RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Jesse Mazer writes: Jesse Mazer writes (after quoting Stathis Papaioannou): No doubt, common implementations of your mind will predominate over more bizarre ones at any given point in time. It is also possible to imagine some scenarios where you survive indefinitely with all of your friends, for example implemented in an Omega Point computer. But eternity is a very long time. If it is possible that the Omega Point computer can break down, then, as Murphy teaches, it certainly *will* break down - eventually. Not if the probability of it breaking down decreases in a geometric way from century to century (or millennium to millennium, aeon to aeon, whatever) as more and more of the universe is incorporated into the giant distributed computing network (or as the increasing computing power allows for more and more sophisticated ways of anticipating and avoiding civilization-ending disasters). Like I said, if the probability of a catastrophic breakdown was 1/8 in one century, 1/16 in the next, 1/32 in the next, and so on, then the total probability of it breaking down at any point in the entire infinite history of the universe would be the sum of the infinite series 1/8+1/16+1/32+1/64+1/128+... , which is equal to 1/4. In such a branch there'd be a 3/4 chance that civilization would last forever. It is possible that the probability of the computer breaking down decreases geometrically with time, as you say. However, as t->infinity, it is nevertheless increasingly likely to deviate from this ideal behaviour, and the measure of branches of the multiverse in which it does will approach zero. Remember, it is not the probability in any single branch which is important (in fact, in the MWI that would be a meaningless concept), but the measure across all branches. It may be more likely to deviate from this ideal behavior, but it could deviate by approaching zero probability of breakdown faster than the ideal behavior predicts, instead of slower; when I said that the probability would be 1/8+1/16+1/32+..., I meant the *average* you get when you sum all possible future histories from that point, including both the histories where at some later time the probability was approaching zero even faster than predicted by the 1/8+1/16+... pattern along with the histories where at some later time it was approaching zero slower, or the probability of breakdown was even increasing. Since it's an average, that means that out of all future histories stemming from that time, in 3/4 of them civilization will never break down. Jesse There are two separate probabilities to consider here. One is the probability (3/4, as you show) that civilization will never break down if implemented on a computer with behaviour as specified above. The other is the probability that the actual hardware will work according to specification. I don't think you should conflate the two, effectively arguing that the hardware will work to specification because that is part of the specification! I don't think I ever said anything about the probability involving software only. If you have a distributed computing network (such that destroying any part of it won't cause a global breakdown), and more and more of the universe is constantly being gobbled up and converted into computing power, then perhaps the probability of all the hardware in the universe breaking down would decrease geometrically as well, on average. Assume that when I talk about the probability of all copies of you being destroyed decreasing like 1/8+1/16+1/32+..., this probability takes into account all possible causes of failure, including software problems, destruction of hardware, and even stuff like the possibility that some other enemy groups of A.I.'s will attempt to erase all copies of you. Returning to the original question, once you have settled into your new home, what is to stop all your friends disappearing, as before? The computer will try to prevent this from happening, and you could probably try the geometric series trick again (i.e. decreasing probability that your friends disappear), but in this case there will be nothing tying you to those ever-rarer branches where the hardware works as it is supposed to. But my point is that it doesn't necessarily have to be a matter of "ever-rarer" branches--even aside from quantum immortality, it might be true that in 3/4 (or whatever) of all branches stemming from a given point in time, any A.I. around at that time will have at least some copies around in the giant computing network forever. Jesse
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
John Mikes wrote: >"...whether I would like something to > be true or not has no bearing whatsoever >on whether in fact it *is* true.< What "is" true? IMO: true is MY 1st person mindset based upon the 3rd person mindsets I have received from others and have put in the "objective" chapter, which is MY "subjective and virtual" interpretation of who knows what. John M No doubt, often we are biased when we decide on the "objective" truth. But at the very least, we should strive to recognise and minimise this bias. It will not do to say straight out, "I don't like ABC, therefore I will say ABC does not exist". --Stathis Papaioannou _ SEEK: Now with over 80,000 dream jobs! Click here: http://ninemsn.seek.com.au?hotmail
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Brent Meeker wrote: >I feel that I am the same person as I was five years ago even though hardly >any of the atoms in my body are the same now as then. The body and brain of >the younger me have disintegrated as completely as if I had died and been >cremated. Certainly, the change has been gradual over time, but the fact >remains that I am now comprised of different matter, with different >spacetime coordinates, in a configuration only approximately copying that of >my younger self. Moreover, my reconstructed brain provides me with only >approximately the same memories as my younger self, in addition to the newer >memories. Without resorting to science fiction thought experiments (mind >uploading, teleportation etc.), I think this demonstrates that consciousness >and personal identity are malleable and mobile, even if you restrict >yourself to implementation on brains. But there is a causal, material chain connecting your brain today and your younger brain. If your brain suffers a concussion or anesthesia, do you suppose your consciousness goes somewhere else? Brent Meeker Why should this "causal, material chain" be significant to the final result? Your body slowly disintegrates and is (approximately) reconstructed atom by atom, so you don't notice a discontinuity, and it doesn't hurt. If the timing and order of the process were changed, so that your body is destroyed in one operation and a copy reconstructed at a different place and time in another operation, all you would notice is a period of unconsciousness, like being knocked out and waking up later in hospital. As for where your consciousness "goes" when you are unconscious, that is my point: it doesn't "go" anywhere. Consciousness (and the associated sense of personal identity) is a process, not a material object. You can still make the point that we have no evidence that human-level consciousness can be implemented outside of a human brain, but I believe the above considerations show that it is not tied to a particular brain. --Stathis Papaioannou _ Dont just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search! http://search.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200636ave/direct/01/
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>-Original Message- >From: Stathis Papaioannou [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >Sent: Monday, April 18, 2005 1:28 PM >To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] >Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality > > >Brent Meeker wrote: > >> >-Original Message- >> >From: Stathis Papaioannou [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >> >Sent: Monday, April 18, 2005 1:03 AM >> >To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com >> >Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality >> > >> > >> >Hal Ruhl wrote: >> > >> >>I know of no reason to assume that the various branches of MWI run >> >>concurrently. >> >> >> >>If they do not run concurrently then the only way I see for immortality >>is >> >>to be in a branch where immortality is already a possibility inherent in >> >>that branch. >> > >> >I don't see why this should be so. Your consciousness should be able to >>jump >> >between branches, between physical locations and across long periods of >> >time. >> >>Why do you assume that - which seems contrary to experience? It seems that >>consciousness is part of the function of material (i.e. brains). > >I feel that I am the same person as I was five years ago even though hardly >any of the atoms in my body are the same now as then. The body and brain of >the younger me have disintegrated as completely as if I had died and been >cremated. Certainly, the change has been gradual over time, but the fact >remains that I am now comprised of different matter, with different >spacetime coordinates, in a configuration only approximately copying that of >my younger self. Moreover, my reconstructed brain provides me with only >approximately the same memories as my younger self, in addition to the newer >memories. Without resorting to science fiction thought experiments (mind >uploading, teleportation etc.), I think this demonstrates that consciousness >and personal identity are malleable and mobile, even if you restrict >yourself to implementation on brains. But there is a causal, material chain connecting your brain today and your younger brain. If your brain suffers a concussion or anesthesia, do you suppose your consciousness goes somewhere else? Brent Meeker
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
Sathis wrote: a. >"...I might agree that Heaven would be wonderful,...< Indeed? to sing the same hymn the 30.000th time? and b. >"...whether I would like something to > be true or not has no bearing whatsoever >on whether in fact it *is* true.< What "is" true? IMO: true is MY 1st person mindset based upon the 3rd person mindsets I have received from others and have put in the "objective" chapter, which is MY "subjective and virtual" interpretation of who knows what. John M - Original Message - From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Sent: Sunday, April 17, 2005 9:28 PM Subject: Re: many worlds theory of immortality
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Jesse Mazer writes:
> >From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ("Hal Finney")
> >Generally, I don't think the same logic applies to copying a mind in a
> >single universe than to splitting of worlds in the MWI. Copying a mind
> >will double its measure, while splitting one leaves it alone. That is a
> >significant practical and philosophical difference.
>
> Doubles its measure relative to who? If I am copied while my friend is not,
> perhaps it makes sense that my measure is doubled relative to his. But what
> if our entire planet, or entire local region of the universe, was copied?
> The relative measure of any two people would not be changed, it seems.
Copying this much would eliminate most of the practical problems, in
terms of how many wives or how much money you would end up with. But it
is important to understand that this is an extremely IMpractical thought
experiment. To the extent that we are focusing on practical issues
we ought to try to stick to at least somewhat plausible experiments.
Copying a person will perhaps be feasible someday, especially if he is an
AI or uploaded person who runs as a computer program. Such people will
have to deal with the practical as well as philosophical considerations
around potential duplication every day. Copying an entire galaxy seems
physically infeasible and is not something that our descendants are
likely to have to deal with.
> Perhaps you could say that the measure of observer-moments that take place
> after the the copying is higher than the measure of observer-moments that
> take place before it, but I'm not sure that'd be true either, it really
> depends on what your theory is about how measure should be assigned to
> different observer-moments.
Yes, I would say this. It is a standard prediction of the MWI (to the
extent that the MWI is standard!). Measure has a certain definition
in this flavor of QM, such that when a universe splits its measure is
reduced in each of the branches. Activities which take place within a
universe (neglecting irrelevant splits) do not get their measured reduced.
We use a similar concept of measure in the AUH (all universe hypothesis).
Schmidhuber defines the inverse exponential of the length of the
computer program to generate a universe as its measure. If we think
of a universe splitting a la the MWI within the framework of the AUH,
the new universe(s) require more information to specify them, namely
the outcome of the coin flip or whatever it was that caused the split.
This additional information reduces the measure of the universes by
making their information description longer. If there is no split and
simply a duplication of some subset, this could happen in a deterministic
universe and there would be no change in the measure. The result is that
universe splitting reduces measure while subset duplication does not.
> Part of the problem is you seem to be assuming
> measure can somehow be derived from the number of physical copies in a
> single universe, whereas I lean more towards the view that a TOE would
> ultimately be stated simply in terms of observer-moments and the measure on
> each, with the appearance of a "physical universe" just being a consequence
> of the particular types of observer-moments that have higher measure. So it
> seems that it partly depends whether one believes the third-person
> perspective or the first-person perspective is more fundamental. (Although
> even if you take the first-person perspective as more basic, you'd need more
> of a fleshed-out theory of how the appearance of an objective physical
> universe comes about to say for sure whether copying a mind in a single
> universe is the same or different from many-worlds splitting.)
I would say that the first person view is consistent with Schmidhuber's
approach as well as the MWI. Both of these models define a measure
over observer moments that can in principle be calculated precisely.
This then determines what we are likely to see and experience.
Hal Finney
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jesse Mazer writes: Jesse Mazer writes (after quoting Stathis Papaioannou): No doubt, common implementations of your mind will predominate over more bizarre ones at any given point in time. It is also possible to imagine some scenarios where you survive indefinitely with all of your friends, for example implemented in an Omega Point computer. But eternity is a very long time. If it is possible that the Omega Point computer can break down, then, as Murphy teaches, it certainly *will* break down - eventually. Not if the probability of it breaking down decreases in a geometric way from century to century (or millennium to millennium, aeon to aeon, whatever) as more and more of the universe is incorporated into the giant distributed computing network (or as the increasing computing power allows for more and more sophisticated ways of anticipating and avoiding civilization-ending disasters). Like I said, if the probability of a catastrophic breakdown was 1/8 in one century, 1/16 in the next, 1/32 in the next, and so on, then the total probability of it breaking down at any point in the entire infinite history of the universe would be the sum of the infinite series 1/8+1/16+1/32+1/64+1/128+... , which is equal to 1/4. In such a branch there'd be a 3/4 chance that civilization would last forever. It is possible that the probability of the computer breaking down decreases geometrically with time, as you say. However, as t->infinity, it is nevertheless increasingly likely to deviate from this ideal behaviour, and the measure of branches of the multiverse in which it does will approach zero. Remember, it is not the probability in any single branch which is important (in fact, in the MWI that would be a meaningless concept), but the measure across all branches. It may be more likely to deviate from this ideal behavior, but it could deviate by approaching zero probability of breakdown faster than the ideal behavior predicts, instead of slower; when I said that the probability would be 1/8+1/16+1/32+..., I meant the *average* you get when you sum all possible future histories from that point, including both the histories where at some later time the probability was approaching zero even faster than predicted by the 1/8+1/16+... pattern along with the histories where at some later time it was approaching zero slower, or the probability of breakdown was even increasing. Since it's an average, that means that out of all future histories stemming from that time, in 3/4 of them civilization will never break down. Jesse There are two separate probabilities to consider here. One is the probability (3/4, as you show) that civilization will never break down if implemented on a computer with behaviour as specified above. The other is the probability that the actual hardware will work according to specification. I don't think you should conflate the two, effectively arguing that the hardware will work to specification because that is part of the specification! On the other hand (and perhaps this is what you meant), in the MWI, there will always be at least one branch where the Omega Point computer does work as advertised, and therefore this constitutes one possible means to achieve immortality. If it can somehow be shown that this is a much more likely scenario for sentience to survive indefinitely than the other possibilities, perhaps we can all look forward to this. Returning to the original question, once you have settled into your new home, what is to stop all your friends disappearing, as before? The computer will try to prevent this from happening, and you could probably try the geometric series trick again (i.e. decreasing probability that your friends disappear), but in this case there will be nothing tying you to those ever-rarer branches where the hardware works as it is supposed to. --Stathis Papaioannou _ Dont just search. Find. Check out the new MSN Search! http://search.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200636ave/direct/01/
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
Le 18-avr.-05, à 02:39, Jonathan Colvin a écrit :
Well, I was elaborating on Bruno's statement that worlds ("maximal
consistent set of propositions") of a FS are not computable; that even
given
infinite resources (ie. infinite time) it is not possible to generate a
"complete" world. This suggests to me that it is *not* the case that
given
infinite time, eveything that can happen must happen. I must admit
this is
not my area of expertise; but it seems to me that the only other
option of
defining a world (identifying it with the FS itself) will, by Godel's
incompleteness theorem, necessitate that there exist unprovable true
propositions of world; the world will be incomplete, so again, not
everything that can happen will happen.
But here I disagree, unless you put some "constructive" or "effective"
constraint on what is a "reality", but then you must abandon the comp
hyp. The reason is admittedly subtle, perhaps, and is based on the
distinction between first person point of view (pov) and third person
pov. The comp hyp is a bet that "I" am a machine, and this entails that
reality, whatever it is, cannot be described by an effective entity.
That is: if I am a machine then reality cannot be a machine (the idea
is that reality emerges from ALL computations relative to my state and
this is essentially due to the fact that a first person cannot be aware
of delays in some effective presentation of all computations (which
exist by Church's thesis)). Please see the links to the Universal
Dovetailer Argument (UDA) in the list and/or in my url. We can discuss
that later 'cause now I'm too buzy alas ... But read the UDA and don't
hesitate to send a catalog of objections, or questions. In english you
can read either
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/
SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html or
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/CC&Q.pdf
From the (pure) computer science point of view the difficulty here is
related to the fact that a set can be effective although some of its
subset is not (see the diagonalization posts in my url). This is not so
astonishing the painting of the Joconde is more complex than the white
paper which "contains" it.
Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
Le 18-avr.-05, à 09:04, Jonathan Colvin a écrit : I was asking the question in the context of Tegmark's UE (by which all and only structures that exist mathematically exist physically), and whether it has relevance to the existence of all possible things. Frankly I'm not sure that Godel is relevant in that context; but then I'm not sure that it's irrelevant either. In this context statements like the descriptions of the states of cellular automata *can* be seen as describing arithmetical truths. No? That's correct. Any relative description of anything digital can be seen as describing some arithmetical truth. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>Jonathan Colvin wrote:
>
>>Well, I was elaborating on Bruno's statement that worlds ("maximal
>>consistent set of propositions") of a FS are not computable;
>that even
>>given infinite resources (ie. infinite time) it is not possible to
>>generate a "complete" world. This suggests to me that it is *not* the
>>case that given infinite time, eveything that can happen must
>happen. I
>>must admit this is not my area of expertise; but it seems to me that
>>the only other option of defining a world (identifying it with the FS
>>itself) will, by Godel's incompleteness theorem, necessitate
>that there
>>exist unprovable true propositions of world; the world will be
>>incomplete, so again, not everything that can happen will happen.
>
Jesse: >Godel's incompleteness theorem only applies in cases where the
>statements have a "meaning" in terms of our mathematical model
>of arithmetic (see my comments at
>http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m4584.html ). If your
>statements are something like descriptions of the state of a
>cellular automaton, then I don't see them having any kind of
>external meaning in terms of describing arithmetical truths,
>so there's no sense in which there would be "unprovable but
>true" statements.
I was asking the question in the context of Tegmark's UE (by which all and
only structures that exist mathematically exist physically), and whether it
has relevance to the existence of all possible things. Frankly I'm not sure
that Godel is relevant in that context; but then I'm not sure that it's
irrelevant either. In this context statements like the descriptions of the
states of cellular automata *can* be seen as describing arithmetical truths.
No?
Jonathan Colvin
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Jesse Mazer writes (after quoting Stathis Papaioannou): No doubt, common implementations of your mind will predominate over more bizarre ones at any given point in time. It is also possible to imagine some scenarios where you survive indefinitely with all of your friends, for example implemented in an Omega Point computer. But eternity is a very long time. If it is possible that the Omega Point computer can break down, then, as Murphy teaches, it certainly *will* break down - eventually. Not if the probability of it breaking down decreases in a geometric way from century to century (or millennium to millennium, aeon to aeon, whatever) as more and more of the universe is incorporated into the giant distributed computing network (or as the increasing computing power allows for more and more sophisticated ways of anticipating and avoiding civilization-ending disasters). Like I said, if the probability of a catastrophic breakdown was 1/8 in one century, 1/16 in the next, 1/32 in the next, and so on, then the total probability of it breaking down at any point in the entire infinite history of the universe would be the sum of the infinite series 1/8+1/16+1/32+1/64+1/128+... , which is equal to 1/4. In such a branch there'd be a 3/4 chance that civilization would last forever. It is possible that the probability of the computer breaking down decreases geometrically with time, as you say. However, as t->infinity, it is nevertheless increasingly likely to deviate from this ideal behaviour, and the measure of branches of the multiverse in which it does will approach zero. Remember, it is not the probability in any single branch which is important (in fact, in the MWI that would be a meaningless concept), but the measure across all branches. It may be more likely to deviate from this ideal behavior, but it could deviate by approaching zero probability of breakdown faster than the ideal behavior predicts, instead of slower; when I said that the probability would be 1/8+1/16+1/32+..., I meant the *average* you get when you sum all possible future histories from that point, including both the histories where at some later time the probability was approaching zero even faster than predicted by the 1/8+1/16+... pattern along with the histories where at some later time it was approaching zero slower, or the probability of breakdown was even increasing. Since it's an average, that means that out of all future histories stemming from that time, in 3/4 of them civilization will never break down. Jesse
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ("Hal Finney")
To: everything-list@eskimo.com
Subject: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Date: Fri, 15 Apr 2005 15:27:25 -0700 (PDT)
Jesse Mazer writes:
> Would you apply the same logic to copying a mind within a single
universe
> that you would to the splitting of worlds in the MWI? If so, consider
the
> thought-experiment I suggested in my post at
> http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m4805.html --
Generally, I don't think the same logic applies to copying a mind in a
single universe than to splitting of worlds in the MWI. Copying a mind
will double its measure, while splitting one leaves it alone. That is a
significant practical and philosophical difference.
Doubles its measure relative to who? If I am copied while my friend is not,
perhaps it makes sense that my measure is doubled relative to his. But what
if our entire planet, or entire local region of the universe, was copied?
The relative measure of any two people would not be changed, it seems.
Perhaps you could say that the measure of observer-moments that take place
after the the copying is higher than the measure of observer-moments that
take place before it, but I'm not sure that'd be true either, it really
depends on what your theory is about how measure should be assigned to
different observer-moments. Part of the problem is you seem to be assuming
measure can somehow be derived from the number of physical copies in a
single universe, whereas I lean more towards the view that a TOE would
ultimately be stated simply in terms of observer-moments and the measure on
each, with the appearance of a "physical universe" just being a consequence
of the particular types of observer-moments that have higher measure. So it
seems that it partly depends whether one believes the third-person
perspective or the first-person perspective is more fundamental. (Although
even if you take the first-person perspective as more basic, you'd need more
of a fleshed-out theory of how the appearance of an objective physical
universe comes about to say for sure whether copying a mind in a single
universe is the same or different from many-worlds splitting.)
Jesse
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jonathan Colvin wrote: >Hal Ruhl wrote: > >>I know of no reason to assume that the various branches of MWI run >>concurrently. >> >>If they do not run concurrently then the only way I see for >immortality >>is to be in a branch where immortality is already a possibility >>inherent in that branch. > >Stathis: I don't see why this should be so. Your consciousness should >be able to jump between branches, between physical locations >and across long periods of time. I have not made up my mind >whether it can also jump backwards in time, i.e. if a moment >can be experienced as being in your future when in the real >world it is actually implemented in the past. That is, presumably, assuming that the Principle of Indifference is correct. I've got an issue with the PofI though; the problem of identity, or, how do we decide whether a consciousness in a different branch or time is "mine"? Is all that is required is that an identical brain-state exist elsewhere or elsewhen? Then, as you've noted, there is an issue of sequencing. Why assume a jump must always be forward in time? With no physical continuity between brain-states, our consciousness might get stuck in an endless loop: ..W>X>Y>Z>X>Y>Z>X>Y>Z>... etc. I suppose that would be an immortality of sorts, albeit rather a hellish one; but I suppose we wouldn't "realize" we were stuck. Jonathan Colvin This question of what constitutes continuity of personal identity comes up all the time in newsgroups, of course. Even if you adhere to the most conservative, common sense belief that identity is attached only to a single animal during its lifetime, you run into problems. *Nothing* need be physically preserved between any two periods in an animal's life: not the constituent atoms, not their absolute position in spacetime, not even their position relative to each other. Your future self from 2006 need only share some of your memories and the belief that he is you; if he came back to 2005 in a time machine, moved into your home and tried to access your bank account, the fiction that you are the "same" person would be seen for what it is. --Stathis Papaioannou _ Buy want you really want - sell what you don't on eBay: http://adfarm.mediaplex.com/ad/ck/705-10129-5668-323?ID=2
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jonathan Colvin wrote:
Well, I was elaborating on Bruno's statement that worlds ("maximal
consistent set of propositions") of a FS are not computable; that even
given
infinite resources (ie. infinite time) it is not possible to generate a
"complete" world. This suggests to me that it is *not* the case that given
infinite time, eveything that can happen must happen. I must admit this is
not my area of expertise; but it seems to me that the only other option of
defining a world (identifying it with the FS itself) will, by Godel's
incompleteness theorem, necessitate that there exist unprovable true
propositions of world; the world will be incomplete, so again, not
everything that can happen will happen.
Godel's incompleteness theorem only applies in cases where the statements
have a "meaning" in terms of our mathematical model of arithmetic (see my
comments at http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m4584.html ). If your
statements are something like descriptions of the state of a cellular
automaton, then I don't see them having any kind of external meaning in
terms of describing arithmetical truths, so there's no sense in which there
would be "unprovable but true" statements.
Jesse
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
John Mikes wrote: I did not follow this thread, because immortality is a nono for my mostly common sense thinking: who wants to 'in eternity' wake up with arthritic pains and struggle with failing memory? Or is immortality understood for an earlier (perfect? when is it?) stage of life, let us say when we get an ugly divorce, or in miltary service? why not as a fetus? is the 'rest of the world' similarly immortal (fetus? or Alzheimer?) and if I like something, I know it will go away for sure... So: I am not for immortality. This is an example of the type of argument used by religious people in reverse, who stop me in the street and say: "But wouldn't it be wonderful if you could look forward to eternal life in Heaven? If you're an atheist, all you have to look forward to is being eaten by worms!" Well, yes, I might agree that Heaven would be wonderful, but whether I would like something to be true or not has no bearing whatsoever on whether in fact it *is* true. --Stathis Papaioannou _ Buy want you really want - sell what you don't on eBay: http://adfarm.mediaplex.com/ad/ck/705-10129-5668-323?ID=2
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>Hal Ruhl wrote: > >>I know of no reason to assume that the various branches of MWI run >>concurrently. >> >>If they do not run concurrently then the only way I see for >immortality >>is to be in a branch where immortality is already a possibility >>inherent in that branch. > >Stathis: I don't see why this should be so. Your consciousness should >be able to jump between branches, between physical locations >and across long periods of time. I have not made up my mind >whether it can also jump backwards in time, i.e. if a moment >can be experienced as being in your future when in the real >world it is actually implemented in the past. That is, presumably, assuming that the Principle of Indifference is correct. I've got an issue with the PofI though; the problem of identity, or, how do we decide whether a consciousness in a different branch or time is "mine"? Is all that is required is that an identical brain-state exist elsewhere or elsewhen? Then, as you've noted, there is an issue of sequencing. Why assume a jump must always be forward in time? With no physical continuity between brain-states, our consciousness might get stuck in an endless loop: ..W>X>Y>Z>X>Y>Z>X>Y>Z>... etc. I suppose that would be an immortality of sorts, albeit rather a hellish one; but I suppose we wouldn't "realize" we were stuck. Jonathan Colvin
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Hal Ruhl wrote: I know of no reason to assume that the various branches of MWI run concurrently. If they do not run concurrently then the only way I see for immortality is to be in a branch where immortality is already a possibility inherent in that branch. I don't see why this should be so. Your consciousness should be able to jump between branches, between physical locations and across long periods of time. I have not made up my mind whether it can also jump backwards in time, i.e. if a moment can be experienced as being in your future when in the real world it is actually implemented in the past. --Stathis Papaioannou _ $60,000 prize pool to be won. Three winners. Apply now! http://www.healthe.com.au/competition.do
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
JC: >>That's a good question. I can think of a chess position that is >>a-priori illegal. But our macroscopic world is so complex it is far >>from obvious what is allowed and what is forbidden. > >Jesse Mazer: So what if some chess position is illegal? They are only >illegal according to the rules of chess, but the point of the >"all logically possible worlds exist" idea is not just that >all possible worlds consistent with a given set of rules (such >as our universe's laws of physics) exist, but that all >possible worlds consistent with all logically possible *rules* >exist. So the only configurations that would be forbidden >would be logically impossible ones like "square A4 both does >and does not contain a pawn". Sure. But chess was just an analogy using one particular FS (part of set theory). But suppose I posit a world that consists of an arbitrary sequence of propositions X>Y>Z. Is it necessarily the case that for *any* arbitrary set of propositions, we can identify a FS that these propositions of theories of? When does a formal system stop being formal, and become simply arbitrary? Here I am out of my depth. Anyone? Jonathan Colvin
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Hal wrote: >Consider a 2-D cellular automaton world like Conway's Life. >Every cell is either occupied or unoccupied. It has one of >two states. Now let us consider such a world in which one >cell holds much more than one bit of information. Suppose it >holds a million bits. This one cell is tiny like an electron; >yet it holds a great deal of information, like an omniscient entity. > >This description is logically contradictory. A system with >only two states cannot hold a million bits of information. >That is an elementary theorem of mathematical information theory. > >The problem is not specific to a world. The problem is with >the concept that a two state system can hold a million bits. >That concept is inherently contradictory. That makes it >meaningless. Trying to apply it to a world or to anything >else is going to produce meaningless results. > >Rather than say that such a world cannot exist because it is >logically contradictory, it makes more sense to say that >logically contradictory descriptions fail to describe worlds, >because they fail to describe anything in a meaningful way. In what way are those two statements not equivalent? They both seem to make the same point, which is that logically contradictory descriptions "do not refer". Jonathan
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>> Bruno:In general worlds are not effective (computable) objects: we cannot
>> mechanically (even allowing infinite resources) generate a world.<
>
>JC: Hmmm..but then if such worlds are not effective objects, how
>can they be
>said to be "instantiated"? If we extend this to Tegmark, this
>implies that
>even given infinite time, a world can never be "complete"
>(fully generated).
>Which implies that even given infinite time, not everything that *can*
>happen *will* happen; which was my argument to begin with.
>
>Jonathan,
>I have seen it stated that, given infinite time, everything
>that CAN happen
>MUST happen, not only once but uncountable times. You argue
>that this is
>incorrect. Can you show why it is incorrect? Thanks,
>Norman Samish
>
Well, I was elaborating on Bruno's statement that worlds ("maximal
consistent set of propositions") of a FS are not computable; that even given
infinite resources (ie. infinite time) it is not possible to generate a
"complete" world. This suggests to me that it is *not* the case that given
infinite time, eveything that can happen must happen. I must admit this is
not my area of expertise; but it seems to me that the only other option of
defining a world (identifying it with the FS itself) will, by Godel's
incompleteness theorem, necessitate that there exist unprovable true
propositions of world; the world will be incomplete, so again, not
everything that can happen will happen.
Bruno?
Jonathan Colvin
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
See please after Hal's message John M - Original Message - From: "Hal Ruhl" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Sunday, April 17, 2005 10:51 AM Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality > I know of no reason to assume that the various branches of MWI run > concurrently. > > If they do not run concurrently then the only way I see for immortality is > to be in a branch where immortality is already a possibility inherent in > that branch. > > Hal Ruhl Is it assumed in the narrative that 'this type' of MWI is within a time-system? Then it must have an origo and - maybe- an omega point. Some would like that to support various belief systems. I assume that the time - space organization is an outcome for our universe. 'My' multiverse is unlimited in qualia and organization since we have no access to details outside this one world. Use my sci-fi? Immortality (second thoughts after my earlier message) is easy in a timeless system, it is not distinguishable from the 'momentarily occurring', timeless existence. Does not last. Concurrent is a time related concept. Best wishes John M
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
J. Colvin wrote: >> >why do you say that it is logically >> >impossible for an electron to be intelligent? To show that it is >> >*logically* impossible you would have to show that it entails a >> >logical or mathematical contradiction, such as 2+2=5. I will be back to this quote later on. I did not follow this thread, because immortality is a nono for my mostly common sense thinking: who wants to 'in eternity' wake up with arthritic pains and struggle with failing memory? Or is immortality understood for an earlier (perfect? when is it?) stage of life, let us say when we get an ugly divorce, or in miltary service? why not as a fetus? is the 'rest of the world' similarly immortal (fetus? or Alzheimer?) and if I like something, I know it will go away for sure... So: I am not for immortality. Now I have read in, because almost ALL members I appreciate here posted ideas in the thread. I cannot keep my mouse shut either, picking on the quote above from Jonathan. First the 2+2=5 carefully restricted to logical or math. I could mention a 1+1=3 nonmathematical case, called matrimonial conception, when it is not contradictory - even for the most anthropocentric/mathloving minds. Which brings me back to J.C.'s quote on the electron. In my little common sense mind the first question is 'intelligence' - so far not generally-acceptibly identified. I like the "elasticity of the mind based on a well working memory" (where mempory carries the questionmark). Some go for the Latin origin: "to read in between", understanding more than just literally. Both are inapplicable here, because these (and I suspect all others the honored listmembers have in mind (what is it?) are fully and exclusively anthropocentric - human related conceptualizations. The poor electron has no interconnected neuronal functions so why not consider it in its own merit, not as a human? And so its (electron-)intelligence? Unless one is a stubborn materialist, the electron has to be more than just a what? wave, or particle (what is it?) as physically measurable (if!) in our obsolete model-system called physical world. Struggling with the words, I would say: some "ideation" (kudos for a better word!) belongs to an electron as well as to anything else we do or don't know about. Consider now an 'ideation' of an electron, not in human terms of course, why should it be restricted to less than omniscience? especially since it is in a total interconnection with all the rest? Let me pass on the anthropomorphic use of examples: RULES (by humans, of course) of chess, or of THAT arithemtic math we apply. If we talk about more than just human, we should think in terms of more than just human. Well, this does not sound too constructive, but alas, so are considetrations on shaky grounds (and their conclusions) as well. Excuse my intrusion John Mikes - Original Message - From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Sunday, April 17, 2005 1:07 AM Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality > > >Jonathan Colvin wrote: > > > >> >>Agreed. But some *worlds* we can imagine may be logically > >impossible > >> >>(inconsistent), may they not? I can imagine (or talk > >about) a world > >> >>where entity A has property X and property Y, but it may be > >> >>logically impossible for any existing entity A to simultaneously > >> >>have > >> >property X > >> >>and Y. For example, it seems that it would be inconsistent > >> >for there to > >> >>exist a world where simultaneously I am omniscinent and I > >> >consist of a single elctron. > >> >>Such a world seems inconsistent (not logically possible). > >> >Such a world > >> >>may not appear in the set of worlds generated by all > >> >instantiated programs. > >> > > >> >Omniscience is a problematic concept; one can argue that a single > >> >electron does indeed have all possible knowledge encoded in > >one bit. > >> >But leaving that aside, why do you say that it is logically > >> >impossible for an electron to be intelligent? To show that it is > >> >*logically* impossible you would have to show that it entails a > >> >logical or mathematical contradiction, such as 2+2=5. > >> > >>My point is not that it *is* logically impossible, but that it *may > >>be*. It is obvious that 2+2=5 is a mathematical contradiction. But if > >>we take Tegmark's radical platonism seriously, then such > >contradictions > >>must "scale up" into the categories of things and worlds. All > >possible > &g
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
I know of no reason to assume that the various branches of MWI run concurrently. If they do not run concurrently then the only way I see for immortality is to be in a branch where immortality is already a possibility inherent in that branch. Hal Ruhl
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
I agree with Brent's comment: > I essentially agree. If we say, "2+2=5" then we have failed to describe > anything because we have contradicted our own semantics. Logic is not a > constraint on the world, but only on our use of language to describe it. But > that doesn't mean that any world for which we make up a description can exist. > Logic doesn't constrain reality; either by prohibiting it or by making it > "possible". It's not that logically impossible worlds don't (or can't) exist; it's that if we use a logical contradiction, we have failed to describe a world. Consider a specific example that captures some of the sense of the proposed logically impossible world where an electron is omniscient. Consider a 2-D cellular automaton world like Conway's Life. Every cell is either occupied or unoccupied. It has one of two states. Now let us consider such a world in which one cell holds much more than one bit of information. Suppose it holds a million bits. This one cell is tiny like an electron; yet it holds a great deal of information, like an omniscient entity. This description is logically contradictory. A system with only two states cannot hold a million bits of information. That is an elementary theorem of mathematical information theory. The problem is not specific to a world. The problem is with the concept that a two state system can hold a million bits. That concept is inherently contradictory. That makes it meaningless. Trying to apply it to a world or to anything else is going to produce meaningless results. Rather than say that such a world cannot exist because it is logically contradictory, it makes more sense to say that logically contradictory descriptions fail to describe worlds, because they fail to describe anything in a meaningful way. Hal Finney
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Johnathan Colvin: That's a good question. I can think of a chess position that is a-priori illegal. But our macroscopic world is so complex it is far from obvious what is allowed and what is forbidden. So what if some chess position is illegal? They are only illegal according to the rules of chess, but the point of the "all logically possible worlds exist" idea is not just that all possible worlds consistent with a given set of rules (such as our universe's laws of physics) exist, but that all possible worlds consistent with all logically possible *rules* exist. So the only configurations that would be forbidden would be logically impossible ones like "square A4 both does and does not contain a pawn". Jesse
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
- Original Message - From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Saturday, April 16, 2005 9:46 PM Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality > In general worlds are not effective (computable) objects: we cannot > mechanically (even allowing infinite resources) generate a world.< Hmmm..but then if such worlds are not effective objects, how can they be said to be "instantiated"? If we extend this to Tegmark, this implies that even given infinite time, a world can never be "complete" (fully generated). Which implies that even given infinite time, not everything that *can* happen *will* happen; which was my argument to begin with. Jonathan Colvin Jonathan, I have seen it stated that, given infinite time, everything that CAN happen MUST happen, not only once but uncountable times. You argue that this is incorrect. Can you show why it is incorrect? Thanks, Norman Samish
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>>Stathis: OK, I agree with your reasoning. But, just for fun, can you >>think of an example of a physical reality which is clearly a priori >>contradictory? > >Jonathan Colvin: That's a good question. I can think of a chess position that >is a-priori illegal. But our macroscopic world is so complex >it is far from obvious what is allowed and what is forbidden. >That's why I can't consistently predict what tomorrow's >lottery numbers will be. So if I could answer your question, >I'd probably be out buying lottery tickets right now :). To elaborate, even something as simple as chess rapidly becomes too complex to answer your question. I can show you a mid-game chess position, and in general it will be unfeasible (even with all the computers in the world) for you to answer the question "is this position a-priori contradictory with the theorem of chess". This is because there at are 10120 possible chess games. If it is that hard to answer the question about a system as simple as chess, it becomes easier to see why it is so hard to answer such a question about our world. Jonathan Colvin
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>Jonathan Colvin wrote: > >> >>Agreed. But some *worlds* we can imagine may be logically >impossible >> >>(inconsistent), may they not? I can imagine (or talk >about) a world >> >>where entity A has property X and property Y, but it may be >> >>logically impossible for any existing entity A to simultaneously >> >>have >> >property X >> >>and Y. For example, it seems that it would be inconsistent >> >for there to >> >>exist a world where simultaneously I am omniscinent and I >> >consist of a single elctron. >> >>Such a world seems inconsistent (not logically possible). >> >Such a world >> >>may not appear in the set of worlds generated by all >> >instantiated programs. >> > >> >Omniscience is a problematic concept; one can argue that a single >> >electron does indeed have all possible knowledge encoded in >one bit. >> >But leaving that aside, why do you say that it is logically >> >impossible for an electron to be intelligent? To show that it is >> >*logically* impossible you would have to show that it entails a >> >logical or mathematical contradiction, such as 2+2=5. >> >>My point is not that it *is* logically impossible, but that it *may >>be*. It is obvious that 2+2=5 is a mathematical contradiction. But if >>we take Tegmark's radical platonism seriously, then such >contradictions >>must "scale up" into the categories of things and worlds. All >possible >>things exist; and all impossible things do not. How do we decide >>whether "an omniscient electron" is a possible thing? It >certainly does >>not appear to be; and the point is that it may *in fact* be an >>impossible thing. It is straightforward to show that 2+2=5 is >>contradictory under number theory. It is obviously not so >>straightforward to show that "an omniscient electron" is equally >>a-priori contradictory. It is not even obvious that "an omniscient >>electron" is in the same category of propositions as "2+2=5". But I'd >>argue that if we take Tegmark seriously, then it should be. >> >>Jonathan Colvin > >Stathis: OK, I agree with your reasoning. But, just for fun, can you >think of an example of a physical reality which is clearly a >priori contradictory? That's a good question. I can think of a chess position that is a-priori illegal. But our macroscopic world is so complex it is far from obvious what is allowed and what is forbidden. That's why I can't consistently predict what tomorrow's lottery numbers will be. So if I could answer your question, I'd probably be out buying lottery tickets right now :). Jonathan Colvin
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>>Jonathan Colvin At first glance that would seem to be the case. But isn't there a >> problem? >> If we consider worlds to be the propositions of formal >systems (as in >> Tegmark), then by Godel there should be unprovable propositions (ie. >> worlds >> that are never instantiated). This seems in direct contradiction to >> the actual existence of everything conveivable, does it not? > > >Bruno: Are you sure Tegmark identify worlds with propositions of FS? Perhaps I should have said, to be precise, "If we consider worlds to consist of the sets of consistent propositions of formal systems". Just being lazy. I'm not aware that anyone else has yet identified worlds with the propositions of FS, but I am identifying them as such. It seems reasonable, since the Ultimate Ensemble is simply the set of all formal systems. >Anyway, what logicians (and modal logicians in particular) are >used to do is to identify worlds with maximal consistent sets >of propositions (or sentences). >Then you >can extract from Godel that any FS can be instantiated in >alternative worlds. >For example if you take a typical FS like Peano Arithmetic, >the proposition that PA is consistent is undecidable. This >means that there is at least two maximal consistent sets of >propositions extending the set of theorems of PA: >one with the proposition that PA is consistent and one with >the proposition that PA is inconsistent. In that sense the non >provable propositions are instantiated in worlds. > In general >worlds are not effective >(computable) objects: >we cannot mechanically (even allowing infinite resources) >generate a world. Hmmm..but then if such worlds are not effective objects, how can they be said to be "instantiated"? If we extend this to Tegmark, this implies that even given infinite time, a world can never be "complete" (fully generated). Which implies that even given infinite time, not everything that *can* happen *will* happen; which was my argument to begin with. Jonathan Colvin
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jonathan Colvin wrote: >>Agreed. But some *worlds* we can imagine may be logically impossible >>(inconsistent), may they not? I can imagine (or talk about) a world >>where entity A has property X and property Y, but it may be logically >>impossible for any existing entity A to simultaneously have >property X >>and Y. For example, it seems that it would be inconsistent >for there to >>exist a world where simultaneously I am omniscinent and I >consist of a single elctron. >>Such a world seems inconsistent (not logically possible). >Such a world >>may not appear in the set of worlds generated by all >instantiated programs. > >Omniscience is a problematic concept; one can argue that a >single electron does indeed have all possible knowledge >encoded in one bit. But leaving that aside, why do you say >that it is logically impossible for an electron to be >intelligent? To show that it is *logically* impossible you >would have to show that it entails a logical or mathematical >contradiction, such as 2+2=5. My point is not that it *is* logically impossible, but that it *may be*. It is obvious that 2+2=5 is a mathematical contradiction. But if we take Tegmark's radical platonism seriously, then such contradictions must "scale up" into the categories of things and worlds. All possible things exist; and all impossible things do not. How do we decide whether "an omniscient electron" is a possible thing? It certainly does not appear to be; and the point is that it may *in fact* be an impossible thing. It is straightforward to show that 2+2=5 is contradictory under number theory. It is obviously not so straightforward to show that "an omniscient electron" is equally a-priori contradictory. It is not even obvious that "an omniscient electron" is in the same category of propositions as "2+2=5". But I'd argue that if we take Tegmark seriously, then it should be. Jonathan Colvin OK, I agree with your reasoning. But, just for fun, can you think of an example of a physical reality which is clearly a priori contradictory? --Stathis Papaioannou _ Are you right for each other? Find out with our Love Calculator: http://fun.mobiledownloads.com.au/191191/index.wl?page=191191text
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>>Agreed. But some *worlds* we can imagine may be logically impossible >>(inconsistent), may they not? I can imagine (or talk about) a world >>where entity A has property X and property Y, but it may be logically >>impossible for any existing entity A to simultaneously have >property X >>and Y. For example, it seems that it would be inconsistent >for there to >>exist a world where simultaneously I am omniscinent and I >consist of a single elctron. >>Such a world seems inconsistent (not logically possible). >Such a world >>may not appear in the set of worlds generated by all >instantiated programs. > >Omniscience is a problematic concept; one can argue that a >single electron does indeed have all possible knowledge >encoded in one bit. But leaving that aside, why do you say >that it is logically impossible for an electron to be >intelligent? To show that it is *logically* impossible you >would have to show that it entails a logical or mathematical >contradiction, such as 2+2=5. My point is not that it *is* logically impossible, but that it *may be*. It is obvious that 2+2=5 is a mathematical contradiction. But if we take Tegmark's radical platonism seriously, then such contradictions must "scale up" into the categories of things and worlds. All possible things exist; and all impossible things do not. How do we decide whether "an omniscient electron" is a possible thing? It certainly does not appear to be; and the point is that it may *in fact* be an impossible thing. It is straightforward to show that 2+2=5 is contradictory under number theory. It is obviously not so straightforward to show that "an omniscient electron" is equally a-priori contradictory. It is not even obvious that "an omniscient electron" is in the same category of propositions as "2+2=5". But I'd argue that if we take Tegmark seriously, then it should be. Jonathan Colvin
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
Le 16-avr.-05, à 01:21, Jonathan Colvin a écrit : At first glance that would seem to be the case. But isn't there a problem? If we consider worlds to be the propositions of formal systems (as in Tegmark), then by Godel there should be unprovable propositions (ie. worlds that are never instantiated). This seems in direct contradiction to the actual existence of everything conveivable, does it not? Are you sure Tegmark identify worlds with propositions of FS? Anyway, what logicians (and modal logicians in particular) are used to do is to identify worlds with maximal consistent sets of propositions (or sentences). Then you can extract from Godel that any FS can be instantiated in alternative worlds. For example if you take a typical FS like Peano Arithmetic, the proposition that PA is consistent is undecidable. This means that there is at least two maximal consistent sets of propositions extending the set of theorems of PA: one with the proposition that PA is consistent and one with the proposition that PA is inconsistent. In that sense the non provable propositions are instantiated in worlds. In general worlds are not effective (computable) objects: we cannot mechanically (even allowing infinite resources) generate a world. What we need to do is to put a measure on those maximal consistent extensions. (maximal = can no more be extended without making the world inconsistent (containing a contradictory proposition). bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jonathan Colvin wrote: Agreed. But some *worlds* we can imagine may be logically impossible (inconsistent), may they not? I can imagine (or talk about) a world where entity A has property X and property Y, but it may be logically impossible for any existing entity A to simultaneously have property X and Y. For example, it seems that it would be inconsistent for there to exist a world where simultaneously I am omniscinent and I consist of a single elctron. Such a world seems inconsistent (not logically possible). Such a world may not appear in the set of worlds generated by all instantiated programs. Omniscience is a problematic concept; one can argue that a single electron does indeed have all possible knowledge encoded in one bit. But leaving that aside, why do you say that it is logically impossible for an electron to be intelligent? To show that it is *logically* impossible you would have to show that it entails a logical or mathematical contradiction, such as 2+2=5. --Stathis Papaioannou _ Update your mobile with a hot polyphonic ringtone: http://fun.mobiledownloads.com.au/191191/index.wl?page=191191polyphonicringtone
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Hal Finney writes: Jesse Mazer writes: > Would you apply the same logic to copying a mind within a single universe > that you would to the splitting of worlds in the MWI? If so, consider the > thought-experiment I suggested in my post at > http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m4805.html -- Generally, I don't think the same logic applies to copying a mind in a single universe than to splitting of worlds in the MWI. Copying a mind will double its measure, while splitting one leaves it alone. That is a significant practical and philosophical difference. Practically, copying a mind leaves it with half as many resources per new-mind, while splitting it leaves it with the same number of resources per mind. This means that you might take very different practical actions if you knew that your mind was going to be copied than if you were about to split a coin. Philosophically, the measure of the observer-moments associated with a copied mind are twice as great as the measure of the observer-moments associated with a split one. Obviously 2 is not equal to 1. This puts the burden of proof on those who would claim that this difference is philosophically irrelevant in considering issues of consciousness. Hal Finney Are you suggesting that the "splitting" in the MWI is different to duplication? The only difference I can see between duplicating a person via a Star Trek teleporter and the MWI splitting is that in the latter case, the whole universe is duplicated. If you could put the whole universe into God's teleporter, wouldn't that be the same as the MWI splitting? --Stathis Papaioannou _ $60,000 prize pool to be won. Three winners. Apply now! http://www.healthe.com.au/competition.do
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>-Original Message- >From: Bruno Marchal [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >Sent: Friday, April 15, 2005 7:58 AM >To: Brent Meeker >Subject: Re: many worlds theory of immortality > > > >Le 14-avr.-05, à 13:53, Brent Meeker a écrit : > >> Before drawing drastic conclusions, like QTI, from the multiple-worlds >> (or >> better, the relative state) interpretation of QM, it would be good to >> remember >> that it is just one of several intepretations. Bohm's interpretation >> will >> leave you as dead as classical physics. So will Penrose's and other >> modified >> theories with real collapse of the wave-function. My personal >> favorite is >> decoherence (Zurek, Joos, Zeh, et al) with a lower bound on non-zero >> probabilities as outlined by Omnes. > >Omnes is just everett + a new axiom asserting the uniqueness of the >universe. >Bohm is everett + a new axiom based on a (non covariant) potential >guiding some >prefered observable result (particle's positions). >Decoherence $is$ everett (as people can understand by reading his long >text. > >Bruno That's essentially my understanding; except that now decoherence and einselection are understood to be responsible for the emergence of classical behavoir - which I think Everett did not consider. Brent Meeker
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>>Jonathan Colvin writes: >> >>>While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I >think it is by >>>no means clear that just because everything that can happen does >>>happen, there will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes >>>omniscient, or lives for ever, or spends their entire life >dressed in a pink rabbit outfit. >>>"Everything that can happen does happen" is not synonymous with >>>"everything we can imagine happening does happen". Worlds where we >>>live forever or become omniscient or are born dressed in a >pink rabbit >>>suit may not be *logically possible* worlds. Just as there >is no world >>>in the multiverse where 2+2=5, there may be no worlds in the >>>multiverse where I live forever or spend my entire life >dressed in a pink rabbit suit. >>> >>>Jonathan Colvin >>> >>I don't see this at all. It is not logically possible that there is a >>world where 2+2=5 (although there are lots of worlds where everyone >>shares the delusion that 2+2=5, and for that matter worlds where >>everyone shares the delusion that 2+2=4 while in actual fact 2+2 does >>equal 5), but how is it logically impossible that you live your whole >>life in a pink rabbit suit? If anything, I would rate such >worlds as at >>least on a par with the ones where pigs fly, and certainly >more common than the ones where Hell freezes over. >> >>--Stathis Papaioannou > >Brent: But what does "logically possible" mean? Logic is just some >rules to prevent us from contradicting ourselves. Is it >logically possible that, "Quadruplicity preens cantatas."? Is >it logically possible that the same object be both red and >green? Once you get beyond direct contradiction (e.g. >"Quadruplicity does >*not* preen cantatas") you have to invoke semantics and some >kind of "nomologically possible". Then, so far as anyone >knows, we're back to "physically possible" and even that is >ill defined. The whole concept of "possible", beyond narrowly >defined circumstances, is so ambiguous as to be worthless. I think we're assuming Tegmark's UI here, so "physically possible" and "logically possible" means the same thing. Jonathan Colvin
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
I agree with Hal. The measure is doubled after copying. So, this is sort of the reverse of a suicide experiment in which the measure decreases. If you consider a doubling in which one of the copies doesn't survive then the measure stays the same, while in suicide experiment it decreases. Both the suicide and copying thought experiments have convinced me that the notion of a conditional probability is fundamentally flawed. It can be defined under ''normal'' circumstances but it will break down precisely when considering copying or suicide. Saibal - Defeat Spammers by launching DDoS attacks on Spam-Websites: http://www.hillscapital.com/antispam/ - Oorspronkelijk bericht - Van: ""Hal Finney"" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Aan: Verzonden: Saturday, April 16, 2005 12:27 AM Onderwerp: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality > Jesse Mazer writes: > > Would you apply the same logic to copying a mind within a single universe > > that you would to the splitting of worlds in the MWI? If so, consider the > > thought-experiment I suggested in my post at > > http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m4805.html -- > > Generally, I don't think the same logic applies to copying a mind in a > single universe than to splitting of worlds in the MWI. Copying a mind > will double its measure, while splitting one leaves it alone. That is a > significant practical and philosophical difference. > > Practically, copying a mind leaves it with half as many resources per > new-mind, while splitting it leaves it with the same number of resources > per mind. This means that you might take very different practical > actions if you knew that your mind was going to be copied than if you > were about to split a coin. > > Philosophically, the measure of the observer-moments associated with a > copied mind are twice as great as the measure of the observer-moments > associated with a split one. Obviously 2 is not equal to 1. This puts > the burden of proof on those who would claim that this difference is > philosophically irrelevant in considering issues of consciousness. > > Hal Finney >
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>-Original Message- >From: Stathis Papaioannou [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] >Sent: Friday, April 15, 2005 7:02 AM >To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]; everything-list@eskimo.com >Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality > > >Jonathan Colvin writes: > >>While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I think it is by no >>means clear that just because everything that can happen does happen, there >>will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes omniscient, or lives for >>ever, or spends their entire life dressed in a pink rabbit outfit. >>"Everything that can happen does happen" is not synonymous with "everything >>we can imagine happening does happen". Worlds where we live forever or >>become omniscient or are born dressed in a pink rabbit suit may not be >>*logically possible* worlds. Just as there is no world in the multiverse >>where 2+2=5, there may be no worlds in the multiverse where I live forever >>or spend my entire life dressed in a pink rabbit suit. >> >>Jonathan Colvin >> >I don't see this at all. It is not logically possible that there is a world >where 2+2=5 (although there are lots of worlds where everyone shares the >delusion that 2+2=5, and for that matter worlds where everyone shares the >delusion that 2+2=4 while in actual fact 2+2 does equal 5), but how is it >logically impossible that you live your whole life in a pink rabbit suit? If >anything, I would rate such worlds as at least on a par with the ones where >pigs fly, and certainly more common than the ones where Hell freezes over. > >--Stathis Papaioannou But what does "logically possible" mean? Logic is just some rules to prevent us from contradicting ourselves. Is it logically possible that, "Quadruplicity preens cantatas."? Is it logically possible that the same object be both red and green? Once you get beyond direct contradiction (e.g. "Quadruplicity does *not* preen cantatas") you have to invoke semantics and some kind of "nomologically possible". Then, so far as anyone knows, we're back to "physically possible" and even that is ill defined. The whole concept of "possible", beyond narrowly defined circumstances, is so ambiguous as to be worthless. Brent Meeker "The life of the law has not been logic, but experience". --- Oliver Wendell Holmes
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>Jonathan Colvin wrote: > >> >>While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I think >> >it is by >> >>no means clear that just because everything that can happen does >> >>happen, there will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes >> >>omniscient, or lives for ever, or spends their entire life >> >dressed in a pink rabbit outfit. >> >>"Everything that can happen does happen" is not synonymous with >> >>"everything we can imagine happening does happen". Worlds >> >where we live >> >>forever or become omniscient or are born dressed in a pink >> >rabbit suit >> >>may not be *logically possible* worlds. Just as there is >no world in >> >>the multiverse where 2+2=5, there may be no worlds in the >multiverse >> >>where I live forever or spend my entire life dressed in a >> >pink rabbit suit. >> >> >> >>Jonathan Colvin >> >> >> >Stathis: I don't see this at all. It is not logically possible that >> >there is a world where 2+2=5 (although there are lots of >worlds where >> >everyone shares the delusion that 2+2=5, and for that matter worlds >> >where everyone shares the delusion that >> >2+2=4 while in actual fact 2+2 does equal 5) >> >>Isn't that a contradictory statement? "It is not logically possible >>that there is a world where 2+2=5" AND "there are lots of >worlds where >> in actual fact 2+2 does equal 5". > >Yes, it is contradictory as written. What I should have said >was that 2+2= (whatever it actually is) independently of time >and space, but while it is not logically possible for this sum >to amount to anything else in any world, it is possible that >one or more sentient beings in some world are systematically >deluded about the value of the sum. > >>, but how is it >> >logically impossible that you live your whole life in a pink rabbit >> >suit? If anything, I would rate such worlds as at least on >a par with >> >the ones where pigs fly, and certainly more common than the ones >> >where Hell freezes over. >> >>I didn't say that it *was* logically impossible for such a world to >>exist; I said that it *might* be that such a world is logically >>impossible. Just because we can talk about such a world does not mean >>that it is logically possible. >> >>Here's a (limited) analogy. If I show you are particular >mid-game chess >>position, with a certain arrangement of pieces on the board, it is >>generally not possible to tell whether the position is a logically >>possible chess game (ie. corresponds to a legal chess >position) without >>knowing the entire history of the game up to that point. There are >>certainly particular arrangements of pieces that it is impossible to >>reach given the axiomatic starting positions and the rules of chess. >> >>It is equally possible, I would suggest, that there *might* >be certain >>arrangements of matter that will not be reachable in *any* formal >>system; universally undecidable propositions, to use a Godelian term. >>My pink buny suit universe might be one such. >> >>Jonathan Colvin > >OK, I agree with this in principle. However, I can't think of >any such logically impossible worlds. With quantum tunneling, >matter popping into existence from the vacuum, and so on, it >really does look like everything conceivable is possible. At first glance that would seem to be the case. But isn't there a problem? If we consider worlds to be the propositions of formal systems (as in Tegmark), then by Godel there should be unprovable propositions (ie. worlds that are never instantiated). This seems in direct contradiction to the actual existence of everything conveivable, does it not? Jonathan Colvin
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>Jonathan Colvin writes: >> I didn't say that it *was* logically impossible for such a world to >> exist; I said that it *might* be that such a world is logically >> impossible. Just because we can talk about such a world does >not mean >> that it is logically possible. > >Hal wrote: It's important to understand that logical possibility is not a >constraint on worlds as such; it is a constraint on our >understanding of worlds. > >It's not like we could go to God and say, "God, please >implement this world"; and God takes a look at the spec, and >answers, in a deep, sorrowful voice, "No, I'm sorry, I can't >implement this world, it's not logically possible. Go back >and try again." And we say, "Okay, sorry, God, we'll try >harder next time." > >If we think of computer programs as implementing worlds, all >programs exist and are instantiated. It's not that some >programs may be logically impossible and the universal TM >refuses to run them. Agreed. But some *worlds* we can imagine may be logically impossible (inconsistent), may they not? I can imagine (or talk about) a world where entity A has property X and property Y, but it may be logically impossible for any existing entity A to simultaneously have property X and Y. For example, it seems that it would be inconsistent for there to exist a world where simultaneously I am omniscinent and I consist of a single elctron. Such a world seems inconsistent (not logically possible). Such a world may not appear in the set of worlds generated by all instantiated programs. >Where logical possibility arises is in our understanding of worlds. >The mere concept of a world where 2+2=5, for example, >represents an error of understanding. What 2+2 equals is not >a property of a world! >It is incoherent to speak of a world where 2+2 equals anything >specific, whether 4 or 5. > >We don't live in a world where 2+2=4. That mathematical fact >has no bearing whatsoever on the existence of our world. As a Platonist, I would disagree. In *all* possible worlds, 2+2=4. So we do live in a world where 2+2=4. > We >live in a world with certain laws of physics: conservation of >energy, quantum theory, Einsteinian gravitation. We may use >mathematics to help us understand these laws, but the truths >of mathematics are not contingent on anything about our world >or any world. Sure; it is the other way round: our world is contingent on the truths of mathematics. > >If a world is logically impossible, the problem is always in >our description and understanding of the world. Worlds >themselves exist (given the AUH) independently of our >understanding of them. Logical and mathematical consistency >are not properties of worlds, they are properties of our descriptions. Yes; but this is begging the question as to how we decide whether any description we come up with corresponds to a logically possible world. Or are you saying that any description necessarily corresponds with a possible world? Is there a world where A AND ~A? Jonathan Colvin
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Jesse Mazer writes: > Would you apply the same logic to copying a mind within a single universe > that you would to the splitting of worlds in the MWI? If so, consider the > thought-experiment I suggested in my post at > http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m4805.html -- Generally, I don't think the same logic applies to copying a mind in a single universe than to splitting of worlds in the MWI. Copying a mind will double its measure, while splitting one leaves it alone. That is a significant practical and philosophical difference. Practically, copying a mind leaves it with half as many resources per new-mind, while splitting it leaves it with the same number of resources per mind. This means that you might take very different practical actions if you knew that your mind was going to be copied than if you were about to split a coin. Philosophically, the measure of the observer-moments associated with a copied mind are twice as great as the measure of the observer-moments associated with a split one. Obviously 2 is not equal to 1. This puts the burden of proof on those who would claim that this difference is philosophically irrelevant in considering issues of consciousness. Hal Finney
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Saibal Mitra wrote: I more or less agree with Jesse. But I would say that the measure of similarity should also be an absolute measure that multiplied with the absolute measure defines a new effective absolute measure for a given observer. Given the absolute measure you can define effective conditional probabilities, except in cases where branches lead to death. In these cases, the ''conditional probability'' of there being a next experience at all would be less than 1. Would you apply the same logic to copying a mind within a single universe that you would to the splitting of worlds in the MWI? If so, consider the thought-experiment I suggested in my post at http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m4805.html -- But you should no more expect to end up in a branch where you died than in a branch where you were never born in the first place. Consider, instead of a branching multiverse, a Star-Trek-style transporter/duplicator in a single universe, which can deconstruct you and reconstruct exact copies atom-by-atom in distant locations (assuming the error introduced by the uncertainty principle is too small to make a difference--if you don't want to grant that, you could also assume this is all happening within a deterministic computer simulation and that you are really an A.I.). To use Bruno Marchal's example, suppose this duplicator recreates two identical copies of you, one in Washington and one in Moscow. As you step into the chamber, if you believe continuity of consciousness is "real" in some sense and that it's meaningful to talk about the probabilities of different possible next experiences, it would probably make sense to predict from a first-person-point of view that you have about a 50% chance of finding yourself in Moscow and a 50% chance of finding yourself in Washington. On the other hand, suppose only a single reconstruction will be performed in Washington--then by the same logic, you would probably predict the probability of finding yourself in Washington is close to 100%, barring a freak accident. OK, so now go back to the scenario where you're supposed to be recreated in both Washington and Moscow, except assume that at the last moment there's a power failure in Moscow and the recreator machine fails to activate. Surely this is no different from the scenario where you were only supposed to be recreated in Washington--the fact that they *intended* to duplicate you in Moscow shouldn't make any difference, all that matters is that they didn't. But now look at another variation on the scenario, where the Moscow machine malfunctions and recreates your body missing the head. I don't think it makes sense to say you have a 50% chance of being "killed" in this scenario--your brain is where your consciousness comes from, and since it wasn't duplicated this is really no different from the scenario where the Moscow machine failed to activate entirely. In fact, any malfunction in the Moscow machine which leads to a duplicate that permanently lacks consciousness should be treated the same way as a scenario where I was only supposed to be recreated in Washington, in terms of the subjective probabilities. Extending this to the idea of natural duplication due to different branches of a splitting multiverse, the probability should always be 100% that my next experience is one of a universe where I have not been killed. So if the machine accidentally creates a copy of me missing a head, do you agree that doesn't lessen the probability that I will continue to have conscious experiences, that in this case I could be confident I'd end up as the other copy that was created with head intact? If so, is this any different from a situation where someone is shooting at me, and there is a branch of the multiverse where my head gets blown off and another where the bullet misses? Jesse
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jonathan Colvin writes: > I didn't say that it *was* logically impossible for such a world to exist; I > said that it *might* be that such a world is logically impossible. Just > because we can talk about such a world does not mean that it is logically > possible. It's important to understand that logical possibility is not a constraint on worlds as such; it is a constraint on our understanding of worlds. It's not like we could go to God and say, "God, please implement this world"; and God takes a look at the spec, and answers, in a deep, sorrowful voice, "No, I'm sorry, I can't implement this world, it's not logically possible. Go back and try again." And we say, "Okay, sorry, God, we'll try harder next time." If we think of computer programs as implementing worlds, all programs exist and are instantiated. It's not that some programs may be logically impossible and the universal TM refuses to run them. Where logical possibility arises is in our understanding of worlds. The mere concept of a world where 2+2=5, for example, represents an error of understanding. What 2+2 equals is not a property of a world! It is incoherent to speak of a world where 2+2 equals anything specific, whether 4 or 5. We don't live in a world where 2+2=4. That mathematical fact has no bearing whatsoever on the existence of our world. We live in a world with certain laws of physics: conservation of energy, quantum theory, Einsteinian gravitation. We may use mathematics to help us understand these laws, but the truths of mathematics are not contingent on anything about our world or any world. If a world is logically impossible, the problem is always in our description and understanding of the world. Worlds themselves exist (given the AUH) independently of our understanding of them. Logical and mathematical consistency are not properties of worlds, they are properties of our descriptions. Hal
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jonathan Colvin wrote: >>While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I think >it is by >>no means clear that just because everything that can happen does >>happen, there will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes >>omniscient, or lives for ever, or spends their entire life >dressed in a pink rabbit outfit. >>"Everything that can happen does happen" is not synonymous with >>"everything we can imagine happening does happen". Worlds >where we live >>forever or become omniscient or are born dressed in a pink >rabbit suit >>may not be *logically possible* worlds. Just as there is no world in >>the multiverse where 2+2=5, there may be no worlds in the multiverse >>where I live forever or spend my entire life dressed in a >pink rabbit suit. >> >>Jonathan Colvin >> >Stathis: I don't see this at all. It is not logically possible that >there is a world where 2+2=5 (although there are lots of >worlds where everyone shares the delusion that 2+2=5, and for >that matter worlds where everyone shares the delusion that >2+2=4 while in actual fact 2+2 does equal 5) Isn't that a contradictory statement? "It is not logically possible that there is a world where 2+2=5" AND "there are lots of worlds where in actual fact 2+2 does equal 5". Yes, it is contradictory as written. What I should have said was that 2+2= (whatever it actually is) independently of time and space, but while it is not logically possible for this sum to amount to anything else in any world, it is possible that one or more sentient beings in some world are systematically deluded about the value of the sum. , but how is it >logically impossible that you live your whole life in a pink >rabbit suit? If anything, I would rate such worlds as at least >on a par with the ones where pigs fly, and certainly more >common than the ones where Hell freezes over. I didn't say that it *was* logically impossible for such a world to exist; I said that it *might* be that such a world is logically impossible. Just because we can talk about such a world does not mean that it is logically possible. Here's a (limited) analogy. If I show you are particular mid-game chess position, with a certain arrangement of pieces on the board, it is generally not possible to tell whether the position is a logically possible chess game (ie. corresponds to a legal chess position) without knowing the entire history of the game up to that point. There are certainly particular arrangements of pieces that it is impossible to reach given the axiomatic starting positions and the rules of chess. It is equally possible, I would suggest, that there *might* be certain arrangements of matter that will not be reachable in *any* formal system; universally undecidable propositions, to use a Godelian term. My pink buny suit universe might be one such. Jonathan Colvin OK, I agree with this in principle. However, I can't think of any such logically impossible worlds. With quantum tunneling, matter popping into existence from the vacuum, and so on, it really does look like everything conceivable is possible. --Stathis Papaioannou _ $60,000 prize pool to be won. Three winners. Apply now! http://www.healthe.com.au/competition.do
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>>While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I think >it is by >>no means clear that just because everything that can happen does >>happen, there will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes >>omniscient, or lives for ever, or spends their entire life >dressed in a pink rabbit outfit. >>"Everything that can happen does happen" is not synonymous with >>"everything we can imagine happening does happen". Worlds >where we live >>forever or become omniscient or are born dressed in a pink >rabbit suit >>may not be *logically possible* worlds. Just as there is no world in >>the multiverse where 2+2=5, there may be no worlds in the multiverse >>where I live forever or spend my entire life dressed in a >pink rabbit suit. >> >>Jonathan Colvin >> >Stathis: I don't see this at all. It is not logically possible that >there is a world where 2+2=5 (although there are lots of >worlds where everyone shares the delusion that 2+2=5, and for >that matter worlds where everyone shares the delusion that >2+2=4 while in actual fact 2+2 does equal 5) Isn't that a contradictory statement? "It is not logically possible that there is a world where 2+2=5" AND "there are lots of worlds where in actual fact 2+2 does equal 5". , but how is it >logically impossible that you live your whole life in a pink >rabbit suit? If anything, I would rate such worlds as at least >on a par with the ones where pigs fly, and certainly more >common than the ones where Hell freezes over. I didn't say that it *was* logically impossible for such a world to exist; I said that it *might* be that such a world is logically impossible. Just because we can talk about such a world does not mean that it is logically possible. Here's a (limited) analogy. If I show you are particular mid-game chess position, with a certain arrangement of pieces on the board, it is generally not possible to tell whether the position is a logically possible chess game (ie. corresponds to a legal chess position) without knowing the entire history of the game up to that point. There are certainly particular arrangements of pieces that it is impossible to reach given the axiomatic starting positions and the rules of chess. It is equally possible, I would suggest, that there *might* be certain arrangements of matter that will not be reachable in *any* formal system; universally undecidable propositions, to use a Godelian term. My pink buny suit universe might be one such. Jonathan Colvin
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jonathan Colvin writes: While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I think it is by no means clear that just because everything that can happen does happen, there will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes omniscient, or lives for ever, or spends their entire life dressed in a pink rabbit outfit. "Everything that can happen does happen" is not synonymous with "everything we can imagine happening does happen". Worlds where we live forever or become omniscient or are born dressed in a pink rabbit suit may not be *logically possible* worlds. Just as there is no world in the multiverse where 2+2=5, there may be no worlds in the multiverse where I live forever or spend my entire life dressed in a pink rabbit suit. Jonathan Colvin I don't see this at all. It is not logically possible that there is a world where 2+2=5 (although there are lots of worlds where everyone shares the delusion that 2+2=5, and for that matter worlds where everyone shares the delusion that 2+2=4 while in actual fact 2+2 does equal 5), but how is it logically impossible that you live your whole life in a pink rabbit suit? If anything, I would rate such worlds as at least on a par with the ones where pigs fly, and certainly more common than the ones where Hell freezes over. --Stathis Papaioannou _ SEEK: Now with over 80,000 dream jobs! Click here: http://ninemsn.seek.com.au?hotmail
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jim Coons writes: I see no reason why consciousness must necessarily be sequential in time, maybe once you begin to die your consciousness decreases till it matches some other being. I don't see why that couldn't just as well be earlier in time as later. Maybe consciousness just flows in a cycle. In fact if our consciousness is owned by many beings instead of just one, could that explain indeterminism in QM. ( We don't know which copy we are. ) Jim Coons This is an "arrow of time" plus "personal identity" sort of question. Why do I look with anticipation to the future, rather than the past? Also, when I die, why can't I say that my consciousness flows to some other sentient being? I can answer the second question - because continuity of personal identity is meaningless without memory and the sense of being the same person. The first question is more difficult. My guess is that in fact a certain time direction *is* necessary for implementation of a conscious process, machine or program. It need not be dependent on real time; it could be simply the fact that lines in a computer program are listed and run in a particular order. I suppose it is possible that there are non-linear consciousnesses, but that would be something very alien. --Stathis Papaioannou _ Are you right for each other? Find out with our Love Calculator: http://fun.mobiledownloads.com.au/191191/index.wl?page=191191text
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jesse Mazer writes (after quoting Stathis Papaioannou): No doubt, common implementations of your mind will predominate over more bizarre ones at any given point in time. It is also possible to imagine some scenarios where you survive indefinitely with all of your friends, for example implemented in an Omega Point computer. But eternity is a very long time. If it is possible that the Omega Point computer can break down, then, as Murphy teaches, it certainly *will* break down - eventually. Not if the probability of it breaking down decreases in a geometric way from century to century (or millennium to millennium, aeon to aeon, whatever) as more and more of the universe is incorporated into the giant distributed computing network (or as the increasing computing power allows for more and more sophisticated ways of anticipating and avoiding civilization-ending disasters). Like I said, if the probability of a catastrophic breakdown was 1/8 in one century, 1/16 in the next, 1/32 in the next, and so on, then the total probability of it breaking down at any point in the entire infinite history of the universe would be the sum of the infinite series 1/8+1/16+1/32+1/64+1/128+... , which is equal to 1/4. In such a branch there'd be a 3/4 chance that civilization would last forever. It is possible that the probability of the computer breaking down decreases geometrically with time, as you say. However, as t->infinity, it is nevertheless increasingly likely to deviate from this ideal behaviour, and the measure of branches of the multiverse in which it does will approach zero. Remember, it is not the probability in any single branch which is important (in fact, in the MWI that would be a meaningless concept), but the measure across all branches. Also, you didn't address my other point, which is that even if all of civilization collapses around you, then if the probability of your continuing to survive would be even lower than the probability that the universe you have seen around you up until then is just part of a giant computer simulation in some branch where the technology exists to run such a simulation, then from your point of view you should expect it to be more likely that the beings running the simulation will decide to rescue you and bring you out into the "real world" than it is that you continue to survive alone at such incredibly long odds. Jesse I'll have to think about this. --Stathis Papaioannou _ Searching for that dream home? Try http://ninemsn.realestate.com.au for all your property needs.
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
- Original Message - From: "Jonathan Colvin" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: Sent: Thursday, April 14, 2005 7:38 PM Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I think it is by no means clear that just because everything that can happen does happen, there will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes omniscient, or lives for ever, or spends their entire life dressed in a pink rabbit outfit. "Everything that can happen does happen" is not synonymous with "everything we can imagine happening does happen". Worlds where we live forever or become omniscient or are born dressed in a pink rabbit suit may not be *logically possible* worlds. Just as there is no world in the multiverse where 2+2=5, there may be no worlds in the multiverse where I live forever or spend my entire life dressed in a pink rabbit suit. I think universes are more like frames of a movie, time is descreet, and we continually move from one universe to the next where continuity exists. Given this, all the universes that ever are, or will be exist right now in a platonic view. We just cruise through them. They are infinite in number and there are ones with every possible arrangement of matter, laws of physics, combinations of dimensions, etc. Once one thinks the universe is infinite, there's no reason to limit it to one universe or a multiverse with only specific components. "How about a universe that is simply an empty dodecahedron? In the Level IV multiverse, all these alternative realities actually exist." "[Level IV multiverses] are almost impossible to visualize; the best one can do is to think of them abstractly". -- Max Tegmark, SciAm 05/2003
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
>Stathias: >Yes, everything that can happen, does happen, somewhere in the >multiverse. >There will certainly be a world where you get smarter and >smarter, and ultimately you know everything. But at any point >in the development of the multiverse, you are (1) certain to >find yourself alive, and (2) most likely to find yourself >alive in branches with higher measure. In the near future, >this means you will not experience life-threatening illnesses >or accidents. >In the intermediate future, it probably means you will be >living in times when anti-ageing technology or mind uploading >becomes available. In the far future, you may survive as the >result of some very bizarre coincidences, but these will still >be the least unlikely of the possible bizarre coincidences. >If you can think of a way in which becoming smarter and >smarter is the most likely / least unlikely method for your >long term survival, then perhaps this is something you can >look forward to. While I'm a supporter of Tegmark's Ultimate Ensemble, I think it is by no means clear that just because everything that can happen does happen, there will necessarily be a world where everyone becomes omniscient, or lives for ever, or spends their entire life dressed in a pink rabbit outfit. "Everything that can happen does happen" is not synonymous with "everything we can imagine happening does happen". Worlds where we live forever or become omniscient or are born dressed in a pink rabbit suit may not be *logically possible* worlds. Just as there is no world in the multiverse where 2+2=5, there may be no worlds in the multiverse where I live forever or spend my entire life dressed in a pink rabbit suit. Jonathan Colvin
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
I see no reason why consciousness must necessarily be sequential in time, maybe once you begin to die your consciousness decreases till it matches some other being. I don't see why that couldn't just as well be earlier in time as later. Maybe consciousness just flows in a cycle. In fact if our consciousness is owned by many beings instead of just one, could that explain indeterminism in QM. ( We don't know which copy we are. ) Jim Coons
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Jesse Mazer writes: I think you can apply the same reasoning to show you will be not only the only sentient being, but ultimately, the only *thing* in the universe (is this the same as saying you will ultimately become the universe?). If QTI is true, your consciousness will survive until the end of time in some branch of the MW with Pr=1. The Pr that any subset of the current universe (excluding you) will survive in the same branch as you is <1, so as eternity approaches, the Pr that anything other than you survives approaches zero. This is true even of the substructure sustaining you, since there is a nonzero Pr that you will find some other means of sustenance in the future. It is also true of your toys, that you might use to reconstruct happier times. The *only* thing guaranteed to survive indefinitely is you bare consciousness. --Stathis Papioannou One thing to take into account is that QTI doesn't say your experience of subjective time will match that of physical time--if there is a branch containing a version of you having a certain experience near the end of the universe, and there is some other branch where the exact same experience is taking place in a *simulation* of the end of the universe that's being run at a much earlier cosmological time, it is certainly possible that your next experience will be of the beings that ran this simulation removing you from it and showing you the "real" world. So, if you reach a point where the only thing that could sustain your consciousness would be a mind-bogglingly unlikely string of luck (the particles that make up your body constantly tunneling into configurations that keep you alive, in defiance of thermodynamics), then I'd expect there to be a lot more branches of the multiverse where your continued experience turns out to be due to the fact that you turned out to be living in a simulation being run well before the end of the universe (after all, a mind-bogglingly unlikely string of luck can only happen in a mind-bogglingly small fraction of all branches, while branches where life is able to run giant simulations of various kinds need not be so rare). Another posssibility, as I said before, is some type of Omega-Point-type scenario where the amount of computations civilization can do grows without bound, in which case the probability that everyone else around you will die might look like a decreasing geometric series such as 1/8+1/16+1/32+1/64+1/128+..., so that the probability of your going on having experiences of seeing civilization around you survive for an infinite time would not go to zero. Jesse No doubt, common implementations of your mind will predominate over more bizarre ones at any given point in time. It is also possible to imagine some scenarios where you survive indefinitely with all of your friends, for example implemented in an Omega Point computer. But eternity is a very long time. If it is possible that the Omega Point computer can break down, then, as Murphy teaches, it certainly *will* break down - eventually. Not if the probability of it breaking down decreases in a geometric way from century to century (or millennium to millennium, aeon to aeon, whatever) as more and more of the universe is incorporated into the giant distributed computing network (or as the increasing computing power allows for more and more sophisticated ways of anticipating and avoiding civilization-ending disasters). Like I said, if the probability of a catastrophic breakdown was 1/8 in one century, 1/16 in the next, 1/32 in the next, and so on, then the total probability of it breaking down at any point in the entire infinite history of the universe would be the sum of the infinite series 1/8+1/16+1/32+1/64+1/128+... , which is equal to 1/4. In such a branch there'd be a 3/4 chance that civilization would last forever. Also, you didn't address my other point, which is that even if all of civilization collapses around you, then if the probability of your continuing to survive would be even lower than the probability that the universe you have seen around you up until then is just part of a giant computer simulation in some branch where the technology exists to run such a simulation, then from your point of view you should expect it to be more likely that the beings running the simulation will decide to rescue you and bring you out into the "real world" than it is that you continue to survive alone at such incredibly long odds. Jesse
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
Danny Mayes writes: Isn't the inverse also true? Wouldn't there always be an outcome where you were born a little earlier, or were transported back in time through some means so that there are "universes" where your consciousness exists at the very beginning? I don't really believe this, but the logic seems to apply just the same. You can also play the same game with other qualities of consciousness (Is there always a universe where you are a little more intelligent, or knowledgeable, so that there are some universes that you know everything that can be known?) My personal belief is that QTI is not the end result of our consciousness. It's just too strange (and this coming from someone who accepts some pretty strange beliefs in the name of QM). Danny Mayes Yes, everything that can happen, does happen, somewhere in the multiverse. There will certainly be a world where you get smarter and smarter, and ultimately you know everything. But at any point in the development of the multiverse, you are (1) certain to find yourself alive, and (2) most likely to find yourself alive in branches with higher measure. In the near future, this means you will not experience life-threatening illnesses or accidents. In the intermediate future, it probably means you will be living in times when anti-ageing technology or mind uploading becomes available. In the far future, you may survive as the result of some very bizarre coincidences, but these will still be the least unlikely of the possible bizarre coincidences. If you can think of a way in which becoming smarter and smarter is the most likely / least unlikely method for your long term survival, then perhaps this is something you can look forward to. --Stathis Papaioannou _ Are you right for each other? Find out with our Love Calculator: http://fun.mobiledownloads.com.au/191191/index.wl?page=191191text
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jesse Mazer writes: I think you can apply the same reasoning to show you will be not only the only sentient being, but ultimately, the only *thing* in the universe (is this the same as saying you will ultimately become the universe?). If QTI is true, your consciousness will survive until the end of time in some branch of the MW with Pr=1. The Pr that any subset of the current universe (excluding you) will survive in the same branch as you is <1, so as eternity approaches, the Pr that anything other than you survives approaches zero. This is true even of the substructure sustaining you, since there is a nonzero Pr that you will find some other means of sustenance in the future. It is also true of your toys, that you might use to reconstruct happier times. The *only* thing guaranteed to survive indefinitely is you bare consciousness. --Stathis Papioannou One thing to take into account is that QTI doesn't say your experience of subjective time will match that of physical time--if there is a branch containing a version of you having a certain experience near the end of the universe, and there is some other branch where the exact same experience is taking place in a *simulation* of the end of the universe that's being run at a much earlier cosmological time, it is certainly possible that your next experience will be of the beings that ran this simulation removing you from it and showing you the "real" world. So, if you reach a point where the only thing that could sustain your consciousness would be a mind-bogglingly unlikely string of luck (the particles that make up your body constantly tunneling into configurations that keep you alive, in defiance of thermodynamics), then I'd expect there to be a lot more branches of the multiverse where your continued experience turns out to be due to the fact that you turned out to be living in a simulation being run well before the end of the universe (after all, a mind-bogglingly unlikely string of luck can only happen in a mind-bogglingly small fraction of all branches, while branches where life is able to run giant simulations of various kinds need not be so rare). Another posssibility, as I said before, is some type of Omega-Point-type scenario where the amount of computations civilization can do grows without bound, in which case the probability that everyone else around you will die might look like a decreasing geometric series such as 1/8+1/16+1/32+1/64+1/128+..., so that the probability of your going on having experiences of seeing civilization around you survive for an infinite time would not go to zero. Jesse No doubt, common implementations of your mind will predominate over more bizarre ones at any given point in time. It is also possible to imagine some scenarios where you survive indefinitely with all of your friends, for example implemented in an Omega Point computer. But eternity is a very long time. If it is possible that the Omega Point computer can break down, then, as Murphy teaches, it certainly *will* break down - eventually. The only thing guaranteed to survive in some universe which you also survive in is you. Hence, while there will always be branches where your friends survive along with you, the measure of these branches approaches zero as t approaches infinity. --Stathis Papaioannou _ SEEK: Now with over 80,000 dream jobs! Click here: http://ninemsn.seek.com.au?hotmail
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
Isn't the inverse also true? Wouldn't there always be an outcome where you were born a little earlier, or were transported back in time through some means so that there are "universes" where your consciousness exists at the very beginning? I don't really believe this, but the logic seems to apply just the same. You can also play the same game with other qualities of consciousness (Is there always a universe where you are a little more intelligent, or knowledgeable, so that there are some universes that you know everything that can be known?) My personal belief is that QTI is not the end result of our consciousness. It's just too strange (and this coming from someone who accepts some pretty strange beliefs in the name of QM). Danny Mayes Stathis Papaioannou wrote: I think you can apply the same reasoning to show you will be not only the only sentient being, but ultimately, the only *thing* in the universe (is this the same as saying you will ultimately become the universe?). If QTI is true, your consciousness will survive until the end of time in some branch of the MW with Pr=1. The Pr that any subset of the current universe (excluding you) will survive in the same branch as you is <1, so as eternity approaches, the Pr that anything other than you survives approaches zero. This is true even of the substructure sustaining you, since there is a nonzero Pr that you will find some other means of sustenance in the future. It is also true of your toys, that you might use to reconstruct happier times. The *only* thing guaranteed to survive indefinitely is you bare consciousness. --Stathis Papioannou _ Are you right for each other? Find out with our Love Calculator: http://fun.mobiledownloads.com.au/191191/index.wl?page=191191text -
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2005 23:39:21 +1000 From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2005 04:04:48 -0400 From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2005 17:22:34 +1000 Jesse Mazer wrote: You're right, alas. If QTI is correct, then each of us can expect to be the last conscious being in some branch of the multiverse. On the brighter side, we will have probably billions or trillions of years during which even the most sociable amongst us may well tire of sentient company! What's your reasoning? If QTI is correct, I think each of us should more likely expect that civilization (a community of sentient beings) will last as long as allowed by the laws of physics, and any being finding himself approaching the physical limit (whether the limit is due to increasing entropy, a big crunch, or a big rip) is probably more likely to find that everything he's experienced up until then has really been a simulation in some larger meta-universe than he is to find himself lasting on thanks to an endless string of hugely unlikely quantum events or something like that. Jesse The probability that my consciousness will survive in some branch of the MW is exactly 1, if QTI is correct. The probability that my friend will survive in the same branch as me may be close to 1 - for example, if we are surgically joined, or if we are both implemented on the same chip - but it must be less than 1, unless it is actually physically impossible for only one of us to die. Therefore, over many branchings, my friend is sure to die and I will be left on my own. From the symmetry of the situation, my friend will in turn survive in some branch of the MW, but as t->infinity the probability that I will be still alive in that branch approaches zero. For any given friend, sure. I thought you meant "alone" in the sense of having no other sentient beings to talk to. Also, if you live in some sort of "Omega Point" scenario where the computing power available to civilization grows without bound (not necessarily in the specific way Tipler proposed), maybe it'd be possible to reconstruct lost friends by simulating all possible past histories of the universe up until a certain time, then looking at the subset of universes that produced a being with your exact mental state at that time, so you can find a past history that's consistent with your memories. Jesse I think you can apply the same reasoning to show you will be not only the only sentient being, but ultimately, the only *thing* in the universe (is this the same as saying you will ultimately become the universe?). If QTI is true, your consciousness will survive until the end of time in some branch of the MW with Pr=1. The Pr that any subset of the current universe (excluding you) will survive in the same branch as you is <1, so as eternity approaches, the Pr that anything other than you survives approaches zero. This is true even of the substructure sustaining you, since there is a nonzero Pr that you will find some other means of sustenance in the future. It is also true of your toys, that you might use to reconstruct happier times. The *only* thing guaranteed to survive indefinitely is you bare consciousness. --Stathis Papioannou One thing to take into account is that QTI doesn't say your experience of subjective time will match that of physical time--if there is a branch containing a version of you having a certain experience near the end of the universe, and there is some other branch where the exact same experience is taking place in a *simulation* of the end of the universe that's being run at a much earlier cosmological time, it is certainly possible that your next experience will be of the beings that ran this simulation removing you from it and showing you the "real" world. So, if you reach a point where the only thing that could sustain your consciousness would be a mind-bogglingly unlikely string of luck (the particles that make up your body constantly tunneling into configurations that keep you alive, in defiance of thermodynamics), then I'd expect there to be a lot more branches of the multiverse where your continued experience turns out to be due to the fact that you turned out to be living in a simulation being run well before the end of the universe (after all, a mind-bogglingly unlikely string of luck can only happen in a mind-bogglingly small fraction of all branches, while branches where life is able to run giant simulations of various kinds ne
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2005 04:04:48 -0400 From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2005 17:22:34 +1000 Jesse Mazer wrote: You're right, alas. If QTI is correct, then each of us can expect to be the last conscious being in some branch of the multiverse. On the brighter side, we will have probably billions or trillions of years during which even the most sociable amongst us may well tire of sentient company! What's your reasoning? If QTI is correct, I think each of us should more likely expect that civilization (a community of sentient beings) will last as long as allowed by the laws of physics, and any being finding himself approaching the physical limit (whether the limit is due to increasing entropy, a big crunch, or a big rip) is probably more likely to find that everything he's experienced up until then has really been a simulation in some larger meta-universe than he is to find himself lasting on thanks to an endless string of hugely unlikely quantum events or something like that. Jesse The probability that my consciousness will survive in some branch of the MW is exactly 1, if QTI is correct. The probability that my friend will survive in the same branch as me may be close to 1 - for example, if we are surgically joined, or if we are both implemented on the same chip - but it must be less than 1, unless it is actually physically impossible for only one of us to die. Therefore, over many branchings, my friend is sure to die and I will be left on my own. From the symmetry of the situation, my friend will in turn survive in some branch of the MW, but as t->infinity the probability that I will be still alive in that branch approaches zero. For any given friend, sure. I thought you meant "alone" in the sense of having no other sentient beings to talk to. Also, if you live in some sort of "Omega Point" scenario where the computing power available to civilization grows without bound (not necessarily in the specific way Tipler proposed), maybe it'd be possible to reconstruct lost friends by simulating all possible past histories of the universe up until a certain time, then looking at the subset of universes that produced a being with your exact mental state at that time, so you can find a past history that's consistent with your memories. Jesse I think you can apply the same reasoning to show you will be not only the only sentient being, but ultimately, the only *thing* in the universe (is this the same as saying you will ultimately become the universe?). If QTI is true, your consciousness will survive until the end of time in some branch of the MW with Pr=1. The Pr that any subset of the current universe (excluding you) will survive in the same branch as you is <1, so as eternity approaches, the Pr that anything other than you survives approaches zero. This is true even of the substructure sustaining you, since there is a nonzero Pr that you will find some other means of sustenance in the future. It is also true of your toys, that you might use to reconstruct happier times. The *only* thing guaranteed to survive indefinitely is you bare consciousness. --Stathis Papioannou _ Are you right for each other? Find out with our Love Calculator: http://fun.mobiledownloads.com.au/191191/index.wl?page=191191text
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
I more or less agree with Jesse. But I would say that the measure of similarity should also be an absolute measure that multiplied with the absolute measure defines a new effective absolute measure for a given observer. Given the absolute measure you can define effective conditional probabilities, except in cases where branches lead to death. In these cases, the ''conditional probability'' of there being a next experience at all would be less than 1. Saibal - Defeat Spammers by launching DDoS attacks on Spam-Websites: http://www.hillscapital.com/antispam/ - Oorspronkelijk bericht - Van: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Aan: Verzonden: Thursday, April 14, 2005 10:20 AM Onderwerp: Re: Many worlds theory of immortality > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > > >>Stathis Papaioannou writes: > >> > QM or QTI do not imply > >> > that you can never lose consciousness. The idea is that you can never > >> > *experience* loss of consciousness. You can fall asleep, but when you > >>wake > >> > up, you don't remember being asleep. If you never wake up - i.e. if you > >>die > >> > in your sleep - then you never experience that particular branch of the > >>MW. > >> > In other words, you can only experience those worlds where the loss of > >> > consciousness is temporary. > >> > >>How about impairment of consciousness? Can you experience that? Can you > >>experience going crazy, or having a reduced level of consciousness where > >>you are drugged or barely alive? That's how death is for most people, > >>it's not like flicking off a light. Will Quantum Immortality protect you > >>from spending an eternity in a near-coma? Exactly how much consciousness > >>does it guarantee you? > >> > >>Hal Finney > >> > >Alas, you are right. Immortality is not all fun and games, and in some > >worlds you may experience a drawn out fizzling out, reduced to the > >consciousness of an infant, then a fish, then an amoeba. I believe Max > >Tegmark aknowledged this in a commentary on his original paper. If you're > >really unlucky, you will experience eternal torment in the flames of hell. > >And unlike the Christian Hell, you don't actually have to do something > >wrong to end up in QTI hell: it all depends on the fall of the cosmic dice. > > > >One question which comes up is, when do you stop being you? I suppose this > >is an answer to your "how much consciousness is guaranteed" question: when > >you lose enough consciousness that you forget who you are, that is the > >cutoff where you can really be said to have lost consciousness. > > I think that's too handwavey--I think that to really have a satisfying > answer to this question, you need some kind of formal theory of > consciousness that answers questions like, "If I am currently experiencing > observer-moment A, what is the probability that my next experience will of > observer-moment B vs. observer-moment C"? I think the answer should depend > both on some sort of measure of the "similarity" of A and B vs. A and C (to > deal with the 'when do you stop being you' question), and also on some > notion of the absolute probability of B vs. C (for example, if B and C are > both equally 'similar' to your current experience A, but B is experiencing > some kind of thermodynamic miracle while C is experiencing business as > usual, then C would be more likely). I elaborated on these ideas in my posts > in the "Request for a glossary of acronyms" thread at > http://tinyurl.com/5265d > > Jesse > >
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Le 14-avr.-05, à 09:48, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit : Alas, you are right. Immortality is not all fun and games, and in some worlds you may experience a drawn out fizzling out, reduced to the consciousness of an infant, then a fish, then an amoeba. I believe Max Tegmark aknowledged this in a commentary on his original paper. If you could find the reference I would be interested. From what I remember from a post by James Higgo who asked Max, it seems to me that Tegmark, although he seems to accept quantum suicide (with a well clearcut self-killing protocol), does not believe in quantum (or comp) immortality. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: Stathis Papaioannou writes: > QM or QTI do not imply > that you can never lose consciousness. The idea is that you can never > *experience* loss of consciousness. You can fall asleep, but when you wake > up, you don't remember being asleep. If you never wake up - i.e. if you die > in your sleep - then you never experience that particular branch of the MW. > In other words, you can only experience those worlds where the loss of > consciousness is temporary. How about impairment of consciousness? Can you experience that? Can you experience going crazy, or having a reduced level of consciousness where you are drugged or barely alive? That's how death is for most people, it's not like flicking off a light. Will Quantum Immortality protect you from spending an eternity in a near-coma? Exactly how much consciousness does it guarantee you? Hal Finney Alas, you are right. Immortality is not all fun and games, and in some worlds you may experience a drawn out fizzling out, reduced to the consciousness of an infant, then a fish, then an amoeba. I believe Max Tegmark aknowledged this in a commentary on his original paper. If you're really unlucky, you will experience eternal torment in the flames of hell. And unlike the Christian Hell, you don't actually have to do something wrong to end up in QTI hell: it all depends on the fall of the cosmic dice. One question which comes up is, when do you stop being you? I suppose this is an answer to your "how much consciousness is guaranteed" question: when you lose enough consciousness that you forget who you are, that is the cutoff where you can really be said to have lost consciousness. I think that's too handwavey--I think that to really have a satisfying answer to this question, you need some kind of formal theory of consciousness that answers questions like, "If I am currently experiencing observer-moment A, what is the probability that my next experience will of observer-moment B vs. observer-moment C"? I think the answer should depend both on some sort of measure of the "similarity" of A and B vs. A and C (to deal with the 'when do you stop being you' question), and also on some notion of the absolute probability of B vs. C (for example, if B and C are both equally 'similar' to your current experience A, but B is experiencing some kind of thermodynamic miracle while C is experiencing business as usual, then C would be more likely). I elaborated on these ideas in my posts in the "Request for a glossary of acronyms" thread at http://tinyurl.com/5265d Jesse
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
From: "Jesse Mazer" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2005 04:04:48 -0400 From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2005 17:22:34 +1000 Jesse Mazer wrote: You're right, alas. If QTI is correct, then each of us can expect to be the last conscious being in some branch of the multiverse. On the brighter side, we will have probably billions or trillions of years during which even the most sociable amongst us may well tire of sentient company! What's your reasoning? If QTI is correct, I think each of us should more likely expect that civilization (a community of sentient beings) will last as long as allowed by the laws of physics, and any being finding himself approaching the physical limit (whether the limit is due to increasing entropy, a big crunch, or a big rip) is probably more likely to find that everything he's experienced up until then has really been a simulation in some larger meta-universe than he is to find himself lasting on thanks to an endless string of hugely unlikely quantum events or something like that. Jesse The probability that my consciousness will survive in some branch of the MW is exactly 1, if QTI is correct. The probability that my friend will survive in the same branch as me may be close to 1 - for example, if we are surgically joined, or if we are both implemented on the same chip - but it must be less than 1, unless it is actually physically impossible for only one of us to die. Therefore, over many branchings, my friend is sure to die and I will be left on my own. From the symmetry of the situation, my friend will in turn survive in some branch of the MW, but as t->infinity the probability that I will be still alive in that branch approaches zero. For any given friend, sure. I thought you meant "alone" in the sense of having no other sentient beings to talk to. Also, if you live in some sort of "Omega Point" scenario where the computing power available to civilization grows without bound (not necessarily in the specific way Tipler proposed), maybe it'd be possible to reconstruct lost friends by simulating all possible past histories of the universe up until a certain time, then looking at the subset of universes that produced a being with your exact mental state at that time, so you can find a past history that's consistent with your memories. Jesse Also, another thought occurred to me--if the amount of computing power available to civilization were to grow without bound, the number of backups of any given being might grow forever too, meaning that the probability that all backups would be erased could decrease from year to year; so if, for example, the probability of all copies of your friend being erased was 1/8 in one century, 1/16 in the next century, 1/32 in the next, and so on, then the sum of this infinite series would give only a 1/4 chance that all copies of your friend would be ever be erased. Jesse
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
Le 14-avr.-05, à 01:31, Hal Finney a écrit : Nick Prince writes: If the MW immortality is correct then would we not only be immortal but also very alone in the end. We know that we observe others die so since we always find ourselves in a branch of the multiverse where we live on - the conclusion seems inescapable Can anyone figure a way out of such inevitable eternal loneliness because I rather like to chat to my freinds!! Yes, it's very simple. Just kill yourself whenever any of your friends die. Then you will only be alive in universes where your friends are alive. Be careful. You need to take into account the probabilities (on which we talk since the beginning of the list). Example: if your friend dies due to the explosion of an atomic bomb, and if you kill yourself with a gun the probabilities you survive in world where your friend survive could be low. If your friend dies because he killed himself with a gun, then if you kill yourself with an atomic bomb, indeed, you will make the probability of staying with your friend high. Of course It is just the idea. A "rigorous" computation should be based on an explicit "probability" calculus relating energy, information, computational histories, ... To sum up the problem: immortality makes the idea of killing oneself ... hard. Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
From: "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], everything-list@eskimo.com Subject: RE: many worlds theory of immortality Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2005 17:22:34 +1000 Jesse Mazer wrote: You're right, alas. If QTI is correct, then each of us can expect to be the last conscious being in some branch of the multiverse. On the brighter side, we will have probably billions or trillions of years during which even the most sociable amongst us may well tire of sentient company! What's your reasoning? If QTI is correct, I think each of us should more likely expect that civilization (a community of sentient beings) will last as long as allowed by the laws of physics, and any being finding himself approaching the physical limit (whether the limit is due to increasing entropy, a big crunch, or a big rip) is probably more likely to find that everything he's experienced up until then has really been a simulation in some larger meta-universe than he is to find himself lasting on thanks to an endless string of hugely unlikely quantum events or something like that. Jesse The probability that my consciousness will survive in some branch of the MW is exactly 1, if QTI is correct. The probability that my friend will survive in the same branch as me may be close to 1 - for example, if we are surgically joined, or if we are both implemented on the same chip - but it must be less than 1, unless it is actually physically impossible for only one of us to die. Therefore, over many branchings, my friend is sure to die and I will be left on my own. From the symmetry of the situation, my friend will in turn survive in some branch of the MW, but as t->infinity the probability that I will be still alive in that branch approaches zero. For any given friend, sure. I thought you meant "alone" in the sense of having no other sentient beings to talk to. Also, if you live in some sort of "Omega Point" scenario where the computing power available to civilization grows without bound (not necessarily in the specific way Tipler proposed), maybe it'd be possible to reconstruct lost friends by simulating all possible past histories of the universe up until a certain time, then looking at the subset of universes that produced a being with your exact mental state at that time, so you can find a past history that's consistent with your memories. Jesse
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Stathis Papaioannou writes: > QM or QTI do not imply > that you can never lose consciousness. The idea is that you can never > *experience* loss of consciousness. You can fall asleep, but when you wake > up, you don't remember being asleep. If you never wake up - i.e. if you die > in your sleep - then you never experience that particular branch of the MW. > In other words, you can only experience those worlds where the loss of > consciousness is temporary. How about impairment of consciousness? Can you experience that? Can you experience going crazy, or having a reduced level of consciousness where you are drugged or barely alive? That's how death is for most people, it's not like flicking off a light. Will Quantum Immortality protect you from spending an eternity in a near-coma? Exactly how much consciousness does it guarantee you? Hal Finney Alas, you are right. Immortality is not all fun and games, and in some worlds you may experience a drawn out fizzling out, reduced to the consciousness of an infant, then a fish, then an amoeba. I believe Max Tegmark aknowledged this in a commentary on his original paper. If you're really unlucky, you will experience eternal torment in the flames of hell. And unlike the Christian Hell, you don't actually have to do something wrong to end up in QTI hell: it all depends on the fall of the cosmic dice. One question which comes up is, when do you stop being you? I suppose this is an answer to your "how much consciousness is guaranteed" question: when you lose enough consciousness that you forget who you are, that is the cutoff where you can really be said to have lost consciousness. QTI then guarantees that there will always be a branch of the MW where you still maintain a sense of your identity. Still, this doesn't save you from hell. --Stathis Papaioannou _ Update your mobile with a hot polyphonic ringtone: http://fun.mobiledownloads.com.au/191191/index.wl?page=191191polyphonicringtone
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Jesse Mazer wrote: You're right, alas. If QTI is correct, then each of us can expect to be the last conscious being in some branch of the multiverse. On the brighter side, we will have probably billions or trillions of years during which even the most sociable amongst us may well tire of sentient company! What's your reasoning? If QTI is correct, I think each of us should more likely expect that civilization (a community of sentient beings) will last as long as allowed by the laws of physics, and any being finding himself approaching the physical limit (whether the limit is due to increasing entropy, a big crunch, or a big rip) is probably more likely to find that everything he's experienced up until then has really been a simulation in some larger meta-universe than he is to find himself lasting on thanks to an endless string of hugely unlikely quantum events or something like that. Jesse The probability that my consciousness will survive in some branch of the MW is exactly 1, if QTI is correct. The probability that my friend will survive in the same branch as me may be close to 1 - for example, if we are surgically joined, or if we are both implemented on the same chip - but it must be less than 1, unless it is actually physically impossible for only one of us to die. Therefore, over many branchings, my friend is sure to die and I will be left on my own. From the symmetry of the situation, my friend will in turn survive in some branch of the MW, but as t->infinity the probability that I will be still alive in that branch approaches zero. --Stathis Papaioannou _ Buy want you really want - sell what you don't on eBay: http://adfarm.mediaplex.com/ad/ck/705-10129-5668-323?ID=2
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Stathis Papaioannou writes: > QM or QTI do not imply > that you can never lose consciousness. The idea is that you can never > *experience* loss of consciousness. You can fall asleep, but when you wake > up, you don't remember being asleep. If you never wake up - i.e. if you die > in your sleep - then you never experience that particular branch of the MW. > In other words, you can only experience those worlds where the loss of > consciousness is temporary. How about impairment of consciousness? Can you experience that? Can you experience going crazy, or having a reduced level of consciousness where you are drugged or barely alive? That's how death is for most people, it's not like flicking off a light. Will Quantum Immortality protect you from spending an eternity in a near-coma? Exactly how much consciousness does it guarantee you? Hal Finney
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
Saibal Mitra wrote: If you encounter a ''branching'' in which one of the possibilities is death, that branch cannot be said to be nonexistent relative to you. Quantum mechanics doesn't imply that you can never become unconscious, otherwise you could never fall asleep! This latter statement seems to come up now and again. QM or QTI do not imply that you can never lose consciousness. The idea is that you can never *experience* loss of consciousness. You can fall asleep, but when you wake up, you don't remember being asleep. If you never wake up - i.e. if you die in your sleep - then you never experience that particular branch of the MW. In other words, you can only experience those worlds where the loss of consciousness is temporary. --Stathis Papaioannou _ Express yourself instantly with MSN Messenger! Download today - it's FREE! http://messenger.msn.click-url.com/go/onm00200471ave/direct/01/
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Stathis Papaioannou wrote: You're right, alas. If QTI is correct, then each of us can expect to be the last conscious being in some branch of the multiverse. On the brighter side, we will have probably billions or trillions of years during which even the most sociable amongst us may well tire of sentient company! What's your reasoning? If QTI is correct, I think each of us should more likely expect that civilization (a community of sentient beings) will last as long as allowed by the laws of physics, and any being finding himself approaching the physical limit (whether the limit is due to increasing entropy, a big crunch, or a big rip) is probably more likely to find that everything he's experienced up until then has really been a simulation in some larger meta-universe than he is to find himself lasting on thanks to an endless string of hugely unlikely quantum events or something like that. Jesse
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
You're right, alas. If QTI is correct, then each of us can expect to be the last conscious being in some branch of the multiverse. On the brighter side, we will have probably billions or trillions of years during which even the most sociable amongst us may well tire of sentient company! The list seems to have suddenly become very active recently, and I for one don't mind if old questions come up now and again. --Stathis Papaioannou From: "Nick Prince" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Everything-List" Subject: many worlds theory of immortality Date: Thu, 14 Apr 2005 00:57:30 +0100 My apologies to the group for bringing up questions which may have been covererd before but I cannot find an answer to the following query and I am new to the group. I have a question to put to anyone who has some ideas as follows: If the MW immortality is correct then would we not only be immortal but also very alone in the end. We know that we observe others die so since we always find ourselves in a branch of the multiverse where we live on - the conclusion seems inescapable Can anyone figure a way out of such inevitable eternal loneliness because I rather like to chat to my freinds!! Nick Prince _ Buy want you really want - sell what you don't on eBay: http://adfarm.mediaplex.com/ad/ck/705-10129-5668-323?ID=2
RE: many worlds theory of immortality
Nick Prince wrote: My apologies to the group for bringing up questions which may have been covererd before but I cannot find an answer to the following query and I am new to the group. I have a question to put to anyone who has some ideas as follows: If the MW immortality is correct then would we not only be immortal but also very alone in the end. We know that we observe others die so since we always find ourselves in a branch of the multiverse where we live on - the conclusion seems inescapable Can anyone figure a way out of such inevitable eternal loneliness because I rather like to chat to my freinds!! I'd say that if you look at the subset of all worlds where you live to some very advanced age--say, 10,000--then in the vast majority of these worlds, you lived this long because of some technological advance rather than due to a ridiculously improbable-seeming string of luck. And in any world where technological advances allow you to live so long, living this long will probably be relatively common among the population in general. I think the ultimate technological means for immortality would probably be "mind uploading", where your physical brain is mapped out in detail and simulated on a computer...uploads could make lots of backups/copies of themselves, spread throughout the entire civilization's network of computing devices, in which case the only type of disaster capable of destroying all copies of you (or any of your uploaded friends) would probably be one that was large enough to destroy civilization in general (and at some point the network of computing devices constituting 'civilization' could end up being spread throughout space instead of confined to one planet, or even one solar system). Of course you would only experience being one copy at a time, but in this case "quantum immortality" would say that you would always find yourself being one of the copies whose "lineage" lasts into the arbitrarily distant future (ie at any point in the future there are at least some copies whose past include your present moment of experience). If Moore's Law continues, it may not be too many more decades before the first uploads can be created, although obviously computing power isn't the only barrier...if not, there's always cryonics... Jesse
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
Hi Nick, I asked a question in a thread "Quantum accident survivor" some time ago where, at least in my mind, it was concluded that we can indeed be removed from loved ones each time we survive a situation that was clearly deadly in most cases and that one's consciousness is "nudged" away from the time-lines which end in death. In a strictly interhuman relationship manner we do end up alone. However QI is far from accepted. If this is what we are going to settle on believing then it follows that for us to actually be immortal some physical processes must account for the continued survival of our bodies, no matter how far fetched/improbable. So you would have to believe that in the next 10s of years (depending on how old you are) remarkable biotechnological breakthroughs would need to occur to prevent death of old age. This seems unlikely. My thoughts then turn to what about those people who were born and died 1000s of years ago? Did their consciousnesses go down paths of immortality? Also will every conscious being living with a serious injury (broken spine) be cured? I'm not convinced either way, but it's fun to think about. - Original Message - From: "Nick Prince" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> To: "Everything-List" Sent: Wednesday, April 13, 2005 4:57 PM Subject: many worlds theory of immortality My apologies to the group for bringing up questions which may have been covererd before but I cannot find an answer to the following query and I am new to the group. I have a question to put to anyone who has some ideas as follows: If the MW immortality is correct then would we not only be immortal but also very alone in the end. We know that we observe others die so since we always find ourselves in a branch of the multiverse where we live on - the conclusion seems inescapable Can anyone figure a way out of such inevitable eternal loneliness because I rather like to chat to my freinds!! Nick Prince
Re: Many worlds theory of immortality
I don't think that the MW immortality is correct at all! In a certain sense we are immortal, because the enseble of all possible worlds is a fixed static entity. So, you ''always'' find yourselve alive in one state or another. However, you won't experience youself evolving in the infinite far future. If you encounter a ''branching'' in which one of the possibilities is death, that branch cannot be said to be nonexistent relative to you. Quantum mechanics doesn't imply that you can never become unconscious, otherwise you could never fall asleep! Of course, you can never experience being unconscious. So, what to do with the branch leading to (almost) certain death? The more information your brain contains, the smaller the set of branches is in which you are alive (and consistent with your experiences stored in your brain). The set of all branches in which you could be alive doesn't contain any information at all. Since death involves complete memory loss, the branch leading to death should be replaced by the complete set of all possibilities. Saibal - Defeat Spammers by launching DDoS attacks on Spam-Websites: http://www.hillscapital.com/antispam/ > > > Quoting nick_h_e_prince <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > > > > > > > > My apologies to the group for bringing up questions which may have > > been covererd before but I cannot find an answer to the following > > query and I am new to the group. > > > > Firstly I am sure I have read that Bruno Marchal had come up with a > > proof of the no cul de sac conjecture - does anyone have a reference > > for this? > > > > I also have a question to put to anyone who has some ideas as follows: > > > > If the MW immortality is correct the would we not only be immortal but > > also very alone in the end. We know that we observe others die so > > since we always find ourselves in a branch of the multiverse where we > > live on - the conclusion seems inescapable > > > > Can anyone figure a way out of such inevitable eternal loneliness > > because I rather like to chat to my freinds!! > > > > Nick Prince > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > Yahoo! Groups Links > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > > -- > _ > Versatel ADSL Gratis. De voordelen van gratis internet met de > snelheid van ADSL. Zonder abonnementskosten en zonder vast contract. > Je betaalt alleen voor de tijd online. Nu zonder aansluitkosten en > met gratis modem. Bestel snel op www.versatel.nl. > > > > > > > Yahoo! Groups Sponsor ~--> > What would our lives be like without music, dance, and theater? > Donate or volunteer in the arts today at Network for Good! > http://us.click.yahoo.com/pkgkPB/SOnJAA/Zx0JAA/pyIolB/TM > ~-> > > > Yahoo! Groups Links > > <*> To visit your group on the web, go to: > http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Fabric-of-Reality/ > > <*> To unsubscribe from this group, send an email to: > [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > <*> Your use of Yahoo! Groups is subject to: > http://docs.yahoo.com/info/terms/ > > > >
Re: many worlds theory of immortality
I don't beleive QTI implies this at all. It does imply that your
experienced reality will get rather weird, as strange coincidences
will start happening to keep you alive. It also implies that friends
will be temporary, as you will see them all die off eventually - but
many people change lifestyle, locations etc, and make new friends, so
there is no reason to expect be lonely unless you choose it.
Cheers
On Thu, Apr 14, 2005 at 12:57:30AM +0100, Nick Prince wrote:
> My apologies to the group for bringing up questions which may have
> been covererd before but I cannot find an answer to the following
> query and I am new to the group.
>
> I have a question to put to anyone who has some ideas as follows:
>
> If the MW immortality is correct then would we not only be immortal but
> also very alone in the end. We know that we observe others die so
> since we always find ourselves in a branch of the multiverse where we
> live on - the conclusion seems inescapable
>
> Can anyone figure a way out of such inevitable eternal loneliness
> because I rather like to chat to my freinds!!
>
> Nick Prince
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Re: many worlds theory of immortality
Nick Prince writes: > If the MW immortality is correct then would we not only be immortal but > also very alone in the end. We know that we observe others die so > since we always find ourselves in a branch of the multiverse where we > live on - the conclusion seems inescapable > > Can anyone figure a way out of such inevitable eternal loneliness > because I rather like to chat to my freinds!! Yes, it's very simple. Just kill yourself whenever any of your friends die. Then you will only be alive in universes where your friends are alive. I should add that the theory of "quantum immortality" is quite controversial on this list and we had a former member, Jacques Mallah, who made many strong arguments against it. Hal Finney
