Re: Article: The Parallel Universes of David Deutsch

2001-11-13 Thread Marchal

Gordon wrote:

>Even if your right Physics found that Comp and the Physical world where
>related through the Philosophy of the Physical hence Objects.
>I agree that our idea of Reality are hard to prove but that mite be just
>down to or Language and nothing to do with the rest of Natures rules.
>
>Before most thought that at the Quantum level it wasn't real.At that
>time Classical Physics had the Vector Potential which most took as not
>real just a math Object in the mind however AB EFFECT should that not
>only on the Quantum level it's real effect but it kicks back, now in our
>words may make this non real again but Nature has a better Language than
>us.Recently Physicist who thought that the Wave was just something of
>Math in there head have said "I have to go pack it and think again about
>how I see the world" this was after seeing the IBM stuff on
>Scan-Tunneling Microscope Quantum corral.We are along way from the
>finished Physical Program yet!


You talk like if Nature necessarily exists in some primary sense, and
that math are just tools for the mind.
I am quite realist about numbers. Numbers kicks back in their own way.

David Deutsch defends such type of number realism. Actually FOR
endorses the three points which defined what I called comp.

And I am just saying  look, if comp is taken seriously enough we 
*have* to derive 'quantum computation' from what machines can possibly
expect from their possible consistent computational histories.
So I point on some work which *needs* to be done (and btw on some modest
parts which has been done!).
And, as gift, we get light on the mind body problem but also on the
origin of physical laws.

About the "finished Physical Program" I agree with you, both empirists
and hard theoreticists are just nibbling the reality beast.
I wouldn't be so astonished that comp makes possible to prove the
impossibility of any unifying physical toes like if the set of
elementary entities was not closed for diagonalisation: give me your
particuls and I will show you a new one:) That is, although comp is 
ontologically "anti-empirical", it is almost quite sure that comp
entails that some part of numberland can only be known by experimentation.
(both from third and first person point of view).
There will be forever machines saying as Rabi "who asks for that?"

Would it be so astonishing for you that the fabric of reality relies
eventually on cohering sheafs of deep and sharable "dreams" (i.e. some 
computations viewed from abstract (platonic) machines)?


Bruno




Re: Article: The Parallel Universes of David Deutsch

2001-11-09 Thread Marchal

Brett Hall wrote:

>
>There is a difference between saying "The existence of the physical world 
>is certain (i.e: we can prove it)" and "I believe that the physical world 
>exists".
>This is analagous to our trust in the laws of physics we can hold the 
>belief that "Quantum Theory is a true description of reality" - without 
>being absolutely certain that it is infallible. It's for this reason we 
>don't 'stay in bed' as you say. A fallibalist does not say "I can prove 
>Physical Reality doesn't exist" -  the fallibalist has the belief that we 
>can be skeptical about everything. I think a pretty good starting point is 
>to assume that physical reality exists and obeys physical laws (I think 
>this is different to the philosophy of Bruno) - but I'm not about to say 
>that my opinion in this matter is a demonstrable certainty.
>  - Original Message - 
>  From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] 
>  [Gordon]Just to add it still does not get away from the Non-physical at
>  least the Physical has something to start with,where in the past when
>  Philosophy and old QT talk of the non-physical it got us know where and
>  if we took it totally nothing would have got done instead we believe in
>  the Fantasy and things got done and later discovered Comp through this
>  Physical theory so I thing right or wrong it has a lot more to tell us
>  then just saying it not there and staying in bed.


The problem is the ambiguity of the expression "physical reality exists 
and obeys physical laws".

I for sure bet physical reality exists and obeys physical laws.

At least in *some* sense for I wouldn't try to extract that "physical
reality (including the laws)" from number's psychology if I was not 
believing in those physical reality-laws first.

I just ask where those physical laws (and sensations) come from, and 
I give an argument (UDA) showing that: 
  IF it exist a level such that  *I* remain invariant
through a digitalisable functional substitution (+ Church Thesis, + 
a minimal amount of arithmetical platonism = comp), 
  THEN, in short, the physical laws are *necessarily* given by a sort 
of modal summation on arithmetical self consistent extensions.
 
In a second step thanks to recursion theory and provability logic (two
children of Post Godel Turing ...), which are really the modern science 
of "I", I extract the logical structure of the UM possible physical 
propositions. Sometimes I just say that I interview some Sound
Universal Machine (SUM) asking her about those consistent extensions.
It is a purely Arithmetical version of UDA. My thesis = UDA + AUDA.
UDA and AUDA can be understood separately, but both are more
persuasive taken together. AUDA needs familiarity with logic.

The future should show if we get the Quantum or Something Else, and 
the future should confirm the quantum or something else.
I mean in the long run comp could be falsifiate, giving the wrong
mass for some bosons. Well, for now I got just a promising (imo)
arithmetical orthologic. It is still an open question if a
Universal Quantum Machines lives there. What is nice is that such
question can be at least precisely formulate.
(Gordon, I'm not staying in bed! :)

Bruno

UDA links: http://www.escribe.com/science/theory/m3044.html



 




Re: Article: The Parallel Universes of David Deutsch

2001-11-08 Thread Marchal

Gordon wrote:


>> You know where I am coming from? Where I am coming from?
>> 
>[Gordon]How do you prove the Non Physical?


What is the link? Are you suspecting I got some Natural
Number on the head after which I became a true believer
in Numberland?

Mmh... Brett Hall is right things are the other way round.
I guess I got no apple on the head.
I am somehow skeptical about any "concrete things" 
ever since (!).

People believe glass of bear exists because they have drunk
those glass and that's concrete.

I think it could appear concrete only because their brain
makes the necessary abstraction unconsciously and 
instinctively (automatically).

But, I would like to say that the question "what is *really*
a glass of bear" leads you quickly to abstractions, from 
number to Hilbert Spaces and well beyond !

Even without mentionning the possible relative taste of
the bear :o)

That's why I doubt less about numbers than about mars,
quark and other boojum. I aknowledge the persistence of
those boojum and to the ingenious invariant patterns
observers and thinkers extracts out of it, but I expect
an explanation of those things in term of arithmetical
relation.

Well the point is that I do not prove the Non Physical.
Nobody has proved the Physical either. 

But I do show that with comp we don't need to postulate
a substancial physical for explaining talks on stable 
appearances in immaterial machine's public discourses.
The advantage of comp is that it explains also stable 
complains in machine's private diaries.


>In Nature has shown us that two different Systems of Rules can
>lead to the same Features,and the Multiverse as a whole certainly has a
>Multivalents about it.

I guess so.


Bruno




Re: Article: The Parallel Universes of David Deutsch

2001-11-07 Thread Marchal

Gordon wrote:


>[Gordon]I think what I was getting at was how Humans get this not Comp
>however I know where you are coming from but I think you have put your
>self into a corner because it is hard to prove your right?


You know where I am coming from? Where I am coming from?

Also, I don't feel myself into a corner but the mathematical questions I
raise seems hard to my poor brain );


>[Gordon]If it helps there is the idea of the Formless Physical that
>carry Active information in order to form events.I am not against your
>idea totally in fact I am trying to help expand it for it may give
>insight to either MWI or yours or something else?


Yeah. Let us try trusting the ideas. We can always put them
in a trash later!



>[Gordon]So what is Threeness?


A Mystery between Twoness and Fourness which can be apparently
instanciated in many histories, and handled in many ways
by many sort of UMs. (Universal Machines).


>[Gordon]It may be true but this line of Argument is not getting any
>where,now that why I follow a different path that is not just comp.Ans
>who knows it may then lead to Yours idea and perhaps prove it or it may
>go somewhere else.


Here I disagree because "just comp" entails the reversal so that it
is not really a matter of choice "once comp". (Cf UDA, ...).


>[Gordon]I would say it is we Humans who apply Bivalent Logic.It is hard
>to tell where our maps end and Reality begins?


I guess I am only a naive optimist platonist, but I would like to bet 
that all polite extraterrestrial use bivalent logic in their scientific
communication.

What definitely convinces me of the interest and importance of
NON classical logics has been most of the time by the richness of their
classical models. (I hope (extra)terrestrials does not apply classical
logic in their private life!).

Our maps defined accessible orthogonal realities. 


>> [Gordon]True I do say this but I say this because I think we are not 
>gods and we dont know everything we are limited and so is the way we look
>at the 
>world round us that why we Test the world aroud us inorder to find things 
>we dont know Plato would have it the other way round.But If I say who true 
>and false then I am gulity of Bivalent mask I place on Reality too :)


It is because we are limited that we can go through the key hole
and contemplate or bet on greater part of the unnameable spectacle.

The sound universal machine does not always say true or false
but sometimes remains silent.   (cf Turing, Post, Godel, ...)


Bruno