1:23 AM, LizR wrote:
>
>  Brent,
>
>  You left me hanging a week or so ago, and never got back to me about
> something I'm interested in finding out more about.
>
>  On 2 July 2014 23:14, LizR  wrote:
>
>>   On 2 July 2014 17:06, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>>>   On 7/1/2014 9:42 PM, LizR wrote:
>>>
>>>  On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb  wrote:
>>>
OK, so how does that work? Like I said, I don't understand it.
 Intuitively, saying that A causes B and B causes A doesn't appear to make
 sense,

  It's not a causal relationship, it's an explanatory "->".

>>>
>>>  Sorry I should have said "explains" although I thought it was obvious
>>> I was using causal in an explanatory sense, not a physical one. Anyway,
>>> please continue the explanation.
>>>
>>>  You don't understand what is meant by "physics -> biology" or "biology
>>> -> evolution -> mathematics" or "mathematics -> physics"?
>>>
>>>   Yes I do.
>>
>>   And there you stopped. I'm still waiting for you to continue the
> explanation.
>
>  To refresh your memory, you said:
>
>  OK, except I think the chain is:
>> arithmetic -> information -> matter -> consciousness -> arithmetic
>
>
>  To which I objected that I couldn't see how this makes sense globally,
> even if each local step makes sense. You appear to be claiming that there
> is no such thing as a fundamental explanatory level. Since this flies in
> the face of 3+ centuries of scientific progress (based on reductionism,
> which assumes there *is* a fundamental explanatory level)
>
> It's just that I noted that fundamental physics has become almost entirely
> abstract and mathematical, so that people like Tegmark and Wheeler started
> to speculate that the mathematics *is* the physics.  Lists like this that
> subscribe to everythingism Bruno's "comp" and Tegmark's MUH completely
> erase the boundary between math and physics.  The 3+ centuries of
> reductionist physics are also 3+ centuries of explaining things through
> synthesis of simpler (and presumably better understood) things.  At the
> same time I think mathematics is a human invention, a certain way of
> looking at the world made precise in language.  Humans and their inventions
> are explicable by evolution, biology, physics,...and mathematics.  So maybe
> the circle closes.  The usual objection of a circular explanation is it
> leaves stuff out, especially if it leaves out all the stuff you understand
> and just explains mystery X in terms of enigma Y.  But if the circle is big
> enough, if it encompasses everything, then either there's some part you
> understand and that allows you to reach all the rest; or you don't
> understand anything and there's no hope for you.
>

OK, thanks, I get all that, and I can see where you're coming from, up to
the point where "maybe the circle closes". However at that point you appear
to have veered off into fantasy (or at least you want to "have you cake and
eat it too").

It may well be that the MUH and comp will turn out to be castles in the
air, or whatever is the appropriate metaphor. But I don't think a good way
to show this is using something that appears at least equally
ridiculous (to me at least, but I suspect others will have the same
reaction). It's quite possible that physics is too abstract, but it's
certainly less abstract than an explanatory circle in which *nothing* is
considered axiomatic. That is equivalent to postmodernist arguments that
since everything is part of a linguistic web, we can't actually know or
even surmise *anything* about reality. I rejected that viewpoint a few
decades ago (I was briefly an ardent postmodernist, at least until I
managed to engage my brain) and before I embrace it again I will need some
VERY convincing evidence.

This gives me, at least, the same problem I would have with a time travel
story in which a time traveller takes something back in time to the person
who was supposed to have originated it and lets them crib it. Hence no one
created whatever it is ("Doctor Who" did this with Shakespeare, with the
Doctor quoting odd Shakespearisms and Will saying "Mind if I use that?"
It's fine as a humorous device in fantasy, but less so when proposed as a
serious basis for everything we know, or can know).

> , not to mention what most people would regard as logic (or at least
> common sense), this looks like a fairly radical revision of our theories of
> knowledge.
>
>  So I'd be interested to know more, if you're prepared to continue
> explaining.
>
> As I said, I don't have my own TOE.
>

I didn't suggest you did. That isn't what I'm asking for.


> I just put forward the virtuous circle of explanation based on a
> suggestion of Bruno (which he's disavowed) as a counter example to the idea
> that reductionism must either bottom out or be like infinite Russian dolls.
>

Sorry, as yet I don't see how it can work. It isn't a virtuous circle
(which is generally taken to mean something like

RE: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]

2014-07-12 Thread 'Chris de Morsella' via Everything List 
 

 

From: everything-list@googlegroups.com 
[mailto:everything-list@googlegroups.com] On Behalf Of meekerdb
Sent: Saturday, July 12, 2014 12:18 PM
To: everything-list@googlegroups.com
Subject: Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]

 

On 7/12/2014 1:23 AM, LizR wrote:

Brent, 

 

You left me hanging a week or so ago, and never got back to me about something 
I'm interested in finding out more about.

 

On 2 July 2014 23:14, LizR  wrote:

On 2 July 2014 17:06, meekerdb  wrote:

On 7/1/2014 9:42 PM, LizR wrote:

On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb  wrote:

OK, so how does that work? Like I said, I don't understand it. Intuitively, 
saying that A causes B and B causes A doesn't appear to make sense, 

It's not a causal relationship, it's an explanatory "->".

 

Sorry I should have said "explains" although I thought it was obvious I was 
using causal in an explanatory sense, not a physical one. Anyway, please 
continue the explanation.

You don't understand what is meant by "physics -> biology" or "biology -> 
evolution -> mathematics" or "mathematics -> physics"?

 

Yes I do. 

 

And there you stopped. I'm still waiting for you to continue the explanation.

 

To refresh your memory, you said:

 

OK, except I think the chain is:
arithmetic -> information -> matter -> consciousness -> arithmetic

 

To which I objected that I couldn't see how this makes sense globally, even if 
each local step makes sense. You appear to be claiming that there is no such 
thing as a fundamental explanatory level. Since this flies in the face of 3+ 
centuries of scientific progress (based on reductionism, which assumes there is 
a fundamental explanatory level)


It's just that I noted that fundamental physics has become almost entirely 
abstract and mathematical, so that people like Tegmark and Wheeler started to 
speculate that the mathematics *is* the physics.  Lists like this that 
subscribe to everythingism Bruno's "comp" and Tegmark's MUH completely erase 
the boundary between math and physics.  The 3+ centuries of reductionist 
physics are also 3+ centuries of explaining things through synthesis of simpler 
(and presumably better understood) things.  At the same time I think 
mathematics is a human invention, a certain way of looking at the world made 
precise in language.  Humans and their inventions are explicable by evolution, 
biology, physics,...and mathematics.  So maybe the circle closes.  The usual 
objection of a circular explanation is it leaves stuff out, especially if it 
leaves out all the stuff you understand and just explains mystery X in terms of 
enigma Y.  But if the circle is big enough, if it encompasses everything, then 
either there's some part you understand and that allows you to reach all the 
rest; or you don't understand anything and there's no hope for you.

 

Brent ~ I like how you bring in biology (and our biological being) into this 
grand cycle. 

It seems natural to me that we are emergent vast-network phenomena dancing upon 
a self-replicating organic chemistry base, itself emerging from physical 
reality that, speculatively perhaps, can be hypothesized to emerge itself from 
an even more fundamental abstract mathematical reality. It would seem natural 
then to me that our brain functioning and the mind ->self-aware consciousness 
that emerges out of this underlying massively parallel network would itself be 
predisposed towards stumbling upon the actions and objects of math and 
eventually developing a theory of a mathematical universe.

If we *are* math then aren’t our minds, emergent from within also math and 
would naturally *think* in mathematical ways, developing a theory that *fit* 
the underlying biological->physical->fundamental-reality nature of our being.

 

Pardon my tangential excursion… for, one question leads to others.

What about question such as these: what was the first mover; the first root 
fundamental action (or elementary entity)? Or if there is no first mover; no 
beginning; no foundational root… then what? Even if all you need is a single 
bit and one, two or (?) basic operations to trigger a math emergence… from 
whence does that come?

 

Is the possibility that we will someday figure things out to this level or is 
an attempt to do so pure theoretical unobtanium? This is the “god” boundary 
where many invoke some kind of inexplicable principal and leave it as 
unexplored terra-incognita. 





, not to mention what most people would regard as logic (or at least common 
sense), this looks like a fairly radical revision of our theories of knowledge.

 

So I'd be interested to know more, if you're prepared to continue explaining.


As I said, I don't have my own TOE.  I just put forward the virtuous circle of 
explanation based on a suggest

Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]

2014-07-12 Thread Quentin Anciaux 
2014-07-12 22:01 GMT+02:00 John Mikes :

> Quentin, I appreciate your sequencing:
>  "*maths => physics => consciousness => human maths"*
> except for the obvious question that arose in my (agnostic) mind:
> what OTHER "maths" can we, humans think of with our (human) minds that
> would not qualify as "human maths"?
>

When I said human maths, I wanted to say Maths human discovered so far...
(and maths we can discover)


> Even - as I believe - Bruno leaves the question open and assigns such to
> his unidentified (universal?) machines WITHOUT atempting to verify,
> 'understand' or 'explain' those marvels. The most is:  'which MAY BE true
> (or not).
>
>
> On Sat, Jul 12, 2014 at 3:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux 
> wrote:
>
>>
>>
>>
>> 2014-07-12 21:17 GMT+02:00 meekerdb :
>>
>>  On 7/12/2014 1:23 AM, LizR wrote:
>>>
>>>  Brent,
>>>
>>>  You left me hanging a week or so ago, and never got back to me about
>>> something I'm interested in finding out more about.
>>>
>>>  On 2 July 2014 23:14, LizR  wrote:
>>>
   On 2 July 2014 17:06, meekerdb  wrote:

>   On 7/1/2014 9:42 PM, LizR wrote:
>
>  On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb  wrote:
>
>>OK, so how does that work? Like I said, I don't understand it.
>> Intuitively, saying that A causes B and B causes A doesn't appear to make
>> sense,
>>
>>  It's not a causal relationship, it's an explanatory "->".
>>
>
>  Sorry I should have said "explains" although I thought it was
> obvious I was using causal in an explanatory sense, not a physical one.
> Anyway, please continue the explanation.
>
>  You don't understand what is meant by "physics -> biology" or
> "biology -> evolution -> mathematics" or "mathematics -> physics"?
>
>   Yes I do.

   And there you stopped. I'm still waiting for you to continue the
>>> explanation.
>>>
>>>  To refresh your memory, you said:
>>>
>>>  OK, except I think the chain is:
 arithmetic -> information -> matter -> consciousness -> arithmetic
>>>
>>>
>>>  To which I objected that I couldn't see how this makes sense globally,
>>> even if each local step makes sense. You appear to be claiming that there
>>> is no such thing as a fundamental explanatory level. Since this flies in
>>> the face of 3+ centuries of scientific progress (based on reductionism,
>>> which assumes there *is* a fundamental explanatory level)
>>>
>>>
>>> It's just that I noted that fundamental physics has become almost
>>> entirely abstract and mathematical, so that people like Tegmark and Wheeler
>>> started to speculate that the mathematics *is* the physics.  Lists like
>>> this that subscribe to everythingism Bruno's "comp" and Tegmark's MUH
>>> completely erase the boundary between math and physics.  The 3+ centuries
>>> of reductionist physics are also 3+ centuries of explaining things through
>>> synthesis of simpler (and presumably better understood) things.  At the
>>> same time I think mathematics is a human invention, a certain way of
>>> looking at the world made precise in language.  Humans and their inventions
>>> are explicable by evolution, biology, physics,...and mathematics.  So maybe
>>> the circle closes.  The usual objection of a circular explanation is it
>>> leaves stuff out, especially if it leaves out all the stuff you understand
>>> and just explains mystery X in terms of enigma Y.  But if the circle is big
>>> enough, if it encompasses everything, then either there's some part you
>>> understand and that allows you to reach all the rest; or you don't
>>> understand anything and there's no hope for you.
>>>
>>>
>>>  , not to mention what most people would regard as logic (or at least
>>> common sense), this looks like a fairly radical revision of our theories of
>>> knowledge.
>>>
>>>  So I'd be interested to know more, if you're prepared to continue
>>> explaining.
>>>
>>>
>>> As I said, I don't have my own TOE.  I just put forward the virtuous
>>> circle of explanation based on a suggestion of Bruno (which he's disavowed)
>>>
>>
>> Because I think he never saw it as a circle, it is IMHO this:
>>
>> maths => physics => consciousness => human maths
>>
>>  There is not circularity here... human maths is only a part of the total
>> mathematical reality, what we discover about it... but that doesn't circle
>> back ISTM.
>>
>> Quentin
>>
>>
>>> as a counter example to the idea that reductionism must either bottom
>>> out or be like infinite Russian dolls.
>>>
>>> Brent
>>>
>>>
>>>
>>>  --
>>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google
>>> Groups "Everything List" group.
>>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send
>>> an email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>>
>>>
>>>  --
>>> Y

Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]

2014-07-12 Thread John Mikes 
Quentin, I appreciate your sequencing:
 "*maths => physics => consciousness => human maths"*
except for the obvious question that arose in my (agnostic) mind:
what OTHER "maths" can we, humans think of with our (human) minds that
would not qualify as "human maths"? Even - as I believe - Bruno leaves the
question open and assigns such to his unidentified (universal?) machines
WITHOUT atempting to verify, 'understand' or 'explain' those marvels. The
most is:  'which MAY BE true (or not).


On Sat, Jul 12, 2014 at 3:45 PM, Quentin Anciaux  wrote:

>
>
>
> 2014-07-12 21:17 GMT+02:00 meekerdb :
>
>  On 7/12/2014 1:23 AM, LizR wrote:
>>
>>  Brent,
>>
>>  You left me hanging a week or so ago, and never got back to me about
>> something I'm interested in finding out more about.
>>
>>  On 2 July 2014 23:14, LizR  wrote:
>>
>>>   On 2 July 2014 17:06, meekerdb  wrote:
>>>
   On 7/1/2014 9:42 PM, LizR wrote:

  On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb  wrote:

>OK, so how does that work? Like I said, I don't understand it.
> Intuitively, saying that A causes B and B causes A doesn't appear to make
> sense,
>
>  It's not a causal relationship, it's an explanatory "->".
>

  Sorry I should have said "explains" although I thought it was obvious
 I was using causal in an explanatory sense, not a physical one. Anyway,
 please continue the explanation.

  You don't understand what is meant by "physics -> biology" or
 "biology -> evolution -> mathematics" or "mathematics -> physics"?

   Yes I do.
>>>
>>>   And there you stopped. I'm still waiting for you to continue the
>> explanation.
>>
>>  To refresh your memory, you said:
>>
>>  OK, except I think the chain is:
>>> arithmetic -> information -> matter -> consciousness -> arithmetic
>>
>>
>>  To which I objected that I couldn't see how this makes sense globally,
>> even if each local step makes sense. You appear to be claiming that there
>> is no such thing as a fundamental explanatory level. Since this flies in
>> the face of 3+ centuries of scientific progress (based on reductionism,
>> which assumes there *is* a fundamental explanatory level)
>>
>>
>> It's just that I noted that fundamental physics has become almost
>> entirely abstract and mathematical, so that people like Tegmark and Wheeler
>> started to speculate that the mathematics *is* the physics.  Lists like
>> this that subscribe to everythingism Bruno's "comp" and Tegmark's MUH
>> completely erase the boundary between math and physics.  The 3+ centuries
>> of reductionist physics are also 3+ centuries of explaining things through
>> synthesis of simpler (and presumably better understood) things.  At the
>> same time I think mathematics is a human invention, a certain way of
>> looking at the world made precise in language.  Humans and their inventions
>> are explicable by evolution, biology, physics,...and mathematics.  So maybe
>> the circle closes.  The usual objection of a circular explanation is it
>> leaves stuff out, especially if it leaves out all the stuff you understand
>> and just explains mystery X in terms of enigma Y.  But if the circle is big
>> enough, if it encompasses everything, then either there's some part you
>> understand and that allows you to reach all the rest; or you don't
>> understand anything and there's no hope for you.
>>
>>
>>  , not to mention what most people would regard as logic (or at least
>> common sense), this looks like a fairly radical revision of our theories of
>> knowledge.
>>
>>  So I'd be interested to know more, if you're prepared to continue
>> explaining.
>>
>>
>> As I said, I don't have my own TOE.  I just put forward the virtuous
>> circle of explanation based on a suggestion of Bruno (which he's disavowed)
>>
>
> Because I think he never saw it as a circle, it is IMHO this:
>
> maths => physics => consciousness => human maths
>
> There is not circularity here... human maths is only a part of the total
> mathematical reality, what we discover about it... but that doesn't circle
> back ISTM.
>
> Quentin
>
>
>> as a counter example to the idea that reductionism must either bottom out
>> or be like infinite Russian dolls.
>>
>> Brent
>>
>>
>>
>>  --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
>> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
>> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>>
>>
>>  --
>> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
>> "Everything List" group.
>> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
>> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
>> To post to this group, send email to everything

Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]

2014-07-12 Thread Quentin Anciaux 
2014-07-12 21:17 GMT+02:00 meekerdb :

>  On 7/12/2014 1:23 AM, LizR wrote:
>
>  Brent,
>
>  You left me hanging a week or so ago, and never got back to me about
> something I'm interested in finding out more about.
>
>  On 2 July 2014 23:14, LizR  wrote:
>
>>   On 2 July 2014 17:06, meekerdb  wrote:
>>
>>>   On 7/1/2014 9:42 PM, LizR wrote:
>>>
>>>  On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb  wrote:
>>>
OK, so how does that work? Like I said, I don't understand it.
 Intuitively, saying that A causes B and B causes A doesn't appear to make
 sense,

  It's not a causal relationship, it's an explanatory "->".

>>>
>>>  Sorry I should have said "explains" although I thought it was obvious
>>> I was using causal in an explanatory sense, not a physical one. Anyway,
>>> please continue the explanation.
>>>
>>>  You don't understand what is meant by "physics -> biology" or "biology
>>> -> evolution -> mathematics" or "mathematics -> physics"?
>>>
>>>   Yes I do.
>>
>>   And there you stopped. I'm still waiting for you to continue the
> explanation.
>
>  To refresh your memory, you said:
>
>  OK, except I think the chain is:
>> arithmetic -> information -> matter -> consciousness -> arithmetic
>
>
>  To which I objected that I couldn't see how this makes sense globally,
> even if each local step makes sense. You appear to be claiming that there
> is no such thing as a fundamental explanatory level. Since this flies in
> the face of 3+ centuries of scientific progress (based on reductionism,
> which assumes there *is* a fundamental explanatory level)
>
>
> It's just that I noted that fundamental physics has become almost entirely
> abstract and mathematical, so that people like Tegmark and Wheeler started
> to speculate that the mathematics *is* the physics.  Lists like this that
> subscribe to everythingism Bruno's "comp" and Tegmark's MUH completely
> erase the boundary between math and physics.  The 3+ centuries of
> reductionist physics are also 3+ centuries of explaining things through
> synthesis of simpler (and presumably better understood) things.  At the
> same time I think mathematics is a human invention, a certain way of
> looking at the world made precise in language.  Humans and their inventions
> are explicable by evolution, biology, physics,...and mathematics.  So maybe
> the circle closes.  The usual objection of a circular explanation is it
> leaves stuff out, especially if it leaves out all the stuff you understand
> and just explains mystery X in terms of enigma Y.  But if the circle is big
> enough, if it encompasses everything, then either there's some part you
> understand and that allows you to reach all the rest; or you don't
> understand anything and there's no hope for you.
>
>
>  , not to mention what most people would regard as logic (or at least
> common sense), this looks like a fairly radical revision of our theories of
> knowledge.
>
>  So I'd be interested to know more, if you're prepared to continue
> explaining.
>
>
> As I said, I don't have my own TOE.  I just put forward the virtuous
> circle of explanation based on a suggestion of Bruno (which he's disavowed)
>

Because I think he never saw it as a circle, it is IMHO this:

maths => physics => consciousness => human maths

There is not circularity here... human maths is only a part of the total
mathematical reality, what we discover about it... but that doesn't circle
back ISTM.

Quentin


> as a counter example to the idea that reductionism must either bottom out
> or be like infinite Russian dolls.
>
> Brent
>
>
>
>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>
>
>  --
> You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
> "Everything List" group.
> To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an
> email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
> To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
> Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
> For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.
>



-- 
All those moments will be lost in time, like tears in rain. (Roy
Batty/Rutger Hauer)

-- 
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/opto

Re: Brent's circular ontology [was: Is Consciousness Computable?]

2014-07-12 Thread meekerdb 

On 7/12/2014 1:23 AM, LizR wrote:

Brent,

You left me hanging a week or so ago, and never got back to me about something I'm 
interested in finding out more about.


On 2 July 2014 23:14, LizR mailto:lizj...@gmail.com>> wrote:

On 2 July 2014 17:06, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>>
wrote:

On 7/1/2014 9:42 PM, LizR wrote:

On 2 July 2014 15:46, meekerdb mailto:meeke...@verizon.net>> wrote:


OK, so how does that work? Like I said, I don't understand it.
Intuitively, saying that A causes B and B causes A doesn't appear 
to make
sense,

It's not a causal relationship, it's an explanatory "->".


Sorry I should have said "explains" although I thought it was obvious I 
was
using causal in an explanatory sense, not a physical one. Anyway, please
continue the explanation.

You don't understand what is meant by "physics -> biology" or "biology 
->
evolution -> mathematics" or "mathematics -> physics"?

Yes I do.

And there you stopped. I'm still waiting for you to continue the explanation.

To refresh your memory, you said:

OK, except I think the chain is:
arithmetic -> information -> matter -> consciousness -> arithmetic


To which I objected that I couldn't see how this makes sense globally, even if each 
local step makes sense. You appear to be claiming that there is no such thing as a 
fundamental explanatory level. Since this flies in the face of 3+ centuries of 
scientific progress (based on reductionism, which assumes there /is/ a fundamental 
explanatory level)


It's just that I noted that fundamental physics has become almost entirely abstract and 
mathematical, so that people like Tegmark and Wheeler started to speculate that the 
mathematics *is* the physics. Lists like this that subscribe to everythingism Bruno's 
"comp" and Tegmark's MUH completely erase the boundary between math and physics.  The 3+ 
centuries of reductionist physics are also 3+ centuries of explaining things through 
synthesis of simpler (and presumably better understood) things.  At the same time I think 
mathematics is a human invention, a certain way of looking at the world made precise in 
language.  Humans and their inventions are explicable by evolution, biology, 
physics,...and mathematics.  So maybe the circle closes.  The usual objection of a 
circular explanation is it leaves stuff out, especially if it leaves out all the stuff you 
understand and just explains mystery X in terms of enigma Y.  But if the circle is big 
enough, if it encompasses everything, then either there's some part you understand and 
that allows you to reach all the rest; or you don't understand anything and there's no 
hope for you.


, not to mention what most people would regard as logic (or at least common sense), this 
looks like a fairly radical revision of our theories of knowledge.


So I'd be interested to know more, if you're prepared to continue explaining.


As I said, I don't have my own TOE.  I just put forward the virtuous circle of explanation 
based on a suggestion of Bruno (which he's disavowed) as a counter example to the idea 
that reductionism must either bottom out or be like infinite Russian dolls.


Brent



--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything 
List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email to 
everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com 
.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com 
.

Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.


--
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To unsubscribe from this group and stop receiving emails from it, send an email 
to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com.
Visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list.
For more options, visit https://groups.google.com/d/optout.