Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Stathis, you put me on the spot (as Brent did, to whom I still owe a reply). I have NO theory. I started to speculate about things I never had the time to read a bout, keep pace with novelties, or even contemplate while I was busy as the nonexistent hell in my day-to day &D and consulting workload. I read some 2-300 NEW books o n new worldview-related topics, starting as probably the oldest one: David Bohm. Then I argued (neophyte hassle) with physicists and conservative neuro-philosophers and wrote a sci-fi. I concluded in an unlimited complexity of everything existing (another questionmark, since I was not on the basis of the physical measurements) of which human thinking formulates topics, maps, territories (=models, within boundaries) and we have a 'science' closed into our models. So I formulated a NARRATIVE for myself. (Plenitude etc.) This (answering your question: " "...how it could be immune to being proved wrong?" makes me immune as it is MY narrative. You don't like it? fine. It gives me easier explanations in MY (common sense) logic to many (not all) questions. Primitive? of course. Are we not all? I found similar thinkers (different theories and bases) galore and have interesting discussions on - I think - 8 lists. Counterarguments help me develop my ideas. The only one I stick to is the total interconnectedness and intereffectiveness in the totality irrespective topics we identify. Complexity exceeds the systems. We are complexity of not separable mind (what is it?) and body (our historical figment of matter, just explaining phenomena in the evolving empirical enrichment). None exists without the other. I better stop because I could not hold water in a detailed wide discussion against all that knowledge stuffed in this list. John M - Original Message - From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "John M" Sent: Monday, August 07, 2006 9:25 PM Subject: RE: Bruno's argument - Comp John, Perhaps I have misunderstood if you were presenting an alternative theory: it's easy to misunderstand the often complex ideas discussed on this list. Could you explain your theory, and how it could be immune to being proved wrong? Stathis Papaioannou > Stathis, > you (of all people) underestimate human optimism and self confidence. "MY > THEORY"? the 'others' maybe, they become proven wrong and false, not mine! > Then again where is an acceptable evidence? to whom? > Ask Goedel, ask Popper, ask all people who 'think' differently. > Bruno has different evidence for his position in his reply to my question > today than I had when I asked it. > Not even a (confirmed?) "Pysical"experiment is 'evidendce'. wHO do you > call > a 'scientist'? the one who accepts an evidence, or who does not? > Best wishes > John M > - Original Message - > From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: "John M" > Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 7:22 AM > Subject: RE: Bruno's argument - Comp > > > > John M writes: > > > Earlier we lived in a telephone central switchboard, further back in a > > steam-engine. Not to mention the Turtle. > > The 'cat' specifies IMO ignorance without prejudice. > > Very droll, very true! But what, then, must we do? Scientists come up with > the > best theory consistent with the evidence, with a willingness to revise the > theory > in the light of new evidence. They might not be quite as willing as they > ideally > should be, but that's just human nature, and they all come around to doing > the > right thing eventually. It would not be very helpful if we all thought, "I > know that > whatever theory I come up with will almost certainly be proved wrong given > enough > time, so I won't bother coming up with a theory at all." > > Stathis Papaioannou --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument - Comp
John, Perhaps I have misunderstood if you were presenting an alternative theory: it's easy to misunderstand the often complex ideas discussed on this list. Could you explain your theory, and how it could be immune to being proved wrong? Stathis Papaioannou > Stathis, > you (of all people) underestimate human optimism and self confidence. "MY > THEORY"? the 'others' maybe, they become proven wrong and false, not mine! > Then again where is an acceptable evidence? to whom? > Ask Goedel, ask Popper, ask all people who 'think' differently. > Bruno has different evidence for his position in his reply to my question > today than I had when I asked it. > Not even a (confirmed?) "Pysical"experiment is 'evidendce'. wHO do you call > a 'scientist'? the one who accepts an evidence, or who does not? > Best wishes > John M > - Original Message - > From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: "John M" > Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 7:22 AM > Subject: RE: Bruno's argument - Comp > > > > John M writes: > > > Earlier we lived in a telephone central switchboard, further back in a > > steam-engine. Not to mention the Turtle. > > The 'cat' specifies IMO ignorance without prejudice. > > Very droll, very true! But what, then, must we do? Scientists come up with > the > best theory consistent with the evidence, with a willingness to revise the > theory > in the light of new evidence. They might not be quite as willing as they > ideally > should be, but that's just human nature, and they all come around to doing > the > right thing eventually. It would not be very helpful if we all thought, "I > know that > whatever theory I come up with will almost certainly be proved wrong given > enough > time, so I won't bother coming up with a theory at all." > > Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
W. C. wrote: >>From: Brent Meeker >>... >>But I like to eat. I like to eat steak. A world in which I can't eat >>steak is not perfect for me. >> >> >>>People with common intelligence can easily *imagine* (or dream) what a >> >>PU > will be. >> >>I guess I have uncommon intelligence :-) since I can't imagine what a PU >>would be. I can't even imagine exactly what would be a perfect universe >>for me. Do I want more security...or more adventure? Sure I want to >>suceed...but maybe not too easily. Do I really need to be the world's >>greatest tennis, chess, and billiards player? >> > > > Don't worry. I already have a solution for this: > Before I adjust the universe to become perfect, I will send everyone one > message (by telepathy) to let you decide: > (1) Stay with the current universe if you like. > (2) Change to PU and become perfect. Aye, there's the rub. I can't become WC-perfect and remain me. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument - Comp
>From: Brent Meeker >... >But I like to eat. I like to eat steak. A world in which I can't eat >steak is not perfect for me. > > > People with common intelligence can easily *imagine* (or dream) what a >PU > will be. > >I guess I have uncommon intelligence :-) since I can't imagine what a PU >would be. I can't even imagine exactly what would be a perfect universe >for me. Do I want more security...or more adventure? Sure I want to >suceed...but maybe not too easily. Do I really need to be the world's >greatest tennis, chess, and billiards player? > Don't worry. I already have a solution for this: Before I adjust the universe to become perfect, I will send everyone one message (by telepathy) to let you decide: (1) Stay with the current universe if you like. (2) Change to PU and become perfect. Thanks. WC. _ Get 10Mb extra storage for MSN Hotmail. Subscribe Now! http://join.msn.com/?pgmarket=en-hk --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
W. C. wrote: >>From: Brent Meeker > > >>I don't think it's possible, because "perfect" is subjective. Perfect for >>the lion is bad for the antelope. >> > > > Such problem doesn't exist in PU. > In PU, there is no food chain like "A eats B; B eats C; C eats D ... etc.". > Perfect beings (both living and non-living) mean no unhappiness (you don't > feel happy when you are eaten, right?). > Why living beings need to eat? But I like to eat. I like to eat steak. A world in which I can't eat steak is not perfect for me. > People with common intelligence can easily *imagine* (or dream) what a PU > will be. I guess I have uncommon intelligence :-) since I can't imagine what a PU would be. I can't even imagine exactly what would be a perfect universe for me. Do I want more security...or more adventure? Sure I want to suceed...but maybe not too easily. Do I really need to be the world's greatest tennis, chess, and billiards player? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument - Comp
>From: Brent Meeker >I don't think it's possible, because "perfect" is subjective. Perfect for >the lion is bad for the antelope. > Such problem doesn't exist in PU. In PU, there is no food chain like "A eats B; B eats C; C eats D ... etc.". Perfect beings (both living and non-living) mean no unhappiness (you don't feel happy when you are eaten, right?). Why living beings need to eat? People with common intelligence can easily *imagine* (or dream) what a PU will be. The difficult thing is how to make it. (The rule is always simple: If I can't make it, it's just dream.) Thanks. WC. _ Get 10Mb extra storage for MSN Hotmail. Subscribe Now! http://join.msn.com/?pgmarket=en-hk --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Norman Samish wrote: > I read Fabric of Reality several years ago, but didn't understand it well. I > intuitively agree with Asher Peres that Deutsch's version of MWI > too-flagrantly violates Occam's Razor. Perhaps I should read it again. This is diusputed, e.g. in http://www.hedweb.com/manworld.htm Q21 Does many-worlds violate Ockham's Razor? William of Ockham, 1285-1349(?) English philosopher and one of the founders of logic, proposed a maxim for judging theories which says that hypotheses should not be multiplied beyond necessity. This is known as Ockham's razor and is interpreted, today, as meaning that to account for any set of facts the simplest theories are to be preferred over more complex ones. Many-worlds is viewed as unnecessarily complex, by some, by requiring the existence of a multiplicity of worlds to explain what we see, at any time, in just one world. This is to mistake what is meant by "complex". Here's an example. Analysis of starlight reveals that starlight is very similar to faint sunlight, both with spectroscopic absorption and emission lines. Assuming the universality of physical law we are led to conclude that other stars and worlds are scattered, in great numbers, across the cosmos. The theory that "the stars are distant suns" is the simplest theory and so to be preferred by Ockham's Razor to other geocentric theories. Similarly many-worlds is the simplest and most economical quantum theory because it proposes that same laws of physics apply to animate observers as has been observed for inanimate objects. The multiplicity of worlds predicted by the theory is not a weakness of many-worlds, any more than the multiplicity of stars are for astronomers, since the non-interacting worlds emerge from a simpler theory. (As an historical aside it is worth noting that Ockham's razor was also falsely used to argue in favour of the older heliocentric theories against Galileo's notion of the vastness of the cosmos. The notion of vast empty interstellar spaces was too uneconomical to be believable to the Medieval mind. Again they were confusing the notion of vastness with complexity [15].) > I even attended a lecture by John Wheeler, David Deutsch's thesis advisor. > He gave me the same sense of unease that FoR did. > > While I have no better explanation for quantum mysteries, I remain agnostic. > "MWI's main conclusion is that the universe (or multiverse in this context) > is composed of a quantum superposition of very many, possibly infinitely > many, increasingly divergent, non-communicating parallel universes or quantum > worlds." (Wikipedia) > > I also can't buy "wavefunction collapse." That is unofortunate, because if you do not have collapse, you have MW, and if you do nto have MW, you have collapse. > Perhaps some undiscovered phenomenon is responsible for quantum mysteries - > e.g., maybe the explanation lies in one or more of the ten dimensions that > string theory requires. What is "responsible" for quantum phenomena is the way the universe works. What needs explaining is how the appearance of a classical world-re-emerges. > Maybe these undiscovered dimensions somehow allow the fabled paired photons > to instantly communicate with each other over astronomical distances. This > is a WAG (wild-ass guess) of course, but it's more believable to me than new > universes being constantly generated. This is already explained: what allows them to communicate is the fact that they occupy an infinitely-dimensional Hilbert space. What needs explaining is how that ends up looking like 3D classical/relativistic space. > However, I CAN see some logic to the idea that Tegmark introduced me to - the > idea that, in infinite space, a multiverse exists containing all possible > universes - and we inhabit one of them. Then the quantum universe will be one of them. But why shouldn't it be the only one ? > I believe that, in infinite time and space, anything that can happen must > happen, not only once but an infinite number of times. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Apologies to the list and to Stathis especially! I replied to Stathis - and "lost" the text - at least I thought so. That happens in Yahoo-mail sometimes and so far I could not detect which 'key' did I touch wrong? So I wrote another one and mailed it all right. Then in the mail I detected my 'original' and "lost" text, it was snatched away and mailed. The two are pretty different. Redface John - Original Message - From: "John M" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 8:12 AM Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp > > Stathis: > "I know that whatever theory I come up with will almost certainly be > proved > wrong given enough > time, so I won't bother coming up with a theory at all." > Funny that you of all people come up with such a supposition so different > from fundamental basic human nature! > We all hope to be smarter than , And speculate. > Even those "scientists" you refer to. > "Evidence"? that is what I scrutinize. It is subject to the level of our > ongoing epistemic enrichment and without later findings one settles with > insufficient ones that become soon obsolete. > I was challenged to propose technical levels 50 years ahead. It is > impossible. I rather try to compose "what and why" of our present > technological and theoretical status could we NOT imagine 60 years > ago...it > is entertaining. > > Man is optimist. Even myself with a cynical pessimism. > > John M > > > - Original Message - > From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: "John M" > Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 7:22 AM > Subject: RE: Bruno's argument - Comp > > > > John M writes: > >> Earlier we lived in a telephone central switchboard, further back in a >> steam-engine. Not to mention the Turtle. >> The 'cat' specifies IMO ignorance without prejudice. > > Very droll, very true! But what, then, must we do? Scientists come up with > the > best theory consistent with the evidence, with a willingness to revise the > theory > in the light of new evidence. They might not be quite as willing as they > ideally > should be, but that's just human nature, and they all come around to doing > the > right thing eventually. It would not be very helpful if we all thought, "I > know that > whatever theory I come up with will almost certainly be proved wrong given > enough > time, so I won't bother coming up with a theory at all." > > Stathis Papaioannou > > >> > I recently read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit is >> > may >> > be >> > a quantum computer. Presumably when we observe Schrodinger's cat >> > simultaneously being killed and not killed, we are observing the >> > quantum >> > computer in action. >> > >> > Norman Samish >> > ~ >> > - Original Message - >> > From: "John M" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >> > To: >> > Sent: Thursday, August 03, 2006 2:05 PM >> > Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp >> > >> > >> >> >> >> To All: >> >> I know my questions below are beyond our comprehension, but we read >> >> (and >> >> write) so much about this idea that I feel compelled to ask: >> >> >> >> is there any idea why there would be 'comp'? our computers require >> >> juice >> >> to >> >> work and if unplugged they represent a very expensive paperweight. >> >> >> >> What kind of "computing unit" (universe? multiverse, or some other >> >> satanic >> >> 'verse') would run by itself without being supplied by something that >> >> moves >> >> it? I hate to ask about its program as well, whether it is an >> >> "intelligent >> >> design"? >> >> Is it a pseudnym for some godlike mystery? >> >> >> >> Are we reinventing the religion? >> >> >> >> John Mikes >> > >> > >> >> >> > > > _ > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d > > > > > -- > No virus found in this incoming message. > Checked by AVG Free Edition. > Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.10.7/409 - Release Date: 8/4/2006 > > > > > > > > -- > No virus found in this incoming message. > Checked by AVG Free Edition. > Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.10.7/410 - Release Date: 8/5/2006 > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Stathis, you (of all people) underestimate human optimism and self confidence. "MY THEORY"? the 'others' maybe, they become proven wrong and false, not mine! Then again where is an acceptable evidence? to whom? Ask Goedel, ask Popper, ask all people who 'think' differently. Bruno has different evidence for his position in his reply to my question today than I had when I asked it. Not even a (confirmed?) "Pysical"experiment is 'evidendce'. wHO do you call a 'scientist'? the one who accepts an evidence, or who does not? Best wishes John M - Original Message - From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "John M" Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 7:22 AM Subject: RE: Bruno's argument - Comp John M writes: > Earlier we lived in a telephone central switchboard, further back in a > steam-engine. Not to mention the Turtle. > The 'cat' specifies IMO ignorance without prejudice. Very droll, very true! But what, then, must we do? Scientists come up with the best theory consistent with the evidence, with a willingness to revise the theory in the light of new evidence. They might not be quite as willing as they ideally should be, but that's just human nature, and they all come around to doing the right thing eventually. It would not be very helpful if we all thought, "I know that whatever theory I come up with will almost certainly be proved wrong given enough time, so I won't bother coming up with a theory at all." Stathis Papaioannou > > I recently read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit is > > may > > be > > a quantum computer. Presumably when we observe Schrodinger's cat > > simultaneously being killed and not killed, we are observing the quantum > > computer in action. > > > > Norman Samish > > ~ > > - Original Message - > > From: "John M" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > To: > > Sent: Thursday, August 03, 2006 2:05 PM > > Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp > > > > > >> > >> To All: > >> I know my questions below are beyond our comprehension, but we read > >> (and > >> write) so much about this idea that I feel compelled to ask: > >> > >> is there any idea why there would be 'comp'? our computers require > >> juice > >> to > >> work and if unplugged they represent a very expensive paperweight. > >> > >> What kind of "computing unit" (universe? multiverse, or some other > >> satanic > >> 'verse') would run by itself without being supplied by something that > >> moves > >> it? I hate to ask about its program as well, whether it is an > >> "intelligent > >> design"? > >> Is it a pseudnym for some godlike mystery? > >> > >> Are we reinventing the religion? > >> > >> John Mikes > > > > > > > > _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.10.7/409 - Release Date: 8/4/2006 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Norman Samish wrote: > I read Fabric of Reality several years ago, but didn't understand it > well. I intuitively agree with Asher Peres that Deutsch's version of > MWI too-flagrantly violates Occam's Razor. Perhaps I should read it > again. > > I even attended a lecture by John Wheeler, David Deutsch's thesis > advisor. He gave me the same sense of unease that FoR did. > > While I have no better explanation for quantum mysteries, I > remain agnostic. "MWI's main conclusion is that the universe (or > multiverse in this context) is composed of a quantum superposition of > very many, possibly infinitely many, increasingly divergent, > non-communicating parallel universes or quantum worlds." (Wikipedia) > > I also can't buy "wavefunction collapse." If you don't buy MWI (or the more modestly name "relative state" version, which is what Everett called it) then you have to "collapse" the wavefunction some way. Decoherence theory has shown that a density matrix for any instrument or observer is quickly diagonalized FAPP. So if you can just ignored those 1e-100 cross-terms you're back to ordinary probabilities. Then as Omnes' remarks, it's a probabilistic theory - which means it predicts one thing happens and the others don't. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
John M wrote: > Stathis: > "I know that whatever theory I come up with will almost certainly be proved > wrong given enough > time, so I won't bother coming up with a theory at all." > Funny that you of all people come up with such a supposition so different > from fundamental basic human nature! > We all hope to be smarter than , And speculate. > Even those "scientists" you refer to. > "Evidence"? that is what I scrutinize. It is subject to the level of our > ongoing epistemic enrichment and without later findings one settles with > insufficient ones that become soon obsolete. > I was challenged to propose technical levels 50 years ahead. It is > impossible. I rather try to compose "what and why" of our present > technological and theoretical status could we NOT imagine 60 years ago...it > is entertaining. > > Man is optimist. Even myself with a cynical pessimism. > > John M Many years ago my dissertation advisor was working a science fiction story in which some men were sent to a planet of Alpha Centauri during the late 1800's by some kind of gun/rocket. They return in 1970. Their stories are of course great fodder for the newspapers - but their reports about the planet are scientifically worthless because they haven't asked the right questions, didn't have the right instruments, and didn't know the current science. Much of what they claim to have discovered about the planet is already known to be wrong based on data from a huge orbiting telescope (anticipating Hubble) that has been used to observe the planet. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
W. C. wrote: > I think it's always good to have all different kinds of theories to explain > our universe. > Whatever current theories are, our understanding could be always limited by > our limitations > (as designed by the so-called Creator if any). > So I always think it's possible to produce a perfect universe by some way > (although other theories say impossible). I don't think it's possible, because "perfect" is subjective. Perfect for the lion is bad for the antelope. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
I read Fabric of Reality several years ago, but didn't understand it well. I intuitively agree with Asher Peres that Deutsch's version of MWI too-flagrantly violates Occam's Razor. Perhaps I should read it again. I even attended a lecture by John Wheeler, David Deutsch's thesis advisor. He gave me the same sense of unease that FoR did. While I have no better explanation for quantum mysteries, I remain agnostic. "MWI's main conclusion is that the universe (or multiverse in this context) is composed of a quantum superposition of very many, possibly infinitely many, increasingly divergent, non-communicating parallel universes or quantum worlds." (Wikipedia)I also can't buy "wavefunction collapse." Perhaps some undiscovered phenomenon is responsible for quantum mysteries - e.g., maybe the explanation lies in one or more of the ten dimensions that string theory requires. Maybe these undiscovered dimensions somehow allow the fabled paired photons to instantly communicate with each other over astronomical distances. This is a WAG (wild-ass guess) of course, but it's more believable to me than new universes being constantly generated. However, I CAN see some logic to the idea that Tegmark introduced me to - the idea that, in infinite space, a multiverse exists containing all possible universes - and we inhabit one of them. I believe that, in infinite time and space, anything that can happen must happen, not only once but an infinite number of times. I freely admit that there are a lot of things I can't understand, e.g. more than three physical dimensions, the concept of infinity, time without beginniing or end, and the like. The reason I lurk on this list is to try to gain understanding. I sit at the feet of brilliant thinkers and listen.Norman~~- Original Message - From: "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>To: "Everything List" Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 11:06 AMSubject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp> > > Norman Samish wrote:>> Thanks - with your help plus Wikipedia I now have an hypothesis about your>> statement. It seems to boil down to "Schrodinger's Cat has nothing to do>> with quantum computers other than they both depend on quantum>> superpositions."> > Correct.> >> Fair enough.>>>> When I read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit may be a>> quantum computer, it enlarged my concept of all possible realities to>> include all possible states of quantum superpositions. In half of these>> S.C. is alive; in half it is dead.> > That's just standard MWI. BTW, you didn't answer my question about FoR. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Norman Samish wrote: > Thanks - with your help plus Wikipedia I now have an hypothesis about your > statement. It seems to boil down to "Schrodinger's Cat has nothing to do > with quantum computers other than they both depend on quantum > superpositions." Correct. > Fair enough. > > When I read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit may be a > quantum computer, it enlarged my concept of all possible realities to > include all possible states of quantum superpositions. In half of these > S.C. is alive; in half it is dead. That's just standard MWI. BTW, you didn't answer my question about FoR. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Thanks - with your help plus Wikipedia I now have an hypothesis about your statement. It seems to boil down to "Schrodinger's Cat has nothing to do with quantum computers other than they both depend on quantum superpositions." Fair enough. When I read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit may be a quantum computer, it enlarged my concept of all possible realities to include all possible states of quantum superpositions. In half of these S.C. is alive; in half it is dead. Norman Samish ~~~` - Original Message - From: "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Everything List" Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 5:35 AM Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp > > > Norman Samish wrote: >> 1Z, >> I don't know what you mean. > > That is unfortunate, because as far as I am concerned everyhting > I am saying is obvious. (Have you read "The fabric of Reality" ?) > >> Perhaps I can understand your statement, but >> only after I get answers to the following questions: >> 1) What do you mean by "Quantum computer"? > > A computer that exploits quantum superpositions to achieve parallelism. > >> 2) What do you mean by "Quantum universe"? > > A universe (or multiverse) in which quantum physics is a true > description of reality. > >> 3) Why is a Quantum Computer only possible in a Quantum Universe? > > It exploits quantum physics. > >> 4) Why is Schrodinger's Cat possible in "quantum universes" without >> computational assistance? > > Superpositions are an implication of quantum mechanics. Schrodinger's > Cat > was mooted decades before anyone even thought of quantum computaion. > >> Norman >> >> - Original Message - >> From: "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> >> To: "Everything List" >> Sent: Saturday, August 05, 2006 2:43 PM >> Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp >> >> >> > >> > >> > Norman Samish wrote: >> >> I recently read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit may >> >> be >> >> a quantum computer. Presumably when we observe Schrodinger's cat >> >> simultaneously being killed and not killed, we are observing the >> >> quantum >> >> computer in action. >> > >> Quantum computers are only possible in quantum universes, and in quantum >> universes, S's C is possible without computational assistance. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Norman Samish wrote: > 1Z, > I don't know what you mean. That is unfortunate, because as far as I am concerned everyhting I am saying is obvious. (Have you read "The fabric of Reality" ?) > Perhaps I can understand your statement, but > only after I get answers to the following questions: > 1) What do you mean by "Quantum computer"? A computer that exploits quantum superpositions to achieve parallelism. > 2) What do you mean by "Quantum universe"? A universe (or multiverse) in which quantum physics is a true description of reality. > 3) Why is a Quantum Computer only possible in a Quantum Universe? It exploits quantum physics. > 4) Why is Schrodinger's Cat possible in "quantum universes" without > computational assistance? Superpositions are an implication of quantum mechanics. Schrodinger's Cat was mooted decades before anyone even thought of quantum computaion. > Norman > > - Original Message - > From: "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: "Everything List" > Sent: Saturday, August 05, 2006 2:43 PM > Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp > > > > > > > > Norman Samish wrote: > >> I recently read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit may be > >> a quantum computer. Presumably when we observe Schrodinger's cat > >> simultaneously being killed and not killed, we are observing the quantum > >> computer in action. > > > Quantum computers are only possible in quantum universes, and in quantum > universes, S's C is possible without computational assistance. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Stathis: "I know that whatever theory I come up with will almost certainly be proved wrong given enough time, so I won't bother coming up with a theory at all." Funny that you of all people come up with such a supposition so different from fundamental basic human nature! We all hope to be smarter than , And speculate. Even those "scientists" you refer to. "Evidence"? that is what I scrutinize. It is subject to the level of our ongoing epistemic enrichment and without later findings one settles with insufficient ones that become soon obsolete. I was challenged to propose technical levels 50 years ahead. It is impossible. I rather try to compose "what and why" of our present technological and theoretical status could we NOT imagine 60 years ago...it is entertaining. Man is optimist. Even myself with a cynical pessimism. John M - Original Message - From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "John M" Sent: Sunday, August 06, 2006 7:22 AM Subject: RE: Bruno's argument - Comp John M writes: > Earlier we lived in a telephone central switchboard, further back in a > steam-engine. Not to mention the Turtle. > The 'cat' specifies IMO ignorance without prejudice. Very droll, very true! But what, then, must we do? Scientists come up with the best theory consistent with the evidence, with a willingness to revise the theory in the light of new evidence. They might not be quite as willing as they ideally should be, but that's just human nature, and they all come around to doing the right thing eventually. It would not be very helpful if we all thought, "I know that whatever theory I come up with will almost certainly be proved wrong given enough time, so I won't bother coming up with a theory at all." Stathis Papaioannou > > I recently read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit is > > may > > be > > a quantum computer. Presumably when we observe Schrodinger's cat > > simultaneously being killed and not killed, we are observing the quantum > > computer in action. > > > > Norman Samish > > ~~~~~ > > - Original Message - > > From: "John M" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > To: > > Sent: Thursday, August 03, 2006 2:05 PM > > Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp > > > > > >> > >> To All: > >> I know my questions below are beyond our comprehension, but we read > >> (and > >> write) so much about this idea that I feel compelled to ask: > >> > >> is there any idea why there would be 'comp'? our computers require > >> juice > >> to > >> work and if unplugged they represent a very expensive paperweight. > >> > >> What kind of "computing unit" (universe? multiverse, or some other > >> satanic > >> 'verse') would run by itself without being supplied by something that > >> moves > >> it? I hate to ask about its program as well, whether it is an > >> "intelligent > >> design"? > >> Is it a pseudnym for some godlike mystery? > >> > >> Are we reinventing the religion? > >> > >> John Mikes > > > > > > > > _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.10.7/409 - Release Date: 8/4/2006 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument - Comp
John M writes: > Earlier we lived in a telephone central switchboard, further back in a > steam-engine. Not to mention the Turtle. > The 'cat' specifies IMO ignorance without prejudice. Very droll, very true! But what, then, must we do? Scientists come up with the best theory consistent with the evidence, with a willingness to revise the theory in the light of new evidence. They might not be quite as willing as they ideally should be, but that's just human nature, and they all come around to doing the right thing eventually. It would not be very helpful if we all thought, "I know that whatever theory I come up with will almost certainly be proved wrong given enough time, so I won't bother coming up with a theory at all." Stathis Papaioannou > > I recently read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit is may > > be > > a quantum computer. Presumably when we observe Schrodinger's cat > > simultaneously being killed and not killed, we are observing the quantum > > computer in action. > > > > Norman Samish > > ~ > > - Original Message - > > From: "John M" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > > To: > > Sent: Thursday, August 03, 2006 2:05 PM > > Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp > > > > > >> > >> To All: > >> I know my questions below are beyond our comprehension, but we read (and > >> write) so much about this idea that I feel compelled to ask: > >> > >> is there any idea why there would be 'comp'? our computers require juice > >> to > >> work and if unplugged they represent a very expensive paperweight. > >> > >> What kind of "computing unit" (universe? multiverse, or some other > >> satanic > >> 'verse') would run by itself without being supplied by something that > >> moves > >> it? I hate to ask about its program as well, whether it is an > >> "intelligent > >> design"? > >> Is it a pseudnym for some godlike mystery? > >> > >> Are we reinventing the religion? > >> > >> John Mikes > > > > > > > > _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
1Z, I don't know what you mean. Perhaps I can understand your statement, but only after I get answers to the following questions: 1) What do you mean by "Quantum computer"? 2) What do you mean by "Quantum universe"? 3) Why is a Quantum Computer only possible in a Quantum Universe? 4) Why is Schrodinger's Cat possible in "quantum universes" without computational assistance? Norman - Original Message - From: "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Everything List" Sent: Saturday, August 05, 2006 2:43 PM Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp > > > Norman Samish wrote: >> I recently read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit may be >> a quantum computer. Presumably when we observe Schrodinger's cat >> simultaneously being killed and not killed, we are observing the quantum >> computer in action. > Quantum computers are only possible in quantum universes, and in quantum universes, S's C is possible without computational assistance. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument - Comp
>From: Quentin Anciaux > >Hi, I've checked and I do not see an absolute meaning to perfection. > OK. If you want more, I will say perfection in PU is *every being is perfect and feels perfect (if it has feeling)*. This doesn't mean that every being is exactly the same. They may have different special functions. But they are all perfect. They are born with highest self-fulfillment and happiness (if needed) and all resources, no need to follow life cycles (born, aged, sick, death etc.). So a PU is without any wars/crimes/conflicts, any bad things, any natural disasters ... etc. If you want even more, I think I need to write down some math. formulas/theorems etc. But it takes time. Thanks. WC. _ Learn English via Shopping Game, FREE! http://www.linguaphonenet.com/BannerTrack.asp?EMSCode=MSN06-03ETFJ-0211E --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Norman Samish wrote: > I recently read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit is may be > a quantum computer. Presumably when we observe Schrodinger's cat > simultaneously being killed and not killed, we are observing the quantum > computer in action. Quantum computers are only possible in quantum universes, and in quantum universes, S's C is possible without computational assistance. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Earlier we lived in a telephone central switchboard, further back in a steam-engine. Not to mention the Turtle. The 'cat' specifies IMO ignorance without prejudice. John M - Original Message - From: "Norman Samish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Friday, August 04, 2006 9:04 PM Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp > > I recently read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit is may > be > a quantum computer. Presumably when we observe Schrodinger's cat > simultaneously being killed and not killed, we are observing the quantum > computer in action. > > Norman Samish > ~ > - Original Message - > From: "John M" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > To: > Sent: Thursday, August 03, 2006 2:05 PM > Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp > > >> >> To All: >> I know my questions below are beyond our comprehension, but we read (and >> write) so much about this idea that I feel compelled to ask: >> >> is there any idea why there would be 'comp'? our computers require juice >> to >> work and if unplugged they represent a very expensive paperweight. >> >> What kind of "computing unit" (universe? multiverse, or some other >> satanic >> 'verse') would run by itself without being supplied by something that >> moves >> it? I hate to ask about its program as well, whether it is an >> "intelligent >> design"? >> Is it a pseudnym for some godlike mystery? >> >> Are we reinventing the religion? >> >> John Mikes > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Bruno: I am sorry to have asked that question. I meant 'religion' as assigning those 'unanswered' questions to some super-authority and 'believe' an answer assigned as if a higher authority-wisdom would have provided them, whilst they came from (definitely wise) humans of THAT age (i.e. level of epistemic readiness). Mostly with mystical painting. Then later on powers picked it up, formulated those ideas into formats according to their goals (any, according to the 'times') and waged brutal wars all the way to this day. Instead of in a - as you said - modestly scientific manner admitting our ignorance. Which does not interfere with trying to find solutions How about steering 'comp' in the direction of the 3rd millennium level of ideas AD instead of BC times? Sorry, I don't know those gentlemen you mention, but it seems they want to explain the fundamentally unknown by parts (ideas) of the same fundamentally unknown . Matter? Math-cal logic? Computer science? all embedded into the age-old ways. Even the last one, unless it 'forms' out itself from its rather embryonic phase of the early development. (Digital that is). John M - Original Message - From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Saturday, August 05, 2006 9:04 AM Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp Le 03-août-06, à 23:05, John M a écrit : > Are we reinventing the religion? Yes. Now, it is not that science is suddenly so clever that it can solve the problem in religion. It is (justifiably assuming comp) that we can approach some religion's problem with the modesty inherent in the scientific attitude, and then deduce testable facts. That scientific attitude has ALWAYS been in conflict, of course, with all form of scientism or religionism or whatever based on authoritative arguments. It is fair to say that Aristotelism has probably saved the observation of nature from the influence of such authoritative arguments, but it has saved only that, and I think it could perhaps be time to dare, at least, reformulate unsolved old question. Comp gives an opportunity to do that. It clearly provides the tools. As Rudy Rucker, Judson Webb, Paul Benacerraf, and others have already shown, notably, is that computer science and mathematical logic makes it possible to develop theories putting light on those questions. About the nature of "matter", Comp, then, appears to go more in the direction of Plato and Plotinus than Aristotle. Is that even astonishing? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ -- No virus found in this incoming message. Checked by AVG Free Edition. Version: 7.1.394 / Virus Database: 268.10.7/409 - Release Date: 8/4/2006 --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
OK John, I say more on your post. Le 03-août-06, à 23:05, John M a écrit : > > To All: > I know my questions below are beyond our comprehension, but we read > (and > write) so much about this idea that I feel compelled to ask: > > is there any idea why there would be 'comp'? our computers require > juice to > work and if unplugged they represent a very expensive paperweight. Sure. > > What kind of "computing unit" (universe? multiverse, or some other > satanic > 'verse') would run by itself without being supplied by something that > moves > it? Space and movement would be how numbers see themselves, in case comp is assumed (that is in case you say "yes" to the doctor). > I hate to ask about its program as well, whether it is an "intelligent > design"? Even without comp, but with the weaker "everything idea" we have already throw out the "intelligent design" idea. The problem is "what is "everything"?". With comp, actually with just Church thesis, we do have a notion of universality which is formalism and theory independent. It is one of the major discovery of last century. It is unique in math. > Is it a pseudnym for some godlike mystery? > > Are we reinventing the religion? See my preceding post. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Le 03-août-06, à 23:05, John M a écrit : > Are we reinventing the religion? Yes. Now, it is not that science is suddenly so clever that it can solve the problem in religion. It is (justifiably assuming comp) that we can approach some religion's problem with the modesty inherent in the scientific attitude, and then deduce testable facts. That scientific attitude has ALWAYS been in conflict, of course, with all form of scientism or religionism or whatever based on authoritative arguments. It is fair to say that Aristotelism has probably saved the observation of nature from the influence of such authoritative arguments, but it has saved only that, and I think it could perhaps be time to dare, at least, reformulate unsolved old question. Comp gives an opportunity to do that. It clearly provides the tools. As Rudy Rucker, Judson Webb, Paul Benacerraf, and others have already shown, notably, is that computer science and mathematical logic makes it possible to develop theories putting light on those questions. About the nature of "matter", Comp, then, appears to go more in the direction of Plato and Plotinus than Aristotle. Is that even astonishing? Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Hi, I've checked and I do not see an absolute meaning to perfection. Le Samedi 5 Août 2006 13:12, W. C. a écrit : > Good question. But I don't think we need to define "perfect". > You can check the dictionary to know its meaning. > Your killing example won't exist in the PU. Otherwise it won't be PU. It won't be in *your view* of *your* PU... That shows that PU notion has no meaning... or I should say the meaning is tied to the person who think of it. Regards, Quentin > >From: everything-list@googlegroups.com The problem with perfection is that > >this word has *no* absolute meaning. > > > >Then depending on your culture/history it can have a different meaning. > > > >Stupid example: Imagine you are a serial killer... perfect world for you > >would be a world were you can kill at will ;) But you would say that a > >serial killer cannot be in a perfect world (I'd say he cannot be in your > >perfect world, not his). > > > >So unless there exists an absolute meaning of perfection, PU seems > >impossible or I should say meaningless. > > > >Quentin > > _ > No masks required! Use MSN Messenger to chat with friends and family. > http://go.msnserver.com/HK/25382.asp > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument - Comp
Good question. But I don't think we need to define "perfect". You can check the dictionary to know its meaning. Your killing example won't exist in the PU. Otherwise it won't be PU. >From: everything-list@googlegroups.com The problem with perfection is that >this word has *no* absolute meaning. > >Then depending on your culture/history it can have a different meaning. > >Stupid example: Imagine you are a serial killer... perfect world for you >would be a world were you can kill at will ;) But you would say that a >serial killer cannot be in a perfect world (I'd say he cannot be in your >perfect world, not his). > >So unless there exists an absolute meaning of perfection, PU seems >impossible or I should say meaningless. > >Quentin _ No masks required! Use MSN Messenger to chat with friends and family. http://go.msnserver.com/HK/25382.asp --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
Hi, The problem with perfection is that this word has *no* absolute meaning. Then depending on your culture/history it can have a different meaning. Stupid example: Imagine you are a serial killer... perfect world for you would be a world were you can kill at will ;) But you would say that a serial killer cannot be in a perfect world (I'd say he cannot be in your perfect world, not his). So unless there exists an absolute meaning of perfection, PU seems impossible or I should say meaningless. Quentin Le Samedi 5 Août 2006 12:41, W. C. a écrit : > I think it's always good to have all different kinds of theories to explain > our universe. > Whatever current theories are, our understanding could be always limited by > our limitations > (as designed by the so-called Creator if any). > So I always think it's possible to produce a perfect universe by some way > (although other theories say impossible). > Then all living beings can live in a paradise-like universe. > In this (infinite) universe with infinite resources, it makes sense that > all living beings should be in paradise. > In one sentence, there should be free lunch for all. > All beings should be created perfect with everything needed forever. > Maybe the solution won't come from the so-called evolution and the slow > science/technology development. > It could come from some magic (sorry if you think I am unscientific). > There should be some magic to make the universe perfect instantly. > > Thanks. > > WC. > > >From: John M > >To All: > >I know my questions below are beyond our comprehension, but we read (and > >write) so much about this idea that I feel compelled to ask: > > > > is there any idea why there would be 'comp'? our computers require juice > >to work and if unplugged they represent a very expensive paperweight. > > > >What kind of "computing unit" (universe? multiverse, or some other satanic > >'verse') would run by itself without being supplied by something that > > moves it? I hate to ask about its program as well, whether it is an > > "intelligent design"? > >Is it a pseudnym for some godlike mystery? > > > >Are we reinventing the religion? > > _ > Learn English via Shopping Game, FREE! > http://www.linguaphonenet.com/BannerTrack.asp?EMSCode=MSN06-03ETFJ-0211E > > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument - Comp
I think it's always good to have all different kinds of theories to explain our universe. Whatever current theories are, our understanding could be always limited by our limitations (as designed by the so-called Creator if any). So I always think it's possible to produce a perfect universe by some way (although other theories say impossible). Then all living beings can live in a paradise-like universe. In this (infinite) universe with infinite resources, it makes sense that all living beings should be in paradise. In one sentence, there should be free lunch for all. All beings should be created perfect with everything needed forever. Maybe the solution won't come from the so-called evolution and the slow science/technology development. It could come from some magic (sorry if you think I am unscientific). There should be some magic to make the universe perfect instantly. Thanks. WC. >From: John M >To All: >I know my questions below are beyond our comprehension, but we read (and >write) so much about this idea that I feel compelled to ask: > > is there any idea why there would be 'comp'? our computers require juice >to work and if unplugged they represent a very expensive paperweight. > >What kind of "computing unit" (universe? multiverse, or some other satanic >'verse') would run by itself without being supplied by something that moves >it? I hate to ask about its program as well, whether it is an "intelligent >design"? >Is it a pseudnym for some godlike mystery? > >Are we reinventing the religion? > _ Learn English via Shopping Game, FREE! http://www.linguaphonenet.com/BannerTrack.asp?EMSCode=MSN06-03ETFJ-0211E --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
I recently read somebody's speculation that the reality we inhabit is may be a quantum computer. Presumably when we observe Schrodinger's cat simultaneously being killed and not killed, we are observing the quantum computer in action. Norman Samish ~ - Original Message - From: "John M" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Thursday, August 03, 2006 2:05 PM Subject: Re: Bruno's argument - Comp > > To All: > I know my questions below are beyond our comprehension, but we read (and > write) so much about this idea that I feel compelled to ask: > > is there any idea why there would be 'comp'? our computers require juice > to > work and if unplugged they represent a very expensive paperweight. > > What kind of "computing unit" (universe? multiverse, or some other satanic > 'verse') would run by itself without being supplied by something that > moves > it? I hate to ask about its program as well, whether it is an "intelligent > design"? > Is it a pseudnym for some godlike mystery? > > Are we reinventing the religion? > > John Mikes --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument - Comp
To All: I know my questions below are beyond our comprehension, but we read (and write) so much about this idea that I feel compelled to ask: is there any idea why there would be 'comp'? our computers require juice to work and if unplugged they represent a very expensive paperweight. What kind of "computing unit" (universe? multiverse, or some other satanic 'verse') would run by itself without being supplied by something that moves it? I hate to ask about its program as well, whether it is an "intelligent design"? Is it a pseudnym for some godlike mystery? Are we reinventing the religion? John Mikes --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
I think if you stack all possible recordings together in the way you
suggest, connected in such as way as to be indistinguishable from a
computation occuring with all its counterfactuals in the Multiverse,
then what you have is a computation.
Cheers
On Fri, Aug 04, 2006 at 02:55:18PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Russell Standish writes:
>
> > In the Multiverse, there is a huge difference between a recording and
> > the actual computation. Only in one single universe (or history) of
> > the ensemble do the two coincide.
> >
> > The "recording is a computation" issue is only a problem for single
> > universe theory IMHO.
>
> Do you mean that the recording is static while the computation branches
> out in the MV? Couldn't we also say that all possible related recordings
> exist
> somewhere in the multiverse, giving just as broad a variety of putative
> computations as the conventional computer? In any case, even if the
> recording is confined to a single universe while the computation roams all
> over the ensemble, does that necessarily say anything about whether the
> recording can be conscious?
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
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RE: Bruno's argument
Russell Standish writes: > In the Multiverse, there is a huge difference between a recording and > the actual computation. Only in one single universe (or history) of > the ensemble do the two coincide. > > The "recording is a computation" issue is only a problem for single > universe theory IMHO. Do you mean that the recording is static while the computation branches out in the MV? Couldn't we also say that all possible related recordings exist somewhere in the multiverse, giving just as broad a variety of putative computations as the conventional computer? In any case, even if the recording is confined to a single universe while the computation roams all over the ensemble, does that necessarily say anything about whether the recording can be conscious? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument
Brent Meeker writes: > > The brain-with-wires-attached cannot interact with the environment, because > > all its sense organs have been removed and the stimulation is just coming > > from > > a recording. Instead of the wires + recording we could say that there is a > > special > > group of neurons with spontaneous activity that stimulates the rest of the > > brain > > just as if it were receiving input from the environment. Such a brain would > > have > > no ability to interact with the environment, unless the effort were made to > > figure out its internal code and then manufacture sense organs for it - but > > I > > think that would be stretching the definition of "potential interaction". > > In any > > case, I don't see how "potential interaction" could make a difference. > > Yet you had to refer to "stimulate...as if it were receiving input from the > environment" to create an example. If there were no potential interaction > there could be no "as if". So istm that the potential interaction can be an > essential part of the definition. That's not to say that such a definition > is right - definitions aren't right or wrong - but it's a definition that > makes a useful distinction that comports with our common sense. It's very difficult to define "potential interaction". With even a completely solipsistic computer we could imagine taking readings at various points in the circuit with an oscilloscope and/or changing circuit voltages, capacitance, resistance etc. Is the fact that we *could* do this enough to make the computer conscious? Or would it only be conscious if we had access to its design specifications, so that we could in principle communicate with it meaningfully rather than just making random changes? What if the human race died out but the computer continued to function, with no hope that anyone might ever talk to it? What if the computer had very complex (putatively) conscious thoughts, but rather simple input and output, eg. it beeps when the counts from a connected geiger counter matches the number it happens to be thinking of at the time: would that be enough to make it conscious or does the environmental interaction have to match or reflect (or potentially so) the complexity of its internal thoughts? > >If you had > > two brains sitting in the dark, identical in anatomy and electrical > > activity except > > that one has its optic nerves cut, will one brain be conscious and the > > other not? > > Where did the brains come from? Since they had optic nerves can we suppose > that they had the potential to see photons and they still have this > potential given replacement optic nerves? Not necessarily. Suppose one > came from a cat that was raised in complete darkness. We know > experimentally that this cat can't see...even when there is light. The lack > of stimulus results in the brain not forming the necessary structures for > interpreting signals from the retina. Now suppose it were raised with no > stimulus whatever, even in utero. I conjecture that it would not "think" at > all - although there would be "computation", i.e. neurons firing in some > order. But it would no longer have the potential for interaction; even with > its own body. Yes, the cat would be missing essential brain structures so it would not be conscious of light even if you somehow gave it eyes and optic nerves. But I think this makes the point that perception/consciousness does not occur in the environment but in the brain. If you have the right environmental inputs but the wrong brain, there is no perception, whereas if you have the right brain with the neurons firing in the right way, but in the absence of the right environmental inputs, the result is a hallucination indistinguishable from reality. Stathsi Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP): > > Consider a computer which is doing something (whether it is dreaming or musing or just running is the point in question). If there is no interaction between what it's running and the rest of the world I'd say it's not conscious. It doesn't necessarily need an external observer though. To invoke an external observer would require that we already knew how to distinguish an observer from a non-observer. This just pushes the problem away a step. One could as well claim that the walls of the room which are struck by the photons from the screen constitute an observer - under a suitable mapping of wall states. The computer could, like a Mars rover, act directly on the rest of the world. >>> >>> >>>The idea that we can only be conscious when interacting with the environment >>>is certainly worth considering. After all, consciousness evolved in order to >>>help >>>the organism deal with its environment, and it may be wrong to just assume >>>without further evidence that consciousness continues if all interaction >>>with the >>>environment ceases. Maybe even those activities which at first glance seem >>>to >>>involve consciousness in the absence of environmental interaction actually >>>rely >>>on a trickle of sensory input: for example, maybe dreaming is dependent on >>>proprioceptive feedback from eye movements, which is why we only dream >>>during REM sleep, and maybe general anaesthetics actually work by >>>eliminating >>>all sensory input rather than by a direct effect on the cortex. But even if >>>all this >>>is true, we could still imagine stimulating a brain which has all its >>>sensory inputs >>>removed so that the pattern of neural activity is exactly the same as it >>>would >>>have been had it arisen in the usual way. Would you say that the >>>artificially >>>stimulated brain is not conscious, even though everything up to and >>>including >>>the peripheral nerves is physically identical to and goes through the same >>>physical processes as the normal brain? >> >>No. I already noted that we can't insist that interaction with the >>environment is continuous. Maybe "potential interaction" would be >>appropriate. But I note that even in your example you contemplate >>"stimulating" the brain. I'm just trying to take what I consider an >>operational defintion and abstract it to the kind of >>mathematical/philosophical definition that can be applied to questions >>about rocks thinking. > > > The brain-with-wires-attached cannot interact with the environment, because > all its sense organs have been removed and the stimulation is just coming > from > a recording. Instead of the wires + recording we could say that there is a > special > group of neurons with spontaneous activity that stimulates the rest of the > brain > just as if it were receiving input from the environment. Such a brain would > have > no ability to interact with the environment, unless the effort were made to > figure out its internal code and then manufacture sense organs for it - but I > think that would be stretching the definition of "potential interaction". In > any > case, I don't see how "potential interaction" could make a difference. Yet you had to refer to "stimulate...as if it were receiving input from the environment" to create an example. If there were no potential interaction there could be no "as if". So istm that the potential interaction can be an essential part of the definition. That's not to say that such a definition is right - definitions aren't right or wrong - but it's a definition that makes a useful distinction that comports with our common sense. >If you had > two brains sitting in the dark, identical in anatomy and electrical activity > except > that one has its optic nerves cut, will one brain be conscious and the other > not? Where did the brains come from? Since they had optic nerves can we suppose that they had the potential to see photons and they still have this potential given replacement optic nerves? Not necessarily. Suppose one came from a cat that was raised in complete darkness. We know experimentally that this cat can't see...even when there is light. The lack of stimulus results in the brain not forming the necessary structures for interpreting signals from the retina. Now suppose it were raised with no stimulus whatever, even in utero. I conjecture that it would not "think" at all - although there would be "computation", i.e. neurons firing in some order. But it would no longer have the potential for interaction; even with its own body. But I think you do bring up a good point - the boundary between "brain" and "environment" is clear enough for actual animals, but seems rather arbitrary in the abstract. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received th
RE: Bruno's argument
Brent Meeker writes (quoting SP): > >>Consider a computer which is doing something (whether it is dreaming or > >>musing or just running is the point in question). If there is no > >>interaction between what it's running and the rest of the world I'd say > >>it's not conscious. It doesn't necessarily need an external observer > >>though. To invoke an external observer would require that we already > >>knew how to distinguish an observer from a non-observer. This just > >>pushes the problem away a step. One could as well claim that the walls > >>of the room which are struck by the photons from the screen constitute > >>an observer - under a suitable mapping of wall states. The computer > >>could, like a Mars rover, act directly on the rest of the world. > > > > > > The idea that we can only be conscious when interacting with the > > environment > > is certainly worth considering. After all, consciousness evolved in order > > to help > > the organism deal with its environment, and it may be wrong to just assume > > without further evidence that consciousness continues if all interaction > > with the > > environment ceases. Maybe even those activities which at first glance seem > > to > > involve consciousness in the absence of environmental interaction actually > > rely > > on a trickle of sensory input: for example, maybe dreaming is dependent on > > proprioceptive feedback from eye movements, which is why we only dream > > during REM sleep, and maybe general anaesthetics actually work by > > eliminating > > all sensory input rather than by a direct effect on the cortex. But even if > > all this > > is true, we could still imagine stimulating a brain which has all its > > sensory inputs > > removed so that the pattern of neural activity is exactly the same as it > > would > > have been had it arisen in the usual way. Would you say that the > > artificially > > stimulated brain is not conscious, even though everything up to and > > including > > the peripheral nerves is physically identical to and goes through the same > > physical processes as the normal brain? > > No. I already noted that we can't insist that interaction with the > environment is continuous. Maybe "potential interaction" would be > appropriate. But I note that even in your example you contemplate > "stimulating" the brain. I'm just trying to take what I consider an > operational defintion and abstract it to the kind of > mathematical/philosophical definition that can be applied to questions > about rocks thinking. The brain-with-wires-attached cannot interact with the environment, because all its sense organs have been removed and the stimulation is just coming from a recording. Instead of the wires + recording we could say that there is a special group of neurons with spontaneous activity that stimulates the rest of the brain just as if it were receiving input from the environment. Such a brain would have no ability to interact with the environment, unless the effort were made to figure out its internal code and then manufacture sense organs for it - but I think that would be stretching the definition of "potential interaction". In any case, I don't see how "potential interaction" could make a difference. If you had two brains sitting in the dark, identical in anatomy and electrical activity except that one has its optic nerves cut, will one brain be conscious and the other not? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
A useful model of computation is the Turing Machine. A TM has a tape with symbols on it; a head which moves along the tape and which can read and write symbols, and a state machine with a fixed number of states that controls head movement and symbol writing based on the current state and the symbol at the head's current location. It has been shown that this relatively simplistic model is able to do anything that more sophisticated computer models can do. We can consider the "state" of a TM to be made up of the conjunction of three things: the current state of the tape (i.e. the string of symbols written there); the position of the head; and the state of the internal state machine. Maybe it would be best to call this the superstate because normally the "state" of the TM just refers to its internal state machine state. The TM can then be said to advance from superstate to superstate according to its internal rules and the contents of the tape. If a TM ever gets into the same superstate twice, it is in an infinite loop. This is because the TM is fully deterministic and so it will always go into the same successor superstate from a given superstate. Halting TM's never get into the same superstate twice. Therefore halting TM's go through a unique succession of superstates, from the first to the last. We can map or label a TM's superstates with successive integers, corresponding to the order that it goes through the superstates of a computation. In this mapping, the only difference between two different computations is their length. If two computations had the same length N, they would both go through states labeled 0, 1, 2, ..., N. What is a computation? A TM computation has two parts. One is the initial conditions: the initial value on the tape, the initial head position. The other is the set of rules used, the internal state machine that controls the machine. Together these two parts define a trajectory of the TM through a sequence of superstates. We often think of the internal state machine as being like the "program" and the initial contents of tape as being the "data". However, as Turing was the first to recognize, this distinction is not always useful, and sometimes it makes more sense to think of at least part of the tape contents as being program rather than data. In particular, the Universal TM treats part of the tape as a specification for a specific other TM that it will emulate, and the remainder of the tape is then the input to that TM. Generally, when we think of counterfactuals in a TM computation we mean to change the data, not the program. We don't mean to ask, what would happen if you ran a different program on the same data. Rather, we mean, what would happen if you ran the same program on different data. We want to say that two computations are equivalent only if they have the same counterfactual behavior - that is, if the programs would behave the same on all data. One problem with this is noted above, that we cannot always cleanly distinguish program and data. In the case of the UTM, is the prefix part of the tape, that defines the particular TM to emulate, program or data? If it is program, we would not try to vary it in considering whether two computations are equivalent. If it is data, we should consider such variations. In general, I don't think we can always distinguish these cases cleanly. UTMs can be nested to any desired degree. What is program to one is data to another. More complex UTM computations may be aided by certain patterns on the tape which will disrupt the computation if they are changed. Another problem is that a more complex mapping may be able to be set up between two different computations even if we consider counterfactuals as all different initial tape configurations. We could make the mapping be a function of the superstate as defined above. Two computations with different initial tapes will start in different superstates, hence the mapping is still unique. And it will be robust over all possible inputs and hence all possible counterfactual computations. On these considerations, It seems to me that there are problems with basing the distinction between computations on support for counterfactuals. TMs make the very notion of counterfactuals rather fuzzy, and still admit the possibility of mappings between computations that remain robust even in the face of counterfactuals. My preferred view is to focus on the algorithmic complexity of the mapping between two computations, and to ask whether the information needed to specify the mapping is less than the information needed to write down the computation from scratch. If not, if the mapping is substantially bigger than the computation it purports to describe, then the correspondence is an illusion and is not real. Hal Finney --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To
Re: Bruno's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > Brent Meeker writes: > > >>Consider a computer which is doing something (whether it is dreaming or >>musing or just running is the point in question). If there is no >>interaction between what it's running and the rest of the world I'd say >>it's not conscious. It doesn't necessarily need an external observer >>though. To invoke an external observer would require that we already >>knew how to distinguish an observer from a non-observer. This just >>pushes the problem away a step. One could as well claim that the walls >>of the room which are struck by the photons from the screen constitute >>an observer - under a suitable mapping of wall states. The computer >>could, like a Mars rover, act directly on the rest of the world. > > > The idea that we can only be conscious when interacting with the environment > is certainly worth considering. After all, consciousness evolved in order to > help > the organism deal with its environment, and it may be wrong to just assume > without further evidence that consciousness continues if all interaction with > the > environment ceases. Maybe even those activities which at first glance seem to > involve consciousness in the absence of environmental interaction actually > rely > on a trickle of sensory input: for example, maybe dreaming is dependent on > proprioceptive feedback from eye movements, which is why we only dream > during REM sleep, and maybe general anaesthetics actually work by eliminating > all sensory input rather than by a direct effect on the cortex. But even if > all this > is true, we could still imagine stimulating a brain which has all its sensory > inputs > removed so that the pattern of neural activity is exactly the same as it > would > have been had it arisen in the usual way. Would you say that the artificially > stimulated brain is not conscious, even though everything up to and including > the peripheral nerves is physically identical to and goes through the same > physical processes as the normal brain? No. I already noted that we can't insist that interaction with the environment is continuous. Maybe "potential interaction" would be appropriate. But I note that even in your example you contemplate "stimulating" the brain. I'm just trying to take what I consider an operational defintion and abstract it to the kind of mathematical/philosophical definition that can be applied to questions about rocks thinking. At the experimental level, I recall that in the late '60s, when sensory deprivation experiments were the craze, there was a report that after an hour or so in a sensory deprivation tank a persons mind would end up in a loop. Incidentally, the attribute in question seems to morph around among "conscious", "intelligent", and "computing something". I don't think those are all exactly the same. Certainly computing and intelligence don't necessarily entail consciousness. And consciousness itself admits of categories. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument
Brent Meeker writes: > Consider a computer which is doing something (whether it is dreaming or > musing or just running is the point in question). If there is no > interaction between what it's running and the rest of the world I'd say > it's not conscious. It doesn't necessarily need an external observer > though. To invoke an external observer would require that we already > knew how to distinguish an observer from a non-observer. This just > pushes the problem away a step. One could as well claim that the walls > of the room which are struck by the photons from the screen constitute > an observer - under a suitable mapping of wall states. The computer > could, like a Mars rover, act directly on the rest of the world. The idea that we can only be conscious when interacting with the environment is certainly worth considering. After all, consciousness evolved in order to help the organism deal with its environment, and it may be wrong to just assume without further evidence that consciousness continues if all interaction with the environment ceases. Maybe even those activities which at first glance seem to involve consciousness in the absence of environmental interaction actually rely on a trickle of sensory input: for example, maybe dreaming is dependent on proprioceptive feedback from eye movements, which is why we only dream during REM sleep, and maybe general anaesthetics actually work by eliminating all sensory input rather than by a direct effect on the cortex. But even if all this is true, we could still imagine stimulating a brain which has all its sensory inputs removed so that the pattern of neural activity is exactly the same as it would have been had it arisen in the usual way. Would you say that the artificially stimulated brain is not conscious, even though everything up to and including the peripheral nerves is physically identical to and goes through the same physical processes as the normal brain? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
On Wed, Aug 02, 2006 at 10:05:37AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> Another question: I can see why a computer should be able to handle
> counterfactuals if it is to be of practical use, but what is wrong with
> saying that a recording implements a computation, whether that is
> adding two numbers or having a conscious experience?
>
> Stathis Papaioannou
In the Multiverse, there is a huge difference between a recording and
the actual computation. Only in one single universe (or history) of
the ensemble do the two coincide.
The "recording is a computation" issue is only a problem for single
universe theory IMHO.
Cheers
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RE: Bruno's argument
Peter Jones writes: > A computation is not a series of states. A computation is an > implementation > of an algorithm, and algorithms include conditional statements which > must be modelled by something with counterfactual behaviour -- > by something which *could have* execute the other branch. Whatever else a computation is, it is a series of states. My computer is going through a series of physical states, with the earlier states determining the later states. If the earlier states were different, then the later states would also be different, hence the computer handles counterfactuals. However, this is so with any physical system: it goes through a series of states, the earlier states determine the later states following the laws of physics, and had the earlier states been different, so would the later states. Now, I suppose you would say that the states in a rock are random, while those in a computer are not. But what is to stop someone from designing a computer so that there is no pattern to its internal states unless you have the key? Suppose you find two inputless electronic devices, powered up, with complex and at first glance random currents circulating in their internal components. One of these devices is in fact implementing a computation, deliberately scrambled to keep it secret from prying eyes, while the other is just a decoy with random electrical activity. Without access to the key, would you be able to tell which is which? Another question: I can see why a computer should be able to handle counterfactuals if it is to be of practical use, but what is wrong with saying that a recording implements a computation, whether that is adding two numbers or having a conscious experience? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
1Z wrote: > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >>John M writes: >> >> >>>Peter Jones writes: >>> >>> Hmm. Including limitations in time? >>> >>>Yes, if an infinite number of finite computations are run simultaneously on >>>a system with a finite number of physical states. >>> >>>Stathis Papaioannou >>>- >>>So if I have a system with finite number of physical states, it will take a >>>matching finite number of (base)-computations leaving an infinite number >>>untreated. Out of them I can take a deduction for muiltiplying the finite >>>number of physical states by the finite number of the base-states to get to >>>the total number of computability on that system in parallel - still a >>>finite number. I still have an infinite number of unbtreated cases left. >>>Damn that infinite! Cantor's curse. >>> >>>John M >> >>Suppose there is a very simple physical system that goes through two states, >>"on" and "off". You wish to map these states onto a binary sequence which at >>first glance seems too long: 10110100... You write down the following: on the >>first run, on->1 and off->0; on the second run, on->1 and off->1; on the >>third run, on->0 and off->1; and so on, for as long as you like. It is not >>common >>practice to change the code from run to run when designing a computer, but >>that is just a matter of convenience. If you specify exactly how the code >>changes the meaning is unambiguous, and in principle the two physical states >>can encode any number of binary states, or even more complex computations. > > > A computation is not a series of states. A computation is an > implementation > of an algorithm, and algorithms include conditional statements which > must be modelled by something with counterfactual behaviour -- > by something which *could have* execute the other branch. I think this "something" is an interaction with something outside the computer, i.e. a different input or a real-time sensor input. I could also be a random variable generated internally - but I'm not clear on whether that satisfies lz's idea - it doesn't satisfy mine. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > John M writes: > > >>Peter Jones writes: >> >> >>>Hmm. Including limitations in time? >> >>Yes, if an infinite number of finite computations are run simultaneously on >>a system with a finite number of physical states. >> >>Stathis Papaioannou >>- >>So if I have a system with finite number of physical states, it will take a >>matching finite number of (base)-computations leaving an infinite number >>untreated. Out of them I can take a deduction for muiltiplying the finite >>number of physical states by the finite number of the base-states to get to >>the total number of computability on that system in parallel - still a >>finite number. I still have an infinite number of unbtreated cases left. >>Damn that infinite! Cantor's curse. >> >>John M > > > Suppose there is a very simple physical system that goes through two states, > "on" and "off". You wish to map these states onto a binary sequence which at > first glance seems too long: 10110100... You write down the following: on the > first run, on->1 and off->0; on the second run, on->1 and off->1; That one's not gonna work :-) >on the > third run, on->0 and off->1; and so on, for as long as you like. It is not > common > practice to change the code from run to run when designing a computer, but > that is just a matter of convenience. If you specify exactly how the code > changes the meaning is unambiguous, and in principle the two physical states > can encode any number of binary states, or even more complex computations. > > The above probably seems silly to most people reading this, because the > burden > of the computation falls on the specification of the code, the physical > processes > being essentially irrelevant. Nevertheless, we may have the situation where > the > code specification is documented in a big book while the computer (such as it > is) > carries out the physical processes which, if we to refer to the book, > performs > perfectly legitimate computations. We could even design a driver for a > monitor to > display the computations, again using the book. Now, suppose the last copy of > the book is destroyed. The computer would still do its business, but it may > as > well be a random number generator for all the good it does us without the > code > specification. But what if, by the book, the computer is actually carrying > out > *conscious* computations? Would it suddenly cease being conscious as the book > is burned in a fire, or gradually lose consciousness as the book's pages are > ripped out one by one? The implication is that the computer was conscious before the book was burned - but I would ask, "What was it's interaction with the world?" If the answer is that the person with the book interpreted the output and was informed by that or acted on that, then I'd say the book+computer was conscious - but not the computer alone. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Brent Meeker writes: > > >>>Would you allow that one machine or computation may be emulated by another >>>following some sort of mapping rule, and that consciousness may be preserved >>>in this process? This would seem to be an assumption at the basis of >>>functionalism >>>and computationalism. But what if the mapping rule were the equivalent of >>>what >>>in cryptography is called a one-time pad, determined by some stochastic >>>process >>>such as radioactive decay? The states of the emulated machine would then >>>seem >>>to vary randomly, but if you had access to the mapping rule you would be >>>able to >>>"read" it (and perhaps interact with it) just as if it followed some simpler >>>code, like >>>shifting each letter of the alphabet by one. Are you prepared to argue that >>>the >>>emulated machine is only conscious if an external observer has the relevant >>>mapping rule at hand and/or is actually "reading" it or interacting with it >>>using >>>this information? >>> >>>Stathis Papaioannou >> >>Yes, that's roughly my idea. Of course you can't insist that a >>computation interact continuously to count as computation, only that it >>does occasionally or potentially. In your example I would say that you >>can only know that there is computation, as distinct from noise, going >>on if the computer, via the emulation code, can still interact with its >>environment (i.e. you). I don't believe the simplicity or complexity of >>the internal operations is relevant. For example, if you could see the >>movements of electrons in my computer, you couldn't tell whether it was >>displaying this email or just doing something random - but if you look >>at the dispaly screen you can. On the other hand, to the alien from >>alpha centauri, the screen might also look random. >> >>Brent Meeker > > > That's fine in the case of an email, but consider a computer which is > conscious and > spends its time musing or dreaming. Would you say that this computer's > consciousness > is contingent on the existence of external observers who might be able to > figure out > what it's up to? > > Stathis Papaioannou Consider a computer which is doing something (whether it is dreaming or musing or just running is the point in question). If there is no interaction between what it's running and the rest of the world I'd say it's not conscious. It doesn't necessarily need an external observer though. To invoke an external observer would require that we already knew how to distinguish an observer from a non-observer. This just pushes the problem away a step. One could as well claim that the walls of the room which are struck by the photons from the screen constitute an observer - under a suitable mapping of wall states. The computer could, like a Mars rover, act directly on the rest of the world. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Peter: As I recall all "I" wrote (and the post marked it as >>> was: So if I have a system with finite number of physical states, it will take a matching finite number of (base)-computations leaving an infinite number untreated. Out of them I can take a deduction for muiltiplying the finite number of physical states by the finite number of the base-states to get to the total number of computability on that system in parallel - still a finite number. I still have an infinite number of unbtreated cases left. Damn that infinite! Cantor's curse. John M * I wanted to point to the 'flipside of it' which was not addressed in your reply: mixing finite and infinite. Those >>>>> marks drive me crazy. too. John - Original Message - From: "1Z" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Everything List" Sent: Tuesday, August 01, 2006 9:17 AM Subject: Re: Bruno's argument > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> John M writes: >> >> > Peter Jones writes: >> > >> > > >> > > Hmm. Including limitations in time? >> > >> > Yes, if an infinite number of finite computations are run >> > simultaneously on >> > a system with a finite number of physical states. >> > >> > Stathis Papaioannou >> > - >> > So if I have a system with finite number of physical states, it will >> > take a >> > matching finite number of (base)-computations leaving an infinite >> > number >> > untreated. Out of them I can take a deduction for muiltiplying the >> > finite >> > number of physical states by the finite number of the base-states to >> > get to >> > the total number of computability on that system in parallel - still a >> > finite number. I still have an infinite number of unbtreated cases >> > left. >> > Damn that infinite! Cantor's curse. >> > >> > John M >> >> Suppose there is a very simple physical system that goes through two >> states, >> "on" and "off". You wish to map these states onto a binary sequence which >> at >> first glance seems too long: 10110100... You write down the following: on >> the >> first run, on->1 and off->0; on the second run, on->1 and off->1; on the >> third run, on->0 and off->1; and so on, for as long as you like. It is >> not common >> practice to change the code from run to run when designing a computer, >> but >> that is just a matter of convenience. If you specify exactly how the code >> changes the meaning is unambiguous, and in principle the two physical >> states >> can encode any number of binary states, or even more complex >> computations. > > A computation is not a series of states. A computation is an > implementation > of an algorithm, and algorithms include conditional statements which > must be modelled by something with counterfactual behaviour -- > by something which *could have* execute the other branch. > >> The above probably seems silly to most people reading this, because the >> burden >> of the computation falls on the specification of the code, the physical >> processes >> being essentially irrelevant. Nevertheless, we may have the situation >> where the >> code specification is documented in a big book while the computer (such >> as it is) >> carries out the physical processes which, if we to refer to the book, >> performs >> perfectly legitimate computations. We could even design a driver for a >> monitor to >> display the computations, again using the book. Now, suppose the last >> copy of >> the book is destroyed. The computer would still do its business, but it >> may as >> well be a random number generator for all the good it does us without the >> code >> specification. But what if, by the book, the computer is actually >> carrying out >> *conscious* computations? Would it suddenly cease being conscious as the >> book >> is burned in a fire, or gradually lose consciousness as the book's pages >> are >> ripped out one by one? > > > No amount or arbitrary mapping can transofrm a situation without > counterfactuals > into one with them > > --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > John M writes: > > > Peter Jones writes: > > > > > > > > Hmm. Including limitations in time? > > > > Yes, if an infinite number of finite computations are run simultaneously on > > a system with a finite number of physical states. > > > > Stathis Papaioannou > > - > > So if I have a system with finite number of physical states, it will take a > > matching finite number of (base)-computations leaving an infinite number > > untreated. Out of them I can take a deduction for muiltiplying the finite > > number of physical states by the finite number of the base-states to get to > > the total number of computability on that system in parallel - still a > > finite number. I still have an infinite number of unbtreated cases left. > > Damn that infinite! Cantor's curse. > > > > John M > > Suppose there is a very simple physical system that goes through two states, > "on" and "off". You wish to map these states onto a binary sequence which at > first glance seems too long: 10110100... You write down the following: on the > first run, on->1 and off->0; on the second run, on->1 and off->1; on the > third run, on->0 and off->1; and so on, for as long as you like. It is not > common > practice to change the code from run to run when designing a computer, but > that is just a matter of convenience. If you specify exactly how the code > changes the meaning is unambiguous, and in principle the two physical states > can encode any number of binary states, or even more complex computations. A computation is not a series of states. A computation is an implementation of an algorithm, and algorithms include conditional statements which must be modelled by something with counterfactual behaviour -- by something which *could have* execute the other branch. > The above probably seems silly to most people reading this, because the burden > of the computation falls on the specification of the code, the physical > processes > being essentially irrelevant. Nevertheless, we may have the situation where > the > code specification is documented in a big book while the computer (such as it > is) > carries out the physical processes which, if we to refer to the book, performs > perfectly legitimate computations. We could even design a driver for a > monitor to > display the computations, again using the book. Now, suppose the last copy of > the book is destroyed. The computer would still do its business, but it may as > well be a random number generator for all the good it does us without the code > specification. But what if, by the book, the computer is actually carrying out > *conscious* computations? Would it suddenly cease being conscious as the book > is burned in a fire, or gradually lose consciousness as the book's pages are > ripped out one by one? No amount or arbitrary mapping can transofrm a situation without counterfactuals into one with them --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument
John M writes: > Peter Jones writes: > > > > > Hmm. Including limitations in time? > > Yes, if an infinite number of finite computations are run simultaneously on > a system with a finite number of physical states. > > Stathis Papaioannou > - > So if I have a system with finite number of physical states, it will take a > matching finite number of (base)-computations leaving an infinite number > untreated. Out of them I can take a deduction for muiltiplying the finite > number of physical states by the finite number of the base-states to get to > the total number of computability on that system in parallel - still a > finite number. I still have an infinite number of unbtreated cases left. > Damn that infinite! Cantor's curse. > > John M Suppose there is a very simple physical system that goes through two states, "on" and "off". You wish to map these states onto a binary sequence which at first glance seems too long: 10110100... You write down the following: on the first run, on->1 and off->0; on the second run, on->1 and off->1; on the third run, on->0 and off->1; and so on, for as long as you like. It is not common practice to change the code from run to run when designing a computer, but that is just a matter of convenience. If you specify exactly how the code changes the meaning is unambiguous, and in principle the two physical states can encode any number of binary states, or even more complex computations. The above probably seems silly to most people reading this, because the burden of the computation falls on the specification of the code, the physical processes being essentially irrelevant. Nevertheless, we may have the situation where the code specification is documented in a big book while the computer (such as it is) carries out the physical processes which, if we to refer to the book, performs perfectly legitimate computations. We could even design a driver for a monitor to display the computations, again using the book. Now, suppose the last copy of the book is destroyed. The computer would still do its business, but it may as well be a random number generator for all the good it does us without the code specification. But what if, by the book, the computer is actually carrying out *conscious* computations? Would it suddenly cease being conscious as the book is burned in a fire, or gradually lose consciousness as the book's pages are ripped out one by one? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Brent Meeker wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> >
> > Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> >>1Z wrote:
> >>
> >>>Brent Meeker wrote:
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>
> I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be
> distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the
> computation. I don't think you can make the idea of "information hidden
> in noise" well defined. By Shannon's measure noise is information.
> >>>
> >>>
> >>>You can easily distinguish computation from noise using counterfactuals
> >>
> >>Can you make that more concrete - an example perhaps?
> >
> >
> > Counterfactuals come from the undertlying physics of the computation.
> > Cups of coffee don't have any woth speaking about-- you can't force
> > them into the same state twice.
>
> Sorry, but I still don't understand the counterfactual aspect.
You have to be able to say what *would* have happened if
the computation had gone down the other fork of an if-then. That
requires some causal stability.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality#Counterfactual_theories_of_causation
> > Whether they are part of the "internal characteristitcs of a
> > computation"
> > depends, question-beggingly , ont what you mean by "computation".
>
> I think I agree with that. I'm trying to come up with a non-question
> begging definition of computation and I think the idea that a rock
> implements all computations implies that computation can't be defined in
> terms of some chracteristic of its sequence of internal states.
I think the idea that a rock implements all computations is the wrong
place to start.
> > If you think a computation is nothing but a string of 1's and 0's,
> > counterfactuals
> > will be very difficulty to find.
>
> So you're agreeing with me that it's impossible to distinguish noise and
> computation based their sequence of internal states (e.g. 1's and 0's)?
No: I'm saying you do need to find counterfactuals,
and since they aren't in bit-strings ("movies" or recordings),
bit-strings aren't computations. Therefore, rocks don't compute
merely by going through a succession of internal states.
> Brent Meeker
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Re: Bruno's argument
Brent Meeker wrote: > And evolution constructs brains to be essentially deterministic for the > same reason. So is it your theory that any deterministic sequence of > states constitutes computation and the reason a rock doesn't instantiate > computation is that, at the microscopic level its state changes are > dominated by quantum randomness? My theory is that to implement an algorithm something needs to have the counteractuals that are part of the algorithm. A machine needs to have distinct states (unlike a rock) and to have them counterfactually/causally linked (unlike a cloud of gas), > This thread started with a discussion of what computation could be > counted as intelligent - or Stathis prefers "conscious". Does your > distinction entail that intelligence (or consciousness) is deterministic? I never said intelligence was computational in the first place ! > Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument
Brent Meeker writes: > > Would you allow that one machine or computation may be emulated by another > > following some sort of mapping rule, and that consciousness may be > > preserved > > in this process? This would seem to be an assumption at the basis of > > functionalism > > and computationalism. But what if the mapping rule were the equivalent of > > what > > in cryptography is called a one-time pad, determined by some stochastic > > process > > such as radioactive decay? The states of the emulated machine would then > > seem > > to vary randomly, but if you had access to the mapping rule you would be > > able to > > "read" it (and perhaps interact with it) just as if it followed some > > simpler code, like > > shifting each letter of the alphabet by one. Are you prepared to argue that > > the > > emulated machine is only conscious if an external observer has the relevant > > mapping rule at hand and/or is actually "reading" it or interacting with it > > using > > this information? > > > > Stathis Papaioannou > > Yes, that's roughly my idea. Of course you can't insist that a > computation interact continuously to count as computation, only that it > does occasionally or potentially. In your example I would say that you > can only know that there is computation, as distinct from noise, going > on if the computer, via the emulation code, can still interact with its > environment (i.e. you). I don't believe the simplicity or complexity of > the internal operations is relevant. For example, if you could see the > movements of electrons in my computer, you couldn't tell whether it was > displaying this email or just doing something random - but if you look > at the dispaly screen you can. On the other hand, to the alien from > alpha centauri, the screen might also look random. > > Brent Meeker That's fine in the case of an email, but consider a computer which is conscious and spends its time musing or dreaming. Would you say that this computer's consciousness is contingent on the existence of external observers who might be able to figure out what it's up to? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument
> > > Brent Meeker wrote: > > 1Z wrote: > > > > > > Brent Meeker wrote: > > > > > > > > >>I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be > > >>distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the > > >>computation. I don't think you can make the idea of "information > hidden > > >>in noise" well defined. By Shannon's measure noise is information. > > > > > > > > > You can easily distinguish computation from noise using > counterfactuals > > > > Can you make that more concrete - an example perhaps? > > Counterfactuals come from the undertlying physics of the computation. > Cups of coffee don't have any woth speaking about-- you can't force > them into the same state twice. I'm curious as to the perceived distinction between a cup of coffee doing a computation (being used to do a computation in a symbolic domain) and the cup of coffee literally being the computation (.i.e. the coffee cup has been computed by the universe). In my mind consideration of the former does not lead to any useful understanding of the latter. It is the latter that is our goal, it seems to me, if we target a true understanding of the universe. Just wondering if this aspect is something I am just plain missing? If feel like I am missing something... Colin Hales --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
1Z wrote: > Brent Meeker wrote: > >>1Z wrote: >> >>>Brent Meeker wrote: > > >>>The underlying physics of the thing will tell youwhether >>>it is capable of supporting countefactuals without >>>running a programme at all. There is something objectively >>>machine-like about machines -- complex , but predictable >>>behaviour. >> >>But so far as we know all machines, all physical objects, are described >>by quantum mechanics and therefore are subject to random variations, >>i.e. they could have done otherwise. > > > That applies to your PC. How often does it randomly crash ? > > >>So I don't see how that helps in >>distinguishing computation from noise. > > > You can't tell the difference between doing something > random once every day and doins something > random billions of times a seconc ? > > >> Are you thinking of abstract >>computation - which of course can be deterministic if you rule out >>randomness in the abstraction? > > > we construct machines to rule out randomness within > certain limits. > And evolution constructs brains to be essentially deterministic for the same reason. So is it your theory that any deterministic sequence of states constitutes computation and the reason a rock doesn't instantiate computation is that, at the microscopic level its state changes are dominated by quantum randomness? This thread started with a discussion of what computation could be counted as intelligent - or Stathis prefers "conscious". Does your distinction entail that intelligence (or consciousness) is deterministic? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Stathis, excuse my naive ignorance: (below your reply) - Original Message - From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "1Z" Sent: Sunday, July 30, 2006 5:12 AM Subject: RE: Bruno's argument Peter Jones writes: > > Hmm. Including limitations in time? Yes, if an infinite number of finite computations are run simultaneously on a system with a finite number of physical states. Stathis Papaioannou - So if I have a system with finite number of physical states, it will take a matching finite number of (base)-computations leaving an infinite number untreated. Out of them I can take a deduction for muiltiplying the finite number of physical states by the finite number of the base-states to get to the total number of computability on that system in parallel - still a finite number. I still have an infinite number of unbtreated cases left. Damn that infinite! Cantor's curse. John M --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Brent Meeker wrote: > 1Z wrote: > > > > Brent Meeker wrote: > > The underlying physics of the thing will tell youwhether > > it is capable of supporting countefactuals without > > running a programme at all. There is something objectively > > machine-like about machines -- complex , but predictable > > behaviour. > > But so far as we know all machines, all physical objects, are described > by quantum mechanics and therefore are subject to random variations, > i.e. they could have done otherwise. That applies to your PC. How often does it randomly crash ? > So I don't see how that helps in > distinguishing computation from noise. You can't tell the difference between doing something random once every day and doins something random billions of times a seconc ? > Are you thinking of abstract > computation - which of course can be deterministic if you rule out > randomness in the abstraction? we construct machines to rule out randomness within certain limits. > Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
1Z wrote: > > Brent Meeker wrote: > > >>>Stathis Papaioannou >> >>Yes, that's roughly my idea. Of course you can't insist that a >>computation interact continuously to count as computation, only that it >>does occasionally or potentially. > > > Most of the counterfactuals that make up a computation > are internal. There has to be some sense in which > it could have gone down the other branch of an if-then > statement (or that is must have gone fown the same one) > > >>In your example I would say that you >>can only know that there is computation, as distinct from noise, going >>on if the computer, via the emulation code, can still interact with its >>environment (i.e. you). I don't believe the simplicity or complexity of >>the internal operations is relevant. For example, if you could see the >>movements of electrons in my computer, you couldn't tell whether it was >>displaying this email or just doing something random - but if you look >>at the dispaly screen you can. On the other hand, to the alien from >>alpha centauri, the screen might also look random. > > > The underlying physics of the thing will tell youwhether > it is capable of supporting countefactuals without > running a programme at all. There is something objectively > machine-like about machines -- complex , but predictable > behaviour. But so far as we know all machines, all physical objects, are described by quantum mechanics and therefore are subject to random variations, i.e. they could have done otherwise. So I don't see how that helps in distinguishing computation from noise. Are you thinking of abstract computation - which of course can be deterministic if you rule out randomness in the abstraction? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Brent Meeker wrote: > > Stathis Papaioannou > > Yes, that's roughly my idea. Of course you can't insist that a > computation interact continuously to count as computation, only that it > does occasionally or potentially. Most of the counterfactuals that make up a computation are internal. There has to be some sense in which it could have gone down the other branch of an if-then statement (or that is must have gone fown the same one) > In your example I would say that you > can only know that there is computation, as distinct from noise, going > on if the computer, via the emulation code, can still interact with its > environment (i.e. you). I don't believe the simplicity or complexity of > the internal operations is relevant. For example, if you could see the > movements of electrons in my computer, you couldn't tell whether it was > displaying this email or just doing something random - but if you look > at the dispaly screen you can. On the other hand, to the alien from > alpha centauri, the screen might also look random. The underlying physics of the thing will tell youwhether it is capable of supporting countefactuals without running a programme at all. There is something objectively machine-like about machines -- complex , but predictable behaviour. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
1Z wrote: > > Brent Meeker wrote: > >>1Z wrote: >> >>>Brent Meeker wrote: >>> >>> >>> I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the computation. I don't think you can make the idea of "information hidden in noise" well defined. By Shannon's measure noise is information. >>> >>> >>>You can easily distinguish computation from noise using counterfactuals >> >>Can you make that more concrete - an example perhaps? > > > Counterfactuals come from the undertlying physics of the computation. > Cups of coffee don't have any woth speaking about-- you can't force > them into the same state twice. Sorry, but I still don't understand the counterfactual aspect. > Whether they are part of the "internal characteristitcs of a > computation" > depends, question-beggingly , ont what you mean by "computation". I think I agree with that. I'm trying to come up with a non-question begging definition of computation and I think the idea that a rock implements all computations implies that computation can't be defined in terms of some chracteristic of its sequence of internal states. > If you think a computation is nothing but a string of 1's and 0's, > counterfactuals > will be very difficulty to find. So you're agreeing with me that it's impossible to distinguish noise and computation based their sequence of internal states (e.g. 1's and 0's)? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > Brent meeker writes: > > [If] a computatation only "dreams" then how could you know whether it was intelligence, or just noise? >>> >>> >>>We wouldn't know, but the computation itself would know if it were >>>conscious, >>>creating its own observer. If we say that noise contains hidden information >>>that may be true in a trivial sense, but it's meaningless: information >>>hidden in >>>noise is not accessible to anyone and is no different to no information at >>>all. >>>But if the information hidden in noise is a conscious computation, then it >>>*is* >>>accessible to someone: itself, by definition. If you don't like this >>>conclusion >>>then you have to either reject computationalism (as John Searle does using >>>this argument) or impose ad hoc limitations on it, which amounts to the same >>>thing. >> >>I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be >>distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the >>computation. I don't think you can make the idea of "information hidden >>in noise" well defined. By Shannon's measure noise is information. > > > Would you allow that one machine or computation may be emulated by another > following some sort of mapping rule, and that consciousness may be preserved > in this process? This would seem to be an assumption at the basis of > functionalism > and computationalism. But what if the mapping rule were the equivalent of > what > in cryptography is called a one-time pad, determined by some stochastic > process > such as radioactive decay? The states of the emulated machine would then seem > to vary randomly, but if you had access to the mapping rule you would be able > to > "read" it (and perhaps interact with it) just as if it followed some simpler > code, like > shifting each letter of the alphabet by one. Are you prepared to argue that > the > emulated machine is only conscious if an external observer has the relevant > mapping rule at hand and/or is actually "reading" it or interacting with it > using > this information? > > Stathis Papaioannou Yes, that's roughly my idea. Of course you can't insist that a computation interact continuously to count as computation, only that it does occasionally or potentially. In your example I would say that you can only know that there is computation, as distinct from noise, going on if the computer, via the emulation code, can still interact with its environment (i.e. you). I don't believe the simplicity or complexity of the internal operations is relevant. For example, if you could see the movements of electrons in my computer, you couldn't tell whether it was displaying this email or just doing something random - but if you look at the dispaly screen you can. On the other hand, to the alien from alpha centauri, the screen might also look random. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Brent Meeker wrote: > 1Z wrote: > > > > Brent Meeker wrote: > > > > > >>I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be > >>distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the > >>computation. I don't think you can make the idea of "information hidden > >>in noise" well defined. By Shannon's measure noise is information. > > > > > > You can easily distinguish computation from noise using counterfactuals > > Can you make that more concrete - an example perhaps? Counterfactuals come from the undertlying physics of the computation. Cups of coffee don't have any woth speaking about-- you can't force them into the same state twice. Whether they are part of the "internal characteristitcs of a computation" depends, question-beggingly , ont what you mean by "computation". If you think a computation is nothing but a string of 1's and 0's, counterfactuals will be very difficulty to find. That may well be a /reductio/ of "a computation is nothing but a string of 1's and 0's". > Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
1Z wrote: > > Brent Meeker wrote: > > >>I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be >>distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the >>computation. I don't think you can make the idea of "information hidden >>in noise" well defined. By Shannon's measure noise is information. > > > You can easily distinguish computation from noise using counterfactuals Can you make that more concrete - an example perhaps? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Brent Meeker wrote: > I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be > distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the > computation. I don't think you can make the idea of "information hidden > in noise" well defined. By Shannon's measure noise is information. You can easily distinguish computation from noise using counterfactuals --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Brent Meeker wrote: > I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be > distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the > computation. I don't think you can make the idea of "information hidden > in noise" well defined. By Shannon's measure noise is information. You can easily distinguish computation from noise using counterfactuals --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument
WC writes: > In multiverses, I think it's possible to say there exists one universe > which could include > only one (super) being with nothing else. > I mean this (super) being is the universe itself. > So this super being knows everything right at the beginning of this > universe. > No need and not possible for this being to interact with other things > (either living or non-living) because > this being is the only thing in its universe. It doesn't need to do > anything except thinking (or dreaming) itself. > Maybe this being has the memories of the entire histories of other universe > (such as the one with the earth). > So this being just thinks always and feels not boring. I think it's > meaningful although I can't observe it. Yes, it's certainly *logically* possible that this is the case, even though in the world with which we are familiar intelligence evolves in order to deal with its environment and would be rather useless unless it could interact with that environment. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument
Brent meeker writes: > >>[If] a computatation only "dreams" then how could you know whether it was > >>intelligence, or just noise? > > > > > > We wouldn't know, but the computation itself would know if it were > > conscious, > > creating its own observer. If we say that noise contains hidden information > > that may be true in a trivial sense, but it's meaningless: information > > hidden in > > noise is not accessible to anyone and is no different to no information at > > all. > > But if the information hidden in noise is a conscious computation, then it > > *is* > > accessible to someone: itself, by definition. If you don't like this > > conclusion > > then you have to either reject computationalism (as John Searle does using > > this argument) or impose ad hoc limitations on it, which amounts to the > > same > > thing. > > I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be > distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the > computation. I don't think you can make the idea of "information hidden > in noise" well defined. By Shannon's measure noise is information. Would you allow that one machine or computation may be emulated by another following some sort of mapping rule, and that consciousness may be preserved in this process? This would seem to be an assumption at the basis of functionalism and computationalism. But what if the mapping rule were the equivalent of what in cryptography is called a one-time pad, determined by some stochastic process such as radioactive decay? The states of the emulated machine would then seem to vary randomly, but if you had access to the mapping rule you would be able to "read" it (and perhaps interact with it) just as if it followed some simpler code, like shifting each letter of the alphabet by one. Are you prepared to argue that the emulated machine is only conscious if an external observer has the relevant mapping rule at hand and/or is actually "reading" it or interacting with it using this information? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Brent meeker writes: > > I don't think "intelligence" is meaningful without an environment with which it can interact. The same for computation: what distinguishes computation and noise is a context in which it interacts with its environment. >>> >>> >>>What about an intelligent, conscious being spending its time dreaming? >>> >>>Stathis Papaioannou >> >>You're hypothesizing an intelligent being and then asking me if it's >>intelligent?? > > > Is it a contradiction to hypothesise an intelligent being which only dreams? > > >>It a computatation only "dreams" then how could you know whether it was >>intelligence, or just noise? > > > We wouldn't know, but the computation itself would know if it were conscious, > creating its own observer. If we say that noise contains hidden information > that may be true in a trivial sense, but it's meaningless: information hidden > in > noise is not accessible to anyone and is no different to no information at > all. > But if the information hidden in noise is a conscious computation, then it > *is* > accessible to someone: itself, by definition. If you don't like this > conclusion > then you have to either reject computationalism (as John Searle does using > this argument) or impose ad hoc limitations on it, which amounts to the same > thing. I'm considering rejecting the idea that a computation can be distinguished from noise by some internal characteristic of the computation. I don't think you can make the idea of "information hidden in noise" well defined. By Shannon's measure noise is information. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Hi, Stathis, Brent, In multiverses, I think it's possible to say there exists one universe which could include only one (super) being with nothing else. I mean this (super) being is the universe itself. So this super being knows everything right at the beginning of this universe. No need and not possible for this being to interact with other things (either living or non-living) because this being is the only thing in its universe. It doesn't need to do anything except thinking (or dreaming) itself. Maybe this being has the memories of the entire histories of other universe (such as the one with the earth). So this being just thinks always and feels not boring. I think it's meaningful although I can't observe it. Thanks. WC. -Original Message- From: everything-list@googlegroups.com [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] On Behalf Of Brent Meeker Sent: Monday, July 31, 2006 12:14 PM To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Subject: Re: Bruno's argument Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Brent Meeker writes: > > >>I don't think "intelligence" is meaningful without an environment with >>which it can interact. The same for computation: what distinguishes >>computation and noise is a context in which it interacts with its >>environment. > > > What about an intelligent, conscious being spending its time dreaming? > > Stathis Papaioannou You're hypothesizing an intelligent being and then asking me if it's intelligent?? It a computatation only "dreams" then how could you know whether it was intelligence, or just noise? Brent Meeker _ MSN Tool Bar 幫你刪除惱人的廣告 ! http://toolbar.msn.com.hk --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument
Brent meeker writes: > >>I don't think "intelligence" is meaningful without an environment with > >>which it can interact. The same for computation: what distinguishes > >>computation and noise is a context in which it interacts with its > >>environment. > > > > > > What about an intelligent, conscious being spending its time dreaming? > > > > Stathis Papaioannou > > You're hypothesizing an intelligent being and then asking me if it's > intelligent?? Is it a contradiction to hypothesise an intelligent being which only dreams? > It a computatation only "dreams" then how could you know whether it was > intelligence, or just noise? We wouldn't know, but the computation itself would know if it were conscious, creating its own observer. If we say that noise contains hidden information that may be true in a trivial sense, but it's meaningless: information hidden in noise is not accessible to anyone and is no different to no information at all. But if the information hidden in noise is a conscious computation, then it *is* accessible to someone: itself, by definition. If you don't like this conclusion then you have to either reject computationalism (as John Searle does using this argument) or impose ad hoc limitations on it, which amounts to the same thing. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Brent Meeker writes: > > >>I don't think "intelligence" is meaningful without an environment with >>which it can interact. The same for computation: what distinguishes >>computation and noise is a context in which it interacts with its >>environment. > > > What about an intelligent, conscious being spending its time dreaming? > > Stathis Papaioannou You're hypothesizing an intelligent being and then asking me if it's intelligent?? It a computatation only "dreams" then how could you know whether it was intelligence, or just noise? Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument
Brent Meeker writes: > I don't think "intelligence" is meaningful without an environment with > which it can interact. The same for computation: what distinguishes > computation and noise is a context in which it interacts with its > environment. What about an intelligent, conscious being spending its time dreaming? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Brent Meeker writes: > > >>Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> >>>Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): >>> >>> >>> >The constraints (a) and (b) you mention are ad hoc and an >unnecessary complication. Suppose Klingon computers change their >internal code every clock cycle according to the well-documented >radioactive decay pattern of a sacred stone 2000 years ago. If we >got our hands on one of these computers and monitored its >internal states it would seem completely random; but if we had >the Klingon manual, we would see that the computer was actually >multiplying two numbers, or implementing a Klingon AI, or >whatever. Would you say that these computations were not valid >because it's a dumb way to design a computer? I'd say that a defintion of "computer" that applies to everything is useless. >>> >>> >>>I agree, it's completely useless to *us* because we couldn't interact >>>with it. That would be the end of the matter unless we say that >>>computation can lead to consciousness, creating as it were its own >>>observer. Are you prepared to argue that the aforementioned Klingon >>>AI suddenly stops being conscious when the last copy of the manual >>>which would allow us to interact with it is destroyed? >> >>If it's intelligent we should be able to interact with it without a manual. > > > I should have specified, there is no input or output device connected. With > a "normal" computer we might look for patterns in its internal states and > design drivers for a keyboard and monitor, but with this computer its > internal states are apparently completely random unless you have the > original design specifications. > > Stathis Papaioannou I don't think "intelligence" is meaningful without an environment with which it can interact. The same for computation: what distinguishes computation and noise is a context in which it interacts with its environment. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument
Peter Jones writes: > > > I can say that a hydrogen atom can't compute an entire virtual > > > universe, > > > because there isn't enough "room". > > > > If you can map multiple computation states to one physical state, then all > > the requisite computations can be run in parallel on a very limited > > physical system. > > Hmm. Including limitations in time? Yes, if an infinite number of finite computations are run simultaneously on a system with a finite number of physical states. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument
Brent Meeker writes: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): > > > > > >>> The constraints (a) and (b) you mention are ad hoc and an > >>> unnecessary complication. Suppose Klingon computers change their > >>> internal code every clock cycle according to the well-documented > >>> radioactive decay pattern of a sacred stone 2000 years ago. If we > >>> got our hands on one of these computers and monitored its > >>> internal states it would seem completely random; but if we had > >>> the Klingon manual, we would see that the computer was actually > >>> multiplying two numbers, or implementing a Klingon AI, or > >>> whatever. Would you say that these computations were not valid > >>> because it's a dumb way to design a computer? > >> > >> I'd say that a defintion of "computer" that applies to everything > >> is useless. > > > > > > I agree, it's completely useless to *us* because we couldn't interact > > with it. That would be the end of the matter unless we say that > > computation can lead to consciousness, creating as it were its own > > observer. Are you prepared to argue that the aforementioned Klingon > > AI suddenly stops being conscious when the last copy of the manual > > which would allow us to interact with it is destroyed? > > If it's intelligent we should be able to interact with it without a manual. I should have specified, there is no input or output device connected. With a "normal" computer we might look for patterns in its internal states and design drivers for a keyboard and monitor, but with this computer its internal states are apparently completely random unless you have the original design specifications. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): > > > > The constraints (a) and (b) you mention are ad hoc and an unnecessary > > > complication. Suppose Klingon > > > computers change their internal code every clock cycle according to the > > > well-documented radioactive > > > decay pattern of a sacred stone 2000 years ago. If we got our hands on > > > one of these computers and > > > monitored its internal states it would seem completely random; but if we > > > had the Klingon manual, we > > > would see that the computer was actually multiplying two numbers, or > > > implementing a Klingon AI, or > > > whatever. Would you say that these computations were not valid because > > > it's a dumb way to design > > > a computer? > > > > I'd say that a defintion of "computer" that applies to everything is > > useless. > > I agree, it's completely useless to *us* because we couldn't interact with it. I don't mean that if a defintion of "computer" applied to everything the *computer* would be useless. I mean that if a defintion of "computer" applied to everything the *definition* would be useless. > That would be the end of the matter unless we say that computation can lead > to consciousness, creating as it were its own observer. Are you prepared to > argue that the aforementioned Klingon AI suddenly stops being conscious when > the last copy of the manual which would allow us to interact with it is > destroyed? > > ... > > I can say that a hydrogen atom can't compute an entire virtual > > universe, > > because there isn't enough "room". > > If you can map multiple computation states to one physical state, then all > the requisite computations can be run in parallel on a very limited physical > system. Hmm. Including limitations in time? --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): > > >>> The constraints (a) and (b) you mention are ad hoc and an >>> unnecessary complication. Suppose Klingon computers change their >>> internal code every clock cycle according to the well-documented >>> radioactive decay pattern of a sacred stone 2000 years ago. If we >>> got our hands on one of these computers and monitored its >>> internal states it would seem completely random; but if we had >>> the Klingon manual, we would see that the computer was actually >>> multiplying two numbers, or implementing a Klingon AI, or >>> whatever. Would you say that these computations were not valid >>> because it's a dumb way to design a computer? >> >> I'd say that a defintion of "computer" that applies to everything >> is useless. > > > I agree, it's completely useless to *us* because we couldn't interact > with it. That would be the end of the matter unless we say that > computation can lead to consciousness, creating as it were its own > observer. Are you prepared to argue that the aforementioned Klingon > AI suddenly stops being conscious when the last copy of the manual > which would allow us to interact with it is destroyed? If it's intelligent we should be able to interact with it without a manual. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): > > The constraints (a) and (b) you mention are ad hoc and an unnecessary > > complication. Suppose Klingon > > computers change their internal code every clock cycle according to the > > well-documented radioactive > > decay pattern of a sacred stone 2000 years ago. If we got our hands on one > > of these computers and > > monitored its internal states it would seem completely random; but if we > > had the Klingon manual, we > > would see that the computer was actually multiplying two numbers, or > > implementing a Klingon AI, or > > whatever. Would you say that these computations were not valid because it's > > a dumb way to design > > a computer? > > I'd say that a defintion of "computer" that applies to everything is > useless. I agree, it's completely useless to *us* because we couldn't interact with it. That would be the end of the matter unless we say that computation can lead to consciousness, creating as it were its own observer. Are you prepared to argue that the aforementioned Klingon AI suddenly stops being conscious when the last copy of the manual which would allow us to interact with it is destroyed? ... > I can say that a hydrogen atom can't compute an entire virtual > universe, > because there isn't enough "room". If you can map multiple computation states to one physical state, then all the requisite computations can be run in parallel on a very limited physical system. > And even so, there is the other part of the problem. You can't > validly infer from "any computation can be implemented > by any physical system" to "any computation can be implemented by > without > any physical basis" Yes, that is a valid point, and the same can be said about mathematical Platonism in general. Perhaps we have to say: all of mathematics is contingent on the existence of a real universe with at least one physical state. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
> > Thanks, Colin, > I feel we also agree in your last sentence statement, however I could not > decide whether "abstraction" is reductionist model forming or a > generalization into wider horizons? Patterns - I feel - are IMO definitely reductive. Abstraction I would characterise as a mapping into a representational domain. As to the level of reduction, that would depend on the domain of symbols and their mapping to the mapped domain. The questions to ask yourself are: a) Who decides what the lowest level domain is to be? b) What do you lose when you choose? Let's look at abstracting a whole human: a-1) Say we 100% abstract a human down to a representation of cells. Cells would be the base level descriptive domain. Organs would be data patterns that the cells express under the rules of the abstraction. And so on. You are not letting the natural rules run. You are merely moving symbols around. No matter how powerful the computer and how detailed (lowest level domain) the abstraction is just the computer's representation of the symbols being moved around. a) If you build a squillion little computers, each to act 'as-if' they were the, say, the cell level of the abstraction with a little physical interface that meant it was just like a cell from the outside, then you have reinstated some level of the natural world's involvement...the resulting human may be indistinguiishable from a human. Organs are an emergent property of these collaborating 'Turing Cells'. b) Then again, if you reduced the abstraction level to build tiny computers that become substitute molecules, so to all intents they looked like molecules...the human would look the same. Cells are an emergent property of collaborations of these 'Turing Molecules'. (please ignore the need for fluids and food etc in this body for the moment!) If you inspected the human a-1) at the molecular level all you see is a computer playing with patterns depending on the chosen abstraction domain. If you inspected human a) at the molecular level you would see only the computer that runs cells, but the cells would look normal. There are no human molecules here, only the molecules of the computers inside the cells. If you inspected human b) at the molecular level you would see what appears to be real molecules. The cells would look normal. However, look for atoms and you won't find any. Q. What is it like to be human a-1) cf a) cf b) and how well does each human operate cognitively? You could extend the argument to simulated Turing-quarks and Turing-leptons... and so on... at some point the human would acquire consciousness. What level of Turing-granularity is that? My answer to this would be probably waay down deep below where the matter and the space differentiate their behaviour. We have no justification that any one level of organisation is an end-point. > > that scale-game (40-50 orders of m. down) seems to me valid within the physical explanatory equationalized circumstances - so I scrutinize it (accept it within physics-thinking). It does not refer to 'time' (whichever > you prefer). I had the notion that there 'is' only "change" ie. movement and > space is a time-coordinate of it, while time is a space-coordinate of it, Change as a structural primitive is quite workable. Imagine being human shaped water in one place in a waterfall... i.e. regular structure within change. At any instant there is a human, but the water is flowing, so the componentry of the human is dynamically refreshed. Think of "humanity". Humanity survives where all the humans in it don't. Same thing at all scales. An infinity of potential collaborations of that one tiny change primitive that have a net value of "1 change primitive" can be substituted for any other change primitive. This recursiveness is the basis of a calculus/logic. In this system time results merely from the state of the collaboration undergoing a transition as the change primitive does what it does (eg changes from state A to B then back to A). There's not such thing as time in this structure. If the state changes happen at a regular enough rate then equations with a "t" in it are possible as descriptors. The universe acts 'as-if' there was time. If you are made of a pile of these changes then, if there was an observation faculty, all you would see is the collaboration evolving according to the rules of the structural primitives. You would need to "see" only the structural regularity, not the change primitives. In the waterfall metaphor, two humans as regularity in this waterfall would not see any water. They would see only each other and the space in between. This is nature of In this structural domain these things are really simple. Also: If you take a slice _across_ this structure around the level of atoms, photons etc and devise mathematical descriptions for the behaviour of identified structures you get quantum mechanics. QM says absolutely nothing about 'what it is that is behaving quantum m
Re: Bruno's argument
Thanks, Colin, I feel we also agree in your last sentence statement, however I could not decide whether "abstraction" is reductionist model forming or a generalization into wider horizons? Patterns - I feel - are IMO definitely reductive. that scale-game (40-50 orders of m. down) seems to me valid within the physical explanatory equationalized circumstances - so I scrutinize it (accept it within physics-thinking). It does not refer to 'time' (whichever you prefer). I had the notion that there 'is' only "change" ie. movement and space is a time-coordinate of it, while time is a space-coordinate of it, as long as we think in terrestrially (not even of THIS universe) formed explanations of those figments we conclude upon the latestly primitive instrumental observations in our reductionist science domain. Matter and its 'behavior' is similarly 'concluded' to reflect the 'personal' experiencing of the unknown effects. I am deterred by the semantic direction of 'computing'. If it is Bruno's manipulation of ordinary numbers, I feel OK, but then I feel domains of incompetence. Your "as-if" changes that and I felt lost. Why use a word with 'other' meaning 'as - if'? It is a cheap excuse that we have no better one . Sorry for just "multiplying the words" in this exchange. John M ----- Original Message - From: "Colin Hales" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Thursday, July 27, 2006 10:32 PM Subject: RE: Bruno's argument > > John M >> >> Colin, >> the entire discussion is too much for me, I pick some remarks of yours >> and >> ask only about them. I am glad to see that others are also struggling to >> find better and more fitting words... >> (I search for better fitting concepts as well to be expressed by those >> better fitting wods). >> You wrote: >> >... *the rest of the universe that is not 'us' behave in a way with >> respect >> >to us that we label 'physical'...< >> Do I sense a separation "us" versus the 'rest of the universe'? >> I figure it is not a relation between "them" (the rest of the universe) >> and >> "us" (what is this? God's children?) especially after your preceding >> sentence: >> > *whatever the universe is we are part of it, made of it, not separably >> 'in >> > it'.< >> I am looking for distinctive features which help us 'feel' as ourselves >> in >> the total and universal interconnectedness. The "closeness" >> (interrelation?) >> vs a more remote connectivity. >> The 'self', which I do not expropriate for us. >> I have no idea about 'physical', it reflects our age-old ways of >> observing >> whatever was observable with that poor epistemic cognitive inventory our >> ancestors used reducing mindset, observation and explanation to their >> models >> (level of the era). >> > 40 or 50 orders of spatial magnitude down deep, space and matter merge > into > their common organisational parent. There is no 'separateness', we have > never justified that, only assumed it and seen no convincing empirical > evidence other than a failure of science to sort out consciousness because > of the assumption. Whatever the depth of structure, we humans are ALL of > it. > The existence of consciousness (qualia) is proof that the separateness is > virtual (as-if). > > IMO the separation is merely a delineation - a notional boundary > supported > by our perception systems. Just because a perceived boundary is closed > does > not mean that it is not 'open' in some other way down deep in the > structure > of the universe. > > So I guess we are in agreement here. > > >> Then again is the 'as - if' really a computation as in our today's >> vocabulary? Or, if you insist (and Bruno as well, that it IS) is it >> conceivable as our digital process, that embryonic first approach, or we >> may hope to understand later on a higher level (I have no better word for >> it): the analog computation of qualia and meaning? Certainly not the >> Turing >> or Church ways and not on Intel etc. processors. >> >> John M >> > > Not sure I follow you here. All abstracted computing everywhere is > 'as-if'. > None of the input domains of numbers or anything else are ever reified. We > simply declare a place to act like it was there and then behave as if it > were. The results work fine! I'm writing this using exactly that process. > Looks &
Re: Bruno's argument
Please see after your remark/question at the end John - Original Message - From: "Bruno Marchal" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Friday, July 28, 2006 10:48 AM Subject: Re: Bruno's argument Le 28-juil.-06, à 02:52, John M a écrit : > Then again is the 'as - if' really a computation as in our today's > vocabulary? Or, if you insist (and Bruno as well, that it IS) is it > conceivable as our digital process, that embryonic first approach, or > we > may hope to understand later on a higher level (I have no better word > for > it): the analog computation of qualia and meaning? Certainly not the > Turing > or Church ways and not on Intel etc. processors. What makes you so sure? Sometimes you talk like if you were sure we are not digital machine. Is that not a human prejudice? At least I can explain why If we are machine, we cannot *know* it (just bet on it). There is mathematical description of machine's prejudices. Bruno --- JM: "...We May Hope..." does not seem to me as beiing "so sure". Look please at the "-IF-" in your offered explanation. How about "if not?" the mathematical description is part of the "human prejudice" you mention. You are within a mindset and not responsive to outside ideas. Which is natural. Once I allow to my (outside) ideas to be dragged INTO your circle of your mindset I am lost. Which may not be so bad, but if I am mistaken, I want to get it verified from arguments applicable within my thinking. Just as you cannot argue with a religious belief taken as very 'sufficient evidence' by the adherents. They KNOW and my agnostic doubt looks to 'them' as a typical "Nescio" non est Argumentum,". (Nor are "if"-s - I think). Best John --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): > > > > There is a very impoertant difference between "computations do > > > > not require a physical basis" and "computations do not > > > > require any *particular* physical basis" (ie computations can be > > > > physical > > > > implemented by a wide variety of systems) > > > > > > Yes, but any physical system can be seen as implementing any computation > > > with the appropriate > > > rule mapping physical states to computational states. > > > > I don't think such mappings are valid > > a) without constraints on the simplicity of the mapping rules > > or > > b) without attention to counterfactuals/dispositions > > > > > > > Attempts are made to put constraints on what > > > counts as implementation of a computation in order to avoid this > > > uncomfortable idea, but it > > > doesn't work unless you say that certain implementations are specially > > > blessed by God or something. > > > > I don't know where you get that idea. Dispositions are physically > > respectable. Simplicity constraints are the lifeblood of science. > > The constraints (a) and (b) you mention are ad hoc and an unnecessary > complication. Suppose Klingon > computers change their internal code every clock cycle according to the > well-documented radioactive > decay pattern of a sacred stone 2000 years ago. If we got our hands on one of > these computers and > monitored its internal states it would seem completely random; but if we had > the Klingon manual, we > would see that the computer was actually multiplying two numbers, or > implementing a Klingon AI, or > whatever. Would you say that these computations were not valid because it's a > dumb way to design > a computer? I'd say that a defintion of "computer" that applies to everything is useless. > Would it make any difference if the Klingons were extinct and every copy of > the manual > destroyed? What about if the exact same states in a malfunctioning human > computer arose by chance, > before the Klingons came up with their design? Having the manual is necessary > to make the computer > useful, so that we can interact with it, but it doesn't magically *create* > computation where previously > there was just noise. > > > So at least you have to say that every computation is implemented if any > > > physical universe at all > > > exists, even if it is comprised of a single atom which endures for a > > > femtosecond. > > > > Hmmm. So much for the quantitative issue. What a strange view of > > physics you have. > > This says nothing about physics. There may well be a physical universe, with > orderly physical laws, > and our computers would have to be of the familiar type which will > consistently handle counterfactuals > in order to be of use to us. But I think it is trivially obvious that any > computation is hiding in noise just > as any statue is hiding in a block of marble. There is a quantitaive issue. There are only so many bits in a phsycial system. > This is not very interesting unless you say that computation > can lead to consciousness. You could specify that only brains can lead to > consciousness, or that only > non-solipsistic computations with inputs and outputs based on physical > reality can lead to consciousness, > but that's not straight computationalism any more. I can say that a hydrogen atom can't compute an entire virtual universe, because there isn't enough "room". And even so, there is the other part of the problem. You can't validly infer from "any computation can be implemented by any physical system" to "any computation can be implemented by without any physical basis" --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Le 28-juil.-06, à 02:52, John M a écrit : > Then again is the 'as - if' really a computation as in our today's > vocabulary? Or, if you insist (and Bruno as well, that it IS) is it > conceivable as our digital process, that embryonic first approach, or > we > may hope to understand later on a higher level (I have no better word > for > it): the analog computation of qualia and meaning? Certainly not the > Turing > or Church ways and not on Intel etc. processors. What makes you so sure? Sometimes you talk like if you were sure we are not digital machine. Is that not a human prejudice? At least I can explain why If we are machine, we cannot *know* it (just bet on it). There is mathematical description of machine's prejudices. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument
John M > > Colin, > the entire discussion is too much for me, I pick some remarks of yours and > ask only about them. I am glad to see that others are also struggling to > find better and more fitting words... > (I search for better fitting concepts as well to be expressed by those > better fitting wods). > You wrote: > >... *the rest of the universe that is not 'us' behave in a way with > respect > >to us that we label 'physical'...< > Do I sense a separation "us" versus the 'rest of the universe'? > I figure it is not a relation between "them" (the rest of the universe) > and > "us" (what is this? God's children?) especially after your preceding > sentence: > > *whatever the universe is we are part of it, made of it, not separably > 'in > > it'.< > I am looking for distinctive features which help us 'feel' as ourselves in > the total and universal interconnectedness. The "closeness" > (interrelation?) > vs a more remote connectivity. > The 'self', which I do not expropriate for us. > I have no idea about 'physical', it reflects our age-old ways of > observing > whatever was observable with that poor epistemic cognitive inventory our > ancestors used reducing mindset, observation and explanation to their > models > (level of the era). > 40 or 50 orders of spatial magnitude down deep, space and matter merge into their common organisational parent. There is no 'separateness', we have never justified that, only assumed it and seen no convincing empirical evidence other than a failure of science to sort out consciousness because of the assumption. Whatever the depth of structure, we humans are ALL of it. The existence of consciousness (qualia) is proof that the separateness is virtual (as-if). IMO the separation is merely a delineation - a notional boundary supported by our perception systems. Just because a perceived boundary is closed does not mean that it is not 'open' in some other way down deep in the structure of the universe. So I guess we are in agreement here. > Then again is the 'as - if' really a computation as in our today's > vocabulary? Or, if you insist (and Bruno as well, that it IS) is it > conceivable as our digital process, that embryonic first approach, or we > may hope to understand later on a higher level (I have no better word for > it): the analog computation of qualia and meaning? Certainly not the > Turing > or Church ways and not on Intel etc. processors. > > John M > Not sure I follow you here. All abstracted computing everywhere is 'as-if'. None of the input domains of numbers or anything else are ever reified. We simply declare a place to act like it was there and then behave as if it were. The results work fine! I'm writing this using exactly that process. Looks 'as-if' I'm writing a letter no? :-) Qualia requires that form of computation executed by the 'natural domain'... IMO it's computation..it just doesn't fit neatly into our limited idealized mathematics done by creature constructed of it from within it. The natural world does not have to comply with our limited abstractions, nor does the apparent existence of an abstraction that seems to act 'as-if' it captures everything in the natural world. Abstractions are just abstractions... ultimately it's all expressed as patterns in the stuff of the universe... IMO If there's any property intrinsic and implicit to the reality of the universe (whatever it is, it is it!) then the abstraction throws it away. Cheers Colin hales --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Colin, the entire discussion is too much for me, I pick some remarks of yours and ask only about them. I am glad to see that others are also struggling to find better and more fitting words... (I search for better fitting concepts as well to be expressed by those better fitting wods). You wrote: >... *the rest of the universe that is not 'us' behave in a way with respect >to us that we label 'physical'...< Do I sense a separation "us" versus the 'rest of the universe'? I figure it is not a relation between "them" (the rest of the universe) and "us" (what is this? God's children?) especially after your preceding sentence: > *whatever the universe is we are part of it, made of it, not separably 'in > it'.< I am looking for distinctive features which help us 'feel' as ourselves in the total and universal interconnectedness. The "closeness" (interrelation?) vs a more remote connectivity. The 'self', which I do not expropriate for us. I have no idea about 'physical', it reflects our age-old ways of observing whatever was observable with that poor epistemic cognitive inventory our ancestors used reducing mindset, observation and explanation to their models (level of the era). Then again is the 'as - if' really a computation as in our today's vocabulary? Or, if you insist (and Bruno as well, that it IS) is it conceivable as our digital process, that embryonic first approach, or we may hope to understand later on a higher level (I have no better word for it): the analog computation of qualia and meaning? Certainly not the Turing or Church ways and not on Intel etc. processors. John M ----- Original Message - From: "Colin Geoffrey Hales" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Thursday, July 27, 2006 6:11 PM Subject: Re: Bruno's argument > >> >> >> Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >>> Well, I think I have a better understanding now of the ideas leading me > to start this thread - thanks to Bruno, Quentin and the other >>> contributors. Moreover, I am leaning towards fundamentally changing my > views on the implementation problem: if computationalism is true, then > it doesn't seem to make much sense to say that computations are > implemented as a result of physical processes, even if a separate > physical reality did exist. It may yet be the case that consciousness > is >>> only the result of special physical processes, perhaps brains and > digital computers but not rocks or the mere existence of computations > as >>> mathematical objects, but then this would entail giving up >>> computationalism. Putting constraints on which computations contribute > to the measure of consciousness, as I understood Jesse Mazer's >>> suggestion to be, may also be true, but it is debatable whether this > preserves computationalism either. >>> Stathis Papaioannou >> >> There is a very impoertant difference between "computations do >> not require a physical basis" and "computations do not >> require any *particular* physical basis" (ie computations can be physical >> implemented by a wide variety of systems) >> >> > > The distractions of language in this are so subtle. The word 'physical' is > so laden with preconceived notions. I wish I could think of a better word > but I can't. Perhaps a better way of couching it would help: > > *whatever the universe is we are part of it, made of it, not separably 'in > it'. > *the rest of the universe that is not 'us' behave in a way with respect to > us that we label 'physical' > *the entire thing could be called a computational domain but based on > computing done with 'objects' that are nothing like the idea of number we > are used to. A particular 'number' in our universe could be > colin.brain.cell.molecule.atom.proton.quark.a.s.d.fetc. There need > be no 'next' or 'previous' number in the sense we are used to - that comes > from our thinking. The number is actually an organisational hierarchy > only. > > Pick up a pencil, hold it. Say to yourself "The universe has computed a > pencil". > > These numbers interact with each other according to whatever is > computationally adjacent (this has nothing to do with space or what we > would call physically adjacent...space can be what it looks like when you > are in it).. for example 'adding' three of these (above) numbers involves > creating the right context of adjacency and voila... a 'proton' (plus some > remainder rubbish which can go away and do something else...) Basically >
RE: Bruno's argument
Peter Jones writes (quoting SP): > > There is a very impoertant difference between "computations do > > > not require a physical basis" and "computations do not > > > require any *particular* physical basis" (ie computations can be > > > physical > > > implemented by a wide variety of systems) > > > > Yes, but any physical system can be seen as implementing any computation > > with the appropriate > > rule mapping physical states to computational states. > > I don't think such mappings are valid > a) without constraints on the simplicity of the mapping rules > or > b) without attention to counterfactuals/dispositions > > > > Attempts are made to put constraints on what > > counts as implementation of a computation in order to avoid this > > uncomfortable idea, but it > > doesn't work unless you say that certain implementations are specially > > blessed by God or something. > > I don't know where you get that idea. Dispositions are physically > respectable. Simplicity constraints are the lifeblood of science. The constraints (a) and (b) you mention are ad hoc and an unnecessary complication. Suppose Klingon computers change their internal code every clock cycle according to the well-documented radioactive decay pattern of a sacred stone 2000 years ago. If we got our hands on one of these computers and monitored its internal states it would seem completely random; but if we had the Klingon manual, we would see that the computer was actually multiplying two numbers, or implementing a Klingon AI, or whatever. Would you say that these computations were not valid because it's a dumb way to design a computer? Would it make any difference if the Klingons were extinct and every copy of the manual destroyed? What about if the exact same states in a malfunctioning human computer arose by chance, before the Klingons came up with their design? Having the manual is necessary to make the computer useful, so that we can interact with it, but it doesn't magically *create* computation where previously there was just noise. > > So at least you have to say that every computation is implemented if any > > physical universe at all > > exists, even if it is comprised of a single atom which endures for a > > femtosecond. > > Hmmm. So much for the quantitative issue. What a strange view of > physics you have. This says nothing about physics. There may well be a physical universe, with orderly physical laws, and our computers would have to be of the familiar type which will consistently handle counterfactuals in order to be of use to us. But I think it is trivially obvious that any computation is hiding in noise just as any statue is hiding in a block of marble. This is not very interesting unless you say that computation can lead to consciousness. You could specify that only brains can lead to consciousness, or that only non-solipsistic computations with inputs and outputs based on physical reality can lead to consciousness, but that's not straight computationalism any more. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument
Brent Meeker writes: > > Yes, but any physical system can be seen as implementing any computation > > with the appropriate > > rule mapping physical states to computational states. > > I think this is doubtful. For one thing there must be enough distinct > states. It's all very well > to imagine a mapping between a rock and my computer idealized as isolated > closed systems - but in > fact they are not isolated close systems. When you're talking about > simulating the universe in > computation it has a lot more states than a rock and it isn't close either. The rock could be running all the required computations *in parallel*. > >Attempts are made to put constraints on what > > counts as implementation of a computation in order to avoid this > > uncomfortable idea, but it > > doesn't work unless you say that certain implementations are specially > > blessed by God or something. > > So at least you have to say that every computation is implemented if any > > physical universe at all > > exists, even if it is comprised of a single atom which endures for a > > femtosecond. That's an absurd > > amount of responsibility for a little atom, and it makes more sense to me > > (although I can't at the > > moment think of a proof) to say that the atom is irrelevant, and the > > computations are implemented > > anyway by virtue of their status as mathematical objects. > > Or by virtue of there being universes. Sure: there may be a physical universe, and there may be something special about brains - i.e. only brains or some restricted subset of possible computation devices might be able to run conscious programs. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
> > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: >> Well, I think I have a better understanding now of the ideas leading me to start this thread - thanks to Bruno, Quentin and the other >> contributors. Moreover, I am leaning towards fundamentally changing my views on the implementation problem: if computationalism is true, then it doesn't seem to make much sense to say that computations are implemented as a result of physical processes, even if a separate physical reality did exist. It may yet be the case that consciousness is >> only the result of special physical processes, perhaps brains and digital computers but not rocks or the mere existence of computations as >> mathematical objects, but then this would entail giving up >> computationalism. Putting constraints on which computations contribute to the measure of consciousness, as I understood Jesse Mazer's >> suggestion to be, may also be true, but it is debatable whether this preserves computationalism either. >> Stathis Papaioannou > > There is a very impoertant difference between "computations do > not require a physical basis" and "computations do not > require any *particular* physical basis" (ie computations can be physical > implemented by a wide variety of systems) > > The distractions of language in this are so subtle. The word 'physical' is so laden with preconceived notions. I wish I could think of a better word but I can't. Perhaps a better way of couching it would help: *whatever the universe is we are part of it, made of it, not separably 'in it'. *the rest of the universe that is not 'us' behave in a way with respect to us that we label 'physical' *the entire thing could be called a computational domain but based on computing done with 'objects' that are nothing like the idea of number we are used to. A particular 'number' in our universe could be colin.brain.cell.molecule.atom.proton.quark.a.s.d.fetc. There need be no 'next' or 'previous' number in the sense we are used to - that comes from our thinking. The number is actually an organisational hierarchy only. Pick up a pencil, hold it. Say to yourself "The universe has computed a pencil". These numbers interact with each other according to whatever is computationally adjacent (this has nothing to do with space or what we would call physically adjacent...space can be what it looks like when you are in it).. for example 'adding' three of these (above) numbers involves creating the right context of adjacency and voila... a 'proton' (plus some remainder rubbish which can go away and do something else...) Basically the gigantic cellular automata. The computations done with these 'numbers' is what we are. For the sake of a name call the numbers 'entropy numbers'. 'AS-IF' COMPUTATION What we can do is arrange this 'intrinsic computation with entropy numbers' to behave 'as-if' idealised numbers existed and obey rules according to the idealised domain of those numbers, if it actually existed (presumably in the legendary platonia). Nowhere in any of this 'as-if' computation does any of the structural 'entropy numbers' have any clue as to what it is doing. The manipuluated 'symbols' are just patterns in the adjacency of the numbers. 'VIRTUAL MATTER' Imagine this huge cellular automata - a computation performed by simple adjacency of entities in an organisational hierarchy - the numbers in it that represent the organisation of me and you is what we call matter. As computation it is actually derived from an axiomatic initial conditions and a set of logical rules, forming a massively parallel calculus. if 'number a' (a cell in the CA) is matter it is a proof in this calculus if 'number b' (a cell in the CA) is matter it is a proof in this calculus then what is the status within the CA the 'difference' between two cells in the CA? The difference has been computed just as exquisitely accurately, but no computational proof exists in the sense that a and b were proven. It is 'as if' the computation was performed...but it was not actually performed. Therefore if a is matter, b is matter, then (a_to_b) is 'as-if' matter - virtual matter. You can see this in any of the CAs Stephen Wolfram's book. Each cell is actually computed. The _difference_ between any two cells is not computed explicity but is as perfectly proven. These are godellian unproven truths in their squintillions. Now ask yourself the one question Stephen Wolfram didn'k himself: Q. "Under what conditions can it be like something to 'be' an object in a CA?" A. When the object in the CA behaves 'as-if' it is interacting with some other part of the CA. Under these circumstances the unproven truths - the virtual matter riddling the CA can be used to paint a computational picture of any other part of the CA. The trick is that the numbers in the CA have to do it... no act as-if'. But the machine that does the 'as-if' symbolic computation throws away all the virtual matter in the process of manipulating symbols only meaningful to a third
Re: Bruno's argument
Brent Meeker wrote: > d the computations are implemented > > anyway by virtue of their status as mathematical objects. > > Or by virtue of there being universes. Something, anyway. You don't get implementation for free. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Peter Jones writes: > > > There is a very impoertant difference between "computations do > > not require a physical basis" and "computations do not > > require any *particular* physical basis" (ie computations can be > > physical > > implemented by a wide variety of systems) > > Yes, but any physical system can be seen as implementing any computation with > the appropriate > rule mapping physical states to computational states. I don't think such mappings are valid a) without constraints on the simplicity of the mapping rules or b) without attention to counterfactuals/dispositions > Attempts are made to put constraints on what > counts as implementation of a computation in order to avoid this > uncomfortable idea, but it > doesn't work unless you say that certain implementations are specially > blessed by God or something. I don't know where you get that idea. Dispositions are physically respectable. Simplicity constraints are the lifeblood of science. > So at least you have to say that every computation is implemented if any > physical universe at all > exists, even if it is comprised of a single atom which endures for a > femtosecond. Hmmm. So much for the quantitative issue. What a strange view of physics you have. > That's an absurd > amount of responsibility for a little atom, and it makes more sense to me > (although I can't at the > moment think of a proof) to say that the atom is irrelevant, Any finite quantitiy is infinitely greater than zero. I *can* think of a disproof! > and the computations are implemented > anyway by virtue of their status as mathematical objects. Assuming Platonism has been proved, whcih it hasn't. (NBB "implemented" means a lot more than "theoretically true" !!!) > Stathis Papaioannou > _ > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Peter Jones writes: > > >>There is a very impoertant difference between "computations do >>not require a physical basis" and "computations do not >>require any *particular* physical basis" (ie computations can be >>physical >>implemented by a wide variety of systems) > > > Yes, but any physical system can be seen as implementing any computation with > the appropriate > rule mapping physical states to computational states. I think this is doubtful. For one thing there must be enough distinct states. It's all very well to imagine a mapping between a rock and my computer idealized as isolated closed systems - but in fact they are not isolated close systems. When you're talking about simulating the universe in computation it has a lot more states than a rock and it isn't close either. >Attempts are made to put constraints on what > counts as implementation of a computation in order to avoid this > uncomfortable idea, but it > doesn't work unless you say that certain implementations are specially > blessed by God or something. > So at least you have to say that every computation is implemented if any > physical universe at all > exists, even if it is comprised of a single atom which endures for a > femtosecond. That's an absurd > amount of responsibility for a little atom, and it makes more sense to me > (although I can't at the > moment think of a proof) to say that the atom is irrelevant, and the > computations are implemented > anyway by virtue of their status as mathematical objects. Or by virtue of there being universes. Brent Meeker --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument
Peter Jones writes: > There is a very impoertant difference between "computations do > not require a physical basis" and "computations do not > require any *particular* physical basis" (ie computations can be > physical > implemented by a wide variety of systems) Yes, but any physical system can be seen as implementing any computation with the appropriate rule mapping physical states to computational states. Attempts are made to put constraints on what counts as implementation of a computation in order to avoid this uncomfortable idea, but it doesn't work unless you say that certain implementations are specially blessed by God or something. So at least you have to say that every computation is implemented if any physical universe at all exists, even if it is comprised of a single atom which endures for a femtosecond. That's an absurd amount of responsibility for a little atom, and it makes more sense to me (although I can't at the moment think of a proof) to say that the atom is irrelevant, and the computations are implemented anyway by virtue of their status as mathematical objects. Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Well, I think I have a better understanding now of the ideas leading me to > start this thread - thanks to Bruno, Quentin and the other contributors. > Moreover, I am leaning towards fundamentally changing my views on the > implementation problem: if computationalism is true, then it doesn't seem to > make much sense to say that computations are implemented as a result of > physical processes, even if a separate physical reality did exist. It may yet > be the case that consciousness is only the result of special physical > processes, perhaps brains and digital computers but not rocks or the mere > existence of computations as mathematical objects, but then this would entail > giving up computationalism. Putting constraints on which computations > contribute to the measure of consciousness, as I understood Jesse Mazer's > suggestion to be, may also be true, but it is debatable whether this > preserves computationalism either. > > Stathis Papaioannou There is a very impoertant difference between "computations do not require a physical basis" and "computations do not require any *particular* physical basis" (ie computations can be physical implemented by a wide variety of systems) --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument
Well, I think I have a better understanding now of the ideas leading me to start this thread - thanks to Bruno, Quentin and the other contributors. Moreover, I am leaning towards fundamentally changing my views on the implementation problem: if computationalism is true, then it doesn't seem to make much sense to say that computations are implemented as a result of physical processes, even if a separate physical reality did exist. It may yet be the case that consciousness is only the result of special physical processes, perhaps brains and digital computers but not rocks or the mere existence of computations as mathematical objects, but then this would entail giving up computationalism. Putting constraints on which computations contribute to the measure of consciousness, as I understood Jesse Mazer's suggestion to be, may also be true, but it is debatable whether this preserves computationalism either. Stathis Papaioannou > From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: Bruno's argument > Date: Wed, 26 Jul 2006 16:32:03 +0200 > To: everything-list@googlegroups.com > > > > Le 26-juil.-06, à 07:55, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > > > > > > Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP): > > > >>> But certain computations are selected out through being isomorphic > >>> with physical structures and processes (or simulations thereof): > >> > >> > >> I would have said that certain computations are selected out by giving > >> high relative measure for locally stable consciousness experiences, > >> and > >> then those relative computations will defined what is physical from > >> inside. this explains (or at least makes it possible to explain) why > >> apparent physical laws are isomorphic to mathematical laws. The > >> physical would be the mathematical as seen from inside by mathematical > >> entities. > > > > I think I understand what you mean. If we say there is a physical > > world for the sake of argument, and then the whole thing suddenly > > disappears, there would be no way for a conscious being to know that > > anything had changed, because the computations underpinning his > > consciousness are unaffected: they still give the impression of a > > physical world. > > > > With comp it have to be so. If it is actually is still an open problem, > despite some results. > > > > > > > > So the existence of a physical world somehow separate from mere > > mathematical entities is an unnecessary hypothesis. > > > >>> a parabola, the number three, a mind. We are happy to say that the > >>> first two of these are not "caused" by physical processes even when > >>> they manifest as if they are, and I think the same consideration can > >>> be applied to mind. What physical structures consciousness is > >>> isomorphic with and why is another question. > >> > >> Consciousness would be isomorphic with relative or conditional average > >> on *all* computations, which can be made matematical by Church Thesis. > > > > This sounds right, but I have absolutely no idea where to start when > > we are talking about computations underlying consciousness. As Russell > > asked, why does it appear that they emanate from complex structures > > called brains? Why don't we perceive ourselves to be disembodied > > spirits, or to have heads solid like a potato? > > > > > stable "brains/ body/universes" are locally needed only to make it > possible for a consciousness or a first person to manifest > him/her/e/self with respect to a stable (high measure preserving) > history. > So comp have to explain why Harry Potter and first person white rabbits > are relatively rare. This is still an open problem, but comp (Church > thesis mainly) makes it mathematical. What I have done is only a > reduction of the mind/body problem to a mathematical problem, + timid > advances toward a solution of that math problem, making comp testable > (and partially tested). > You are near the difficult questions which remains to be thoroughly > worked out ... > > Bruno > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Le 26-juil.-06, à 07:55, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : > > Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP): > >>> But certain computations are selected out through being isomorphic >>> with physical structures and processes (or simulations thereof): >> >> >> I would have said that certain computations are selected out by giving >> high relative measure for locally stable consciousness experiences, >> and >> then those relative computations will defined what is physical from >> inside. this explains (or at least makes it possible to explain) why >> apparent physical laws are isomorphic to mathematical laws. The >> physical would be the mathematical as seen from inside by mathematical >> entities. > > I think I understand what you mean. If we say there is a physical > world for the sake of argument, and then the whole thing suddenly > disappears, there would be no way for a conscious being to know that > anything had changed, because the computations underpinning his > consciousness are unaffected: they still give the impression of a > physical world. With comp it have to be so. If it is actually is still an open problem, despite some results. > So the existence of a physical world somehow separate from mere > mathematical entities is an unnecessary hypothesis. > >>> a parabola, the number three, a mind. We are happy to say that the >>> first two of these are not "caused" by physical processes even when >>> they manifest as if they are, and I think the same consideration can >>> be applied to mind. What physical structures consciousness is >>> isomorphic with and why is another question. >> >> Consciousness would be isomorphic with relative or conditional average >> on *all* computations, which can be made matematical by Church Thesis. > > This sounds right, but I have absolutely no idea where to start when > we are talking about computations underlying consciousness. As Russell > asked, why does it appear that they emanate from complex structures > called brains? Why don't we perceive ourselves to be disembodied > spirits, or to have heads solid like a potato? stable "brains/ body/universes" are locally needed only to make it possible for a consciousness or a first person to manifest him/her/e/self with respect to a stable (high measure preserving) history. So comp have to explain why Harry Potter and first person white rabbits are relatively rare. This is still an open problem, but comp (Church thesis mainly) makes it mathematical. What I have done is only a reduction of the mind/body problem to a mathematical problem, + timid advances toward a solution of that math problem, making comp testable (and partially tested). You are near the difficult questions which remains to be thoroughly worked out ... Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Bruno's argument
Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP): > > But certain computations are selected out through being isomorphic > > with physical structures and processes (or simulations thereof): > > > I would have said that certain computations are selected out by giving > high relative measure for locally stable consciousness experiences, and > then those relative computations will defined what is physical from > inside. this explains (or at least makes it possible to explain) why > apparent physical laws are isomorphic to mathematical laws. The > physical would be the mathematical as seen from inside by mathematical > entities. I think I understand what you mean. If we say there is a physical world for the sake of argument, and then the whole thing suddenly disappears, there would be no way for a conscious being to know that anything had changed, because the computations underpinning his consciousness are unaffected: they still give the impression of a physical world. So the existence of a physical world somehow separate from mere mathematical entities is an unnecessary hypothesis. > > a parabola, the number three, a mind. We are happy to say that the > > first two of these are not "caused" by physical processes even when > > they manifest as if they are, and I think the same consideration can > > be applied to mind. What physical structures consciousness is > > isomorphic with and why is another question. > > Consciousness would be isomorphic with relative or conditional average > on *all* computations, which can be made matematical by Church Thesis. This sounds right, but I have absolutely no idea where to start when we are talking about computations underlying consciousness. As Russell asked, why does it appear that they emanate from complex structures called brains? Why don't we perceive ourselves to be disembodied spirits, or to have heads solid like a potato? Stathis Papaioannou _ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Le 24-juil.-06, à 09:26, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : It's only a coincidence in the literal sense of the word, i.e. two things happening simultaneously. My point was to explore the idea of supervenience, which (to me, at any rate) at first glance seems a mysterious process, and we should cut mysterious processes from our theories whenever possible: "entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily". Computations exist eternally as mathematical objects, regardless of whether there is a physical world or not. OK. But certain computations are selected out through being isomorphic with physical structures and processes (or simulations thereof): I would have said that certain computations are selected out by giving high relative measure for locally stable consciousness experiences, and then those relative computations will defined what is physical from inside. this explains (or at least makes it possible to explain) why apparent physical laws are isomorphic to mathematical laws. The physical would be the mathematical as seen from inside by mathematical entities. a parabola, the number three, a mind. We are happy to say that the first two of these are not "caused" by physical processes even when they manifest as if they are, and I think the same consideration can be applied to mind. What physical structures consciousness is isomorphic with and why is another question. Consciousness would be isomorphic with relative or conditional average on *all* computations, which can be made matematical by Church Thesis. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
RE: Re: Bruno's argument
Russell Standish writes (quoting SP): > > What if we just say that there is no more to the supervenience of the> > mental on the physical than there is to the supervenience of a> > parabola on the trajectory of a projectile under gravity? The> > projectile doesn't "create" the parabola, which exists in Platonia in> > an infinite variety of formulations (different coordinate systems and> > so on) along with all the other mathematical objects, but there is an> > isomorphism between physical reality and mathematical structure, which> > in the projectile's case happens to be a parabola. So we could say> > that the brain does not "create" consciousness, but it does happen> > that those mathematical structures isomorphic with brain processes in> > a particular individual are the subset of Platonia that constitutes a> > coherent conscious stream. This is not to assume that there actually> > is a real physical world: simulating a projectile's motion with pencil> > and paper, on a computer, or just the *idea* of doing so will define> > that subset of Platonia corresponding to a particular parabola as> > surely as doing the actual experiment. Similarly, simulating atoms,> > molecules etc. making up a physical brain, or just the idea of doing> > so defines the subset of Platonia corresponding to an individual> > stream of consciousness. Your head suddenly turning into a bunch of> > flowers is not part of the consciousness simulation/reality (although> > it still is part of Platonia), just as the projectile suddenly> > changing its trajectory in a random direction is not part of the> > parabola simulation/reality, or "7" is not an element of the set of> > even numbers. > > Stathis Papaioannou >> > So you consider it just a coincidence then that incredibly complicated> structures (called "brains") are part of our observed reality, even> though by Occam's razor we really should be demanding an explanation> of why such complexity exists. It's only a coincidence in the literal sense of the word, i.e. two things happening simultaneously. My point was to explore the idea of supervenience, which (to me, at any rate) at first glance seems a mysterious process, and we should cut mysterious processes from our theories whenever possible: "entities should not be multiplied unnecessarily". Computations exist eternally as mathematical objects, regardless of whether there is a physical world or not. But certain computations are selected out through being isomorphic with physical structures and processes (or simulations thereof): a parabola, the number three, a mind. We are happy to say that the first two of these are not "caused" by physical processes even when they manifest as if they are, and I think the same consideration can be applied to mind. What physical structures consciousness is isomorphic with and why is another question. Stathis PapaioannouBe one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
On Mon, Jul 24, 2006 at 12:35:02PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> What if we just say that there is no more to the supervenience of the
> mental on the physical than there is to the supervenience of a
> parabola on the trajectory of a projectile under gravity? The
> projectile doesn't "create" the parabola, which exists in Platonia in
> an infinite variety of formulations (different coordinate systems and
> so on) along with all the other mathematical objects, but there is an
> isomorphism between physical reality and mathematical structure, which
> in the projectile's case happens to be a parabola. So we could say
> that the brain does not "create" consciousness, but it does happen
> that those mathematical structures isomorphic with brain processes in
> a particular individual are the subset of Platonia that constitutes a
> coherent conscious stream. This is not to assume that there actually
> is a real physical world: simulating a projectile's motion with pencil
> and paper, on a computer, or just the *idea* of doing so will define
> that subset of Platonia corresponding to a particular parabola as
> surely as doing the actual experiment. Similarly, simulating atoms,
> molecules etc. making up a physical brain, or just the idea of doing
> so defines the subset of Platonia corresponding to an individual
> stream of consciousness. Your head suddenly turning into a bunch of
> flowers is not part of the consciousness simulation/reality (although
> it still is part of Platonia), just as the projectile suddenly
> changing its trajectory in a random direction is not part of the
> parabola simulation/reality, or "7" is not an element of the set of
> even numbers. > > Stathis Papaioannou >
So you consider it just a coincidence then that incredibly complicated
structures (called "brains") are part of our observed reality, even
though by Occam's razor we really should be demanding an explanation
of why such complexity exists.
Cheers
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A/Prof Russell Standish Phone 8308 3119 (mobile)
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RE: Bruno's argument
Russell Standish writes: > But why does our consciousness supervene on any physical object (which we> conventionally label "heads")?> > > One answer is that only those computations which> >supervene on physical processes in a brain which exists in a universe> >with orderly physical laws (which universe is just a tiny subset of> >the computations in Platonia) can result in the kind of orderly> >structure required to create the effect of a conscious being> >persisting through time. This does not necessarily mean that the> >computations underpinning your stream of conscious are actually> >implemented in a physical universe, or even in a simulation of a> >physical universe, since it is impossible to say "where" a computation> >is being implemented when there are an infinity of them for every> >possible thought. Rather, it is enough that those computations which> >have a component in the physical universe (such as it is) are selected> >out, while those that end in your head turning into a bunch of flowers> >in the next microsecond are excluded. > > I don't really follow this argument :( What if we just say that there is no more to the supervenience of the mental on the physical than there is to the supervenience of a parabola on the trajectory of a projectile under gravity? The projectile doesn't "create" the parabola, which exists in Platonia in an infinite variety of formulations (different coordinate systems and so on) along with all the other mathematical objects, but there is an isomorphism between physical reality and mathematical structure, which in the projectile's case happens to be a parabola. So we could say that the brain does not "create" consciousness, but it does happen that those mathematical structures isomorphic with brain processes in a particular individual are the subset of Platonia that constitutes a coherent conscious stream. This is not to assume that there actually is a real physical world: simulating a projectile's motion with pencil and paper, on a computer, or just the *idea* of doing so will define that subset of Platonia corresponding to a particular parabola as surely as doing the actual experiment. Similarly, simulating atoms, molecules etc. making up a physical brain, or just the idea of doing so defines the subset of Platonia corresponding to an individual stream of consciousness. Your head suddenly turning into a bunch of flowers is not part of the consciousness simulation/reality (although it still is part of Platonia), just as the projectile suddenly changing its trajectory in a random direction is not part of the parabola simulation/reality, or "7" is not an element of the set of even numbers. Stathis PapaioannouBe one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Le 22-juil.-06, à 22:02, Brent Meeker a écrit : >> No bigger than the "assumption" that "other" minds exists (a key >> assumption in comp if only through the trust to the doctor). > > Aren't those two propositions independent - that there are other minds > and that we cannot possibly > know what their experiences are like? Not with comp. Other minds have personal experiences, and if they are vehiculated by a software having a complexity comparable to your's, those personal experience are knowable only by empathy, for you. Not 3-describable knowledge. >> And then it is a theorem that for any correct machine there are true >> propositions about them that the machine cannot prove. > > And there are true propositions about itself that the machine cannot > prove - but are they > "experiences"? Certainly there are myriad true propositions about > what my brain is doing that I am > not, and cannot be aware of, but they aren't experiences. I don't try to use a sophisticated theory of knowledge. You mention yourself "knowing" can be given by true justified opinion (Theaetetus). I take "provability of p" as a form of justified opinion of p: Bp. Then I get knowledge by adding that p is true, under the form "& p". Limiting ourself to correct machine, we know that Bp and Bp & p are equivalent, but the key (godelian) point is that the machine itself cannot know that for its own provability predicate, making the logic of Bp & p different. It can be proved that Bp & p acts as a knowledge operator(*) (S4 modal logic), even a "temporal one" (S4Grz logic), and even a quasi quantum one with comp: S4GRz1 proves LASE p -> BDp necessary to get an arithmetical interpretation of some quantum logic. So "non provability" is not the way I "model" experience in the lobian interview. I model experiences and experiments with *variant* of G and G*, the logics of provable and true provability respectively. The variants are obtain by adding "& p" or "& Dp". This could sound technical, it is, sorry. Bruno (*) Which I should have recall to Russell (it is the best justification for the "& p"). Artemov has shown that it is the only one possible(*) if we decide to restrict ourself (as I have done) to what Russell call "mathematical knowledge", but if Russell agrees with the UDA, this should not cause a problem (especially knowing that S4Grz describes mathematically a form of knowledge which cannot be put (knowingly) in a mathematical form. That's admittedly counter-intuitive and subtle and explains why I need to get people familiar with many similar counter-intuitive propositions which all are obtained directly or indirectly from diagonalizations. (*) http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/bxlthesis/Volume4CC/ 6%20La%20these%20d'Artemov.pdf http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Russell Standish wrote: > On Sun, Jul 23, 2006 at 06:53:50PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > Russell Standish writes: > > > > > To refine the problem a little further - we see a brain in our> observed > > > reality on which our mind supervenes. And we see other> brains, for which > > > we must assume supervenience of other persons (the> no zombies > > > assumption).> > What is the cause of this supervenience? It is a symptom > > > of the> anthropic principle (observed reality being consistent with our> > > > brains), but this is merely transferring the mystery. In my ToN book I> > > > advance the argument that this has to be something to do with> > > > self-awareness - ie the body is necessary for self-awareness, and> > > > self-awareness must therefore be necessary for consciousness.> > Bruno, I > > > know in your theory that introspection is a vital component> (the > > > Goedel-like constructions), but I didn't see how this turns back> onto > > > the self-awareness issue. Did you develop this side of the argument? > > Why is the body necessary for self-awareness? > > >And why are our heads not homogeneously solid like a potato? > > Good question! > > > The > >answer is straightforward if you say only computers compute, but not > >if you say everything computes, or every computation is implemented > >(sans "physical reality") by virtue of its status as a mathematical > >object in Platonia. > > But why does our consciousness supervene on any physical object (which we > conventionally label "heads")? it is easy enough to see why the Easy Problem asepcts of consciousness... # the ability to discriminate, categorize, and react to environmental stimuli; # the integration of information by a cognitive system; # the reportability of mental states; # the ability of a system to access its own internal states; # the focus of attention; # the deliberate control of behavior; # the difference between wakefulness and sleep. ...do. The question, then, is : why do the Hard Problem aspects.. (The really hard problem of consciousness is the problem of experience. When we think and perceive, there is a whir of information-processing, but there is also a subjective aspect. As Nagel (1974) has put it, there is something it is like to be a conscious organism. This subjective aspect is experience. When we see, for example, we experience visual sensations: the felt quality of redness, the experience of dark and light, the quality of depth in a visual field. Other experiences go along with perception in different modalities: the sound of a clarinet, the smell of mothballs. Then there are bodily sensations, from pains to orgasms; mental images that are conjured up internally; the felt quality of emotion, and the experience of a stream of conscious thought. What unites all of these states is that there is something it is like to be in them. All of them are states of experience.) ...supervene on the easy problem aspects. Of course, the universe would be quite a strange place if reports of red qualia (EP) weren't accompanied by experienced red qualia (HP)! Which is just he issue Chalmers addresses in another key paper: "Absent Qualia, Fading Qualia, Dancing Qualia" http://consc.net/papers/qualia.html --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Bruno's argument
Brent Meeker wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> >
> > Brent Meeker wrote:
> >
> >
> >>In other words it is not justified, based on our limited understanding of
> >>brains, to say we'll never
> >>be able to know how another feels based on observation of their brain.
> >
> >
> >
> > We don't know how insects or amoebae feel, either.
> > It is not just an issue of complexity.
> > We don't knw where to *start* with qualia.
>
> We know where to start when it comes to knowing how other people feel, i.e.
> we empathize. If we
> knew how our brain worked and how the brain of our friend worked, then we
> could correlate the
> empathized feeling with the brain events.
Correlation isn't explanation.
> This doesn't mean we would experience our friends
> feeling, but we could produce a mapping between his brain processes and his
> (inferred) feelings. Of
> course we wouldn't *know* this was right - but scientific knowledge is always
> uncertain, so I don't
> see that as a objection to calling it knowledge.
I think you have skated past an important point. Being explanatory
is not all the same as being certain. All scientific knowledge
is uncertain; all knowledge worthy of the name is explanatory --
meaning it can provide answers (however uncertain) to "how" and "why"
questions.
> Then there are homologous structures in our
> friends brain to those in a chimpanzee's brain and there are similar
> behavoirs - so I think we could
> extend our map to the feelings of a chimpanzee. Of course with some really
> alien life form, say an
> octopus, this would be difficult to test empirically - but not, I think,
> impossible.
At best, this anwers questions about the circumstances under which an
organism might feel a quale. It doesn't say anything about what qualia
are -- why red seems red. ("oh well, of course we can't answer that
question..")
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