Re: John Conway, "Free Will Theorem"
wrote: > A person's decisions and actions must either follow deterministically from a set of rules (which at bottom must reduce to the laws of physics, whatever these ultimately turn out to be), or else they must be random; what other possibility is there?...< [JM]: The inaccuracy of the paranthesis-statement. There is more to be learned (discovered, experienced, adding to our knowledge-base) than those observations and their explanations we usually call 'physics' or any other name. Your word "ultimately" points to this concern very decently. You have the right to call the 'ultimate' (never attainable?) epistemic cognitive inventory "PHYSICS" (based on the origin of this word), but most people will take it as the limited subject in ongoing college curricula. : >Certainly, when I make a > decision it doesn't *feel* as if I am bound by any absolute deterministic > rules, nor does it feel as if I am being driven by a random number > generator. But if I think about it seriously, it is clear that this is > what must actually be happening.< [JM]: I deny the 'random number generator' part, but I agree with your point that "what I feel" is irrelevant. There are unconscious motives in the mindset. There are 'hidden' variables and 'not yet discovered' inputs, we cannot give full account of all that is going on in our mind (incl. decisions?). The 'random' IMO comes from the unkown part of the world, just as the "chaotic", once our epistemic enrichment discloses those "rules?" (parts) that explain the process leading to either random or chaotic, they cease to be such and are included in the orderly and understandable. In your reply to Russell you wrote: : it seems to me that in the brain both types of "random" event would combine to give a very complex and unpredictable picture indeed: quantum events at the atomic or subatomic scale would be amplified by chaotic interactions at the classical scale. However, I have seen it stated that quantum events would in fact not be significant at the scale of neuronal processes. Which is correct? And does it really make much difference, whether we are talking truly random or intractably pseudo-random? [JM]: Your doubts are well taken. The stage, when some 'model-views' led to the QM-based considerations, includes no indications that there is nothing else. In fact, the missing transition between "physical measurements" vs (true?) ORIGINATION of mental content (NOT the correlations between such occurrencies!) postulates the 'more significant' factors you are missing. We are talking in our limited models and their explanations, based on levels of (epistemic) information which during the eras when our scientific concepts were developed was by far not sufficient to understand e.g. mentality. It is still not sufficient and this calls for considerations of randomness, chaos, indeterministic and emergent marvels. (Religions included). The unpredicatbility stems from the total interaction of factors not only so far unaccountable, but a (potential) full combination of the unlimited 'all' is exceeding our mental capabilities. John M - Original Message - From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: Sent: Monday, April 11, 2005 9:26 PM Subject: Re: John Conway, "Free Will Theorem" > John Mikes wrote: > > > >The question of (in)determinacy within our judgement is model-related. A > >distinction: > >"..."free will" to refer to conscious entities making indeterminate > >choices..." is as well the judgement of reasonability in our limited views. > >There may be (hidden? undiscovered?) 'reasons' that make us choose a > >(seemingly) "unreasonable" decision. > > > >To Statis' question I don't pretend to have "The Answer", : > >"...Can someone please explain how I can tell when I am exercising > >*genuine* free will, as opposed to this pseudo-free variety, which clearly > >I have no control over?" > > but a consideration may go like this: > >our mind is interrelated to the rest of the totality (wholeness) and stores > >individually different mindsets as a result of memory and ideation > >(genetically + personal history-wise modified). > >The 'mind' (what is it? self, memories, etc., I say: the mental ASPECT of > >our complexity) > >is not a sole function of the brain-tissues which are only the tools > >working WITH it. There is no 'mystery' in this statement: only our > >ignorance preventing to discover things beyond our present models by our > >physical and physiological observational (and expla
Re: John Conway, "Free Will Theorem"
Stathis, thanks for your reply, but my two points in return are: 1. to the list-appearance remark: I did not miss the 'responses', I missed the list-mail CONTAINIG my post. Whether there is a response is of course up to the (non?)respondents. I don't "require" such. 2. in the thread: I wonder if your logic is straightforward, if you don't have an understanding about a "very complicated" system, a fault in it will NOT clear up your underestanding. I agree that in medical 'sciences' there is a widely used practice of studying the sick and drawing conclusions on the healthy, but that does not mean that I should accept it as the right method. You can draw true conclusions from the 'faults' if you know the unfaulted system. Otherwise you just guess. Maybe guess right John M - Original Message - From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: Sent: Tuesday, April 12, 2005 1:42 AM Subject: Re: John Conway, "Free Will Theorem" > > John Mikes wrote: > > >Stathis: > >it is always dangerous (wrong!) to mix deviated cases (sick patients) with > >the general (non sick) human (behavioral etc.) concepts. > >One thing is even worse: to draw conclusions of such. > > I disagree with this, in general. In medical science, in particular, one of > the most common means of progress in understanding normal physiology has > been the study of pathological cases. If you have a very complex system, and > a fault develops, if you can trace and understand the fault, then you > understand at least one small part of the system. > > >I wrote some comments in this thread lately and did not see them being > >included in the list-posts. Am I banned from writing to the list? > > John, of course your comments are welcome on the list. It is easy to think > that you are being ignored when nobody replies to your post, but that is not > necessarily the case. The posts that get most replies seem to be the ones > that say something provocative, controversial, or just plain wrong: everyone > loves a good argument! It could simply be that everyone agrees with you if > you have no replies. For example, I don't think anyone specifically replied > to George Levy's post on this thread, which I thought was very well reasoned > and I completely agreed with. > > --Stathis Papaioannou >
Re: John Conway, "Free Will Theorem"
John Mikes wrote: Stathis: it is always dangerous (wrong!) to mix deviated cases (sick patients) with the general (non sick) human (behavioral etc.) concepts. One thing is even worse: to draw conclusions of such. I disagree with this, in general. In medical science, in particular, one of the most common means of progress in understanding normal physiology has been the study of pathological cases. If you have a very complex system, and a fault develops, if you can trace and understand the fault, then you understand at least one small part of the system. I wrote some comments in this thread lately and did not see them being included in the list-posts. Am I banned from writing to the list? John, of course your comments are welcome on the list. It is easy to think that you are being ignored when nobody replies to your post, but that is not necessarily the case. The posts that get most replies seem to be the ones that say something provocative, controversial, or just plain wrong: everyone loves a good argument! It could simply be that everyone agrees with you if you have no replies. For example, I don't think anyone specifically replied to George Levy's post on this thread, which I thought was very well reasoned and I completely agreed with. --Stathis Papaioannou _ $60,000 prize pool to be won. Three winners. Apply now! http://www.healthe.com.au/competition.do
Re: John Conway, "Free Will Theorem"
John Mikes wrote: The question of (in)determinacy within our judgement is model-related. A distinction: "..."free will" to refer to conscious entities making indeterminate choices..." is as well the judgement of reasonability in our limited views. There may be (hidden? undiscovered?) 'reasons' that make us choose a (seemingly) "unreasonable" decision. To Statis' question I don't pretend to have "The Answer", : "...Can someone please explain how I can tell when I am exercising *genuine* free will, as opposed to this pseudo-free variety, which clearly I have no control over?" but a consideration may go like this: our mind is interrelated to the rest of the totality (wholeness) and stores individually different mindsets as a result of memory and ideation (genetically + personal history-wise modified). The 'mind' (what is it? self, memories, etc., I say: the mental ASPECT of our complexity) is not a sole function of the brain-tissues which are only the tools working WITH it. There is no 'mystery' in this statement: only our ignorance preventing to discover things beyond our present models by our physical and physiological observational (and explanatory) skills. At the level of complexness in our mind-state we have choices. Not freely, but definitely 'ways' to compare and choose. "We are free" means we can choose the route that fits most the combined image of our mental state at the moment. We are "free" to choose otherwise, again, deterministically by the background(s) we consciously know or don't. No matter if it looks 'reasonable' for others, ot not. Statis is right to feel not responsible for such choices - only religions impart such guilt-feeling to keep the flock under control. Since the actions are deemed (in)deterministic in both 'conscious(?)' and 'inanimate(?)' units, it points to our ignorance about the functional originations for them. The unlimited interconnections with their differential efficiency on the different targets that makes the wholistic interconnection of the totality incalculable (not prone to Turing-Chuch application) gives us the feeling of a free will, of indeterminacy, earlier: of a miracle and awe. I don't want to even guess how much we did not yet discover. Just to clarify, my request for a method to distinguish "genuine" free will from the "pseudo-free" variety (deterministic or random) was tongue-in-cheek. A person's decisions and actions must either follow deterministically from a set of rules (which at bottom must reduce to the laws of physics, whatever these ultimately turn out to be), or else they must be random; what other possibility is there? Certainly, when I make a decision it doesn't *feel* as if I am bound by any absolute deterministic rules, nor does it feel as if I am being driven by a random number generator. But if I think about it seriously, it is clear that this is what must actually be happening. --Stathis Papaioannou _ Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it's FREE! http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/
Re: John Conway, "Free Will Theorem"
I got something from you yesterday ... maybe you had an errant email
relay like I suffered yesterday.
On Mon, Apr 11, 2005 at 11:25:29AM -0400, John M wrote:
> I wrote some comments in this thread lately and did not see them being
> included in the list-posts. Am I banned from writing to the list?
>
> John Mikes
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Re: John Conway, "Free Will Theorem"
Stathis: it is always dangerous (wrong!) to mix deviated cases (sick patients) with the general (non sick) human (behavioral etc.) concepts. One thing is even worse: to draw conclusions of such. I wrote some comments in this thread lately and did not see them being included in the list-posts. Am I banned from writing to the list? John Mikes - Original Message - From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Sunday, April 10, 2005 10:46 PM Subject: Re: John Conway, "Free Will Theorem" > Here are some interesting symptoms from sufferers of schizophrenia, which > may be seen as disorders of free will: > > 1. Command auditory hallucinations. The patient hears voices commanding him > to do sometimes horrific things, which he feels he *must* obey, and often > does obey, even though he does not want to. It is not that there is a fear > of consequences if he disobeys, like Nazi subordinates following orders. > Rather, the perceived command seems to directly impinge on the > decision-making centres of the brain, bypassing the frantic efforts of the > judgement centres to counteract it: > > "I heard a voice telling me to strangle my mother... I was terrified, I > didn't want to do this, but I couldn't resist, I *had* to do it." > > 2. Passivity phenomena. This is generally even harder to resist, and hence > more dangerous, than command auditory hallucinations. The patient > experiences his body being controlled like a puppet by an external force: > > "I was walking down the street when all of a sudden, I felt the satellites > beaming a force field at me, which took control of my body and made me throw > myself in front of the oncoming traffic. I tried to resist, but it was > impossible." > > 3. Catatonia. The patient appears as if paralysed and unresponsive. Asked > about the experience afterwards, he sometimes explains that he was actually > aware of his surroundings, that he felt able to move and speak if he wanted > to at any point, but that he did not want to do so, for reasons he cannot > explain - just a whim. The fact is, catatonic patients are *not* able to > move, even though they think they are, and could die if not given urgent > medical care (IV hydration, ECT). > > --Stathis Papaioannou >
Re: John Conway, "Free Will Theorem"
Here are some interesting symptoms from sufferers of schizophrenia, which may be seen as disorders of free will: 1. Command auditory hallucinations. The patient hears voices commanding him to do sometimes horrific things, which he feels he *must* obey, and often does obey, even though he does not want to. It is not that there is a fear of consequences if he disobeys, like Nazi subordinates following orders. Rather, the perceived command seems to directly impinge on the decision-making centres of the brain, bypassing the frantic efforts of the judgement centres to counteract it: "I heard a voice telling me to strangle my mother... I was terrified, I didn't want to do this, but I couldn't resist, I *had* to do it." 2. Passivity phenomena. This is generally even harder to resist, and hence more dangerous, than command auditory hallucinations. The patient experiences his body being controlled like a puppet by an external force: "I was walking down the street when all of a sudden, I felt the satellites beaming a force field at me, which took control of my body and made me throw myself in front of the oncoming traffic. I tried to resist, but it was impossible." 3. Catatonia. The patient appears as if paralysed and unresponsive. Asked about the experience afterwards, he sometimes explains that he was actually aware of his surroundings, that he felt able to move and speak if he wanted to at any point, but that he did not want to do so, for reasons he cannot explain - just a whim. The fact is, catatonic patients are *not* able to move, even though they think they are, and could die if not given urgent medical care (IV hydration, ECT). --Stathis Papaioannou _ SEEK: Now with over 80,000 dream jobs! Click here: http://ninemsn.seek.com.au?hotmail
Re: John Conway, "Free Will Theorem"
On Mon, Apr 11, 2005 at 10:30:25AM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
>
> I agree that "the purpose of punishment is to prevent that occurrence from
> happening again"; at least, this is what the purpose of punishment ought to
> be. But note that this *does* imply an assumption about the reasons people
> decide to act in a particular way, which is that it is not completely
> random or indeterminate. If it were, then punishment or the fear of
> punishment would not have any effect on future behaviour, would it?
Sure - a totally indeterminate human being would not be very
functional. Nor would a totally determinate one. Punishment would
probably be inappropriate in either case.
>
> Putting aside the pragmatics of the legal system, one's philosophical
> beliefs about free will can influence attitudes towards criminals. A
> criminal behaves as he does due to (a) his biology, (b) his past life
> experiences, (c) random physical processes in the brain, or some
> combination of the three. It is tempting to add (d) free choice, but how
> can this possibly be anything different to (a), (b) and (c)? It certainly
> feels like one can "overcome" (a), (b) and (c) by force of will, but the
> existence of this subjective experience has no more bearing on reality
> than, for example, the strong feeling that the Earth is flat, and that
> there is an absolute up/down in the universe.
>
> --Stathis Papaioannou
Nothing I disagree with here.
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Re: John Conway, "Free Will Theorem"
Russell Standish writes: Since this topic of legal responsibility regularly comes up in discussions of free, it needs to be squashed from a great height. The notion of legal responsibility has nothing whatsoever to do with free will. Legal responsibility is used for different purposes, depending on whether the case is civil or criminal. In civil cases, legal responsibility who pays cost and damages. In criminal cases, it used to decide whether an agent should be punished. An agent here may be a person, or a company, or any other legal entitity that that legal tradition recognises. The purpose of punishment is to prevent that occurrence from happening again. Human society depends on punishment to ensure altruism (reference to recent work by that Swiss guy here...). If the agent is a learning system, then applying punishment to the agent can cause the agent to learn - the stick of carrot & a stick. Alternatively, the punishment is used to deter others from committing the same crime. The notion of diminished responsibility is an interesting case. Here, an agent may be found to be under the influence of another agent, so one can attribute some of the responsibility to another agent. However, as the Nuernberg trials showed, this is a very shaky defence. It cannot be applied to the sources of randomness within your brain - those sources of randomness are still part of the legal entity that is you. Pleading the defence of insanity can really only alter the punishment. Punishing an insane person to make them learn will probably not work - different sort of treatment, such as medical intervention might be appropriate. Religions have a notion of responsibility rather similar to the legal one, however theological doctrine seems to have more to say about free will. However, being essentially atheist, and unlikely to ever meet a god face to face, this line of argumentation doesn't impress me much. So I leave it at that - responsibility has nothing whatsoever to do with free will. Cheers I agree that "the purpose of punishment is to prevent that occurrence from happening again"; at least, this is what the purpose of punishment ought to be. But note that this *does* imply an assumption about the reasons people decide to act in a particular way, which is that it is not completely random or indeterminate. If it were, then punishment or the fear of punishment would not have any effect on future behaviour, would it? Putting aside the pragmatics of the legal system, one's philosophical beliefs about free will can influence attitudes towards criminals. A criminal behaves as he does due to (a) his biology, (b) his past life experiences, (c) random physical processes in the brain, or some combination of the three. It is tempting to add (d) free choice, but how can this possibly be anything different to (a), (b) and (c)? It certainly feels like one can "overcome" (a), (b) and (c) by force of will, but the existence of this subjective experience has no more bearing on reality than, for example, the strong feeling that the Earth is flat, and that there is an absolute up/down in the universe. --Stathis Papaioannou _ Buy want you really want - sell what you don't on eBay: http://adfarm.mediaplex.com/ad/ck/705-10129-5668-323?ID=2
Re: John Conway, "Free Will Theorem"
Russel, Stathis I agree that free will and legal responsibility are different. Free will is a subjective concept. It is a feeling that one has about being "master" of one's decisions. In the terminology used in this list, free will is also a "first person" issue. Legal responsibility is an objective concept about restricting or punishing members of a society, used to insure that the society is functioning porperly. Legal responsibility is also a third person issue. Confusion arise because we are mixing first person and third person concepts, that is we assume that other members of our species (third persons) have free will like ourselves (first person). Hence, we deduce that others have free will and therefore they should be masters of their own decisions to do "good and evil" - in relation to society or to conscious deity - and therefore can be guided by a system of rewards and punishments. This key assumption may be justified on practical ground for the stability of our society and requires the existence of conscious others. Treating free will as a first person concept, implies that it is also relative to the observer. For example a super being observing our brain as we make decisions, will come to the conclusion that we have no free will. Our choices, as Stathis said, is only the result of causally driven sodium atoms pushing through nerve membranes. Similarly, a programmer who understand his code thoroughly, can believe that his program has no free will. We can also have a super being watching a programmer watching his programthere is no absolute free will. >From an absolute viewpoint, that is looking at the whole plenitude, there is no quantum free will since any decision involving quantum branching is no decision at all. >From the relative point of view of a classical superbeing observing a human making a decision generated by a quantum event, the superbeing must deduce that the decision is produced by free will since, being classical, he cannot understand the causality behind the decision. My point is that free will cannot be absolute. It is really a relative, subjective and first person concept that depends on the state of mind of the observer and the complexity of the observed entity in relation to the observer. George Russell Standish wrote: Since this topic of legal responsibility regularly comes up in discussions of free, it needs to be squashed from a great height. The notion of legal responsibility has nothing whatsoever to do with free will. Legal responsibility is used for different purposes, depending on whether the case is civil or criminal. In civil cases, legal responsibility who pays cost and damages. In criminal cases, it used to decide whether an agent should be punished. An agent here may be a person, or a company, or any other legal entitity that that legal tradition recognises. The purpose of punishment is to prevent that occurrence from happening again. Human society depends on punishment to ensure altruism (reference to recent work by that Swiss guy here...). If the agent is a learning system, then applying punishment to the agent can cause the agent to learn - the stick of carrot & a stick. Alternatively, the punishment is used to deter others from committing the same crime. The notion of diminished responsibility is an interesting case. Here, an agent may be found to be under the influence of another agent, so one can attribute some of the responsibility to another agent. However, as the Nuernberg trials showed, this is a very shaky defence. It cannot be applied to the sources of randomness within your brain - those sources of randomness are still part of the legal entity that is you. Pleading the defence of insanity can really only alter the punishment. Punishing an insane person to make them learn will probably not work - different sort of treatment, such as medical intervention might be appropriate. Religions have a notion of responsibility rather similar to the legal one, however theological doctrine seems to have more to say about free will. However, being essentially atheist, and unlikely to ever meet a god face to face, this line of argumentation doesn't impress me much. So I leave it at that - responsibility has nothing whatsoever to do with free will. Cheers On Sun, Apr 10, 2005 at 03:19:19PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Norman Samish writes: The answer to Stat[h]is' question seems straightforward. Given quantum indeterminacy, thought processes cannot be predictable. Therefore, genuine free will exists. "...Can someone please explain how I can tell when I am exercising *genuine* free will, as opposed to this pseudo-free variety, which clearly I have no control over?" Norman Samish So if, on a whim, I commit murder, I can present the following argument to the judge: Your Honour, quantum indeterminacy made me do it. If you could have looked inside my brain just prior to the mome
Re: John Conway, "Free Will Theorem"
Since this topic of legal responsibility regularly comes up in
discussions of free, it needs to be squashed from a great height.
The notion of legal responsibility has nothing whatsoever to do with
free will.
Legal responsibility is used for different purposes, depending on
whether the case is civil or criminal. In civil cases, legal
responsibility who pays cost and damages. In criminal cases, it used
to decide whether an agent should be punished. An agent here may be a
person, or a company, or any other legal entitity that that legal
tradition recognises.
The purpose of punishment is to prevent that occurrence from happening
again. Human society depends on punishment to ensure altruism
(reference to recent work by that Swiss guy here...). If the agent is
a learning system, then applying punishment to the agent can cause the
agent to learn - the stick of carrot & a stick. Alternatively, the
punishment is used to deter others from committing the same crime.
The notion of diminished responsibility is an interesting case. Here,
an agent may be found to be under the influence of another agent, so
one can attribute some of the responsibility to another
agent. However, as the Nuernberg trials showed, this is a very shaky
defence. It cannot be applied to the sources of randomness within your
brain - those sources of randomness are still part of the legal entity
that is you.
Pleading the defence of insanity can really only alter the
punishment. Punishing an insane person to make them learn will
probably not work - different sort of treatment, such as medical
intervention might be appropriate.
Religions have a notion of responsibility rather similar to the legal
one, however theological doctrine seems to have more to say about free
will. However, being essentially atheist, and unlikely to ever meet a
god face to face, this line of argumentation doesn't impress me much.
So I leave it at that - responsibility has nothing whatsoever to do
with free will.
Cheers
On Sun, Apr 10, 2005 at 03:19:19PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Norman Samish writes:
>
> >The answer to Stat[h]is' question seems straightforward. Given quantum
> >indeterminacy, thought processes cannot be predictable. Therefore, genuine
> >free will exists.
> >
> >"...Can someone please explain how I can tell when I am exercising
> >*genuine*
> >free will, as opposed to this pseudo-free variety, which clearly I have no
> >control over?"
> >
> >Norman Samish
>
> So if, on a whim, I commit murder, I can present the following argument to
> the judge:
>
> Your Honour, quantum indeterminacy made me do it. If you could have looked
> inside my brain just prior to the moment when I decided to become a
> murderer you would have seen a sodium ion teetering at the edge of a
> protein ion channel embedded in the membrane of a particular neuron. If the
> sodium ion passes through the channel it will raise the voltage across the
> membrane to just past the threshold required to trigger an action
> potential. The neurone will then "fire", setting off a cascade of neuronal
> events which I experience as the decision to kill an innocent stranger -
> which I then proceeded to do. If, on the other hand, that crucial sodium
> ion had not passed through the membrane channel, a different cascade of
> neuronal events would have ensued, causing me to allow the stranger to live.
>
> I cannot deny that it felt like I was exercising my free will when I
> decided to kill, but clearly this must have been a delusion. Firstly, the
> cause of my "decision" was a random event (to the extent where
> non-classical behaviour applies to the sort of biochemical reactions which
> occur in the brain). Secondly, my "decision" had already been determined at
> the point where the behaviour of that initial sodium ion was determined;
> when I experienced myself "deciding" to kill, in a sense my brain had
> already been programmed to do so. Therefore, I don't think it is fair that
> I should be punished!
>
> --Stathis Papaioannou
>
> _
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Re: John Conway, "Free Will Theorem"
Hi Stathis: I left out that Turing's result seem to point towards a conclusion that the set of universe descriptions does not form a continuum but rather a countable set and thus these descriptions can generally differ by too large an amount to store all prior quantum level states - too coarse grained. Thus the illusion of indeterminacy and thus free will. Hal Ruhl
Re: John Conway, "Free Will Theorem"
Hi Stathis: My argument is that Turing's result points towards the MWI and makes it a deterministic outcome but I so far see no reason why all worlds should run concurrently. So the judge's "decision" you experience "now" is an indeterminate [random] selection from all possible outcomes and gives the illusion that the judge has Free Will because our minds are too coarse grained to store the quantum level events. Hal Ruhl
Re: John Conway, "Free Will Theorem"
Norman Samish writes: The answer to Stat[h]is' question seems straightforward. Given quantum indeterminacy, thought processes cannot be predictable. Therefore, genuine free will exists. "...Can someone please explain how I can tell when I am exercising *genuine* free will, as opposed to this pseudo-free variety, which clearly I have no control over?" Norman Samish So if, on a whim, I commit murder, I can present the following argument to the judge: Your Honour, quantum indeterminacy made me do it. If you could have looked inside my brain just prior to the moment when I decided to become a murderer you would have seen a sodium ion teetering at the edge of a protein ion channel embedded in the membrane of a particular neuron. If the sodium ion passes through the channel it will raise the voltage across the membrane to just past the threshold required to trigger an action potential. The neurone will then "fire", setting off a cascade of neuronal events which I experience as the decision to kill an innocent stranger - which I then proceeded to do. If, on the other hand, that crucial sodium ion had not passed through the membrane channel, a different cascade of neuronal events would have ensued, causing me to allow the stranger to live. I cannot deny that it felt like I was exercising my free will when I decided to kill, but clearly this must have been a delusion. Firstly, the cause of my "decision" was a random event (to the extent where non-classical behaviour applies to the sort of biochemical reactions which occur in the brain). Secondly, my "decision" had already been determined at the point where the behaviour of that initial sodium ion was determined; when I experienced myself "deciding" to kill, in a sense my brain had already been programmed to do so. Therefore, I don't think it is fair that I should be punished! --Stathis Papaioannou _ Update your mobile with a hot polyphonic ringtone: http://fun.mobiledownloads.com.au/191191/index.wl?page=191191polyphonicringtone
Re: John Conway, "Free Will Theorem"
The answer to Statis' question seems straightforward. Given quantum indeterminacy, thought processes cannot be predictable. Therefore, genuine free will exists. "...Can someone please explain how I can tell when I am exercising *genuine* free will, as opposed to this pseudo-free variety, which clearly I have no control over?" Norman Samish
Re: John Conway, "Free Will Theorem"
I think the (originally so named) "Multiverse" has been formulated to fit Russell's postulate. I formulated a different 'structure'(?) for a 'multiverse', maybe I should find another name for it. It is closer to Hal's 'everything'. I am not on the level to discuss, how the infinites in an unlimited ideation fit the QM determinism. Deterministic it is, as long as we consider ONE existence and not many (infinitely many) parallel ones. QM or not. If I understand Russell's 'the single world universe of our senses' right, it is the 'model' we construe upon our interpretation of the limited part of the world which our senses provide for us, eo ipso it is not deterministic (arbitrary?). It also changes with our epistemic enrichment. The question of (in)determinacy within our judgement is model-related. A distinction: "..."free will" to refer to conscious entities making indeterminate choices..." is as well the judgement of reasonability in our limited views. There may be (hidden? undiscovered?) 'reasons' that make us choose a (seemingly) "unreasonable" decision. To Statis' question I don't pretend to have "The Answer", : "...Can someone please explain how I can tell when I am exercising *genuine* free will, as opposed to this pseudo-free variety, which clearly I have no control over?" but a consideration may go like this: our mind is interrelated to the rest of the totality (wholeness) and stores individually different mindsets as a result of memory and ideation (genetically + personal history-wise modified). The 'mind' (what is it? self, memories, etc., I say: the mental ASPECT of our complexity) is not a sole function of the brain-tissues which are only the tools working WITH it. There is no 'mystery' in this statement: only our ignorance preventing to discover things beyond our present models by our physical and physiological observational (and explanatory) skills. At the level of complexness in our mind-state we have choices. Not freely, but definitely 'ways' to compare and choose. "We are free" means we can choose the route that fits most the combined image of our mental state at the moment. We are "free" to choose otherwise, again, deterministically by the background(s) we consciously know or don't. No matter if it looks 'reasonable' for others, ot not. Statis is right to feel not responsible for such choices - only religions impart such guilt-feeling to keep the flock under control. Since the actions are deemed (in)deterministic in both 'conscious(?)' and 'inanimate(?)' units, it points to our ignorance about the functional originations for them. The unlimited interconnections with their differential efficiency on the different targets that makes the wholistic interconnection of the totality incalculable (not prone to Turing-Chuch application) gives us the feeling of a free will, of indeterminacy, earlier: of a miracle and awe. I don't want to even guess how much we did not yet discover. Well, we are past the Flat Earth. Or are we? John Mikes - Original Message - From: "Russell Standish" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Pete Carlton" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Cc: <everything-list@eskimo.com> Sent: Thursday, April 07, 2005 8:40 PM Subject: Re: John Conway, "Free Will Theorem" The Multiverse is a deterministic framework for quantum mechanics. Itis completely compatible with it. A paradox can only occur if youthink the single world universe of our senses is deterministic - whichit clearly isn't. My "definition" of free will is "the ability to do somethingcompletely stupid" - ie related to irrationality. A perfectly rationalbeing would be completely deterministic, and in my mind has no freewill. This certainly appears to be compatible with Conway's use of theterm. It is usual to equate the choice of measurement by theexperimenter as "free will". It is also certainly true that fixing the QM statevector, as well as the choice of measurement does not determine theoutcome of the measurement. To say that the observed system has freewill in deciding the outcome of the experiment is certainly aprovocative way of putting it, but I think it is perfectly reasonableto ask the question of why we use the term "free will" to refer toconscious entities making indeterminate choices, and not fornon-conscious entities. On an interesting segue on this matter is found in Roy Frieden's book"Physics from Fisher Information", where he talks about measurement asbeing a game in which the experimenter attempts expose as muchinformation as possible about reality, and reality attempts to hidethat information. The minimax principle this generates can be used toderive all sorts of fundamental equations, including the Klein-Gordonequation, a relativistic version of Schroedinger's equation. Cheers (R.Standish) On Thu, Apr 07, 2005 at 01:30:00AM -0700, Pete Carlton wrote:> Greetings,> SNIP
RE: John Conway, "Free Will Theorem"
Hi Stathis: At 08:17 AM 4/8/2005, you wrote: I am worried that some of what I have always believed to be my freely made decisions may actually result from physical processes in my brain which are either, on the one hand, completely random, or on the other hand, entirely deterministic (even if intractably complex). I don't think it is fair that I should be held accountable for such decisions! Can someone please explain how I can tell when I am exercising *genuine* free will, as opposed to this pseudo-free variety, which clearly I have no control over? --Stathis Papaioannou I am currently working on forging a set of beliefs re "Free Will" and they currently go something like this: 1) It seems to me that math and reality (physics?) are joined at the deepest level. My basis: Godel's venue as I understand it was the spectrum of the response behavior of entities when asked a question meaningful to that entity. Godel showed as I understand it that some mathematical entities belonging to the ensemble of formal systems are unable to respond to all such questions with a single resolving reply. Does reality have a similar entity? Lets start with the "Nothing" in a way similar to some of my other posts. Define it as the "is-not" of the system that embeds universe(s). The definition is already a problem because it is like a toe tag attached to the "Nothing" that effectively parses (not necessarily in a time based sense) reality into two sub systems. But that is another story. Now since universe(s) seem to be at the least information and we should avoid preselecting the nature of the information that can describe a universe then the "Nothing" can contain (embed) no information. Since the "Nothing" embeds no information it can not respond at all to a meaningful question. The issue is now one of: Is there a meaningful question to which it must respond? As I have said before I think the answer is yes. It is the question of its own persistence. The "Nothing" can only deal with this by incorporating some response as an axiom (information). So to me the "Nothing" seems incomplete in the Godelian sense. Further after this necessary event it is no longer the "Nothing". It has "exploded" - as some say - into something else. It seems unlikely that the follow on entity is any more complete as a result of the "explosion" so - fortunately for us - the "explosion" continues. It seems to me that a universe suffers from a similar issue due to the existence of the next up theory re the general absence of a decision procedure. A universe being unable to respond to some meaningful questions with a single resolving response simply produces the entire ensemble - the MWI. Further I think one can make other more real life examples such as a manufacturing system. Here we have an alphabet - quarks and such, axioms - particular arrangements of quarks and such called raw material, rules of grammar - quality control, rules of inference - process instructions, and escapes are just examples of the general absence of a decision procedure. 2) Suppose I convince myself that there is no such thing as free will. I have then decided that I can not decide. Is that not what Turing did? There is no reason that I can think of for reality to depart from the nature of its contents so since it contains Turing's result then the states of reality should be discrete and at most countably infinite to correspond with the presence of the diagonal argument that supports Turing's result. Since the entries in the Turing table (the outputs of all computer programs) do not talk to each other (the essence of the diagonal argument is the lack of inter output influence) neither do the states of 'Worlds". The sentence: "I have decided I can not decide." acts like Epimenides Paradox in the sense that Epimenides Paradox is an example of an undecidable and the basis of Godel's result and "I have decided I can not decide" is Turing's result and Godel's is of course a corollary of that so Epimenides Paradox must be contained within "I have decided I can not decide". The undecidability simply causes reality to jump (at some point) to all possible next states for that world (MWI). That is a determined result. Conclusions so far: The description of states of reality are discrete, do not communicate, are at most countably infinite in number, can be infinite in length, have a determined succession, there is no free will. However, I see no reason why reality must visit these states in some ordered sequence or in some ordered grouping - only one branch of MWI may be active for some number of transitions for example. An illusion of free will may reside in this last. Well anyway that is where my thinking stands at the moment. Hal Ruhl
RE: John Conway, "Free Will Theorem"
I am worried that some of what I have always believed to be my freely made decisions may actually result from physical processes in my brain which are either, on the one hand, completely random, or on the other hand, entirely deterministic (even if intractably complex). I don't think it is fair that I should be held accountable for such decisions! Can someone please explain how I can tell when I am exercising *genuine* free will, as opposed to this pseudo-free variety, which clearly I have no control over? --Stathis Papaioannou From: Pete Carlton <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: John Conway, "Free Will Theorem" Date: Thu, 7 Apr 2005 01:30:00 -0700 Greetings, I recently attended a talk here in Berkeley, California given by John Conway (of 'Game of Life' fame), in which he discussed some of his results with Simon Kochen, extending the Kochen-Specker paradox. He presents this as the "Free Will Theorem", saying basically that particles must have as much "free will" as the experimenters who are deciding which directions to measure the |spin| of a spin-1 particle in. --I would replace his words "free will" with "indeterminacy", but there is still an interesting paradox lurking there. A good online writeup is here: http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~jas/one/freewill-theorem.html I wrote up my brief take on it, necessarily from a more philosophical angle, here: http://homepage.mac.com/pmcarlton/iblog/C1074759898/E263558720/ index.html and here: http://homepage.mac.com/pmcarlton/iblog/C1074759898/E688049825/ index.html. I have the intuition that a multiverse approach very readily dissolves his mystery, but am not quite sure how to formally work it out. I thought some people on this list might be interested, or have a ready answer in hand - in particular, I'd like to know if this 'paradox' really is a paradox in one or more of the multiverse conceptions discussed here. thanks and best regards, Pete _ Buy want you really want - sell what you don't on eBay: http://adfarm.mediaplex.com/ad/ck/705-10129-5668-323?ID=2
Re: John Conway, "Free Will Theorem"
Hi Pete and Russell While it may be true that the propagation of the wave equation (and the consequent branching pattern) is deterministic, the actual branch in which one instance of us finds itself in the Multiverse, is random. I agree with Russell that free will occurs only in irrational cases: when the choice is clear and rational there is no free will; when the situation is so clouded and uncertain that we are teetering between alternatives then irrationality comes into play and we might say that we exercise free will. The problem is what may be irrational for one person may be perfectly rational for another. We are led to another concept. The relativity of information According to Shannon the amount of information in data communicated to a receiver is a function of how much the receiver already knows. Extending Shannon's concept we find that information is relative. At the macro level, choices which may appear clear to one person may not be clear to another, possibly because of different degrees of intelligence or different knowledge bases. At the micro level, if we can extending Shannon's mutual information concept to Quantum Mechanics, we find that there is an eerie analogy with entanglement. Two entangled particles maintain a constancy in their relative states. Thus entanglement may be viewed as a relative state between two particles. However, a more interesting theoretical and philosophical situation occurs when observer A states become entangled with a particle P that he observes while oberver B remains unentangled with either A or P. In this case A observes that the state of P depends on his own state. This situation is theoretical at the microscopic level because at this point in time, there is no practical means as far as I know, to construct a lab so well isolated that we can get A entangled to P without also entangling B. To go back to the idea that > the "Free Will Theorem", saying basically that > particles must have as much "free will" as the experimenters who are > deciding which directions to measure the |spin| of a spin-1 particle > in. It is possible to devise a macroscopic experiment simulating entanglement between experimenter and particles by monitoring brainwaves (or implenting electrodes in subject's brains) to correlate the behavior of motorized objects to people's thoughts. For example, an interesting experiment would be to ask a volunteer to catch a motorized object placed on a table, when the object has been programmed to avoid the hand of the experimenter at the slightest thought of him grabbing the object. As soon as the volunteer thinks of exercising his free will, the object will automatically move away. How would you catch this object? Russell Standish wrote: The Multiverse is a deterministic framework for quantum mechanics. It is completely compatible with it. A paradox can only occur if you think the single world universe of our senses is deterministic - which it clearly isn't. My "definition" of free will is "the ability to do something completely stupid" - ie related to irrationality. A perfectly rational being would be completely deterministic, and in my mind has no free will. This certainly appears to be compatible with Conway's use of the term. It is usual to equate the choice of measurement by the experimenter as "free will". It is also certainly true that fixing the QM state vector, as well as the choice of measurement does not determine the outcome of the measurement. To say that the observed system has free will in deciding the outcome of the experiment is certainly a provocative way of putting it, but I think it is perfectly reasonable to ask the question of why we use the term "free will" to refer to conscious entities making indeterminate choices, and not for non-conscious entities. On an interesting segue on this matter is found in Roy Frieden's book "Physics from Fisher Information", where he talks about measurement as being a game in which the experimenter attempts expose as much information as possible about reality, and reality attempts to hide that information. The minimax principle this generates can be used to derive all sorts of fundamental equations, including the Klein-Gordon equation, a relativistic version of Schroedinger's equation. Cheers On Thu, Apr 07, 2005 at 01:30:00AM -0700, Pete Carlton wrote: Greetings, I recently attended a talk here in Berkeley, California given by John Conway (of 'Game of Life' fame), in which he discussed some of his results with Simon Kochen, extending the Kochen-Specker paradox. He presents this as the "Free Will Theorem", saying basically that particles must have as much "free will" as the experimenters who are deciding which directions to measure the |spin| of a spin-1 particle in. --I would replace his words "free will" with "indeterminacy", but there is still an interesting paradox lurking there. A good online writeup is here: http://www.cs.auckland
Re: John Conway, "Free Will Theorem"
The Multiverse is a deterministic framework for quantum mechanics. It
is completely compatible with it. A paradox can only occur if you
think the single world universe of our senses is deterministic - which
it clearly isn't.
My "definition" of free will is "the ability to do something
completely stupid" - ie related to irrationality. A perfectly rational
being would be completely deterministic, and in my mind has no free
will.
This certainly appears to be compatible with Conway's use of the
term. It is usual to equate the choice of measurement by the
experimenter as "free will". It is also certainly true that fixing the QM state
vector, as well as the choice of measurement does not determine the
outcome of the measurement. To say that the observed system has free
will in deciding the outcome of the experiment is certainly a
provocative way of putting it, but I think it is perfectly reasonable
to ask the question of why we use the term "free will" to refer to
conscious entities making indeterminate choices, and not for
non-conscious entities.
On an interesting segue on this matter is found in Roy Frieden's book
"Physics from Fisher Information", where he talks about measurement as
being a game in which the experimenter attempts expose as much
information as possible about reality, and reality attempts to hide
that information. The minimax principle this generates can be used to
derive all sorts of fundamental equations, including the Klein-Gordon
equation, a relativistic version of Schroedinger's equation.
Cheers
On Thu, Apr 07, 2005 at 01:30:00AM -0700, Pete Carlton wrote:
> Greetings,
>
> I recently attended a talk here in Berkeley, California given by John
> Conway (of 'Game of Life' fame), in which he discussed some of his
> results with Simon Kochen, extending the Kochen-Specker paradox. He
> presents this as the "Free Will Theorem", saying basically that
> particles must have as much "free will" as the experimenters who are
> deciding which directions to measure the |spin| of a spin-1 particle
> in.
> --I would replace his words "free will" with "indeterminacy", but
> there is still an interesting paradox lurking there.
>
> A good online writeup is here:
> http://www.cs.auckland.ac.nz/~jas/one/freewill-theorem.html
>
> I wrote up my brief take on it, necessarily from a more philosophical
> angle, here:
> http://homepage.mac.com/pmcarlton/iblog/C1074759898/E263558720/
> index.html
> and here:
> http://homepage.mac.com/pmcarlton/iblog/C1074759898/E688049825/
> index.html.
>
> I have the intuition that a multiverse approach very readily dissolves
> his mystery, but am not quite sure how to formally work it out. I
> thought some people on this list might be interested, or have a ready
> answer in hand - in particular, I'd like to know if this 'paradox'
> really is a paradox in one or more of the multiverse conceptions
> discussed here.
>
> thanks and best regards,
> Pete
--
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