Re: Are First Person prime?
1Z wrote: George Levy wrote: A conscious entity is also information. I am assuming here that a conscious entity is essentially "software." George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
David Nyman wrote: Bruno Marchal wrote: All right. (I hope you realize that you are very ambitious, but then that is how we learn). Yes, learning is my aim here. My terminological problem here is that experience and knowledge are usually put in the epistemology instead of ontology. Of course I know that you (and George, perhaps Stephen and Lee) would like to make primitive the first person notion(s) ... or the first persons themselves ? To be sure I have some problem to interpret this. I'll try to nail this here. I take 'ontology' to refer to issues of existence or being, where 'epistemology' refers to knowledge, or 'what and how we know'. When I say that our 'ontology' is manifest, I'm claiming (perhaps a little more cautiously than Descartes): 'I am that which experiences here'. I take these to be an ontological continuum or set of equivalences, not properties: I -experience - here. For reasons of economy, I see no need to postulate any other ontological status. What about all the stuff that appears, subjectively , to be not-me ? If I ignore it, I am not making full use of my only epistemologial resource. If I treat is as 1st-personal as well as third-personal, I am overcomplicating things. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
George Levy wrote: 1Z wrote: George Levy wrote: A conscious entity is also information. I am assuming here that a conscious entity is essentially software. You can assume it of you like. It isn't computationalism, which is the claim that congition is running a programme, not the claim that disemobodied algorithms are conscious. --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
1Z wrote: I'll try to nail this here. I take 'ontology' to refer to issues of existence or being, where 'epistemology' refers to knowledge, or 'what and how we know'. When I say that our 'ontology' is manifest, I'm claiming (perhaps a little more cautiously than Descartes): 'I am that which experiences here'. I take these to be an ontological continuum or set of equivalences, not properties: I -experience - here. For reasons of economy, I see no need to postulate any other ontological status. What about all the stuff that appears, subjectively , to be not-me ? If I ignore it, I am not making full use of my only epistemologial resource. If I treat is as 1st-personal as well as third-personal, I am overcomplicating things. Hi Peter I'd like to be really careful here to avoid getting into some of the same loops that so frustrated Alan on the FOR list! I may well be dead wrong in what I'm claiming, but at least I'd like us both to be clear on precisely what in fact this is. Firstly, my overall enterprise is to arrive at some general description of things that relies on as few explanatory entities as possible. Now, IMO we cannot avoid taking first person into account - I find I can't begin to have an intelligible discussion with anyone who doesn't accept this (not you clearly). From this, if first person is to be a given, the simplest approach is to explore whether, ontologically speaking, we could take it to be the sole given, and my project has been to see where this leads. One of the difficulties has been to pin down the language to distinguish the different meanings associated with the term 'first person', so I've attempted to define certain usages (which I'm happy at any time to abandon for better ones). These are: 1) FP1g - primitive 'global' first person entity or context 2) FP1i - individual person delimited by primitive differentiation (which is agnostic to comp, physics, or anything else at this logical level) 3) FP2 - narrative references to first persons, as in 'David is a first person', an attribution, as opposed to 'David-as-first-person', a unique entity. 4) TP - third person, or structure-read-as-information, as opposed to structure-demarcating-an-entity Later on in the reply to Bruno from which you quote, and in some of the earlier posts, I make the point that starting from such a generalised or undifferentiated first person context we can see that certain sorts of structural differentiation can create delimited zones within the whole. Some of these zones take the form of individual first persons (FP1i). Within each FP1i person so constituted exists a 'set of capabilities' and a 'structural model of the world'. Which part of the FP1i acts as 'perceiver' and which 'perceptual model' is simply an aspect of function-from-structure. It happens to be the former that has the organisation for representing information and self-reporting, so it's the one that gets to enjoy 'experience'. Within the structural model of the world - our only means of representing, and through 'downloading', sharing information with other first persons - there will of course be regions that we variously label 'self' (e.g. 'my arm') or 'other' (e.g. Peter Jones'). The latter, I presume, would be an example of what you call 'stuff that appears, subjectively , to be not-me'. Of course I agree that 'If I ignore it, I am not making full use of my only epistemologial resource'. So, I don't ignore it. However, you go on: 'If I treat is as 1st-personal as well as third-personal, I am overcomplicating things'. My response to this is two-fold. First, of course, it is simply not the case that my representation of 'Peter Jones' is the same as its presumed referent in the world 'Peter Jones'. My assumption is that it is informationally connected with this referent, and to an extent co-varies with it, but it is well for me to remember that such representations are my reponsibility and not yours. But more fundamentally, and this is why I recapitulated my overall project at the outset, the intention is to simplify, not complicate. My representation of 'Peter Jones' is a part of my subjectivity, and it is a part I label 'third person' to distinguish it from 'self', an evolutionarily useful distinction. Peter Jones in the world I take to be another first person entity (FP1i) that derives this status in virtue of being another delimited zone, appropriately structured, within FP1g, the single ontological context. Outside of my subjective model of the world, and that of other first persons, in no sense is Peter Jones in the world 'third person'. Only the *references* to Peter Jones are subjectively categorised as such within individual world-models, and these are FP2 first-person analogs, or third person descriptions of first persons - as distinct from 'instantiated first persons'. Now it seems to me that all of the above has been accomplished without moving outside of a primitive first
Re: Are First Person prime?
Bruno/ George I thought I might offer the following analogy to help to clarify the application and relevance of the distinctions I'm trying to make vis-a-vis the different types of 'first person'. I wouldn't want to push it too far, but I think it has a certain formal similarity to the points I've been trying to establish. Suppose that I am a PC running Word and Excel at the same time. Suppose also that in some way you were able to interrogate me (i.e. the PC) during some cycles when I am running Word, and ask me - who are you?. Given that I could refer only to the data available to me 'as Word', I could only reply: I am Word, of course!. Alternatively, if the interrogation occurred during those cycles when I was running Excel, my response would have to be: I'm Excel. Now this somewhat loose analogy makes the point that we have no recourse but to refer to whatever data is accessible to us in attempting to answer any query whatsoever, including those relating to identity. However, going back to the analogy, an observer might be tempted to inform me, in my incarnations as PC-as-Word and PC-as-Excel, that I should really say: I am a PC running both these applications during different cycles under WindowsXP. So, in this limited domain, 'my' run-time instantiations of 'Word' and 'Excel' play the role of FP1i, and the run-time PC-under-WindowsXP, that of FP1g. The analogs of these 'actors' - their descriptions in my narrative - would be examples of 'FP2' : i.e. a *representation* of a first person, *not* the unique 'runtime' FP1i. Now of course we can say: But the PC itself is more fundamentally an electronics hardware platform with a certain architecture. Fine, then the claim should be In that case 'I' am that platform with that architecture. But suppose we believe that the 'hardware' is an emulation within comp? Well, In that case 'I' am a comp emulation. It's 'I' all the way down, as far as you care to go. Whatever you believe the 'fundamental level' to be, or even if you think there is no such thing, that's what is substantively making the claim to be 'I', in the global sense of 'FP1g'. And, since individual first persons are somewhat in the position of 'Word' and 'Excel', or for that matter 'the PC' in the analogy, each 'FP1i' is making the same claim: I am the context of a local capability and knowledge base that gives me access to such-and-such information. Comp/ QM/ MW etc. exist mutually as something of the nature of a 'superposition' - i.e. whatever exists does so in a unified manner that we can only 'a posteriori' attempt to organise into schemas or 'levels'. Consequently I feel justified in claiming that my ultimate first personhood is founded in the whole not simply some part or level. Further, IMO, this may be the only coherent way to understand the arbitrariness of indexicality - that the individual 'I' is only a delimited point-of-view arising from local structure, not an independent ontological status. Self-identification and the status of 'knower' are alike derived from locally-determined capabilities and information 'in context', somewhat like that of 'Word' or Excel' in the context of the PC in my analogy. Lastly, I suppose that my personal motivation here really stems from my sense that the questions 'why is there anything?' and 'why am I here?' amount to the same thing. That is to say: the 'something' isn't 'out there' - i.e.in the way its analog is represented in the 'knowledge base' - but 'in here'. Does this help at all? David --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
Bruno Marchal wrote: Would it be possible to map your three axiomatic lines replacing "knowable" by "think" and "true" by "exist." ... See my conversation with 1Z (Peter D. Jones). I will define "exist" by " "exist" is true". Then we have: 1 If p thinks then p exists; This does not make sense at all, I prefer to say honestly. It is not the proposition p which thinks, and I don't understand what would it means that a proposition exists. I dont' really see any problem if we think of a conscious entity just like a proposition as information. Proposition p is information which can be either true or false. A conscious entity is also information. In this case, if the information is true then the entity exists. I guess you are perhaps saying here that If a Machine(entity) thinks then it exists. Then OK. But as you know I don't believe the reverse is true. In particular I belief that the square root of two exist (perhaps under the form of a total computable function), but I would not say that the square root of two thinks. The English language is treacherous. we have to be careful when we use the word "exist." I think there are several kinds of existence. In any case to assert that the square root of two exists is assigning to the square root of two an existence independent of any observer, thereby negating the primacy of first person. I do think that the multiverse even got rich but devoid of consciousness (immaterial) comp-branches. 2 If p thinks then it is thinkable that p thinks; All right with the interpretation that "p" is some entity, not a proposition. Perhaps you are identifying machines and propositions? This can be done with the Fi and Wi , and it needs many cautions. Yes I am saying that machines, propositions, databases, programs, and conscious minds are different words for the same thing: information. Thus information can be true, false or unknown. 3 If it is thinkable that p entails q, then if p thinks then q thinks. One of the problem lies with the "it" word as in: "if 'it' is knowable" or "If 'it' is thinkable". What or who is "it?" Here again the English or French languages can be treacherous. 1 If p thinks then p exists; (This maps nicely with Descartes as stated from a third person) 2 If p thinks then p think that p thinks; (This is nice reflective statement essential to consciousness) 3 If p think that p entails q, then if p thinks then q thinks. (The phrase "p entails q" reminds me vaguely of the Anthropic principle. I am not sure what to make of this. My children think???) Your way of talking is a bit confusing as you seem to see by yourself :) The first two statements are relatively easy to understand. The first one is more or less what Descartes said. The second one is a reflective form probably necessary for consciousness. The third statement taken seriously is intringing. If entity p thinks that entity q is necessary for p's existence, then if p thinks then q thinks. In other words all necessary conditions for my own existence form a conscious entity. This is weird. It is as if I had my own personal Personal God or guardian angel. George --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
Le 05-août-06, à 02:07, George Levy a écrit : Bruno Marchal wrote:I think that if you want to make the first person primitive, given that neither you nor me can really define it, you will need at least to axiomatize it in some way. Here is my question. Do you agree that a first person is a knower, and in that case, are you willing to accept the traditional axioms for knowing. That is: 1) If p is knowable then p is true; 2) If p is knowable then it is knowable that p is knowable; 3) if it is knowable that p entails q, then if p is knowable then q is knowable (+ some logical rules). I like where this may be leading This may be the first step to your roadmap. As you know I have been a supporter of first person primitive for a long time. My roadmap was simple. It is a chain rule a la Descartes. I mentionned it before. Let me repost it: 1 I think therefore I am (Descartes) 2 I am therefore the world is (Anthropic principle) 3 The world is therefore the plenitude is. (Principe of sufficient reason: if something is observed to be arbitrary and without any cause, then all other alternatives must also be realized) This is coherent with the theaetetical notion of comp, although you take Anthropic in a very large sense (perhaps too large). 1 I think what I think, therefore I am what I am. (Descartes augmented by defining my consciousness and being as a function of my thought process) 2 I am what I am, therefore the world is what it is. (Anthropic principle augmented by defining the world in more precise terms as a function of exactly who I am - There is a strange echo from the burning bush in Exodus) 3 The world is what it is, therefore the plenitude is. I am not sure this helps. Would it be possible to map your three axiomatic lines replacing knowable by think and true by exist. ... See my conversation with 1Z (Peter D. Jones). I will define exist by exist is true. Then we have: 1 If p thinks then p exists; This does not make sense at all, I prefer to say honestly. It is not the proposition p which thinks, and I don't understand what would it means that a proposition exists. I guess you are perhaps saying here that If a Machine(entity) thinks then it exists. Then OK. But as you know I don't believe the reverse is true. In particular I belief that the square root of two exist (perhaps under the form of a total computable function), but I would not say that the square root of two thinks. I do think that the multiverse even got rich but devoid of consciousness (immaterial) comp-branches. 2 If p thinks then it is thinkable that p thinks; All right with the interpretation that p is some entity, not a proposition. Perhaps you are identifying machines and propositions? This can be done with the Fi and Wi , and it needs many cautions. 3 If it is thinkable that p entails q, then if p thinks then q thinks. 1 If p thinks then p exists; (This maps nicely with Descartes as stated from a third person) 2 If p thinks then p think that p thinks; (This is nice reflective statement essential to consciousness) 3 If p think that p entails q, then if p thinks then q thinks. (The phrase p entails q reminds me vaguely of the Anthropic principle. I am not sure what to make of this. My children think???) Your way of talking is a bit confusing as you seem to see by yourself :) Bruno http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
Hi David,
I think I see, albeit vaguely, what you mean by your distinction, but
it seems to me more and more complex and based on many non trivial
notion objective, context, boudaries . It would be interesting if
George and you were able to converge to a sharable notion of first
person. I am interested because the first person notion plays a key
role, both in the UDA reasoning (the first part of my thesis which
shows that comp forces a reversal between physics and the
bio/psych/theology of numbers) and in the beginning of the partial
but explicit part of (propositional) physics we can already extract
(and compare with quantum logic) when we translate the UDA in purely
number-theoretical tools (the second part of my thesis).
To be sure, David, there are too many implicit assumptions, in your
person distinction in your last posts, which, even in the case you
would make them clear, would still be too precise so that I cannot
currently make the comparison. I will say more in the roadmap asap.
Bruno
Le 05-août-06, à 02:21, David Nyman a écrit :
Hi Bruno
I think before commenting on the axioms you present I would want to
place them within something more inclusive along the following lines:
('FP1' and 'FP2' are used in the senses I have previously given, with
'TP' as 'third person' in the sense of any schema whatsoever for
differentiating the 'directly uttered' FP1 subjective context. The
intention is to present an 'outsideless' approach to reality that
nevertheless allows for the definition of boundaries that delimit
information flow and representation, and consequently 'knowing',
'knowability' and 'knowledge', in the ways characteristic of
'individual first persons'.)
1) Global FP1 (FP1g) = 'subjective context'
2) TP = 'objective content'
3) Individual FP1 (FP1i) : perceiver/ model = FP1g + TP
4) FP2 : shareable model of FP1i = FP1g + TP
Then:
5) If p is knowable then p is TP in context of FP1g
6) If k1 is a knower then k1 is FP1i in context of FP1g
7) If p is known then p is TP in context of FP1i
8) If k2 is knowable then k2 is FP2 in context of FP1g
9) If k2 is known then k2 is FP2 in context of FP1i
10) If k2 is shared then k2 is FP2 in context of more than one FP1i
This further implies that:
11) FP1g is not knowable
12) FP1i is knowable but not shareable
13) FP2 is knowable and shareable
14) FP2 may in fact be known and in fact be shared
In consequence of the foregoing, third person discourse relating to
'first person' necessarily takes place in terms of FP2, but in the
context of a community of FP1i 'knowers'. The content of FP1i is
indescribable but 'shareable' - on the analogy of a shareable
distribution - 'downloadable'. As directly uttered or manifested,
it's sui generis, not 'like anything'. As FP1i, 'I' can narrate my
'experience' - including my own 'self-reporting' - only in
ostensive TP terms that map to the 'shareable distribution'. Hence,
for example, 'red' is indicated by 'pointing' to 'that' - both
for 'me' and in my report to 'you' via the shareable
distribution. In this way we can jointly develop common mappings and
organising schemas within 'shared reality'. This symmetry of
limitation puts us on an equal footing within a community of shareable
discourse.
David
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
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Re: Are First Person prime?
George: I loved your series. Question: Is that all not a consequence of "I think"? My increased Cartesian sentence may be;I think therefore I think I am. Both ways: Cogito, ergo 'ego', and Cogito, ergo' esse'. John M - Original Message - From: George Levy To: everything-list@googlegroups.com Sent: Friday, August 04, 2006 8:07 PM Subject: Re: Are First Person prime? Bruno Marchal wrote: I think that if you want to make the first person primitive, given that neither you nor me can really define it, you will need at least to axiomatize it in some way. Here is my question. Do you agree that a first person is a knower, and in that case, are you willing to accept the traditional axioms for knowing. That is: 1) If p is knowable then p is true; 2) If p is knowable then it is knowable that p is knowable; 3) if it is knowable that p entails q, then if p is knowable then q is knowable (+ some logical rules). Bruno,I like where this may be leading This may be the first step to your roadmap. As you know I have been a supporter of first person primitive for a long time. My roadmap was simple. It is a chain rule a la Descartes. I mentionned it before. Let me repost it: I think therefore I am (Descartes) I am therefore the world is (Anthropic principle) The world is therefore the plenitude is. (Principe of sufficient reason: if something is observed to be arbitrary and without any cause, then all other alternatives must also be realized)Let me make these statements more precise: I think what I think, therefore I am what I am. (Descartes augmented by defining my consciousness and being as a function of my thought process) I am what I am, therefore the world is what it is. (Anthropic principle augmented by defining the world in more precise terms as a function of exactly who I am - There is a strange echo from the burning bush in Exodus) The world is what it is, therefore the plenitude is.Would it be possible to map your three axiomatic lines replacing "knowable" by "think" and "true" by "exist." Then we have: If p thinks then p exists; If p thinks then it is thinkable that p thinks; If it is thinkable that p entails q, then if p thinks then q thinks.The phrase "it is thinkable" is undefined possibly because of third person (it?) inferencing. If we make it squarely first person then we have: If p thinks then p exists; (This maps nicely with Descartes as stated from a third person) If p thinks then p think that p thinks; (This is nice reflective statement essential to consciousness) If p think that p entails q, then if p thinks then q thinks. (The phrase "p entails q" reminds me vaguely of the Anthropic principle. I am not sure what to make of this. My children think???)George Levy --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
Hi Bruno
I think you're right about the complexity. It's because at this stage
I'm just trying to discover whether this is a distinction that any of
us think is true or useful, so I'm deliberately (but perhaps not always
helpfully alas) using a variety of terms in the attempt to get my
meaning across (you will recall the difficulties this caused in the FOR
group). However, even 'vaguely' is a start, so I'll count it as a
success!
To make my own summary, I think my key points are:
1) I take some sort of 'first person', in the direct sense I've termed
'FP1', to be primitive because IMO this establishes our 'manifest'
ontology (i.e. that given to us in direct experience) without either
dualism, or 'emergence' from the third person (which IMO is
incoherent). This amounts to saying that any situation or context
which is able to manifest the direct experience of 'I' is in some
fundamental sense 'I all the way down'.
2) However, I don't by this token believe that such a 'global I' (FP1g)
is a 'person' with individual experiential content. The reason is that
FP1g is undifferentiated, and such differentiation is what IMO
demarcates 'perceivers' and their 'perceptual models'. A conceptual
model might be a network where 'persons' are nodes that co-vary, by
sharing information, with other parts of the network to which they are
energetically connected. These nodes are then what I have termed FP1i.
3) About the details of differentiation schemas (comp, physics,
whatever) I'm deliberately agnostic, because my key point is simply to
propose the emergence of 'persons' from the contrast between a seamless
'context' and its differentiated 'content'. I take such persons to
have a 'dyadic' structure ('perceiver' + 'perceptual model') that is
directly experienced, and elements of such direct experience are also
what we call 'third person' when 'read' as information. I do, as you
know, hold certain opinions about the equivalence properties of
experience, but they are not IMO critical in establishing this more
fundamental point.
4) A consequence of the foregoing is that such experiential content can
be 'experienced' (or *is* experience) but not 'known', in the sense of
'if p is true'. This is because experience is 'incorrigible', and
consequently is not open to falsification. 'Knowing' is then an
emergent aspect of the 'third' person - experience read as information.
A key point is that this applies equally to the 'self' as it does to
others, since both are in the same position vis-a-vis the 'shareable
knowledge base' (SKB) that IMO is the basis of 'consensual reality'.
My point here is that the relation of both 'self' and 'others' to
'knowledge' consists of indicating and manipulating parts of the SKB.
'Experience' is the 'means whereby' we grasp this communicable base,
and is consequently itself not communicable.
5) Finally, I think that many conceptual problems come from confusing
the SKB with the referents from which it derives. In 'everyday life'
we tend to act from the belief that the world *itself* is 'third
person' - because its analogs in the SKB are read in that way.
I think this summarises the distinctions I'm trying to make, in a non
rigorous way. If you or George feel inclined to take it further that
would be great, but I guess it would depend on whether, as I've said,
this seems to add anything useful to the enterprise. I could certainly
use some help in any attempt to axiomatise the above.
David
Bruno Marchal wrote:
Hi David,
I think I see, albeit vaguely, what you mean by your distinction, but
it seems to me more and more complex and based on many non trivial
notion objective, context, boudaries . It would be interesting if
George and you were able to converge to a sharable notion of first
person. I am interested because the first person notion plays a key
role, both in the UDA reasoning (the first part of my thesis which
shows that comp forces a reversal between physics and the
bio/psych/theology of numbers) and in the beginning of the partial
but explicit part of (propositional) physics we can already extract
(and compare with quantum logic) when we translate the UDA in purely
number-theoretical tools (the second part of my thesis).
To be sure, David, there are too many implicit assumptions, in your
person distinction in your last posts, which, even in the case you
would make them clear, would still be too precise so that I cannot
currently make the comparison. I will say more in the roadmap asap.
Bruno
Le 05-août-06, à 02:21, David Nyman a écrit :
Hi Bruno
I think before commenting on the axioms you present I would want to
place them within something more inclusive along the following lines:
('FP1' and 'FP2' are used in the senses I have previously given, with
'TP' as 'third person' in the sense of any schema whatsoever for
differentiating the 'directly uttered' FP1 subjective context. The
intention is to present an 'outsideless' approach to
Re: Are First Person prime?
Hi Bruno I think before commenting on the axioms you present I would want to place them within something more inclusive along the lines of: 1) FP1 = context = 'subjectivity' 2) TP = content = 'objectivity' 3) FP2 = FP1 + TP Then: 4) If p is knowable then p is TP in context of FP1 5) If k is a knower then k is FP2 in context of FP1 6) If n is known then n is TP in context of FP2 This further implies that: 7) FP2 is knowable 8) FP2 may be known 9) FP1 is not knowable 'FP1' and 'FP2' are used in the senses I have previously given, with 'TP' as 'third person' in the sense of any schema whatsoever for differentiating the 'directly uttered' FP1 subjective context. The intention is to present an 'outsideless' approach to reality that nevertheless allows for the definition of boundaries that delimit information flow and representation, and consequently 'knowing', 'knowability' and 'knowledge', in the ways characteristic of 'individual first persons'. David Bruno Marchal wrote: Hi David (Nyman), Let me sum up and conclude (and then we can discuss more details and technical stuff elsewhere for example on the everything-list). I think we agree on the importance of the first person points of view. I think David Deutsch and Everett would agree there. Now, and this is a methological remark, I think that if you want to make the first person primitive, given that neither you nor me can really define it, you will need at least to axiomatize it in some way. Here is my question. Do you agree that a first person is a knower, and in that case, are you willing to accept the traditional axioms for knowing. That is: 1) If p is knowable then p is true; 2) If p is knowable then it is knowable that p is knowable; 3) if it is knowable that p entails q, then if p is knowable then q is knowable (+ some logical rules). In this case or with other axioms, I would be able to make sense of your enterprise. Informally, I can understand your feeling to make the first person primitive (indeed we address any third person discourse eventually from a first person point of view, but from this, you should not infer the basic scientific discourse needs to rely on a first person discourse, as opposed to some third person presentation of an axiomatic describing the notion of first person (like we *do* here and now btw). Godel knew already that formal provability does not obey to the axiom above, so that formal provability cannot be used without nuances for modeling a notion of knowledge, but by defining knowledge by provable-and-true, like in Plato's Theaetetus, we *are* led to such a knowledge notion which already can explain why it is not definable by the machine, justifying your feeling of primtiveness and irreducibility feeling about it. More later perhaps because I'm busy this week. Bruno Le 31-juil.-06, à 19:03, David Nyman a écrit : --- In [EMAIL PROTECTED], Bruno Marchal [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: At this stage you should try to be specific about the reasons why an hardware independent isomorphism cannot exist, or perhaps you are just saying that first person feeling would not be genuine if they were not related to some 'physical reality' in which case I could agree I feel we're getting quite close to any genuine difference between us on these issues, so I'll try my best to clarify. I still believe there are some vocabulary problems, so first I'll have another go at pinning these down (sorry, but please be patient!). One thing that strikes me is that there are (at least) two distinctly different usages of the term `first person': `First person 1' (FP1) is used when I mean to indicate my own internal centred perspective, `looking out', as it were, on the world. It is the word `I' exclusively as used reflexively by a first person about him/ herself. As such, it can't be reported in third person narrative, only directly *uttered* by some FP1-centred individual. I will call it 'FP1-I'. `First person 2' (FP2) is used to describe a point-of-view within a third person narrative. For example: David thought about the problem and realised - I am confused again! The narrative contains the *description* of a first person characterised as `David', whose point-of-view we would call a `first person position'. The use of `I' here is understood to be this *narrative* David's reference to himself. As such it's 'FP2-I' Throughout these discussions, when I have used terms such as `first person, `personal, or `presence' to describe the context within which `individual first persons' IMO could arise, I have meant the sense given in FP1. The intuition that I have is that even when you `strip away' the structuring that provides the perceptual mechanism and its experiential content, what remains must be an FP1-type context - the `Big `I', if you like, the `arena' within which all else takes place. And this 'Big I' could
Re: Are First Person prime?
Hi Bruno
I think before commenting on the axioms you present I would want to
place them within something more inclusive along the following lines:
('FP1' and 'FP2' are used in the senses I have previously given, with
'TP' as 'third person' in the sense of any schema whatsoever for
differentiating the 'directly uttered' FP1 subjective context. The
intention is to present an 'outsideless' approach to reality that
nevertheless allows for the definition of boundaries that delimit
information flow and representation, and consequently 'knowing',
'knowability' and 'knowledge', in the ways characteristic of
'individual first persons'.)
1) Global FP1 (FP1g) = 'subjective context'
2) TP = 'objective content'
3) Individual FP1 (FP1i) = FP1g + TP (perceiver/ perceptual model)
4) FP2 = FP1g + TP = descriptive representation of 3)
Then:
5) If p is knowable then p is TP in context of FP1g
6) If k is a knower then k is FP1i in context of FP1g
7) If p is known then p is TP in context of FP1i
8) If k is known then k is FP2 in context of FP1i
This further implies that:
9) FP2 is knowable
10) FP2 may in fact be known
11) FP1g is not knowable
12) FP1i is not knowable
David
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Re: Are First Person prime?
Bruno Marchal wrote: I think that if you want to make the first person primitive, given that neither you nor me can really define it, you will need at least to axiomatize it in some way. Here is my question. Do you agree that a first person is a knower, and in that case, are you willing to accept the traditional axioms for knowing. That is: 1) If p is knowable then p is true; 2) If p is knowable then it is knowable that p is knowable; 3) if it is knowable that p entails q, then if p is knowable then q is knowable (+ some logical rules). Bruno, I like where this may be leading This may be the first step to your roadmap. As you know I have been a supporter of first person primitive for a long time. My roadmap was simple. It is a chain rule a la Descartes. I mentionned it before. Let me repost it: I think therefore I am (Descartes) I am therefore the world is (Anthropic principle) The world is therefore the plenitude is. (Principe of sufficient reason: if something is observed to be arbitrary and without any cause, then all other alternatives must also be realized) Let me make these statements more precise: I think what I think, therefore I am what I am. (Descartes augmented by defining my consciousness and being as a function of my thought process) I am what I am, therefore the world is what it is. (Anthropic principle augmented by defining the world in more precise terms as a function of exactly who I am - There is a strange echo from the burning bush in Exodus) The world is what it is, therefore the plenitude is. Would it be possible to map your three axiomatic lines replacing "knowable" by "think" and "true" by "exist." Then we have: If p thinks then p exists; If p thinks then it is thinkable that p thinks; If it is thinkable that p entails q, then if p thinks then q thinks. The phrase "it is thinkable" is undefined possibly because of third person (it?) inferencing. If we make it squarely first person then we have: If p thinks then p exists; (This maps nicely with Descartes as stated from a third person) If p thinks then p think that p thinks; (This is nice reflective statement essential to consciousness) If p think that p entails q, then if p thinks then q thinks. (The phrase "p entails q" reminds me vaguely of the Anthropic principle. I am not sure what to make of this. My children think???) George Levy --~--~-~--~~~---~--~~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups Everything List group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~--~~~~--~~--~--~---
Re: Are First Person prime?
Hi Bruno
I think before commenting on the axioms you present I would want to
place them within something more inclusive along the following lines:
('FP1' and 'FP2' are used in the senses I have previously given, with
'TP' as 'third person' in the sense of any schema whatsoever for
differentiating the 'directly uttered' FP1 subjective context. The
intention is to present an 'outsideless' approach to reality that
nevertheless allows for the definition of boundaries that delimit
information flow and representation, and consequently 'knowing',
'knowability' and 'knowledge', in the ways characteristic of
'individual first persons'.)
1) Global FP1 (FP1g) = 'subjective context'
2) TP = 'objective content'
3) Individual FP1 (FP1i) : perceiver/ model = FP1g + TP
4) FP2 : shareable model of FP1i = FP1g + TP
Then:
5) If p is knowable then p is TP in context of FP1g
6) If k1 is a knower then k1 is FP1i in context of FP1g
7) If p is known then p is TP in context of FP1i
8) If k2 is knowable then k2 is FP2 in context of FP1g
9) If k2 is known then k2 is FP2 in context of FP1i
10) If k2 is shared then k2 is FP2 in context of more than one FP1i
This further implies that:
11) FP1g is not knowable
12) FP1i is knowable but not shareable
13) FP2 is knowable and shareable
14) FP2 may in fact be known and in fact be shared
In consequence of the foregoing, third person discourse relating to
'first person' necessarily takes place in terms of FP2, but in the
context of a community of FP1i 'knowers'. The content of FP1i is
indescribable but 'shareable' - on the analogy of a shareable
distribution - 'downloadable'. As directly uttered or manifested,
it's sui generis, not 'like anything'. As FP1i, 'I' can narrate my
'experience' - including my own 'self-reporting' - only in
ostensive TP terms that map to the 'shareable distribution'. Hence,
for example, 'red' is indicated by 'pointing' to 'that' - both
for 'me' and in my report to 'you' via the shareable
distribution. In this way we can jointly develop common mappings and
organising schemas within 'shared reality'. This symmetry of
limitation puts us on an equal footing within a community of shareable
discourse.
David
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