Re: Astigmatism Example

2013-04-05 Thread Bruno Marchal


On 03 Apr 2013, at 23:53, Jesse Mazer wrote:




On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 2:42 PM, Craig Weinberg  
whatsons...@gmail.com wrote:


In a universe of functionalism or comp, I would expect that this  
would never happen, as my brain should always prioritize the  
information made available by any eye that is open over that of an  
eye which is closed.


I don't think the function in functionalism is supposed to refer  
to utility or purpose. Functionalism as I understand it just refers  
to the idea that if you replaced each part of the brain with a  
functionally identical part, meaning that its input/output  
relationship is the same as the original part, then this will result  
in no change in conscious experience, regardless of the material  
details of how the part produces this input/output relation (a  
miniature version of the Chinese room thought experiment could  
work, for example). It's also self-evident that there should be no  
behavioral change, *if* we assume the reductionist idea that the  
large-scale behavior of any physical system is determined by the  
rules governing the behavior and interactions of each of its  
component parts (you would probably dispute this, but the point is  
just that this seems to be one of the assumptions of  
'functionalism', and of course almost all modern scientific theories  
of systems composed of multiple parts work with this assumption).


For example, if you have a tumor which is altering your  
consciousness and disrupting some other abilities like speech, that  
is obviously not serving any useful function, but functionalism  
wouldn't claim it should, it would just say that if you replaced the  
tumor with an artificial device that affected the surrounding  
neurons in exactly the same way, the affected patient wouldn't  
notice any subjective difference (likewise with more useful parts of  
the brain, of course).


There may of course be different meanings that philosophers have  
assigned to the term functionalism, but I think this is one, and  
I'm pretty sure it's part of what COMP is taken to mean on this  
list.


You are right. Functionalism means that we can substitute a part with  
functionally equivalent part. Comp, in the weak sense I use it, means  
that functionalism occurs at some description level. Then we can  
explain that a machine cannot know for sure its own substitution  
level, but it can bet on it, and the physics around him can give some  
indication. If the comp physics gives exactly the usual quantum  
mechanics, it could be an evidence that pour substitution level is  
given by the Heisenberg uncertainty relations. Note that this is not  
the level needed to survive, but to survive in the exact same mental  
state. People will accept much higher level brain substitution,  
because they will be cheaper, and they will not mind so much loosing  
some memories or even personality treats.


Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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Re: Astigmatism Example

2013-04-03 Thread Richard Ruquist
I am a leftist astigmatic.

But you raise an interesting point that I believe supports a mind/brain
duality.
In a universe of functionalism or comp, I would expect that this would
never happen, as my brain should always prioritize the information made
available by any eye that is open over that of an eye which is closed. I
agree.

However, in a mind/brain dualism, the mind may be due to comp and the brain
 due to evolution of physical biological organisms, influenced by the mind
comp but not controlled by the mind comp. (However, below the substitution
level the universal mind comp controls all particle interactions and such a
duality does not exist.) So in a mind/brain duality, the prioritization you
mention cannot exist if it has not physically evolved.

In my model, all physical particles and energy are created by comp in the
big bang and are conserved thereafter, subject to the laws and constants of
nature that also come from comp. Consciousness is a property of the
universal mind and also manifests in biological organisms as a mind
consciousness when the complexity of the organism exceeds the 10^120 bit comp
power limit derived from the Bekenstein bound of the universe.
Richard



On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 2:42 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:

 If any of you have a moderate astigmatism, you may have observed this - if
 not, you'll have to take my word for it.

 If I close my weak eye*, I find that after a few seconds, the image from
 the strong eye, even though it is closed, tries to creep into my visual
 field. It is not difficult at this point to 'look through' the eye that is
 closed (seeing phosphenes or just darkness). Reversing the test, with my
 weak eye closed, there is no creeping effect and it is not really possible
 for me to look through the eye that is closed.

 In a universe of functionalism or comp, I would expect that this would
 never happen, as my brain should always prioritize the information made
 available by any eye that is open over that of an eye which is closed. The
 fact that closing the weak eye instead does not produce the creeping image
 effect demonstrates that there is no functional purpose which could be
 served by favoring the strong eye when it is the one which is closed.

 In some people astigmatism progresses until the develop a wandering eye.
 The physicalist can claim victory over the functionalist here in that the
 atrophy of nerve connections to the weak eye and the relative hypertrophy
 of the nerve connections to the strong eye clearly dominate the functional
 considerations of the visual mechanism. The creeping image effect also is
 not immediate, so that it is not the case that the hardware is incapable of
 maintaining clear vision through the weak eye, it is obviously the inertia
 of purely physical-perceptual processes which is dragging the function down.

 Between the physical and the perceptual, which one is driving? It would
 seem that physics would win here, because the creeping image is not the
 more aesthetically rich image - however, this is not a case where the
 aesthetics are determined only from the top down. Remember that both eyes
 are exposed to the same light. The retinas receive the same total number of
 photons. The strong eye develops more robust connections to it not because
 it has more light, but because the shape of the eye is such that the cells
 (sub-personal agents) of the retina are able to make more sense out of the
 better focused light.

 There are not more signals being generated, but clearer signals which
 carry farther up the ladder from sub-personal optical detection to personal
 visual sensation. The nerve growth follows the coherence of visual
 consciousness, not a just a photological nutrient supply. The eye becomes
 stronger because the brain population is prioritizing higher sensitivity,
 not because neurons are being pushed around by blind ionic concentration
 gradients. That sensory priority is the cause of the neurological
 investment in that eye's sensitivity, so that it is perceptual inertia
 which drives the creeping image effect not just biological morphology.

 *which is my left eye. Curious if any of you left brainy types have an
 astigmatism in the right eye.

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Re: Astigmatism Example

2013-04-03 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Wednesday, April 3, 2013 3:10:29 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:

 I am a leftist astigmatic.

 But you raise an interesting point that I believe supports a mind/brain 
 duality.
 In a universe of functionalism or comp, I would expect that this would 
 never happen, as my brain should always prioritize the information made 
 available by any eye that is open over that of an eye which is closed. I 
 agree.
  
 However, in a mind/brain dualism, the mind may be due to comp and the 
 brain  due to evolution of physical biological organisms, influenced by the 
 mind comp but not controlled by the mind comp. (However, below the 
 substitution level the universal mind comp controls all particle 
 interactions and such a duality does not exist.) So in a mind/brain 
 duality, the prioritization you mention cannot exist if it has not 
 physically evolved.

 In my model, all physical particles and energy are created by comp in the 
 big bang and are conserved thereafter, subject to the laws and constants of 
 nature that also come from comp. Consciousness is a property of the 
 universal mind and also manifests in biological organisms as a mind 
 consciousness when the complexity of the organism exceeds the 10^120 bit comp 
 power limit derived from the Bekenstein bound of the universe.


My view is similar to what you describe as far as mind-brain dualism 
proscribing a different evolution of the agendas of mind and the 
consequences of brain conditions. I think that in a complex organism there 
is feedback on multiple levels - the mind and brain influence each other 
constantly, and, in my view, are as the head and tail of the Ouroboros 
serpent - opposite ends of the same unbroken continuum. 

The problem that I have with what you propose, as I understand it is 
twofold:

The presentation problem. If the universal mind is comp, why does the 
universe have any aesthetic content at all? Why does comp create formal 
localizations as a physical phenomenon when it could use the digital 
localizations that it already consists of. 

The de-presentation problem. What would be the point of physical particles 
and energy being created by comp if there could be nothing able to detect 
them until some organism exceeds the 10^120 bit comp power limit? You are 
looking at a universe which is almost completely undetectable except for in 
the processing of a few organisms scattered on planets after billions of 
years of silent darkness.

If you run it the other way, with the Universal Mind as the Universal 
Experience instead, then complexity becomes a symptom of elaborated 
qualities of that experience rather than a cause of experience itself 
appearing into an unconscious world of matter. Our own quality of 
consciousness is not just a mind full of practical or logical thoughts, but 
also of feelings, images, intuitions, visions, etc. Our world has never 
been unconscious or conscious like us, but is rather filled with every sort 
of in-between semi-conscious, from primate to mammal, reptile, etc.. The 
transition to inorganic matter is both smooth and sudden, as phenomena like 
viruses and crystals bridge the gap but also on another level, leave no 
obvious link.

From the Universal Experience, comp is derived as a second order strategy 
to manage the interaction between sub-experiences, and that interaction is 
what we perceive as physics. This way, representation arises naturally 
through any multiplicity of presentations, and both the presentation 
problem and de-presentation problems are resolved. Comp exists to serve 
sensory presence, since sensory presence cannot plausibly serve comp in any 
way. The universe is never silent and unconscious, but is always an 
experience defined by whatever participants are available, regardless of 
the complexity. The Universal Experience, I suggest, has the property of 
conserving appearances of separateness between different kinds of 
sub-experiences, and this accounts for the mistaken impression that 
non-human experiences are objectively and absolutely unconscious - they are 
'as if unconscious' relative to our local realism, but that is necessary to 
insulate our experience from an implosion of significance.

Thanks,
Craig

Richard



 On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 2:42 PM, Craig Weinberg 
 whats...@gmail.comjavascript:
  wrote:

 If any of you have a moderate astigmatism, you may have observed this - 
 if not, you'll have to take my word for it.

 If I close my weak eye*, I find that after a few seconds, the image from 
 the strong eye, even though it is closed, tries to creep into my visual 
 field. It is not difficult at this point to 'look through' the eye that is 
 closed (seeing phosphenes or just darkness). Reversing the test, with my 
 weak eye closed, there is no creeping effect and it is not really possible 
 for me to look through the eye that is closed.

 In a universe of functionalism or comp, I would expect that this would 
 never happen, as my brain should always prioritize 

Re: Astigmatism Example

2013-04-03 Thread Richard Ruquist
My google account is forcing me to reply here rather than interspersed,
which is very inconvenient. But I will try.

1. As far as I know the universal mind is not aesthetic
2. Not sure what your 2nd question means
3. The universe has existed for 13.82 ly with little or no consciousness to
detect it unless you consider a universal consciousness. I do not see how
that is a criticism. Seems to be a fact of nature.
4.I cannot run the other way with my model. That's your model


On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 5:01 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:



 On Wednesday, April 3, 2013 3:10:29 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:

 I am a leftist astigmatic.

 But you raise an interesting point that I believe supports a mind/brain
 duality.
 In a universe of functionalism or comp, I would expect that this would
 never happen, as my brain should always prioritize the information made
 available by any eye that is open over that of an eye which is closed. I
 agree.

 However, in a mind/brain dualism, the mind may be due to comp and the
 brain  due to evolution of physical biological organisms, influenced by the
 mind comp but not controlled by the mind comp. (However, below the
 substitution level the universal mind comp controls all particle
 interactions and such a duality does not exist.) So in a mind/brain
 duality, the prioritization you mention cannot exist if it has not
 physically evolved.

 In my model, all physical particles and energy are created by comp in the
 big bang and are conserved thereafter, subject to the laws and constants of
 nature that also come from comp. Consciousness is a property of the
 universal mind and also manifests in biological organisms as a mind
 consciousness when the complexity of the organism exceeds the 10^120 bit comp
 power limit derived from the Bekenstein bound of the universe.


 My view is similar to what you describe as far as mind-brain dualism
 proscribing a different evolution of the agendas of mind and the
 consequences of brain conditions. I think that in a complex organism there
 is feedback on multiple levels - the mind and brain influence each other
 constantly, and, in my view, are as the head and tail of the Ouroboros
 serpent - opposite ends of the same unbroken continuum.

 The problem that I have with what you propose, as I understand it is
 twofold:

 The presentation problem. If the universal mind is comp, why does the
 universe have any aesthetic content at all? Why does comp create formal
 localizations as a physical phenomenon when it could use the digital
 localizations that it already consists of.

 The de-presentation problem. What would be the point of physical particles
 and energy being created by comp if there could be nothing able to detect
 them until some organism exceeds the 10^120 bit comp power limit? You are
 looking at a universe which is almost completely undetectable except for in
 the processing of a few organisms scattered on planets after billions of
 years of silent darkness.

 If you run it the other way, with the Universal Mind as the Universal
 Experience instead, then complexity becomes a symptom of elaborated
 qualities of that experience rather than a cause of experience itself
 appearing into an unconscious world of matter. Our own quality of
 consciousness is not just a mind full of practical or logical thoughts, but
 also of feelings, images, intuitions, visions, etc. Our world has never
 been unconscious or conscious like us, but is rather filled with every sort
 of in-between semi-conscious, from primate to mammal, reptile, etc.. The
 transition to inorganic matter is both smooth and sudden, as phenomena like
 viruses and crystals bridge the gap but also on another level, leave no
 obvious link.

 From the Universal Experience, comp is derived as a second order strategy
 to manage the interaction between sub-experiences, and that interaction is
 what we perceive as physics. This way, representation arises naturally
 through any multiplicity of presentations, and both the presentation
 problem and de-presentation problems are resolved. Comp exists to serve
 sensory presence, since sensory presence cannot plausibly serve comp in any
 way. The universe is never silent and unconscious, but is always an
 experience defined by whatever participants are available, regardless of
 the complexity. The Universal Experience, I suggest, has the property of
 conserving appearances of separateness between different kinds of
 sub-experiences, and this accounts for the mistaken impression that
 non-human experiences are objectively and absolutely unconscious - they are
 'as if unconscious' relative to our local realism, but that is necessary to
 insulate our experience from an implosion of significance.

 Thanks,
 Craig

 Richard



 On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 2:42 PM, Craig Weinberg whats...@gmail.comwrote:

 If any of you have a moderate astigmatism, you may have observed this -
 if not, you'll have to take my word for it.

 If I close my weak 

Re: Astigmatism Example

2013-04-03 Thread Jesse Mazer
On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 2:42 PM, Craig Weinberg whatsons...@gmail.comwrote:


 In a universe of functionalism or comp, I would expect that this would
 never happen, as my brain should always prioritize the information made
 available by any eye that is open over that of an eye which is closed.


I don't think the function in functionalism is supposed to refer to
utility or purpose. Functionalism as I understand it just refers to the
idea that if you replaced each part of the brain with a functionally
identical part, meaning that its input/output relationship is the same as
the original part, then this will result in no change in conscious
experience, regardless of the material details of how the part produces
this input/output relation (a miniature version of the Chinese room
thought experiment could work, for example). It's also self-evident that
there should be no behavioral change, *if* we assume the reductionist idea
that the large-scale behavior of any physical system is determined by the
rules governing the behavior and interactions of each of its component
parts (you would probably dispute this, but the point is just that this
seems to be one of the assumptions of 'functionalism', and of course almost
all modern scientific theories of systems composed of multiple parts work
with this assumption).

For example, if you have a tumor which is altering your consciousness and
disrupting some other abilities like speech, that is obviously not serving
any useful function, but functionalism wouldn't claim it should, it would
just say that if you replaced the tumor with an artificial device that
affected the surrounding neurons in exactly the same way, the affected
patient wouldn't notice any subjective difference (likewise with more
useful parts of the brain, of course).

There may of course be different meanings that philosophers have assigned
to the term functionalism, but I think this is one, and I'm pretty sure
it's part of what COMP is taken to mean on this list.

Jesse

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Re: Astigmatism Example

2013-04-03 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Wednesday, April 3, 2013 5:30:44 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:

 My google account is forcing me to reply here rather than interspersed, 
 which is very inconvenient. But I will try.

 1. As far as I know the universal mind is not aesthetic


Exactly, which is why it can't be responsible for any aesthetic agenda, and 
as far as I can tell, consciousness is a purely aesthetic agenda. No mind 
(or logic, or set of computations) can be responsible for consciousness.
 

 2. Not sure what your 2nd question means
 3. The universe has existed for 13.82 ly with little or no consciousness 
 to detect it unless you consider a universal consciousness.


Little to no consciousness is what I am saying is a bad assumption. Any 
given non-human experience may have little or no consciousness which we 
relate to as human beings, but just as comp (especially Bruno's 
implementation of comp) points to a vast infinity of unfamiliar and 
invisible perfections, my expectation is that the universe without human 
beings is still overflowing with experience. This is a different kind of 
panexperientialism, not one which says that a planet is a living being, but 
that what we see as a planet is a contrived representation of vast set of 
experience on a completely different scale than humans can directly 
interact with. Just as a human brain reveals no clue as to the particular 
feelings and memories of the person who is associated with it, all 
experiences associated with Earth are represented by the Earth itself. My 
panexperientialism is about all phenomena which appear to us as public 
bodies being tokens of the underlying reality, which is not matter, not 
computation, but an eternity of interwoven experiences and meta-experiences.
 

 I do not see how that is a criticism. Seems to be a fact of nature.


Seems is the key word. Of course nature seems to contain a universe of 
unconscious matter to us, because that perceptual relativity is what allows 
us to develop our own rich perceptual inertial frame (niche or umwelt). 
Just as the mites that live in our eyelids have no possible sense of the 
actions which exist on our level, we have no opportunity to view the 
universe from a non-human vantage point - where millions of years pass in 
seconds and solar systems bounce off of each other like spinning tops.
 

 4.I cannot run the other way with my model. That's your model


The truth of nature belongs to everyone, not just me. All that it takes for 
you to be able to run the model my way is some curiosity, bravery, and 
humility.

Craig
 



 On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 5:01 PM, Craig Weinberg 
 whats...@gmail.comjavascript:
  wrote:



 On Wednesday, April 3, 2013 3:10:29 PM UTC-4, yanniru wrote:

 I am a leftist astigmatic.

 But you raise an interesting point that I believe supports a mind/brain 
 duality.
 In a universe of functionalism or comp, I would expect that this would 
 never happen, as my brain should always prioritize the information made 
 available by any eye that is open over that of an eye which is closed. I 
 agree.
  
 However, in a mind/brain dualism, the mind may be due to comp and the 
 brain  due to evolution of physical biological organisms, influenced by the 
 mind comp but not controlled by the mind comp. (However, below the 
 substitution level the universal mind comp controls all particle 
 interactions and such a duality does not exist.) So in a mind/brain 
 duality, the prioritization you mention cannot exist if it has not 
 physically evolved.

 In my model, all physical particles and energy are created by comp in 
 the big bang and are conserved thereafter, subject to the laws and 
 constants of nature that also come from comp. Consciousness is a property 
 of the universal mind and also manifests in biological organisms as a mind 
 consciousness when the complexity of the organism exceeds the 10^120 bit 
 comp 
 power limit derived from the Bekenstein bound of the universe.


 My view is similar to what you describe as far as mind-brain dualism 
 proscribing a different evolution of the agendas of mind and the 
 consequences of brain conditions. I think that in a complex organism there 
 is feedback on multiple levels - the mind and brain influence each other 
 constantly, and, in my view, are as the head and tail of the Ouroboros 
 serpent - opposite ends of the same unbroken continuum. 

 The problem that I have with what you propose, as I understand it is 
 twofold:

 The presentation problem. If the universal mind is comp, why does the 
 universe have any aesthetic content at all? Why does comp create formal 
 localizations as a physical phenomenon when it could use the digital 
 localizations that it already consists of. 

 The de-presentation problem. What would be the point of physical 
 particles and energy being created by comp if there could be nothing able 
 to detect them until some organism exceeds the 10^120 bit comp power limit? 
 You are looking at a universe which is almost 

Re: Astigmatism Example

2013-04-03 Thread Craig Weinberg


On Wednesday, April 3, 2013 5:53:40 PM UTC-4, jessem wrote:



 On Wed, Apr 3, 2013 at 2:42 PM, Craig Weinberg 
 whats...@gmail.comjavascript:
  wrote:


 In a universe of functionalism or comp, I would expect that this would 
 never happen, as my brain should always prioritize the information made 
 available by any eye that is open over that of an eye which is closed.


 I don't think the function in functionalism is supposed to refer to 
 utility or purpose. Functionalism as I understand it just refers to the 
 idea that if you replaced each part of the brain with a functionally 
 identical part, meaning that its input/output relationship is the same as 
 the original part, then this will result in no change in conscious 
 experience, regardless of the material details of how the part produces 
 this input/output relation (a miniature version of the Chinese room 
 thought experiment could work, for example). 


Right, but in the nervous system, the input/output relationship is the 
same as utility or purpose. Think of it this way. If I make a cymatic 
pattern in some sand spread out on top of a drum head by vibrating it with 
a certain frequency of sound, then functionalism says that whatever I do to 
make that pattern must equal a sound. We know that isn't true though. I 
could make that cymatic pattern simply by making a mold of it and filling 
that mold with sand. I could stamp out necklaces with miniature versions of 
that pattern in bronze. I could design a device which records the motion of 
the sand as the pattern forms optically and then reproduces the same motion 
and the same pattern in some other medium, like a TV screen. All of these 
methods reproduce the input/output relationship which creates the 
pattern, yet none of them involve carrying over the sound which I initially 
used to make the pattern.

It's a little different because we can change our conscious experience by 
changing the pattern of our brain activity, and that activity can be 
changed in the same way by different means, so that functionalist 
assumptions can be used legitimately to understand brain physiology - but - 
that does not mean that the functionalist assumptions automatically tell 
the whole story. If they did, then we would not need subjective reports to 
correlate with brain activity, we would be able to simply detect subjective 
qualities as functions, which of course we cannot do in any way. Just as 
there is more than one way to make a pattern in sand, there is more than 
one expression of any given experience. On one level it is hundreds of 
billions of molecules reconfiguring each other, and on another is a single 
experience which contains within it a billion times that number of 
experiences on different levels.

It's also self-evident that there should be no behavioral change, *if* we 
 assume the reductionist idea that the large-scale behavior of any physical 
 system is determined by the rules governing the behavior and interactions 
 of each of its component parts (you would probably dispute this, but the 
 point is just that this seems to be one of the assumptions of 
 'functionalism', and of course almost all modern scientific theories of 
 systems composed of multiple parts work with this assumption).


Look at how freeway traffic works. We can statistically analyze the 
positions and actions of the cars and with a few simple rules, predict a 
model of general traffic flow. Such a model is very effective for 
predicting and controlling traffic, but it does not have access to the 
meaning of the traffic - which is in fact the narrative agendas of each 
individual driver trying to leave one location and get to another. That is 
the reason the traffic exists; because drivers are using vehicles to 
realize their motives. We could model traffic instead as a torrent of 
automotive particles, which attract drivers inside of them automatically 
through a wave like field which happens to be synchronized with rush hour 
and lunch hour, and our model would not be incorrect in its predictions, 
but of course, it would lead us to a completely false conclusion about the 
nature of cars.
 


 For example, if you have a tumor which is altering your consciousness and 
 disrupting some other abilities like speech, that is obviously not serving 
 any useful function, but functionalism wouldn't claim it should, it would 
 just say that if you replaced the tumor with an artificial device that 
 affected the surrounding neurons in exactly the same way, the affected 
 patient wouldn't notice any subjective difference (likewise with more 
 useful parts of the brain, of course).

 There may of course be different meanings that philosophers have assigned 
 to the term functionalism, but I think this is one, and I'm pretty sure 
 it's part of what COMP is taken to mean on this list.


Point taken. I was referring more to the 'ontological implications of 
functionalism' rather than functionalism itself. It's important to